Proposed Modifications to Capacity Market Rules

MRC 4/26/2023 IMM



Proposed Modifications

- LS proposal re penalty rate:
 - Reduce penalty rate to 0.5 * existing penalty rate (Net CONE/30)
 - Stop loss = 2.0 * BRA clearing price.
- LS proposal re PAI trigger:
 - Emergency not triggered by DR
 - Reserve shortage
- AMP proposal re PAI trigger:
 - Reduce penalty rate to BRA clearing price (Price/30)
 - Stop loss = 1.5 * BRA clearing price





Purpose of LS Modifications

- LS asserts a disconnect between MSOC based on net ACR and penalty rate
- LS asserts that MSOC suppressed because CPQR was too low
- LS asserts the result was lower BRA prices



IMM Response to LS

- FERC decision to correct the MSOC to net ACR was appropriate.
- CPQR levels were appropriate.
- The MSOC did not suppress BRA clearing prices.
- A significant proportion of offers were below MSOCs.
- LS ignores the supply and demand fundamentals that resulted in competitive clearing prices
- LS ignores other market changes including MOPR rules, shift from coal to renewables and gas, EE offers.
- LS proposal does not meet definition of a quick fix. **Monitoring Analytics**

IMM Proposal

- The IMM agrees that current penalty rates are excessive because they are defined by Net CONE.
- The solution is not to just multiply Net CONE by 0.5.
- The solution is to break the link between the penalty rate and Net CONE.
- The goal should be to link the penalty rate to BRA market clearing prices.
- There is no fixed relationship between Net CONE and BRA market clearing prices.
- Continued use of Net CONE as LS proposes is likely to have unintended consequences.



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IMM Proposal

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- Penalty rate = (BRA clearing price/30 PAH)
- Stop loss = 2 * BRA market revenue
- PAI triggered only when two conditions both met:
 - Regional emergency declaration by PJM
 - PJM is short primary reserves

Next BRA: 2025/2026

- The approach adopted in this process could also apply to the BRA for 2025/2026.
- This would permit the BRA for 2025/2026 to be run in the summer of 2023 rather than being on indefinite hold until an entirely new design is approved by FERC.





Examples

- Examples of the impact of LS, AMP and IMM proposals on penalties and stop loss calculations.
 - For a range of clearing prices.



Example: \$30/MW-Day Capacity Price

	PJM PAI penalty rate	Existing	.5 * Existing	Market Price	
		Existing	.5 Existing	MarketThee	
	Penalty Rate (\$/MW-day)	\$254.80	\$127.40	\$30.00	
	Total (\$/MW-year)	\$93,002			
	30 hours	30			
	Hourly rate (\$/MWh)	\$3,100.07			
		<i>\$</i> 3,100.07	Ŷ1,330.03	2505.00	
	Intervals (Elliott)	277	7 277	277	
	Hours (Eliott)	23.08			
		23.00	25.00	25.00	
	Max Elliott exposure per MW-year	\$71,560	\$35,780	\$8,425	
	500 MW: penalty max	\$35,779,936			
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	Stop Loss	(1.5 * Net CONE)	(2 * Mkt Price)	(2 * Mkt Price)	
	Stop Loss Price (\$/MW-day)	\$254.80	\$30.00	\$30.00	
	Stop loss (\$/MW-day)	\$382.20	\$60.00	\$60.00	
	Per year (\$/MW-year))	\$139,503	\$21,900	\$21,900	
	500 MW (\$ per year)	\$69,751,500	\$10,950,000	\$10,950,000	
	Max Elliott share of stop loss	51.30%	6 163.38%	38.47%	
	Capacity market revenue				
	\$/MW-day	\$30) \$30	\$30	
	500 MW annual revenue	\$5,475,000	\$5,475,000	\$5,475,000	
	Share of capacity market revenue	653.51%	ő <u>326.76</u> %	76.94%	
	Adjusted by B	0.85	5 0.85	0.85	
	Share of capacity market revenue	555.49%	6 277.74%	65.40%	
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Example: \$50/MW-Day Capacity Price

