PLS Implementation Background Documents

The Independent Market Monitor for PJM

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June 2005 MMU RMWG Operating Reserves Presentation

OPERATING RESERVES
PJM Market Monitoring Unit

Reserve Markets Working Group

June 23, 2005

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Market Mitigation

- Local Market Power Mitigation Rules
  - When a unit is frequently taken for Operating Reserves (or other non-TX reason) and there is a market power concern, should they be Cost-Capped.
- Resources Parameters Steam vs CTs

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- Current Rule
  - Resources needed to relieve Transmission Constraints (Exempt Post 1996 Units): Possible market power concern
  - Resources that are frequently taken for Operating Reserves (or other non –TX reason): Possible market power concern
- Desired Outcome
  - Limit amount of Operating Reserve Credits for units that have a high Mark Up
- Proposed Changes
  - Operating Reserves payments capped at cost

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Local Market Power - Current

Day 1 | Day 2

Energy Market

Price $80 | Cost $50 | Price $100 | Cost $50



Operating Reserves

Price $80 | Cost $50 | Price $100 | Cost $50

Explanation:

- Unit picked up for Operating Reserves in Day 1
- Day 1 Operating Reserve Mark Up=($80-50)/$50=3/5=0.6

- Unit expects being picked up for Operating Reserves in Day 2
- Day 2 Operating Reserve Mark Up = ($100-$50)/$50=1

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Local Market Power - Proposed



Explanation:

- Unit picked up for Operating Reserves in Day 1
- Day 1 Operating Reserve Mark Up=($80-50)/$50=3/5=0.6

- Unit expects being picked up for Operating Reserves in Day 2
- Day 2 Operating Reserve Mark Up = ($50-$50)/$50=0
- It will get paid $100 in the Energy Market
- It will be cost capped in Operating Reserves
- It will occur in repeatedly occurred days (repeatedly will be defined by threshold of days).

-Example of repeatedly occurred days:

  - It was picked up for 3 consecutive days for Operating Reserves
  - It was needed by PJM for the next 3 days for Operating Reserves
  - It raised its Mark Up on day 4 (the fourth consecutive day)
  - It will be cost capped in days 4 through 6 in terms of Operating Reserves.

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- Current Rule
  - Manipulation of unit parameters: Possible market power concern
- Desired Outcome
  - Eliminate manipulation of parameters that effect PJM operations and Operating Reserves
- Proposed Changes
  - To limit Minimum Run time, Minimum Down time, and Notification time to type specific technical parameters

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Generation Type Specific Technical Parameters:
Min Run Time = 3 Hours ; Min Down Time = 5 hours;
Notification Time =1 Hour; Start Up Time = 1 Hour;

Day 1

Unit picked up for Operating Reserves

- Min Run time = 3 hours
- Min Down time = 10 hours
- Notification Time = 1 hour
- Start Up Time = 1 hour

Day 2

Unit expects being picked up for Operating Reserves

- Min Run time = 20 hours
- Min Down time = 14 hours
- Notification Time = 1 hour
- Start Up Time = 1 hour

Explanation:

- System conditions look the same for Day 1 and Day 2
- Unit keeps the same price and cost, but changes parameters
- Unit needed by PJM for Day 2
- Scenario 1: PJM will not pick this unit because of the Min Run Time and commits more expensive resources, driving prices higher
- Scenario 2: PJM will pick up this unit and it will pay high Operating Reserve Credits that are not justified

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Resources Parameters - Proposed

Generation Type Specific Technical Parameters:
Min Run Time = 3 Hours ; Min Down Time = 5 hours;
Notification Time =1 Hour; Start Up Time = 1 Hour;

Day 1

Unit picked up for Operating Reserves

- Min Run time = 3 hours
- Min Down time = 5 hours
- Notification Time = 1 hour
- Start Up Time = 1 hour

Day 2

Unit expects being picked up for Operating Reserves

- Min Run time = 3 hours
- Min Down time = 5 hours
- Notification Time = 1 hour
- Start Up Time = 1 hour

Explanation:

- Keep unit parameters to their technical specifications on a regular basis
- Notification of PJM in instances of parameters change

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June 2007 MIC RMWG Proposal Material (Presentation and Proposed Rules)

Segmented Make-Whole Payments

Below is a suggested list of business rules to segment Make-Whole Payments as a function of the greater of the Day-Ahead Schedule, or Minimum Run Time. *Revision is expected to be required to OATT sections 1.10.1A (d), 1.10.2 (b) and 3.2.3 (b) and PJM M-28, <u>PJM Operating Agreement Accounting</u>*

1. For an entire calendar day, a resource will be made whole for the duration of the greater of the Day-Ahead Schedule or Minimum Run Time(Minimum Down Time for demand resources) and made whole separately for the block of hours it is operated at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of the Day-Ahead Schedule or Minimum Run Time (Minimum Down Time for demand resources).

2. During an entire calendar day, and for each synchronized start or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments per day, per unit,. Segment 1 will be the greater of the Day-Ahead schedule and Minimum Run Time (Minimum Down Time for demand resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the calendar day when the unit is running.

3. A segment cannot be "carried over" into the next calendar day. Any individual segment will have an end hour at midnight.

4. Startup costs (shut down costs for demand resources) and no-load costs as applicable will be included in the segment represented by the longer of the Day-Ahead Schedule or Minimum Run Time (Minimum Down Time for demand resources).

5. Regulation Market and Synchronized Reserve Market (with the exception of Condensing CTs) revenue will be applied against balancing credits along the segments that correspond to the appropriate hour that the revenue was earned. For Condensing CTs, Synchronized Reserve Market revenue will be applied against balancing credits earned during a single period of operation, where a period of operation is defined as contiguous hours of condensing and generation operation.

Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules

Below is the suggested list of business rules to require units to submit schedules that meet minimum accepted parameters. *Revision is expected to be required to OATT section 6.4 and PJM Manuals M-11, <u>Scheduling Operations;</u> M-15, <u>Cost Development Task Force Guidelines;</u> and M-28, <u>PJM Operating Agreement Accounting</u>*

6. Pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters for all generation resources, both exempt and non-exempt, will define limits on generation resources' non-price offer parameters under the following circumstances:

    i. If the three pivotal supplier test for the operating reserve market defined by transmission constraint(s) is failed, generation resources, both exempt and non-exempt, will be committed on their Parameter-Limited Schedule.

- For exempt units, the Parameter-Limited Schedule will be used with the existing price offer for the day such that the price components of the offer may not change as a result;
- For exempt and non-exempt units, the Parameter-Limited Schedule shall be the less limiting of the defined Parameter-Limited Schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

ii. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all or any part of such Operating Day, generation resources, both exempt and non-exempt, will be committed on their Parameter-Limited Schedule.

7. On an annual basis, PJM will define a list of minimum acceptable operating parameters, based on an analysis of historically submitted offers, for each unit class for the following parameters[1]:
   - Turn Down Ratio
   - Minimum Down Time
   - Minimum Run Time
   - Maximum Daily Starts
   - Maximum Weekly Starts

8. The following parameters[2] will be reviewed on an ongoing basis, via a stakeholder process, and may, at some future date, define limitations for:
   - Hot Start Notification Time
   - Warm Start Notification Time
   - Cold Start Notification Time

9. The operating parameters for each unit class must meet the historically based criteria listed in the rules below. The operating parameter limits will remain in place unless an exception is filed and approved (see rules 22 through 29 below).

10. Turn Down Ratio is defined as the ratio of economic maximum MW to economic minimum MW.

11. The minimum acceptable Turn Down Ratio applicable to an individual unit will be the greater of:

    a) the difference between the minimum of the economic minima and the maximum of the economic maxima submitted over the prior 24 months, or
    b) 90 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio.

[1] As defined in the PJM Manuals and Markets Database Dictionary.

[2] As defined in the PJM Manuals and Markets Database Dictionary.

12. If the resulting unit Turn Down Ratio is less than 90 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio, then the unit's Turn Down Ratio will be set equal to 90 percent of PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio.

13. For CTs, the Turn Down Ratio will assumed to be 1.0.

14. The submitted Minimum Run Time may not exceed the defined Minimum Run Time for the PJM-defined unit class.

15. The initial Minimum Down Time for each unit is based on the minimum of the Minimum Down Times submitted over the prior 24 months, if the resultant minimum down time is less than or equal to 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time.

16. If Minimum Down Time submitted for a unit is more than 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time, then the unit's Minimum Down Time will be set equal to 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time.

17. The initial Maximum Starts per Week for a unit will be based on the posted level for the PJM-defined unit class.

18. If the Maximum Starts Per Week submitted for a unit is less than the PJM-defined unit class maximum starts per week, then the unit's Maximum Starts per Week will be set equal to the PJM-defined unit class posted Maximum Starts per Week.

19. The Maximum Starts Per day will be based on the PJM-defined unit class for non-CT units. For CT units, the minimum value of maximum starts per day will be 2.

20. If the number of Maximum Daily Starts submitted by a unit is less than the PJM-defined unit class Starts per Day for a non-CT unit, or less than 2 for a CT, then the unit's Maximum Starts per Day will be set equal to the PJM-defined unit class Maximum Starts per Day for a non-CT unit and 2 for a CT.

21. Non-exempt generation resources will be required to submit an additional price schedule specifying the unit's predefined non-price parameter limits. This schedule will be identified as the unit's "parameter limited" schedule. The unit's cost-based schedule(s) to be used when the unit is offer-capped for transmission will also need to include the same parameters as the Parameter-Limited Schedule.

22. Exempt generation resources will be required to submit an additional schedule specifying the unit's predefined non-price parameter limits. This schedule will be identified as the unit's Parameter-Limited Schedule.

23. The MMU will post unit class specific parameter limits thirty (30) business days prior to the bi-annual enrollment periods for the submission of start-up and no-load costs. Period 1 is defined as the period of time beginning April 1 and ending September 30. Period 2 will be defined as the period of time beginning October 1 and ending March 31. Twenty (20) business days prior to each period, all generation suppliers that wish to submit a Parameter-Limited Schedule for units with physical operational limitations that prevent the units from meeting the minimum parameters may submit a

request for a new exception to ParametersExceptions@pjm.com for evaluation. Each generation supplier must supply the required historical unit operating data in support of the exception.

24. Physical operational limitations may include, but are not limited to, metallurgical restrictions due to age and long term degradation, physical design modifications performed as part of a life extension program, or environmental permit limitations under non-emergency conditions.

25. Each requested exception will indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the date on which the requested exception period will end. If physical conditions at the unit change such that the exception is no longer required, the generation supplier is obligated to inform PJM and the exception will be reviewed to determine if the exception continues to be appropriate.

26. PJM and the MMU will review the exception and provide the generation supplier with a decision within ten (10) business days. Should PJM require additional technical expertise in order to evaluate the exception request, PJM will engage the services of a consultant with the required expertise.] All Parameter-Limited Schedules must be submitted in eMKT seven days prior to the beginning of period 1 and period 2, defined as April 1 and October 1, respectively.

27. On a daily basis, each generation supplier may submit notification to PJM that changed physical operational limitations at the unit require a temporary exception to the unit's parameters. Each generation supplier must supply the required unit operating data in support of the exception.

28. Physical operational limitations may include, but are not limited to, short term equipment failures, short term fuel quality problems such as excessive moisture in coal fired units, or environmental permit limitations under non-emergency conditions.

29. For steam units, regardless of fuel type, the average historical values for any of the parameters as offered by the owners for the calendar year 2006 may be used in place of the values in the matrix.

30. For steam units, regardless of fuel type, the historical average is calculated from the market based offers for market based units and from cost-based offers for units which made only cost-based offers.

31. For combined cycle units,

    i. If the 2006 average historical market-based offer parameters are within the limits in the parameter matrix, the unit be limited to that 2006 historical average. If not then ii) applies;
    ii. If the unit was offered with market-based offer parameters for 10% or more of the days (36 days minimum) at a level at or more flexible than parameters in matrix, the unit will be limited at that level. If not the iii) applies
    iii. If the 2006 average historical market based offer parameters exceed the limits in the matrix (less flexible than the parameters in the matrix) then the unit will be limited to the level at which the market-based parameter was bid to the most flexible level for 10% or more of the days (36 days minimum) at that level.

32. Each generation supplier will provide a date on which the exception period will end. No daily exception may continue past the beginning of the next period. Such exceptions will be accepted, but will be

subject to after-the-fact review by PJM and the MMU. If physical conditions at the unit change such that the exception is no longer required, the generation supplier is obligated to inform PJM and the exception will be terminated.

33. If an exception request is denied by PJM in part or in full, the generation supplier may choose to dispute the decision via the Dispute Resolution Process as defined in the PJM Operating Agreement. While under dispute, the generation supplier will be required to submit parameter-limited schedules for the period as determined during the exception process.

34. Generation suppliers may indicate to PJM those units with the ability to operate on multiple fuels. Multiple-fuel units may submit a parameter-limited schedule associated with each fuel type. All Parameter-Limited Schedules must be submitted via eMKT seven days prior to the beginning of each period. The generation supplier will be required to indicate to PJM which of the parameter-limited schedules are available each day. Any exceptions required for any of the parameter-limited schedules submitted for multiple-fuel units will be required to be submitted and approved via the exception process.

35. Nuclear Units are excluded from eligibility for Operating Reserve payments except in cases where PJM requests that nuclear units reduces output at PJM's direction or where a physical problem at a nuclear unit requires a risk premium and that risk premium is submitted to and accepted by the MMU. Other specific circumstances will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by PJM and the MMU.

Ramp-limited RT Desired MW to determine deviations

Below is a suggested list of business rules to calculate a **Ramp-limited Desired MW value.** *Revision is expected to be required to OATT 3.2.3 (f) and PJM Manuals M-11, Scheduling Operations and M-28, PJM Operating Agreement Accounting.*

36. PJM will determine a unit's Ramp-Limited Desired MW according to the following calculation:

$$\text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \frac{(\text{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1})}{(\text{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

where the variables are:

- UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
- RL_Desired = Ramp limited desired MW

37. PJM will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

38. % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

39. A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled generator is considered to be "following dispatch" if its actual output is between its Ramp Limited Desired MW and UDS Basepoint, or its % off dispatch is <= 10] or it's hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated Ramp Limited Desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum.

40. A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum will be assessed deviations using |hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh|.

41. A unit that is dispatchable Day-Ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time will have deviations assessed using |hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW|.

42. Pool-schedule generators deemed to be "following dispatch" will not be assessed balancing operating reserve deviations.

43. Pool-scheduled generators that are deemed to be "not following dispatch" will be assessed operating reserve deviations based on |hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp Limited Desired MW|..

44. As a result of this revised calculation, PJM will not consider the "Eligible to set LMP" Flag when determining Balancing Operating Reserve eligibility.

45. PJM will calculate a Ramp Limited Desired MW value for units where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in Day-Ahead.
    - Real Time Economic Minimum <= 105% of Day-Ahead Economic Minimum or Day-Ahead Economic Minimum plus 5MW, whichever is greater.
    - Real Time Economic Maximum >= 95% Day-Ahead Economic Maximum or Day-Ahead Economic Maximum minus 5MW, whichever is lower.

46. If a unit's real-time economic minimum is greater than its Day Ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic m minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then deviations for the unit will be calculated as |hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh|.

47. UDS LMP Desired MWh is calculated by comparing the hourly integrated UDS LMP to the unit's bid curve to determine a corresponding MW value. This value is not ramp-limited.

48. If the unit is deemed "not following dispatch" and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, the deviation will be calculated as the |hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp Limited Des MW|. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW(whichever is greater) of Ramp Limited Desired MW, no deviations will be calculated.

49. If the unit is deemed to be "not following dispatch" and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, the unit's deviations will be calculated as |hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh|.

50. If a unit is deemed to be "not following dispatch" and has tripped, the deviation MW for the hour it tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its DA Schedule will be calculated as |hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh|.

51. Units that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Market will have operating reserve deviations based on the current comparison between |hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh|.

Supplier Netting

Below is a suggested list of business rules to allow Supplier Netting at the Bus to offset deviations. *Revision is expected to be required to OATT 3.2.3 (e) and PJM Manuals M-11, Scheduling Operations and M-28, PJM Operating Agreement Accounting.*

52. Generator deviations for units deemed to be "not following dispatch" that occur at a single bus will be able to offset one another.

53. A "single bus" will be any unit located at the same site and that has the identical electrical impacts on the transmission system.

54. Unit parameters do not have to be identical for the units' deviation MW to offset one another.

55. If multiple units are deemed to be "not following dispatch" at a single bus, the deviation MW and direction of each unit at that bus will be summed to determine the deviation MW at that bus.

56. Units at a "single bus" must be owned or marketed by single PJM Market Participant.

Netting Deviation Calculations

Below is a suggested list of business rules for Netting Deviation Calculations. *Revision is expected to be required to PJM OATT 3.2.3 (h) and M-28, PJM Operating Agreement Accounting.*

57. Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all Day-Ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the Real Time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

58. Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all Day-Ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the Real Time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

59. Generator deviations will be assessed on an individual unit basis, except as provided in Business Rules 49 - 53.

60. Deviations that occur within a single zone will be associated with a particular Region, and will be subject to the Regional Balancing Operating Reserve rate.

61. Deviations at interfaces and hubs can be associated with a particular region, if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located completed in the region and will be subject to the Regional Balancing Operating Reserve rate.

62. Demand and supply deviations will be based on total activity in a zone, including all aggregates within the same zone.

Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation

Below is a suggested list of business rules for Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation. *Revision is expected to be required to PJM OATT 3.2.3 (h) and M-28, PJM Operating Agreement Accounting.*

63. For the purposes of allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve charges, PJM will determine and identify the reasons for which operating reserve credits are earned. This determination will be conducted by PJM in two stages: 1) those resources called on during the Reliability Analysis and 2) those resources called on to operate during the operating day. The results of this determination will identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be allocated to Real-time deviations from Day-Ahead schedules and identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will should be allocated to real-time load share plus exports.

64. For units called on during Reliability Analysis (i.e. – called on by PJM between 1800 and 2400 hours the day preceding the operating day to operate the next day or to "run through" the midnight period) Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be allocated based on the reason for which the PJM operator logs the decision.

65. During the Reliability Analysis, if the PJM operator determines, through the commitment and dispatch algorithms utilized to complete the Reliability Analysis, that such units were committed to operate in real time in order to augment the physical units committed in the Day-Ahead Market to meet the forecasted real time load plus the operating reserve requirement, then any balancing operating reserve credits earned by those units would be allocated to deviations. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such units will be identified as "RA Credits for Deviations". PJM will the post the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet this criteria

66. During the Reliability Analysis, if the PJM operator determines that such units are being committed due to extenuating conditions that warrant conservative actions to ensure the maintenance of system reliability (i.e. – to provide reserves over and above the quantity determined by the real time load forecast), then any Balancing Operating Reserve credits earned by those units would be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such units will be identified as "RA Credits for Reliability". PJM will the post the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet this criteria

67. Units with Day-Ahead schedules that are identified in the Reliability Analysis and either required to start earlier in the operating day than the DA schedule or run longer in RT than their DA schedule will need to have the reason for such extension identified in the same manner as units committed in the RA. The Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be segmented and calculated separately.

68. During the Operating Day, Balancing Operating Reserve credits earned by units called on by PJM to operate during the operating day for which the LMP at the unit's bus does not meet or exceed the unit's applicable offer (cost or price) for at least four, 5-minute intervals of at least one clock hour during which the unit was running at PJM's direction will be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. . Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such units will be identified as "RT Credits for Reliability". PJM will the post the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet this criteria

69. During the Operating Day, Balancing Operating Reserve credits earned by all other units operated at PJM's direction in real time will be allocated according to deviations between Day-Ahead schedules and Real-Time quantities. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such units will be identified as "RT Credits for Deviations". PJM will the post the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet this criteria

70. Units called on to run in real time (i.e. – during the operating day) will be treated identically regardless of unit type. That is, regardless of whether a unit is identified as a "CT" or "Steam" unit, the same test regarding

whether the LMP exceeded the unit's applicable offer for the minimum number of intervals in at least one of its run hours will be conducted and any BOR credits earned by the unit allocated accordingly.

Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Charge Allocation

Below is a suggested list of business rules for calculating the Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Charge Allocation. *Revision is expected to be required to PJM OATT 3.2.3 (h) and M-28, PJM Operating Agreement Accounting.*

71. PJM will determine Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Rates for the following Operating Reserve Regions:

    - Western Region defined as transmission zones AEP, APS, COMED, DUQ, DAYTON
    - Eastern Region defined as transmission zones BGE, DOM, PENELEC, PEPCO, METED, PPL, , JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RECO

72. In each Region, PJM will collect the credits paid to generators for all identified transmission constraints that are less than or equal to 345kv. The total credits that are collected for each local transmission constraint will be allocated to all real-time deviations and real time load within that Region, to determine a Regional Adder rate for Reliability and a Regional Adder rate for Deviations. As determined in the Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation, Balancing Credits will be identified for either Reliability or Deviations and will be collected by Region.

73. The total balancing operating reserve credits that accrue in excess of the Regional Adder rates will be allocated to all real-time deviations and real-time load across the RTO to determine an RTO Balancing Operating Reserve Rate for Reliability and a RTO Balancing Operating Reserve Rate for Deviations. As determined in the Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation, Balancing Credits will be identified for either Reliability or Deviations and will be collected for the RTO.

74. Each Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Rate for Deviations and/or Reliability will be determined by summing the RTO Balancing Operating Reserve rate for Deviations and/or Reliability and the associated Regional Adder rate.

75. For regions that do not have Regional Adders, the Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Rate for Deviations and/or Reliability will equal the RTO Balancing Operating Reserve Rate for Deviations and/or Reliability.

Market Implementation Committee
Operating Reserves
Agenda Item #9

June 27, 2007

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- In 2005, the Market Implementation Committee (MIC) created the Reserve Markets Working Group (RMWG) to develop proposed modifications to the Operating Reserve mechanism.
- After a period of discussion and analysis, the Working Group identified a specific list of modifications that could be made to improve to the Operating Reserve mechanism.
- As per deadline of May 1, 2007 on the Reserve Markets Working Group (RMWG) Charter, a proposal for a package of Operating Reserve Changes was introduced at the MIC for consideration.
  - No endorsement vote was taken at the Working Group

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- To summarize the expected outcome of the proposed modifications, the modified Operating Reserve Business Rules are designed to:
  - Provide incentives for participants to bid their Day-ahead quantities as close as possible to what they expect in the Balancing Market, thereby leading to increased convergence between Day-Ahead and Real Time prices and increased market efficiency.
  - Provide incentive for generators to follow PJM dispatch instructions and provide flexibility, thus increasing market efficiency and system reliability; and
  - Collect the costs of balancing operating reserve and appropriately allocate and assign those costs to transactions in areas that contribute to the additional costs

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Package of Proposed BOR Changes

Proposed Business Rule Change	Impact	Description
Segmented Make-Whole Payments	Gen Credits	Segment Make-Whole Payments as a function of the greater of the DA Schedule, or Min Run Time
Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules	Gen Credits	Define operator objectives and the associated relevant market for solutions. Apply the defined market power test to the defined market. Apply market power mitigation rules only when the test indicates the potential to exercise market power.
Use Ramp-Limited Desired MW to determine deviations	Gen Deviations	PJM will determine whether a generator is following dispatch and calculate the deviation based on a new calculation incorporating ramp limited desired MW
Supplier Netting at the Bus (Plant)	Gen Deviations	Generators that deviate from RT dispatch may offset deviations by another generator at the same bus.
Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Allocation	Allocation	Allocate OR charges that were accrued for local constraints to the regions, creating "regional" rates for Balancing Operating Reserve charges.
Netting (by Zone, Interface, Hub)	Allocation	Demand bucket should be netted locationally by zone, hub, or interface. Supply bucket should be netted locationally by zone, hub, or interface.
Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation	Allocation	For the purposes of allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve charges, PJM will determine and identify the reasons for which operating reserve credits are earned. The results of this determination will identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be allocated to Real-time deviations from Day-Ahead schedules and identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will should be allocated to real-time load share plus export

Current Rule

– The total resource offer amount for generation, including startup and no-load costs as applicable, is compared to its total energy market value for an entire 24-hour period.

Desired Outcome

– Solidify incentive to follow PJM dispatch and continue operating when minimum run time has expired

Proposed Change

– Segment Make-Whole Payments as a function of the greater of the DA Schedule, or Min Run Time

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Current Rule

– Each generator may submit their operating parameters for individual units when participating in the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets.

Desired Outcome

– It has been recognized that there are issues that result from inconsistent treatment of submitted operating parameters during times of transmission constrained operations and/or maximum generation conditions. It has also been identified by the PJM Market Monitor that there exists potential of generation resources to exercise market power by altering operating parameters in order to increase operating reserves credits.

Proposed Solution

– During times of transmission constrained operations and/or maximum generation conditions, limit operating parameters via unit schedules to be consistent with operating parameters based on the market data for actual PJM market offers by unit class, where relevant.

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Use Ramp Limited Des MW Calculation for Deviations

Current Rule

- PJM calculates all generator balancing operating reserve deviations as (Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh)

Desired Outcome

- Create greater incentive for generators to follow PJM dispatch instruction

Proposed Changes

- PJM will determine whether a generator is following dispatch and calculate the deviation based on a new calculation incorporating ramp limited desired MW

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Current Rule

– PJM calculates all generator deviations individually. Deviations by one generator cannot offset deviations by another generator.

Desired Outcome

– Recognize that generator injections at the same bus are electrically equivalent as far as their impact on the system.

Proposed Changes

– Generators that deviate from RT dispatch may offset deviations by another generator at the same bus.

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Current Rule

– All balancing operating reserve credits are divided equally among all deviations (Supply Bucket, Demand Bucket, and Generator Bucket), to create a single Balancing Operating Reserve Rate across the PJM RTO.

Desired Outcome

– Recognize that some Balancing OR credits are accrued to manage local constraints

Proposed Change

– Allocate OR charges that were accrued for local constraints to the regions, creating "regional" rates for Balancing Operating Reserve charges.

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Current Rule

– Demand bucket is netted across the RTO, meaning that a negative deviation in one zone could be offset by a positive deviation another zone. Supply bucket is also netted across the RTO.

Desired Outcome

– Recognize that deviations at differing locations on the system can impact balancing operating reserve costs.

Proposed Change

– Demand bucket should be netted by zone, hub, or interface. Supply bucket should be netted by zone, hub, or interface.

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Current Rule

- Under the current Operating Reserve methodology, all Balancing OR Costs are allocated to deviations.

Desired Outcome

- Certain Balancing OR costs are incurred for reasons other than differences between Day-Ahead schedules and actual conditions. The desire is to recognize this split in cost causation and allocate the portion of Balancing OR incurred to maintain system reliability to the beneficiaries of those costs.

Proposed Solution

- For the purposes of allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve charges, PJM will determine and identify the reasons for which operating reserve credits are earned.
- This determination will be conducted by PJM in two stages:
  - 1) those resources called on during the Reliability Analysis and
  - 2) those resources called on to operate during the operating day.
- The results of this determination will identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be allocated to Real-time deviations from Day-Ahead schedules and identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will should be allocated to real-time load share plus exports.

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

PJM Comitted MWs Post Day Ahead vs. Daily Real Time
Operating Reserve Rate
Jan - Mar, 2007
MWs
Daily Real Time Rate
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Pool-Scheduled for Transmission Problems
Pool-Scheduled for Reliability
Units Chosen to Run-Thru for PJM
Balancing Rate

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
% CTs Dispatched with LMP>MC for 4 or More Intervals for at least 1 hour
the unit ran
Compared to Balancing Operating Reserve Rate
Jan - Mar, 2007 (Weekly)
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
%
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
$/MWH Deviation
1/2/2007
1/7/2007
1/14/2007
1/21/2007
1/28/2007
2/4/2007
2/11/2007
2/18/2007
2/25/2007
3/4/2007
3/11/2007
3/18/2007
3/25/2007
Weekly_Average_%
Weekly_Avg_RT_Operating Reserve Rate $/MWH

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% CTs Dispatched with LMP>MC for 4 or More Intervals for at least 1 hour the unit ran
Compared to # of CTs Dispatched
Jan - Mar , 2007 (Weekly)



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% CTs Dispatched with LMP>MC for 4 or More Intervals for at least 1 hour the unit ran
Compared to % of Dispatch MW
Jan - Mar, 2007 (Weekly)



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% Good CT Dispatch MW Compared to Total CT Dispatch MW
Weekly Average Data (Jan-Mar 2007)
UPDATED FROM MAY 23rd MEETING



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September 24, 2008

FILED
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
2008 SEP 25 A 10: 02
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Honorable Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20426-0001

Re: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER08-1569-000

Dear Secretary Bose:

Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000), and the Commission's Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 35 (2007), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM") hereby submits for filing the attached revisions to Schedule 1 ("Schedule 1") of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement"), as well as the parallel provisions of the Appendix to Attachment K of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("PJM Tariff"), concerning PJM's Operating Reserve mechanism.[1] PJM also submits revisions to correct non-substantive clerical items in the Operating Agreement for purposes of consistency, and revisions to the Table of Contents for the Operating Agreement. If approved by the Commission, the proposed revisions that are the subject of this filing will: (a) separately consider extended hours of operation when calculating a pool-scheduled resource's Operating Reserve credits; (b) limit under certain conditions the operating parameters that may be submitted for a unit to reduce the possibility that market power may be exerted to receive Operating Reserve credits; and (c) change how the costs of Balancing Operating Reserves are allocated to PJM Members. These proposed revisions were developed by the PJM stakeholders through the Reserve Markets Working Group and were endorsed by a majority of the PJM Members Committee. Accordingly, PJM files the proposed revised Operating Agreement and Tariff sheets as Attachment A (clean) and Attachment B (blacklined) and requests an effective date of December 1, 2008, sixty-seven (67) days post filing.

I. The Background

The PJM Market Implementation Committee ("MIC") created the Reserve Markets Working Group ("Working Group") to develop proposed modifications to the

[1] The referenced Operating Reserve provisions are found in Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the Appendix to Attachment K of the Tariff. All further references in this transmittal letter to referenced sections in Schedule 1 shall only be made to the Operating Agreement provisions, without reference to the parallel Tariff provisions. Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined herein have the meaning set forth in the Operating Agreement and Tariff.

Operating Reserve mechanism in 2005. This Working Group analyzed the relevant aspects of revisions proposed by stakeholders and met on numerous occasions throughout 2006 and 2007 to discuss those proposed revisions. After thoroughly vetting the issues, the members of the Working Group presented the resulting package of proposed changes to the Operating Reserves mechanism to the MIC in May 2007. The MIC endorsed the revisions on July 25, 2007. Thereafter, the proposed revisions were presented to the PJM Members Committee for endorsement at its November 15, 2007 meeting. An additional proposed revision was presented to the Members Committee at its meeting on June 26, 2008.

PJM delayed making the instant filing, the majority of the substance of which was originally approved by the PJM Members Committee on November 15, 2007, in order to synchronize the timing of this filing to occur after the completion of the development of the required technical and billing software changes to PJM's MSET system, which development and implementation did not occur until August 1, 2008.

II. Proposed Operating Agreement Revisions

Currently in PJM, accounting for Operating Reserves is performed on a daily basis and is calculated separately for the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time ("Balancing") Energy Market. The cost of Day-ahead Operating Reserves for an Operating Day is allocated and charged to PJM Market Participants in proportion to their total cleared Day-ahead demand and decrement bids plus cleared Day-ahead exports for that Operating Day. Balancing Operating Reserves charges for an Operating Day are allocated and charged to PJM Market Participants to the extent their actual real time transactions during the Operating Day deviate from their scheduled transactions cleared in the Day-ahead Market ("deviations") in proportion to their daily quantity of deviations compared to the total deviations for the day.

The revisions proposed herein apply to the calculation and allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve charges. These proposed revisions will further solidify incentives for participants to bid their Day-ahead quantities as close as possible to what they expect in the Balancing Market, thereby maintaining a high level of convergence between Day-ahead and Real-time Prices and maximizing market efficiency. These modifications will also strengthen the incentive for generators to follow PJM dispatch instructions and prevent the exertion of market power by generators committed to provide Operating Reserves through the submission of inflexible operating parameters, thus increasing market efficiency and system reliability. Finally, the proposed Operating Agreement revisions will more appropriately allocate and assign Balancing Operating Reserve costs to transactions that contributed most to the those costs.

The proposed revisions to Schedule 1, developed by the PJM membership through the stakeholder process, prescribe changes to how PJM calculates generation credits and deviations as well as changes in how the costs associated with Balancing Operating Reserves are allocated. Further, the proposed revisions were developed as a packaged set of revisions to Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement in order to balance the impact on all market segments of the PJM membership. PJM believes that

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the package of proposed revisions would not have been approved through the stakeholder process if they had been presented to the stakeholders as separate, individual revisions rather than as a package of inter-related revisions. Thus, PJM and the majority of its stakeholders have concluded that all of the proposed revisions are necessary, and that they all should be approved as one package of balanced, related revisions since they contain offsetting changes that will impact PJM Market Participants differently if some are approved while others are not.

III. <u>Proposed Revisions</u>

A. Generation Credit Calculation Revisions

i. Segmented Make-Whole Payments

Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 describes the rules governing how the costs for Operating Reserve will be calculated.[2] Subsection (e) thereof presently provides that at the end of every Operating Day, PJM must determine the total offered price for start-up fees, no-load fees and energy for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource dispatched by PJM, except those resources committed only to provide Synchronized Reserves. Accordingly, the Market Seller presently receives Operating Reserve credits, i.e. make-whole payments, for each Operating Day for which the total offered price exceeds the total energy market value of the pool-scheduled resource for that particular Operating Day.[3] PJM proposes to revise Section 3.2.3(e) to create a mechanism pursuant to which make-whole payments can be segmented as described below.

Specifically, for resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the proposal would divide the Operating Day into multiple segments based on (a) the number of hours that the Market Seller committed to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market or the resource's minimum run time, whichever is greater – Segment 1, and (b) for each synchronized start of the resource, the number of hours that the resource was operated at PJM's direction in the Real-time Energy Market beyond the longer of its Day-ahead schedules or minimum run time in the same calendar day – Segment 2. For resources that were not scheduled to provide energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the proposal would divide the Operating Day into no more than two segments for each synchronized start of the resource based on (a) the resource's minimum run time – Segment 1, and (b) the number of hours that the resource was extended in the Real-time Energy Market beyond its minimum run time in the same calendar day at PJM's direction – Segment 2.

Segmenting the make-whole payments is intended to motivate the Market Sellers to follow PJM dispatch and to encourage the resource to continue operating when its minimum run time has expired and when it has already fulfilled its output

[2] *See* Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1.

[3] *See* Section 3.2.3(e) of Schedule 1.

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commitment to produce energy for the Day-ahead Energy Market. This motivation is not as strong today as it could be to the extent that the Locational Marginal Price ("LMP") at the resource's bus is not equal to or greater than the resource's offer at its requested output level for the hours of extended operation. To the extent the resource earned a margin because the LMP at its bus during the hours of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time was greater than its offer, if the LMP does not exceed its offer for the hours of extended operation, some or all of that margin is lost because the current Operating Reserve make-whole payment is calculated based on the unit's operation for the entire 24-hour calendar day. By segmenting the make-whole payment and providing separate make-whole compensation specifically for the hours of extended operation, the owner of the resource can retain any margin earned in the earlier hours and be made whole separately for the extended period of operation.

Further revisions are proposed for Section 3.2.3(e) regarding how Operating Reserve credits received by Market Sellers under Section 3.2.3 will be calculated. As is the case under the current provisions, the proposed revisions provide that Operating Reserve credits received under Section 3.2.3 will be equal to the positive difference between (a) the total offered price for start-up costs for a generation resource (shutdown costs for a Demand Resource) and no-load fees and energy, which are to be determined based on the scheduled output of the resource, and (b) the resource's total value of energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time LMP applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. However, the proposed revisions also provide that, notwithstanding the foregoing, start-up costs for a generation resource and shutdown costs for a Demand Resource are not included in the calculation of Segment 2 Operating Reserve credits.

Lastly with regard to Section 3.2.3(e), PJM proposes revisions to address how Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits are applied against Operating Reserve credits. The revisions provide that Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, "provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours."

Additionally, revisions are proposed for Section 1.10.1A of Schedule 1 concerning Day-ahead Energy Market scheduling. The requirements for how Market Sellers must submit offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market are specified in Subsection 1.10.1A(d).[4] Subsection 1.10.1A(d)(i) currently provides that such offers must "specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy for each hour in the offer period."[5] The revision that is proposed for this subsection provides that the offers must "specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand

[4] *See* Section 1.10.1A(d) of Schedule 1.

[5] *See* Section 1.10.1A(d)(i) of Schedule 1.

Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources." This revision to Subsection 1.10.1A(d)(i) takes into account the participation of demand resources in the Day-ahead Energy Market and resources that were not scheduled to provide energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market may still be called upon by PJM to extend their required dispatch in the Operating Day beyond their minimum run times.

ii. Minimum Generator Operating Parameters and Parameter Limited Schedules

The PJM rules permit Generation Capacity Resources and Demand Resources to submit operating parameters as part of their energy market offers. The ability to submit such parameters is critical to PJM's ability to reliably and efficiently schedule and operate the PJM system because it allows PJM to respect resources' physical characteristics when scheduling their operation. For example, the physical properties of a generating unit may require that once it is started, it must be operated for a minimum number of hours before it can be shut down in order to protect the unit from component damage. In order for PJM to consider this characteristic when deciding whether it is economic to commit the unit, the unit's owner may submit a minimum run time as part of its offer parameters. The operating parameters that a unit may submit as part of its offer include Economic Minimum, Economic Maximum, Minimum Down Time, Minimum Run Time, Maximum Daily Starts and Maximum Weekly Starts.

The current PJM market power mitigation rules provide that when PJM determines that the owner of a unit has the potential to exercise market power, PJM caps that unit at its cost-based energy offer. The mitigation rules, however, do not provide for any limitation of the operating parameters that may be submitted as part of a unit's cost-based energy offer. During the deliberations of the Reserve Market Working Group, concern was expressed by the PJM Market Monitor that market power could be exerted through the submission of inflexible operating parameters for the sole purpose of increasing a unit's Operating Reserves credits.

In order to address these concerns, PJM is proposing that certain pre-determined limits ("parameter limited schedules") that are based on the physical parameters of the units should be applied when certain system conditions exist and a unit has the potential to exhibit market power. These conditions could exist when (i) the unit owner fails the three pivotal supplier test, and (ii) PJM declares a Maximum Generation Emergency, issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"), or schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for part or all of an Operating Day. The factors to be considered in determining the parameter limited schedules are Turn Down Ratio, Minimum Down Time, Minimum

Run Time, Maximum Daily Starts and Maximum Weekly Starts.[6] These revisions are set forth in proposed new Section 6.6 of Schedule 1.[7]

Further, PJM proposes to exclude nuclear units from receiving the payment of Operating Reserves credits unless PJM has specifically requested that the unit reduce its output during a period when the LMP at the unit's bus exceeds the unit's offer price. This change reflects the reality that PJM does not rely on nuclear units to provide Operating Reserves because unless such units are specifically requested by PJM to reduce output, they are scheduled to operate at their economic maximum output and therefore provide no reserve. In cases where such units are specifically requested to reduce output and the LMP at the unit's bus exceeds the unit's offer price at the requested level of output, opportunity cost compensation is necessary and appropriate. Thus, PJM proposes to add a new Subsection 1.7.17(c) to establish that PJM shall not make Operating Reserve payments to nuclear generation resources unless (1) the Office of the Interconnection has directed the nuclear generation resources to reduce output; or (2) there is a physical problem with the unit that requires a risk premium that has been pre-approved by the PJM Market Monitor. Notwithstanding the foregoing, PJM and the PJM Market Monitor must consider requests of a nuclear generation resource to receive Operating Reserve payments for specific circumstances that are not encompassed by the foregoing, which requests shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

B. Generation Deviation Calculation

i. Supplier Netting at the Bus to Offset Deviations

The present mechanism to allocate and charge Market Participants for Operating Reserves is found in Subsection 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement. PJM calculates all generator deviations individually pursuant to its Operating Reserves business rules. Presently, deviations by one generator cannot be financially offset by opposite deviations caused by another generator. PJM stakeholders recognized, however, that generator injections at the same electrical location are equivalent as far as their impact on the system. Thus, revisions to Subsection 3.2.3(h) are being proposed to allow for deviations by one generator to offset deviations by another generator provided the two generators are connected at the same electrical location. The resulting consequence of this proposed change will be to reduce Operating

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[6] *See* Proposed New Section 6.6 of Schedule 1.

[7] The language of proposed new Section 6.6 of Schedule 1 that is being filed herewith differs slightly from the language that was approved by PJM's Members Committee on November 15, 2007 in that all references to exempt and non-exempt units have been deleted. The references to exempt and non-exempt units have been deleted in compliance with the Commission's Order Granting in Part and Dismissing in Part Complaint, and Establishing Section 206 Hearing, *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. EL08-34-000 (May 16, 2008), in which the Commission required that PJM make a compliance filing implementing the elimination of the exemptions from energy market offer mitigation.

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Reserves charges to generators, reflecting the fact that equal and opposite deviations at the same electrical location do not cause Operating Reserve costs to be incurred.

ii. Determining Operating Reserve Deviations for Units Not Following PJM Dispatch Instructions

Currently, for purposes of determining eligibility for Balancing Operating Reserve charges and credits, PJM determines if a generating resource is following PJM dispatch instructions. If the unit is determined not to be following PJM dispatch instructions, then the unit incurs generator Balancing Operating Reserve deviations. These deviations are calculated as the absolute value of the Real-time MWh minus the value of the Day-ahead MWh.[8] There are currently two ways for a generator to be determined to be following dispatch instructions and therefore not incur deviations for a given hour: (a) if the unit was eligible to set LMP for at least one five-minute interval during the hour, or (b) if the unit's actual output for the hour is within 10% of its desired MW value for the hour. The desired MW values, i.e. the hourly desired dispatch point requested for the unit by PJM, used in this calculation are not ramp-limited. In other words, in determining the desired dispatch point for each generator every five minutes and then averaging the five-minute dispatch points over each hour to calculate the desired MW value used in this determination, the amount by which the dispatch software can raise or lower a unit's output is not limited by the unit's physical ramping capability. As such, the resulting desired MW values do not consistently reflect whether the unit was actually following PJM dispatch instructions. Further, the deviation MW value that results from the Day-ahead versus Real time MWh calculation creates an incentive for a unit to follow its day-ahead schedule as opposed to the dispatch signals issued by PJM. As a result, generators in those circumstances sometimes choose to ignore PJM dispatch instructions and instead follow their day-ahead schedules.

In order to strengthen the incentive for generators to follow PJM dispatch instructions, PJM proposes to modify its Operating Agreement to assess Operating Reserve deviations to generators that are operating at PJM's direction based on a comparison of their Real-time desired MW with their Real-time MWh. PJM further proposes to change how it calculates the Real-time desired MW value in an effort to create an accurate and more realistic Ramp-Limited Desired MW value that will be used to determine whether a unit is following PJM dispatch instructions as well as the actual quantity of deviations themselves should a unit be determined to not be following dispatch instructions. Thus, PJM proposes to add a new Section 3.2.3(o) of Schedule 1 to state that dispatchable pool-scheduled and self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch won't be assessed Balancing Operating Reserve deviations, and those that do not follow dispatch will be assessed Balancing Operating Reserve deviations pursuant to the calculations set forth in the PJM Manuals. This new subsection also provides that Ramp-Limited Desired MW value must be used to determine real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules for generation resources. The method for how

[8] *See* Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1.

PJM must calculate the Ramp-Limited Desired MW value is also proscribed in the proposed revised Operating Agreement language.

Further, proposed Subsection 3.2.3(o) specifies how PJM will utilize a Ramp-Limited Desired MW value to determine whether a unit is following PJM dispatch instructions. PJM will calculate two values, specifically the MW off dispatch[9] and % off dispatch[10] for a generation resource that is operating at PJM's direction. Specifically, PJM will use the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the desired dispatch point, or the actual output and Ramp-Limited Desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will then be calculated as time-weighted averages of the values calculated with each dispatch solution over the course of an hour. Pool-scheduled and dispatchable self-scheduled resources operating above economic minimum will then be considered to be following dispatch if their (a) actual output is between their Ramp-Limited Desired MW value and desired dispatch point, (b) % off dispatch is less than or equal to 10, or (c) hourly integrated Real-time MWh are within five percent (5%) or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

C. Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation

i. Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Analysis

PJM's current Operating Reserve methodology specifies that all Balancing Operating Reserve costs are to be allocated to deviations between Day-ahead schedules and real-time quantities.[11] However, in actuality certain Balancing Operating Reserve costs are incurred for reasons other than differences between day-ahead schedules and actual conditions, such as increased loop flow not anticipated in the Day-ahead Energy Market and unplanned transmission line outages or deratings. PJM intends to modify the Operating Agreement to recognize these differences in order to better align the allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve costs to those Market Participants who benefit from those costs.[12] When the PJM operators commit and operate resources over and above the quantity necessary to account for differences between Day-Ahead schedules and Real-time requirements, the proposed changes will result in the allocation of any Balancing Operating Reserve costs associated with such

[9] MW off dispatch is a defined term that is the lesser of the difference between the actual output of a unit in MW and the UDS Basepoint, or the difference between the actual output of a unit in MW and its Ramp-Limited Desired MW. See http://www.pjm.com/markets/energy-market/downloads/operating-reserve-revised-business-rules-v6.pdf.

[10] % off dispatch is a defined term that is the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint of a unit expressed as a percentage, or the difference between the actual output and its Ramp-Limited Desired MW of a unit expressed as a percentage. See http://www.pjm.com/markets/energy-market/downloads/operating-reserve-revised-business-rules-v6.pdf.

[11] *See* Subsection 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1.

[12] *See* Proposed New Subsection 3.2.3(p)(i) of Schedule 1.

resources to real time load plus exports as the beneficiary of the additional reliability provided. In order to determine the reason why the Operating Reserve credit has been earned so that the charges related thereto can be properly allocated, PJM will conduct a Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Analysis.

The purpose of the Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Analysis is to separate those Balancing Operating Reserve charges to be allocated to deviations between Day-ahead schedules and Real-time quantities from those that should be allocated to real-time load and exports. The key factor in separating the allocation is the determination of the particular units by which operating reserve credits were earned, and the units for which those credits should be allocated to deviations as opposed to those units for which those credits should be allocated to load and exports. This cost determination will occur in two stages: those units called on during the Reliability Analysis, and those units called on to operate during the Operating Day. In both cases, the proposed changes establish clear, definitive, and objective criteria that will be applied to such units to determine the reason Balancing Operating Reserve credits were earned.

Pursuant to proposed new Section 3.2.3(p)(i), for resources scheduled by PJM during its reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated Balancing Operating Reserve charges are allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled. When a resource is scheduled by PJM during its reliability analysis if the resource is committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve Requirement, then in such cases, the proposed revisions provide that the associating Balancing Operating Reserve charges will be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules. If however, a resource is scheduled by PJM during its reliability analysis not to account for anticipated deviations between day-ahead schedules and real time conditions but instead to provide additional reliability margin, then the proposed revisions provide that the associating Balancing Operating Reserve charges must be allocated to real-time load plus exports.

Pursuant to proposed new Section 3.2.3(p)(ii), Balancing Operating Reserve credits earned by units called on by PJM to operate during the Operating Day for which the LMP at the unit's bus does not meet or exceed the unit's applicable offer (cost or price) for at least four, five-minute intervals of at least one clock hour during which the unit was running at PJM's direction will be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. Balancing Operating Reserve credits earned by all other units operating at PJM's direction in real-time will be allocated according to deviations between Day-ahead schedules and Real-time quantities. The logic behind this distinction is that units called on in real-time for which LMP exceeds their offer for a significant number of intervals while they are running are necessary to meet load requirements respecting active transmission constraints. On the other hand, units called on at PJM's direction in real time for which the LMP does not exceed the unit's offer were not needed and were therefore operating in order to ensure reliability is maintained as opposed to account for differences between day-ahead schedules and real-time system conditions.

ii. Locational netting of deviation calculations

The current Operating Agreement states that the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market are allocated and charged in proportion to deviations between scheduled Day-Ahead Market quantities and actual Real-time Market quantities. These deviations are calculated in three categories: the Demand Bucket, the Supply Bucket and individual generator deviations. The Demand Bucket is calculated as the sum of the absolute values of load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market, deviations of internal bilateral sales between the Day-ahead and Real Time Markets, and deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to outside of the PJM Region. The Supply Bucket is calculated as deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside of PJM for delivery into PJM, and deviations of internal bilateral purchases between the Day-ahead and Real Time Markets.[13] At the present time, these deviation calculations are assessed across the entire PJM RTO and do not take into account the location of the deviation. Thus, at present, within both the Demand and Supply Buckets, deviations are netted across the RTO, meaning that a negative deviation in one location could be offset by a positive deviation in another location. A participant can therefore offset a day-ahead transaction in one area of the PJM system with real-time activity in a completely different area of the PJM system without being assessed a deviation for the purposes of Balancing Operating Reserve allocation. However, such activity can result in increased Operating Reserve costs to the market.

As part of the Day-Ahead Market, PJM schedules generation to meet the bid-in demand, including taking into account its location. It is possible that when real-time activity appears in a completely different location than the day-ahead activity, constraints can occur in real-time that did not occur day-ahead and additional generation required in real time to control those constraints that then accrues Balancing Operating Reserves. In an effort to encourage Market Buyers to bid their Day-ahead quantities as close as possible to what they expect in the Real-time Energy Market, and to improve market and operations certainty and forecast, PJM proposes to modify its Operating Agreement to net deviations within the Supply and Demand Buckets by Zone, hub or interface. Hubs within a single Zone will also be permitted to net against each other, e.g. NI Hub and the ComEd Zone. With the proposed changes in place, participants with cleared day-ahead activity at locations that vary from their real time activity will be assessed deviations at both locations, and allocated a proportionate share of Balancing Operating Reserve costs. Individual generator deviations are by definition already locational, and the only change to such deviation calculations is discussed above in section B(i).

While this proposed revision to the Operating Agreement will create more deviation on the system because PJM will be looking not at the entire RTO, but rather at deviations at the sub-level of a Zone, hub and/or interface, the expected result is that

[13] *See* Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1.

the overall Operating Reserves charge rate per MWh of deviations will be reduced because the charges will be spread out among a greater quantity of deviations.

iii. Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Allocation

Presently in PJM, Balancing Operating Reserve credits to generators calculated during the Operating Day are collected and considered the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market that are allocated to all Market Participants' deviations across the entire RTO, creating a single Balancing Operating Reserve rate. PJM recognizes, however, that some Balancing Operating Reserve credits are accrued to resources operating to manage local transmission constraints. Thus, in order to more appropriately collect the costs of Balancing Operating Reserve for local constraints within the regions where the constraints existed, PJM is proposing to modify its Operating Agreement to calculate a Regional Balancing Operating Reserve rate for the costs of Operating Reserves that result from actions to control transmission constraints that are solely within pre-defined regions in the RTO. Additional costs of Operating Reserves that result from actions to control transmission constraints that benefit the entire RTO will continue to be allocated equally to deviations across the entire RTO as an RTO Balancing Operating Reserve rate. PJM proposes to incorporate these revisions into a new Subsection 3.2.3(q) of the Operating Agreement to specifically delineate how regional Balancing Operating Reserve rates will be calculated for the Western Region of PJM, comprised of the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, and Dayton Zones and the Eastern Region of PJM made of the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG and RE Zones.

