

IMM Reserve Market Proposal

MRC

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Consolidated Synchronized Reserve Market

- **PJM and IMM share most aspects of the proposal to consolidate the synchronized reserve market.**
- **Strong must offer requirement enforced by PJM**
 - **IMM also includes must offer penalty**
- **Lower offer margin for cost-based reserve offers**
 - **IMM eliminates the offer margin altogether**
- **Penalties for nonperformance during reserve events**
 - **IMM penalty is stronger than status quo PJM penalty**

IMM ORDC Proposal

- **Simple ORDC: vertical demand with penalty factor**
 - Consistent with precedent of other RTOs
 - Used for both synchronized and primary reserve
- **No sloped curve, no extension beyond MRR**
- **Identical curves in day ahead market**
- **Max price equal to energy offer cap**
 - \$1,000 per MWh, unless PJM has approved a higher cost-based offer, per FERC rules
 - Increases at \$250 per MWh increments with higher approved cost-based offers, up to \$2,000 per MWh

Operator Actions


- **Operators may increase the minimum reserve requirements under predefined conditions.**
 - **Change in the largest contingency (Synch., Primary)**
 - **Extreme weather (Synchronized, Primary)**
 - **Gas contingencies (Secondary)**
- **The increased requirements will have defined start and end times.**
- **PJM will post on its website:**
 - **The active minimum reserve requirements**
 - **The reason for any increased reserve requirements**
 - **The beginning and end times for the increased reserve requirements**

Secondary (30 Minute) Reserves

- **Eliminate Day Ahead Schedule Reserves**
- **Default requirement is zero**
 - **Consistent with no NERC requirement**
- **Secondary reserves may be created with an ORDC based on a PJM defined contingency**
 - **such as a gas contingency**
 - **defined under the operator actions provisions for increasing a minimum reserve requirement**
- **Penalty factor is \$1,000 to \$2,000 per MWh, as with synchronized and primary reserves.**

IMM Proposed Default ORDCs

Reserve Price (\$ per MW)




- Secondary
- Primary
- Synchronized



IMM Proposed ORDCs

with Approved Cost Offer of \$1,100 per MWh and Defined Gas Pipeline Contingency



Reserve Subzones

- **Additive reserve prices across products and zones, without a cap**
- **The IMM recommends multiple subzones, but PJM says it cannot model multiple subzones.**
- **The IMM proposal includes only one subzone.**
- **If PJM cannot model multiple subzones, it should not use a subzone for secondary reserves.**
 - **Secondary reserves only RTO wide**

Demand Response

- **Demand Response should participate under the same rules as generators.**
 - **Cost-based market**
 - **Must offer requirement for all cleared capacity (including pre-emergency and emergency DR)**
- **The current maximum DR strike price was designed to exceed the scarcity penalty factor. Instead of raising the penalty factor, the strike price should be removed.**

Scarcity Revenue True Up Mechanism

- IMM proposed true up mechanism returns energy market scarcity rents to customers during the four transition years.
- The true up mechanism continues until adequate capacity market changes
 - VRR curve capped at Net CONE
 - Forward looking E&AS offset
- True up delivery year capacity payments by scarcity rents calculated for the reference CT using actual delivery year energy prices to determine the accurate E&AS offset.

Settlement Rule Preventing Double Payment

- The IMM proposes a new settlement rule that a resource cannot receive payment for reserve MW in excess of its applicable economic maximum output limit for the dispatch interval.
- Pay the full value for metered energy produced, but would cap the settlement of reserve MW so that payment does not exceed the resource's stated capability.

$$\textit{Metered Energy MW} + \textit{Reserve MW} \leq \textit{Eco.Max.}$$

One Energy and Reserves Uplift Payment

- **Market incentives do not require a five minute negative balancing reserve uplift payment.**
- **The IMM proposes one daily uplift calculation that prevents resources that follow dispatch from operating at a loss without creating overcompensation.**
- **The calculation should include costs and revenues in all short term markets (energy, regulation, reserves).**
- **Incorporating reserves in the existing Balancing Operating Reserve Credit accomplishes this.**

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