	PJM PAI penalty rate	Existing	.5 * Existing	Market Price	
	Penalty Rate (\$/MW-day)	\$254.8	0 \$127.40	\$50.00	
	Total (\$/MW-year)	\$93,00	2 \$46,501	\$18,250	
	30 hours	30	0 30	30	
	Hourly rate (\$/MWh)	\$3,100.0	7 \$1,550.03	\$608.33	
	Intervals (Elliott)	27	7 277	277	
	Hours (Eliott)	23.0	8 23.08	23.08	
	Max Elliott exposure per MW-year	\$71,56	0 \$35,780	\$14,042	
	500 MW: penalty max	\$35,779,93			
	Stop Loss	(1.5 * Net CONE)	(2 * Mkt Price)	(2 * Mkt Price)	
	Stop Loss Price (\$/MW-day)	\$254.8	0 \$50.00	\$50.00	
	Stop loss (\$/MW-day)	\$382.20	0 \$100.00	\$100.00	
	Per year (\$/MW-year))	\$139,50	3 \$36,500	\$36,500	
	500 MW (\$ per year)	\$69,751,50	0 \$18,250,000	\$18,250,000	
	Max Elliott share of stop loss	51.30%	6 98.03%	38.47%	
	Capacity market revenue				
	\$/MW-day	\$50	0 \$50	\$50	
	500 MW annual revenue	\$9,125,00	0 \$9,125,000	\$9,125,000	
	Share of capacity market revenue	392.11%	6 196.05%	76.94%	
	Adjusted by B	0.8	5 0.85	0.85	
	Share of capacity market revenue	333.29%	6 166.65%	65.40%	
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Example: \$100/MW-Day Capacity Price

	PJM PAI penalty rate	Existing	.5 * Ex	isting	Market Price	e	
		40-1					
	Penalty Rate (\$/MW-day)	\$254		\$127.40		0.00	
	Total (\$/MW-year)	\$93,0	002	\$46,501		,500	
	30 hours		30	30		30	
	Hourly rate (\$/MWh)	\$3,100	.07 .	\$1,550.03	\$1,21	6.67	
	Intervals (Elliott)		277	277		277	
	Hours (Eliott)	23	.08	23.08	2	3.08	
	Max Elliott exposure per MW-year	\$71,	560	\$35,780	\$28	,085	
	500 MW: penalty max	\$35,779,9		7,889,968	\$14,042	,361	
	Stop Loss	(1.5 * Net CON	IE) (2 * M	kt Price)	(2 * Mkt Pric	ce)	
	Stop Loss Price (\$/MW-day)	\$254	.80	\$100.00	\$10	0.00	
	Stop loss (\$/MW-day)	\$382	.20	\$200.00	\$20	0.00	
	Per year (\$/MW-year))	\$139,	503	\$73,000	\$73	,000	
	500 MW (\$ per year)	\$69,751,	500 \$3	6,500,000	\$36,500	,000	
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	Max Elliott share of stop loss	51.3	0%	49.01%	38.	47%	
	Capacity market revenue						
	\$/MW-day	¢.	100	\$100	ć	5100	
	500 MW annual revenue	\$18,250,0		8,250,000			
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	Share of capacity market revenue	196.0	5%	98.03%	76.	94%	
	Adjusted by B	C	.85	0.85		0.85	
	Share of capacity market revenue	166.6	5%	83.32%		40%	
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Example: \$200/MW-Day Capacity Price

	PJM PAI penalty rate	Existing	.5 * Existing	Market Price	
	Penalty Rate (\$/MW-day)	\$254.8	\$127.40	\$200.00	
	Total (\$/MW-year)	\$93,00			
	30 hours		30 30		
	Hourly rate (\$/MWh)	\$3,100.0			
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	Intervals (Elliott)	27	7 277	277	
	Hours (Eliott)	23.0			
	Hours (Ellott)	25.0	16 25.00	23.08	
	May Elliptt overseurs por MM/ year	671 FC	o ćar 700	¢FC 100	
	Max Elliott exposure per MW-year	\$71,56			
	500 MW: penalty max	\$35,779,93	\$6 \$17,889,968	\$\$\$,084,722	
	Stop Loss) (2 * Mkt Price)		
	Stop Loss Price (\$/MW-day)	\$254.8			
	Stop loss (\$/MW-day)	\$382.2	\$400.00	\$400.00	
	Per year (\$/MW-year))	\$139,50	3 \$146,000	\$146,000	
	500 MW (\$ per year)	\$69,751,50	0 \$73,000,000	\$73,000,000	
	Max Elliott share of stop loss	51.30	% 24.51%	38.47%	
	Capacity market revenue				
	\$/MW-day	\$20	0 \$200	\$200	
	500 MW annual revenue	\$36,500,00	90 \$36,500,000	\$36,500,000	
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	Share of capacity market revenue	98.03	% 49.01%	76.94%	
	Adjusted by B	0.8	.85 0.85	0.85	
	Share of capacity market revenue	83.32	% 41.66%	65.40%	
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