D. Consistency

In addition, PJM proposes revisions to correct non-substantive clerical items in Sections 3.2.3 of the Operating Agreement for purposes of consistency as indicated in the proposed revised tariff sheets. The need for these corrections is self-explanatory, and they have not been reviewed by PJM's stakeholders. These proposed revisions are to correct references from "operating reserve(s)" to "Operating Reserve(s)," "pool scheduled" to "pool-scheduled," and "unforseen" to "unforeseen."

E. Table of Contents Revisions

Finally, revisions to the Operating Agreement and Tariff tables of contents are proposed to reflect the correct pagination for Section 3.2.3A and to incorporate a reference to proposed new Section 6.6 of Schedule 1. The need for these corrections is self-explanatory, and they have not been reviewed by PJM's stakeholders.

IV. <u>Stakeholder Support</u>

On November 15, 2007, the PJM Members Committee approved and endorsed all of the proposed revisions that were presented to the committee on that date, with 4 members opposing and no abstentions. The Members Committee met again on June 26, 2008 and endorsed by acclamation the one additional proposed revision presented

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to the committee on that date, with 4 members opposing and 6 abstaining. As stated earlier herein, PJM delayed making the within filing because PJM wanted to synchronize the timing of this filing with the development of the required technical and billing software changes to PJM's MSET software.

V. Effective Date

Consistent with the Commission's sixty (60) day notice requirement, PJM requests an effective date of December 1, 2008.

VI. Correspondence

The following individuals are designated for inclusion on the official service list in this proceeding and for receipt of any communications regarding this filing:

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VII. Description of Submittal

This submittal includes an original and six copies of the following:

- This letter of transmittal;
- The proposed revisions on clean Operating Agreement and Tariff sheets (Attachment A); and
- The proposed revisions red-lined against the currently effective Operating Agreement and Tariff sheets (Attachment B).

VIII. Service

PJM has served a copy of this filing on all PJM Members and on all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region by posting this filing electronically, and requests waiver of the requirement to post by mailing paper copies. Waiver of paper service is consistent with Commission's decision to establish electronic service as the default method of service on service lists maintained by the Commission Secretary for Commission proceedings.[14] While Order No. 653 did not amend the posting requirements, application of its rules to initial tariff filings would be consistent with the Commission's "efforts to reduce the use of paper in compliance with the Government Paperwork Elimination Act."[15] Applying amended Rule 385.2010(f) to this filing, PJM will post this filing to the FERC filings section of its internet site, *http://www.pjm.com/documents/ferc.html*, on the date that it is filed and will send an e-mail to all PJM members and all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Regions notifying them that the filing is available by following such link.[16]

Respectfully submitted,

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[14] *See* Electronic Notification of Commission Issuances, Order No. 653, 110 FERC ¶61,110 (2005).

[15] *Id.* at P 2, *citing* 44 U.S.C. § 3504.

[16] PJM already maintains, updates, and regularly uses e-mail lists for all Members and affected commissions.

Attachment A

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REVISIONS TO PJM OPERATING AGREEMENT

Schedule 1

Clean Version

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Market. The PJM Manuals, as they relate to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market, shall conform and comply with this Agreement, NERC operating policies, and Applicable Regional Reliability Council reliability principles, guidelines and standards, and shall be designed to facilitate administration of an efficient energy market within industry reliability standards and the physical capabilities of the PJM Region.

1.7.15 Corrective Action.

Consistent with Good Utility Practice, the Office of the Interconnection shall be authorized to direct or coordinate corrective action, whether or not specified in the PJM Manuals, as necessary to alleviate unusual conditions that threaten the integrity or reliability of the PJM Region, or the regional power system.

1.7.16 Recording.

Subject to the requirements of applicable State or federal law, all voice communications with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center may be recorded by the Office of the Interconnection and any Market Participant communicating with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center, and each Market Participant hereby consents to such recording.

1.7.17 Operating Reserves.

(a) The following procedures shall apply to any generation unit subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection for which construction commenced before July 9, 1996, or any Demand Resource subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule to the Operating Reserve and load-following objectives of the Control Zones of the PJM Region and the PJM Interchange Energy Market in scheduling generation resources and/or Demand Resources pursuant to this Schedule. A table of Operating Reserve objectives for each Control Zone is calculated and published annually in the PJM Manuals. Reserve levels are probabilistically determined based on the season's historical load forecasting error and forced outage rates.

(c) Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output; or 2) a physical problem at the unit requires a risk premium, provided that the risk premium is approved by the MMU. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Office of the Interconnection and the MMU shall consider requests by nuclear generation resources for Operating Reserve payments for specific circumstances not covered by the foregoing rules. Such requests shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

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to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region. The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generating unit, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such unit on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day; and

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the MW of Regulation being offered, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the offer in dollars per MWh, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed $100 per MWh in the case of regulation offered for all Regulation Zones, except that offers for Regulation by American Electric Power Company and Virginia Electric Power Company and/or their respective affiliates for the Regulation Zone comprised of the ECAR Control Zone(s), MAIN Control Zone(s), or the VACAR Control Zone shall be cost-based consisting of the following components:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower MW output incurred from the provision of Regulation;

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3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection and that is not committed solely for the purpose of providing Synchronized Reserve: For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time

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for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) and less any amounts credited for Regulation in excess of the Regulation offer plus the resources opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG}, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG} where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection will negotiate with the individual Market Seller such appropriate compensation, subject to approval of such compensation by the Market Monitoring Unit.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (i) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; (ii) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (iii) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (iv) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of Schedule 1 of this Operating Agreement, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at interfaces and hubs shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located in the region. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate.

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Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by busses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus;

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface;

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each Control Zone of the PJM Region based on the Control Zone to which the resource was synchronized to provide synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not

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receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this paragraph (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent paragraphs (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this paragraph, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent paragraphs (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then paragraph (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\mathrm{Ramp\_Request}_t = {(\mathrm{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathrm{AOutput}_{t-1})} \big/ {(\mathrm{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\mathrm{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathrm{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\mathrm{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathrm{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

Issued By: Craig Glazer Effective: December 1, 2008
Vice President, Federal Government Policy
Issued On: September 25, 2008

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or it's hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.*

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.*

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.* If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh.*

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

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(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP is less than the offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete hour periods during the relevant Operating Day.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

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3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its *pro rata* share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Synchronized Reserve Zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Synchronized Reserve Zone, for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, plus the amounts if any, described in paragraphs (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A Generating Market Buyer supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation units that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules

(a) Generation resources shall be subject to pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Operating Reserve markets fail the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) Parameter limited schedules applied pursuant to this section shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and shall consist of the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

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REVISIONS TO PJM TARIFF

Appendix to Attachment K

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in the PJM Manuals. Reserve levels are probabilistically determined based on the season's historical load forecasting error and forced outage rates.

(c) Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output; or 2) a physical problem at the unit requires a risk premium, provided that the risk premium is approved by the MMU. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Office of the Interconnection and the MMU shall consider requests by nuclear generation resources for Operating Reserve payments for specific circumstances not covered by the foregoing rules. Such requests shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

1.7.18 Regulation.

(a) Regulation to meet the Regulation objective of each Regulation Zone shall be supplied from generation resources and/or Demand Resources located within the metered electrical boundaries of such Regulation Zone. Generating Market Buyers, and Market Sellers offering Regulation, shall comply with applicable standards and requirements for Regulation capability and dispatch specified in the PJM Manuals.

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Area outside the PJM Region. The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the generation resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generating unit, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such unit on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day; and

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the MW of Regulation being offered, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the offer in dollars per MWh, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed

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3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7 and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection and that is not committed solely for the purpose of providing Synchronized reserves: For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

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Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) and less any amounts credited for Regulation in excess of the Regulation offer plus the resources opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

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LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

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UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection will negotiate with the individual Market Seller such appropriate compensation, subject to approval of such compensation by the Market Monitoring Unit.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d) such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (i) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; (ii) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (iii) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (iv) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Regions, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at interfaces and hubs shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located in the region. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by busses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus;

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface;

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(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each Control Zone of the PJM Region based on the Control Zone to which the resource was synchronized to provide synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\text{Ramp\_Request}_t = {(\text{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1})}\Big/{(\text{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or it's hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following *formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.*
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.*
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.* If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh.*

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP is less than the offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete hour periods during the relevant Operating Day.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

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must agree to provide to PJM relevant cost data concerning fuel, operating and maintenance, and other avoidable costs, (ii) the maintenance practices and incurrence of expense at the unit shall be subject to audit by the Office of the Interconnection, and (iii) the unit owner agrees to operate the unit in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

(e) Any agreement entered pursuant to section 6.4.2(a)(iv) shall be filed with the Commission and shall be effective only upon acceptance of the agreement for filing by the Commission; provided however, that agreements to reflect unit-specific going forward costs in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall be filed with the Commission for informational purposes only and shall be effective the day following the date of the informational filing.

(f) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate information.

6.5 [Reserved for Future Use]

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter_Limited Schedules

(a) Generation resources shall be subject to pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Operating Reserve markets fail the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) Parameter limited schedules applied pursuant to this section shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and shall consist of the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

Attachment B

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REVISIONS TO PJM OPERATING AGREEMENT

Schedule 1

Redline Version

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Market. The PJM Manuals, as they relate to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market, shall conform and comply with this Agreement, NERC operating policies, and Applicable Regional Reliability Council reliability principles, guidelines and standards, and shall be designed to facilitate administration of an efficient energy market within industry reliability standards and the physical capabilities of the PJM Region.

1.7.15 Corrective Action.

Consistent with Good Utility Practice, the Office of the Interconnection shall be authorized to direct or coordinate corrective action, whether or not specified in the PJM Manuals, as necessary to alleviate unusual conditions that threaten the integrity or reliability of the PJM Region, or the regional power system.

1.7.16 Recording.

Subject to the requirements of applicable State or federal law, all voice communications with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center may be recorded by the Office of the Interconnection and any Market Participant communicating with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center, and each Market Participant hereby consents to such recording.

1.7.17 Operating Reserves.

(a) The following procedures shall apply to any generation unit subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection for which construction commenced before July 9, 1996, or any Demand Resource subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule to the Operating Reserve and load-following objectives of the Control Zones of the PJM Region and the PJM Interchange Energy Market in scheduling generation resources and/or Demand Resources pursuant to this Schedule. A table of Operating Reserve objectives for each Control Zone is calculated and published annually in the PJM Manuals. Reserve levels are probabilistically determined based on the season's historical load forecasting error and forced outage rates.

(c) Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output; or 2) a physical problem at the unit requires a risk premium, provided that the risk premium is approved by the MMU. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Office of the Interconnection and the MMU shall consider requests by nuclear generation resources for Operating Reserve payments for specific circumstances not covered by the foregoing rules. Such requests shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region. The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generating unit, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such unit on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day; and

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the MW of Regulation being offered, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the offer in dollars per MWh, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed $100 per MWh in the case of regulation offered for all Regulation Zones, except that offers for Regulation by American Electric Power Company and Virginia Electric Power Company and/or their respective affiliates for the Regulation Zone comprised of the ECAR Control Zone(s), MAIN Control Zone(s), or the VACAR Control Zone shall be cost-based consisting of the following components:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower MW output incurred from the provision of Regulation;

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3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

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(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection and that is not committed solely for the purpose of providing Synchronized Reserve: For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time

Deleted: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the lesser of the resource's (i) hourly output as determined by revenue meter data, if available, or by the State Estimator, if revenue meter data is not available, or (ii) requested output as determined by the PJM dispatch. The total offered price shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or charge for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day

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for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) and less any amounts credited for Regulation in excess of the Regulation offer plus the resources opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG}, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG} where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

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UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

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(f-3) If a Market Seller can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection will negotiate with the individual Market Seller such appropriate compensation, subject to approval of such compensation by the Market Monitoring Unit.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (i) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; (ii) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (iii) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (iv) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of Schedule 1 of this Operating Agreement, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at interfaces and hubs shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located in the region. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate.

Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by busses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus;

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface;

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

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(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each Control Zone of the PJM Region based on the Control Zone to which the resource was synchronized to provide synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not

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receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this paragraph (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent paragraphs (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this paragraph, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent paragraphs (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then paragraph (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

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(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$Ramp\_Request_t = {(UDStarget_{t-1} - AOutput_{t-1})}/{(UDSLAtime_{t-1})}$$

$$RL\_Desired_t = AOutput_{t-1} + \left(Ramp\_Request_t * Case\_Eff\_time_{t-1}\right)$$

Issued By: Craig Glazer Effective: December 1, 2008
Vice President, Federal Government Policy
Issued On: September 25, 2008

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where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or it's hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.*

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.*

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.* If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

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- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh.*

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(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

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(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

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(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

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(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP is less than the offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete hour periods during the relevant Operating Day.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

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3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its *pro rata* share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Synchronized Reserve Zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Synchronized Reserve Zone, for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, plus the amounts if any, described in paragraphs (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A Generating Market Buyer supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation units that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules

(a) Generation resources shall be subject to pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Operating Reserve markets fail the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) Parameter limited schedules applied pursuant to this section shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and shall consist of the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

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REVISIONS TO PJM TARIFF

Appendix to Attachment K

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in the PJM Manuals. Reserve levels are probabilistically determined based on the season's historical load forecasting error and forced outage rates.

(c) Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output; or 2) a physical problem at the unit requires a risk premium, provided that the risk premium is approved by the MMU. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Office of the Interconnection and the MMU shall consider requests by nuclear generation resources for Operating Reserve payments for specific circumstances not covered by the foregoing rules. Such requests shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

1.7.18 Regulation.

(a) Regulation to meet the Regulation objective of each Regulation Zone shall be supplied from generation resources and/or Demand Resources located within the metered electrical boundaries of such Regulation Zone. Generating Market Buyers, and Market Sellers offering Regulation, shall comply with applicable standards and requirements for Regulation capability and dispatch specified in the PJM Manuals.

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Area outside the PJM Region. The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the generation resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generating unit, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such unit on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day; and

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the MW of Regulation being offered, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the offer in dollars per MWh, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

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(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

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(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7 and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection and that is not committed solely for the purpose of providing Synchronized reserves: For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

Deleted: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the lesser of the resource's (i) hourly output as determined by revenue meter data, if available, or by the State Estimator, if revenue meter data is not available, or (ii) requested output as determined by the PJM dispatch. The total offered price shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or charge for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) and less any amounts credited for Regulation in excess of the Regulation offer plus the resources opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours.

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(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

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LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

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(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

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UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to paragraph 1.10.3 (c)), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

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(f-3) If a Market Seller can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection will negotiate with the individual Market Seller such appropriate compensation, subject to approval of such compensation by the Market Monitoring Unit.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d) such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (i) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; (ii) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (iii) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (iv) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Regions, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at interfaces and hubs shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located in the region. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by busses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

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The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus;

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface;

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(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

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(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each Control Zone of the PJM Region based on the Control Zone to which the resource was synchronized to provide synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that

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(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$Ramp\_Request_t = (UDStarget_{t-1} - AOutput_{t-1}) / (UDSLAtime_{t-1})$$

$$RL\_Desired_t = AOutput_{t-1} + \left(Ramp\_Request_t * Case\_Eff\_time_{t-1}\right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or it's hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must

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also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following *formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.*

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.*

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.* If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- *If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.*

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour *the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead* schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.*

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: *hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh.*

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(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

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(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

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(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP is less than the offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete hour periods during the relevant Operating Day.

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(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on *transmission system capacity equal to or less than* 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Appendix to Attachment K of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

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must agree to provide to PJM relevant cost data concerning fuel, operating and maintenance, and other avoidable costs, (ii) the maintenance practices and incurrence of expense at the unit shall be subject to audit by the Office of the Interconnection, and (iii) the unit owner agrees to operate the unit in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

(e) Any agreement entered pursuant to section 6.4.2(a)(iv) shall be filed with the Commission and shall be effective only upon acceptance of the agreement for filing by the Commission; provided however, that agreements to reflect unit-specific going forward costs in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall be filed with the Commission for informational purposes only and shall be effective the day following the date of the informational filing.

(f) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate information.

6.5 [Reserved for Future Use]

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules

(a) Generation resources shall be subject to pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Operating Reserve markets fail the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

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(ii) The Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) Parameter limited schedules applied pursuant to this section shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and shall consist of the following parameters:

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(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

2008 PJM Balancing Operating Reserve Training

Changes to Operating Reserve Accounting Methodology

PJM State & Member Training Dept.

PJM©2008

Agenda

- Define Operating Reserves and previous calculation methodologies
- Summarize the changes and impacts of the new Balancing Operating Reserve (BOR) construct
- Review new BOR calculation methodologies
  - Segmented Make-Whole Payments
  - Minimum Generator Operating Parameters
  - Ramp-Limited Desired MW to determine deviations
  - Supplier Netting at the Bus to offset deviations
  - Netting (deviations net by zone, hub or interface)
  - Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation (BORCA)
  - Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation

Generator focused

Load Serving Entity focused

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Upon completion of this presentation, participants will have the ability to:

- Define Operating Reserves from an accounting standpoint
- Differentiate the current Balancing Operating Reserve (BOR) rules from the new BOR rules
- Summarize the various components of the new BOR Reserve calculation construct

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Interrelated Stakeholder Activity

	Preliminary Vote	Final Vote	
Modified Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Methodology	MRC Nov 14, 2007 Endorsed	MRC Nov 14, 2007 Endorsed	Implemented 1/1/08
Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market	MRC Nov 14, 2007 Endorsed	MC Jan 15, 2007 Endorsed	Implemented 6/1/08
Revised Operating Reserve Accounting Methodology	MC Nov 15, 2007 Endorsed	MC Nov 15, 2007 Endorsed	Implementation Dec 1, 2008

- "Operations" Definition of Operating Reserves
  - "Extra" available generation that is scheduled on a day-ahead basis and maintained in real-time.
  - Defined in
    - PJM Pre-Scheduling Manual (M-10)
    - PJM Emergency Ops Manual (M-13)
- "Accounting" Definition of Operating Reserves
  - "Make-whole" payments to pool-scheduled generation
  - Defined in Operating Agreement
    - Schedule 1-3.2.3 &3.3.3
- Following slides refer to the **Accounting** Definition

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Current Operating Reserves Accounting Methodology

- Separate Operating Reserves for Day-ahead and Balancing Markets
- Cleared offers for <u>pool-scheduled</u> generation in the day-ahead market are guaranteed to be made whole for the day
- Accepted offers for <u>pool-scheduled</u> generation operating in the real-time market <u>as requested</u> are also made whole
- Additional payments provided for generator cancellations, and generation reduced for reliability
- Charge allocations based on day-ahead load + exports, and real-time deviations from day-ahead market scheduled quantities (unless following dispatch)

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Overview of BOR Credits (Current Rules)

- Generators, synchronous condensers, and transactions dispatched for PJM are eligible
- For each eligible resource, daily credit is the balancing offer amount in excess of
  - Balancing Market revenue
  - any Day-Ahead Market revenue
  - any Day-Ahead Operating Reserves credits
  - any Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve credits
  - any Regulation revenue (in excess of Regulation offer + Opportunity Cost)
  - any Synchronized Reserve revenue (in excess of offer plus opportunity, energy usage and startup costs)

The fundamental objective of Balancing Operating Reserve (BOR) Credits does not change with the implementation of the new BOR construct

Overview of BOR Charges (Current Rules)

- Allocated proportionately to all deviations from day-ahead scheduled quantities, including:
  - "load" , internal sales, and export transactions
    - (not including dynamically scheduled transactions)
  - generation (for self-scheduled or PJM scheduled generation <u>not</u> following real-time dispatch instructions and signals)
  - Self-scheduled units not dispatched by PJM above their economic minimum limits (unless reducing for a Min Gen Event)
  - cleared inc offers, internal purchases, and import transactions

The fundamental objective of Balancing Operating Reserve (BOR) Charges does not change with the implementation of the new BOR construct

Overview of BOR (Current Rules)

Generator Offer: $100

- $75

$25

Charged to participants that deviate from Day Ahead Market position:



Total Revenue For Generator:

Synch Reserve Revenue = $10
DASR Market Revenue = $2
DA Op Reserve Revenue = $3
Balancing Market Revenue = $10
Day Ahead Market Revenue = $50

= $75


PJM Operating Reserve Costs 2003-2008 ($/MWh Load)
$/MWh Load
2.00
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
-
Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08
DA Operating Reserve $/MWh Load
RT Operating Reserve $/MWh Load
Load-Adjusted DA Operating Reserve (Average + 1 Standard Deviation (Trailing 36 Months))
Load-Adjusted RT Operating Reserve (Average + 1 Standard Deviation (Trailing 36 Months))

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- The modified Operating Reserve Business Rules are designed to:
  - incent participants to *bid their Day-ahead quantities as close as possible to what they expect in the Balancing Market*, thereby leading to increased convergence between Day-Ahead and Real Time prices and increased market efficiency.
  - incent generators to *follow PJM dispatch instructions and provide flexibility*, thus increasing market efficiency and system reliability
  - *appropriately allocate OR costs* to transactions in areas that contribute to the additional costs

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BOR Terminology

Total Cost:
- Total credit amount paid to generators to supply RT Operating Reserves
- Total “Bucket”

(8)

Rate:
- $ per MW charge that is derived from Total Cost
- Calculated daily
- http://www.pjm.com/markets/jsp/ops-rate.jsp



(6)

Charge:
- *Allocation* of the Total Cost to the participant based on deviations, BORCA rules, netting by location, etc.
- Charged monthly per the daily Rate

Total Cost ÷ Charge = Rate

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The "Package" of Proposed BOR Changes

Proposed Business Rule Change	Impact	Description
Segmented Make-Whole Payments	Generator Credits	Segment Make-Whole Payments as a function of the greater of the DA Schedule, or Min Run Time
Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules	Generator Credits	Define operator objectives and the associated relevant market for solutions. Apply the defined market power test to the defined market. Apply market power mitigation rules only when the test indicates the potential to exercise market power.
Use Ramp-Limited Desired MW to determine deviations	Generator Deviations	PJM will determine whether a generator is following dispatch and calculate the deviation based on a new calculation incorporating ramp limited desired MW
Supplier Netting at the Bus (Plant)	Generator Deviations	Generators that deviate from RT dispatch may offset deviations by another generator at the same bus.
Regional Balancing Operating Reserve Allocation	Charge Allocation	Allocate OR charges that were accrued for local constraints to the regions, creating "regional" rates for Balancing Operating Reserve charges.
Netting (by Zone, Interface, Hub)	Charge Allocation	Demand bucket should be netted locationally by zone, hub, or interface. Supply bucket should be netted locationally by zone, hub, or interface.
Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation	Charge Allocation	For the purposes of allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve charges, PJM will determine and identify the reasons for which operating reserve credits are earned. The results of this determination will identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be allocated to Real-time deviations from Day-Ahead schedules and identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will should be allocated to real-time load share plus export

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Impact of Changes to Participants

The Members Committee voted on the BOR changes as a "Package." This approach facilitated comprise between suppliers (generators, DSR) and those entities bearing the costs of BORs (LSEs, etc)

Segmented Make-Whole Payments	Will be an overall benefit to generators
Parameter Limited Schedules	Could be a liability to some generators
Ramp-Limited Desired MWs	Could be an overall benefit (or liability) to generators
Supplier Netting at the Bus	Will be an overall benefit to a few generators
Netting by Zone, Hub, Interface	Could be a liability to entities (other than generators) that deviate from DA schedules
Regional BORCA	Could be a benefit or liability to LSEs More closely allocates the BOR costs
BORCA	Could be a benefit or liability to LSEs More closely allocates the BOR costs



Due to the volatile nature and RT operational basis of Operating Reserves, it is difficult to accurately model the future financial impacts and the allocation (regional, RTO) of the charges

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Rule changes applicable to Supply (generators)

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Segmented Make Whole Payments

- Current Rule
  - The total resource offer amount for generation, including startup and no-load costs as applicable, is compared to its total energy market value for an entire 24-hour period.
- Desired Outcome
  - Solidify incentive to follow PJM dispatch and continue operating when minimum run time has expired
- Proposed Change
  - Segment Make-Whole Payments as a function of the greater of the DA Schedule, or Min Run Time

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Segmented Make-Whole Payments
Example 1 – Unit Y Extended Beyond DA Schedule

Example 1: Unit was extended in real time for two hours beyond its day ahead schedule. (LMP is less than offer during extended period)



Explanation:

Segment 1: Day Ahead Schedule

- DA Energy = (4 hours * $100 * 150 MW) = $60,000
- DA Offer = (4hours * $75 * 150MW) = $45,000
- Day Ahead OR Credit: $0
- Balancing OR Credit: $0

Segment 2: Extended Period

- RT Energy = (2 hours * $50 * 150MW) = $15,000
- RT Offer = (2 hours * $75 * 150MW) = $22,500
- Balancing OR Credit: $7,500

Note: Under current rules, this unit receives a balancing payment of $ 0

Balancing OR Credit = Offer Value (6 hours * $75 * 150MW) – (DA Energy + RT Energy) = $67,500 – ($60,000 + $15,000) = - $7,500 → 0

**DA operating reserve credits, regulation revenue, and spinning revenue are also applied against balancing OR credits.

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Segmented Make-Whole Payments
Example 2 – Unit Y Extended Before/ After DA Schedule

Example 2: Unit was extended in real time through the midnight period,
The unit was uneconomic for most of the extended period.



Explanation:

Segment 1: Day Ahead Schedule

- DA Energy = (16 hours * $100 * 150 MW) = $240,000
- DA Offer = (16hours * $75 * 150MW) = $180,000
- DA OR Credit: $0
- Balancing OR Credit: $0

Segment 2: Extended Period

- RT Energy = (4 hours * $25 * 150MW) + (3hours * $50 * 150MW) + (1 hour * $110 * 150 MW) = $54,000
- RT Offer = (8 hours * $75 * 150MW) = $90,000
- Balancing OR Credit: $36,000

Note: Under current rules, this unit receives a balancing payment of $ 0

Balancing OR Credit = Offer Value (24 hours * $75 * 150MW) – (DA Energy + RT Energy) = $270,000 – ($240,000 + $54,000) = - $34,000 → 0

**DA operating reserve credits, regulation revenue, and spinning revenue are also applied against balancing OR credits.

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Example 3 – Unit Y Extended Beyond Min Run Time

Example 3: Unit was extended in real time for four hours beyond its min run time.
(LMP is less than offer during extended period)

MIN RUN TIME – 4 HOURS

REAL TIME DISPATCH (beyond Min Run Time)



Explanation:

Segment 1: Min Run Time

- RT Energy = (4 hours * $80 * 150 MW) = $48,000
- RT Offer = (4hours * $75 * 150MW) = 45,000
- Balancing OR Credit: $0

Segment 2: Extended Period

- RT Energy = (4 hours * $50 * 150MW) = $30,000
- RT Offer = (4 hours * $75 * 150MW) = $45,000
- Balancing OR Credit: $15,000

Note: Under current rules, this unit receives a balancing payment of $12,000

Balancing OR Credit = Offer Value (8 hours * $75 * 150MW) – (DA Energy + RT Energy) = $90,000 – ($0 + $78,000) = $12,000

**Regulation revenue, and spinning revenue are also applied against balancing OR credits.

Segmented Make-Whole Payments
Example 4 – Unit Y Extended Beyond Min Run Time

Example 4: Unit was extended in real time for four hours beyond its min run time.
(LMP is less than offer during extended period)



Explanation:

Segment 1: Min Run Time

- RT Energy = (2 hours * $100 * 150 MW) + (2 hours * $25 * 150 MW) = $37,500
- RT Offer = (4hours * $75 *150MW) = $45,000
- Balancing OR Credit: $7,500

Segment 2: Extended Period

- RT Energy = (2 hours * $75 * 150MW) + (2 hours * $100 * 150MW) = $52,500
- RT Offer = (4 hours * $75 * 150MW) = $45,000
- Balancing OR Credit: $0

Note: Under current rules, this unit receives a balancing payment of $ 0

Balancing OR Credit = Offer Value (8 hours * $75 * 150MW) – (DA Energy + RT Energy) = $90,000 – ($0 + $90,000) = $0

**Regulation revenue, and spinning revenue are also applied against balancing OR credits

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Example 5 – CT Unit w / DA Schedule is called in RT

Example 5: CT Unit had DA commitment and was called to run in RT. The DA commitment and the time when the unit was called to run do not align.



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Example 6 – CT Unit w / DA Schedule is called in RT

Example 6: CT Unit had DA commitment and was called to run in RT. The DA commitment and the time when the unit was called to run do not align.



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Segmented Make-Whole Payments – Summary of Key Points

- A resource will be made whole for two periods for each synchronized start. The two periods are as follows:
  1. greater of the DA Schedule or Min Run time
  2. hours in excess of #1 (above)
- Segment does not “carry over” to the next day
- Start-up costs (and applicable no-load costs) will be in the segment “greater of the DA Schedule or Min Run Time”
- Segmented Make-Whole Payments will be an overall benefit to resources

Current Rule

- Each generator may submit their operating parameters for individual units when participating in the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets.

Desired Outcome

Issues with current construct include:

inflexible operating parameters during times of transmission constrained operations and/or maximum generation conditions

potential of generation resources to exercise market power by altering operating parameters in order to increase operating reserves credits.

Proposed Solution

- Apply market power mitigation rules only when a market power test indicates the potential to exercise market power.

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What are Parameter-Limited Schedules?

*Parameter-Limited Schedules are **limitations** that **could be imposed** on the parameters that generators submit as part of their offer.*

These pre-determined limits are used when certain operational circumstances exist.

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- For each unit class, minimum acceptable operating parameters include:
  - Turn Down Ratio (Ratio of Eco Max MW to Eco Min MW)
  - Minimum Down Time
  - Minimum Run Time
  - Maximum Daily Starts
  - Maximum Weekly Starts

Future parameters MAY include:
Hot Start Notification Time, Warm Start Notification Time, Cold Start Notification Time

Some parameters will be set based on operating history of the unit compared to % of PJM-defined unit class

i.e.

The initial Minimum Down Time for each unit is based on the minimum of the Minimum Down Times submitted over the prior 24 months, if the resultant minimum down time is less than or equal to 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time. If Minimum Down Time submitted for a unit is more than 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time, then the unit's Minimum Down Time will be set equal to 110 percent of the PJM defined unit class Minimum Down Time.

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When are Parameter-Limited Schedules used?

<u>Units will be committed on Parameter-Limited Schedules when:</u>

1) The Three Pivotal Supplier (TPS) Test is failed

-- OR –

2) PJM:
   - declares a Maximum Generation Emergency
   - issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert
   - schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all or any part of such Operating Day

Potential Operational Scenarios

Normal Operations	→	*Generators continue on their Price Schedule and non-limited parameters*
Generator fails the Three Pivotal Supplier Test (TPS)	→	*Generators are placed on their cost schedule as well as their Parameter-Limited Schedules*
Max Emergency Alert, loading, etc.	→	*Generators continue on their price schedule but placed on their Parameter-Limited Schedules (note: Scarcity Pricing rules may apply)*

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PJM Unit Parameter Matrix Summary

Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW

Parameter	Minimum Down Time (Hrs)	Minimum Run Time (Hrs)	Maximum Daily Starts	Maximum Weekly Starts	Turn Down Ratio
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 125 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

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Parameter-Limited Schedules – example for Min Run Time

Without Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

A 150MW Combustion Turbine (CT) submits a 20-hour Minimum Run Time

HE 1 HE 20

This parameter could have substantial impacts to BOR credits if LMP prices fall below the unit offer prior to the end of the min-run time

---

With Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

PJM implements the parameter-limited schedule based on submitted value or unit class (in this case, 5 hours or less)

HE 1 HE 5

Business Rule 14: The submitted Minimum Run Time may not exceed the defined Minimum Run Time for the PJM defined unit class.

See Appendix for complete list of PJM-defined values

Parameter-Limited Schedules – example for Min Down Time

Without Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

A Natural Gas Steam Unit (pre-1985) submits a 48-hour Minimum Down Time

HE 1 HE 48

This parameter could result in market power issues (takes away PJM's flexibility to cycle unit)

With Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

PJM implements the parameter-limited schedule based on history of the unit or on unit class (in this case, 7 hours or less)

HE 1 HE 7

Business Rule 14: The initial Minimum Down Time for each unit is based on the minimum of the Minimum Down Times submitted over the prior 24 months, if the resultant minimum down time is less than or equal to 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time. If Minimum Down Time submitted for a unit is more than 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time, then the unit's Minimum Down Time will be set equal to 110 percent of the PJM defined unit class Minimum Down Time.

See Appendix for complete list of PJM-defined values

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Parameter-Limited Schedules – example for Max Weekly Starts

Without Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

A Combustion Turbine (CT) with a 75MW ICAP submits Maximum Weekly Starts of 1

This parameter could result in market power issues (takes away PJM's flexibility to cycle unit)



With Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

PJM implements the parameter-limited schedule based on submitted value or unit class (in this case, 14 starts or more)



Business Rule 17 - 18: The initial Maximum Starts per Week for a unit will be based on the posted level for the PJM-defined unit class. If the Maximum Starts Per Week submitted for a unit is less than the PJM-defined unit class maximum starts per week, then the unit's Maximum Starts per Week will be set equal to the PJM-defined unit class posted Maximum Starts per Week.

See Appendix for complete list of PJM-defined values

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Parameter-Limited Schedules – example for Turn Down Ratio

Without Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

A Natural Gas Steam Unit (pre-1985) submits the following:

Emg Max: 250
Econ Max: 240
Econ Min: 230
Emg Min: 50



This parameter could result substantial BOR charges due to inflexibility of unit

With Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

PJM implements the parameter-limited schedule based on history of the unit or on unit class:

Emg Max: 250
Econ Max: 240
Econ Min: 80
Emg Min: 50

(example uses a Turn Down Ratio value of 3)

Business Rule 10 - 13: Turn Down Ratio is defined as the ratio of economic maximum MW to economic minimum MW. The minimum acceptable Turn Down Ratio applicable to an individual unit will be the greater of: a) the difference between the minimum of the economic minima and the maximum of the economic maxima submitted over the prior 24 months, or b) 90 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio. If the resulting unit Turn Down Ratio is less than 90 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio, then the unit's Turn Down Ratio will be set equal to 90 percent of PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio. For CTs, the Turn Down Ratio will assumed to be 1.0.

See Appendix for complete list of PJM-defined values

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Parameter-Limited Schedules – example for Max Daily Starts

Without Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

A Combined Cycle unit Maximum Daily Starts of 1



This parameter could result in market power issues (takes away PJM's flexibility to cycle unit)

With Parameter-Limited Schedules in effect:

PJM implements the parameter-limited schedule based on submitted value or unit class





Business Rule 19 - 20: The Maximum Starts Per day will be based on the PJM-defined unit class for non-CT units. For CT units, the minimum value of maximum starts per day will be 2. If the number of Maximum Daily Starts submitted by a unit is less than the PJM-defined unit class Starts per Day for a non-CT unit, or less than 2 for a CT, then the unit's Maximum Starts per Day will be set equal to the PJM-defined unit class Maximum Starts per Day for a non-CT unit and 2 for a CT.

See Appendix for complete list of PJM-defined values

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eMarket updates will be required in the current parameter screens to reflect new parameter limits

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Parameter Limited Schedules - Timeline

- PJM posts unit class specific parameter limits 30 days prior to bi-annual enrollment period
- Generator Suppliers submitting schedules for units with physical operational limitations (exceptions) need to submit 20 days prior to bi-annual enrollment period
  - Operational limitations include
    - Restrictions due to age & long term degradation
    - Modifications due to life extension program
    - Environmental permit limitations (non-emergency conditions)

Note: PLS exceptions need to be submitted 20 days prior to December 1, 2008 implementation

Submit request for new exception to ParametersExceptions@pjm.com

All Parameter-Limited Schedules must be submitted in eMKT 7 days prior to the bi-annual enrollment period



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Daily Exception Process – Business Rules

- On a daily basis, the generation supplier may submit notification to PJM that changed physical operational limitations at the unit require a temporary exception to the unit's parameters.

- Physical operational limitations may include, but are not limited to, short term equipment failures, short term fuel quality problems such as excessive moisture in coal fired units, or environmental permit limitations under non-emergency conditions.

- Each generation supplier will provide a date on which the exception period will end. Exceptions granted may not continue past the beginning of the next period. Such exceptions will be accepted, but will be subject to after-the-fact review by PJM and the MMU. If physical conditions at the unit change such that the exception is no longer required, the generation supplier is obligated to inform PJM and the exception will be terminated.

- If an exception request is denied by PJM, the generation supplier may choose to dispute the decision via the PJM Dispute Resolution Process per the OA. While under dispute, the generation supplier will be required to submit parameter-limited schedules for the period as determined during the exception process.

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Multiple Fuels / Nuclear Units Business Rules

- Multiple-fuel units may submit a parameter-limited schedule (PLS) associated with each fuel type. All PLS's must be submitted via eMKT seven days prior to the beginning of each period. The generation supplier will be required to indicate to PJM which of the parameter-limited schedules are available each day. The exception process (as previously described) for any of the PLS's submitted for multiple-fuel units will be in effect.

- Nuclear Units are excluded from eligibility for Operating Reserve payments except in cases where PJM requests that nuclear units reduces output at PJM's direction. Other specific circumstances will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by PJM and the MMU.

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- A resource could have its parameters changed under certain operational conditions. These conditions are:
  1. failing a Three Pivotal Supplier Test
  2. Max Generation Alert, loading, etc.

- Parameters that could be impacted are Turn Down Ratio, Min Down Time, Min Run Time, Min Daily Starts, Max Weekly Starts

- Exceptions, for the entire 6-month period or for a certain number of days within the period, may be submitted. Exceptions must abide by the timeline and other requirements per the business rules.

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Ramp Limited Desired MW Calculation for Deviations

- Current Rule
  - PJM calculates all generator balancing operating reserve deviations as (Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh)
- Desired Outcome
  - Create greater incentive for generators to follow PJM dispatch instruction
- Proposed Changes
  - PJM will determine whether a generator is following dispatch and calculate the deviation based on a new calculation incorporating ramp limited desired MW

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Ramp Limited Desired (RLD) – Getting Started

Definitions, Acronyms, and New Terms applicable to RLD

- UDS Basepoint – time weighted individual generator dispatch point (this value is ramp limited)
- Ramp Limited Desired (RLD) MW – achievable MW based on UDS requested ramp rate (this value is ramp-limited)
- UDS LMP Desired MWh - calculated by comparing the hourly integrated UDS LMP to the unit's bid curve to determine a corresponding MW value (this value is not ramp-limited)
- Day-Ahead MWh – the participants DA market position
- % Off Dispatch – percentage off dispatch using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS basepoint or the actual output and Ramp Limited Desired MW **(new calculation)**
- MW Off Dispatch – MW off dispatch using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS basepoint or the actual output and Ramp Limited Desired MW **(new calculation)**

- % Off Dispatch & MW Off Dispatch time-weight the values over the hour

- Which units will this apply to?
  - DA Scheduled units
  - RA Run (2nd pass) Scheduled units
  - Must-Run units that are dispatchable and dispatched above Eco Min

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Old Rules



If greater than 10%, unit could be considered deviating
(10% of PJM desired, 5% or 5MW from DA schedule)

New Rules



Dotted line represents Ramp-Limited Desired MW

Deviations based on this new line (see previous slide)

Calculation of Ramp Limited Desired MW

$$Ramp\_Request_t = \frac{(UDStarget_{t-1} - AOutput_{t-1})}{(UDSLAtime_{t-1})}$$

$$RL\_Desired_t = AOutput_{t-1} + \left(Ramp\_Request_t * Case\_Eff\_time_{t-1} \right)$$

- AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
- RL_Desired = Ramp limited desired MW

Operating Scenarios with Ramp Limited Desired MW

Operating scenarios of the generator will determine if and how a deviation is calculated

- No Deviation Calculation ?
- Real Time MWh – Ramp Limited Desired MWh ?
- Real Time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh ?
- Real Time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh ?

See Business Rules for more details

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Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 1)

BR 39: A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled generator is considered to be "following dispatch" if its actual output is between its Ramp Limited Desired MW and UDS Basepoint, (or its % off dispatch is <= 10) or it's hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated Ramp Limited Desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum.

Unit considered following dispatch

(Dotted line represents Ramp-Limited Desired MW)



(or its % Off Dispatch is <= 10)

No Deviation Calculation

Unit considered following dispatch

(Dotted line represents Ramp-Limited Desired MW)



No Deviation Calculation

Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 2)

BR 40: A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum will be assessed deviations using |hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh|

Economic Maximum – 200 MW

RT Unit Output – 175 MW (Ramps 1 MW / min)

Unit is Self Scheduled

Economic Minimum – 100 MW

The RT dispatch lambda is $50, which translates to 100 MW (Eco Min)

Deviation based on Hourly Integrated RT MWh – Day-Ahead MWh



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Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 3)

BR 41: A unit that is dispatchable Day-Ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time will have deviations assessed using |hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW|

DA Economic Maximum – 200 MW

Unit is dispatchable in DA

Fixed Gen in RT

RT Fixed Gen Unit Output – 150 MW (Ramps 1 MW / min)

DA Economic Minimum – 100 MW

In RT, participant flags eMKT as Fixed Gen with 150 MW output

Deviation based on RT MWh - UDS LMP Desired

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Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 4)

BR 45 – 46: PJM will calculate a Ramp Limited Desired MW value for units where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in Day-Ahead (around a 5% or 5 MW bandwidth)
If a unit's real-time economic minimum is greater than its Day Ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5MW, whichever is lower, then deviations for the unit will be calculated as |hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh|

In Summary:

If the Real-Time ratio of Eco Min / Eco Max become more restrictive than what was submitted in the Day-Ahead, then the deviation is calculated as:

Real Time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh

If the Real-Time ratio of Eco Min / Eco Max is equal to (or less restrictive) what was submitted in the Day-Ahead, then the deviation is calculated as:

Real Time MWh – Ramp Limited Desired MWh

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Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 4 cont.)

DA Economic Maximum – 200 MW

Ratio of Eco Max / Eco Min submitted in DA

RT Unit Output – 125 MW (Ramps 1 MW / min)

DA Economic Minimum – 100 MW

The RT dispatch lambda increases to $150, which translates to above 200 MW (Eco Max)
In this case using a 20 minute UDS Look-Ahead:
Ramp-Limited Desired = 145 MW
UDS Basepoint = 200   UDS LMP Desired= 200

If RT Eco Max = 200 and RT Eco Min = 100
then,
Deviation based on Ramp-Limited Desired (145 – 125) if unit does not respond to lambda increase
(note: % off Dispatch is < 20%)

If RT Eco Max = 200 and RT Eco Min = 125
then,
Deviation based on UDS LMP Desired (200 – 125) if unit does not respond to lambda increase

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Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 5)

BR 48: If the unit is deemed "not following dispatch" and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, the deviation will be calculated as the |hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp Limited Des MW|.

As mentioned earlier, If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp Limited Desired MW, no deviations will be calculated

Deviation based on RT MWh – Ramp-Limited Desired MW

BR 49: If the unit is deemed to be "not following dispatch" and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, the unit's deviations will be calculated as |hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh|

Deviation based on RT MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh

% Off Dispatch *– percentage off dispatch using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS basepoint or the actual output and Ramp Limited Desired MW*



Operating Scenarios with RLD (Example 6)

BR 50: If a unit is deemed to be "not following dispatch" and has tripped, the deviation MW for the hour it tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its DA Schedule will be calculated as |hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh|

Deviation based on Hourly Integrated RT MWh – Day-Ahead MWh



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Ramp Limited Desired MW – Summary of Key Points

- Determination of generation deviations will be made using new criteria:
  1. Ramp-Limited Desired MW
  2. % Off Dispatch
  3. MW Off Dispatch

- Once a generator is deemed “deviating,” charges will be based on operational characteristics of the generator and of one of the following calculations:
  1. Real Time MWh – Ramp Limited Desired MWh
  2. Real Time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh
  3. Real Time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh

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- Current Rule
  - PJM calculates all generator deviations individually. Deviations by one generator cannot offset deviations by another generator.
- Desired Outcome
  - Recognize that generator injections at the same bus are electrically equivalent as far as their impact on the system.
- Proposed Changes
  - Generators that deviate from RT dispatch may offset deviations by another generator at the same bus.

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Supplier Netting at the Bus

Generators A and B are located at the same bus. Both generators are deemed to be “not following dispatch” for a given hour.

	Station A 138KV ST1	Station A 138KV ST2
RT Desired MW	100	200
RT Output (MW)	112	178
Deviation (MW)	12	-22

Nets to 10 MW

Old Rules

Unit 1: 12MW deviation
Unit 2: 22MW deviation

Total MWs subject to BOR charges: 34MW

New Rules

Deviation MW at the Bus:
12MW + (-22MW) = 10MW **
(**5% or 5 MW of Desired is calculated at the individual generator level prior to netting the two deviations. Therefore, both units are considered deviating.)

Total MWs subject to BOR charges: 10MW

** Note: Ramp Limited Desired MW calculation could also be applicable

- Generators that deviate from RT dispatch may offset deviations by another generator at the same bus
- For deviations purposes, these two units will look like one unit
- This change should be an overall benefit to a handful of generators within PJM

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Rule changes applicable to Demand (Load Serving Entities)

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Netting Deviations

- Current Rule
  - Demand bucket is netted across the RTO, meaning that a negative deviation in one zone could be offset by a positive deviation another zone. Supply bucket is also netted across the RTO.
- Desired Outcome
  - Recognize that deviations at differing locations on the system can impact balancing operating reserve costs.
- Proposed Change
  - Demand bucket should be netted by zone, hub, or interface. Supply bucket should be netted by zone, hub, or interface.

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Deviation Calculation (old rules)

Balancing Operating Reserve Charges Applied to:

Day-Ahead		Real-Time
	"Bucket 1"	
Cleared Decrements, DA Load, Sales/Export	← Net Deviation of total →	RT Load, Sales/Export
	"Bucket 2"	
Cleared Increments, Purchases/Imports	← Net Deviation of total →	Purchases/Imports
	"Bucket 3"	
DA Scheduled Generation	← **Individual deviation on each generator not following dispatch** →	RT Generation

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Deviation Calculation (new rules)

Balancing Operating Reserve Charges Applied to:

Day-Ahead		Real-Time
	"Bucket 1"	
Cleared Decrements, DA Load, Sales/Export By Zone, by Hub, by Interface	← Net Deviation of total →	RT Load, Sales/Export By Zone, by Hub, by Interface
	"Bucket 2"	
Cleared Increments, Purchases/Imports By Zone, by Hub, by Interface	← Net Deviation of total →	Purchases/Imports By Zone, by Hub, by Interface
	"Bucket 3"	
DA Scheduled Generation	← **Individual deviation on each generator not following dispatch** →	RT Generation

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Netting Deviations - Example

LSE "EnerWave"
Serves load in two different PJM zones

A
DA Fixed Demand = 100
RT Load Served = 0

B
DA Fixed Demand = 0
RT Load Served = 100

Old Rules

Deviation calculation = 0 MW Total Dev (DA position in Zone A offsets RT position in Zone B)

LSE "EnerWave"
Serves load in two zones in different PJM regions

A
DA Fixed Demand = 100
RT Load Served = 0

B
DA Fixed Demand = 0
RT Load Served = 100

New Rules

Does not change total COST of BORs. Allocates cost to increased participant base with possible impact to CHARGES.

Deviation calculation = 100 (Zone A) + 100 (Zone B) = 200 MW Total Dev

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Nested Hubs



Some hubs are wholly-contained inside a zone (nested).

Netting is allowed across areas that are nested.



Deviation calculation = 0 MW Total Dev (DA position in ComEd Zone offsets RT position in ComEd Gen Hub)

- For determination of BORs, Demand and Supply buckets will be netted by Zone, Hub, or Interface
- Deviations for Generators will continue to be calculated by individual unit (except for Supplier Netting at the Bus change as previously discussed)

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Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation (BORCA)

Current Rule

- Under the current Operating Reserve methodology, all Balancing OR Costs are allocated to deviations.

Desired Outcome

- Certain Balancing OR costs are incurred for reasons other than differences between Day-Ahead schedules and actual conditions. The desire is to recognize this split in cost causation and allocate the portion of Balancing OR incurred to maintain system reliability to the beneficiaries of those costs.

Proposed Solution

- **For the purposes of allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve charges, PJM will determine and identify the reasons for which operating reserve credits are earned.**
- **This determination will be conducted by PJM in two stages:**
  - **1) those resources called on during the Reliability Analysis and**
  - **2) those resources called on to operate during the operating day.**
- **The results of this determination will identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will be allocated to Real-time deviations from Day-Ahead schedules and identify the resources for which Balancing Operating Reserve credits will should be allocated to real-time load share plus exports.**

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Differentiating the reasons why operators are making decisions into the following categories:

a) Reliability

b) Managing Deviations from DA positions

	Reliability	Managing Deviations
Numerator	Collect system costs (BOR) due to reliability decisions	Collect system costs (BOR) due to changes (deviations) from DA schedules on a System–wide & Local basis
Denominator	RT Load	All Deviations (Including Incs & Decs)

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Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation (BORCA)

Reliability Analysis

1

Reliability Analysis (RA) BOR Cost Allocation

RA BOR Credits for Reliability

Units committed due to extenuating conditions that warrant conservative actions to ensure the maintenance of system reliability

(i.e. – to provide reserves over and above the quantity determined by the real time load forecast)

RA BOR Credits for Deviations

Units committed to operate in real time in order to augment the physical units committed in the Day-Ahead Market to meet the forecasted real time load plus the operating reserve requirement

Operating Day (0001 to 2400)

2

Real- Time (RT) BOR Cost Allocation

RT BOR Credits for Reliability

Units called on by PJM to operate during the operating day for which the LMP at the unit's bus does not meet or exceed the unit's applicable offer (cost or price) for at least four, 5-minute intervals of at least one clock hour during which the unit was running at PJM's direction

RT BOR Credits for Deviations

All other units operated at PJM's direction in real time

Load Ratio Share plus exports

Real- Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules

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- Current Rule
  - All balancing operating reserve credits are divided equally among all deviations (Supply Bucket, Demand Bucket, and Generator Bucket), to create a single Balancing Operating Reserve Rate across the PJM RTO.
- Desired Outcome
  - Recognize that some Balancing OR credits are accrued to manage local constraints
- Proposed Change
  - Allocate OR charges that were accrued for local constraints to the regions, creating “regional” rates for Balancing Operating Reserve charges.

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- As determined during Real Time (RT) or during the Reliability Analysis (RA), Balancing Operating Reserve Credits will be identified for either:
  - a) Reliability or b) Deviations: and
  - will be collected for the RTO and/or each Region based on whether units were committed for transmission constraints and if so, for which constraints they were committed.
- PJM will post the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet this criteria in all the respective buckets.

