MIC October 7, 2020

IMM



Background

- Parameter Limited Schedules were implemented to prevent exercise of market power by using inflexible parameters.
 - Inflexible parameters can be used to withhold capacity, e.g., long minimum run time, long time to start, long minimum down time etc.
 - Inflexible parameters can be used to extract uplift payments, e.g., high economic minimum MW, long minimum run time.
- Parameter limits apply to cost-based and price-based PLS schedules.

Parameter Limited Schedules

- Parameter limited schedules can be used by PJM during high load conditions when hot and cold weather alerts or maximum emergency generation alerts are declared.
- Cost-based offers, that are parameter limited, can be used by PJM when a market seller fails the TPS test for local market power.

Parameter Limits

- The parameter limit values are unit specific.
- The PJM tariff defines a process to obtain exceptions to unit specific parameter limits for physical reasons.
- Exceptions that are supported with documentation allow resources to be made whole when they operate under the exception to the parameter limit.

- Real-Time Values (RTVs) are not defined in the tariff.
- RTVs allow resources to communicate less flexible parameters to PJM.
 - A unit has lower turn down ratio for testing.
 - A unit has lower turn down ratio due to a derate.
- If a unit is committed with inflexible parameter limits due to an RTV, the unit forgoes any uplift, unless it is supported with evidence of a physical reason, or in the case of a gas pipeline issue, a contractual reason.

- Real-Time Values are increasingly used to avoid adhering to unit specific limits, for economic reasons.
 - Not staffing a unit to increase time to start
 - Not procuring flexible fuel supply
- Real-Time Values weaken the parameter limited schedule rules because they do not have the same tariff defined process and standards as exceptions.

- The use of RTVs to extend startup times, notification times, minimum run time and minimum down time allows generators to circumvent the PLS rules, to avoid commitment by PJM.
- Using RTVs to remove a unit from the real-time lookahead dispatch window, and to avoid commitment, is withholding.
- For example, a unit with an approved 30 minute start time overrides the parameter with a 3 hour RTV.
 - IT SCED can only commit resources with a time to start of two hours or less.

- A resource that is staffed or has remote start capability and offers according to its physical capability, and a resource that makes the economic choice not to staff or invest in remote start and offers to decrease the likelihood of commitment, are paid the same in the capacity market.
- The resource that is staffed or has remote start capability has more performance risk because it is more likely to be committed.

- PJM proposal undermines the market power protections of the PLS rules.
- PJM proposal allows RTVs with no justification or consequence. It will make the parameter limited schedule rules irrelevant.
 - Unit specific parameter limits will be optional.
- PJM proposal explicitly allows units to bypass parameter limits on days without weather alerts or maximum emergency alerts.
 - On days with alerts, there is no defined consequence.

- PJM proposal includes a proposed remedy: "PJM has the option to refer the Market Seller to the FERC"
- Referrals to FERC are not a substitute for good market rules.
- Referrals have limited significance if there is not an identified rule.
- The IMM has general referral authority defined in the tariff.

IMM Proposal

- Creates a penalty structure to provide incentives for accurate parameter values.
- Goal is to prevent generators from bypassing the PLS rules through the use of RTVs.
- Maintains the protections from exercise of market power with the current PLS rules.
- Creates a level playing field to ensure resources that do invest in staffing or remote start are not disadvantaged.
- Ensures resources that do not invest in staffing or remote start are not paid the same capacity price as resources that do.

 Forfeit a proportion of daily capacity revenues for use of RTVs.

RTV Penalty
$$= \frac{BRA \ Price \times Committed \ UCAP \times Penalty \ Intervals}{288}$$

where

Penalty Intervals

 $= max(Min\ Run\ Time \times A, Economic\ Intervals)$

 A = 0 when unit is either unavailable or online for all 24 hours, otherwise A = 1.

- Economic Intervals = number of intervals during the day in which:
 - 1. the unit submitted an RTV less flexible than its PLS and
 - 2. the unit was available and offline and
 - 3. the unit's lowest offer at Eco Min is equal to or less than the RT LMP (LMP test)
- No penalty for use of RTVs for reflecting reduced turn down ratios for testing, or to reflect derates from outage tickets.

- Clearly defined, transparent formula for using RTVs to deviate from unit specific limits.
- Ensures that resources that use RTVs to deviate from unit specific limits understand that they do not receive uplift and pay a penalty.
- Rules are transparent and known ahead of time.
 - Rules use capacity prices, known ahead of time, not real time LMPs.
- Closes the current loophole with using RTVs to withhold generation.

- Tied to capacity revenues.
 - Resources without a capacity commitment, that do not have a must offer obligation in the energy market, do not face penalty for choosing to operate inflexibly.
- Resources that operate according to unit specific limits and tariff defined exceptions do not face penalties.
- Resources that operate inflexibly are not paid the same as resources that invest in flexibility.
- Maintains the PLS requirements to ensure they work as intended.

Misrepresented Parameter Values

- Resources that misrepresent parameter limits present a reliability risk to PJM operators.
- PJM markets rely on accurate information.
- FERC Market Behavior Rules (CFR § 35.41) require market sellers to provide accurate information to RTOs.
- Resources that misrepresent their parameter values are in violation of the market behavior rules.

IMM Proposal for Misrepresented Parameters

Penalty for misrepresenting parameters:

$$365 \times \left(\frac{2 \times BRA\ Price \times Committed\ UCAP \times Penalty\ Intervals}{288}\right)$$

- To ensure that market sellers that misrepresent parameters face substantial risk.
- Flat fee for resources without capacity commitment
 - Can submit RTVs with accurate parameters without penalties.

IMM Proposal

- Removes minimum run time from the list of eligible parameters with RTV submissions.
 - Units that choose to run longer can self schedule beyond the minimum run time, with PJM operator notification.
 - Prevents withholding using longer minimum run time.
- Any penalties collected to be allocated to daily realtime load.
- Penalties will be highest of RTV penalty, penalty for misrepresenting parameters, CP PAI penalties, and capacity deficiency charges.

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