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Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation - Regional



- **Definition of Load-ratio Share:**
  - A Market Participant's portion of a total obligation or charge based on their "load"
    - (LSE load) / (PJM Total Load)



Allocation for Reliability

BORs for Reliability are allocated by **Load Ration Share plus Exports:**

Participant's Reliability Allocation (by RTO or Region) = Total BORs for Reliability (by RTO or Region) * (Customer total MWh of energy delivered to load + exports (by RTO or Region) / Total PJM MWh of energy delivered to load + exports (by RTO or Region))

Allocation for Deviations

BORs for Deviations are allocated by participants based on deviations from Day-Ahead scheduled quantities:

RTO Rate for BORs for Deviations = Total $ Cost of BORs in RTO for Deviations / Total MW Deviations Across RTO (after netting by zone, hub, interface)

Participants Deviation Allocation = RTO Rate for BORs for Deviations * Total MW Deviations of Participant

This example shows the calculation for deviations across RTO (not regional)

Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation

This BORCA process separates the TOTAL COST (credits) of BORs into eight buckets



Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation - Regional



Allocation Methodology

Allocated to LSEs or Deviations across RTO including those who might have charges from the regional bucket

The rate for this bucket will be the RTO rate

Allocated to LSEs or Deviations in region

The rate for this bucket will be in the form of an adder to the RTO rate

Regional costs allocated regionally

RTO costs are allocated globally

Separate buckets:
The costs of Regional BORs are not contained in the costs of the RTO BORs

No "Double Dipping" of costs

Balancing Operating Reserve Regions



For regions that do not have Regional Adders, the Regional BOR Rate for Deviations and/or Reliability will equal the RTO BOR Rate for Deviations and/or Reliability

Regional BOR Rates will be calculated for the following two OR regions:

Western Region: AEP, APS, COMED, DUQ, DAYTON

Eastern Region: BGE, DOM, PENELEC, PEPCO, METED, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RECO, AE

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The following are some scenarios for Balancing Operating Reserve Cost Allocation (BORCA)…

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Base Case

• LSE “Enerwave” serves load in the ComEd and BGE zones, HE 16

• The Load Ratio Share of Enerwave is:

ComEd – 30% Western Region – 2% RTO – 1%

BGE – 40% Eastern Region – 4% RTO – 2%

3% Total RTO

• Cleared Day Ahead Market Bids:

ComEd – 1000 MW Fixed Demand, 50 MW Dec, 10 MW Inc

BGE – 1500 MW Fixed Demand

Daily BOR Rates:

RTO Rate for Reliability: $3

Regional Adder for Reliability (East): $2

Regional Adder for Reliability (West): $1

RTO Rate for Deviations: $2

Regional Adder for Deviations (East): $2

Regional Adder for Deviations (West): n/a

Scenario #1 – BOR Cost Allocation

• Additional generation is picked up in the RA case due to an increased RTO load forecast (not for constraint control)
• The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $200,000
• The real time load for Enerwave is 900MW in ComEd and 1300MW in BGE

What is the correct BOR rate category for this unit commitment?

A) RTO BOR Rate for Reliability
B) Regional BOR Rate for Reliability (East & West)
C) RTO BOR Rate for Deviations
D) Regional BOR Rate for Deviations (East & West)

How will PJM allocate the BOR charges?

A) Load Ratio Share plus Exports by RTO
B) Load Ratio Share Plus Exports by Region
C) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by RTO
D) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by Region

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Scenario #1 – BOR Cost Allocation (cont)

- Additional generation is picked up in the RA case due to an increased RTO load forecast (not for constraint control)
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $200,000
- The real time load for Enerwave is 900MW in ComEd and 1300MW in BGE

What are the BOR costs for Enerwave for this unit commitment?

In ComEd:
100MW X $2 = $200 (Load dev)
50MW X $2 = $100 (Dec dev)
10MW X $2 = $20 (Inc dev)

RTO Rate for Deviations

In BGE:
200MW X $2 = $400 (Load dev)

Total BOR charges for Enerwave
$720

The RTO BOR Rate for Deviations will incorporate the participants deviation from DA position and will be the vehicle for the calculation

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Scenario #2 – BOR Cost Allocation

- Additional generation is picked up in the RA case due to an increased RTO load forecast (not for constraint control)
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $200,000
- The real time load for Enerwave is 900MW in ComEd and 1650MW in BGE

(Note: new netting rule nets Load / Dec deviations by zone)

What is the correct BOR rate category for this unit commitment?

A) RTO BOR Rate for Reliability
B) Regional BOR Rate for Reliability (East & West)
C) RTO BOR Rate for Deviations
D) Regional BOR Rate for Deviations (East & West)

How will PJM allocate the BOR charges?

A) Load Ratio Share plus Exports by RTO
B) Load Ratio Share Plus Exports by Region
C) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by RTO
D) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by Region

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Scenario #2 – BOR Cost Allocation (cont)

- Additional generation is picked up in the RA case due to an increased RTO load forecast (not for constraint control)
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $200,000
- The real time load for Enerwave is 900MW in ComEd and 1650MW in BGE

What are the BOR costs for Enerwave for this unit commitment?

In ComEd:
100MW X $2 = $200 (Load dev)
50MW X $2 = $100 (Dec dev)
10MW X $2 = $20 (Inc dev)

RTO Rate for Deviations

In BGE:
150MW X $2 = $300 (Load dev)

Total BOR charges for Enerwave
$620 ***

*** previous rules would calculate $20 (Inc) in BOR charges due to netting deviations across RTO

The RTO BOR Rate for Deviations incorporate the participants deviation from DA position and will be the vehicle for the calculation

Scenario #3 – BOR Cost Allocation

• PJM RTO is in a Cold Weather Alert. PJM requests 3 additional units on in addition to what was requested by the RA case
• The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $200,000

What is the correct BOR rate category for this unit commitment?

A) RTO BOR Rate for Reliability
B) Regional BOR Rate for Reliability (East & West)
C) RTO BOR Rate for Deviations
D) Regional BOR Rate for Deviations (East & West)

How will PJM allocate the BOR charges?

A) Load Ratio Share plus Exports by RTO
B) Load Ratio Share Plus Exports by Region
C) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by RTO
D) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by Region

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Scenario #3 – BOR Cost Allocation (cont)

- PJM RTO is in a Cold Weather Alert. PJM requests 3 additional units on in addition to what was requested by the RA case
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $200,000

What are the BOR costs for Enerwave for this unit commitment?

In ComEd:
$200,000 X .01 = $2,000

In BGE:
$200,000 X .02 = $4,000

Load Ratio Share by Zone (totals 3%)

Total BOR charges for Enerwave
$6,000

The RTO BOR Rate for Reliability will incorporate the Load Ratio Share and will be the vehicle for the calculation

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Scenario #4 – BOR Cost Allocation

- PJM RTO is in a Cold Weather Alert. Steam generation that was to be cycled, is run through the midnight period to ensure it's availability the next morning
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $100,000

What is the correct BOR rate category for this unit commitment?

A) RTO BOR Rate for Reliability
B) Regional BOR Rate for Reliability (East & West)
C) RTO BOR Rate for Deviations
D) Regional BOR Rate for Deviations (East & West)

How will PJM allocate the BOR charges?

A) Load Ratio Share plus Exports by RTO
B) Load Ratio Share Plus Exports by Region
C) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by RTO
D) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by Region

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Scenario #4 – BOR Cost Allocation (cont)

• PJM RTO is in a Cold Weather Alert. Steam generation that was to be cycled, is run through the midnight period to ensure it's availability the next morning
• The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $100,000

What are the BOR costs for Enerwave for this unit commitment?

In ComEd:
$100,000 X .01 = $1,000

In BGE:
$100,000 X .02 = $2,000

Load Ratio Share by Zone (totals 3%)

Total BOR charges for Enerwave
$3,000

The RTO BOR Rate for Reliability will incorporate the Load Ratio Share and will be the vehicle for the calculation

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Scenario #5 – BOR Cost Allocation

- Generation is requested in the RA Case for a 230 kV transmission constraint located in PSEG
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $100,000
- The real time load for Enerwave is 900MW in ComEd and 1300MW in BGE

What is the correct BOR rate category for this unit commitment?

A) RTO BOR Rate for Reliability
B) Regional BOR Rate for Reliability (East & West)
C) RTO BOR Rate for Deviations
D) Regional BOR Rate for Deviations (East & West)

How will PJM allocate the BOR charges?

A) Load Ratio Share plus Exports by RTO
B) Load Ratio Share Plus Exports by Region
C) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by RTO
D) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by Region

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Scenario #5 – BOR Cost Allocation (cont)

- Generation is requested in the RA Case for a 230 kV transmission constraint located in PSEG
- The total cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $100,000.
- The real time load for Enerwave is 900MW in ComEd and 1300MW in BGE

What are the BOR costs for Enerwave for this unit commitment?

In BGE:
200MW X $2 = $4,000 (Load dev)

$2 Regional Adder (East)

Total BOR charges for PSEG constraint: $4,000

Total BOR charges for Enerwave: something greater than $4,000 for RTO BORs (calculation depends on scenario of additional BORs)

The Regional Adder for Deviations will incorporate the participants deviation from DA position and will be the vehicle for the calculation

Scenario #6 – BOR Cost Allocation

- A CT is called on by the Power Dispatcher in real-time to alleviate a 230kv transmission constraint in the AEP Zone
- Throughout the operating day, the LMP never exceeded the unit's offer (in any of the five-minute intervals)
- The cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $300,000. (The cost of Operating Reserves for the RTO is $700,000.)

What is the correct BOR rate category for this additional unit commitment?

A) RTO BOR Rate for Reliability
B) Regional BOR Rate for Reliability (East & West)
C) RTO BOR Rate for Deviations
D) Regional BOR Rate for Deviations (East & West)

How will PJM allocate the BOR charges?

A) Load Ratio Share plus Exports by RTO
B) Load Ratio Share Plus Exports by Region
C) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by RTO
D) Real Time Deviations from Day-Ahead Schedules by Region

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Scenario #6 – BOR Cost Allocation (cont)

- A CT is called on by the Power Dispatcher in real-time to alleviate a 230kv transmission constraint in the AEP Zone
- Throughout the operating day, the LMP never exceeded the unit's offer (in any of the five-minute intervals)
- The cost of Operating Reserves for this additional unit commitment is $300,000. (The cost of Operating Reserves for the RTO is $700,000.)

In ComEd:
$300,000 X .02 = $6,000

Load Ratio Share for Western Region

Total BOR charges for CT in AEP: $6,000

Total BOR charges for Enerwave: something greater than $6,000 (calculation depends on scenario of additional BORs)

The Regional Adder for Reliability will incorporate the Load Ratio Share and will be the vehicle for the calculation:

RTO Rate for Reliability: $3 ← Charged for BORs across RTO
Regional Adder for Reliability (West): $1 ← Charged for BORs for CT in AEP
Enerwave's Total Rate for Reliability: $4 ← **Enerwave's total charge for all BORs**

BORCA & Regional BORCA – Summary of Key Points

- The allocation of Balancing Operating Reserve Charges will be more "cost causation" focused

- BOR costs associated with reliability will be allocated based on Load Ratio Share. BOR costs associated with deviations from DA commitments will be allocated to those entities who deviated from DA scheduled quantities.

- Using the above criteria, BORs that are associated with a constraint of <=345kV will be allocated regionally

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Information on the PJM Web….



Scroll Down to find postings on Business Rules, Training Links, etc.

PJM Operating Reserve Construct
(Business Rules)

See handouts in front of classroom

Also, see Reserve Markets Working Group materials
http://www.pjm.com/committees/working-groups/rmwg/rmwg.html

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2009 PJM Manual 11

Working to Perfect the Flow of Energy

PJM Manual 11:

Scheduling Operations

Revision: 42

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Prepared by

Forward Market Operations

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Table of Contents

Table of Exhibits

Approval

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Amanda Whitehead, Manager

Forward Market Operations

Current Revision

Revisions 42 (07/31/2009)

- Revised Section 2: Overview of Two-Settlement System section to reflect Balancing Operating Reserve construct change as approved by FERC (ER08-1569).
- Revised Section 2: Overview of Two-Settlement System to incorporate revisions to allow generators with negative offers to set price in the Day-Ahead Market during a Minimum Generation event, as approved by the Markets & Reliability Committee on July 30, 2009
- Revised Section 10: Overview of Demand Response Participation to incorporate enhancement to DSR economic aggregation rules for resources providing Ancillary Services, as approved by the Markets & Reliability Committee on July 30, 2009

Introduction

Welcome to the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this Introduction, you will find the following information:

- What you can expect from the PJM Manuals in general (see "*About PJM Manuals*").
- What you can expect from this PJM Manual (see "*About This Manual*").
- How to use this manual (see "*Using This Manual*").

About PJM Manuals

The PJM Manuals are the instructions, rules, procedures, and guidelines established by PJM for the operation, planning, and accounting requirements of the PJM RTO and the PJM Energy Market. The manuals are grouped under the following categories:

- Transmission
- PJM Energy Market
- Generation and transmission interconnection
- Reserve
- Accounting and Billing
- PJM administrative services

For a complete list of all PJM Manuals, go to www.pjm.com and select "Manuals" under the "Documents" pull-down menu.

About This Manual

The ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations*** is one of a series of manuals within the PJM Energy Market manuals. This manual focuses on the day-ahead and hourly scheduling activities that are performed by the PJM staff and the PJM Members. The manual describes the rules and procedures that are followed to schedule resources.

The ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations*** consists of ten sections. The sections are listed in the table of contents beginning on page ii.

Intended Audience

The intended audience of the PJM Manual for ***Scheduling Operations*** is:

- *PJM Members* - Any participants requesting to purchase or sell energy to or from the PJM Interchange Energy Market and any participant that schedules bilateral sales or purchases.
- *PJM operations staff* - The PJM operations staff processes the market information and develops the resource schedule.
- *PJM dispatchers* - The PJM dispatchers process PJM Member requests, make hourly schedule adjustments, and post information in the OASIS.
- *Local Control Center dispatchers* - The Local Control Center dispatchers submit hourly schedule changes.
- *Local Control Center operations support staff* - The Local Control Center operations support staff support the day-ahead information requirements.

References

The References to other documents that provide background or additional detail directly related to the PJM Manual for ***Scheduling Operations*** are:

- EES User's Guide
- PJM Manual for Transmission Operations(M-03)
- PJM Manual for PJM OASIS Operation (M-04)
- PJM Manual for PJM eSchedules (M-09)
- PJM Manual for Pre-Scheduling Operations (M-10)
- PJM Manual for Balancing Operations (M-12)
- PJM Manual for Operating Agreement Accounting (M-28)
- PJM Manual for Definitions & Abbreviations (M-35)

Using This Manual

We believe that explaining concepts is just as important as presenting procedures. This philosophy is reflected in the way we organize the material in this manual. We start each section with an overview. Then, we present details, procedures or references to procedures found in other PJM manuals. The following provides an orientation to the manual's structure.

What You Will Find In This Manual

- A table of contents that lists two levels of subheadings within each of the sections
- An approval page that lists the required approvals and a brief outline of the current revision
- Sections containing the specific guidelines, requirements, or procedures including PJM actions and market participant actions
- Attachments that include additional supporting documents, forms, or tables in this PJM Manual
- A section at the end detailing all previous revisions of the PJM Manual
- A new introduction with the “List of PJM Manuals” table removed.

Section 1: Overview of Scheduling Operations

Welcome to the *Overview of Scheduling Operations* of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- A description of the scope and purpose of scheduling (see "*Scope & Purpose of Scheduling*").
- A list of the PJM scheduling responsibilities (see "*PJM Responsibilities*").
- A list of the market participants' scheduling responsibilities (see "*PJM Interchange Energy Market Participant Responsibilities*").

Scope & Purpose of Scheduling

Operation of the PJM RTO involves many activities that are performed by different operating and technical personnel. These activities occur in parallel on a continuous basis, 24 hours a day and can be grouped into three overlapping time frames:

- pre-scheduling operations
- scheduling operations and the Day-Ahead Energy Market
- dispatching and the Real-time Energy Market

In the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations*** we focus mainly on the activities that take place one day prior to the Operating Day including the activities associated with the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Exhibit 2 presents the scheduling activities in the form of a time line. The reference point for the timeline is the "Operating Day", recognizing that every new day becomes an Operating Day. This timeline-type of description is used throughout this PJM Manual.

Generation resources fall into one of two categories, Capacity Resources or Non- Capacity Resources. If available, All Generation Capacity Resources, that have an RPM Resource Commitment must submit offer data into the Day-Ahead Market and may elect either to Self-Schedule or offer the resource to PJM for scheduling as a PJM RTO-Scheduled Resource. In this section we focus primarily on the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Control Area reliability-based scheduling process that takes place after the Day-Ahead Energy Market is cleared. Scheduling by PJM includes the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Control Area reliability-based scheduling process and the hourly scheduling process. The Day-Ahead Energy Market bid/offer period closes at noon on the day before the Operating Day and the Day-Ahead Market results are posted at 1600 on the day before the Operating Day. The Control Area reliability-based scheduling process occurs throughout the day before the operating day. Hourly scheduling occurs up to sixty minutes prior to an hour during the Operating Day. During the scheduling process, PJM will:

Clear the Day-Ahead Market and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market based using Least-cost security constrained resource commitment and dispatch that simultaneously optimizes energy and reserves.

Determine a plan to reliably serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the PJM RTO by minimizing the cost to provide additional operating reserves above what was scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market if required,

Perform hourly scheduling throughout the Operating Day as required.



Exhibit 1: Scheduling Timeline

The following notations are used in the timeline:

- D represents the Operating Day
- D-1 represents the day before the Operating Day
- D+6 represents six days after the Operating Day
- COP is the Current Operating Plan

In this manual there is no special distinction between the terms “price” and “cost”. PJM Members submit their bids according to either actual cost or offer price as designated by the Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. for each generation resource.

In this manual, **Locational Marginal Price (LMP**) is defined as the marginal price for energy at the location where the energy is delivered or received. For accounting purposes, LMP is expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour ($/MWh). In performing this LMP calculation, the cost of serving an increment of load at each bus from each resource associated with an eligible energy offer is calculated as the sum of the following three components of Locational Marginal Price: System Energy Price, Congestion Price, and Loss Price. In this manual, unless otherwise specified, the terms “**LMP” or “Locational Marginal Price”** refer to the total LMP value including all three components. **[For information on the concept of Locational Marginal Prices, please refer to Section 2 of PJM Manual for Operating Agreement Accounting]**

PJM Responsibilities

In the Day-Ahead Market, PJM determines the least-price means (minimizing production cost in terms of bid prices submitted) of satisfying the Demand bids, Decrement bids, operating reserves and other ancillary services requirements of the market buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM RTO. In addition to the Day-Ahead Market scheduling process, PJM will also schedules resources to:

- Satisfy the reserve requirements of the PJM RTO by minimizing the cost to provide additional operating reserves above what was scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market if required,
- Provide other ancillary services requirements of the market buyers,
- Satisfy all other reliability requirements of the PJM RTO. Specifically, PJM’s responsibilities to support scheduling activities for all PJM Members include:

Develop the Day-Ahead Market financial schedules based upon participant-supplied bids, offers and bilateral transaction schedules using least-cost security constrained resource commitment and dispatch analysis.

Post the following information after the Day-Ahead Market clears at 4:00 p.m.:

- Schedules for Next Day by participant (generation & demand),
- Transaction Schedules,

- Day-ahead LMPs, Day-ahead Congestion Prices, & Day-ahead Loss Prices
- Day-Ahead Binding Transmission Constraints,
- Day-Ahead Net Tie Schedules,
- Day-Ahead Reactive 500 kV Interface Indicator Limits,
- PJM Load Forecast,
- Aggregate Demand Bids
- PJM Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) Objective.

Perform scheduling for the PJM Forecasted load and reserves not covered by the Day-ahead demand bids, Self-Scheduled Resources or Bilateral Transactions, including scheduling generation to relieve expected transmission constraints

Perform analysis to clear the Regulation Market and Synchronized

Reserve Markets simultaneously and post the Regulation Marginal Clearing Price (RMCP) and Synchronized Reserve Marginal Clearing Price (SRMCP) on an hourly basis no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of the operating hour.

Maintain data and information which is related to generation facilities in the PJM RTO, as may be necessary to conduct the scheduling and dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM RTO

Post the updated forecast of PJM Load and of the location and duration of any expected transmission congestion between areas in the PJM RTO

Revise schedule of resources to reflect updated projections of load, changing Bulk Electric System conditions, availability of and constraints of limited energy and other resources

PJM Member Responsibilities

Only PJM Members are eligible to submit offers and purchase energy or related services in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and in the Real-Time Energy Market. PJM Members include the Market Buyers and the Market Sellers.

Market Buyers

There are two general types of Market Buyers:

- *Metered Market Buyer* – A Metered Market Buyer is a buyer that is purchasing energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users that are located inside the PJM RTO. A Metered Market Buyer may be further classified as a Generation Market Buyer. A Generation Market Buyer is a Metered Market Buyer that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources that are capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM RTO or selling energy-related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere. By definition, all Market Buyers become Market Sellers upon approval of their applications.

- The scheduling responsibilities of an Internal Market Buyer are to:
    - Submit forecasts of its customer loads for the next Operating Day
    - Submit economic load management agreements to PJM
    - Submit hourly schedules for Self-Scheduled Resource increments
    - Submit a forecast of the availability of each Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days
    - Submit Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources for supply of energy to the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market for the next day whether Self-Scheduled or PJM scheduled
    - Submit Bilateral Transactions for delivery within the PJM RTO, regardless of whether the generation is located inside or outside the PJM RTO
    - Submit optional Offer Data to supply Regulation Services in the PJM Regulation Market.
    - Submit optional Offer Data to supply Synchronized Reserve Services in the Synchronized Reserve Market.
- *Unmetered Market Buyer* – An Unmetered Market Buyer is a Market Buyer that is making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by metered end-users or end-users that are located outside the PJM RTO.

The scheduling responsibilities of an Unmetered Market Buyer are to:

a. Submit optional requests to purchase specified amounts of energy for each hour of the Operating Day during which it intends to purchase from the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market, along with Dispatch Rates (i.e. price-sensitive Demand Bids) above which it does not desire to purchase, if desired

b. Purchase transmission capacity reservation in order to receive generation from PJM Interchange Energy Market if the energy is being delivered to end-users that are located outside the PJM RTO

Market Sellers

A Market Seller is a PJM Member that demonstrates to PJM that it meets the standards for the issuance of an order mandating the provision of transmission service under Section 211 of the Federal Power Act, submits an application to the PJM, and is approved by the Market Administrative Committee (see the PJM Manual for **Administrative Services for Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (M-33)**).

The scheduling responsibilities of a market seller include:

- submit schedules for bilateral sales to entities outside the PJM RTO from generation within the PJM RTO
- submit optional offers for the supply of energy, capacity, and other services from Non-Capacity Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for the next operating day only

Load Serving Entities

A Load Serving Entity (LSE) is any entity that has been granted authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regulation, or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users that are located within the PJM RTO. An LSE may be a Market Buyer or a Market Seller, as described above.

Curtailment Service Providers

A Curtailment Service Provider is a Member or Special Member, which acting on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market by causing a reduction in demand.

Section 2: Overview of the PJM Two-Settlement System

Welcome to the *Overview of the PJM Two-Settlement System* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- An overview description of the PJM Two-Settlement System (see "*Overview of Two-Settlement*").
- A list of the PJM Two-Settlement Market Business Rules (see "*PJM Two-Settlement Market Business Rules*").

Overview of Two-Settlement

The Two-Settlement system consists of two markets, a Day-ahead market and a Real-time balancing market. The Day-Ahead Market is a forward market in which hourly clearing prices are calculated for each hour of the next operating day based on generation offers, demand bids, Increment offers, Decrement bids and bilateral transaction schedules submitted into the Day-Ahead Market. The balancing market is the real-time energy market in which the clearing prices are calculated every five minutes based on the actual system operations security-constrained economic dispatch. Separate accounting settlements are performed for each market, the Day-Ahead Market settlement is based on scheduled hourly quantities and on day-ahead hourly prices, the balancing settlement is based on actual hourly (integrated) quantity deviations from day-ahead scheduled quantities and on real-time prices integrated over the hour. The day-ahead price calculations and the balancing (real-time) price calculations are based on the concept of Locational Marginal Pricing. [For information on the concept of Locational Marginal Prices, please refer to ***Section 2 of PJM Manual for Operating Agreement Accounting]***

The Day-Ahead Market enables participants to purchase and sell energy at binding Day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). The components of Day-ahead hourly LMPs are the Day-ahead System Energy Price, Day-ahead Congestion Price, and the Day-ahead Loss Price. It also allows transmission customers to schedule bilateral transactions at binding Day-ahead congestion charges based on the differences in the Congestion Prices between the transaction source and sink. Load Serving Entities (LSEs) may submit hourly demand schedules, including any price sensitive demand, for the amount of demand that they wish to lock-in at Day-ahead prices. Any generator that is a PJM generation capacity resource that has an RPM Resource Commitment must submit a bid schedule into the Day-Ahead Market even if it is self-scheduled or unavailable due to outage. Other generators have the option to bid into the Day-Ahead Market. Transmission customers may submit fixed, dispatchable or 'up to' congestion bid bilateral transaction schedules into the Day-Ahead Market and may specify whether they are willing to pay congestion charges or wish to be curtailed if congestion occurs in the Real-time Market. Curtailment Service Providers (CSPs) may submit demand reduction bids. All spot purchases and sales in the Day-Ahead Market are settled at the Day-ahead prices. Congestion that results from the Day-ahead sales and purchases of energy is settled at the Day-ahead Congestion Price component of LMP. Transmission losses that result from the Day-ahead sales and purchases of energy is settled at the Day-ahead Loss Price component of LMP. After the daily quote period closes, PJM will calculate the Day-ahead schedule based on the bids, offers and schedules submitted, using the scheduling programs described in Section 2 of this manual, based on least-cost, security constrained resource commitment and dispatch for each hour of the next operating day. The Day-ahead scheduling process will incorporate PJM reliability requirements and reserve obligations into the analysis. The resulting Day-ahead hourly schedules and Day-ahead LMPs represent binding financial commitments to the market participants. Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) are accounted for at the Day-ahead Congestion Price component of LMP values (see the ***PJM Manual for Financial Transmission Rights (M-06)***).

The Real-Time Energy Market is based on actual real-time operations. Generators that are PJM capacity resources and Demand Resources that are available but not selected in the day-ahead scheduling may alter their bids for use in the Real-Time Energy Market during the Generation Rebidding Period from 4:00 PM to 6:00 PM (otherwise the original bids remain in effect for the balancing market). Real-time LMPs are calculated based on actual system operating conditions as described by the PJM state estimator. LSEs will pay the Real-time LMPs for any demand that exceeds their Day-ahead scheduled quantities (and will receive revenue for demand deviations below their scheduled quantities). Generators are paid the Real-time LMPs for any generation that exceeds their day-ahead scheduled quantities (and will pay for generation deviations below their scheduled quantities). Transmission customers pay congestion charges based on the real-time Congestion Price component of LMPs for bilateral transaction quantity deviations from Day-ahead schedules. CSPs may self schedule demand reductions for Demand Resources not dispatched in real-time by PJM. All spot purchases and sales in the balancing market are settled at the real-time LMPs. Congestion that results from the Real-time sales and purchased of energy is settled at the Real-time Congestion Price component of LMP. Transmission losses that result from the Real-time sales and purchased of energy are settled at the Real-time Loss Price component of LMP.

Two-Settlement Market Business Rules

Bidding & Operations Time Line:

The day-ahead scheduling/bidding timeline for two-settlement consists of the following time frames:

- **1200** — Day-Ahead Market bid period closes. All bids must be submitted to PJM. At 1200 PJM begins to run the two-settlement software to determine the hourly commitment schedules and the LMPs for the Day-Ahead Market. This is the first resource commitment run, which determines the resource commitment profile that satisfies the fixed demand, cleared price-sensitive demand bids, cleared demand reduction bids, and PJM Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) objectives, while minimizing the total production cost (subject to certain limitations) for energy and reserves. This commitment analysis also includes external bilateral transaction schedules and external resource offers into the PJM Day-Ahead Market.
- **1600** — PJM posts the day-ahead hourly schedules and LMPs on a web-based Market User Interface (MUI) for the two-settlement system, based on the first resource commitment. PJM also makes these results available in downloadable files, via the MUI, or a dedicated communication link.

- **1600 - 1800** — PJM opens the balancing market offer period. During this time, market participants can submit revised offers for resources not selected in the first commitment.
- **1800** — The balancing market offer period closes. PJM performs a second resource commitment, which includes the updated offers, updated resource availability information, and updated PJM load forecast information and load forecast deviation. The focus of this commitment is reliability and the objective is to minimize start-up and no load costs for any additional resources that are committed.
- **1800 - Operating Day** — PJM may perform additional resource commitment runs, as necessary, based on updated PJM load forecasts and updated resource availability information. PJM sends out individual generation schedules updates to specific generation owners only, as required.

Market Buyers

The following business rules apply to Market Buyers:

- Each Market Participant's profile (which is defined by PJM) shall specify the transmission zones or buses for which that participant is eligible to submit demand bids.
- Market Buyers may submit hourly demand quantities for which it commits to purchase energy at day-ahead prices for consumption in the next Operating Day. Quantity bids must specify MW quantity and location (transmission zone, aggregate, or single bus).
- Demand bids are assumed to exclude losses (transmission zone losses and share of 500 kV losses).
- Price sensitive demand bids shall specify MW quantity, location (transmission zone, aggregate, or single bus), and the price at which the demand shall be curtailed.
- Price sensitive demand bids are accepted in single bid blocks only. Up to nine bid blocks may be submitted per market participant at a specific location.
- If a Market Buyer submits no day-ahead bid information, then a zero MW quantity is assumed.
- For the Day-Ahead Market, the Electric Distribution Company (EDC) shall specify the transmission zone, bus distributions, and aggregate bus distributions as a daily distribution. The default distribution for a transmission zone for the Day-Ahead Market is the state estimator distribution for that zone at 8:00 a.m. one week prior to the Operating Day (i.e. if next Operating Day is Monday, the default distribution is from 8:00 a.m. on Monday of the previous week).
- The EDC may update the default distribution factors only after the state estimator populates the default.

- EDCs shall submit a forecast of demand within their transmission zone. This is for reliability purposes only (and does not, therefore, require a binding bid).
- A Market Buyer that is not an LSE or purchasing on behalf of an LSE is not required to purchase transmission service for purchases from the PJM Market to cover deviation from its sales in a day-ahead market.
- The list of transmission zones, aggregates, and single buses at which demand bids are accepted is defined by PJM.
- Market Buyers may submit increment offers or decrement bids at any hub, transmission zone, aggregate, single bus or eligible external interface point (posted on the PJM website) for which an LMP is calculated. It is not required that physical generation or load exists at the location that is specified in the increment offer or decrement bid.
- Price-sensitive demand bids, increment offers, and decrement bids must be consistent with the $1000/MWh price cap.

Market Sellers

The following business rules apply to Market Sellers:

- Self-scheduled generation shall submit an hourly MW schedule.
- Generators that are Capacity Resources shall submit offers into the Day-Ahead Market, even if they are unavailable due to forced, planned, or maintenance outages.
- Generators that are Capacity Resources and are self-scheduling shall submit offer data in the event that they are called upon during emergency procedures.
- Generation Capacity Resources shall submit a schedule of availability for the next seven days and may submit non-binding offer prices for the days beyond the next Operating Day.
- The set of offer data last submitted for each Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for each day until specifically superseded by subsequent offers.
- If a Generation Capacity Resource is not scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, it may revise its offer and submit into the real-time market or it may self-schedule the resource.
- Generation Capacity Resources that have notification, startup, and minimum run times that exceed 24 hours must submit binding offer prices for the next seven days.
- Each Generation Capacity Resource must make available at least one cost-based schedule.

- Generation offers may consist of startup, no-load, and incremental energy offer. A generation offer may not exceed $1000/MWh.

- Non-capacity resources may offer into the Day-Ahead Market or Real-Time Market.

- If a non-capacity resource does not submit offer data, then the offer is assumed to be a zero MW quantity.

- Two single price-based schedule may be offered into the Day-Ahead Market. One schedule must be a price based parameter limited schedule. The price-based parameter-limited schedule may be unavailable, and if it is, the “use max gen” flag must be set to “yes”. The price-based parameter limited schedule will be committed during Maximum Generation Emergency if it is unavailable in the Day Ahead Market and the “use max gen” flag is set to “yes”. The second price schedule is a price-based schedule that is not parameter limited. One of these two price schedules must be available in the Day Ahead Market. In addition to the price-based schedule, one cost-based schedule shall be made available for PJM's use in the event that the resource is used to control a transmission constraint. The cost based schedule shall be parameter-limited.

- A generator offer that is accepted for the Day-Ahead Market automatically carries over into the balancing market.

- Only a single price-based offer may be submitted into the balancing market.

- A generator offer for a generating unit with combined cycle capability shall make available either the schedule for the CTs or the schedule for the combined cycle unit, not both, unless the unit is using the combined cycle model.

- Only CTs may submit weather curves, which specify MW limits for CTs as a function of temperature.

- Forecast points shall consist of a daytime temperature and a nighttime temperature.

- There are separate weather curves for economic MW and for emergency MW.

- Each CT is assigned to a weather point, which is entered by the Operating Company. As generating units change ownership it may be necessary to add weather points. The default for the weather points is the PJM temperature forecast.

- The priority of generator offer operating limits is unit limits that can be overridden by daily unit schedule MW limits. Daily unit schedule MW limits can be overridden by unit hourly MW limits. Weather curves for CTs apply to both unit limits and schedule limits.

- Market Sellers may submit increment offers or decrement bids at any hub, transmission zone, aggregate, single bus or or eligible external interface point (posted on the PJM website) for which an LMP is calculated. It is not required that physical generation or load exists at the location that is specified in the increment offer or decrement bid.

- A price-based unit has the option to choose cost-based start-up and no-load fees. A price-based unit that chooses the cost based option may change the start-up and no-load fees daily. A priced-based unit that chooses the price based option will continue to be able to change the start-up and no-load fees twice a year.

- The choice between using cost-based and price-based startup and no-load fees can be made twice a year during the same open enrollment window (on or before 1200 hours March 31 for the period April 1 through September 30 and on or before 1200 hours September 30 for the period October 1 through March 31). Period 1 is defined as the period of time beginning April 1 and ending September 30. Period 2 is defined as the period of time beginning October 1 and ending March 31. If a priced based unit chooses the cost-based start-up and no-load fees option, the decision cannot be changed unit the next open enrollment period takes place.

- When a unit or part of a unit is designated as Maximum Emergency (ME), this means that the referenced output levels may require extraordinary procedures and that the designated MW is available to PJM only when PJM requests Maximum Emergency Generation. Designation of a unit or a portion of a unit as ME should be based on the real operating characteristics of the unit and not be used to withhold all or a portion of the capacity of a unit from the Day-Ahead Market.

Designation of all or part of a unit's capacity as Maximum Emergency (ME) constitutes withholding in the Day-Ahead Market, if:

- The capacity is not designated as ME in the bid for the Real-Time Market, or;

- There is no physical reason to designate the unit as ME.

The consequence of withholding a unit's capacity under ME is:

- The unit will be given an outage ticket which reflects a de-rating equal to the positive difference in capacity designated Maximum Emergency in the bid for the Day-Ahead Market and capacity designated Maximum Emergency in the bid for the Real-Time Market.

- A unit bid includes an Economic Maximum point, which is the highest output on its bid curve that the unit is offering for economic dispatch. The Economic Max represents the highest unrestricted level of MW that the operating company will operate the unit, under its offer, for economic dispatch. The Economic Max point should be based on the actual capability of the unit to operate on its bid curve and should not be used to withhold a portion of the capacity of a unit from the Day-Ahead Market.

Reduction of Economic Max MW constitutes withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, if:

- The Economic Max MW is higher in the bid for the Real-Time Energy Market than in the bid for the Day-Ahead Market, or;

- There is no physical reason to designate a lower Economic Max in the bid for the Day-Ahead Market bid than in the bid for the Real-Time Market.
- The consequence of withholding a unit's capacity by reduction of Economic Max MW is:
  - The unit will be given an outage ticket which reflects a derating equal to the positive difference in Economic Max output designated in the bid for the Real-Time Market and in the bid for the Day-Ahead Market.
  - Generating units that are connected to the system at the same electrical location may be aggregated and offered into the PJM market as a single unit.
- The aggregated unit must be offered into the PJM markets as a single unit with only one set of offer data, including startup, no load and incremental energy. This rule applies to all energy and ancillary service markets into which the unit is offered.
- Hourly integrated, revenue quality meter data must be submitted to eMeter on the basis of the aggregated unit.
- Real-time meter data is required for each physical unit in order to support the PJM state estimator model and to allow energy settlement on an individual unit level.
- Balancing Operating Reserve deviations for aggregated units will be calculated based on the hourly difference between the DA schedule for the aggregated unit and the hourly integrated revenue quality eMeter data for the aggregated unit.
- Balancing Operating Reserve Generator deviations for units deemed to be "not following dispatch" that occur at a single bus will be able to offset one another.
- A "single bus" will be any unit located at the same site and that has the identical electrical impacts on the transmission system. Units are deemed to have identical electrical impacts on the transmission system if they meet the following criteria:
  - Units that have identical dfax to the system
  - Units that are on the same low side of the bus (i.e. connected at same voltage level)
- In the case of units on busses with bus-tie breaker, if bus-tie breaker was open less than 5% of the hours in the previous 3 years, supplier netting of units will be allowed across this bus-tie breaker.
- PJM will maintain a list of units that are deemed to have identical electrical impacts on the transmission system to be used for Balancing Operating Settlement. PJM will review the list on an annual basis. Generators will be reviewed as needed during any new generation activation or reconfiguration process as defined in **Section 7 of PJM Manual 14d: Generator Operational Requirements .**

- Unit parameters do not have to be identical for the units' deviation MW to offset one another.

- If multiple units are deemed to be "not following dispatch" at a single bus, the deviation MW and direction of each unit at that bus will be summed to determine the deviation MW at that bus.

- Units at a "single bus" must be owned or marketed by single PJM Market Participant.

- Unit modeling changes in the PJM eMKT system (unit type, aggregation level, for example), not including changes based on physical changes at the plant, can be made at the beginning of each quarter.

- CT's are permitted to provide an Economic Minimum less than the physical economic minimum value of the unit.Per the PJM Manual for Operating Agreement Accounting, for settlement purposes, PJM determines the resource's hourly Desired MWh based on its dispatch rate, offer data, and minimum and maximum energy limits for that hour. For steam units, the lesser of the day-ahead scheduled and real-time economic minimum limits, and the greater of the day-ahead scheduled and real-time economic maximum limits, are used. For CT's, operating at PJM direction, the actual real-time output is used as the Desired MWh value.Transmission Customers

Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules

Below is the list of business rules to require units to submit schedules that meet minimum accepted parameters.

- Pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters for all generation resources will define limits on generation resources' non-price offer parameters under the following circumstances:
    - If the three pivotal supplier test for the operating reserve market defined by transmission constraint(s) is failed, generation resources will be committed on their Parameter-Limited Schedule, as defined below.
        - The Parameter-Limited Schedule that is utilized shall be the less limiting of the defined Parameter-Limited Schedules or the submitted offer parameters.
    - In the event that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all or any part of such Operating Day, generation resources will be committed on their Parameter-Limited Schedule.

- On an annual basis, PJM will define a list of minimum acceptable operating parameters, based on an analysis of historically submitted offers, for each unit class for the following parameters[1]:
    - Turn Down Ratio
    - Minimum Down Time
    - Minimum Run Time
    - Maximum Daily Starts
    - Maximum Weekly Starts
- The following parameters[2] will be reviewed on an ongoing basis, via a stakeholder process, and may, at some future date, define limitations for:
    - Hot Start Notification Time
    - Warm Start Notification Time
    - Cold Start Notification Time
- The operating parameters for each unit class must meet the historically based criteria listed in the rules below. The operating parameter limits will remain in place unless an exception is filed and approved (see rules below).
- Turn Down Ratio is defined as the ratio of economic maximum MW to economic minimum MW.
- The minimum acceptable Turn Down Ratio applicable to an individual unit will be the greater of:

  a) the difference between the minimum of the economic minima and the maximum of the economic maxima submitted over the prior 24 months, or

  b) 90 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio.
- If the resulting unit Turn Down Ratio is less than 90 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio, then the unit's Turn Down Ratio will be set equal to 90 percent of PJM-defined unit class Turn Down Ratio.
- For CTs, the Turn Down Ratio will assumed to be 1.0.
- The submitted Minimum Run Time may not exceed the defined Minimum Run Time for the PJM-defined unit class.

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[1] As defined in the PJM Manuals and Markets Database Dictionary.
[2] As defined in the PJM Manuals and Markets Database Dictionary.

- The initial Minimum Down Time for each unit is based on the minimum of the Minimum Down Times submitted over the prior 24 months, if the resultant minimum down time is less than or equal to 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time.

- If Minimum Down Time submitted for a unit is more than 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time, then the unit's Minimum Down Time will be set equal to 110 percent of the PJM-defined unit class Minimum Down Time.

- The initial Maximum Starts per Week for a unit will be based on the posted level for the PJM-defined unit class.

- If the Maximum Starts Per Week submitted for a unit is less than the PJM-defined unit class maximum starts per week, then the unit's Maximum Starts per Week will be set equal to the PJM-defined unit class posted Maximum Starts per Week.

- The Maximum Starts Per day will be based on the PJM-defined unit class for non-CT units. For CT units, the minimum value of maximum starts per day will be 2.

- If the number of Maximum Daily Starts submitted by a unit is less than the PJM-defined unit class Starts per Day for a non-CT unit, or less than 2 for a CT, then the unit's Maximum Starts per Day will be set equal to the PJM-defined unit class Maximum Starts per Day for a non-CT unit and 2 for a CT.

- Generation resources will be required to submit an additional price schedule specifying the unit's predefined non-price parameter limits. This schedule will be identified as the unit's "parameter limited" schedule. The unit's cost-based schedule(s) to be used when the unit is offer-capped for transmission will also need to include the same parameters as the Parameter-Limited Schedule.

- The MMU will post unit class specific parameter limits thirty (30) business days prior to the bi-annual enrollment periods for the submission of start-up and no-load costs. Period 1 is defined as the period of time beginning April 1 and ending September 30. Period 2 will be defined as the period of time beginning October 1 and ending March 31. Twenty (20) business days prior to each period, all generation suppliers that wish to submit a Parameter-Limited Schedule for units with physical operational limitations that prevent the units from meeting the minimum parameters may submit a request for a new exception via eMKT for evaluation. Each generation supplier must supply the required historical unit operating data in support of the exception.

- Physical operational limitations may include, but are not limited to, metallurgical restrictions due to age and long term degradation, physical design modifications performed as part of a life extension program, or environmental permit limitations under non-emergency conditions.

- Each requested exception will indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the date on which the requested exception period will end. If physical conditions at the unit change such that the exception is no longer required, the generation supplier is obligated to inform PJM and the exception will be reviewed to determine if the exception continues to be appropriate.

- PJM and the MMU review the exception and provide the generation supplier with a decision within ten (10) business days. Should PJM require additional technical expertise in order to evaluate the exception request, PJM will engage the services of a consultant with the required expertise.] All Parameter-Limited Schedules must be submitted in eMKT seven days prior to the beginning of period 1 and period 2, defined as April 1 and October 1, respectively.

- On a daily basis, each generation supplier may submit notification to PJM that changed physical operational limitations at the unit require a temporary exception to the unit's parameters. Each generation supplier must supply the required unit operating data in support of the exception.

- The process and timeline for submitting a daily exception is as follows:

  - By 10 am prior to the close of DAM

    - Initial Deadline to request a parameter exception that will begin the next operating day

    - PLS Schedules (both Price & Cost) will be revised in eMKT to change the parameter limit for the next operating day

    - Daily Exception Requests should be submitted via eMKT

  - By 4 pm prior to operating day (close of the DAM)

    - PJM must receive a complete exception request that includes:

    - Unit Name

    - Parameter Limit Requested

    - Reason for Daily Exception Request

    - eDart ticket

    - Justification for Daily Exception Request, including required unit operating data in support of the exception

    - Date on which the exception period will end. Exceptions granted may not continue past the beginning of the next period.

  - If PJM does not receive a complete exception request, and the unit did not clear in the DAM, the unit schedule will returned to its previous parameter limits.

- Physical operational limitations may include, but are not limited to, short term equipment failures, short term fuel quality problems such as excessive moisture in coal fired units, or environmental permit limitations under non-emergency conditions.
- For steam units, regardless of fuel type, the average historical values for any of the parameters as offered by the owners for the calendar year 2006 may be used in place of the values in the matrix.
- For steam units, regardless of fuel type, the historical average is calculated from the market based offers for market based units and from cost-based offers for units which made only cost-based offers.
- For combined cycle units,
  - If the 2006 average historical market-based offer parameters are within the limits in the parameter matrix, the unit be limited to that 2006 historical average. If not then ii) applies;
  - If the unit was offered with market-based offer parameters for 10% or more of the days (36 days minimum) at a level at or more flexible than parameters in matrix, the unit will be limited at that level. If not the iii) applies
  - If the 2006 average historical market based offer parameters exceed the limits in the matrix (less flexible than the parameters in the matrix) then the unit will be limited to the level at which the market-based parameter was bid to the most flexible level for 10% or more of the days (36 days minimum) at that level.
- Each generation supplier will provide a date on which the exception period will end. Exceptions granted pursuant to Business Rule #27 may not continue past the beginning of the next period. Such exceptions will be accepted, but will be subject to after-the-fact review by PJM , and the MMU provided that the after-the-fact review shall be limited to the continuation of the exception. If physical conditions at the unit change such that the exception is no longer required, the generation supplier is obligated to inform PJM and the exception will be terminated.
- If an exception request is denied by PJM in part or in full, the generation supplier may choose to dispute the decision via the Dispute Resolution Process as defined in the PJM Operating Agreement. While under dispute, the generation supplier will be required to submit parameter-limited schedules for the period as determined during the exception process.
- Generation suppliers may indicate to PJM those units with the ability to operate on multiple fuels. Multiple-fuel units may submit a parameter-limited schedule associated with each fuel type. All Parameter-Limited Schedules must be submitted via eMKT seven days prior to the beginning of each period. The generation supplier will be required to indicate to PJM which of the parameter-limited schedules are available each day. Any exceptions required for any of the parameter-limited schedules submitted for multiple-fuel units will be required to be submitted and approved via the exception process.

- Nuclear Units are excluded from eligibility for Operating Reserve payments except in cases where PJM requests that nuclear units reduces output at PJM's direction or where a physical problem at a nuclear unit requires a risk premium and that risk premium is submitted to and accepted by the MMU. Other specific circumstances will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by PJM and the MMU.

The following business rules apply to Transmission Customers:

- Transmission customers may submit external bilateral transaction schedules and may indicate willingness to pay congestion charges into either the Day-Ahead Market or balancing market. In the Day-Ahead Market, a transaction shall indicate willingness to pay congestion charges by submitting the transaction as an 'up to' congestion bid.

- 'Up to' congestion bids shall be no greater than $50/MWh, and no less than -$50/MWh. Any 'up to' congestion transaction that bids higher than $50/MWh or less than -$50/MWh will be rejected.

- PJM will maintain an up-to date list of source/sink combinations that will be available for 'Up to 'congestion bidding on the PJM OASIS.

- Internal bilateral transactions may be designated as day-ahead or balancing market in PJM eSchedules.

- Up-to congestion bids and increment offers and decrement bids shall be supported in the Day-Ahead Market only.

- 'Up to" congestion bids are cleared based on the total LMP price difference between the source and the sink.

Curtailment Service Providers

The business rules that apply to Curtailment Service Providers are set forth in Section 10.

PJM Activities

The following business rules apply to PJM activities:

- PJM shall post on the two-settlement MUI the PJM load forecast, total bid demand, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) objective for each hour of the next Operating Day by 1600 at the completion of the day-ahead scheduling process.

- PJM shall post forecasts of total hourly demand for the next four days and peak demand for the subsequent three days.

- PJM shall post hourly LMP, Congestion Price, and Loss Price values for the next operating day at the completion of the day-ahead scheduling process at 1600.

- PJM shall post the schedule of demand, supply, and bilateral transactions for private viewing by market participants.
- PJM may perform supplemental resource commitments after the day-ahead schedule is posted in order to maintain reliable operation. Such supplemental commitments are based on minimizing startup and no-load costs.
- During the various resource commitment analyses, PJM may limit its dependence on Combustion Turbines to provide reserves in order to maintain reliable operational standards. Such limits shall be based on past performance of these units.
- PJM's market power mitigation procedure continues under the two-settlement procedure. If transmission limits are identified during the day-ahead scheduling process or during real-time operations, the appropriate generators (those for which the owner fails the Three-Pivotal Supplier Test as detailed in Section 6.4.1 paragraphs (e) and (f) of the PJM Operating Agreement) are offer-capped.
- Units are offer-capped at lesser of their cost-based or price-based schedules, including start-up and no-load components. Specific details regarding determination of cost-based offers may be found in PJM Manual M-15 (Cost Development Guidelines) and Section 6.4.2 of the PJM Operating Agreement.
- For the Day-Ahead Market, the offer caps will apply for the length of time the unit is scheduled.
- Non-CT units offer-capped in the Day-Ahead Market will be offer-capped in the real-time market.
- Units offer-capped in the real-time market shall remain offer-capped until the unit's minimum run time is exhausted. Once the minimum run time for a particular unit expires in the real-time market, if that unit is no longer needed to control any of the constraints for which it was originally started but the unit is kept on-line, the decision as to whether the unit remains offer-capped will be made as follows:
  - If PJM needs the unit for economics (on its price-based offer) and the unit is not required to relieve a current or anticipated constraint, the unit will be un-capped.
  - If released by PJM, any subsequent offer-capping decision for a unit will be determined by the Three-Pivotal Supplier Test.
- Units remain eligible to set LMP when offer-capped.
- Offer-capping is suspended in Scarcity Pricing Regions during scarcity conditions, as defined and detailed in Section 6A of the PJM Operating Agreement and PJM Manual M-13 (Emergency Procedures).
- Units brought on-line for economics prior to constrained conditions will not be offer-capped.

- Once the price-based switch is set to price (set by PJM upon request from generation owner), the generator owner cannot return to a cost-based offer (cost-capped or historic LMP-capped).

- Price-sensitive demand can set LMP in the Day-Ahead Market. (Due to communication infrastructure challenges, price-sensitive demand cannot currently set LMP in the real-time market.)

Mechanical/Technical Rules

- A valid generator offer consists of the following elements:

  - For an internal Generation Capacity Resource a valid generator offer consists of a price-based schedule (if the unit has switched to price) and at least one cost-based schedule. The default values for the schedules are:

    1. Day-Ahead Market switch is yes (1).
    2. Balancing market switch is yes (1).
    3. Use start-up & no-load switch is yes (1).
    4. Use offer slope switch is no (0).
    5. Condense available switch is blank or no (0).
    6. Startup and no load costs are zero.
    7. Hourly economic max/min and emergency max/min are the unit level economic and emergency MW limits, respectively.
    8. Minimum down time, minimum run time, start times, and notification times are zero.
    9. Maximum run time and maximum number of starts per week are infinity.
    10. The default for incremental offer curve data is $0. If the last MW point on the segment curve is less than the maximum emergency limit, then the curve is extended up to the emergency maximum limit using zero slope from the last incremental point on the curve.

  - For an external resource or a non-Capacity Resource, a valid generator offer consists of a price-based schedule. The default values for the schedules are:

    1. Day-Ahead Market switch is yes (1).
    2. Balancing market switch is yes (1).
    3. Use start-up & no-load switch is yes (1).

4. Use offer slope switch is no (0).

5. Condense available switch is blank or no (0).

6. Startup and no-load costs are zero.

7. Hourly economic max/min and emergency max/min are the unit level economic and emergency MW limits, respectively.

8. Minimum down time, minimum run time, start times, and notification times are zero.

9. Maximum run time and maximum number of starts per week are infinity.

10. The default for incremental offer curve data is $0. If the last MW point on the segment curve is less than the maximum emergency limit, then the curve is extended up to the emergency maximum limit using zero slope from the last incremental point on the curve.

11. Valid offers for demand bids, price sensitive and fixed, consist of the following items:

12. MW, with a default value of 0 MW. Demand bids should not include losses.

13. Location (transmission zone, aggregate, or single bus)

14. Price at which demand shall be curtailed (for price-sensitive bids)

Modeling

- Fixed transactions, including increment offers and decrement bids, are modeled in the Resource Commitment. Up-to congestion transactions are not modeled in the commitment, but are handled in the day–ahead dispatch. PJM does not commit additional generation to support up-to congestion transactions.

- The day-ahead security analysis treats increment offers and decrement bids injections as distributed load (or generation) that create an imbalance where physical load and generation do not exist.

- External bilateral transactions with source = interface bus are modeled as generation at the source bus location. This is the case for both dispatchable and non-dispatchable transactions.

- External bilateral transactions with sink = interface bus are modeled as a load at the sink bus location. This is the case for both dispatchable and non-dispatchable transactions.

- Only fixed transactions and transactions involving external aggregate resources are modeled in the Resource Commitment (RSC) for the Day-Ahead Market.

Day-Ahead LMP Calculations

- The day-ahead LMP calculation is based on the first resource commitment, which has the objective to satisfy the day-ahead bid demand, plus the PJM Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) objective requirement for that level of bid demand.
- The following resources are eligible to set LMP values in the Day-Ahead Market:
    - all pool-dispatchable steam units
    - pool-scheduled CTs and diesels whose bid price is at or below the system marginal cost
    - dispatchable external resource offers
    - increment offers
    - committed Economic Load Response bids
- Demand bids that are eligible to set LMP values in the Day-Ahead Market are price-sensitive demand bids and decrement bids.
- Transactions that bid 'up to' congestion charges are eligible to set LMP values in the Day-Ahead Market.
- Settlements Data Requirements Data required for day-ahead settlements:
    - Day-ahead LMP values by PNODE
    - Day-ahead System Energy Prices, Day-ahead Congestion Prices, Day-ahead Loss Prices
    - Day-ahead schedule MW quantities by Market Participant and by PNODE
    - Increment/decrement bid clearing results and transaction clearing results
    - Binding transmission constraints
    - Generators that have been price-capped
    - Generation offer data (startup, no-load, incremental curve, availability, etc.)
    - Economic Load Response offer data (shutdown costs, strike price, etc.)
- Data required for balancing settlements:
    - Generation offer data (startup, no load, incremental curve, availability, etc.)
    - Generation status information, via DMT

- Transmission losses by transmission zone and 500 kV transmission losses
- Economic Load Response offer data (shutdown costs, strike price, etc.)

- There are two Operating Reserve calculations, which require the following information:
  - Day-Ahead Operating Reserves
  - Number of starts for the day by class (hot, intermediate, cold)
  - Startup cost by class (hot, intermediate, cold)
  - No load cost
  - Resource offer data
  - Schedule id
  - Scheduled MW
  - Price switch (price-based unit Yes/No)
  - Use startup/no-load switch
  - Resource status
  - Economic Max
  - Economic Min
  - Balancing Operating Reserves
  - Dispatch logging information, via the Unit Dispatch System (UDS) and Dispatch Management Tool (DMT)
  - Unit state estimated MW
  - Resource offer data

Day-Ahead Settlement

- Day-ahead settlement is based on Day-ahead hourly LMPs. The components of Day-ahead hourly LMPs are the Day-ahead System Energy Price, Day-ahead Congestion Price, and the Day-ahead Loss Price.

- For each hour of the Day-Ahead Market:

- Each scheduled demand pays its day-ahead System Energy Price component of LMP for the hour.
- Each scheduled generator is paid its day-ahead System Energy Price component of LMP for the hour.

- Scheduled transactions pay congestion charges based on the day-ahead Congestion Price component of LMP differences between sources and sinks.
- Transmission losses that result from the Day-ahead sales and purchases of energy will be settled at the Day-ahead Loss Price component of LMP.
- FTR holders receive congestion credits based on hourly day-ahead Congestion Price component of LMP values. Therefore, under two-settlement, congestion charges for the hour from both day-ahead and real-time markets are distributed to FTR holders based on target allocations, which are calculated as a function of day-ahead prices. Excess congestion charges are distributed in the following manner:
  - Stage One - PJM distributes excess Transmission Congestion Charges accumulated during the month to each holder of FTRs in proportion to, but not greater than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during that month as compared to its total target allocations for the month.
  - Stage Two - Any remaining excess after the stage one distribution will be used to satisfy any FTR deficiency from previous months within the Planning Period on a pro-rata basis up to the full FTR Target Allocation value.
  - Stage Three – Any remaining excess after the stage Two distribution will be carried forward to the next month as excess congestion charges.
  - Stage Four - At the end of the calendar year, any remaining Excess Congestion Charges will first be used to satisfy any ARR deficiency that may exist. If insufficient funds exist to honor all ARR revenue shortfalls then the funds would be distributed by ratio of the ARR deficiency.
  - Stage Five - PJM distributes any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after the stage four distribution to Network Customers and Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers in proportion to their Demand Charges for Network Integration Service and their charges for Reserved Capacity for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, regardless of whether these customers hold FTRs for their Transmission Service.
- Operating Reserves — There are separate operating reserve credit calculations for the Day-Ahead Market and the balancing market. This option preserves the incentive for demand and supply to bid into the Day-Ahead Market based on their actual expectations and preserves the incentive for generation to follow real-time dispatch signals.

- A resource that is accepted in the Day-Ahead Market will be eligible to receive a day-ahead operating reserves credit. If a different schedule is made available in real-time operations, this resource is not eligible to receive a balancing market operating reserve credit.

- Allocation of operating reserve charges in the Day-Ahead Market is to all day-ahead demand, accepted Decrement bids, and to exports that submit day-ahead schedules (not including bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside PJM).

Balancing Settlement

- Balancing settlement is based on Real-Rime LMP values averaged over the hour. The components of Real-Time hourly LMPs are the Real-time System Energy Price, Real-time Congestion Price, and the Real-time Loss Price.

- Transmission losses that result from the Real-time sales and purchased of energy will be settled at the Real-time Loss Price component of LMP.

- Settlement is performed on quantity deviations from day-ahead schedule values.

- FTRs do not apply to balancing settlement. FTRs apply to the day-ahead settlement only, because of the market revenue adequacy issue. PJM cannot provide financial hedging in both the day-ahead and the balance markets, which in effect is selling the service twice.

- Balancing operating reserves charges are allocated to all deviations from day-ahead scheduled quantities including demand deviations, generation deviations (for generation not following real-time dispatch instructions, scheduling and dispatch signals), transaction import/export deviations (but not including bilateral transactions that are dynamically schedule to load outside the PJM RTO), and for increment or decrement bid deviations. Balancing operating reserves for synchronous condensing are allocated to Market participants in proportion to deliveries of energy to load during the Operating Day, excluding its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside the PJM RTO.

Maximum Emergency Generation in Day-Ahead Market

- If the day-ahead demand bid MW cannot be satisfied with all available generation at its economic maximum MW limit, the program shall issue a Maximum Generation Warning message due to a shortage of economic generation in the Day-Ahead Market. The program shall then perform the following steps to achieve power balance:

    - Increase all on-line generation up to its maximum emergency MW limit. (Increase generator MW proportionately by ratio of economic maximum, if power balance is achieved prior to reaching maximum limits). Set LMP values equal to the highest offer price of all on-line generation.

- Load off-line generation that is designated as available only for maximum generation emergency conditions, as required. The order of loading is based on economic offer data. Set LMP values equal to the highest offer price of all on-line generation.

- If power balance is not achieved after Step 2, drop any remaining price-sensitive demand to zero MW. Set LMP values equal to the highest price-sensitive demand bid that was cut in this step. If no price-sensitive demand was reduced in this step, the LMP values are set equal to highest offer price of all on-line generation (resulting from Step 2).

- If power balance is not achieved after step 3, reduce all load proportionately (by ratio of load MW) until balance is achieved. Set LMP values equal to the highest offer price of all on-line generation, the price from Step 3, or the bid cap (presently $1000/ MWh), whichever is higher.

Minimum Capacity Emergency in Day-Ahead Market

- If the day-ahead demand bid MW is less than the total generation MW with all possible generation off and with all remaining generation at their economic minimum MW limit, the program shall issue a Minimum Generation Warning message due to an excess of economic generation in the Day-Ahead Market. The program shall then perform the following steps to achieve power balance.

- Reduce all on-line generation down to its minimum emergency MW limit. (Reduce generator MW proportionately, by ratio of economic minimum, if power balance is achieved prior to reaching minimum limits). Set LMP values equal to the lower of zero or to the lowest offer price of all on-line generation.

- Set LMP values to zero. Reduce all on-line generation below emergency minimum proportionately (by ratio of emergency minimum) to achieve power balance.

Section 3: Overview of the PJM Regulation Market

Welcome to the *Overview of the PJM Regulation Market* section of the PJM Manual for ***Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- An overview description of the PJM Regulation Market (see "Overview of PJM Regulation Market").
- A list of the PJM Regulation Market Business Rules (see "PJM Regulation Market Business Rules").

Overview of the PJM Regulation Market

The PJM Regulation Market provides PJM participants with a market-based system for the purchase and sale of the Regulation ancillary service. Resource owners submit specific offers to provide Regulation, and PJM utilizes these offers together with energy offers and resource schedules from the eMarket System, as input data to the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Optimizer (SPREGO). SPREGO then optimizes the RTO dispatch profile and forecasts LMPs to calculate an hourly Regulation Market Clearing Price (RMCP). This clearing price is then used to determine the credits awarded to providers and charges allocated to purchasers of the Regulation service.

PJM uses resource schedules and regulation and energy offers from the eMarket System as input data to the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Optimizer (SPREGO) to provide the lowest cost alternative for the procurement of Ancillary Services and energy for each hour of the operating day. The lowest cost alternative for these services is achieved through a simultaneous co-optimization of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, and energy. Within the co-optimization, an RTO dispatch profile is forecasted along with LMPs for the market hour and adjacent hours. Using the dispatch profile and forecasted LMPs, an opportunity cost is estimated for each resource that is eligible to provide regulation. The estimated opportunity cost for demand resources will be zero. The estimated opportunity cost is then added to the regulation offer price to create the merit order price. All available regulating resources are then ranked in ascending order of their merit order prices, and the lowest cost set of resources necessary to simultaneously meet the PJM Regulation Requirement, PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement, and provide energy that hour is determined. The highest merit order price associated with this lowest cost set of resources awarded regulation becomes the RMCP for that hour of the operating day. Resource owners may self-schedule Regulation on any qualified resource, and the merit order price for any self-scheduled Regulation resource is set to zero.

PJM simultaneously optimizes energy, Regulation and Synchronized Reserve, and assigns both Regulation and Synchronized Reserve to the most cost-effective set of resources each hour of the operating day.

In the after-the-fact settlement, any resources self-scheduled to provide Regulation are compensated at the hourly RMCP. Any resources selected by PJM to provide Regulation are compensated at the higher of the hourly RMCP or their real-time opportunity cost plus their Regulation offer price. LSEs required to purchase Regulation are charged the hourly

RMCP plus their percentage share of opportunity cost credits over and above the RMCP and any un-recovered costs of resources called on by PJM to provide Regulation.

PJM Regulation Market Business Rules

Regulation Market Eligibility

- Regulation offers may be submitted only for those resources electrically within the PJM RTO.
- The following resources criteria must be met:
  - Generation resources must have a governor capable of AGC control.
  - Resources must be able to receive an AGC signal.
  - Resources must demonstrate minimum performance standards, as set forth in the PJM Manuals.
  - New resources must pass an initial performance test (minimum 75% compliance required). PJM will rely on owner's data for initial qualification. Resources qualified as of June 1, 2000 are grandfathered.
  - Resources must exhibit satisfactory performance on dynamic evaluations.
  - Resources MW output must be telemetered to the PJM control center in a manner determined to be acceptable by PJM.
- The following information must be supplied through the Two-Settlement Market User Interface (eMarket):
  - Resource Regulating Status (available, unavailable, self-scheduled)
  - Regulation Capability (above and below regulation midpoint, MW)
  - Regulation Maximum and Minimum values, considering any necessary offsets (MW)
- Cost-Based Regulation Offer ($/MWHr). This value will be validated using the unit-specific operating parameters submitted with the regulation offer and the applicable $12/MWHr regulation margin adder.
- Price-Based Regulation Offer ($/MWHr, optional): This value is capped at $100/MWHr, and its submission is optional on the part of the market participant.

In addition to the cost-based regulation offer price, each market participant may also submit additional information to support the cost-based offer price. Using the calculations in Manual M-15: Cost Development Guidelines, PJM will validate the cost-based regulation offer price to ensure that it does not exceed actual regulating cost as determined by this manual, plus the applicable regulation margin adder. Any cost-based offer prices that exceed this value will be rejected by eMKT.

If a market participant does not submit a cost-based regulation offer price they will not be permitted to participate in the PJM Regulation Market until such offer has been validated. Any participants that do not submit any of the supporting parameters below will have their cost-based regulation offer price capped at the margin adder of $12/MWHr.

The following optional parameters may be submitted to support the cost-based regulation offer price. If any of these parameters are not submitted they will default to zero.

- **Heat Rate @ EcoMax [BTU/KWh]:** The heat rate at the default economic maximum for a resource. The economic maximum that will correspond to this rate value will be the default economic maximum that is shown both on the Daily Regulation Offers and Unit Details pages.

- **Heat Rate @ RegMin [BTU/KWh]:** The heat rate at the default regulation minimum for a resource. The regulation minimum that will correspond to this rate value will be the default regulation minimum that is shown both on the Daily Regulation Offers and Unit Details pages.

- **VOM Rate [$/MWh of Regulation]:** The increase in VOM resulting from operating the regulating resource at a higher heat rate than is otherwise economic for the purpose of providing regulation.

- **Fuel Cost [$/MBTU]:** The fixed fuel costs of the resource. This value will be used to determine the heat rate adjustments during steady-state and non steady-state operation for the purpose of providing regulation.

Regulation Offer(s) and any applicable cost information must be supplied prior to 6:00 p.m. day-ahead and is applicable for the entire 24-hour period for which it is submitted. The remaining information may be submitted or changed up until sixty (60) minutes prior to the operating hour, at which time the Regulation market closes. In the event that the Regulation Maximum and Regulation Minimum limits are not the most restrictive for a given resource (i.e. the Regulation Maximum the lowest of all the high limits and the Regulation Minimum the highest of all the low limits), the regulation software will utilize the most restrictive minimum and maximum of all applicable limits for real time.

- The following changes in Resource Regulating Status may be made after the regulation market closes either through direct communication with the PJM Scheduling Coordinator or through the hourly updates screens of the Two-Settlement MUI:

  - Available to unavailable

  - Self-scheduled to unavailable

- High Regulation Limit may be decreased but not increased and Low Regulation Limit may be increased but not decreased after the regulation market closes through direct communication with the PJM Scheduling Coordinator.

- Regulating capability may be decreased but not increased after the regulation market closes through direct communication with the PJM Scheduling Coordinator and through the hourly update screens of the Two-Settlement MUI.
- Regulation Maximum may be decreased but not increased and Regulation Minimum may be increased but not decreased after the regulation market closes through the hourly update screens of the Two-Settlement MUI.
- Any resource that is unavailable for energy when the Regulation market closes and becomes available during the operating hour may also be made available or self-scheduled for regulation. Any associated regulation offer information may be changed for such resources, since none was considered in the calculation of RMCP.
- Resources that are self-scheduled for energy that do not have an available bandwidth above the self-scheduled value and below the applicable maximum greater than or equal to twice the regulation offer cannot be evaluated for the full amount of the offer. Such resources will be evaluated for regulating capability equal to half the bandwidth available.
- Demand Resources must complete initial training on Regulation and Synchronized Reserve Markets as detailed in Manual M-01 Control Center and Data Exchange Requirements – Attachment C

Regulation Requirement Determination

- The total PJM Regulation Requirement for the PJM RTO is determined in whole MW for the on-peak (0500 – 2359) and off-peak (0000 – 0459) periods of day.
- The PJM RTO on-peak Regulation Requirement is equal to 1% of the forecast peak load for the PJM RTO for the day. The PJM RTO off-peak Regulation Requirement is equal to 1% of the forecast valley load for the PJM RTO for the day.
- The requirement percentage may be adjusted by the PJM Interconnection, if the adjustment is consistent with the maintenance of NERC control standards.

Regulation Obligation Fulfillment

- LSEs may fulfill their regulation obligations by:
    - Self-scheduling the entity's own resources;
    - Entering contractual arrangements with other market participants; or
    - Purchasing regulation from the regulation market.

Regulation Offer Period

- Resource owners wishing to sell regulation service must at least supply a cost-based regulation offer price by 6:00 p.m. the day prior to operation, and the remainder of the necessary data prior to Regulation market closing as stated above in the Regulation Market Eligibility section.

- Regulation offers are locked as of 6:00 p.m. the day prior to operation. The Markets Database is unavailable for entry between 12 noon and 4:00 p.m. the day prior to operation while the commitment software is running. All resources listed as available for regulation with no offer price have their offer prices set to zero.

- Bilateral regulation transactions must be entered by the buyer and subsequently confirmed by the seller through the Two-Settlement MUI no later than 16:00 the day after the transaction starts. Bilateral transactions that have been entered and confirmed may not be changed; they must be deleted and re-entered. Deletion of a bilateral transaction is interpreted as a change in the end time of the transaction to the current hour, unless the transaction has not yet started.

Regulation Market Clearing

- PJM clears the regulation market simultaneously with the synchronized reserve market, and posts the results no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of the operating hour.

- PJM utilizes the Three Pivotal Supplier (TPS) Test in the regulation market to mitigate market power as detailed in section 3.2.2A.1 of the PJM Tariff. Each supplier, from 1 to n, is ranked from the largest to the smallest offered MW of eligible regulation supply in each hour. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. In each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the regulation requirement for the hour (*D*). Where *j* defines the supplier being tested in combination with the two largest suppliers (initially the third largest supplier with *j*=3), **Error! Reference source not found.** shows the formula for the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers (RSI3):

  Equation 0-1 Calculating the three pivotal supplier test

$$RSI3_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} S_i - \sum_{i=1}^{2} S_i - S_j}{D}.$$

  Where *j*=3, if $RSI3_j$ is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a supplier *j* result in $RSI3_j$ greater than 1.0. When the result of this process is that $RSI3_j$ is greater than 1.0, the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the TPS Test will be offer-capped.

- Regulating resources are offer-capped at the lesser of their cost-based or market-based regulation offer price.
- An offer-capped resource will only be offer-capped for a single hour at a time as the TPS Test is rerun for each hour of the day.
- Resource merit order price ($/MWHr) = Resource regulation offer + estimated resource opportunity cost per MWHr of capability
- Opportunity cost for Demand Resources will be zero.
- Demand Resources will be limited to providing 25% of the regulation requirement.
- Estimated resource opportunity cost is calculated as follows:
    - The Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Optimizer (SPREGO) optimizes resource energy schedules and forecasts LMPs for the operating hour while respecting appropriate transmission constraints and Ancillary Service requirements..
    - SPREGO utilizes the lesser of the available price-based energy schedule or most expensive available cost-based energy schedule (the "lost opportunity cost energy schedule"), and forecasted LMPs to determine the estimated opportunity cost each resource would incur if it adjusted its output as necessary to provide its full amount of regulation. Regulation opportunity cost is divided into three components.
        1. The lost opportunity cost incurred in the shoulder hour preceding the initial regulating hour while the unit moves uneconomically into its regulating band to comply with the next hour's regulation assignment.
        2. The lost opportunity cost incurred in the actual regulating hour from reducing or raising the unit's output uneconomically for the purpose of providing regulation.
        3. The lost opportunity cost incurred in the shoulder hour following the final hour of the regulation assignment while the unit moves from its uneconomic regulation set point back to its economic set point.
    - The approximate formula for the lost opportunity incurred during the shoulder hours can be defined as:

$$|LMP_{SH} - ED| * GENOFF * TIME, \text{ where:}$$

a. LMP_{SH} is the forecasted shoulder hour LMP at the generator bus,

b. ED is the price from the lost opportunity cost energy schedule associated with the setpoint the resource must maintain to provide its full amount of regulation, and

c. GENOFF is the MW deviation between economic dispatch and the regulation setpoint.

d. TIME is the percentage of the hour it would take the unit to reduce GENOFF MWs using the applicable bid-in ramp rate.

- The approximate formula for the lost opportunity cost incurred during the regulating hour is:

*|LMP – ED| * GENOFF, where:*

e. LMP is the forecasted hourly LMP at the generator bus,

f. ED is the price from the lost opportunity cost energy schedule associated with the setpoint the resource must maintain to provide its full amount of regulation, and

g. GENOFF is the MW deviation between economic dispatch and the regulation setpoint.

Both lost opportunity cost calculations are defined simplistically for the purpose of the manual. The actual calculations are integrations which may be visualized as the area on a graph enclosed by the lost opportunity cost energy schedule, the points on that curve corresponding to the resource's desired economic dispatch and the setpoint necessary to provide the full amount of regulation, and the LMP.

SPREGO ranks all available regulating resources in ascending merit order price, and simultaneously determines the least expensive set of resources necessary to provide energy, regulation and synchronized reserve for the operating hour taking into account any resources self-scheduled to provide any of these services. Should the SPREGO application be unable to fulfill both the Regulation and Synchronized Reserve requirements, regulation receives the higher priority.

PJM may call on resources not otherwise scheduled to run in order to provide regulation, in accordance with PJM's obligation to minimize the total cost of energy, operating reserves, regulation, and other ancillary services. If a resource is called on by PJM for the purpose of providing regulation, the resource is guaranteed recovery of start-up and no-load costs. Any unrecovered portion of these costs will be credited along with opportunity costs in the regulation settlement process.

- Non-capacity resources that are self-scheduled to provide energy and do not supply an energy bid have no opportunity cost associated with providing regulation.

- The highest merit order price becomes the Regulation Market Clearing Price for that hour.

- The hourly RMCPs are posted on the user interface for public view.
- If no Regulation Market Results are posted to the eMKT MUI for an hour, PJM will continue the current assignments, as needed, into the un-posted hour and the RMCP from the previous hour will be used for settlement.

Hydro Units

- Since hydro units operate on a schedule and do not have an energy bid, opportunity cost for these units is calculated as follows:
    - The formula is the same as above, except the ED value is an average of the LMP at the hydro unit bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydro plant were operating. If this average LMP value is higher than the actual LMP at the generator bus, the opportunity cost is zero. Day-ahead LMPs are used for the purpose of estimating opportunity costs for hydro units, and actual LMPs are used in the after-the-fact settlement.
    - If a hydro unit is brought on out of schedule to provide regulation, the opportunity cost is equal to the average LMP (calculated as stated in [a]) minus the actual LMP at the generator bus. If the actual LMP is higher than the average, the opportunity cost is zero.
- During those hours when a hydro unit is in spill, the ED value is set to zero such that the opportunity cost is based on the full value of LMP. During the operating day, the operating company is responsible for communicating this condition to the PJM Scheduling Coordinator, and indicating this condition on the Regulation Hourly Updates page of the Two-Settlement MUI.
- When determined to be economically beneficial, PJM maintains the authority to adjust hydro unit schedules for those units scheduled by the owner if the owner has also submitted a regulation offer for those units and made the units available for regulation.

Regulation Market Operations

- The PJM Operator maintains total Regulation Zonal capabilities within a +/- 2%, but no less than +/- 15MW bandwidth around the RTO Regulation Requirement.
- The PJM Operator periodically evaluates the set of resources providing regulation, and makes any adjustments to regulation assignments deemed necessary and appropriate to minimize the overall cost of regulation.
- In the event of a regulation excess, the PJM dispatcher deselects resources beginning with the highest cost resource currently providing regulation and moving downward.

- In the event of a regulation deficiency, the PJM dispatcher selects resources to provide regulation beginning with the lowest cost resource currently not providing regulation and moving upward.
- The RMCP does not change based upon regulating resource adjustments made in real time. Any opportunity costs that exceed the RMCP are credited after the fact on a resource-specific basis.
- The PJM Energy Management System (EMS) sends one Control Area Regulation signal to each Local Control Center (LCC), as well as signals to individual resources or plants as requested by the owner.
- The PJM Operator communicates any change in resource regulating assignments to individual Local Control Centers. Company total in-service regulating capabilities are then telemetered back to the PJM EMS via the PJM data link.
- Resource regulation assignment changes during transitions between on-peak and off-peak periods begin 30 minutes prior to the new period, and are completed no later than 30 minutes after the period begins.

Settlements

- Regulation settlement is a zero-sum calculation based on the regulation provided to the market by generation owners and purchased from the market by LSEs.
- Regulation obligation is determined hourly for each LSE as follows:
    - for an LSE in the Mid-Atlantic Region, the ratio of the Mid-Atlantic Region regulation requirement over the PJM RTO requirement is multiplied times the total regulation assigned in the RTO, and then the real-time load ratio share within the Mid-Atlantic Region (adjusted for scheduled load responsibility) for the LSE is applied to the result.
    - for and LSE in the Western or Southern Region, the ratio of the of the sum of the Western and Southern Region regulation requirements over the PJM RTO requirement is multiplied times the total regulation assigned in the RTO, and then the real-time load ratio share within the combined Western and Southern Regions (adjusted for scheduled load responsibility) for the LSE is applied to the result.
- Regulation credits are awarded to resource owners that have either self-scheduled regulation or sold regulation into the market. Regulation credits for resource self-scheduled to provide regulation are equal to RMCP times the resource's self-scheduled regulating capability. Regulation credits for resources that offered regulation into the market and were selected to provide regulation are the higher of:
    - RMCP times the resource's assigned regulating capability, or

- The resource's regulation bid times its assigned regulating capability plus opportunity cost incurred.

- Demand Resources have zero opportunity cost.

- Opportunity cost is calculated as shown above in Market Clearing using actual integrated LMPs as opposed to that which was forecasted. PJM then adjusts the opportunity cost calculated for each resource based on the actual hourly integrated value of the real-time PJM regulation signal to account for the fact that the resource may have been held above or below its regulation setpoint for greater than half the hour.

- Non-capacity resources that are self-scheduled to provide energy and do not supply an energy bid are not eligible to collect opportunity cost credits. These resources will receive credit equal to the RMCP times the amount of regulation self-scheduled on or assigned to them.

Section 4: Overview of the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market

Welcome to the *Overview of the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market* section of the PJM Manual for ***Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- An overview description of the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market (see "*Overview of PJM Synchronized Reserve Market*").
- A list of the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market Business Rules (see "*PJM Synchronized Reserve Market Business Rules*").

Overview of the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market

The PJM Synchronized Reserve Market provides PJM participants with a market-based system for the purchase and sale of the Synchronized Reserve ancillary service. Resource owners submit resource-specific offers to provide Synchronized Reserve, and PJM utilizes these offers together with energy offers and resource schedules from the eMarket System, as input data to the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Optimizer (SPREGO). SPREGO then optimizes the RTO dispatch profile and forecasts LMPs to calculate an hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price (SRMCP). This clearing price is then used to determine the credits awarded to providers and charges allocated to purchasers of the Synchronized Reserve service.

PJM uses forecasted LMPs and resource schedules from the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Optimizer (SPREGO) to estimate the amount of incidental Synchronized Reserve present on the PJM system due to economic dispatch, and this capability is designated as Tier 1. Tier 1 is provided by any unit that is on line, following economic dispatch, and capable of increasing its output within ten (10) minutes following a call for Synchronized Reserve. If the amount of Tier 1 estimated for a given hour is insufficient to meet the PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement, PJM must assign resources to operate at a point that deviates from economic dispatch in order to provide the remainder of the requirement. The extra capacity that must be committed is designated Tier 2. The acquisition of Tier 2 reserves is performed jointly with regulation and energy through a simultaneous co-optimization which provides the lowest cost alternative for the procurement of Ancillary Services and energy for that hour of the operating day. Within the co-optimization, an RTO dispatch profile is forecasted along with LMPs for that hour. Using the dispatch profile and forecasted LMPs, an opportunity cost (including energy usage) is estimated for each resource that is eligible to provide Tier 2 synchronized reserve. Demand resources have an estimated opportunity cost of zero. This estimated opportunity cost is then added to the synchronized reserve offer price to create the merit order price. All available Tier 2 synchronized reserve resources are then ranked in ascending order of their merit order prices, and the lowest cost set of resources necessary to simultaneously meet the PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement, PJM Regulation Requirement, and provide energy that hour is determined. The highest merit order price associated with this lowest cost set of resources awarded Tier 2 synchronized reserve becomes the SRMCP for that hour of the operating day. Resource owners may self-schedule Synchronized Reserve on any qualified resource, and the merit order price for any self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve resource is set to zero. PJM simultaneously optimizes energy, Regulation and

Synchronized Reserve, and assigns both Regulation and Synchronized Reserve to the most cost-effective set of resources each hour of the operating day.

In the after-the-fact settlement, any resources self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve are compensated at the hourly SRMCP. Any resources selected by PJM to provide Synchronized Reserve are compensated at the higher of the hourly SRMCP or their real-time opportunity cost plus their Synchronized Reserve offer price. LSEs required to purchase Synchronized Reserve are charged the hourly SRMCP plus their percentage share of opportunity cost credits over and above the SRMCP and any unrecovered costs of resources called on by PJM to provide Synchronized Reserve.

PJM Synchronized Reserve Market Business Rules

Synchronized Reserve Market Eligibility

- Synchronized Reserve offers may be submitted only for those resources located electrically within the Synchronized Reserve Zone.
- Resources participating in the synchronized reserve market are divided into two Tiers:
  - **Tier 1** is comprised of all those resources on line following economic dispatch and able to ramp up from their current output in response to a synchronized reserve event, or demand resources capable of reducing load within 10 minutes.
  - **Tier 2** consists of:
    1. that additional capacity that is synchronized to the grid and operating at a point that deviates from economic dispatch (including condensing mode) to provide additional spinning synchronized reserve not available from Tier 1 resources; and
    2. dispatchable load resources that have controls in place to automatically drop load in response to a signal from PJM.
- All resources operating on the PJM system with the exception of those assigned as Tier 2 resources are by definition Tier 1 resources. Any resource capable of operating in condensing mode or willing to operate with an output less than that dictated by economic dispatch may participate as a Tier 2 resource. There is no qualification process for Tier 2 resources. However, consequences exist as described below for response by Tier 2 resources that are less than that which is committed.
- The following information must be supplied through the Two-Settlement Market User Interface (eMarket):
  - Synchronized Reserve Ramp Rate for Tier 1 resources (MW/minute). A separate rate may be submitted for multiple segments of a resource's MW range, and

these rates must be greater than or equal to the real-time economic ramp rate(s) submitted for the resource. Synchronized reserve ramp rates that exceed economic ramp rates must be justified via submission of actual data from past synchronized reserve events to the PJM Performance Compliance Department.

 - Synchronized reserve maximum for Tier 1 resources. This value represents the maximum MW output a resource can achieve in response to a synchronized reserve event, and must be greater than or equal to the economic maximum for the resource.

 - Synchronized Reserve Availability for Tier 2 resources. Resources may be made available, unavailable, or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 synchronized reserve.

 - Synchronized Reserve Offer Quantity for Tier 2 resources (MW). This quantity is defined as the increase in output achievable by the resource in ten (10) minutes, or the load reduction achievable in ten (10) minutes.

 - Synchronized Offer Price for Tier 2 resources ($/MWHr). Synchronized Reserve Offer Prices will be capped at a maximum value of the resource's O&M cost (as determined by the Cost Development Task Force) plus $7.50/MWh margin.

- Energy use for condensing Tier 2 resources (MW). This is the amount of instantaneous energy a condensing resource consumes while operating in the condensing mode. The value submitted as part of the synchronized reserve offer must be less than or equal to the actual energy consumed as observed in real time.

- Condense to gen cost. This is the cost of transitioning a condenser to the generating mode. The value submitted for this cost must be less than or equal to the condensing start cost.

- Shutdown Costs. These are the costs a Demand Resource incurs when reducing load in response to a synchronized reserve event.

- Condense Startup Cost. This is the actual cost associated with getting a resource from a completely off-line state into the condensing mode including fuel, O&M, etc.

- Condense Hourly Cost. This is the hourly cost to condense is equal to the actual, variable O&M costs associated with operating a resource in the condensing mode, including any fuel costs. It does not include any estimate for energy consumed

- Condense Notification Time. The amount of advance notice, in hours, required to notify the operating company to prepare the resource to operate in synchronous condensing mode. The default value is 0 hours.

- Spin as Condenser. This is used to identify if a combustion turbine can be committed for synchronized reserve as a condenser.

- Tier 1 estimates for Demand Resources will equal zero.

Synchronized Reserve Requirement Determination

Each Ancillary Service Area may have separate Synchronized Reserve Zones, but operated via the same market mechanism. PJM will select resources in each Synchronized Reserve Zone hourly to provide synchronized reserve based on a co-optimization between energy, regulation and synchronized reserve. Assignments will be communicated to the resource owners/operators by eMKT or the appropriate dispatcher.

The RTO will be arranged into two (2) zones. All companies within PJM, excluding the SERC companies, are part of the ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RFC) reliability region and will thus be grouped together into a single synchronized reserve zone. The SERC companies are part of a separate reserve sharing agreement and therefore comprise a second synchronized reserve zone. The two (2) synchronized reserve zones contain the following control zones:

RFC Synchronized Reserve Zone:

- PJM Mid-Atlantic
- AP
- AEP
- Dayton
- Duquesne
- CE

Southern Synchronized Reserve Zone:

- Dominion
- Total PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement for each Synchronized Reserve Zone is determined in whole MW for each hour of the operating day.

The RFC Synchronized Reserve Zone Requirement is defined as that amount of 10-minute reserve that must be synchronized to the grid. The requirement will be defined as the greater of the ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RFC) imposed minimum requirement or the largest contingency on the system.

The Southern Synchronized Reserve Zone Requirement is defined as the Dominion load ratio share of the largest system contingency within VACAR, minus the available 15 minute quick start capability within the Southern Synchronized Reserve Zone.

- North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) standards may impose greater requirements for synchronized reserve following Disturbance Control Standard (DCS) violations. Any such impositions will be incorporated as an increase to the overall control zone synchronized reserve requirement.

Synchronized Reserve Obligation Fulfillment

- Each Load Serving Entity (LSE) on the PJM system incurs a synchronized reserve obligation in kWh based on their real-time load ratio share and the Market Area synchronized reserve assigned. During hours when the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price (SRMCP) is the same throughout the Market Area, an LSE's synchronized reserve obligation is equal to its load ratio share times the amount of synchronized reserve assigned for the Market Area. During hours when congestion causes Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Prices (SRMCP) to separate each LSE's obligation is equal to its load ratio share within its reserve zone times the amount of synchronized reserve assigned in that reserve zone. Any PJM market participant may incur or fulfill a synchronized reserve obligation through the execution of a bilateral synchronized reserve transaction as described below.

- Participants may fulfill their synchronized reserve obligations by:
    - Owning Tier 1 resources from which the Synchronized Reserve Zone obtains synchronized reserve;
    - Self-scheduling owned Tier 2 resources;
    - Entering bilateral arrangements with other market participants; or
    - Purchasing synchronized reserves from the market.

Synchronized Reserve Offer Period

- Synchronized Reserve offer prices for Tier 2 resources are locked as of 1800 hours on the day proceeding the operating day. All resources listed as available for Tier 2 synchronized reserve with no offer price have their offer prices set to zero.

- The following information can be submitted and/or updated up until 60 minutes prior to the operating hour, at which time PJM begins the process of estimating the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that will be available for the operating hour:
    - Synchronized Reserve Ramp Rate
    - Synchronized Reserve Maximum

- The following information may be submitted and/or changed up until 60 minutes prior to the start of the operating hour, at which time the Synchronized Reserve Market closes:
    - Synchronized Reserve Availability for Tier 2 resources
    - Synchronized Reserve Offer Quantity

- In general, generation owners may not self-schedule synchronized reserve resources after 60 minutes prior to the operating hour when the Synchronized

Reserve Market closes. However, the following exceptions exist: if a generation owner has a resource that was either self-scheduled or pool-assigned to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and subsequent to either being self-scheduled or assigned that resource becomes unavailable to provide such amount of Synchronized Reserve, the generation owner has the option of self-scheduling another resource in order to make up the shortfall. Also, a resource that was unavailable for energy and therefore not evaluated as part of the Synchronized Reserve Market clearing becomes available during the operating hour, that resource may be self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve at that time.

Bilateral Synchronized Reserve Transactions

- Bilateral synchronized reserve transactions must be entered by the buyer and subsequently confirmed by the seller through the Two-Settlement MUI no later than 16:00 the day after the transaction starts. Bilateral transactions that have been entered and confirmed may not be changed; they must be deleted and re-entered. Deletion of a bilateral transaction after its start time has passed will result in a change in the end time of the transaction to the current hour.

- Bilateral synchronized reserve transactions may be entered either in MW or as a percentage of the purchaser's obligation. Participants will also be required to indicate the reserve zone for which the transaction is applicable.

- PJM will calculate and post the following indexes in order to provide an approximate value of synchronized reserve on which market participants may base prices for bilateral synchronized reserve transactions:

  - (Total hourly synchronized reserve cost)/(Total synchronized reserve assigned)

  - (Total hourly synchronized reserve cost)/(Total Tier 2 assigned)

Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing

- PJM clears the synchronized reserve market on an hourly basis. The following is the timeline by which this hourly clearing is accomplished:

  - **90 minutes prior to the start of each hour**, PJM estimates the amount of Tier 1 synchronized reserve that will be available on each resource. PJM posts this information on eMarket such that each generation owner is able to view the Tier 1 assigned for each of the owner's resources.

  - **60 minutes prior to the start of each hour**, each generation owner is required to identify those resources that are to be self-scheduled to provide synchronized reserve and for what quantity, if this information has changed from the previous hour.

  - **30 minutes prior to the start of each hour**, PJM re-estimates the amount of Tier 1 synchronized reserve available on each resource simultaneously clears the synchronized reserve and regulation markets, and posts regulation market clearing prices, synchronized reserve market clearing prices and Tier 2 assignments, based on the remaining requirement not met by Tier 1 and self-scheduled Tier 2. If the available Tier 1 is sufficient to meet the synchronized reserve requirement, self-scheduled Tier 2 offers will not clear, no Tier 2 will be assigned, and the Tier 2 clearing price will be zero. If Tier 1 and self-scheduled Tier 2 resources are sufficient to meet the synchronized reserve requirement, the Tier 2 clearing price is zero and no Tier 2 assignments are made. If the available Tier 1 and self-scheduled Tier 2 are not sufficient to meet the requirement, the Tier 2 clearing price is set equal to the merit order price of the highest cost Tier 2 resource necessary to meet the remaining requirement. Should regulation and synchronized reserve capacity be insufficient to meet both requirements, regulation will receive the higher priority in the market clearing.

Resource merit order price ($/MWHr) = Resource synchronized reserve offer + estimated resource opportunity cost per MWh of capability + energy use per MWh of capability

The resource synchronized reserve offer is that which is submitted by the owner via eMarket by 1800 hours on the day preceding the operating day.

Estimated resource opportunity cost for condensing CTs is calculated as follows:

O.C.= [positive (forecast LMP – energy offer price)] x MW capability} / synchronized reserve capability

Estimated resource opportunity cost for non-condensing resources is calculated as follows:

O.C. = |LMP – ED| x GENOFF, where:

LMP is the forecasted hourly LMP at the generator bus,

ED is the price associated with the setpoint the resource must maintain to provide its assigned amount of synchronized reserve, and

GENOFF is the MW amount of synchronized provided.

> This formula is somewhat simplistic. The actual calculation is an integration which may be visualized as the area on a graph enclosed by the resource's price curve, the points on that curve corresponding to the resource's desired economic dispatch and the setpoint necessary to provide the assigned amount of synchronized reserve, and the LMP.

Energy use for each condensing resource is entered in MW by the owner via eMarket as part of the synchronized reserve offer. Estimated energy use is calculated as part of the merit order price as follows:

E.U. = forecast LMP x energy use MW / synchronized reserve capability

For each of these calculations, forecast LMP is the result of the 1-hour look-ahead provided by the Unit Dispatch Tool.

Non-capacity resources for which an energy offer is not submitted will be ineligible for opportunity cost credit.

The opportunity cost for a Demand Resource is zero.

- PJM may call on resources not otherwise scheduled to run in order to provide synchronized reserve, in accordance with PJM's obligation to minimize the total cost of energy, operating reserves, regulation, and other ancillary services. If a resource is called on by PJM for the purpose of providing synchronized reserve, the resource is guaranteed recovery of all costs including start-up, no-load and minimum energy costs. Any unrecovered portions of these costs are credited as part of the synchronized reserve settlement process described below.

- Due to transmission considerations on the PJM system, it is sometimes necessary to carry a minimum amount of synchronized reserve in specific areas in PJM such that loading 100% synchronized reserve will not result in an overload of any of the PJM transfer interfaces. The goal is to minimize the cost of synchronized reserve such that given current system conditions, the flow on binding transmission constraints is not increased after a synchronized reserve event is initiated and the associated response is achieved. Therefore, PJM clears the Tier 2 market based on this locational synchronized reserve requirement and calculates zonal Tier 2 clearing prices. Whenever the locational synchronized reserve constraint is not binding, the clearing prices are equal. However, when more synchronized reserve is required in a given area than would have been assigned without this requirement, the clearing prices will separate. Resources will be identified and receive the applicable clearing price based on their location with respect to the binding constraint(s). That is, resources for which synchronized reserve response would help the constraint will receive the higher clearing price, whereas resources for which synchronized reserve response would aggravate the constraint will receive the lower clearing price.

- The hourly Tier 2 clearing prices are posted on the eMarket user interface for public view.

- If no Synchronized Reserve Market Results are posted to the eMKT MUI for an hour, PJM will continue the current assignments, as needed, into the un-posted hour and the SRMCP from the previous hour will be used for settlement.

Hydro Units

- Hydro units condensing to provide synchronized reserve during times when they were not scheduled to generate incur no opportunity cost. There may or may not be an energy use component, as indicated by the owner as part of the synchronized reserve offer.

- If a hydro unit is held off line to provide synchronized reserve during a time when it was scheduled to generate, it will incur opportunity cost. Since hydro units operate on a schedule and do not have an energy bid, opportunity cost for these units is calculated as follows:

    - The formula is the same as that shown under ‘Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing’, in rule #1d, third bullet, except the ED value is the average value of the LMP at the hydro unit bus for the on-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydro plant were operating. Day-ahead values are used for the purposes of assigning Tier 2 resources, and actual LMPs are used in the after-the-fact settlement. If the average LMP value is higher than the actual LMP at the generator bus, the opportunity cost is zero. During those hours when a hydro unit is in spill, the ED value is set to zero such that the opportunity cost is based on the full value of LMP.

- When determined to be economically beneficial, PJM maintains the authority to adjust hydro unit schedules for those units scheduled by the owner if the owner has also submitted a synchronized reserve offer for those units and made the units available for spin.

Demand Resources

- Demand Resources providing Synchronized Reserve are required to provide metering information at no less than a one minute scan surrounding a synchronized reserve event.

- Metering information for demand resources is not required to be sent to PJM in real time. Daily uploads at the end of the day if an event has occurred are sufficient.

- Demand Resources are limited to providing 25% of the Synchronized Reserve requirement.

- Demand Resources that are considered to be “batch load” resources are limited to providing 20% of the Synchronized Reserve requirement.

- Demand Resources must complete initial training on Regulation and Synchronized Reserve Markets as detailed in Manual M-01 Control Center and Data Exchange Requirements – Attachment C

Synchronized Reserve Market Operations

- The PJM Operator maintains the total Synchronized Reserve Zone Capability equal to the Synchronized Reserve Zone synchronized reserve requirement.

- The PJM Operator evaluates the set of resources providing synchronized reserve on an hourly basis, and assigns the most cost-effective set of Tier 2 resources necessary to fulfill the requirement.

- The hourly Tier 2 clearing price is fixed once calculated and posted. Any opportunity cost or energy use that exceeds the clearing price is credited after-the-fact on a resource-specific basis.

- The PJM Operator communicates Tier 2 condenser assignments to individual Local Control Centers via telephone.

Settlements

- Synchronized Reserve settlement is a zero-sum calculation based on the synchronized reserve provided to the market by generation owners and purchased from the market by participants.

- Synchronized Reserve obligation is determined hourly for each participant by applying the real-time load ratio share (adjusted for scheduled load responsibility) to the total synchronized assigned in the Synchronized Reserve Zone for that hour (considering locational constraints as noted above), and then adding bilateral sales and subtracting bilateral purchases. Synchronized Reserve charges are then determined for both the amount of Tier 1 applied to each participant's obligation and the amount of Tier 2 each participant purchased from the market.

- Tier 1 charges for each participant are equal to the percentage share of the overall Tier 1 credits according to the amount of Tier 1 applied to their obligation. The amount of Tier 1 applied to each participant's obligation is equal to the amount of Tier 1 estimated prior to the operating hour as part of the market clearing process on that participant's own resources up to the amount of obligation, plus the remaining load ratio share of any excess Tier 1 estimated on the resources of generation owners in excess of their individual obligations. Note that Tier 1 charges will only exist if a synchronized reserve event occurs within a given hour.

- Tier 2 synchronized reserve charges for each participant are equal to:

  - The appropriate hourly Tier 2 clearing price times the MW of Tier 2 self-scheduled toward the participant's obligation plus that which is purchased from the market plus;

  - The participant's share of any un-recovered costs incurred by assigned Tier 2 resources over and above the Tier 2 clearing price plus;

  - The participant's share of any un-recovered costs incurred by those resources PJM committed for the sole purpose of providing synchronized reserve plus;

  - The participant's share of the costs of those Tier 2 resources assigned in addition to that which was estimated prior to a given hour.

  The appropriate hourly Tier 2 clearing price for each LSE is the clearing price for the sub-zone or Synchronized Reserve Zone which the LSE's load is located. Loads located in a reserve zone will pay that sub-zone's SRMCP. Loads not located in a sub-zone will pay the corresponding area Synchronized Reserve Zone SRMCP (i.e. RFC or Southern).

- The costs listed in items b), c) and d) above are allocated as follows:

  - Un-recovered costs incurred by Tier 2 resources assigned by PJM either during the Tier 2 clearing process or during the operating hour due to conditions other than a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve are allocated based on each participant's pro-rata share of Tier 2 synchronized reserve purchased from the market.

- The cost of Tier 2 resources assigned by PJM during the operating hour in addition to that which resulted from the Tier 2 clearing process due to reduced availability of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve are allocated to those entities for which less Tier 1 was available during the hour than was estimated prior to the hour, in proportion to the reduction in Tier 1 availability.

- During hours when the Tier 2 clearing price is the same for an entire Synchronized Reserve Zone, the Tier 2 each participant purchases from the market is defined as that participant's obligation less the Tier 1 applied, less Tier 2 self-scheduled, plus bilateral sales, minus bilateral purchases. During hours when the Tier 2 clearing price varies across a Synchronized Reserve Zone, the Tier 2 each participant purchases from the market is defined as that participant's load ratio share of the synchronized reserve required in the appropriate Synchronized Reserve Zone or sub-zone less the Tier 1 applied, less Tier 2 self-scheduled, plus bilateral sales, minus bilateral purchases.

- Tier 1 synchronized reserve credits are awarded to all generation owners whose resources increased output in response to a synchronized reserve event (with the exception of those resources that were assigned Tier 2 synchronized reserve.) These credits are equal to the integrated increase in MW output from each generator over the length of the event, times the synchronized reserve energy premium less the hourly integrated LMP. The amount of the increase in output is defined as stated in the Verification section below. The synchronized reserve energy premium is defined as the average of the 5-minute LMPs calculated during the synchronized reserve event plus $50/MWh. In cases where a synchronized reserve event spans two or more hours, the response from each resource will be integrated according to the length of response in each hour for the purpose of calculating the Tier 1 credit.

- Tier 1 credits will be awarded to each eligible resource for response up to 110% of the resource's capability based on the synchronized reserve ramp rate(s) submitted by the resource's owner day-ahead. Credits to individual resources may be awarded for response greater than 110% of stated capability if other Tier 1 resources under-respond. Credits for response in excess of 110% of capability will be awarded on a pro-rata basis such that the aggregate Tier 1 credits awarded do not exceed 110% of the total possible credits based on the aggregate capability of all eligible Tier 1 resources.

- Resources providing regulation at the initiation of a synchronized reserve event will be compensated for Tier 1 response according to the following formula:

$$(\mathrm{T1P} - \mathrm{LMP}) \times \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left[\max\left(0, \text{integrated } \left(\text{Output} - \min\left(\text{EcoMax, RegHighLimit}\right)\right)\right)\right] + \\ \left[\max\left(0, \left(\text{integrated } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \min\left(\text{EcoMax, RegHighLimit, Output}\right) - \\ \text{Initial Output} - \left(2 \times \text{RegMW}\right) \end{array} \right\}\right)\right)\right] \end{array} \right\}, \quad \text{where:}$$

- T1P is the Tier 1 synchronized reserve energy premium (average of the five-minute LMPs during the synchronized reserve event plus $50)
- LMP is the hourly integrated LMP for the hour in which the synchronized reserve event occurs
- Final Output is the resource's greatest telemetered output between 9 and 11 minutes after synchronized reserve event is initiated
- Initial Output is the resource's lowest telemetered output between 1 minute before and 1 minute after synchronized reserve event is initiated
- RegMW is the resource's assigned amount of regulation

As a result of this formula, resources that are assigned regulation when a synchronized reserve event is initiated will be compensated based on the amount of response provided beyond their regulation commitment, as well as for any response in excess of their regulation high limit or economic maximum (whichever is lower.) A resource's regulation maximum commitment will be defined as the resource's full regulating range (i.e. - twice the amount of assigned regulation.)

- Tier 2 synchronized reserve credits are awarded to generation owners that have either self-scheduled synchronized reserve or sold synchronized reserve into the market. Synchronized reserve credits for resources self-scheduled to provide synchronized reserve are equal to Tier 2 clearing price times the resource's self-scheduled synchronized reserve capability. Synchronized reserve credits for resources that offered synchronized reserve into the market and were selected to provide synchronized reserve are the higher of:
  - Tier 2 clearing price times the resource's assigned synchronized reserve capability, or
  - The resource's synchronized reserve offer times its assigned synchronized reserve capability plus opportunity cost and/or energy use incurred.
- For all resources dispatched as a result of a Synchronized Reserve event, an additional daily make-whole evaluation is performed to ensure that a resource's total cost to provide the Synchronized Reserve service (including, but not limited to, hourly offer costs, energy use costs and startup costs for generation, and shutdown costs for demand resources) is greater less than or equal to the resource's daily synchronized reserve credits. If the daily costs exceed the daily credits, an additional opportunity cost payment is made to the resource for the difference. The daily costs are further defined in the Cost Development Task Force Manual (CDTF).
- Opportunity cost and energy use are calculated as shown above in Market Clearing using actual integrated LMP as opposed to that which was forecasted.
- Resources that are pool-assigned Tier 2 synchronized reserve are therefore exempt from deviations for the purpose of accumulating operating reserves charges, for the

MW response associated with the Tier 2 assignment, for the hours during which the Tier 2 assignment is effective.

Verification

- The magnitude of each resource's response to a synchronized reserve event (both Tier 1 and Tier 2) is the difference between the resource's output at the start of the event and its output ten minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered output between one (1) minute prior to and one (1) minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a resource's output ten minutes after the event is defined as the greatest output achieved between nine (9) and eleven (11) minutes after the start of the event. All resources (both Tier 1 and Tier 2) must maintain an output level greater than or equal to that which was achieved as of ten minutes after the event for the duration of the event or thirty (30) minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a given resources will be reduced by the amount the MW output of that resource falls below the level achieved after ten (10) minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

- For demand resources that are considered "batch load" resources, a second method of verification will be used for instances where a synchronized reserve event is initiated and the resource is operating at the minimum consumption level of its duty cycle. In this case, the magnitude of the response will be measured as the difference between (a) the resource's consumption at the end of the event and (b) the maximum consumption within a ten (10) minute period following the event provided that all subsequent minutes following that minute are no less than 50% of the consumption in that minute.

Non-Performance

- There is no consequence for a Tier 1 resource that does not respond with the amount of synchronized reserve that was expected of it in response to a synchronized reserve event. Tier 1 resources are simply credited for the amount of response they provide.

- Since Tier 2 resources are credited with a capacity payment any time they are expected to be ready to respond to a synchronized reserve event, failure to provide that response results in an obligation to "repay" that credit following instances of non-performance. The following consequences exist for a Tier 2 resource that does not respond with its assigned amount of synchronized reserve:

    - The resource is credited for Tier 2 synchronized reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous hours the resource was assigned Tier 2 synchronized reserve during which the event occurred, and;

    - The owner of the resource incurs a synchronized reserve obligation in the amount of the shortfall for the three (3), consecutive, same-peak days occurring at least three (3) business days following the event. Off-peak days are defined as weekends and PJM holidays, and on-peak days are all others. Owners of assigned Tier 2 resources will be permitted to demonstrate aggregate response, such that the total response from all assigned resources must be greater than or equal to the total assigned amount of synchronized reserve. This aggregate response will be used when determining the owner's additional obligation.

- In cases where a synchronized reserve event lasts less than 10 minutes, Tier 2 resources are credited with the amount of synchronized reserve capacity they are assigned. Tier 1 resources are credited with the amount of response provided over the length of the event, as determined via measurement parallel to that which is described above in the Verification section. That is, the output of each resource at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered output between one (1) minute prior to the start of the event and one (1) minute after the start of the event, and the output at the end of the event is defined as the greatest telemetered output between one (1) minute prior to the end of the event and one (1) minute following the end of the event.

Section 5: Scheduling Philosophy and Tools

Welcome to the *Scheduling Philosophy & Tools* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- A description of the PJM scheduling philosophy (see "*PJM Philosophy*").
- A description of the tools that are used during the scheduling process (see "*Scheduling Tools*").

PJM Philosophy

The PJM scheduling philosophy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market is to schedule generation to meet the aggregate Demand bids that results in the least-priced generation mix, while maintaining the reliability of the PJM RTO. PJM will also schedule additional resources as needed to satisfy the PJM Load Forecast and the additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) Objective based on minimizing the cost to procure such reserves. PJM will also schedule resources based on economics to control potential transmission limitations that are binding in the Transmission Reliability analysis that is performed in parallel with and subsequent to the Day-Ahead Market analysis. The scheduling process evaluates the price of each available resource compared with every other available generating resource. The philosophy for scheduling the PJM RTO requires:

- Scheduling sufficient generation in the Day-Ahead Energy Market to cover aggregate Demand bids and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) requirements calculated as a function of such demand bids
- Scheduling sufficient generation in the reliability-based analysis subsequent to the Day-Ahead Energy Market to cover the PJM Load Forecast and additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) requirements
- Scheduling sufficient generation to control potential transmission limitations that are binding in the Transmission Reliability analysis
- Scheduling sufficient generation to satisfy the PJM Regulation Requirement, PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement, and other ancillary service requirements of the PJM RTO.
- Ensuring PJM Members participate in the analysis and elimination of conditions that threaten the reliable operation of the PJM RTO

Scheduling of resources by PJM is performed economically on the basis of the prices and operating characteristics offered by the Market Sellers, using security, constrained dispatch and continuing until sufficient generation is dispatched in each hour to serve all energy purchase requirements, as well as the PJM RTO requirements.

Scheduling Tools

Analytical scheduling tools exist to assist PJM with the scheduling process. These tools permit PJM scheduling staff to analyze numerous scheduling scenarios. PJM personnel use several tools to assist in scheduling the resources for short-term and hourly activities. The scheduling tools include:

- PJM Enhanced Energy Scheduler (EES)
- PJM eSchedules
- Load Forecasting Algorithms
- eMKT and Market Database System
- Unit Dispatch System (UDS)
- Hydro Calculator
- Two-Settlement Technical Software (RSC, SPD and SFT)
- PJM Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Scheduling Software (SPREGO)
- Transmission Outage Data System

Together these tools recognize the following conditions:

- Reactive limits
- Resource constraints
- Unscheduled power flows
- Inter-area transfer limits
- Resource distribution factors
- Self-Scheduled Resources
- Limited fuel resources
- Bilateral Transactions
- Hydrological constraints
- Generation requirements
- Reserve requirements

Enhanced Energy Scheduler (EES)

The EES program records and manages the interchange of bulk power between the PJM RTO and other utilities, marketers, and brokers. PJM personnel use EES to process daily non-firm (both those electing to curtail due to congestion and those electing to pay congestion charges) and firm Bilateral Transaction schedules that are submitted by PJM Members. In general, EES is used to perform the following activities:

- Processes PJM Members' Bilateral Transactions
- Validates transaction by verifying transaction rules

PJM eSchedules

PJM eSchedules is an internet application that is used, among other functions, to schedule internal Bilateral Transactions.

Load Forecasting

PJM scheduling staff requires load forecasts for up to ten days in the future. For each day, a 24-hour load shape is needed.

- The first step in developing a load forecast is to obtain the weather information for the time period. Weather information is provided to PJM at regular intervals by a contracted-for weather service. Additional weather data sources include the National Weather Service, radio news, LSE weather information, and existing local PJM RTO conditions.
- The forecast period is reviewed to determine any conditions that could affect the PJM RTO's load, including:
    - Day of week
    - Holidays
    - Special events
    - Daylight savings time changes
    - Internal participant load forecasts
- Peak loads and load shapes are determined using a similar day's forecast. PJM retrieves the load data from a historical file and adjusts the forecasts, as needed, to reflect growth or other discrepancies.

Exhibit 2 presents the typical approach PJM uses to forecast load.



Exhibit 2: Load Forecasting Process

The load forecasts for each 24-hour period are input in the Marginal Scheduler program. PJM scheduling staff also posts these forecasts on the OASIS. (See Section 6: Posting OASIS Information for more information.)

Markets Database System

The Markets Database System is a two-part system:

- The Markets Database stores the basic resource data supplied by the PJM Members, including operating limits and resource availability.

- The eMKT website that provides the internet-based user interface that allows Market participants to submit generation offer data, Demand bids, Increment Offers, Decrement bids and Regulation Offers into the Markets Database.

The Markets Database is a very large database that contains information on each generating resource that operates as part of the PJM Energy Market, Demand Information, Increment Offers, Decrement Bids, Regulation Offers, Synchronized Reserve Offers, Day-Ahead Energy Market results, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Clearing Prices, Regulation Market Clearing Prices and Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Prices. A description of the Markets Database can be found in the Markets Database Dictionary (http://www.pjm.com/etools/downloads/emkt/market-database-data-dictionary.pdf).

Market participants may access the Markets Database by using the PJM eMKT website via the internet using manual entry or bulk upload/download via XML format.

The deadline for submission of Generation Offers, Demand Bids, Demand Reduction Bids, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Offers, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids into the Day-Ahead Energy Market is 12:00 Noon of the day before the Operating Day. After this deadline, no further bids or offers are accepted for the Day-Ahead Market and the Markets Database is locked until the Generation Re-bidding Period commences at 4:00 PM. The deadline is only extended when there is a computer problem at the PJM. The Generation Re-bidding Period allows generation that was not selected in the Day-Ahead Market to submit revised offer data for the Real-time Market. The Generation Re-bidding Period for the next Operating Day is open from 4:00 PM to 6:00 PM each day. Participants wishing to sell Regulation or Synchronized Reserve may supply an offer price by 6:00 PM the day prior to the operating day.

Please refer to Exhibit 3: Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Market Daily Timeline.



Exhibit 3: Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Market Daily Timeline

Please refer to Exhibit 4: Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Market Hourly Timeline.



Exhibit 4: Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Market Hourly Timeline

The data that needs to be submitted by PJM Members to participate in the Day-Ahead Energy, Synchronized Reserve, and Regulation Markets is described in detail in the [Markets Database Dictionary](http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/~/media/etools/emkt/market-database-data-dictionary.ashx) (http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/~/media/etools/emkt/market-database-data-dictionary.ashx)

Hydro Calculator

For PJM RTO-Scheduled Resources, PJM is responsible for developing the schedules for the run-of-river and pumped storage plants located within the PJM RTO and turned over to PJM for coordination. To assure hydraulic coordination of the hydro plants, PJM uses a computer program called the Hydro Calculator. The Hydro Calculator computes hourly reservoir elevations and plant generation from input river flows and plant discharges. PJM scheduling staff uses the Hydro Calculator to concentrate on economic placement of available hydro energy.

Two-Settlement Technical Software

The PJM Two-settlement Technical Software is a set of computer programs, which performs a security-constrained resource commitment, an economic dispatch for the Day-Ahead Market. The individual programs are:

Resource Scheduling & Commitment (RSC) - Performs security-constrained resource commitment based on generation offers, demand bids, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Offers, Increment Offers, Decrement bids and transaction schedules submitted by participants and based on PJM RTO reliability requirements. RSC will enforce physical resource specific constraints that are specified in the generation offer data and generic transmission constraints that are entered by the Market Operator. RSC provides an optimized economic resource commitment schedule for the next seven days and it utilizes a Mixed Integer linear programming solver to create an initial resource dispatch for the next operating day.

Scheduling, Pricing, & Dispatch (SPD) - Performs security-constrained *economic dispatch* using the commitment profile produced by RSC. SPD calculates hourly resource generation MW levels,LMPs and Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Clearing Prices for all load and generation buses for each hour of the next operating day. SPD utilizes a linear programming solver to develop the economic dispatch solution while respecting generic transmission constraints that affect dispatch, such as reactive interface limits, and thermal limits.

Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT) - SFT performs AC contingency analysis using contingency list from PJM EMS and creates generic constraints equations based on any violations that are detected. These generic constraints equations are then passed them back to SPD for resolution. SFT ensures that the Day-Ahead Market results are physically feasible considering PJM RTO security constraints and reliability requirements.



Exhibit 5: Settlement Subsystems

The Two-settlement technical software develops the Day-Ahead Market results based on minimizing production cost of energy and reserve to meet the Demand bids and Decrement bids that are submitted into the Day-Ahead Market while respecting the PJM RTO security constraints and reliability requirements that are necessary for the reliable operation of the PJM RTO.

Subsequent to the close of the generation Re-bidding Period at 6:00 PM, the RSC is the primary tool used to determine any change in steam resource commitment status based on minimizing the additional startup costs and costs to operate steam resources at economic minimum in order to provide sufficient operating reserves to satisfy the PJM Load Forecast (if greater that cleared total demand in the Day-Ahead Market) and adjusted Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserves) requirements. The purpose of this second phase of resource commitment is to ensure that PJM has scheduled enough generation in advance to meet the PJM Load Forecast for the next operating day and for the subsequent 6 days. CTs resources are included in the scheduling process and are scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market. However, the decisions concerning actual operation of pool-scheduled CT resources during the operating day are not made until the current operating hour in real-time dispatch.

Download Data from Markets Database



Exhibit 6: Download Data from Markets Database



Exhibit 7: Two-Settlement Data Flow

Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Scheduling Software (SPREGO)

The SPREGO is the synchronized reserve and regulation market software. It uses the regulation offers, synchronized reserve offers, and commitment data to determine the regulation market clearing price (RMCP) and synchronized reserve market clearing price (SRMCP). It also determines a preliminary forecast of which resources will provide regulation and synchronized reserve. SPREGO performs regulation and synchronized reserve market dispatch to minimize the total cost of energy, regulation and synchronized reserve dispatch.



Exhibit 8: Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Subsystems

Section 6: Scheduling Strategy and Method

Welcome to the *Scheduling Strategy and Method* section of the PJM Manual for ***Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- A description of the requirement/supply relationship (see "*Forecasting PJM Generation Requirement*").
- How PJM regulation requirements are determined (see "*PJM Regulation Requirements*").
- How PJM synchronized reserve requirements are determined (see "PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirements")
- How the marketing information is processed (see "*Processing Market Information*").

Scheduling bridges the gap between advance outage and market information (pre-scheduling) and real-time operations (dispatching) of monitored facilities. Details on the dispatching procedures for all facilities can be found in **PJM Manual 12 Dispatch Operations.** The goal of the PJM is to develop schedules that preserve the security of the PJM RTO on an unbiased basis for all PJM Members. The scheduling process for each day consists of the Day-Ahead Energy Market and of the development Current Operating Plan (COP) based on reliability analysis that is performed in parallel with and subsequent to the Day-Ahead Energy Market clearing.

Forecasting PJM Generation Requirement

The first step in the scheduling process is to examine the relationship between Day-Ahead Demand Bids and Decrement Bids with and Generation Offers and Increment Offer and to clear the Day-Ahead Market based on these bids and offers. In the reliability analysis that follows the Day-Ahead Market, the relationship between PJM Load Forecast requirement and generation supply for the Real-time Energy Market is considered. Exhibit 9 illustrates the Real-time Market relationships in the form of a bar chart.



Exhibit 9: Requirement Versus Generation Supply

Exhibit 9 presents the following information:

- The PJM requirement is represented by the bar on the left. The height of this bar is the total PJM capacity requirement in MW. The capacity requirement consists of two components:
    - Energy requirement, consisting of the PJM load forecast plus External Transaction sales to External Control Areas
    - Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) requirement
- The PJM generation supply is represented by the bar on the right which consists of four supply components:
    - External Transaction purchases from External Control Areas
    - Generation that is self-scheduled by the PJM Members
    - Generation and capacity that has been bid into the Day-Ahead Market and the Real-time Market and is scheduled by PJM to meet the energy and reserve requirement
    - Additional capacity to satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) requirement is committed at the discretion of the PJM

The identity of the resources that are self-scheduled or PJM RTO-scheduled is given by the market information contained in the Markets Database as shown in the Markets Database Dictionary (http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/~/media/etools/emkt/market-database-data-dictionary.ashx).

The PJM RTO's load forecast is described in Section 2 of this PJM Manual. The amount of External Transactions as scheduled by the PJM Members is also considered when establishing the amount of generation that must be scheduled.

So far, we have only discussed the basic requirement/supply relationships. The details of how we actually match the resources with the corresponding loads for both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market are discussed in later subsections.

PJM Regulation Requirement

- The total PJM Regulation Requirement for the PJM RTO is determined in whole MW forthe on-peak (0500 – 2359 and off-peak (000 – 0459) periods each day.
- The PJM RTO on-peak Regulation Requirement is equal to 1% of the forecast peak load for the PJM RTO for the day. The PJM RTO off-peak Regulation Requirement is equal to 1% of the forecast valley load for the PJM RTO for the day.

PJM Actions:

The PJM actions that are performed to clear the Regulation Market by establishing the initial list of resources to provide regulation for the next On/Off-Peak Period and by calculating the Regulation Marginal Clearing Prices (RMCP) are as follows:

- PJM clears the Regulation Market simultaneously with the Synchronized Reserve Market, and posts the results no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of the operating hour.
- The PJM Operator maintains total PJM regulating capability within a 30MW bandwidth around the Regulation Requirement.
- The PJM Operator periodically evaluates the set of resources providing regulation, and makes any adjustments to regulation assignments deemed necessary and appropriate to minimize the overall cost of regulation.
- In the event of a regulation excess, the PJM ISO dispatcher deselects resources beginning with the highest cost resource currently providing regulation and moving downward.
- In the event of a regulation deficiency, the PJM ISO dispatcher selects resources to provide regulation beginning with the lowest cost resource currently not providing regulation and moving upward.
- The RMCP does not change based upon regulating resource adjustments made in real time. Any opportunity costs that exceed the RMCP are credited after the fact on a resource -specific basis.
- The PJM Energy Management System (EMS) sends one Area Regulation signal to each Local Control Center (LCC), as well as signals to individual resources or plants as requested by the owner.

- The PJM Operator communicates any change in resource regulating assignments to individual Local Control Centers. Company total in-service regulating capabilities are then telemetered back to the PJM EMS via the PJM data link.
- Resource regulation assignment changes during transitions between on-peak and off-peak periods begin 30 minutes prior to the new period, and are completed no later than 30 minutes after the period begins.

Hourly participant Regulation obligations are determined after-the-fact, based on the LSE's actual load ratios. Participants can estimate their share of the PJM Regulation Requirement in advance by comparing their hourly load forecast to the PJM hourly load forecasts provided by the PJM.

PJM Member Actions:

- PJM Members submit Individual Synchronized Reserve and Regulation offer data for each Resource that is available to provide synchronized reserve and/or regulation (for generation or demand resources meeting the Regulation quality standard and Synchronized Reserve quality standard), differentiated as self-scheduled, External Transaction sale/purchase (identifying seller and buyer) and available for PJM RTO-scheduling. This information is maintained within the PJM eMKT website and is passed to the PJM Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Software (SPREGO). Exhibit 10 summarizes this information.



Exhibit 10: Synchronized & Regulation Data Flow

PJM Members update regulating resource operating limits and availability in the PJM eMKT website.

Regulation Service

PJM operates a bidding market for Regulation services in the PJM RTO. PJM Members that have generation or demand resources meeting the Regulation quality standard may submit Regulation offer data for each individual Resource that is available to provide regulation. The offer information is maintained within the PJM eMKT website and is passed to the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation software (SPREGO). Generation owners wishing to sell regulation service must supply a regulation offer price by 6:00 PM the day prior to operation and is applicable for the entire 24-hour period for which it is submitted. The remainder of the necessary data may be submitted or changed up until sixty (60) minutes prior to the operating hour, at which time the Regulation market closes.

Exhibit 11 defines the Regulation parameters of a qualified generating resource.



Exhibit 11: Generator Regulation Service

The PJM RTO's total available Regulation service is calculated and compared with its requirements. Any significant shortage is reported to PJM dispatcher for possible action. See the PJM Manual for **Balancing Operations (M-12)** for a description of the Regulation allocation process during the course of system operation.

PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirements

The total PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement for each Synchronized Reserve Zone is determined in whole MW for each hour of the operating day.

The RFC Synchronized Reserve Zone Requirement is defined as that amount of 10-minute reserve that must be synchronized to the grid. The requirement will be defined as the greater of the ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RFC) imposed minimum requirement or the largest contingency on the system.

The Southern Synchronized Reserve Zone Requirement is defined as the Dominion load ratio share of the largest system contingency within VACAR, minus the available 15 minute quick start capability within the Southern Synchronized Reserve Zone.

PJM Actions:

The PJM actions that are performed to clear the Synchronized Reserve Market by establishing the initial list of resources to provide Synchronized Reserve for the next operating day and by calculating the Synchronized Reserve Marginal Clearing Prices (SRMCP) for each hour as follows:

- PJM clears the Synchronized Reserve Market simultaneously with the Regulation Market, and posts the results no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of the operating hour

- The PJM Operator maintains total PJM synchronized reserve capability equal to the control zone synchronized reserve requirement.

- The PJM Operator evaluates the set of resources providing synchronized reserve on an hourly basis, and assigns the most cost-effective set of Tier 2 resources necessary to fulfill the requirement.

- The hourly Tier 2 clearing price is fixed once calculated and posted. Any opportunity cost or energy use that exceeds the clearing price is credited after-the-fact on a resource-specific basis.

- The PJM Operator communicates Tier 2 condenser assignments to individual Local Control Centers via telephone.

Hourly participant Synchronized Reserve obligations are determined after-the-fact, based on the LSE's actual load ratios. Participants can estimate their share of the PJM Synchronized Reserve Requirement in advance by comparing their hourly load forecast to the PJM hourly load forecasts provided by the PJM.

PJM Member Actions:

- PJM Members submit Individual Synchronized Reserve and Regulation offer data for each Resource that is available to provide Synchronized Reserve and/or regulation (for generation or demand resources meeting the Regulation quality standard and Synchronized Reserve quality standard), differentiated as self-scheduled, External Transaction sale/purchase (identifying seller and buyer) and available for PJM RTO-scheduling. This information is maintained within the PJM eMKT website and is passed to the PJM Synchronized Reserve & Regulation Software (SPREGO). Exhibit 12 summarizes this information.



Exhibit 12: Synchronized & Regulation Data Flow

PJM Members update regulating resource operating limits and availability in the PJM eMKT website.

Synchronized Reserve Service

PJM operates a bidding market for Synchronized Reserve services in the PJM RTO. PJM Members that have resources meeting the Synchronized Reserve quality standard may submit Synchronized Reserve offer data for each individual resource that is available to provide synchronized reserve. The offer information is maintained within the PJM eMKT website and is passed to the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation Market software (SPREGO). Resource owners wishing to sell synchronized reserve or regulation service must supply an offer price by 6:00 pm the day prior to operation and is applicable for the entire 24-hour period for which it is submitted. The remainder of the necessary data may be submitted or changed up until sixty (60) minutes prior to the operating hour, at which time the Regulation and Synchronized Reserve markets close.

Processing Market Information

Our attention now focuses on the elements that make up the requirement and supply picture in both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and in the Real-Time Energy Market. In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, participants submit Demand bids, Demand Reduction Bids, Decrement Bids, Increment Offers and Generation Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and PJM clears the Market based on these bids and offers using least-cost security-constrained resource commitment and dispatch. For the PJM Real-Time Energy Market, Exhibit 13 summarizes the PJM Members' interactions.



Exhibit 13: PJM Member Role In PJM Energy Market

PJM Member Load Forecasts

Each PJM Electric Distribution Company (EDC) within the PJM RTO provides PJM with a forecast of its requirements by 1200 hours on the day before the Operating Day. Regardless of how the PJM EDC's load is supplied, the PJM EDC submits the following Operating Day forecast information to the PJM:

- Midnight valley MW
- Morning peak MW
- Afternoon peak MW
- Evening peak MW

The hours for which the forecasts apply are specified and changed periodically by PJM and communicated to the PJM Members either electronically or by facsimile.

PJM compares the forecasts submitted by the PJM Members against the PJM RTO load forecast which is developed by PJM. The PJM Members' forecasts cover only four specified hours, while the PJM RTO forecast is for each hour of the Operating Day. Any significant discrepancies between the PJM Members' forecasts and the corresponding PJM RTO forecasts are reported to PJM dispatcher. In general, the PJM RTO forecast takes precedence over the aggregate of the individual PJM Members' forecasts.

Reserve Service

The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) objective is a Control Zone requirement (not allocated to PJM Members individually). PJM schedules sufficient generating resources to meet the PJM Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve (Operating Reserve) objective as part of the Da-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Clearing process. See the ***PJM Manual for Pre-Scheduling Operations (M-10)*** for the detailed methodology for determining Reserve Requirements.

Self-Scheduled Resources

PJM Members can choose to self-schedule their generation in the Day-Ahead Market or to Offer into the Day-Ahead Market and allow PJM to schedule their generation in the Day-Ahead Market. Subsequent to the Day-Ahead Market, any generator that was not selected in the Day-Ahead Market may choose to self-schedule. Another option is to purchase generation from the market. The PJM Members' scheduling choice is dependent on their scheduling philosophy.

Exhibit 14 illustrates the relationship between self- and pool-scheduling for a particular resource.



Exhibit 14: Generating Resource Scheduling

Deviations from Day-Ahead Market for Pool Scheduled Resources

If a generation resource has been scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market and wishes to deviate from that schedule (i.e. not run), the generation owner should contact the PJM Scheduling Coordinator to determine if this course of action is possible. The PJM Scheduling Coordinator will then:

- If the PJM Scheduling Coordinator determines that the generation resource is not needed for reliability purposes for the operating day, the generation owner can decide not to run the resource and no forced outage will be incurred. The generation owner will be responsible for all imbalance and operating reserve charges.

- If the PJM Scheduling Coordinator determines that the resource is needed for reliability purposes, he/she will inform the generation owner. The generation owner may still elect to not run the resource, but a forced outage for the duration of the scheduled operation of the resource will be generated. The generation owner will be responsible for all imbalance and operating reserve charges.

The guideline for notifying PJM of deviations for pool scheduled resources will be the sum of the resource's notification time plus the time to start. If this sum totals to zero, then the minimum notification time will be 45 minutes prior to the scheduled operation of the resource. This allows PJM adequate time for determining if the resource is needed for reliability.

Credits for Cancellation of Pool Scheduled Resources

At the end of each month, PJM calculates the credits due to each PJM Member for pool-scheduled resources that were selected to run as part of the reliability study, and that PJM canceled before coming on-line. The cancellation credit equals the actual costs incurred, capped at the appropriate start-up cost as specified in the generating resource's offer data. Requests for such credits must be submitted, in writing, to the PJM Manager of Market Settlements, within forty-five days of the date of incident.

Resource Specific Data Requirements

Internal PJM Members Offer Data for resource specific offers is submitted directly into the Markets Database via the eMKT website. Exhibit 15 summarizes the data requirements for capacity and non-capacity resources.

Capacity and Non-Capacity Data Requirements		
Resource Type	Input Requirements	Data Requirements
Capacity	Next Day and Following Six Days	Availability Status Startup and No-Load, if Cost-Based (If Price-Based, Startup and No-Load fees are updated biannually as detailed in Section 1 of the PJM Manual for **Pre-Scheduling Operations (M-10)**)
	Next Day and Optionally For The Following Six Days	Minimum Energy Maximum Energy Regulation Availability Incremental Price Points Resource Characteristics
	Next Day	Must Run Output Whether or Not to Request Bid Acceptance Notification By 4:00 p.m.
Non-Capacity	Next Day	Availability Status Must Run Output

Exhibit 15: Capacity and Non-Capacity Data Requirements

If offer data for a capacity resource is not submitted by 12:00 noon of the day before the operating day, PJM uses the offer data and resource availability previously entered into the Markets Database and considers the data a binding offer. For a more detailed description of the data, please see the PJM Markets Database Dictionary (http://www.pjm.com/etools/downloads/emkt/market-database-data-dictionary.pdf).

External Market Sellers

An External Resource is a generation resource that is located outside the metered boundaries of PJM. If an external resource is qualified as a capacity resource in PJM, then in accordance with the PJM Tariff, all external resources being offered in as capacity resources must bid into the PJM Day-Ahead Market as generation resources.

For an external resource to be offered as a unit resource, a valid generator offer, which consists of a price-based schedule, is submitted in the eMKT system and a valid energy schedule is submitted in the EES system.

External Market sellers report the following data for resource-specific offers, reported on the business day before the next operating day, up to seven days in advance:

- Specific generation resource (the CCPPTTUUSS reference number and resource name from The Markets Database). This number is supplied by PJM to the PJM Member upon creation of the resource in the Markets Database. If the resource is submitted at least 30 days before the bid date, see the ***PJM Manual for* Pre-Scheduling Operations (M-10)**.
- Minimum and maximum energy for each hour
- Minimum and maximum generation for each hour
- Minimum and maximum run times
- Resource availability for each hour

- Availability of regulation upper and lower energy limits for each hour
- Response and constraint data
- Whether or not to use start-up and no-load fees

The Network Customer may request Network External Designated transmission service for the delivery of a designated network resource. Requests for service are subject to Available Transmission Capability (ATC) and other PJM Regional Practices (http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/~/media/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean.ashx).

Energy Scheduling (EES and eTag) Requirements:

A valid NERC eTag is required for all hours that the external resource will be bid into PJM. The firm OASIS reservation assigned to the external resource shall be linked to the tag. The tag will also have a special exception attached in the form of the Token/Value pair: “EXCEPTION”/”CAPBACK”, and the tag will be subject to PJM interchange ramp limits.

Day-Ahead Market between 1200 and 1600

As specified in the Two-Settlement Business Rules, Bidding and Operations Timeline section, all bids must be received by 12:00 noon. From 12:00 noon to 4:00 pm (ET), the bids will be evaluated. Results will be posted on the Market User Interface at 4:00 p.m. (ET). External Capacity Participants will be required to check the MUI to see if the bid has been accepted.

For bids accepted in the Day-Ahead Market, External Capacity Participants may submit adjustments to the hourly profile of their tag in order to avoid balancing market MW deviations.

Rebidding Period between 1600 and 1800

If the unit is accepted in the Reliability Run, External Capacity Participants will be required to submit a NERC eTag that matches the hourly energy profile.

If the bid is not accepted in the Day-Ahead Market the participant may choose to either modify an already existing tag to zero (0) MW, or take no action.

If the participant wishes to schedule the resource as a self-scheduled/must run unit they may choose to do so and must submit an eTag. The participant must also notify the PJM Generation Dispatcher that the unit is being self-scheduled into PJM as a contract.

Real Time Market

If the bid is not accepted in the Day-Ahead Market or Reliability Market, but is requested during the operating day the Generation Dispatcher will notify the participant who will then submit an eTag to match the request. This tag will be subject to all scheduling timing requirements and PJM interchange ramp limits.

Section 7: External Transaction Scheduling

Welcome to the *External Transactions* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- An overview description of External Transaction Scheduling in PJM (see "*Overview of External Transaction Scheduling*").
- A list of the PJM External Transaction Scheduling Business Rules (see "*External Transaction Scheduling Business Rules*").

Overview of External Transaction Scheduling

Market participants that wish to transact energy in-to, out-of or through the PJM RTO are required to make their requests to PJM via the NERC E-Tagging software. These requests must be consistent with the more restrictive of either NERC Standard INT-001 (Interchange Transaction Tagging) or the PJM External Transaction Scheduling rules contained within this manual. The NERC E-Tagging software interfaces with PJM's Enhanced Energy Scheduler (EES) software to create an interface that both PJM Market participants as well as PJM Transaction Coordinators can use to evaluate and manage external transactions that affect the PJM RTO.

Based on market participant feedback, PJM has enhanced the EES tool to utilize NERC tags as the source for its external scheduling data. This change was done primarily to ease the amount of data entry required to submit external schedules in PJM as well as conform to general industry trends toward the use of the NERC tag as a schedule. This enhancement aids PJM in handling the increased number of external transactions presented by integration of other control areas in the PJM RTO. Market participants are no longer required to enter schedule data in both the EES system and on a NERC tag as the NERC tag data is utilized by EES as the schedule.

This change highlights an issue of data responsibility because of the nature of E-tagging and the fact that PJM now uses information entered on an E-tag as a schedule. Market participants scheduling in PJM are responsible for ensuring that data on PJM's EES is consistent with that which they desire to be their energy schedule. The continuity of the tagging process dictates that PJM receives its tag data in completed form from its tag authority, as it was entered by market participants. In order to ensure this delivery of data is complete and accurate, the market participants are responsible for confirming the data in PJM's EES to ensure it is consistent with that which they desired for their energy schedule. This confirmation can take place by simply looking at the tag data through the EES user interface, or by viewing customer reports which are made available through EES.

An important aspect of scheduling external transactions in PJM is finding a start and end time to transact energy while respecting the PJM ramp limits imposed for security (see "Ramp Limits" section for additional information on PJM's ramp limits). PJM allows market participants to reserve ramp in advance of completing their transactions via the EES application. This is an optional step in making external transaction requests, as the NERC E-Tag serves as the actual request for scheduling in PJM.

In cases where the NERC E-tag does not have the required fields to request a PJM market specific transaction (e.g. dispatchable, two-settlement etc.) the EES application will be used in concert with the NERC E-tag (see “Entering Dispatchable Schedules” and “Entering Two-settlement transactions” sections).

External Transaction Scheduling Business Rules

This section will outline the External Transaction Business Rules that are required by PJM. This section will include:

- PJM Contact Information
- External Transaction Timing Requirements
- General Information
- Data Requirements
- Ramp Limits
- OASIS Business Rules
- Entering Ramp Reservations
- Entering Schedules
- Entering Real-Time with Price Schedules
- Entering Two-Settlement Schedules
- Transaction Validations, Verification and Checkout

PJM Contact Information

The following numbers can be used to contact PJM regarding External Energy Transactions:

- Scheduling Fax number – 610-666-4275
- Day-Ahead Scheduling phone number – 610-666-4548. 610-666-8947 and 610-666-8949
- Hourly Scheduling phone number – 610-666-4510
- EES Hotline (used to report issues, or to ask questions during normal business hours) – 610-666-2270
- PJM Helpdesk (used to report technical issues during non-business hours) – 610-666-8886

External Transaction Timing Requirements

The following timing requirements are imposed by PJM for the submission of ramp reservations:

- Ramp reservations can be made up to 30 minutes prior to the scheduled start time for hourly transactions.
- Ramp reservations can be made up to 4 hours prior to start time for transactions that are more than 24 hours in duration.
- Ramp reservations utilizing the Real-Time with Price option must be made prior to 1200 noon (EPT) one day prior to start time.

Ramp reservations expire if they are not used. The following timing requirements are imposed on ramp reservations that are not scheduled against:

- For ramp reservations less than or equal to 24 hours in duration:

If the reservation is submitted 1 hour prior to the start of the schedule or less, the reservation will be held in Pending Tag status for 10 minutes.

If the reservation is submitted more than 1 hour, but less than 4 hours prior to the start of the schedule, the reservation will be held in Pending Tag status for 15 minutes.

- Reservations that are less than 24 hours in duration and submitted 4 or more hours prior to the start of the schedule will be held in Pending Tag status for 90 minutes.
- Reservations made on a day-ahead basis will expire at 1430 EPT, one day prior to the start of the schedule. Note that a ramp reservation will not be "split" into separate days, so if a ramp reservation is made for multiple days, and not scheduled against, and if the start time for the multi-day reservation is the next day, the entire reservation will expire.

Ramp reservations that have been placed In-Queue will expire if sufficient ramp room does not become available. The following timing requirements are imposed on ramp reservations that have been placed In-Queue:

- Reservations that are 24 hours or less in duration will be held in In-Queue status until 30 minutes prior to the start of the schedule.
- Reservations that are greater than 24 hours in duration will be held in In-Queue status until 5 hours prior to the start of the schedule.

The following timing requirements are imposed by PJM for the submission of Schedules. Schedules are submitted to PJM by submitting a valid NERC Tag. (The schedule is considered submitted when the NERC Tag is received by the PJM Tag Approval Service, not when it is submitted by the market participant's Tag Agent software):

- Schedules can be submitted up to 20 minutes prior to the scheduled start time for hourly transactions.

- Schedules can be submitted up to 4 hours prior to the scheduled start time for transactions that are more than 24 hours in duration.
- For a schedule to be included in PJM's Day-Ahead checkout process, they must be implemented by 1400 (EPT) one day prior to start of schedule.
- Schedules utilizing the Real-Time with Price option must be submitted prior to 1200 noon (EPT) day prior to start time.
- Schedules utilizing FIRM Point-To-Point transmission service must be submitted by 1000 (EPT) one day prior to start of schedule. Transactions submitted after 1000 (EPT) one day prior will be accommodated if practicable.

The following timing requirements are imposed by PJM for the submission of Two-Settlement Transactions:

- All Two-Settlement transactions must be submitted by 1200 noon (EPT) one day prior to start time.

General Information

- External offers can be made either on the basis of an individual generator (resource specific offer) or an aggregate of generation supply (aggregate offer).
- PJM will only accept the transaction if submitted by a member company.
- Transmission reservations that are not used due to canceled spot market offers will be subject to transmission charges as appropriate.
- PJM does not accept bids where the PJM Interchange Market is identified as both the source (GCA) and sink (LCA).
- PJM does not accept offers for resources committed to supply operating reserves to another control area. PJM does not double count resources internal to PJM for operating reserves. If energy is being offered from a resource to PJM and is already included in the PJM operating reserves, the energy can be accepted, but does not participate in PJM operating reserves accounting.
- Offers not properly submitted are rejected. The PJM member is notified of the reason for rejection and the PJM member may then take action to submit a new offer.

Data Requirements

Market participants are expected to keep PJM informed of all external transactions that involve the operation of the PJM RTO. The following information is submitted to PJM via the market participants E-Tag agent service and/or EES:

- Valid NERC E-Tag

- Valid transaction path
- Start date before end date
- Start and end times in the future
- Requested MW profile
- Valid transmission (see “OASIS Business Rules” for more information)
- Price associated with transaction (if utilizing the Real-Time with Price option)

Ramp Limits

PJM validates all external transaction requests against a net interchange ramp. The ramp limit is configurable by PJM dispatch based on operating conditions. There are two separate ramps that are evaluated, a PJM Net Interchange Ramp, and a NYISO Interchange Ramp.

- PJM Variable Ramp

At no time, can the difference in the net interchange be greater than the ramp designated by the PJM dispatch at any given 15 -minute interval. Ramp room is allocated on a first come, first serve basis. Refer to Exhibit 17 for a ramp example to see how the ramp is calculated for any given 15 - minute interval.

- NYISO 1000 MW Ramp

PJM also monitors a ± 1000 MW ramp with the NY ISO. At no time can the difference in the interchange between NY and PJM be greater than ± 1000 MW at any 15-minute interval. Ramp room for NY transactions is allocated on a first come, first serve basis. NY transactions submitted to PJM will be evaluated against both the PJM ramp and the NY ISO ramp.

Ramp Example



$$NI_{0700} = (100) + (150) + (200) + (-100) + (-50) = (+300)$$
$$NI_{0715} = (100) + (150) + (200) + (-200) + (-150) = (+100)$$
$$Ramp_{0715} = NI_{0715} - NI_{0700} = (100) - (300) = (-200)$$

NOTE: NI = Net Interchange

Exhibit16: Example Ramp Calculation

OASIS Business Rules

All external transaction requests require a CONFIRMED transmission reservation from the PJM OASIS. PJM offers several transmission product types, such as hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, on and off-peak, non-firm, firm and network transmission. PJM also offers the opportunity to state whether or not the market participant is willing to pay congestion. These, and additional options, are further explained in the “PJM Regional Practices” document, which can be found on the PJM OASIS home page at http://oasis.pjm.com.

On some occasions, due to PJM ramp rules, market participants are required to shift their energy requests. If the market participant shifts their energy up to one hour in either direction, they are not required to purchase additional transmission. Likewise, if the market participant chooses to fix their ramp violation by extending the duration of the transaction, they do not have to purchase additional transmission if the total MWh capacity of the transmission request is not exceeded. For graphical representations of these scenarios, refer to Exhibit 17 through Exhibit 20.



Exhibit 17: On-Peak Transmission Service Over 16 Hour Period Example



Exhibit 18 On-Peak Transmission Service Over 18 Hour Period Example

Off-Peak
Monday-Friday



Example of Valid Energy Schedule using a 100MW Capacity Off-Peak Transmission Service Reservation

Exhibit 19 Off-Peak Monday-Friday Transmission Service Example

Off-Peak
Saturday & Sunday



Example of Valid Energy Schedule using a 100MW Capacity Off-Peak Transmission Service Reservation

Exhibit 20: Off-Peak Saturday-Sunday Transmission Service Example

Frequently Asked Questions (regarding on-peak and off-peak energy scheduling):

(Q1) A market participant has reserved off-peak daily transmission for Wednesday, but ramp room is not available at 07:00 or 23:00.

(A1) Two possible solutions are 1) the energy may be scheduled from 00:00 to 08:00 or 2) the energy may be scheduled from 00:00 to 07:15 and from 23:15 to 24:00.

(*Q2) A market participant has reserved on-peak weekly transmission. Ramp room is available from 07:00 to 23:00 Tuesday through Friday, but ramp room is not available at 07:00 or 23:00 on Monday.*

(A2) The energy may be scheduled 07:00 to 23:00 Tuesday through Friday. One solution to the Monday ramp limit is to schedule the energy from 06:45 to 22:45.

Entering Ramp Reservations

Each PJM Member Company that is authorized to do business in PJM's energy market is given an EES account. It is in the EES application that ramp reservations are made.

Ramp reservations are an optional step in scheduling transactions in PJM. A ramp reservation can be made to "hold" ramp room while market participants complete their scheduling responsibilities. Ramp reservations are then associated on the NERC Tag when the market participant wishes to submit the schedule. The ramp reservation is validated against the submitted NERC Tag to ensure the energy profile and path matches. Ramp reservations are generally used to ensure the ability to schedule prior to purchasing transmission or making other potentially cost affecting decisions.

To make a ramp reservation, the market participant enters the EES application, and navigates to the "Ramp Reservation" screen. On this screen, the market participant enters the path for which they are interested in transacting energy, their energy profile and any other unique information that may apply to a schedule (i.e. special exceptions, notes, outside ID's, internal naming conventions etc.). Upon submission of a ramp reservation, PJM validates the information against ramp availability. If it passes the current ramp limits, the ramp reservation will pass, and will move into a status of "pending tag". At this point, the market participant is holding a valid reservation that can then be associated on a NERC Tag for scheduling.

Entering Schedules

Market participants enter schedules in PJM by submitting a valid NERC Tag. As noted in the previous section, if the market participant holds a ramp reservation in the status of "Pending Tag", they can associate the ramp reservation on the NERC Tag. This is done by placing the ramp reservation in the "miscellaneous" column on the PJM Transmission Provider line, of the "physical segment" portion of the NERC Tag.

If no ramp reservation was made prior to scheduling, a NERC Tag can be submitted without a reservation. NERC Tags that are submitted without a ramp reservation will automatically have a ramp reservation created that matches the energy profile and path of the NERC Tag. This newly created reservation will be evaluated against ramp, and an approval or denial will be made based on the validation. If there is enough ramp room, PJM will continue with other validations (See "Transaction Verification and Checkout"). If all validations pass, an approval message will be sent to the NERC Tag, and upon IMPLEMENTATION of the NERC Tag, the transaction will be scheduled by PJM.

Because of the nature of NERC tagging, it is possible for the market participant who enters a NERC tag to not be consistent with the market participants listed for each TP segment on a particular tag. In this instance, the financially responsible party (FRP) entering the tag is effectively acting on behalf of other market participants that are listed. Because PJM will now be identifying a NERC tag as a market participant's schedule, it will be necessary for those market participants who have had a tag entered on their behalf to acknowledge this tag through the EES.

Entering Real-Time with Price Schedules

Real-Time with Price schedules differ from other schedules in that an action **must** be made in EES in addition to the submission of a NERC Tag. To enter a Real-Time with Price schedule, the market participant must first make a ramp reservation in EES using the "Real-Time with Price" tab in the notebook section of the ramp reservation screen. In addition to the information entered for a Real-Time schedule, market participants are also required to enter a price associated with each energy block. Upon submission, the Real-Time with Price request will automatically move to the "Pending Tag" status, as Real-Time with Price schedules do not hold ramp.

Once the information is entered in EES, a NERC Tag must be submitted with the ramp reservation associated on the NERC Tag. This is done by placing the ramp reservation in the "miscellaneous" column on the PJM Transmission Provider line, of the "physical segment" portion of the NERC Tag. For Real-Time with Price schedules, the NERC Tag energy profile must match exactly for the tag to be approved.

Entering Two-Settlement Schedules

Market participants can submit Two-Settlement schedules to the eMarket application through EES. These schedules do not require a NERC tag, as they are only financial obligations, and are not considered physical schedules for actual flow. Two-Settlement schedules are submitted using the "Two-Settlement" tab in the notepad section of the ramp reservation screen.

Two-Settlement schedules require an OASIS number to be associated upon submission. The path is identified on the OASIS reservation.

In addition to the selection of OASIS and pricing points, the market participant must enter their energy profile. The option to choose fixed, dispatchable and up-to are also displayed in the notepad section. The type "fixed" acts as a price taker, "dispatchable" sets a floor or ceiling price criteria for acceptance and "up-to" sets the maximum amount of congestion the market participant is willing to pay for acceptance in the Two-Settlement Market. Graphing energy is done the same way as a Real-Time or Real-Time with Price request.

Transaction Validations, Verification and Checkout

Transactions must pass specific validations and evaluations prior to being scheduled. The following validations and evaluation and checkout procedures are done to ensure accurate information and reliable scheduling in PJM:

- Validations
- On submission, the following validations are performed on ramp reservations:
- Path Identified
- Stop time after start time
- Energy Profile Identified
- Price associated with Energy Profile (only applicable for Real-Time with Price)
- Ramp Availability (not applicable for Real-Time with Price)
- Timing Requirements are met for submission deadlines
- On submission, the following validations are performed on NERC Tags:
- Syntax validation (See NERC Tagging Policy for complete list of syntax validations for NERC Tags)
- Path on NERC Tag matches ramp reservation (if identified) and OASIS path
- Timing requirements are met for submission deadlines
- PJM Loss type must be financial (FIN)
- Ramp availability (if no ramp reservation is identified)
- OASIS validation for valid OASIS, valid path, instantaneous capacity, total capacity, date-time, priority and vertical stacking (not allowed)
- Token and Value fields (in miscellaneous column) have valid inputs
- FRP check
- On submission, the following validations are performed for two settlement requests:
- Path identified
- Timing requirements are met for submission deadlines

- OASIS validation for valid OASIS, ensure that the reservation is willing to pay congestion, OASIS is valid for period covered by the two-settlement contract and capacity checks
- Pricing point(s) have been identified
- Stop time is after start time
- Energy profile is identified
- Price is associated for energy profile (for dispatchable option only)
- Congestion amount is identified for energy profile (for up-to congestion option only)
- Real-Time Evaluation and Checkout

If all validations pass on a Real-Time schedule, PJM will approve the tag. Once the tag is approved by all parties associated on the tag and the status of the tag becomes “IMPLEMENTED”, the schedule will be ready for the Control Area to Control Area Checkout. If during the Control Area to Control Area checkout, both parties agree to the interchange on the NERC Tag, the schedule will flow.

- Real-Time with Price Evaluation and Checkout

Real-Time with Price schedules are verified differently than Real-Time schedules. Real-Time with Price schedules are evaluated hourly to determine if they will be loaded or not for the upcoming hour. This evaluation is done by the PJM Generation Dispatcher. If the dispatcher feels that the economics for the schedule warrant the transaction to be loaded or unloaded, they will inform the transaction coordinator to load or unload the contract. This evaluation is based on a very conservative approach, and works similar to the way the generation dispatcher would call on or off generation. In addition to the economics of the transaction, the generation dispatcher may also take into consideration the ramp availability for the loading or unloading of the schedule. Since Real-Time with Price schedules do not hold ramp room, there may be times where the economics warrant a schedule to be loaded, but due to security issues related to ramp, the schedule will not be called on to flow. Once a Real-Time with Price schedule has been called on to flow, a reload request will be issued by the PJM Transaction Coordinator. If all external parties approve the reload request, and it passes the Control Area to Control Area checkout process, the schedule will flow.

- Two-Settlement Evaluation and Checkout

For Two-Settlement scheduling, EES serves only as an interface to the eMarket application. Two-Settlement transactions are evaluated by the PJM Markets Department, and the results are fed back to EES to allow market participants to view the results. There is no Checkout performed on two-settlement schedules, as they are considered financially binding transactions, not physical schedules.

Section 8: Posting OASIS Information

Welcome to the *Posting OASIS Information* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- A description of the information posted by PJM and the PJM Member's responsibilities (see "*PJM OASIS*")

PJM OASIS

PJM is responsible for providing the OASIS node for the PJM RTO. OASIS serves as an information network for the use by PJM, PJM Members and other authorized users. Refer to the PJM Manual for **PJM OASIS Operation (M-04)** for additional information. OASIS is used for the dissemination of transmission, generation, and Ancillary Services information. For this PJM Manual, we are concerned with the following OASIS information:

- Total load forecasts (hourly for next four days)
- Peak load forecasts (for next seven days)
- Resources
- Transmission service reservations
- Transmission congestion
- Ancillary Services

PJM Actions:

- No later than 1600 hours of the day before each Operating Day, PJM posts the following information:
  - forecast of the location and duration of any expected transmission congestion and major sub-areas of the PJM RTO that are expected to result from such transmission congestion
- At PJM-designated times during the day (currently, 1600 and 2000 hours of the day ahead and 0000, 0400, and 0800 hours of the Operating Day), PJM posts the following information:
  - a revised forecast of the location and duration of any expected transmission congestion between major sub-areas of the PJM RTO
- As required by PJM, the following information is posted:
  - Curtailment or interruption of Bilateral Transactions with entities that are External to the PJM RTO

- Availability of transmission services to PJM Members whose External transactions were curtailed or interrupted
- Any interconnected operations service requested or offered by PJM, together with the price or discount for that service

PJM Member Actions:

None for scheduling purposes.

Section 9: Hourly Scheduling

Welcome to the *Hourly Scheduling* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- How schedules may be adjusted on an hourly basis (see "*Hourly Scheduling Adjustments*").

Hourly Scheduling Adjustments

During the course of Bulk Electric System operations, planned and unplanned events may continually occur. This section discusses the process by which pre-planned operating schedules may be changed by PJM or PJM Members to reflect new conditions.



Exhibit 21: Hourly Scheduling Timeline

A PJM Member may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control (Self-Scheduled Resource) on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 2200 of the day before the Operating Day under the following conditions:

- Subject to the right of PJM to schedule and dispatch Self-Scheduled Resources in an Emergency
- Provided that PJM is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect

The following adjustments may be made:

- A PJM Member may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydro power resources not previously designated as Self-Scheduled Resources and not selected as a PJM RTO – Scheduled Resource
- A PJM Member may request the scheduling of a new Bilateral Transaction that uses non-firm transmission service
- A PJM Member may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydro power resource that it had previously designated as a Self-Scheduled Resource, provided that PJM has the option to schedule energy from such resource increment at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee

An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase by notifying PJM dispatcher of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 20 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect. Any such refusal of delivery shall be subject to non-delivery charges as described in the ***PJM Manual for Operating Agreement Accounting (M-28).***

Section 10: Overview of the Demand Resource Participation

Welcome to the *Overview of the Demand Resource Participation* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- An overview description of the Demand Resource Participation in the PJM Energy Market (see "Demand Resource Participation").
- A list of the Demand Resource Registration Requirements (see "*Demand Resource Registration Requirements*").
- A list of the Demand Resource Energy Market Participation (see "*Demand Resource Energy Market Participation"*).
- A list of the Demand Resource Metering and Settlement Data Requirements ("*Demand Resource Metering and Settlement Data Requirements"*).

Overview of Demand Resource Participation

The integration of Demand Response into the PJM Interchange Energy Market recognizes the importance of load response to a fully functioning market as well as the affect of load response on the reliability of the grid. The purpose of these rules is to enable Demand Resources under the direction and control of Curtailment Service Providers to respond to LMPs. Curtailment Service Providers (CSPs) are Members or Special Members of PJM that participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market by causing Demand Resources to reduce demand.

PJM Emergency Load Response enables Demand Resources that reduce load during emergency conditions to receive payment for those reductions.

- Demand Resources in the Energy Only Option of Emergency Load Response are defined as Demand Resources that receive only an energy payment for reductions.
- Demand Resources in Full Emergency Load Response are defined as Demand Resources that receive both an energy payment for reductions and a capacity payment.
- Demand Resources in Capacity Only Option of Emergency Load Response are defined as Demand Resources that receive only a capacity payment for reduction.

PJM Economic Load Response enables Demand Resources to respond to PJM LMP prices by reducing consumption and receiving a payment for the reduction. Settlements shall be limited to demand reductions executed in response to the real-time and/or day-ahead LMP. Reductions that do not meet these requirements will not be eligible for settlement. Examples of ineligible settlements include, but are not limited to the following:

Settlements based on variable demand where the timing of the demand reduction supporting the settlement did not change in direct response to the real-time and/or day-ahead LMP

Consecutive daily settlements that are the result of a change in normal demand patterns that are submitted to maintain a CBL that no longer reflects the relevant end-use customer's demand.

Settlements based on On-Site Generator data if the On-Site Generation is not supporting demand reductions executed in response to the real-time and/or day-ahead LMP

Settlements based on demand reductions that are the result of operational changes between multiple end-use customer sites in the PJM footprint except that settlements based on such demand reduction shall be allowed if the demand reduction alleviates congestion.

PJM shall disallow settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements set forth above. If the CSP continues to submit settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements set forth above then PJM shall suspend the CSP's Energy Market activity and refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement.

Economic Load Response Participant Review Process

PJM shall review the participation of a CSP, EDC and/or LSE in the Energy Market under the following circumstances:

The CSPs registrations are disputed more than 10% of the time by the relevant EDC or LSE.

The CSP's settlements are disputed more than 10% of the time by the relevant EDC or LSE.

The CSP's settlements are denied by PJM more than 10% of the time.

PJM shall have 30 days to conduct the required review. PJM may refer the matter to the PJM MMU and/or the FERC Office of Enforcement if the review indicates the relevant CSP and/or EDC or LSE is engaging in activity that is inconsistent with the Economic Load Response rules.

- The **Day-Ahead Option** will provide a mechanism by which any qualified market participant may offer Demand Resources the opportunity to reduce the load they draw from the PJM system in advance of real-time operations and receive payments based on day-ahead LMP for the reductions

- The **Real-Time Option** will provide a mechanism by which any qualified market participant may offer Demand Resources the opportunity to commit to a reduction and receive payments based on real-time LMP for the reductions.

Demand Resource Registration Requirements

Curtailment Service Providers shall register Demand Resources that choose to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market according to the rules and requirements set forth below.

Curtailment Service Providers

The following business rules apply to Curtailment Service Providers:

- Prior to participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Curtailment Service Providers must complete via eLoadResponse in PJM eSuites the Load Response Registration for each Demand Resource.
- Simultaneous registration of a Demand Resource by more than one Curtailment Service Provider will not be accepted by PJM unless the registration by the second CSP is for a Capacity Only ILR resource.
- In order to register Demand Resources, the following customer Information needs to be provided for each Demand Resource:
    - End-use customer name
    - Customer's energy supplier
    - Program Option Type that is the subject of the registration
    - EDC Account Number
    - Electric Distribution Company (EDC)
    - Transmission Zone
    - Pricing Zone (Transmission Zone, Aggregate, or node)
    - PNODE, if willing to set LMP
    - Dispatch Contact Information , if willing to be dispatched by PJM
    - Retail Contract Information (including a description of the contract)
    - Retail Rate
    - Energy Loss Factor
- In order to register Demand Resources, the following Operational Information needs to be provided for each Demand Resource:
    - KW quantity to be reduced

  - Alternative Customer Baseline (CBL) calculation, where offered
  - Availability of the demand resource during non-summer months (October 1 through May 31).
  - Locational Marginal Price (LMP), in $/MW, at which the load shall be reduced in Economic Load Response or the Minimum Dispatch Price, in $/MW, at which the load shall be reduced in the Emergency Load Response Program.
  - Load Reduction Method
- Time, in minutes, to reduce
  - Metering Requirements
  - Indicate if a Weather Sensitivity Adjustment (WSA) or alternative adjustment, if approved, will be applied
  - Weather Station
  - Type of On-Site Generation
  - KW quantity of On-Site Generation to be produced to reduce the load withdrawn from the PJM system
  - Locational Marginal Price (LMP),$/MW at which Backup Generation to be reduced
  - Fuel type of Backup Generator
  - Indicate if a load reduction may be dispatchable in real-time operations
  - Indicate if a load reduction is willing to set LMP during real-time operations
  - Shut Down Costs for Period 1, April 1 - Sept 30. When the Shut Down Costs entered in eMkt and eLoadResponse are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values
  - Shut Down Cost for Period 2, October 1 - March 30. When the Shut Down Cost entered in eMkt and eLoadResponse are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values
  - Minimum Down Time, in hours
- In order to register Demand Resources for participation in the Reliability Pricing Model, the following Load Management Information needs to be provided for each Demand Resource:
  - Load Management Participant status

- Indicate if load reduction in under a Load Management contract prior to 6/1/2002
- Load Management Capacity Type – Demand Resource (DR) or Interruptible Load Reliability (ILR)
- Load Management Contract Type – Direct Load Control, Firm Service Level, Guaranteed Load Drop
- Load Management Notification – Long Lead Time; Short Lead Time
- Load Management Capacity Factor
- Load Management Zone Area

- Demand Resources may be registered simultaneously as Economic Load Response Resources and Emergency Load Response Resources so long as they bid their load reductions in the Day-Ahead Market or notify PJM that their demand resources are dispatchable in Real Time.

- A Demand Resource may switch from Economic Load Response to Emergency Load Response and vice versa upon one day notice if it has been registered for 15 consecutive days.

- Demand Resources may switch CSPs. The CSP registering the switching Demand Resource shall provide PJM with the name of the CSP that previously registered the Demand Resource. PJM will treat the switching as a new registration and will request the CSP that previously registered the Demand Resource to terminate the previous registration. PJM will deem the previous registration terminated if the previous CSP does not respond within 10 business days. Termination of the previous registration will be required for acceptance of the switched registration. No Demand Resource will be eligible to reduce load when the identity of the CSP is in dispute. In order to accommodate day-ahead load response the switch will become effective at 12:01 a.m. of the third business day after the previous registration is terminated or deemed terminated by PJM. The previous registration will remain active for the sole purpose of settlement of load reductions that occurred before the switch became effective.

- Demand Resource intending to run an On-Site Generator in support of local load must represent in writing to PJM that it holds all applicable environmental and use permits for running those generators. Continuing participation will be deemed as a continuing representation by the owner that each time its On-Site Generator is run it complies with all applicable permits, including any emissions, run-time limit or other constraint on plant operations that may be imposed by such permits.

- To assist CSPs in obtaining the electric usage information of the end-use customer the following Customer Usage Information Authorization form has been developed.

Customer Usage Information Authorization
for PJM Load Response Programs ("Authorization")

____________________ , the end-use customer, ("Customer") hereby authorizes _____________________, and ________________, its electric distribution company(ies) ("EDCs"), to release its electric usage information, including hourly or sub-hourly usage history (kwh/kw), EDC loss factors, and peak load contribution assignments for the current delivery year and the upcoming delivery year, if known, to _________________, the curtail service provider ("CSP"), which has been or may be retained by Customer to act on its behalf in the PJM Load Response Programs. Customer's EDCs and end-use sites are identified on Attachment A-1 and A-2 hereto, which are incorporated herein by reference.

1. Customer's contact information for purposes of its participation in the PJM Load Response Programs is as follows:

Customer Name: ____

Contact Person: ____

Mailing Address: ____

____
City State Zip Code

Telephone Number: _______________________________________

Fax Number: ____

Contact Person's Email Address: ____________________________

2. Customer hereby advises CSP that it deems the information obtained pursuant to this Authorization to be confidential and therefore requests that such information not be divulged to any third party, except as required to participate in the PJM Load Response Programs.

3. This Authorization shall terminate as follows (mark ONE of the options below):

____ This Authorization shall be perpetual and shall not terminate unless written notice is provided to CSP at least ____ days in advance.

____ This Authorization shall automatically terminate on ____________________, with no further notice to CSP being required.

4. I understand that termination of this Authorization will not affect any action that CSP took in reliance on this Authorization before it automatically terminated or before CSP received Customer's written notice of termination.

5. The undersigned affirms that he/she has authority to execute this Authorization on behalf of Customer.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Customer executes this Authorization to be effective as of the date written below.

Customer: ______________________________

By: ___________________________________
Print Name

____
Title

____
Signature

____
Date

ATTACHMENT A–1

LIST OF SITES FOR WHICH EDC, ___________________________________,
HAS AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE ELECTRIC USAGE INFORMATION TO CSP

Account Number(s):
Service Address:

Account Number(s):
Service Address:

Account Number(s):
Service Address:

Account Number(s):
Service Address:

PJM Activities

The following business rules apply to PJM activities:

- PJM will, if appropriate, propose an alternative CBL calculation together with supporting analysis. The process for determining the appropriate CBL is set forth below.
- PJM will confirm with the appropriate Load Serving Entity (LSE), Electric Distribution Company (EDC) and ALM Provider whether the load reduction is under other contractual obligations. (The EDC and LSE have ten (10) business days to respond or PJM assumes acceptance.)
- Other contractual obligations may not preclude participation, but may require special consideration by PJM such that appropriate settlements are made within the confines of the existing contract.
- PJM will confirm with the customer's LSE whether the Demand Resource is served under day-ahead or real-time LMP-based contract for energy delivery. PJM will further verify the nature of the Demand Resource's LMP-based contract.
- An LMP-based contract is defined as one by which an end-use customer has agreed to pay its LSE for the physical delivery of energy according to the hourly value of the Locational Marginal Price (LMP) as calculated by PJM. The bus, zone, aggregate, etc at which the LMP forms the basis for the contract is immaterial. The LMP on which the contract is based can be either day ahead or real time, and is assumed to be some multiple of the actual, calculated LMP.
- End-use customers that have LMP-based contracts under which they have agreed to pay their Load Serving Entity for the physical delivery of energy according to the hourly value of the real-time LMP as calculated by PJM may participate in the Real-Time Market as provided for under the Real-Time Operations section below.
- PJM will verify the transmission and generation (retail rate) charges with the appropriate EDC and LSE.
- PJM will verify whether or not a Demand Resource is subject to a Load Management contract. PJM will further verify the nature of the Demand Resource's Load Management contract.
- If a Load Response registration is denied by an EDC or LSE because the Curtailment Service Provider provided an incorrect EDC Account Number, Zone, Aggregate or Retail Contract Information; the Curtailment Service Provider must submit to PJM a new registration for the Demand Resource that includes the correct EDC Account Number, Zone, Aggregate and Retail Contract Information.
- If a Load Response registration or re-registration is reviewed by an EDC or LSE and the EDC or LSE does not believe that the standard CBL calculation is appropriate, then the EDC or LSE shall provide a proposed alternative CBL calculation together

with supporting analysis to PJM, the CSP, and the EDC or LSE respectively. The process for determining the appropriate CBL is set forth below.

- PJM will inform the Curtailment Service Provider of the acceptance into the program.
- PJM will notify the appropriate LSE and EDC of the Demand Resource's acceptance.
- Curtailment Service Providers shall maintain the accuracy of the information provided to register the Demand Resource. The Curtailment Service Provider shall between May 1st and June 1st of each year certify to PJM Load Response Registrations by reviewing, updating and re-submitting each Demand Resource's registration.

Process for Determining the Appropriate CBL (standard or alternative)

- PJM, the CSP, the EDC, and/or the LSE that proposes an alternative CBL calculation shall provide the alternative CBL calculation and supporting analysis to the other parties.
- PJM, the CSP, the EDC and the LSE shall have 30 days from the day the alternative CBL proposal is received by the other parties to agree on a proposed alternative CBL calculation. If the parties agree on an alternative CBL calculation, then the agreed upon CBL calculation shall be effective from the date of the registration.
- If the parties do not agree on an alternative CBL calculation within 30 days, then PJM shall determine the CBL calculation within 20 days of the expiration of the prior 30 day period. The CBL established by PJM shall be binding on the parties unless agreement on an alternative CBL is reached before the end of the 20 day period.
- The process for determining the appropriate CBL shall not delay the registration, provided that the alternative CBL established shall be used for all applicable energy settlements.
- PJM shall periodically publish herein alternative CBL calculations established through this process.

Demand Resource Energy Market Participation

Qualified Curtailment Service Providers may offer the load reductions of Demand Resources into the Day-Ahead Market pursuant to the following rules and requirements. Demand Resources that have an RPM Resource Commitment must be registered in the Full Program Option of the Emergency Load Response Program and thus available for dispatch during PJM-declared emergency events.

Day-Ahead Operations

- Demand Resources, except Demand Resources served under LMP-based contracts which provide for payment for the physical delivery of energy according to the hourly value of the real-time LMP as calculated by PJM, have the option to participate in the Day-Ahead Market. Participants in Economic Load Response Program may submit a bid to reduce the load they draw from the PJM system in advance of real-time operations. In the Day-Ahead Market, the participant may submit a Load Response Bid on behalf of a Demand Resource ("Load") for a specific KW curtailment (in minimum increments of .1 MW or 100 KW). Participants that submit Load Response bids in the Day-Ahead Market may establish an incremental offer curve.

- Demand Resources that are served under LMP-based contracts which provide for payment for the physical delivery of energy according to the hourly value of the real-time LMP as calculated by PJM, do not have the option to participate in the Day-Ahead Market.

- Each Market Participant's profile (which is defined by PJM) shall specify the transmission zones or aggregates for which that Participant is eligible to submit load response bids.

- Load Response Bids are assumed to exclude losses (transmission zone losses and share of 500 kV losses).

- Load Response Bids shall specify for each Demand Resource:

  - KW quantity to be reduced, Day-ahead Load Response bids should not include losses Location (transmission zone or aggregate)

  - Price, in $/MW, at which the load shall be curtailed

- The Load Response Bid could also include for each Demand Resource:

  - Shut down costs, for each period (When the Shut down costs entered in eMkt and Load Response Application are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values)

  - Minimum down times for which the load reduction must be committed

- Shutdown costs and minimum down times are optional, and will default to zero (0) if not submitted.

- Shutdown cost will be expressed in dollars, and represents the fixed cost associated with committing a load response resource.

- Shutdown costs will be changeable only every six months, corresponding to the six-month periods during which price-based start-up costs may be changed for generators.

- The six month periods for shutdown costs are defined as follows: Period 1 is defined as April 1 – September 30 and Period 2 is defined as October 1 - March 30.

- Minimum down time will be expressed as a number of hours, and represents the minimum number of contiguous hours for which a load response bid must be committed in the Day-Ahead Market.

- If a Program Participant submits no day-ahead bid information, then a zero KW quantity is assumed.

- The list of transmission zones and aggregates for which Load Response Bids are accepted is defined by PJM.

- All day-ahead Load Response Bids will be submitted to the eMKT website by 1200 each day.

- The Day-Ahead Market closes at 1600 each day, and cleared Load Response Bids will be posted to eMKT.

Real-Time Operations

- Demand Resources including Demand Resources served under LMP-based contracts which provide for payment for the physical delivery of energy according to the hourly value of the real-time LMP as calculated by PJM, have the option to participate in the Real-Time Market. Curtailment Services Providers, representing Demand Resources participating as Economic Load Response resources, may choose to commit to a reduction of the load they draw from the PJM system during times of high prices. These Curtailment Service Providers are responsible for determining the conditions under which load reductions will actually take place and implementing the reductions should those conditions arise.

- Demand Resources served under LMP-based contracts which provide for payment for the physical delivery of energy according to the hourly value of the real-time LMP as calculated by PJM, have the option to participate in the Real-Time Market under the following circumstances. The Curtailment Service Provider shall provide PJM with a "strike" price for the Demand Resource's zonal LMP at which the Demand Resource will reduce load, as well as any shutdown costs and opportunity costs and costs associated with the minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed.

- In cases where the zonal real-time LMP reaches the "strike" price and the load response is dispatched by PJM, PJM shall pay the CSP the difference between the actual savings achieved based on zonal LMP and the total value of the load response bid, if savings achieved by the load reduction are less than the total value of the load response bid. For purposes of this provision, the load response bid will be the sum of the "strike" price times the MW of reduction achieved during each hour of the time period the reduction was dispatched by PJM or minimum down-time whichever is greater, plus submitted shutdown costs.

- Each Curtailment Service Provider is responsible for maintaining the load reduction information associated with each Demand Resource registered via the PJM LoadResponse system in eSuite.
- At the time of registration, each Curtailment Service Provider shall specify for each Demand Resource ("Load) the following operational information:
    - KW quantity to be reduced.
    - Locational Marginal Price (LMP), in $/MW, at which the load shall be reduced ("strike" price)
    - Pricing Zone (transmission zone or aggregate)
    - Load Reduction Method
    - Time, in minutes, to reduce
    - Indicate if a load reduction may be dispatchable in real-time operations
    - Indicate if the Demand Resource ("Load") is served under an LMP-based contract
    - Shut Down Costs for Period 1, April 1 - Sept 30. When the Shut Down Costs entered in eMkt and Load Response Application are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values
    - Shut Down Cost for Period 2, October 1 - March 30. When the Shut Down Cost entered in eMkt and Load Response Application are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values
    - Minimum Down Time, in hrs
- If a Load Response Bid for a Demand Resource is not accepted in the Day-Ahead Market and the CSP indicates that it wishes the Demand Resource to be dispatchable in real time, the PJM dispatcher will use operational information provided during registration to dispatch the Demand Resource in real time. Participants that indicate that the Demand Resource is dispatchable in real time may establish an incremental offer curve.PJM shall not dispatch a Demand Resource that has already self scheduled. In the event that a Demand Resource that has been self scheduled is also dispatched by PJM then settlement will be based on the Notification of self-schedule.
- Curtailment Service Providers shall provide PJM with Notification no less than 5 minutes prior to beginning a load reduction event and no more than 7 days prior to an event. CSPs may begin a Demand Response intra-hour provided that Notification is given. A Notification may be withdrawn or adjusted downward during the relevant event hour, but not after the event hour. The Notification shall include the start and stop times of the event and the amount of the demand reduction. PJM will provide

the Notification window(s) to the LSE as part of the settlement approval process. In the event that the Load Resource fails to reduce load and the CSP does not submit a settlement, no payment or debit will be assessed by PJM. Notification must be given when the CSP will submit a settlement for an energy payment when the load reduction complies with a synchronized reserve event or a regulation assignment.

- Demand Resources will not be eligible to set real-time price on the PJM system unless metered directly by PJM.

- The event period for self-scheduled Demand Resources shall be defined as all hours in the day for which the CSP has provided a Notification. If Notification and settlement hours do not match, then a review of the CSP's settlements for up to the 12 prior months by PJM to determine free-ridership will be triggered.

Demand Resource Metering and Settlement Data Requirements

The settlements submitted to PJM by Curtailment Service Providers must conform to the following requirements for data, including metered data, and Customer Baseline Load (CBL) calculations.

Metered Data

- For load reduction that is not metered directly by PJM, Curtailment Service Providers are responsible for forwarding the appropriate meter data (as defined in this Manual) to PJM within 60 days of the reduction. Participants submitting a settlement for an energy payment when load reduction complies with a synchronized reserve event or regulation assignment must use data provided by the load meter. This data shall be forwarded through eLoadResponse.

- If the meter data files are not received within 60 days, no payment for participation is provided.

- Meter data must be provided for the hour prior to the reduction, as well as every hour during the reduction with the following exception. When on-site generation is used solely to enable the Participant to provide demand reductions then the CSP may provide qualified meter data from the on-site generation for each hour of the event instead of actual load metered data. Provision of hourly meter data from the on-site generation will be deemed a certification by the CSP that the on-site generation was not used for any purpose other than to support the load reduction during the event day. If the On-Site Generator is used on a regular basis for normal operations then the CSP may provide qualified meter data from the On-Site Generator for each hour of the event provided the amount of generation run to provide Economic Load Response can be quantified in a manner that is acceptable to PJM. For example, if a 5 MW On-Site Generator that normally provides 3 MW boosts its output to 5 MW in response to LMPs the CSP will be eligible to receive a demand response energy settlement for the additional 2 MW of output.

- Meter data will be forwarded to the EDC and LSE upon receipt, and these parties will then have ten (10) business days to provide feedback to PJM.

- Objection by the EDC or the LSE to the CBL, the Meter Data, or the retail rate shall be clearly set forth in the Comments related to the Settlement Data. The CSP shall correct and re-submit the Settlement Data within 2 business days. The objecting EDC and/or LSE shall have 5 business days to review the re-submitted Settlement Data or PJM will assume acceptance.

- All load reduction data are subject to PJM Market Monitoring Unit audit.

Customer Baseline Load (CBL)

- For those CSPs that wish to measure load reductions by comparing metered load against an estimate of what metered load would have been absent the reduction, a Customer Baseline Load (CBL) shall be calculated for each Demand Resource ("Load").

- A Customer Baseline Load cannot be calculated for the Demand Resources participating as Emergency Load Response resources.

- A Customer Baseline Load is calculated for three timeframes: an Average Day CBL for Weekdays, the Average Day CBL for Saturdays, and the Average Day CBL for Sundays/Holidays. The standard CBL for all three timeframes is set forth in section 3.3A.2 (Customer Baseline Load) of the PJM Tariff.

- At the time it enters the Load Response Program, the Demand Resource or its representative (CSP), shall specify whether it desires to apply a Weather Sensitivity Adjustment (WSA) for the summer period (May-October, inclusive) or the winter period (November-April) or both.

- The election to apply the WSA may be changed only annually.

- The WSA shall increase or decrease the CBL. The WSA shall be calculated for interval-metered Demand Resources using a simplified methodology, including a regression analysis and analysis method, as defined in the Program Documentation. This simplified methodology only will be applicable for reductions in real-time Economic Load Response during the summer months when the hourly temperature at the nearest major airport equals or exceeds 85 degrees during each hour of the load reduction event and the WSA would make more than a five percent difference in the CBL that is calculated.

- The WSA, expressed in percentage terms, shall be applied to each hour of the CBL during the event period in order to establish a weather-adjusted CBL.

- The CSP may choose to apply to the Symmetric Additive Adjustment instead of the regression analysis or the simplified methodology described above. The election to apply the Symmetric Additive Adjustment shall be made at the time the Demand Resource is registered and annually thereafter. The Symmetric Additive Adjustment is defined in section 3.3A.3(a) (Weather-Sensitive and Symmetric Additive Adjustment) of the PJM Tariff.

- For Demand Resources without interval data from the previous summer that select the regression analysis, the WSA shall initially be set at 100%. After one month of actual program response, a regression analysis shall be performed and the WSA shall be adjusted.

- In no event shall application of the WSA produce a weather-adjusted CBL that exceeds the Demand Resource's historical, seasonal, on-peak non-coincident peak load.

- Case-by-case suggestions for alternative WSA methods or adjustments to the Demand Resource's historical, seasonal, on-peak non-coincident peak load may be approved by PJM if negotiated in good faith and agreed to by all appropriate parties.

- Curtailment Service Providers are responsible for forwarding the appropriate CBL data (to PJM within 60 days of the reduction.

- If the CBL data files are not received within 60 days, no payment for participation is provided.

- CBL data must be provided for each contiguous hour during which load reduction was accomplished.

- PJM will forward Customer Baseline (CBL) and Weather-Sensitive Adjustment (WSA) calculations to the appropriate EDC and LSE for optional review.

- EDC and LSE will provide feedback to PJM within ten (10) business days of receipt of data.

- Objection by the EDC or the LSE to the CBL, the Meter Data, or the retail rate shall be clearly set forth in the Comments related to the Settlement Data. The Curtailment Service Provider shall correct and re-submit the Settlement Data within 2 business days. The objecting EDC and/or LSE shall have 5 business days to review the re-submitted Settlement Data or PJM will assume acceptance. This procedure does not affect the requirement for the CSP to submit the settlement to PJM within 60 days of the load reduction event.

- The Demand Resource shall inform PJM directly or inform its CSP, who shall inform PJM, of any significant change to the Demand Resource's operations that increases or decreases the Demand Resource's CBL.

- A significant incremental change is defined as any operational or physical change to the Demand Resource's facilities that will adjust more than half the hours in the Demand Resource's CBL by at least 20% for more than twenty consecutive days. PJM may require and approve such adjustments to the CBL as are necessary to reflect the significant incremental change.

- All CBL data are subject to PJM Market Monitoring Unit audit.

Settlements Data Requirements

- Data required for emergency load response settlements:
  - Real-time LMP values by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Actual Metered Reduction (Hourly MW) by Market Participant and by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Actual Load (Hourly MW) by Market Participant and by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Market Participant acting as CSP (ParticipantName)
- Data required for day-ahead economic load response settlements :
  - Day-ahead LMP values by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Day-ahead load response scheduled MW quantities by Market Participant and by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Real-time LMP values by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Actual Metered Reduction (Hourly MW) by Market Participant and by Zone (PNODE)
  - Actual Load (Hourly MW) by Market Participant and by Zone (PNODE)
  - Load Serving Entity (LSEOrgId)
  - Market Participant acting as CSP (ParticipantName)
  - Loss Factor
  - Retail Rate (G & T)
- Data required for real-time economic load response settlements:
  - Real-time LMP values by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Actual Metered Reduction (Hourly MW) by Market Participant and by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - Actual Load (Hourly MW) by Market Participant and by Zone or aggregate (including nodal) (PNODE)
  - CBL (Hourly MW)

- Load Serving Entity (LSEOrgId)
- Market Participant acting as CSP (ParticipantName)
- Loss Factor
- Retail Rate (G & T)
- Real-Time Operating Reserve Charges (to be applied when the bid of the Demand Resource cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Demand Resource over or under performed in the real-time)
- There are two Operating Reserve calculations, which require the following information:

- Day-Ahead Operating Reserves
  - ShutDown Costs submitted biannually (When the ShutDown Costs entered in eMkt and eLoadResponse are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values)
- Balancing Operating Reserves
  - ShutDown Costs submitted biannually (When the ShutDown Costs enetered in eMkt and eLoadResponse are not the same, PJM will use the lower of the two values)

Aggregation for Economic Load Response

The purpose for aggregation is to allow the participation of end-use customers in the energy market that can provide less than 100 kW of demand response when they currently have no alternative opportunity to participateon an individual basis or can provide less than 500 kw of demand response in the day-ahead scheduling reserve (DASR), synchronized reserve (SR) or regulation (REG) markets when they currently have no alternative opportunity to participate on an individual basis. An aggregation shall meet the following requirements:

- If the aggregation will only provide energy to the market then only 1 end use customer within the aggregation shall have the ability to reduce more than 99kw of load unless the CSP, LSE and PJM approve. If the aggregation will provide an ancillary service to the market then only 1 end use customer within the aggregation shall have the ability to reduce more than 499kw of load unless the CSP, LSE and PJM approve.
- All end-use customers in an aggregation shall be served by the same electric distribution company or Load Serving Entity where the EDC is the LSE for all end-use customers in the aggregation. If the aggregation will provide synchronized reserves, all customers in the aggregation must also be part of the same synchronized reserve sub-zone.

- All end-use customers in an aggregation that settle at Transmission Zone, existing load Aggregate, or node prices shall be located in the same Transmission Zone, existing load Aggregate, or at the same node.
- Each end-use customer site must meet the requirements for market participation by a Demand Resource except for the 100 kW minimum load reduction requirement for energy or the 500 kw minimum load reduction requirement for ancillary services.
- An end use customer's participation in the energy and ancillary service markets shall be administered under one economic registration.

Registration for Aggregation

Until such time as the PJM system is able to accommodate individual end-use customers having anticipated load reductions of less than 100 kW in the PJM Economic Load Response program, Curtailment Service Providers (CSP) shall register an aggregation under a master account in the appropriate PJM system.

- A fictional EDC account number shall be created for the Master Account.
- Format for account number shall be "Master_" & actual EDC account number for the largest end use customer in the aggregation.
- If end-use customers are added or subtracted from a Master Account, then a new Master Account shall be created.
- A new Master Account may not be created more than once a month.
- All end-use customers in a Master Account shall be specifically identified in a supplemental electronic file in a standard file format and available to all parties to include:
    - End-use customer name
    - Electric Distribution Company account number
    - End-use customer state
    - Electric Distribution Company name
    - Anticipated load reduction capability
    - Load Serving Entity name
    - Retail Rate (G&T)
    - Loss Factor

Calculations for the weighted average retail rate and line loss factor

- When all end-use customers in a Master Account are not subject to the same retail rate, the rate for the Master Account shall be the registration load reduction weighted average of the retail rates for end-use customers in an aggregation.
- When all end-use customers in a Master Account are not subject to the same line loss factor, the factor for the Master Account shall be the registration load reduction weighted average of the factors for end-use customers in an aggregation.
- The CSP shall calculate the Ratio Share for each end-use customer as the percentage share of the summation of the individual anticipated load reduction capabilities (Total kW).
- The CSP shall calculate the Weighted Average G&T (WA G&T) by multiplying the Ratio Share times the G&T for each end-use customer and totalizing the results. The WA G&T shall represent the G&T of the Master Account.
- The CSP shall calculate the Weighted Average line loss factor (WA LF) by multiplying the Ratio Share times the loss factor (LF) for each end-use customer and totalizing the results. The WA LF shall represent the loss factor of the Master Account.
- The CSP shall provide the calculation of all load weighted values and their supporting data to the LSE and PJM at the time of registration.
- An example calculation would be:

Customer	1	2	3	Total
kW	32.02	22.46	50.91	105.38
Ratio Share	30.38%	21.31%	48.31%	100.00%
G&T	$ 0.0500	$ 0.0660	$ 0.0890	
LF	1.0680	1.0790	1.0900	
WA G&T	$ 0.0152	$ 0.0141	$ 0.0430	$ 0.0722
WA LF	0.32448	0.22995	0.52654	1.08097

Settlement for Aggregation

All end-use customers in the Master Account are considered to have individually participated in each curtailment event as scheduled by the CSP or dispatched by PJM for the Master Account. A supplemental calculation shall be performed by the CSP to determine the Master Account settlement components for uploading into the appropriate PJM system. The CSP shall provide all supporting details as outlined below to the LSE and PJM prior to submitting the settlement.

- Customer Baseline (CBL)

- Each individual end-use customer in the aggregation will have its own metered load incorporated with the metered loads of the other members of the aggregation.
- The summation of the individual metered loads represents the Master Account Baseline.
- The Master Account single CBL for settlement shall be based on the Master Account Baseline.
- Metered Load - Each individual end-use customer in the aggregation will have its own metered load and the summation of the individual metered loads will represent the Master Account metered load.
- Weighted Average G&T - The load reduction weighted average G&T rate shall be the value calculated for registration.
- Weighted Average Loss Factor - The load reduction weighted average loss factor shall be the value calculated for registration.

Interval Meter Equipment and Load Data Requirements

(Section becomes effective on 10/1/09)

A CSP, LSE, EDC or agent designated by the CSP may fulfill the interval metering equipment and load data responsibilities which are required by PJM of the CSP for economic and emergency demand response resources including ancillary services. Interval metering equipment and load data used for retail electricity service shall be deemed to meet PJM requirements for energy settlement and capacity compliance.

The following documentation shall be provided by the CSP to PJM when non-retail electric service metering equipment and load data will be utilized for settlements or compliance. The CSP shall verify that all documentation is accurate and maintain compliance to PJM metering equipment and load data requirements.

- The date the metering equipment was installed, tested and ready to record, store and communicate interval load data for DSR activity
- The person that installed the metering equipment
- The make and model of the meter
- Metering equipment accuracy (meter, CT and PT)
- CT & PT type designation
- CT ratio
- All metering equipment shall, at a minimum, meet appropriate ANSI c12.1 and c57.13 standards to ensure the metering equipment is within the Tariff defined accuracy standards

- Metering equipment used for ancillary services shall meet additional requirements as defined in the PJM Tariff and/or Manuals.
  - If equipment does not meet these standards, then on an exception basis, a field test may be conducted to validate the accuracy as long as the electricity service is less than 600 volts. PJM will review the field test results and associated metering equipment configuration to determine whether or not the use of metering equipment will be permitted.
  - Metering equipment may include a pulse data recorder used in conjunction with a meter.

The CSP or designated agent shall maintain the relationship between the load data, metering equipment, EDC account number and other Customer Identifiers as defined. Further, the CSP or designated agent shall submit to PJM the quality assurance protocol used to ensure metering equipment accuracy over time. All interval load data, except where also used for retail electric service, shall at a minimum comply with the NAESB VEE (validate, edit & estimate) standards, where applicable, for retail electric service to ensure the quality of the information. If a pulse data recorder is utilized then time shall be managed on a daily basis or per communication whichever is least frequent. Time may be checked and reconciled through the network time protocol. Load data, including both pre and post VEE data shall be maintained for 36 months by CSP or designated agent. The CSP and/or designated agent will comply with request for metering equipment and load data audit as necessary which may include but not be limited to the following:

- Being available for on-site verification of metering equipment
- Providing load data history for Pre and Post VEE load data
- Providing work order, cut sheet or other documentation to validate the installation of the metering equipment
- Load data reconciliation where there are two metering systems present

A CSP or their designated agent that violate these standards will not be allowed to manage the installation/maintenance of metering equipment and associated load data for PJM settlements or compliance.

Non-retail electric service load data used for settlements or compliance will not be reconciled by PJM to the retail electric service load data unless, to troubleshoot an issue or as part of an audit.

If the CSP elects to utilize non-retail electric service load data for settlements then CSP will provide 90 consecutive days of load data on an annual basis near the effective date of the registration to PJM and PJM will make this load data available to the appropriate LSE. In addition, CSP or PJM shall provide load data to the EDC, as appropriate, for the peak load contribution add back process.

All metering equipment and load data shall comply with these standards by October 1, 2009.

Section 11: Overview of the Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market

Welcome to the *Overview of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market* section of the ***PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations***. In this section you will find the following information:

- An overview description of the PJM Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market (see "Overview of PJM Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market").
- A list of the PJM Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Business Rules (see "PJM Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Business Rules").

Overview of Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market

The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market is a construct for a market based mechanism for the procurement of supplemental, 30-minute reserves on the PJM System. The Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve Market is a offer-based market that will clear existing reserve requirements on a day-ahead, forward basis.

The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market is designed to create an explicit value for an additional ancillary service in the PJM Markets, on a short-term basis. A Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve market can provide a pricing method and price signals that can encourage generation and demand resources to provide Day-ahead Scheduling reserves and to encourage new resources to be deployed with the capability to provide such services.

The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market is designed to interact with the current and proposed PJM Operating Reserve construct. While a clearing market for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserves may reduce out-of-market payments to generators in the form of Operating Reserve credits, it will not eliminate them, and the remaining Operating Reserve costs will continue to be allocated.

PJM Day-Ahead Reserve Market Business Rules

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Reserve Requirement

- Current reserve requirements are detailed in **PJM Manual M-13, Section 2,** and vary according to the specific PJM region. The requirements for each region are combined to determine the overall requirement for the RTO, and the overall RTO requirement would form the basis for clearing the forward market.
- The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement will adhere to the requirements for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve defined by Reliability First Corporation and all applicable reliability councils for areas within the PJM RTO.
- The PJM RTO Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement will be defined as the sum of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve requirements defined for all zones and areas within the PJM RTO, including any additional Day-ahead Scheduling reserves

scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

- Future reserve requirements may be defined locationally based on operation criteria as documented in the PJM Manuals.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Eligibility

- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources are defined as resources that meet the following eligibility requirements to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve:
    - Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources comprise of all those resources that can provide reserve capability that can be fully converted into energy within 30 minutes from the request of the PJM dispatcher at the time of the request and is provided by equipment which may not necessarily at the time of the request be electrically synchronized to the system.
- A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resource may be:
    - Equipment not electrically synchronized to the system. The equipment that generally qualifies in this category is shutdown run-of-river, pumped hydro, industrial combustion turbines, jet engine/expander turbines, combined cycle and diesels ; or
    - Additional generating capacity that is synchronized to the grid and scheduled and can increase output in 30 minutes (including condensing mode and pumped hydro that is in pumping mode) to provide additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve;

      or
    - Load response resources must be registered in the Economic Load Response program, indicate that they can be dispatchable by PJM in real-time and be able to be reduced within 30 minutes.
    - Load response resources that are considered “batch load” resources as defined in the Synchronized Reserve Market detailed in PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations (M-11), Section 4 may participate in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve market under the same conditions as exist for Synchronized Reserve with respect to having already reduced prior to receiving a PJM dispatch instruction to do so. Such resources must remain off line for the duration of the PJM dispatch request in order to receive the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve market payment.
- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market offers may be submitted only for those resources located electrically within the PJM RTO.
- Resources may participate and be compensated in both the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve and Synchronized Reserve Markets. In addition, resources may participate and be compensated in both the Day-ahead Scheduling and Regulation Markets

However, since resources cannot participate in both the Synchronized Reserve and Regulation markets, no resources can participate in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve, Synchronized Reserve AND Regulation markets and be compensated for all three.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Rules

- The following offer and operational information must be supplied through the Two-Settlement Market User Interface (eMarket):
    - Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Availability.
- All generator units that have submitted energy offers with the parameters that make them capable of increasing energy output within 30 minutes are available to provide Day-ahead Scheduling reserve. Default = available.
- Demand resources may indicate if they are available to provide Day-ahead Scheduling reserve. Default = unavailable.
- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Offer Quantity (MW) for Online Units is derived as the lesser of:
    - difference of the Emergency Max – DA Dispatch Pt scheduled
- Energy Ramp Rate * (30 minutes)
- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Offer Quantity (MW) for Offline Units is:
    - Emergency Max
    - Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Offer Price.
- A valid generator or demand response energy offer must be available in the Day-ahead Energy Market to participate.
- Non-capacity resources will need to have an energy offer available in the Day-ahead Market to participate in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market.
- All generator units that are eligible and available to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve will be counted in the clearing of the RTO Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement. Demand resources may voluntarily make themselves available to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Offer Period

- Market participants wishing to offer into the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market must supply offer and operational data on a day-ahead basis, with offers due to PJM by 1200 EPT on the day before the operating day.

- Offers to provide Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve are in dollars/MW of Reserve to be provided, and $0 is a valid offer.

- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offers are locked as of 1200 EPT the day prior to operation. All generating units listed as available for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve with no offer price will have their offer prices set to zero.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Clearing

- PJM would clear the forward market for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves via a simultaneous optimization with the energy market as part of the Day-Ahead Market mechanism.

- The Operating Reserve objective utilized in the Day-Ahead Market and on which the Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve market that would clear will be calculated based on the PJM load forecast for the upcoming operating day.

- The market clearing would result in an hourly price for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve for the next day, and would be posted along with the resource-specific Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve awards by 1600 EPT via the PJM eMarket User Interface.

- A clearing price for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve would be calculated for each hour of the upcoming operating day based upon whether PJM was required to commit additional resources to meet the RTO Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve requirement. The hourly clearing price would be based upon the offer prices submitted by the selected resources, together with any opportunity cost a resource incurs in the day-ahead market as a result of being backed down in the day-ahead scheduling process in order to provide reserve.

- The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market clearing price is set equal to the merit order price of the highest cost Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve resource necessary to meet the remaining requirement.

- Resource merit order price ($/MWHr) = resource Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer + resource Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve opportunity costs.

- Both generator startup costs and demand resource shutdown costs are divided over the expected commitment period for the resource, as part of the market clearing process. Neither of these costs are including in the clearing price.

- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve start-up costs are defined as applicable generator startup costs required to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve or demand resource shutdown costs required to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve.

- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve opportunity costs are defined as applicable generator opportunity costs required to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve or applicable demand resource opportunity costs required to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve. [**NOTE: Opportunity Costs have not been defined for**

Demand Resources in the Synchronized Reserve construct. When, and if they are defined for Synchronized Reserve, they can be defined for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve.]

- The resource Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer is that which is submitted by the owner via eMarket by 1200 hours on the day preceding the operating day.
- For each of these calculations, forecast LMP is the result of the Day-Ahead Market software.
- All Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve clearing prices are posted on the eMarket user interface for public view at 1600 EPT.
- All Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve award are posted on the eMarket user interface for private view at 1600 EPT.
- Data posted at 1600 will include Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Clearing Price, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement, and Cleared MWs.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Operations

- Those resources receiving a day-ahead award for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve would receive the hourly clearing price for the awarded MW amount as long as they were capable of providing the reserve in real time as scheduled.
- PJM may call on resources not otherwise scheduled to run in order to provide Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve, in accordance with PJM's obligation to minimize the total cost of energy, operating reserves, synchronized reserve, regulation, and other ancillary services. If a resource is called on by PJM for the purpose of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve, the resource is guaranteed recovery of all costs including start-up, no-load and minimum energy costs.
- The hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve clearing price is fixed once calculated and posted at 1600 EPT the day before the Operating Day.
- Measurement of the performance of assigned resources will be as follows:
  - For resources with a start time of greater than 30 minutes, the resource is required to be on line and operating at PJM’s direction during the timeframe (i.e. – all hours) of the award with a dispatchable range (Eco Max – Eco Min) at least as great as the supplement reserve award.
  - For resources with a start plus notification time of less than or equal to 30 minutes, the resource would be required to be available to the PJM operator for dispatch during the hours of the award and start within the specified notification plus start time if dispatched by PJM.
  - For Demand Resources, measurement is the difference between the demand resource’s MW consumption at the time a resource is requested by PJM dispatch

to reduce and its MW consumption after 30 minutes of the request. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, demand resources consumption at the start of the event is defined as the greatest telemetered consumption between one (1) minute prior to and one (1) minute following the issuance of the dispatch instruction. Similarly, a demand resource's consumption thirty minutes after the dispatcher request is defined as the lowest consumption measured between twenty nine (29) and thirty (31) minutes after the start of the request.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Obligation Fulfillment

- Each Load Serving Entity (LSE) on the PJM system incurs a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve obligation in kWh based on their real-time load ratio share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve assigned. Each LSE's obligation is equal to its load ratio share within its RTO times the amount of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve assigned in the RTO. Any PJM market participant may incur or fulfill a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve obligation through the execution of a bilateral Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve transaction as described below.

- Participants may fulfill their Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve obligations by:

  - Owning Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve resources from which the RTO obtains Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve ;

  - Entering bilateral arrangements with other market participants; or

  - Purchasing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve from the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve market.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Bilateral Transactions

- Bilateral Day-ahead Scheduling [Supplement] Reserve bilateral transactions must be entered by the buyer and subsequently confirmed by the seller through the Two Settlement MUI no later than 1600 the day after the transaction starts. Bilateral transactions that have been entered and confirmed may not be changed; they must be deleted and re-entered. Deletion of a bilateral transaction is interpreted as a change in the end time of the transaction to the current hour, unless the transaction has not yet started.

- Bilateral Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve transactions may be entered either in MW or as a percentage of the purchaser's obligation. The minimum MW value is .1 MW

- PJM will calculate and post an indexes in order to provide an approximate value of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve on which market participants may base prices for bilateral Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions:

$$(\text{Total hourly Supplemental Reserve cost})/(\text{Total Supplemental Reserve assigned})$$

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Settlement

- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve settlement is a zero-sum calculation based on the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve provided to the market by generation and demand resource owners and purchased from the market by participants.

- Costs for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserves would be allocated according to load ratio share. Similar to the Regulation and Synchronized Reserve markets, each Load-Serving Entity would carry an obligation to purchase Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve equal to its load ratio share of the RTO requirement, and charges would be based on the MW obligation carried by each LSE. If in the future, Day-ahead Scheduling reserve requirements are defined locationally based on operating criteria, then the costs would be allocated locationally to load ratio share.

- Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges for each participant are equal to:

    - the appropriate hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve clearing price times the MW of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve that which is purchased from the market plus;

    - the participant's share of any unrecovered costs incurred by assigned Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve resources over and above the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve clearing price plus;

    - the participant's share of any unrecovered costs incurred by those resources PJM committed for the sole purpose of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve plus;

- The appropriate hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve clearing price for each LSE is the clearing price for the zone in which the LSE's load is located.

- Revenue from the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market will be applied against balancing operating reserve credits that correspond to the hour that the revenue was earned.

Non-Performance

There is no requirement for resources with Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve awards to actually maintain the awarded amount of reserve capability in real time.

Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve awards are required to follow PJM direction, in real time, as specified in the rules detailed in **Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market Operations section,** during the hours they received those awards.

Those resources receiving a day-ahead award for Day-ahead Scheduling [30-Minute] Reserve that are not available to provide that reserve in real time during the timeframe of the award will not receive the clearing price for the awarded MW amount for the hours the resource was assigned for that day.

a. For resources with a start time + notification time of greater than 30 minutes, this means resources that received an award but are not on line during the hours for which the award was received.

b. For resources with a start time + notification time of less than or equal to 30 minutes, this means resources that received an instruction from PJM to start during one of the hours for which the award was received but did not complete startup within specified startup and notification time from the time the PJM operator issued the instruction.

    i. If unit with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Award for any hour in a day is requested to start in an hour that it did not receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Award, the unit must start within the specified Notification + Startup time for that hour in order to receive the award for the day.

c. Those resources receiving a day-ahead award for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve, that have a real-time dispatchable range that is less than the resource's Day-ahead dispatchable range become ineligible to receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market payment.

Demand Resources

Demand resources' response controls must be approved by PJM prior to participation in the Supplement Reserve Market including ability to be dispatched by PJM's Unit Dispatch System.

Demand resources providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve are required to provide telemetry that is capable of providing metering information at no less than a one minute scan rate.

Metering information of demand resources is not required to be sent to PJM in real time. Daily uploads at the end of the day if an event has occurred are sufficient, as the response evaluation is performed after the fact.

Demand resources may be aggregated and offered into the PJM Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market as one combined resource if the appropriate telemetry is provided for the aggregated resource.

Demand resource participation will be limited to 25% of the RTO Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement.

Demand Resources will be allowed to participate in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Markets if approved by the appropriate Regional Reliability Council.

Attachment A: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order

Curtailment of Transmission or Recall of Energy:

The following is the curtailment order used by PJM for curtailing due to system constraints, Maximum Emergency and other PJM Emergencies. This curtailment order is used for transmission as well as capacity related curtailments.

PJM Dispatch may deviate from this pattern as necessary to maintain reliability. The *(italicized)* text below represents likely system events as they would occur during a transmission constraint.

(Constrained System)

Non-Firm over Secondary Points not willing to pay congestion charges

Firm transmission used for a path other than the OASIS POR/POD. (NERC Transmission Bucket 1) Curtail by energy timestamp (LIFO).

Non-Firm not willing to pay congestion charges (NF-NPC)

Curtail descending by transmission time block (hour - NERC Transmission Bucket 2, day - NERC Transmission Bucket 3, week - NERC Transmission Bucket 4, and then month - NERC Transmission Bucket 5)

- Within a time block, curtail on/off-peak before curtailing all day reservations.
- Within the above categories curtail lower priced transmission first.
- Within the above categories curtail by transmission timestamp (LIFO).

Network Import not willing to pay congestion charges (Net-NPC)

(NERC Transmission Bucket 6) Curtail by energy timestamp (LIFO).

(Redispatch System)

Spot Market Import (SPTIN)

(NERC Transmission Bucket 6) Unload based on dispatch rate (non-zero rate schedules)

(Zero Dispatch Rate if applicable)

Unload spot market imports with zero dispatch rates

(Declare Emergency if applicable)

Must-take spot market import schedules are to be curtailed after non-firm not willing to pay congestion (npc) but before non-firm willing to pay congestion (wpc).

Non-Firm over Secondary Points willing to pay congestion charges

Firm transmission used for a path other than the OASIS POR/POD. (NERC Transmission Bucket 1) Curtail by energy timestamp (LIFO).

Non-Firm willing to pay congestion charges (NF-WPC)

Curtail descending by transmission time block (hour – NERC Transmission Bucket 2, day – NERC Transmission Bucket 3, week – NERC Transmission Bucket 4, and then month – NERC Transmission Bucket 5).

- Within a time block, curtail on/off-peak before curtailing all day reservations.
- Within the above categories curtail lower priced transmission first.
- Within the above categories curtail by transmission timestamp (LIFO).

Network Import willing to pay congestion charges (Net-WPC)

(NERC Transmission Bucket 6) Curtail by energy timestamp (LIFO).

Firm

Curtail schedules that effectively relieve the constraint, proportionally among Native Load customers, Network customers and customers taking Firm Point-to-Point transmission service. (NERC Transmission Bucket 7)

Example of Recall of Energy

An example of curtailment of capacity is curtailment of interchange energy schedules due to a maximum generation emergency. After schedules using non-firm energy (which effectively relieves the constraint) are curtailed in the order specified above, schedules using firm transmission would be curtailed. Note: the transmission is not curtailed; the energy is curtailed.

Based on the PJM Transmission Tariff, PJM formed the following wording, which describes the method for curtailing energy using a firm transmission reservation.

Firm

Curtail schedules that effectively relieve the constraint, proportionally among Native Load customers, Network customers and customers taking Firm Point-to-Point transmission service. (NERC Transmission Bucket 7)

Exports would be curtailed for maximum generation emergency; Native Load, Network Customers, and other imports would not curtailed (imports are helpful during times of capacity shortage). This guideline is used for curtailment (on a whole contract basis) of energy schedules using firm transmission.

The method used to determine which firm schedules to curtail and in what order is explained below:

First, all effective cuts of schedules using lower priority transmission reservations (non-firm) are curtailed. Then recallable energy using firm transmission service is curtailed. The energy schedules using firm transmission service are cut on a whole contract basis and approximately proportionately among the transmission customers. The method used is to subdivide the schedule into two approximately equal segments, with about half of the any given companies energy in each block. These blocks are then subdivided repeatedly until each block is less than or equal to 400 MW. The blocks are then cut from first to last, as needed to follow load. If a block is to be subdivided and there are multiple customers, each with only one schedule in that block, the last customers to submit their energy schedules will be curtailed first. Similarly, a transmission customer's schedules will be curtailed in descending timestamp order.

Curtailment of Capacity Backed Resources

Capacity Backed Exports are those transactions sourced from generators or portions of generators on the PJM system that are not designated as PJM installed capacity.

At Maximum Emergency, PJM will not recall any energy from a resource that is not included in PJM Installed Capacity. If a resource has been de-rated from summer peak capacity, any export that exceeds the pro-rated capacity not attributed to PJM will be reduced to that pro-rated level.

Example: Unit A has a summer rated capacity of 80 MW, where 60 MW is designated as installed capacity and 20 MW is not. A 20 MW export is scheduled from PJM. There is no outage on the unit. The full 20 MW export will be scheduled.

Example: Unit A has a summer rated capacity of 80 MW, where 60 MW is designated as installed capacity and 20 MW is not. If there is a 40 MW partial outage of the unit, 3/4 (or 60/80) of the remaining capacity is considered installed. 1/4, or 20/80, of the remaining capacity is available as non-installed capacity and will not be curtailed during a PJM Maximum Emergency. In this example 30 MW remains as PJM installed capacity and 10 MW remains available for capacity backed exports. If the owner of Unit A scheduled a 20 MW export, 10 MW could be recalled during PJM Maximum Emergency. At the conclusion of Maximum Emergency or at the conclusion of the outage, the export would be restored to the full 20 MW.

Revision History

Revisions 41 (06/18/2009)

- Revisions to Section 3 to incorporate rules as approved by FERC on March 29, 2009 (Docket No. ER09-789) to allow for the recovery of lost opportunity costs incurred by generating market buyers and market sellers during the hour preceding the initial regulating hour and the hour following the final regulation hour.

- Cleanup revision on page 121.

Revision 40 (03/18/2009):

Revision to Section 10 to change the current rule requiring a participating end-use customer site have only one Curtailment Service Provider. Revision approved by Markets Reliability Committee on April 23, 2009.

Revision 39 (03/18/2009):

Revisions to Section 10 for Interval Meter Equipment and Load Data Requirements for DSR resources, Revisions approved by the Markets and Reliability Committee on March 18, 2009. Interval Meter Equipment and Load Data Requirements become effective on **October 1, 2009.**

Revision 38 (01/15/2009):

Revised Section 3 to incorporate rules to implement the Three Pivotal Supplier Test in the Regulation Market as approved by FERC (ER09-013) on November 26, 2008.

Revisions to Section 10 to incorporate Customer Usage Information Form

Revision 37 (11/24/2008)

Revised Synchronized Reserve Market rules to allow recalculation of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve estimates 60 minutes prior to the market hour [as approved by MRC on June, 2008]

Revision 36 (08/06/2008)

Revised offer capping rules to eliminate exemptions per FERC Order EL08-34 (Effective May 16, 2008). Revisions made to Section 2.

Revised terminology for revised RFC Definition for Bulk Electric System (BES. Revisionds made to Sections 1, 11 & 9.

Created new Section 11: Overview of Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market to incorporate markets rules approved per FERC Order ER08-780 (Effective May 30, 2008). Additional revisions made to Sections 1, 2, 5 & 6 for consistency.

Revised the Regulation Market Requirement to calculate on and off peak values. Revisions made to Sections 3 & 6.

Revision 35 (06/13/2008)

Section 10: Demand Resources Participation

Revised Demand Response Participation Rules effective June 13, 2008 for calculation of Customer Baseline (CBL) and associated rules per FERC Order ER08-824.

Revision 34 (2/29/2008)

Corrected typographical error made in Revision 33 on page 23.

Revision 33 (02/21/2008)

Section 2 – Revisions to reflect changes to the business rules for 'up-to-congestion' transactions.

Revision 32 (09/28/2007)

Section 2 – Revisions to reflect changes to the Day-ahead modeling of external bilateral transactions to put the generator or load (for import or export respectively) at the interface point.

Revision 31 (06/01/2007)

- Revisions for the implementation of Marginal Losses
- Revisions for the implementation of the Reliability Pricing Model

Revision 30 (03/20/02007)

- Section 2: Clarifying changes for consistency
- Section 3: Clarifying changes to reflect the implementation of Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP) in SPREGO optimization. Clarifying changes to reflect posting of Regulation Market Results.
- Section 4: Clarifying changes to reflect the implementation of Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP) in SPREGO optimization. Clarifying changes to reflect posting of Synchronized Reserve Market Results.
- Section 4: Revised rules to reflect the requirements of Demand Resources that are considered "batch load"
- Section 4: Revised rules to reflect Synchronized Reserve Market Consolidation for Reliability First Corporation.
- Section 5: Clarifying changes for terminology
- Section 6: Clarifying changes for consistency and terminology

- Section 6: Clarifying changes to reflect the scheduling process for External Market Sellers (XIC Units)
- Revision History permanently moved to the end of the manual.

Revision 29 (08/11/2006)

Exhibit 1: Updated to include the new Manual 30: Alternative Collateral Program.

Section 2: Revised rules to clarify the determination of a resource's hourly Desired MWh value and no-load compensation values.

Section 7: Timing requirement updates made regarding ramp reservations that are not scheduled against and ramp reservations that are placed In-Queue.

Added new section (Section 10) for Demand Response Participation

Revision 28 (06/13/06)

Revised Ancillary Services Rules for DSR.

Revised Ancillary Services Rules for RFC.

Revised for Three Pivotal Supplier rules.

Revision 27 (05/12/06)

- Section 7: Overview of External Transaction Scheduling
    - Removed exception for spot import service.
- Revisions were made to the following pages: 101 and 106.

Revision 26 (11/09/05)

- Section 7: Overview of External Transaction Scheduling
    - Revised wording in paragraph 1 to reflect PJM's compliance with NERC Standard INT-001.

Revision 25 (08/19/05)

- Section 3: Overview of PJM Regulation Market
    - Revised PJM Regulation Market Business Rules to create a single regulation market for the PJM RTO effective August 1, 2005.

Revision 24 (05/09/05)

- Section 3: Overview of PJM Regulation Market
    - Revised PJM Regulation Market Business Rules to identify Ancillary Services Market Areas for Market Integration.

- Revised PJM Spinning Reserve Market Business Rules to define Southern Spinning Reserve Requirement.

- Section 4: Overview of the PJM Spinning Reserve Market
  - Revised PJM Spinning Reserve Market Business Rules to identify Ancillary Services Market Areas for Market Integration.
  - Revised PJM Spinning Reserve Market Business Rules to define Southern Spinning Reserve Requirement.
- Section 7: External Transaction Scheduling
  - Revised expiration times for reservations that are not scheduled against that are made to start the following day.

Revision 23 (12/7/04)

- Section 2: Overview of PJM Two-Settlement System
  - Changed PJM Two-Settlement Business Rules for to allow Unit Modeling Changes quarterly.

Revision 22 (10/01/04)

- Section 2: Overview of PJM Two-Settlement System
  - Changed PJM Two-Settlement Business Rules for Virtual Bidding at External Interfaces
  - Added PJM Two-Settlement Business Rules for modeling multiple units for operating reserve calculations.
- Section 3: Overview of PJM Regulation Market
  - Changed PJM Regulation Market Business Rules to identify Ancillary Services Market Areas
  - Added/Changed PJM Regulation Market Business Rules for Market Integration
  - Changed PJM Regulation Market Business Rules to define Main/ECAR regulation requirement
  - Changed PJM Regulation Market Business Rules to define new information supplied through the Two-Settlement Market User Interface
- Section 4: Overview of the PJM Spinning Reserve Market
  - Changed PJM Spinning Reserve Market Business Rules to identify Ancillary Services Market Areas

- Added/Changed PJM Spinning Reserve Market Business Rules for Market Integration

Revision 21 (01/31/04)

- Created a new section (Section 7: External Energy Scheduling)
- Revised Exhibit 1: List of PJM Manuals to reflect additional manuals which have been created in 2003.

Revision 20 (09/01/03)

- Section 1: Overview of Scheduling Operation
  - Revised exhibit 2.
- Section 2: Overview of PJM Two-Settlement System
  - Revised exhibit 2.
- Section 3: Overview of PJM Regulation Market
  - Changed High Regulation Limit to Regulation Max
  - Changed Low Regulation Limit to Regulation Min
- Section 4: Overview of the PJM Spinning Reserve Market
  - Changed PJM Spinning Reserve Market Business Rules to define new information supplied through the Two-Settlement Market User Interface: Condense Startup Cost, Condense Hourly Cost, Condense Notification Time, Spin as Condenser.
  - Added Spinning Reserve Market Business Rule regarding Balancing Operating Reserves for units that are pool-assigned Tier 2 spinning reserve.
- Section 5: Scheduling Philosophy and Tools
  - Revised exhibit 4.
  - Added exhibit 5.
  - Revised exhibit 12.
  - Revised exhibit 13.
  - Removed all Attachments
- Attachment A: Markets Database Dictionary has been removed
- The Markets Database Dictionary provides PJM market participants with definitions for each of the data elements in the Markets Database. The Markets Database is an Oracle database that replaced the PJM unit commitment database. It is the repository of all generation offers, demand bid data and schedules for the Day-Ahead Energy

Market, Real-Time Energy Market, Regulation Market, and Spinning Reserve Market. The Markets Database Dictionary can be found on the PJM website at http://www.pjm.com/etools/downloads/emkt/market-database-data-dictionary.pdf.

- Attachment B (Offer Forms) has been deleted since the forms are no longer used
- Attachment C (eMKT User's Guide) has been removed
- The PJM eMKT Users Guide provides market participants with the information needed to participate in the PJM two-settlement, regulation markets and spinning reserve markets. The user guide describes the two-settlement software, the spinning reserve and regulation software, and the tasks that market participants can perform, as well as the expected system responses. The eMKT Users Guide can be found on the PJM website at http://www.pjm.com/documents/downloads/user-guides/ts-userguide.pdf
- Attachment D (Source & Sink List) has been removed
- Instructions on how to download the valid sources and sinks for the Day-Ahead Energy Market can be found in the PJM eMKT Users Guide. The eMKT Users Guide can be found on the PJM website at http://www.pjm.com/documents/downloads/user-guides/ts-userguide.pdf
- Participants can also download the PJM Network Model information from the PJM website at www.pjm.com/markets/energy-market/bus-price-model.html.
- Attachment E: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order
- This attachment has been renamed "Attachment A."
- Attachment F: External Interface Specification Guide has been removed
- The External Interface Specification Guide is intended to help market participants in the PJM two-settlement, regulation and spinning reserve markets who want to develop their own interfaces for exchanging market data with PJM instead of using the default Market User Interface provided in PJM. The External Interface Specification Guide can be found on the PJM website at http://www.pjm.com/services/training/downloads/two-externalspecs1.pdf.

Revision 19 (12/01/02)

- Revised Attachment E: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order.

Revision 18 (12/01/02)

- Revised Attachment E: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order.

Revision 17 (12/01/02)

- Added new Section 4: Overview of the PJM Spinning Reserve Market.
- All remaining sections re-numbered respectively.

Revision 16 (05/18/01)

- Revised Section 2: Overview of the PJM Two-Settlement System. Updated 'Market Sellers' subsection to include rules involving the designation of Maximum Emergency and Maximum Economic generation, numbered items 22 and 23, respectively.

Revision 15 (02/01/01)

- Revised Section 5: Scheduling Strategy & Method. Under subsection 'External Transactions', updated 60/45/30 minute rule to the new 60/30/20 minute rule. Also added bullet: "Hourly transactions will only be accepted after 1600 EPT (1400 EPT on non-business days) of the day before the Operating Day. Lastly, listed under 'Validating and Confirming Transaction Requests', a bullet was added to read:
- "Ensure a valid NERC Tag has been associated. A valid NERC Tag is one in which:"
    - The profile is entirely covered by the tag
    - The tag duration is not longer than the schedule
    - The tag does not overlap profiles within a schedule
    - The tag is not used for multiple schedules
- Removed Attachment A: Definitions and Abbreviations, and all references. Attachment A is being developed into a new PJM Manual for ***Definitions and Abbreviations (M-35)***. All remaining attachments have been renumbered and all references have been corrected.

Revision 14 (08/24/00)

- Revised Section 5: Scheduling Strategy & Method. In subsection "*Processing Market Information"*, added text pertaining to Deviations from Day-Ahead Market for Pool Scheduled Resources, and Credits for Cancellation of Pool Scheduled Resources.

Revision 13 (08/15/00)

- Revised Section 5: Scheduling Strategy & Method. Added text pertaining to Ramp Violations.

Revision 12 (07/25/00)

- Revised Section 5: Scheduling Strategy & Method.

Revision 11 (06/16/00)

- Attachment F: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order
    - Revised Curtailment of Capacity Backed Resources.
    - Capacity Backed Exports are those transactions sourced from generators or portions of generators on the PJM system that are not designated as PJM installed capacity.

- At Maximum Emergency, PJM will not recall any energy from a resource that is not included in PJM Installed Capacity. If a resource has been de-rated from summer peak capacity, any export that exceeds the pro-rated capacity not attributed to PJM will be reduced to that pro-rated level.

- Example: Unit A has a summer rated capacity of 80 MW, where 60 MW is designated as installed capacity and 20 MW is not. A 20 MW export is scheduled from PJM. There is no outage on the unit. The full 20 MW export will be scheduled.

- Example: Unit A has a summer rated capacity of 80 MW, where 60 MW is designated as installed capacity and 20 MW is not. If there is a 40 MW partial outage of the unit, 3/4 (or 60/80) of the remaining capacity is considered installed. 1/4, or 20/80, of the remaining capacity is available as non-installed capacity and will not be curtailed during a PJM Maximum Emergency. In this example 30 MW remains as PJM installed capacity and 10 MW remains available for capacity backed exports. If the owner of Unit A scheduled a 20 MW export, 10 MW could be recalled during PJM Maximum Emergency. At the conclusion of Maximum Emergency or at the conclusion of the outage, the export would be restored to the full 20 MW.

Revision 10 (06/01/00)

- Attachment F: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order
  - Removed Non-Firm over Secondary Points schedules requested after 2:00 PM of the day before operations and Non-Firm schedules requested after 2:00 PM of the day before operations from curtailment order.
  - Added category: Curtailment of Capacity Backed Resources.

Revision 09 (06/01/00)

- Revised to reflect the Multi-Settlement Process implementation.

Revision 08 (04/01/00)

- Attachment B: Unit Commitment Database
  - Removed reference to Maximum Scheduled Generation in section Unit Commitment – Scheduling Data (Cost Capped) for Steam Unit and Schedule Data #7 Schedule Operating Data.
  - Removed reference to Maximum Scheduled Generation in section Unit Commitment – Scheduling Data (Cost Capped) CT Unit and Schedule Data #5 Unit & Schedule Operating Data.
  - Removed reference to Maximum Scheduled Generation in section Unit Commitment – Scheduling Data (Cost Capped) Diesel Unit Data #5 Schedule Operating Data.

Revision 07 (06/01/99)

- Section 3: Scheduling Strategy & Method
  - Revised to reflect the new addition of Attachment F (see below).
  - Added 'new' Attachment F: Interchange Energy Schedule Curtailment Order.

Revision 06 (10/06/98)

- Section 3: Scheduling Strategy & Method
  - Guidelines and requirements for the submission of Offer Data, and confirmation and PJM acceptance of schedules/transactions under "Spot Market Energy" and "Bilateral Transactions" of "Processing Market Information" were revised.

Revision 05 (04/01/98)

- Attachment C: Offer Forms
  - Added "Exhibit C.7: Market Seller Aggregate Bid for Non-Designated Resource (E-Schedules Contracts)"
- Attachment E: Source & Sink List
  - Added Attachment E: Source & Sink List
- Section 1: Overview of Scheduling Operations
  - Revised exhibits and text.
- Section 2: Scheduling Philosophy & Tools
  - Revised exhibits and text.
- Section 3: Scheduling Strategy & Method
  - Added exhibits and text describing Locational Marginal Pricing application to the Scheduling process.
- Section 4: Posting OASIS Information
  - Revised exhibits and text.
- Section 5: Hourly Scheduling
  - Revised exhibits and text.

Revision 04 (01/30/98)

- Section 3: Scheduling Strategy & Method
    - Changed PJM contact phone numbers for receipt of Offer Data to include 610-666-4532
- under “Spot Market Energy.” Added
    - “A schedule is not accepted without confirmation of the schedule details with all parties.
    - External offers are subject to the 500 MW ramp rule. The ramp rules outlined under “Bilaterals” in this section apply to offers.”
    - under “Spot Market Energy.” Added
    - “Offers Submitted More Than One Day in Advance

        Offers may be submitted up to seven (7) days in advance (e.g., a bid for the tenth of the month could be submitted as early as the third of the month).

        Offers submitted more than one day in advance received after 12:00 noon will not be processed until the following day.

        Spot Market offers submitted more than one day in advance are not considered binding until 12:00 noon of the day before operations.

        Ramp room will be held for the schedule, but neither PJM nor the market participant is bound to the schedule before 12:00 noon of the day before the operating day. Up to this time, either party may decline the offer without penalty.

        A change to one day of a multi-day offer nullifies the timestamp for the rest the offer. The offer will be given a new timestamp and scheduled as though the rest of the schedule was submitted at the time of the change (including ramp room).

        Transmission reservations that are not used due to cancelled spot market offers will be subject to transmission charges as appropriate.

        PJM will notify the submitter of the acceptance status of offers submitted more than one day in advance by 4:00 p.m. of the day before operations or earlier as specified by the submitter. No offer will be marked as accepted before 12:00 noon of the business day before the operating day.

        Offers may be withdrawn before PJM notifies the PJM Member of bid acceptance and before 4:00 p.m. of the business day before operations or 12:00 noon of the non-business day before operations.”

- under “Spot Market Energy.”
- Changed heading “Data Requirements” from “Aggregate Offer Data Requirements:” under “Spot Market Energy.”
- Changed
  - “identity of all parties that are engaged in the schedule (e.g., buyers, sellers, marketers, transmitters, and brokers)”
- from
  - “identity of all parties that are engaged in the Bilateral Transactions (e.g., buyers, sellers, marketers, transmitters, and brokers)”
- under “Data Requirements” in “Spot Market Energy.”
- Changed
- “Offers may be withdrawn before PJM notifies the External PJM Member of bid acceptance and before 4:00 p.m. of the business day before operations or 12:00 noon of the non-business day before operations. All offers for the same period from the same Market Seller of a higher price than the withdrawn offer are also considered withdrawn.”
- from
- Offers may be withdrawn before PJM notifies the External PJM Member of bid acceptance and before 4:00 p.m. A withdraw of a bid after either of the aforementioned result in a non-delivery charge, unless withdrawing a resource specific offer due to a forced outage demonstrated to the satisfaction of the PJM. All offers for the same period from the same Market Seller of a higher price than the withdrawn offer are also considered withdrawn.
- under “Data Requirements” in “Spot Market Energy.”
- Changed
- “If the discrepancies are resolved without change to the original Bilateral Transaction request by 4:00 p.m., the schedule status is marked as confirmed. If discrepancies are resolved with changes to original Bilateral Transaction request before the scheduling deadline, the time stamp is updated to the time at which the discrepancies are resolved with the PJM.”
- from
- “If the discrepancies are resolved without change to the original Bilateral Transaction request by 4:00 p.m., the schedule status is marked as confirmed. If discrepancies are resolved with changes to original Bilateral Transaction request before 2:00 p.m., the time stamp is updated to the time at which the discrepancies are resolved with the PJM.”

- under "Confirmation of Bilateral Transactions" in "Bilateral Transactions."

- Attachment C: Offer Forms

    - Changed PJM contact phone numbers for receipt of Offer Data to include 610-666-4532.

Revision 03 (01/01/98)

- Section 3: Scheduling Strategy & Method

    - Changed "The Regulation Requirement for the PJM Control Area is defined as follows:

        PJM -specified percentage of the PJM Valley Load Forecast (currently 1.1%). This requirement is in effect during the Off-Peak Period (0000-0459 hours).

        PJM -specified percentage of the PJM Peak Load Forecast (currently 1.1%). This requirement is in effect during the On-Peak Period (0500-2359 hours)."

    - from "The Regulation Requirement for the PJM Control Area is defined as follows:

        PJM -specified percentage of the PJM Valley Load Forecast (currently 1.1%). This requirement is in effect during the Off-Peak Period (2300-0659 hours).

        PJM -specified percentage of the PJM Peak Load Forecast (currently 1.1%). This requirement is in effect during the On-Peak Period (0700-2259 hours)."

    - Changed Exhibit 3.2: Regulation Requirement Timeline.

- Attachment D: Process Diagrams

    - Added "Attachment D: Process Diagrams."

Revision 02 (09/23/97)

- Changed selected references to PJM Member to market participant.

- Changed PJM phone number for receipt of Offer Data during business hours from "610-666-8947" to "610-666-4548."

- Changed PJM phone number for checking Offer Data during non-business hours from "610-650-4307" to "610-666-4510."

- Changed PJM phone number for receipt of Bilateral Transactions (North/West) during non-business hours from “610-666-8807 to “610-666-4510.”
- Section 1: Overview of Scheduling Operations
  - Revised “(2) Unmetered Market Buyer - An Unmetered Market Buyer is a Market Buyer that is making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by metered end-users or end-users that are located outside the PJM Control Area.” in “Market Buyers” under “PJM Member Responsibilities.”
  - Revised “purchase transmission capacity reservation in order to receive generation from PJM Interchange Energy Market if the energy is being delivered to end-users that are located outside the PJM Control Area” in “Market Buyers” under “PJM Member Responsibilities.”
- Section 2: Scheduling Philosophy & Tools
  - Deleted “verifies that transmission service exists” in “Transaction Management System” under “Scheduling Tools.”
  - Revised “The deadline for both internal and external participants to submit information for the next day is 12:00 Noon of the previous PJM business day. After this deadline, no further offers are accepted for the next day and the UCDB is locked. The deadline is only extended when there is a computer problem at the PJM” in “Marginal Scheduler” under “Scheduling Tools.”
- Section 3: Scheduling Strategy & Method
  - Revised “(4) PJM notifies via ALL-CALL, of the PJM Regulation Requirement” in “PJM Actions” under “PJM Regulation Requirements.”
  - Revised “ (6) PJM notifies via ALL-CALL, in the event of a Regulation Requirement shortage” in “PJM Actions” under “PJM Regulation Requirements.”
  - Revised “Each PJM Member, that has a requirement to serve load within the PJM Control Area, provides the PJM with a forecast of its requirements by 1200 hours on the day before the Operating Day. Regardless of how the PJM Member’s load is supplied, the PJM Member submits the following Operating Day forecast information to the PJM: in “PJM Member Load Forecasts” under “Processing Market Information.”
  - Revised “Each PJM Member makes its own choice based on the information it possesses. Exhibit 3.5 illustrates the relationship between self- and PJM -scheduling for a particular resource” in “Self-Scheduled Resources” under “Processing Market Information.”
  - Revised heading “Buy/Sell Request for External Energy” to “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised “Spot Market requests are in the form of offers. There are general requirements for offer data, as well as specific requirements for internal and external participants” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Replaced “Internal offers must be resource specific unless a schedule with an internal (metered) participant is agreed to beforehand. This is because PJM must account for every MW of energy within the PJM Control Area” with “A PJM Member must be in possession of the power to sell it as Spot Market energy (i.e., no entity can be in the contract path between the PJM Member selling the energy and PJM)” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Added “PJM does not accept bids where the PJM Interchange Market is the source and sink (e.g., PJM-Market Participant-PJM)” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Added “PJM does not accept bids for less than one continuous hour” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised “PJM does not accept offers for resources committed to supply Operating Reserves to another Control Area. PJM will not double count units internal to PJM for Operating Reserves. If energy is being offered from a resource to PJM and is already included in the PJM Operating Reserve, the energy can be accepted but will not participate in PJM Operating Reserve accounting. Offers not properly submitted are rejected. The PJM Member is notified of the reason for rejection and the PJM Member may then take action to submit a new offer” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised heading “Internal PJM Member Requirements” to “Resource Specific Offer Data Requirements” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Deleted heading “External PJM Member Requirements” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Deleted “External PJM Members submit offer data via both telephone and facsimile; numbers are listed under General Requirements. External PJM Members use the forms found in Attachment C to submit offers” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Deleted “External Market Buyers submit the following data, for the next operating day only:

- specific amount of energy for each hour of the day

- dispatch rate above which it does not desire to purchase OASIS number (the “transaction” number from the “Buy/Sell ATC” page of the PJM OASIS. More details on procedures for making a transmission service request via the PJM OASIS can be found on the PJM OASIS Users Guide @ http://oasis.pjm.com) for the transmission service reservation(s) which will be used to deliver the energy for the desired point of receipt of the intention to purchase transmission if the offer is accepted”

- in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Deleted “Valid offers are entered into the Transaction Maintenance System (TMS) for analysis by the Marginal Scheduler” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Deleted “complete energy path” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Added heading “Aggregate offer Data Requirements” and the following text in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information:”

- “Aggregate offer data shall be submitted via both telephone and facsimile; phone numbers are listed under General Requirements. External PJM Members use the forms found in Attachment C of this manual to submit offers.

- A request to change offer data after an offer has been accepted (e.g., dispatch level, dispatch rate, path) will be rejected.

- PJM Members delivering Spot Market Energy to the PJM Interchange Energy Market submit the following data for the next operating day only:

    - identity of all parties that are engaged in the Bilateral Transaction (e.g., buyers, sellers, marketers, transmitters, and brokers)

    - minimum and maximum dispatch levels for each hour

    - identity of any neighboring External Control Area identifiers and priorities, if applicable

    - dispatch rate above which it does not desire to sell

- PJM Members requesting Spot Market Energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market submit the following data for the next operating day only:

    - identity of all parties that are engaged in the Bilateral Transaction (e.g., buyers, sellers, marketers, transmitters, and brokers)

    - minimum and maximum dispatch levels for each hour

    - dispatch rate above which it does not desire to purchase

    - For Spot Market Energy to be delivered external to the PJM Control Area, OASIS number (the “transaction” number for the “Buy/Sell ATC” page of the PJM OASIS - More details on procedure for making a transmission service request via the PJM OASIS can be found on the PJM OASIS Users Guide @ http://oasis.pjm.com) for the transmission service reservation(s) which will be used to deliver the energy for the desired point of receipt or the intention to purchase transmission if the offer is accepted.

  - identity of any neighboring External Control Area identifiers and priorities, if applicable”

- Deleted “External Market Sellers reports the following data for aggregate offers, the next operating day, up to the next business day only:

  - complete energy pay

  - dispatch rate below which it does not desire to sell

  - hours of energy availability

  - minimum and maximum dispatch levels”

- in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Deleted “This data constitutes a binding offer. Valid offers are entered into the Transaction Maintenance System (TMS) system for analysis by the Marginal Scheduler” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised “Aggregate *Offer Data* - PJM compares the offer characteristics to the forecasted system conditions and Marginal Scheduler output. See “Forecasting PJM Generation Requirement” in Section 3 of this manual for more information” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised “Resource Specific *Offer Data Evaluation* - Resource Specific Offer Data remains in Marginal Scheduler for evaluation. If the offer is not accepted before or during the operating day, the offer is considered rejected” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised “If an offer is accepted or rejected, the PJM Member is notified via phone and fax. A confirmation fax is sent to the PJM Member (see Attachment C). For any accepted offer the PJM Member is notified by telephone by PJM as soon as possible. For External PJM Members, the contact information requested on the fax form (Attachment C) must be listed on the offer facsimile” in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Added heading “Non-Delivery of Spot Market Energy” and the following text in “Spot Market Energy” under “Processing Market Information:”

- “A PJM External Market Seller will not be assessed a non-delivery charge if participants were not able to provide delivery for one or more of the following valid and documented reasons which physically prevented delivery and which was not reasonably anticipated at the time of scheduling:

  - transmission system constraints prevented delivery

  - generation outages of source generator(s) (resource must be specified in original Offer)

  - supplier or intervening power system emergencies prevent delivery

- A PJM External Market Buyer will not be assessed a non-delivery charge if the participant was prevented from delivery by one or more of the three conditions described above, the participant subsequently attempted to reschedule delivery, and PJM was unable to comply with the timing requirements for continuity of the transaction.

- Non-delivery charges described in Section 1.6.5 and 1.6.6 of Attachment K of the Tariff will continue to be assessed for all other non-delivery situations.

- The interface path of a Spot Market Energy schedule will not be changed on-shift (hourly)."

- Changed heading "Data Requirements Involving PJM Members External to PJM" to "Data Requirements Involving Parties External to PJM" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Revised "If a transaction is reported after 2:00 p.m. of the business day before the operating day, the transaction uses non-firm transmission, congestion is expected on the system, and the transaction might contribute to the congestion, the request for the transaction will not be accepted. These schedules are submitted to the non-business hours facsimile or telephone number provided above." in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Added "valid NERC TIS Tag" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Deleted "identity of all PJM Members that are engaged in the Bilateral Transaction (e.g., buyers, sellers, marketers, transmitters, and brokers)" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Deleted "type of transaction (wheel in, wheel out, losses, firm, non-firm)" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Deleted "scheduled start/stop dates and time" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Deleted "quantity of service by hour (maximum and minimum MW) in increments of 1 MW/hour (1,000 kW/hour)" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Deleted "identity of any neighboring External Control Area identifiers and priorities" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Revised "identity of associated transmission service reservation(s) for each hour of the Bilateral Transaction. This is the "transaction" number on the "Buy/Sell ATC" page of the PJM OASIS. Only one transmission service reservation may be applied to one energy schedule in any given hour. More details on procedures for making a transmission service request via the PJM OASIS can be found on the PJM OASIS Users Guide at http://oasis.pjm.com)" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Added "identity of any neighboring External Control Area identifiers and priorities" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Revised "Bilateral Transactions scheduled for delivery to native load must be submitted by the Market Participant that reserved the Transmission Service or the LSE. The LSE ultimately receiving the energy and the Market Participant that reserved the Transmission Service must both confirm the Bilateral Transaction. All parties to the transaction must confirm the transaction" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Added "valid NERC TIS Tag is received (see www.nerc.com)" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Revised "valid energy transaction type (firm, non-firm, wheel in, wheel out, loses)" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Revised "if using non-firm transmission, then transaction must be reported to PJM before 2:00 p.m. of the business day before the operating day" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Added heading "Additional Validations for a Bilateral Transaction Schedule using On-Peak or Off-Peak Transmission Service Reservations" in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Added Exhibits 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

- Added heading "Frequently Asked Questions (regarding on-peak and off-peak energy scheduling)" and the following text in "Bilateral Transactions" under "Processing Market Information."

    - "(Q1) A Market Participant has reserved off-peak daily transmission for Wednesday, but ramp room is not available at 0700 or 2300.

    - (A1) Two possible solutions are 1) the energy may be scheduled from 0000 to 0800 or 2) the energy may be scheduled from 0000 to 0715 and from 2315 to 2400.

    - (Q2) A Market Participant has reserved on-peak weekly transmission. Ramp room is available from 0700 to 2300 Tuesday through Friday, but ramp room is not available at 0700 or 2300 on Monday.

    - (A2) The energy may be scheduled 0700 to 2300 Tuesday through Friday. One solution to the Monday ramp limit would be to schedule the energy from 0645 to 2245."

- Deleted “Because Internal Bilateral Transactions do not cross a PJM interface, the 500 MW ramp rule does not apply to these transactions. Internal Bilateral Transactions are entered before the energy is scheduled to start. If a participant does not have direct access to TMS, the PJM Member can request PJM to confirm the transaction in TMS” in “Bilateral Transactions” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Revised “identity of all parties that are involved in the Bilateral Transaction (e.g., buyers, sellers, marketers, wheelers, and brokers)” in “Bilateral Transactions” under “Processing Market Information.”

- Section 4: Posting OASIS Information

  - Replaced “Bilateral Transactions” with “transmission service reservations” under "PJM OASIS.”

  - Revised “(1) Not later than 1600 hours of the day before each Operating Day, PJM posts the following information:” in “PJM Actions” under “PJM OASIS.”

- Attachment C: Offer Forms

  - Revised PJM phone numbers on all forms.

  - Added “For Internal Use” fields to Exhibits C.1, C.3 and C.4

Revision 01 (07/08/97)

- Section 2: Scheduling Philosophy & Tools

  - Deleted “... (both those electing to curtail due to congestion and those electing to pay congestion charges) ...” under “Transaction Management System.”

- Section 5: Hourly Scheduling

  - Deleted “... (not paying congestion charges) ...” under “Hourly Scheduling Adjustments.”

Revision 00 (05/01/97)

- Changed references to PJM Interconnection Association to PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

- Changed references to PJM to PJM buses where appropriate.

- Changed references to PJM to PJM Control Area where appropriate.

- Changed references to PJM IA to PJM.

- Changed references to IA to PJM.

- Changed references to Mid-Atlantic Market to PJM Interchange Energy Market.

- Changed references to Mid-Atlantic Market Operations Agreement to Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
- Changed references to pool to control area.
- Changed references to parties to PJM Members.
- Changed references to External Market Participant to Non-Metered PJM Member.
- Changed references to Internal Market Participant to Metered PJM Member.

Revision 00 (03/21/97)

- This revision is a draft of the PJM Manual for ***Scheduling Operations***.

December 2014 CP Filing

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December 12, 2014

Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, N.E., Room 1A
Washington, D.C. 20426

Re: *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. EL15-___-000

Dear Ms. Bose:

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM"), pursuant to sections 205 and 206[1] of the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d and 824e, submits proposed revisions to the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement") and related revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("Tariff")[2] to correct present deficiencies in those agreements on matters of resource performance, and excuses for resource performance, in the wholesale markets administered by PJM.[3]

For the reasons explained below, PJM requests an effective date of April 1, 2015, for the enclosed Operating Agreement and Tariff revisions. *PJM also proposes that the Commission establish a comment date for this filing of January 12, 2015.*

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1 The proposed revisions to the Tariff are submitted under section 205, while the proposed revisions to the Operating Agreement are submitted under section 206. Nevertheless, since the proposed substantive revisions to Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff are identical to the proposed revisions to the parallel provisions of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, PJM recognizes that the Commission is not held to the 60-day notice period in section 205.

2 Where PJM refers herein to provisions in Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, those references also are intended to encompass the identical, parallel provisions in Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

3 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meaning specified in, as applicable, the Tariff, Operating Agreement, or Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region ("RAA").

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Overview.

PJM is concurrently filing with the Commission today, under section 205 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, revisions to the Tariff and RAA, to better ensure that committed capacity resources will perform when called upon to meet the reliability needs of the PJM Region ("Capacity Performance Filing"). As PJM explains in the Capacity Performance Filing, the Commission has recognized that a resource adequacy construct that "fails to provide adequate incentives for resource performance, [can] threaten[] reliable operation of the system and forc[e] consumers to pay for capacity without receiving commensurate reliability benefits."[4] The Capacity Performance Filing makes important changes to the design of PJM's capacity market, known as the Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM"), to ensure it "provide[s] adequate incentives for resource performance,"[5] and to make numerous other related and conforming changes.

In developing those capacity market design changes, PJM also has more broadly reviewed issues of resource performance, and excuses for resource performance, arising outside the PJM capacity market. Based on that review, PJM has identified four areas of its current energy market rules that enable, or could enable, unreasonable excuses for Market Participant performance in PJM's markets. Specifically:

- The current energy market rules allow Market Sellers in certain circumstances to condition their Day-ahead Energy Market offers on acceptance of parameter limitations that extend beyond the operating design characteristics of their specific resources and include economic or budgetary concerns;
- the Operating Agreement's current force majeure rules are unreasonably over-broad as applied to transactions and commitments in PJM's wholesale markets, and should be dramatically narrowed to excuse PJM Market Participant performance *only* when catastrophic conditions broadly preclude performance by all or most Market Participants in the PJM Region;
- the current market rules extend an overbroad opportunity to sellers of Generation Capacity Resources to avoid energy market performance, and potentially engage in economic withholding, by submitting uneconomic ("Maximum Emergency") offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market, even in circumstances when PJM has issued certain alerts or warnings, which indicates a heightened need for capacity; and
- the current Operating Agreement should be clear, but is not, that PJM can withdraw or rescind prior approval of a generator maintenance outage when

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4 *ISO New England Inc.*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,172, at P 23 (2014), *reh'g pending*.

5 *Id.* at P 23.

> necessary for resource adequacy or reliability reasons in anticipation of, or to avoid, emergencies, and also fails to clearly provide for other PJM actions that would better enable PJM to strike the right balance between system reliability needs and the needs of sellers for prudent and cost-effective maintenance of their generation facilities.

All of these provisions principally arise under the Operating Agreement, which can be amended only upon a supermajority vote of the PJM Members. Because these changes were considered in connection with the Capacity Performance changes, pursuant to a special stakeholder process that proceeded directly to the PJM Board of Managers without a stakeholder vote, no such vote was held for these changes. PJM therefore asks the Commission to revise these Operating Agreement provisions pursuant to section 206 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824e.[6]

To allow ample time for the Commission to consider these changes, PJM requests that the Commission rule on this filing, and make it effective, by April 1, 2015, which is the same effective date PJM seeks for the Capacity Performance Filing. As noted above, PJM also seeks an extension of the customary 21-day notice period, so that the deadline does not fall the day after the New Year's Day holiday.

While PJM urges the Commission to approve the changes requested in this filing by April 1, 2015, PJM recognizes that, while that timing is reasonable and desirable, it is less critical for the energy market changes in this filing than it is for the capacity market changes in the Capacity Performance Filing. PJM's next Base Residual Auction ("BRA") is scheduled for May, 2015, and will procure capacity on a three-year forward basis, i.e., for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year. The RPM rule changes in the Capacity Performance Filing must be approved and in place reasonably in advance of that auction, if PJM is to implement those rules for that auction.

The energy market changes in this filing, by contrast, are slightly less time-critical. Approval before the next BRA is greatly preferred, as it would eliminate any uncertainty among Capacity Market Sellers about energy market rules that would most likely affect their capacity resources during the Delivery Year addressed by the May 2015 Auction. But as a practical matter, Market Participants are reasonably on notice, simply by virtue of this filing, of the energy market rules PJM hopes to implement on or before that forward Delivery Year. Moreover, it has always been the case that energy market rules can and do change in the three years between the conduct of a BRA and the start of the Delivery Year addressed by that BRA.

PJM also notes that while some of the changes in this filing build on, and assume approval of, certain changes in the Capacity Performance Filing, the reverse is not true.

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6 As noted above, the Commission can approve the Tariff changes under section 205.

Approval of both filings will establish a stronger and more comprehensive solution to the capacity performance shortcomings observed in RPM, and PJM urges the Commission to approve both filings. But the Tariff and RAA changes in the Capacity Performance Filing encompass all changes needed to reform PJM's capacity market, and are just and reasonable standing alone.

B. Stakeholder Process.

The energy market reforms proposed in this filing were developed alongside the capacity market reforms PJM reflected in the Capacity Performance Filing, employing the Enhanced Liaison Committee ("ELC") stakeholder process described in that filing.

As explained in that filing, the ELC process is specifically intended for issues that have not been resolved, or are unlikely to be resolved, in the standard stakeholder process.[7] The PJM Board of Managers elected the ELC process for the capacity performance and related changes given valid concern that the standard stakeholder process could not resolve the inherently contentious issues in a timely manner. The capacity and related energy market changes were discussed together in that process, following the steps and timelines described in the Capacity Performance Filing.

II. PROPOSED ENERGY MARKET REFORMS

As explained above, PJM seeks approval of these changes to its energy market rules, which require amendments to the Operating Agreement, under FPA section 206. Under both sections 205 and 206, PJM must demonstrate that the changes proposed in this filing are "just and reasonable." Section 206 adds the requirement that PJM show that the current rules filed with the Commission are "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential."[8]

As shown below, the current energy market rules are unjust and unreasonable in the specific respects described below. The common thread in each of the four areas discussed below is that PJM's current rules include provisions that Market Participants have used, or might attempt to use, to excuse performance by their resources. These current provisions are inconsistent with the overriding theme of both the Capacity Performance Filing and this filing, i.e., resource performance responsibility should rest with Market Sellers, and should not be transferred to loads. Rigorous application of that principle compels changes in each of the areas described below. Moreover, the particular replacement provisions proposed in this filing are just and reasonable because they

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7 *See PJM Manual 34: PJM Stakeholder Process*, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., section 15.2.2 (May 15, 2014), www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m34.ashx.

8 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).

remedy those specific deficiencies in a manner that promotes reliability, resource accountability, and efficient and competitive markets.

A. The Parameter Limits Market Sellers Specify in the Energy Market Offers for their Generation Capacity Resources Should Be Based on the Specific Physical Characteristics of those Resources, Rather than on the Economic or Budgetary Considerations Unreasonably Allowed by the Current Rules.

1. Recent Events Exposed Weaknesses in PJM's Market Rules

On January 6-8, 2014, extreme cold weather and high winds (popularly known as the "Polar Vortex") gripped much of the eastern half of the United States.[9] PJM and its Members met the challenges of the extreme weather, and PJM managed the system effectively such that the lights remained on in the PJM Region. However, the experience made clear that improvements are needed in PJM's operations and market processes. Later that same month, in and around January 17 through 29, extreme cold weather was again experienced in the PJM Region ("Winter Storm"). Based on its prior experiences with the Polar Vortex, and expecting the possibility of generator outages similar to those experienced during the Polar Vortex, PJM scheduled additional generation to be available for expected extreme system conditions, and to mitigate any potential power shortfalls due to generator forced outages, to ensure reliable operations of the bulk power system during the Winter Storm.[10]

However, contractual constraints on generators' availability challenged PJM operators and contributed to a significant increase in uplift payments for January 2014. The contractual constraints included natural gas generators with the need for early commitment, days ahead of the Day-ahead Energy Market, to ensure fuel deliverability; inflexible scheduling criteria such as 24-hour and multi-day gas commitment requirements; and, the purchase of gas for an entire weekend in order to operate for only a few hours.[11]

These factors are relevant because typically PJM schedules only the most economically efficient set of resources necessary to meet load and reserve requirements and thereby minimize production cost. However, operational parameters of individual

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9 *Analysis of Operational Events and Market Impacts During the January 2014 Cold Weather Events*, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 4 (May 8, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/20140509-analysis-of-operational-events-and-market-impacts-during-the-jan-2014-cold-weather-events.ashx ("2014 Cold Weather Report").

10 2014 Cold Weather Report at 5.

11 2014 Cold Weather Report at 31.

generation resources can limit PJM's flexibility in scheduling and dispatching resources day-ahead and in real-time. For example, one reason for increased generation contractual constraints during January was natural gas pipeline operational flow orders. During January 2014 peak natural-gas demand days,[12] some pipeline operators required customers, including generators, to take natural gas from their systems in even, incremental amounts over a 24-hour natural gas day, i.e., from 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. This process forced generators to run during periods when they traditionally would be uneconomic. In those circumstances, the generators were required to either run or face significant operational or economic penalties imposed by the gas pipelines that serve their units.[13]

Generator limitations are based on resource type and operational capability and can include issues such as fuel procurement and environmental limitations. Generators are scheduled economically, but, due to the generator's minimum run time or other limiting parameter, it must be run uneconomically through some hours before it can be shut down. Due to the dual-peaked nature of the winter load curve, PJM values resource flexibility especially on peak winter days. The goal on a winter day is to schedule resources to meet the morning peak, either cycle them or reduce them to their minimum output during the afternoon valley, and then be able to re-start them or increase their output back up to their maximum output for the evening peak. The ability for resources to be flexible throughout an Operating Day therefore is integral to efficiently dispatching the system and minimizing uplift, especially during winter peaks.

When controlling the grid in January 2014, PJM had no choice but to dispatch additional generation that was relatively inflexible because of the operational issues referenced above. These generators could not cycle on and off from hour to hour and were kept online through the overnight and uneconomic periods in order to be available during peak electricity demand hours.[14]

Both PJM and its Members had concerns regarding Winter 2014 operations and agreed that market rule changes were needed to alleviate those concerns for future winters, though they did not necessarily agree on what those changes should encompass. In an effort to address these concerns, PJM proposes to require energy market offers from Capacity Resources to be more flexible. Such flexibility, as described and discussed in the following subsections of this letter, will help ensure resource availability during times of system stress, and avoid the problems experienced when Capacity Resources are expected to commit to provide energy in real-time but are unable to do so for various

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[12] 2014 Cold Weather Report at 49 n.21 (peak gas demand days: January 6-8, 21-23, and 27-28, 2014).

[13] 2014 Cold Weather Report at 49.

[14] 2014 Cold Weather Report at 49-50.

reasons, including economic reasons within the market seller's control.[15] Such flexibility should also reduce the need for PJM operators to schedule generation outside of the timeframes when they are actually necessary, thereby reducing the need to compensate such resources via uplift (make-whole) payments.

2. Implementation of New Unit Specific Parameter Limited Schedules and Elimination of Default Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

First, PJM clarifies in section 6.6(a) that a Capacity Market Seller must limit the energy offer parameters for output from its Generation Capacity Resource to its pre-determined limits on cost-based offers, which are always parameter limited, and that it must limit the offer parameters for market-based offers conforming to parameter limitations ("parameter limited schedules") under the circumstances identified in that section. PJM further clarifies in section 6.6(a)(i) that it is a Market Seller, rather than the Operating Reserve markets, that fails the three pivotal supplier test. PJM further clarifies in section 6.6(i) that if a resource cannot actually be operated on the basis of these more flexible parameters, then it must inform PJM of the parameters to which it is capable of being operated. However, any such operation outside of the more flexible parameter limited values will be considered to *not* be at PJM's direction, and therefore make-whole payments will be made to the resource pursuant to sections 1.10.1 and 3.2.3 of the Operating Agreement for operation at PJM direction only to the extent the resource's operation is based upon the more flexible parameter limited values. This change would mitigate uplift costs in the types of circumstances experienced last January.

In anticipation of acceptance of the Capacity Performance Filing, to conform the parameter limited schedule rules for Base Capacity Resources and Capacity Performance Resources, PJM proposes to incorporate into section 6.6(a)(ii) through (a)(iv) and sections 6.6(b) through 6.6(e) specific Delivery Year references to differentiate (i) the time period for the applicability of the existing rules (for the current Delivery Year 2014/2015 through the 2017/2018 Delivery Year since resources have already been committed under the existing rules for those Delivery Years), from (ii) the time period for the applicability of the new parameter limited schedule rules for Base Capacity Resources which are proposed to be first committed for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, and from (iii) the time period for the applicability of the new parameter limited schedule rules for Capacity Performance Resources, which are proposed to be first permitted for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. The staggered effective dates for these market rule changes are required because by definition Base Capacity Resources can only be offered in RPM

[15] Such economic factors within the seller's control could include (i) failure to have sufficient fuel storage resources; (ii) inability to purchase (or decision not to purchase) fuel to operate on peak days; and (iii) failure to properly maintain or upgrade resources to ensure their ability to operate on the hottest and coldest days of the year when they are most needed.

Auctions for the 2018/2019 through 2019/2020 Delivery Years,[16] Capacity Performance Resources may be offered into RPM auctions beginning as early as the 2016/2017 Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction, and all Capacity Resources are required to be Capacity Performance Resources by the 2020/2021 Delivery Year.

In sections 6.6(a)(iii) and (iv), PJM defines the circumstances when parameter limited schedules are to be applied for Base Capacity Resources as the time when PJM, during hot weather operations, declares a Maximum Generation Emergency, issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert, or schedules units based on the anticipation of the occurrence of any of these events for any portion of an Operating Day. For Capacity Performance Resources, PJM defines the circumstances as the time when PJM declares a Maximum Generation Emergency, issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, or Cold Weather Alert, or schedules units based on the anticipation of the occurrence of any of these events for any portion of an Operating Day.[17]

In addition, PJM is proposing to revise section 6.6(b) to provide for three additional parameter limitations for Capacity Performance Resources and Base Capacity Resources, during Emergency Actions, and Hot Weather Alerts and/or Cold Weather Alerts, as applicable, for offers submitted in its energy markets when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of transmission constraints.[18] These three new parameter limitations are for maximum run time, start-up time and notification time. PJM believes these additional parameters are needed because these parameters directly impact the ability for PJM operators to schedule resources for only the timeframe they are economically efficient to serve the region's load, and for no shorter or longer a timeframe than necessary to do so.

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16 See revisions described in Capacity Performance Filing at section III.B.2 (proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 2.2B, 2.2C, 2.2F, 2.2G, 3.2(e), 5.5A(b), 5.6.1(g) & (h), 5.10(c), 5.11(a)(vi), 5.12(a) & (b), 6.4(d); *id.*, Attachment DD-1, section L.2; proposed RAA, sections 1.2A, 1.2B; *id.*, Schedule 6, section L.2; *id.*, Schedule 8.1, sections D.2, D.5).

17 See revisions described in Capacity Performance Filing at section III.A.2 (proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A).

18 *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(b); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(b). (In its proposal, PJM changes Turn Down Ratio to the equivalent Economic Minimum and Economic Maximum because given the evolution of the parameter limited schedule rules to be determined on a unit specific basis, the minimum Economic Minimum value and the maximum Economic Maximum value can be determined for each unit, and the more generically applicable "Turn Down Ratio" value is no longer required.)

For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, PJM proposes to eliminate the current default parameter limited schedule matrix that is based on a class-level of parameters and instead require Market Sellers to operate to unit-specific parameters for their resources that are based on their physically achievable operating design characteristics for the following parameters: (i) Economic Minimum; (ii) Economic Maximum; (iii) Minimum Down Time; (iv) Minimum Run Time; (v) Maximum Daily Starts; (vi) Maximum Weekly Starts; (vii) Maximum Run Time; (viii) Start-up Time; and (ix) Notification Time.[19] This requirement applies for all schedules, regardless of whether they are market-based schedules or cost-based schedules, submitted for a given resource. Under these new rules, Generation Capacity Resources that have long notification and start times or have inflexible operating parameters run the risk of not being available when the system needs them most. Moreover, in order to ensure these resources are available, PJM may need to commit such inflexible resources out of economic merit order and incur operating reserve (uplift) costs to ensure the resources are available when needed. Consequently, to ensure availability at the least cost to the system, Capacity Resources will be required to meet minimum flexibility requirements. The minimum flexibility requirements are proposed to be specific to each resource, and to reflect the design characteristics and flexibility the resource is capable of achieving. The expectation is for the resource to be available when called upon, consistent with its unit-specific parameter limited schedule values, irrespective of previous dispatch history.

For resources that have already cleared RPM Auctions for the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, PJM is maintaining its existing parameter limited schedule provisions. Revisions to account for these rule changes, including incorporating an end date for the requirements on PJM and the IMM to review and prepare new parameter limited schedule matrices, are reflected in sections 6.6(b), (c), (d) and (e), and in section II.B.1 of Attachment M-Appendix of the Tariff.

In addition, under these new market rules, PJM will make the determination of the unit-specific physically achievable operating parameters for each individual resource on the basis of the resource's operating design characteristics, in consultation with the Independent Market Monitor for PJM ("IMM") and will take into consideration in its determination any input received from the IMM. This approach is consistent with the Commission's determination in response to PJM's original parameter limited schedule filing that "PJM, as an independent market administrator, needs to be able to exercise reasonable discretion in reviewing the appropriateness of information provided to it."[20] As the proposed tariff language indicates, PJM will consult with the IMM throughout the

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19 *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1 section 6.6(b); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(b).

20 *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 125 FERC ¶ 61,244, at PP 39-40 (2008).

review process and take the IMM's input into consideration in making its determination of the appropriate unit-specific parameter limits for each resource.

Additionally, PJM proposes further parameter limits for resources offering into its energy markets. For Capacity Performance Resources, other than Capacity Storage Resources, PJM will require that the combined start-up and notification time be 24 hours or less, except when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, in which case the combined start-up and notification time shall not exceed 14 hours.[21] When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour.[22] Presently, resources oftentimes have start-up and notification times that exceed 24 hours due either to the physical operational limitations of the resource itself or to external factors such as fuel contracts that require them to purchase fuel several days in advance of the anticipated run time. The proposed reduced start-up and notification times are necessary to give PJM the ability to commit a resource on a day-ahead basis immediately following the posting of the Day-ahead Energy Market results if the Day-ahead Energy Market did not otherwise result in scheduling the resource. This is an important rule change because the Capacity Performance Filing will effectively require resources committed and compensated in the capacity market as Capacity Performance Resources to make themselves available to operate for PJM under time frames which allow for their efficient commitment and scheduling. Therefore these changes will reinforce and facilitate those performance and commitment expectations.

Accordingly, under these new proposed rules, Capacity Market Sellers will be expected to take steps to make their resources available for scheduling with a 24-hour (14-hour during a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert) or less lead time. All resources will be treated (and scheduled) as having a start-up time of no more than 24 hours, except during a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert when resources will be treated as having a start-up and notification time or no more than 14 hours for scheduling purposes. PJM further clarifies that when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, parameters under which resources may be scheduled to operate at PJM's direction shall be based solely on the physical operational limitations of the Capacity Performance Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.[23] If for some reason the resource is unable to meet these parameters, then the unit will need to ensure it is operating during times when its energy is needed, and operation outside of the more flexible operating parameters established pursuant to section 6.6 will not be at

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[21] *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(f)(i) & (ii); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(f)(i) & (ii).

[22] *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(f)(iii); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(f)(iii).

[23] *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(f)(iv); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(f)(iv).

PJM's direction, and therefore will be ineligible for make-whole payments as established in sections 1.10.1 and 3.2.3.

The referenced start-up and notification time requirements for Capacity Performance Resources during Hot and Cold Weather Alerts were determined based on PJM's scheduling needs in preparation for a summer or winter peak load event. These proposed start-up and notification times are just and reasonable for Capacity Performance Resources because PJM needs to be able to commit resources for operation in real-time after the Day-ahead Energy Market clears. The Day-ahead Energy Market clears at 4:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day, and the morning peak on a winter Operating Day typically occurs by 6:00 a.m. On a typical summer Operating Day, the morning ramp typically begins by around the same time. Thus, there is a 14-hour period between clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market and commencement of the morning peak on the Operating Day. Outside of a Hot or Cold Weather Alert, PJM can allow a relaxed lead time of 24 hours due to the reduced urgency to have access to all potential resources to meet anticipated demand. However, recognizing the increased uncertainty with respect to anticipated system conditions, a maximum 24-hour lead time for Capacity Performance resources is reasonable in order to ensure their availability to be scheduled in the most efficient manner possible.

Capacity Performance Resources that are Capacity Storage Resources that clear an RPM Auction must have combined start-up and notification times that do not exceed one hour, as well as a minimum down time that does not exceed one hour.[24] This shorter start-up and notification time is just and reasonable for Capacity Storage Resources because the physical properties of these resources provides this level of flexibility, and PJM needs to be able to commit such resources for operation in real-time after the Day-ahead Energy Market clears.

With respect to cleared Base Capacity Resources, the additional parameter limits that PJM proposes for energy market offers are that they must have a combined start-up and notification time that shall not exceed 48 hours. When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, notification time for such resources shall not exceed 1 hour. When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, parameters for such resources shall be based solely on the physical limitations of the Base Capacity Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules, similar to the requirements for Capacity Performance Resources.[25]

Accordingly, under these new proposed rules, Capacity Market Sellers will be expected to take steps to make their Base Capacity Resources available for scheduling

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[24] *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(f); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(f).

[25] *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(g); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(g).

with a 48-hour or less lead time. All Base Capacity Resources will be treated as having a start-up and notification time of no more than 48 hours for scheduling purposes.

The referenced start-up and notification time requirements for Base Capacity Resources were determined based on the reasonable needs of the system and the typical capabilities of these resources. In that regard, most of the time PJM is able to anticipate a peak load condition outside of the normal summer period at least two days in advance. Therefore, resources with a 48 hour or less start-up and notification time would be available for scheduling when such conditions are seen in advance.

If a resource clears an RPM auction as a Base Capacity Resource or a Capacity Performance Resource it will be compensated based on the physical capabilities of the unit *only*. It cannot extend its notification or start up time so that it looks less attractive to be scheduled. It cannot manipulate its Economic Minimum, Economic Maximum or Minimum Run Time due to contractual issues that are unrelated to the physical capability of the resource itself. If a cleared Base Capacity Resource or Capacity Performance Resource has an actual combined start-up and notification time exceeding the applicable requirements, and thus is unable to start-up within the required time period, then the affected Market Seller must either operate on a self-scheduled basis in order to ensure that it is able to meet PJM's directions for operating according to these established requirements, or make that resource unavailable and go on forced outage until it is able to operate consistent with PJM's direction.

3. *Resources Will Not Be Compensated for Excess Hours of Operation*

If a resource is unable to operate on the basis of the parameters that would otherwise be defined by the physical properties of the resource, but instead must operate less flexibly for reasons such as fuel supply limitations, and therefore submits parameters to PJM that deviate from those established by PJM for the resource, or if a resource has an actual combined start-up and notification time for a length of time in excess of the maximum start-up and notification times permitted under PJM's new market rules, then the resource will forfeit any Operating Reserves Credits (uplift payments) when operating based on parameters that are less flexible than specified in section 6.6 and will only be made whole for the period of operation that its operating parameters would have required under section 6.6.[26]

Thus, any Capacity Market Seller that enters parameters that exceed the limitations referenced in section 6.6 for its Capacity Resource will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be eligible for make-whole payments in excess of the parameter

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[26] *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1(d), 1.10.1A(f), and 3.2.3(e); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, sections 1.10.1(d), 1.10.1A(f), and 3.2.3(e).

limits.[27] PJM proposes revisions in sections 1.10.1(d), 1.10.1A(f), and 3.2.3(e) to address this issue.

The rationale for requiring the forfeiture of Operating Reserve Credits and other make-whole payments is that load is paying for Capacity Resources to be flexible and operate according to the resource's physically based parameters. That being the case, load should not be required to pay more by way of Operating Reserve Credits or make-whole payments because the Market Seller entered into a fuel procurement contract or did not arrange for on-site fuel availability, for example, and therefore had restricted flexibility.

4. Proposed Market Rule Changes Do Not Impact NERC Requirements

During the PJM stakeholder process, many stakeholders expressed concern that both the existing and proposed parameter limited schedule provisions imply that a Generation Owner that is a Market Seller is required to operate to pre-determined default parameter limited schedule values or unit-specific parameters that do not actually reflect how the resource operates in real-time, in violation of NERC Reliability Standards. PJM assured stakeholders that its parameter limited schedule rules in no way request or require that such Generation Owners/Market Sellers violate any NERC Reliability Standards.

PJM clarifies in this filing that the provisions of this section 6.6 only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to PJM for its offers into PJM's markets, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day.[28]

To give stakeholders further assurance that this is PJM's intent, PJM proposes to incorporate a new section 6.6(i) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement stating that the provisions of section 6.6 only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to PJM for its offers into PJM's markets, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day. This revision is being made to make clear that while Market Sellers must submit unit-specific parameter limits for their generation resources well in advance of the actual Operating Day in order for PJM to determine which resources to schedule and dispatch for that day, they also remain obligated to notify PJM of resources' *actual*

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27 *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1(d), 1.10.1A(f), and 3.2.3(e); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, sections 1.10.1(d), 1.10.1A(f), and 3.2.3(e).

28 *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(i); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(i).

or expected physical operating conditions during the Operating Day consistent with all applicable NERC Guidelines.

5. Other Clarifying and Clean Up Changes

PJM also proposes several clean up, clarifying and/or ministerial revisions for accuracy, to clear any potential ambiguity and to amplify certain limitations and requirements of the existing rules. These revisions are as follows.

First, PJM proposes to incorporate into the definition section of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement definitions for the terms Cold Weather Alert, Hot Weather Alert, and Maximum Generation Emergency Alert that are being incorporated into the Tariff and Operating Agreement.[29] Maximum Generation Emergency Alert is currently explained within section 6.6(a)(i), but not formally defined. Hot Weather Alert and Cold Weather Alert are only currently defined in PJM Manual 13.[30]

Second, PJM proposes to clarify in section 1.10.4 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement that Generation Capacity Resources must be made available for scheduling and dispatch by PJM, consistent with the parameter limited schedule requirements of section 6.6 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, to close any real or perceived loophole in the provisions describing the commitment of Generation Capacity Resources in PJM's Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market. Without this revision, a Market Seller could argue that section 1.10.4 is ambiguous or inconsistent with the requirements of section 6.6 since it does not currently include any of the start-up and notification time or other restrictions specifically delineated in section 6.6.

Finally, PJM proposes to maintain the existing parameter limited schedule exception process to allow resource operators to reflect physical conditions at an individual resource that may deviate from its pre-established operating parameters. However, PJM is proposing clarifying language in section 6.6(h) to reflect that the exception process pursuant to which a Capacity Market Seller can obtain a temporary, period or persistent exception to its parameter limited schedules will apply not only to the parameter limited schedule matrix default values as it does today, but that it will also

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29 *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.3.1B.01A, 1.3.9.01, and 1.3.13A; proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, sections 1.3.1B.01A, 1.3.9.01, and 1.3.13A.

30 *See PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations*, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., section 2.3.4 (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m11.ashx (includes definition of Maximum Generation Emergency Alert); *PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations*, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., sections 3.3, 3.5 (June 1, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m13.ashx ("Manual 13") (describing Hot and Cold Weather Alerts).

apply to any unit-specific default values determined by PJM.[31]

B. PJM's Current Force Majeure Provisions Are Unreasonable as Applied to PJM's Centralized Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Service Markets and Should be Replaced with Provisions that Excuse Market Participant Performance Only in the Most Limited Circumstances.

1. Introduction: Need for Revised Force Majeure Provisions

PJM's filed agreements, including its Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA, excuse Market Participants, Transmission and Generation Owners, transmission customers, and interconnection service customers from performing obligations otherwise established by such agreements in the event of force majeure. The text defining "force majeure" varies among agreements, and in certain agreements, multiple definitions of "force majeure" are provided, presumably appropriate to different matters addressed by the given agreement. Despite wording differences, the various force majeure provisions scattered across PJM's filed agreements provide very broad opportunities to claim excuse under a litany of unanticipated circumstances (i.e., "Act of God," breakage, accident, fire, storm, explosion, and the like). Notwithstanding the open-ended nature of these various force majeure provisions, PJM cannot recall an instance in the history of these agreements where a customer or Market Participant has invoked force majeure to excuse performance, despite instances of major storms, floods, extreme weather and of course, numerous instances of individual unit or customer unavailability, accidents and breakages.

While PJM has never interpreted its force majeure provisions to apply to market operations, development of the Capacity Performance Filing gave PJM cause to revisit and question the utility, and potential consequences, of having expansively worded "escape hatch" provisions lurking in the shadows and threatening to undermine more carefully considered rules defining performance obligations and attendant financial consequences for failing to perform. As a result of having so considered the numerous references to, and definitions of, "force majeure" in PJM's agreements, PJM is proposing changes based on the proposition that:

(1) in centralized, multilateral markets, such as PJM's energy, capacity and ancillary services markets, there should be only very narrow excuses allowed by reason of force majeure; and

(2) in non-market, bilateral contexts arising in PJM's transmission system, operations and planning contexts, such as circumstances involving the

31 *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(h); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6(h).

> construction of interconnection facilities or network upgrades, more traditional, broader force majeure provisions are appropriate.

Accordingly, this filing proposes to considerably and explicitly narrow current force majeure provisions that could be invoked to excuse performance in PJM's markets, including a Capacity Performance Resource's performance. This action is necessary because PJM's current force majeure provisions purport to offer exceptionally expansive "outs" that are fundamentally incompatible with, and would frustrate, PJM's markets. PJM's proposed revisions to its force majeure provisions are similar to the approach taken to force majeure in other centralized, multilateral commodity markets, in particular energy contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"). In non-market contexts, force majeure provisions that trace back to pro-forma agreements issued by the Commission (such as in the case of open-access transmission service and large generator interconnection service) are being left largely unchanged by this filing. Finally, certain clerical revisions are necessary to keep clear, on one hand, the application of broader, more traditional force majeure to non-market areas of the tariff, from on the other hand, the new proposed narrowed version of force majeure as applied to the PJM markets. These clerical revisions also correct textual errors or inconsistencies identified in the course of PJM's review. PJM's proposed revisions will ensure the two different forms of force majeure each apply only to those particular types of transactions to which they were intended to apply.

2. Traditional Force Majeure Provisions Should Not Be Used to Excuse Market Participant Performance in PJM's Centralized Markets; the Existing Provisions' Application in that Context Therefore Would Be Unjust and Unreasonable.

The broad protections afforded by PJM's existing force majeure provisions, which are similar to standard force majeure provisions in bilateral, commercial contracts, and provide for a wide range of excuses for non-performance, are incompatible with reasonable expectations of performance by Market Participants operating in PJM's markets, including RPM. In a bilateral context, such as a contract between two parties to deliver goods or perform services, standard force majeure provisions can be appropriate because each individual party can negotiate with the other to allocate the risk of unforeseen circumstances. PJM's markets, however, are not bilateral – they are multilateral, and thus individual parties have no meaningful opportunity to negotiate with their counterparty an appropriate allocation of risk for varying circumstances as between buyer and seller. Indeed, this understanding is implicit but evident from the design and historical operation of PJM's markets. If the broad force majeure provisions, currently found in PJM's Operating Agreement (and elsewhere), were interpreted to apply to PJM's markets, such interpretations and applications would lead to absurd results inconsistent with the performance-related rules that were approved (or proposed) specifically to govern several aspects of PJM's markets, including but not limited to such matters within RPM as EFORd and the new Capacity Performance Resource product (which is closely patterned on an approach already approved for ISO-New England

("ISO-NE")). As a simple hypothetical example, if a generator were to offer to sell power and clear a position in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the generator could not simply avoid its obligation if its plant were not available to perform in real-time due to an unexpected accident or equipment failure. To the contrary, long-standing rules at the heart of the "two-settlement" system in PJM's energy market would charge that generator for the imbalance between its day-ahead commitment and its real-time performance. That simple, but fundamental, hypothetical underscores why a broad force majeure performance excuse would frustrate major assumptions underlying PJM's market design, would be incompatible with PJM's markets, and would be unjust and unreasonable. Thus, PJM's current force majeure protections, which are drafted as one might draft for a bilateral agreement, must be revised to eliminate any possibility that they could be misapplied in their current, broad form to PJM's centralized markets, and instead considerably narrowed to appropriately and rationally apply to PJM's centralized, multilateral markets.

Revising PJM's force majeure provisions, as applied to PJM's markets, will also more closely align these provisions with force majeure provisions in other forward commodities markets, which contain narrower protections compared to PJM's current force majeure provisions. For example, if a farming cooperative sells its orange juice crop forward by selling a NYMEX frozen orange juice futures contract, but before the delivery year, the crop is lost due to a statistically improbable freeze, the extreme weather will not serve as a force majeure to excuse the farming cooperative from performing that contract when it becomes due, despite the high price it will pay to cover the promised obligation. Multilateral commodity markets typically recognize only sweeping, systemic events as force majeure and leave to the market administrator alone (in the case of the NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas contract for instance, NYMEX's Chief Executive Officer, President or Chief Operating Officer) the right to declare a force majeure event.[32]

To PJM's knowledge, no entity has ever invoked any force majeure provision to excuse its performance in any of PJM's markets. This is likely due to the fact that, practically speaking, all Market Participants appreciate such invocation would be contrary to the well understood predicates of the market. Further, PJM has never interpreted its force majeure provisions to apply to market operations. Therefore, PJM's instant revisions are best understood as correcting technicalities that exist in the language of its current force majeure provisions, prudently preventing the potential misapplication of any force majeure provision in the future, and in any event should not change the understood rights and obligations of Market Participants. The Capacity Performance

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32 *See NYMEX Rulebook*, Rule 701, Declarations of Force Majeure, New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. (2009) http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/1/7.pdf ("NYMEX Rule 701"). The kind of "systemic" failure that constitutes potential force majeure under these NYMEX contracts is akin to what PJM is proposing as its "Catastrophic Force Majeure" described below.

initiative, focusing on defining both obligation and performance in PJM's capacity market, elevates the need for these changes—there clearly is no way to reconcile the "no excuses" approach approved by the Commission for ISO-NE[33] (which set the pattern for PJM's Capacity Performance Filing) with the numerous, broad excuses found in a traditional force majeure clause.

3. Catastrophic Force Majeure Proposal

The key feature of PJM's force majeure related revisions is the proposed new definition of "Catastrophic Force Majeure." PJM believes that Market Participants should be relieved during events of widespread, systemic failure, but cannot be excused from individual or more localized risks that are more appropriately managed by the facility facing that risk. Catastrophic Force Majeure, which has significantly narrower protections than traditional force majeure provisions, should apply to all Market Participants and market transactions, including Capacity Performance Resources. Catastrophic Force Majeure, further described in detail below in section B.5, will apply only where there has been a systemic failure of either (i) the transmission system, or (ii) the fuel delivery network in all or substantially all of the PJM area.

Another key aspect of PJM's proposed Catastrophic Force Majeure revision is that PJM will be the entity responsible for determining whether an event constituting Catastrophic Force Majeure has occurred based on its consideration as a financially disinterested market administrator of the totality of the circumstances, and subject to appropriate oversight from the Commission. Although this determination in the first instance is guided by the proposed revised language, it admittedly has a degree of subjectivity. While this is unavoidable – after all, by design force majeure addresses that which cannot be foreseen – the revised provision is plainly less subjective than the existing provision, and by limiting to PJM the authority to declare Catastrophic Force Majeure, the rule places this decision making (again, in the first instance) in the hands of the party most objectively positioned to make the declaration. This proposed revision is in line with the NYMEX force majeure construct, in which *NYMEX officials*, not participants in NYMEX, declare whether a force majeure event has occurred under NYMEX's governing documents.[34] This proposed revision will also ensure that Market Participants cannot attempt to utilize this provision to inappropriately excuse themselves from performance, and will reduce the likelihood of future litigation over whether a particular event constitutes Catastrophic Force Majeure because it will be PJM's decision to make, rather than individual Market Participants.

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[33] *ISO New England Inc.*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,172, at PP 8, 62 (2014), *reh'g pending*.

[34] NYMEX Rule 701.

4. Traditional Force Majeure Provisions Should Continue to Apply to Non-Markets Contexts

While PJM's existing force majeure provisions should not apply to Capacity Performance Resources and PJM's markets generally, some of PJM's existing force majeure provisions that grant broader protections *should* continue to apply to other specified transactions and contexts. Unlike participation in PJM's markets, these arrangements under PJM's governing documents are akin to any other bilateral negotiation involving the provision of services or products where one typically sees traditional broad force majeure provisions. For example, parties to an Interconnection Service Agreement ("ISA") should have broader protection under force majeure provisions than Capacity Performance Resources due to the nature of the parties' relationship to PJM when they provide interconnection services under an ISA, as compared to the services a Capacity Performance Resource will provide. Therefore, PJM believes that the force majeure provisions in the ISAs, and other sections of the Tariff and Operating Agreement, should be kept in place. Further, PJM is well aware that many of these provisions emanate from Commission issued *pro forma* agreements, and believes that any argument to change those provisions should be considered more generically by the Commission. PJM is also making multiple revisions to its Tariff and Operating Agreement to clarify which force majeure provisions appropriately apply to particular transactions and in particular contexts.

5. Description of Revisions

a. <u>Catastrophic Force Majeure</u>

PJM is proposing to delete section 1.13A.01 of the Tariff and section 18.9 of the Operating Agreement. These force majeure provisions, which could be read to apply to PJM's markets, contain language similar to standard force majeure provisions found in bilateral, commercial contracts. PJM is relabeling section 18.9 of the Operating Agreement as a new "Catastrophic Force Majeure" section, and adding a definition of "Catastrophic Force Majeure" to the Operating Agreement.

The proposed new section 18.9 of the Operating Agreement states that performance of any obligation arising under the Operating Agreement, owed by a Member to either PJM or to another Member (either directly or indirectly), shall not be excused or suspended by reason of an event of force majeure unless such event constitutes an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure. Section 18.9 also notes that an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure shall excuse a Member from performing such obligations during the period such Member's performance is prevented by any event of Catastrophic Force Majeure, provided such event was not caused by such Member's fault or negligence. The event of Catastrophic Force Majeure may suspend but shall not excuse any payment obligation owed by a Member. Section 18.9 also states that any excuse or exception to a performance obligation expressly provided for by specific terms of the Operating Agreement, Tariff, or RAA (including, for example, the limited excuses for non-performance permitted by RPM's proposed new Non-Performance Charge, as discussed at section III.E.5 of the transmittal letter for the Capacity Performance Filing) shall apply according to their terms and remain in full force and effect without regard to the Catastrophic Force Majeure provision. Further, unless expressly referenced in any section of the Operating Agreement, Tariff, or the RAA, the Catastrophic Force Majeure provision shall not apply, and not supersede, other force majeure provisions that are expressly applicable to specific obligations arising under any sections of those governing documents. Last, section 18.9 states that Catastrophic Force Majeure will apply to Attachments K-Appendix and DD of the PJM Tariff, Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, and the RAA, and that no other force majeure provisions in the Operating Agreement, Tariff or RAA shall apply to these specified provisions. While Attachments K-Appendix and DD of the Tariff, Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, and the RAA do not currently contain any applicable force majeure provisions, PJM is proposing this last set of revisions to explicitly clarify that Catastrophic Force Majeure is the only force majeure provision applicable to these specified provisions, and by extension to market operations and Capacity Performance Resources.

The newly proposed section 1.6.01 of the Operating Agreement defines Catastrophic Force Majeure. It specifically states:

> "Catastrophic Force Majeure" shall not include any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, explosion, or Curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental, military or lawfully established civilian authorities, unless as a consequence of any such action, event, or combination of events, either (i) all, or substantially all, of the Transmission System is unavailable, or (ii) all, or substantially all, of the interstate natural gas pipeline network, interstate rail, interstate highway or federal waterway transportation network serving the PJM Region is unavailable. The Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure has occurred for purposes of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, based on an examination of available evidence. The Office of the Interconnection's determination is subject to review by the Commission.

The definition of Catastrophic Force Majeure explicitly excludes many of the events that are covered under "traditional" force majeure clauses, unless such events cause a catastrophe affecting all, or substantially all, of the PJM Region. As discussed, PJM believes that only these type of events should allow a Capacity Performance Resource or any Market Participant to be excused from performance, unless another specified provision explicitly excuses such entities from performance.

The definition of Catastrophic Force Majeure also states that the Office of the Interconnection (PJM) shall determine whether an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure has occurred, subject to review by the Commission. As discussed, this revision is in line with the NYMEX force majeure construct, and will ensure that Market Participants cannot attempt to utilize this provision to inappropriately excuse themselves from performance.

b. Other Revisions

PJM is also making several revisions to other force majeure provisions in the Tariff and Operating Agreement, and references to "force majeure" generally throughout the Tariff and Operating Agreement.

First, PJM is revising one force majeure provision, section 10.1 of the Tariff, to clarify that it only applies to the provision of transmission service. Section 10.1 of the Tariff emanates from Order 888[35] and the Commission's *pro forma* Tariff,[36] which address open access to transmission service. PJM has always interpreted section 10.1 of the Tariff to apply solely to the provision of transmission service, and is making clarifying revisions to section 10.1 of the Tariff to make this explicitly clear.

Second, PJM is making revisions to several sections of its Tariff and Operating Agreement to clarify that applicable force majeure provisions pertain solely and explicitly to specified sections of the Tariff. PJM is making these revisions to Attachment O, Appendix 2; Attachment P, Appendix 2; Attachment GG, Appendix 3; Attachment KK; and Attachment LL of the Tariff. Similarly, PJM is proposing to revise sections 230.3.2 and 232.7.2 of the Tariff to clarify that references therein to "force majeure" are to the newly proposed force majeure provision in section 9.4 of Attachment O, Appendix 2 of the Tariff.

Third, PJM is proposing to amend section 1.3.17A of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff and Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, which address the definition of Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost, and specifically how it is calculated. References in these sections to "force majeure" should instead be to "Catastrophic Force Majeure" because the narrower protection afforded by Catastrophic Force Majeure compared with

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35 *Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities*, Order No. 888, 1991-1996 FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles ¶ 31,036 (1996), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 888-A, 1996-2000 FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles ¶ 31,048, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), *aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC*, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), *aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC*, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).

36 PJM's proposed revisions are superior to the existing provisions of *pro forma* Tariff, and therefore meet the applicable burden for revising the *pro forma* Tariff. *See* Order No. 888 at 31,635-36, 31,767-69; *see also id.* at 31,770.

standard "force majeure" is now more appropriate when calculating Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost. This narrower protection is consistent with the other changes PJM is making in this filing with respect to the responsibilities of resources committed as Capacity Performance. Specifically, lack of fuel will not be a reason for which Capacity Performance Resources will be exempted from their performance requirements. Allowing owners of Capacity Performance Resources to incorporate a Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost component in their cost-based offers when fuel supplies are restricted for reasons other than Catastrophic Force Majeure would potentially allow them to circumvent the enhanced performance requirements by allowing the submission of higher cost-based offers that might result in those resources not being dispatched by PJM.

Last, PJM is proposing to amend sections 5.2.2(f) and 7.4.2(i) of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff to clarify that references to "force majeure" in those sections are improper, and is revising the applicable language to instead refer to "an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM." These sections address the allocation of Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights, and PJM's allocation of such products are more appropriately described as being affected by unanticipated events outside of the control PJM, rather than the current imprecise references to "force majeure." The proposed revisions to these sections make this concept clear.

C. PJM's Current Energy Market Rules Grant Market Sellers Excessive Discretion to Declare Their Generation Capacity Resources Effectively Unavailable During the Very Times When the PJM Region Most Needs the Capacity These Resources Committed to Provide.

1. Current rules

The energy market rules require all Generation Capacity Resources to submit sell offers for their available capacity in the Day-ahead Energy Market.[37] However, the energy market rules allow such resources, in certain circumstances,[38] to designate all or part of the resource's committed capacity as a Maximum Emergency Offer. Resource capacity so designated is "available to [PJM] only when [PJM] declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to

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37 *See* Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d); Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d).

38 A Market Seller can designate its Generation Capacity Resource as a Maximum Emergency Offer if it falls into at least one of the following four categories: (1) environmental limitations (e.g., run limits due to air quality permit); (2) fuel limitations (e.g., temporary interruption in fuel supply); (3) temporary emergency conditions at the resource (e.g., physical occurrence limits availability); and (Cont'd . . .)

run."[39] But a Maximum Generation Emergency is a serious emergency declaration; PJM typically will not implement a Maximum Generation Emergency until after it has invoked a number of other established emergency alerts, warnings, or actions, all indicating, to various degrees, that capacity shortage conditions are approaching. Yet, under the current rules, PJM cannot require a Generation Capacity Resource that has designated its otherwise available output as a Maximum Emergency offer to offer that output into the Day-ahead Energy Market, even as the system passes through various emergency alerts, warnings and actions that reflect a clear need for Capacity Resources.

2. Need for change and proposed rules

Designating a resource with a Maximum Emergency offer effectively (by virtue of an uneconomic offer price) excuses a Generation Capacity Resource from offering its available capacity into the Day-ahead Energy Market, until PJM has reached the point of, in effect, issuing its last call for all available generation. However, Capacity Resources are paid to be available and to perform when needed, even outside the most dire emergency conditions. The current energy market rules are too lax in allowing Generation Capacity Resources to avoid honoring their capacity commitments.

Thus, to ensure that Capacity Resources are available when the PJM Region needs them to perform, PJM proposes to revise the market rules to state that a Market Seller may not designate its Generation Capacity Resource as a Maximum Emergency offer during certain extreme weather alerts or other more severe emergencies.

For this purpose, in anticipation of Commission acceptance of the Capacity Performance Filing, PJM proposes to distinguish between Base Capacity Resources and Capacity Performance Resources. For Base Capacity Resources, the bar on designation as a Maximum Emergency Offer would apply during the months of June through September, when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert,[40] or has declared an Emergency

(. . . cont'd)

(4) availability of temporary megawatts that are not ordinarily otherwise available.

39 Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.3.12A; Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.3.12A.

40 A Hot Weather Alert is a formal alert issued by PJM to facility owners and operators, PJM customers, Members, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for extreme hot and/or humid weather conditions which may cause capacity requirements and/or unit unavailability to be substantially higher than forecast and are expected to persist for an extended period. *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.3.9.01; proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.3.9.01. *See also* Manual 13, section 3.4.

Action.[41] For Capacity Performance Resources, the bar on designation as a Maximum Emergency offer would apply year-round, when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert,[42] or has declared an Emergency Action.

In both cases, the effect would be to require the Market Seller to offer the full available capacity of its Capacity Resource into the Day-ahead Energy Market earlier in the process, i.e., when PJM has issued an extreme weather alert requiring numerous actions by capacity resource owners to prepare their resources to run. The Market Sellers would then have to continue to submit day-ahead offers if PJM continues through the various Emergency Actions, even if PJM does not declare a Maximum Generation Emergency.

The only difference between the resource types is that Base Capacity Resources would only be required to submit day-ahead offers for these alert and emergency procedures during the months of June through September, while Capacity Performance Resources would have to submit offers during these alerts and emergencies any time of the year.

In addition to the change described above, PJM proposes to clarify in section 1.10.1A(d) that all Generation Capacity Resource sell offers "shall be based on the [installed capacity, or "ICAP"] equivalent of the Market Seller's cleared [Unforced Capacity, or "UCAP"] capacity commitment." This change is reasonable, as it simply makes explicit the existing obligation for all Generation Capacity Resources. Sellers can discount the expected capability of their resource to reflect an allowance for forced outages when they offer the resource *in an RPM Auction*. But a resource that is not on a forced outage would have its full installed capacity available, and could offer up to that amount *in the Day-ahead Energy Market*.

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41 An Emergency Action refers to a Pre-Emergency Load Management Reduction Action and any more severe emergency action. Several of the actions encompassed within the definition of an Emergency Action would precede declaration of a Maximum Generation Emergency. *See* Manual 13, section 2.3.2 (listing sequence of capacity shortage emergencies).

42 A Cold Weather Alert is a formal alert issued by PJM to facility owners and operators, customers, regulators, and PJM Members, to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions. *See* proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.3.1B.01A; proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.3.1B.01A. *See also* Manual 13, section 3.3.

D. The Generator Outage Approval Process Must Include Clear Rules for PJM to Be Able to Withhold, Withdraw, or Rescind Prior Approval, Based on Reliability Needs for Generator Planned Outages and Generator Maintenance Outages During Emergency Conditions.

1. Current Rules

PJM's Operating Agreement, and parallel provisions in Attachment K-Appendix, contains rules governing outage scheduling, including, as relevant here, Generator Planned Outages and Generator Maintenance Outages.[43] Generator Planned Outages are those which are planned to conduct inspection, maintenance or repair of a generating facility, while Generator Maintenance Outages are taken to perform repairs on specific components of a generating facility.[44] Generator Planned Outages typically are taken for a longer period of time and, as such are subject to a more deliberate approval process than has been the case for Generator Maintenance Outages.[45] The current provision on Generator Planned Outages expressly allows PJM to withhold approval of a requested outage, or withdraw a prior approval of an outage, "as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures."[46] By contrast, the current provision on Generator Maintenance Outages simply states that PJM "shall approve" such an outage requested for a Generation Capacity Resource "unless the outage would threaten the adequacy of reserves in, or the reliability of, the PJM Region."[47]

2. Need for Change and Proposed Rules

The Capacity Performance Filing proposes that a PJM-approved planned or maintenance outage is one of the few acceptable excuses for capacity resource non-performance. In connection with preparation of that proposal, PJM noted that the current generator outage provisions in the market rules, particularly as to Generator Maintenance Outages, are unreasonably vague and incomplete in their description of the interaction between outage approval and preservation of reliability. The Generator Maintenance

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43 Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.9.2 and 1.9.3; Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, sections 1.9.2 and 1.9.3.

44 Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.3.8 (Generator Maintenance Outage) and 1.3.9 (Generator Planned Outage).

45 *See PJM Manual 38: Operations Planning*, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., section 2.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m38/ashx.

46 Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.2(b); Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.2(b).

47 Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.3; Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.3.

Outage provision recognizes that PJM can deny a maintenance outage request if the outage would threaten the adequacy of reserves in, or reliability of, the PJM Region, but there is no recognition that PJM might need to withdraw or rescind a prior approval if reliability conditions change after the outage request is first approved.

In its present state, therefore, this provision is unreasonable. Preservation of reliability is essential, and clear rules and clear authority in this area are essential. While the provision must balance the interests of Market Sellers in scheduling and completing maintenance, those interests can and should yield when necessary to ensure adequacy of reserves and when PJM anticipates implementing, or seeks to avoid, emergency procedures. Moreover, vague rules on this point serve no party's interests. If, for example, an unexpectedly high level of forced outages or other unexpected circumstances required withdrawal or rescission of a prior outage approval, the lack of clarity in the current rules might not prevent PJM from taking that action if needed for reliability, but the rules would not be clear, and the possibility of misunderstandings, disputes, or delays would be substantial, and thus could hamper efforts to preserve reliability.

Accordingly, for Generator Maintenance Outages, PJM proposes to add details similar to those that presently govern Generator Planned Outages, and to add details regarding the generator's obligations to come back into service if PJM rescinds approval because the generator is needed during an emergency.

First, PJM adds explicit language that a Generator Maintenance Outage cannot proceed unless it is submitted to PJM for approval, in accordance with standards and procedures in the PJM Manuals, and approved, prior to the outage start date.[48] Next, PJM clarifies the standard for when PJM may withhold approval of an outage, or withdraw a prior approval for an outage that has not yet commenced, or rescind approval of an outage that is already underway. That governing standard will be "to ensure adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures."[49]

To ensure transparency and an efficient process for rescinding a prior approval, PJM proposes that it will provide notice to the Market Seller at least 72 hours prior to requiring the generator to return to normal operation. This is a reasonable amount of notice for ending a Generator Maintenance Outage, as such outages, by definition, are concerned only with replacing specific components of the generator. PJM's experience has been that Generator Maintenance Outages typically can be resolved within 72 hours. If the generator is not able to come back into normal operation by 72 hours after such

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[48] Proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.3(a); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.3(a).

[49] Proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.3(b); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.3(b).

notice, the remaining hours it continues on the outage will be classified as a Generator Forced Outage.[50]

Finally, PJM proposes that if PJM withholds, withdraws, or rescinds approval for an outage, PJM will work with the Market Seller to reschedule the Generator Maintenance Outage at the earliest practicable time. To that end, PJM will propose alternative schedules with the intent to minimize economic impact on the Market Seller.[51]

For Generator Planned Outages, the existing provision already addresses the circumstances under which PJM could withhold approval or withdraw a prior approval. The sole change proposed here is that each Market Seller would be required to provide PJM "with an estimate of the amount of time it needs to return to service any Generation Capacity Resource on Generator Planned Outage that is already underway."[52] Thus, PJM does not propose a right of rescission for approved Generator Planned Outages that are underway. PJM instead seeks only information that could be used to facilitate a voluntary solution with the Market Seller should emergency conditions approach or arise that could implicate a need for the particular generation resource. This approach for Generator Planned Outages simply reflects that such outages usually involve more extensive work, and can take longer to complete. Thus, a 72-hour notice would likely not be feasible for Generator Planned Outages. PJM instead reasonably proposes a voluntary approach, but with an estimate from the seller of the time that would be needed to return to service, which could then become a basis for further conversations and negotiations with the seller if concerns arose about possible capacity shortage conditions while the outage remained in effect.

Therefore, the proposed additions[53] are just and reasonable, as they will establish clear rules on PJM's outage approval authority, provide a more transparent approval process, and ensure that PJM has the tariff tools needed to balance (i) the reliability need for a resource that is, or will be, on a scheduled outage against (ii) support for resource operator's efforts to conduct necessary generator maintenance in a prudent, timely, and cost-effective manner.

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[50] Proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.3(b); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.3(b).

[51] Proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.3(b); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.3(b).

[52] Proposed Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.2(b); proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.2(b).

[53] In reviewing these sections, PJM found some non-substantive discrepancies between the Operating Agreement Schedule 1 and the Appendix to Tariff Attachment K. This filing corrects those discrepancies, so that the two versions will be identical (as they are intended to be).

IV. EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 206 directs the Commission to establish an effective date in section 206 proceedings that is between one day and five months after the filing that initiates the proceeding. PJM asks that the Commission make these Operating Agreement and conforming Tariff changes effective on April 1, 2015, which is 110 days from the date of this filing.

V. CORRESPONDENCE

The following individuals are designated for inclusion on the official service list in this proceeding and for receipt of any communications regarding this filing:

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VI. DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED

This filing consists of the following:

1. This transmittal letter;

2. Revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement, in redlined format, as Attachment A; and

3. Revisions to the Tariff and Operating Agreement, in clean format, as Attachment B.

VII. SERVICE

PJM has served a copy of this filing on all PJM members and on all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region by posting this filing electronically. In accordance with the Commission's regulations,[54] PJM will post a copy of this filing to the FERC filings section of its internet site, located at the following link: http://www.pjm.com/documents/ferc-manuals/ferc-filings.aspx with a specific link to the newly-filed document, and will send an e-mail on the same date as this filing to all PJM members and all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region[55] alerting them that this filing has been made by PJM and is available by following such link. PJM also serves the parties listed on the Commission's official service list for this docket. If the document is not immediately available by using the referenced link, the document will be available through the referenced link within 24 hours of the filing. Also, a copy of this filing will be available on the FERC's eLibrary website located at the following link: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp in accordance with the Commission's regulations and Order No. 714.

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[54] *See* 18 C.F.R. §§ 35.2(e) and 385.2010(f)(3).

[55] PJM already maintains, updates and regularly uses e-mail lists for all PJM members and affected state commissions.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, PJM requests that the Commission find that the currently effective energy market rules described above are unjust and unreasonable, and direct PJM to file the Operating Agreement and Tariff changes shown on Attachments A and B, with an effective date of April 1, 2015, as a just and reasonable replacement for the current provisions.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ *Paul M. Flynn*

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December 12, 2014

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

	)	
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	)	**Docket No. EL15-___-000**
	)	

NOTICE OF FILING

(December ___, 2014)

Take notice that on December 12, 2014, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM"), submitted under section 206 of the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 824e, proposed revisions to the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement") and related revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("Tariff") to correct present deficiencies on issues of resource performance, and excuses for resource performance, in the wholesale markets administered by PJM. Specifically, PJM is proposing reforms regarding offers into PJM's Day-ahead Energy Market (including parameter limits on such offers), force majeure provisions applicable to market participant performance, and planned and maintenance outage rules.

Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. All interventions, comments, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date.

The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and interventions in lieu of paper using the "eFiling" link at *http://www.ferc.gov*. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426.

This filing is accessible on-line at *http://www.ferc.gov*, using the "eLibrary" link and is available for review in the Commission's Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an "eSubscription" link on the web site that enables subscribers to receive email notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with any FERC Online service, please email *FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov*, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Comment Date: 5:00 pm Eastern Time on January 12, 2015.

Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary

Attachment A

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff
and PJM Operating Agreement

(Identified by Additional Cover Pages)

(Marked/Redline Format)

Sections of the

PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Marked/Redline Format)

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ATTACHMENT GG - APPENDIX III – GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Definitions – E - F

1.10A Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion:

“Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

1.10B Economic Minimum:

The lowest incremental MW output level a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.11 Eligible Customer:

(i) Any electric utility (including any Transmission Owner and any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any person generating electric energy for sale for resale is an Eligible Customer under the Tariff. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Provider or Transmission Owner offer the unbundled transmission service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by a Transmission Owner.

(ii) Any retail customer taking unbundled transmission service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Provider or a Transmission Owner offer the transmission service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by a Transmission Owner, is an Eligible Customer under the Tariff. As used in Part VI, Eligible Customer shall mean only those Eligible Customers that have submitted a Completed Application.

1.11.01 Emergency Condition:

A condition or situation (i) that in the judgment of any Interconnection Party is imminently likely to endanger life or property; or (ii) that in the judgment of the Interconnected Transmission Owner or Transmission Provider is imminently likely (as determined in a non-discriminatory manner) to cause a material adverse effect on the security of, or damage to, the Transmission System, the Interconnection Facilities, or the transmission systems or distribution systems to which the Transmission System is directly or indirectly connected; or (iii) that in the judgment of Interconnection Customer is imminently likely (as determined in a non-discriminatory manner) to cause damage to the Customer Facility or to the Customer Interconnection Facilities. System restoration and black start shall be considered Emergency Conditions, provided that a Generation Interconnection Customer is not obligated by an Interconnection Service Agreement to possess black start capability. Any condition or situation that results from lack of sufficient generating capacity to meet load requirements or that results solely from economic conditions shall not constitute an Emergency Condition, unless one or more of the enumerated conditions or situations identified in this definition also exists.

1.11A Energy Resource:

A generating facility that is not a Capacity Resource.

1.11A.01 Energy Settlement Area:

The bus or distribution of busses that represents the physical location of Network Load and by which the obligations of the Network Customer to PJM are settled.

1.11B Energy Transmission Injection Rights:

The rights to schedule energy deliveries at a specified point on the Transmission System. Energy Transmission Injection Rights may be awarded only to a Merchant D.C. Transmission Facility that connects the Transmission System to another control area. Deliveries scheduled using Energy Transmission Injection Rights have rights similar to those under Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

1.11C Environmental Laws:

Applicable Laws or Regulations relating to pollution or protection of the environment, natural resources or human health and safety.

1.12 Facilities Study:

An engineering study conducted by the Transmission Provider (in coordination with the affected Transmission Owner(s)) to determine the required modifications to the Transmission Provider's Transmission System, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide the requested transmission service or to accommodate an Interconnection Request or Upgrade Request. As used in the Interconnection Service Agreement or Construction Service Agreement, Facilities Study shall mean that certain Facilities Study conducted by Transmission Provider (or at its direction) to determine the design and specification of the Interconnection Facilities necessary to accommodate the New Service Customer's New Service Request in accordance with Section 207 of Part VI of the Tariff.

1.12A Federal Power Act:

The Federal Power Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a, et seq.

1.12B FERC:

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or its successor.

1.13 Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:

Transmission Service under this Tariff that is reserved and/or scheduled between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery pursuant to Part II of this Tariff.

1.13A Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights:

The rights to schedule energy and capacity withdrawals from a Point of Interconnection (as defined in Section 1.33A) of a Merchant Transmission Facility with the Transmission System. Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights may be awarded only to a Merchant D.C. Transmission Facility that connects the Transmission System with another control area. Withdrawals scheduled using Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights have rights similar to those under Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

~~**1.13A.01 Force Majeure:**~~

~~Any cause beyond the control of the affected Interconnection Party or Construction Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which, in any of the foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence such party could not reasonably have been expected to avoid, and which, by the exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. Force Majeure does not include (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remediable causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected party.~~

10.1 Force Majeure for Transmission Service:

An event of ~~F~~force ~~M~~majeure under this section shall mean~~s~~ any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any Curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond ~~a~~the control of the ~~P~~party~~'s control~~ claiming force majeure under this section 10.1 that prevents the Transmission Provider, any Transmission Owner or any Transmission Customer from fulfilling any obligation under this Tariff related to the provision of transmission service. An event of ~~F~~force ~~M~~majeure ~~event~~ does not include an act of negligence or intentional wrongdoing. Neither the Transmission Provider, the Transmission Owners, PJMSettlement nor the Transmission Customer will be considered in default as to any obligation under this Tariff related to the provision of transmission service if prevented from fulfilling the obligation due to an event of ~~F~~force ~~M~~majeure as described in this section 10.1. However, a ~~P~~party claiming force majeure whose performance under this Tariff is hindered by an event of ~~F~~force ~~M~~majeure as described in this section 10.1 shall make all reasonable efforts to perform its obligations under this Tariff.

230.3 Loss of Capacity Interconnection Rights:

230.3.1 Operational Standards:

To retain Capacity Interconnection Rights, the Generation Capacity Resource associated with the rights must operate or be capable of operating at the capacity level associated with the rights. Operational capability shall be established consistent with Schedule 9 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region and the PJM Manuals. Generation Capacity Resources that meet these operational standards shall retain their Capacity Interconnection Rights regardless of whether they are available as a Generation Capacity Resource or are making sales outside the PJM Region.

230.3.2 Failure to Meet Operational Standards:

This Section 230.3.2 shall apply only in circumstances other than Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource. In the event a Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the operational standards set forth in Section 230.3.1 of the Tariff for any consecutive three-year period (with the first such period commencing on the date the Interconnection Customer must demonstrate commercial operation of the generating unit(s) as specified in the Interconnection Service Agreement), the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such Generation Capacity Resource will lose its Capacity Interconnection Rights in an amount commensurate with the loss of generating capability. Any period during which the Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the standards set forth in Section 230.3.1 as a result of an event that meets the standards of~~would constitute~~ a ~~F~~force ~~M~~majeure event ~~under~~ as defined in s~~S~~ection ~~10~~9.4 of Attachment O, Appendix 2 of the Tariff shall be excluded from such consecutive three-year period, provided that the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights exercises due diligence to remedy the event. A Generation Capacity Resource that loses Capacity Interconnection Rights pursuant to this section may continue Interconnection Service, to the extent of such lost rights, as an Energy Resource in accordance with (and for the remaining term of) its Interconnection Service Agreement and/or applicable terms of the Tariff.

230.3.3 Replacement of Generation:

In the event of the Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource (in accordance with Part V and any Applicable Standards), any Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall terminate one year from the Deactivation Date unless the holder of such rights (including any holder that acquired the rights after Deactivation) has submitted a new Generation Interconnection Request up to one year after the Deactivation Date which contemplates use of the same Capacity Interconnection Rights. The Interconnection Customer must provide written notification to the Transmission Provider that it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights on or before the date the Interconnection Customer executes the System Impact Study Agreement associated with the Generation Interconnection Request for which it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, Interconnection Customers in the New Services Queue prior to May 1, 2012 must provide written notice of intent to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights when it executes its Facilities Study Agreement or, if it has already executed its Facilities Study Agreement, then by November 1, 2012. Such notification of transfer of Capacity Interconnection Rights shall be posted on Transmission Provider's public website. Such new Generation Interconnection Request may include a request to increase Capacity Interconnection Rights in addition to the replacement of the previously deactivated amount as a single Generation Interconnection Request. Transmission Provider may perform thermal, short circuit, and/or stability studies, as necessary and in accordance with its manuals, due to any changes in the electrical characteristics of any newly proposed equipment, or where there is a change in Point of Interconnection, which may result in the loss of a portion or all of the Capacity Interconnection Rights as determined by such studies.

Upon execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement reflecting its new Interconnection Request, the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights will retain only such rights that are commensurate with the size in megawatts of the replacement generation, not to exceed the amount of the holder's Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with the facility upon Deactivation. Any desired increase in Capacity Interconnection Rights must be requested in the new Generation Interconnection Request and be accredited through the applicable procedures in Part IV and Part VI of the Tariff. In the event the new Interconnection Request to which this section refers is or is deemed to be terminated and/or withdrawn for any reason at any time, the pertinent Capacity Interconnection Rights shall not terminate until the end of the one year period from the Deactivation Date.

232.7 Loss of Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights:

232.7.1 Operational Standards:

To retain Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights, the associated Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities must operate or be capable of operating at the capacity level associated with the rights. Operational capability shall be established consistent with applicable criteria stated in the PJM Manuals. Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities that meet these operational standards shall retain their Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights regardless of whether they are used to transmit energy within or to points outside the PJM Region.

232.7.2 Failure To Meet Operational Standards:

In the event that any Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities fail to meet the operational standards set forth in Section 232.7.1 of the Tariff for any consecutive three-year period, the holder(s) of the associated Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights will lose such rights in an amount reflecting the loss of first contingency transfer capability. Any period during which the transmission facility fails to meet the standards set forth in Section 232.7.1 as a result of an event that meets the standards of~~would constitute~~ a force majeure event ~~under~~ as defined in s~~S~~ection ~~10~~9.4 of Attachment O, Appendix 2 of the Tariff shall be excluded from such consecutive three-year period, provided that the owner of the Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities exercises due diligence to remedy the event.

1.3 Definitions.

1.3.1 Acceleration Request.

"Acceleration Request" shall mean a request pursuant to section 1.9.4A of this Schedule to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 or 1.9.4.

1.3.1A Auction Revenue Rights.

"Auction Revenue Rights" or "ARRs" shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Section 7.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B Auction Revenue Rights Credits.

"Auction Revenue Rights Credits" shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B.01 Batch Load Demand Resource.

"Batch Load Demand Resource" shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

1.3.1B.01A Cold Weather Alert.

"Cold Weather Alert" shall mean the notice that PJM provides to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions.

1.3.1B.02 Congestion Price.

"Congestion Price" shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02A Coordinated External Transaction.

"Coordinated External Transaction" shall mean a transaction to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02B Coordinated Transaction Scheduling.

"Coordinated Transaction Scheduling" or "CTS" shall mean the scheduling of Coordinated External Transactions at a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of ~~this~~ Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02C CTS Enabled Interface.

"CTS Enabled Interface" shall mean an interface between the PJM Control Area and an adjacent Control Area at which the Office of the Interconnection has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling ("CTS"), designated in Schedule A to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45).

1.3.1B.02D CTS Interface Bid

"CTS Interface Bid" shall mean a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.03 Curtailment Service Provider.

"Curtailment Service Provider" or "CSP" shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Ancillary Services markets, and/or Reliability Pricing Model by causing a reduction in demand.

1.3.1B.04 Day-ahead Congestion Price.

"Day-ahead Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1C Day-ahead Energy Market.

"Day-ahead Energy Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1C.01 Day-ahead Loss Price.

"Day-ahead Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D Day-ahead Prices.

"Day-ahead Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves" shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the Reliability*First* Corporation and SERC.

1.3.1D.02 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement" shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with the Applicable Standards, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

1.3.1D.03 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources" shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

1.3.1D.04 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1D.05 Day-ahead System Energy Price.

"Day-ahead System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E Decrement Bid.

"Decrement Bid" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E.01 Demand Bid

"Demand Bid" shall mean a bid, submitted by a Load Serving Entity in the Day-ahead Energy Market, to purchase energy at its contracted load location, for a specified timeframe and megawatt quantity, that if cleared will result in energy being scheduled at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market and in the physical transfer of energy during the relevant Operating Day.

1.3.1E.02 Demand Bid Limit

"Demand Bid Limit" shall mean the largest MW volume of Demand Bids that may be submitted by a Load Serving Entity for any hour of an Operating Day, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.03 Demand Bid Screening

"Demand Bid Screening" shall mean the process by which Demand Bids are reviewed against the applicable Demand Bid Limit, and rejected if they would exceed that limit, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.04 Demand Resource.

"Demand Resource" shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

1.3.1F Dispatch Rate.

"Dispatch Rate" shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

1.3.1F.01 Emergency Load Response Program

The Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.1G Energy Storage Resource.

"Energy Storage Resource" shall mean flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.

1.3.2 Equivalent Load.

"Equivalent Load" shall mean the sum of a Market Participant's net system requirements to serve its customer load in the PJM Region, if any, plus its net bilateral transactions.

1.3.2A Economic Load Response Participant.

"Economic Load Response Participant" shall mean a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Section 1.5A of this Schedule to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and/or Ancillary Services markets through reductions in demand.

1.3.2A.01 Economic Minimum.

"Economic Minimum" shall mean the lowest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2A.02 Economic Maximum.

"Economic Maximum" shall mean the highest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2B Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

"Energy Market Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of available run hours due to limitations imposed on the unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in PJM Tariff), and (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Energy Market Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same compliance period, which compliance period is determined by the applicable regulatory authority and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Energy Market Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.3 External Market Buyer.

"External Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users outside the PJM Region, or for load in the PJM Region that is not served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.4 External Resource.

"External Resource" shall mean a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the PJM Region.

1.3.5 Financial Transmission Right.

"Financial Transmission Right" or "FTR" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.5A Financial Transmission Right Obligation.

"Financial Transmission Right Obligation" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(b) of this Schedule.

1.3.5B Financial Transmission Right Option.

"Financial Transmission Right Option" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(c) of this Schedule.

1.3.6 Generating Market Buyer.

"Generating Market Buyer" shall mean an Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM Region, or of selling energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere.

1.3.7 Generator Forced Outage.

"Generator Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

1.3.8 Generator Maintenance Outage.

"Generator Maintenance Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform necessary repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility meets the guidelines specified in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9 Generator Planned Outage.

"Generator Planned Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9.01 Hot Weather Alert.

"Hot Weather Alert" shall mean the notice provided by PJM to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for extreme hot and/or humid weather conditions which may cause capacity requirements and/or unit unavailability to be substantially higher than forecast are expected to persist for an extended period.

1.3.9A Increment Offer.

"Increment Offer" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is an offer to sell energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Increment Offer results in scheduled generation at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.9B Interface Pricing Point.

"Interface Pricing Point" shall have the meaning specified in section 2.6A.

1.3.10 Internal Market Buyer.

"Internal Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for ultimate consumption by end-users inside the PJM Region that are served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.11 Inadvertent Interchange.

"Inadvertent Interchange" shall mean the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the individual Control Areas operated by PJM.

1.3.11.01 Load Management.

"Load Management" shall mean a Demand Resource ("DR") as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.11.02 Load Management Event

"Load Management Event" shall mean a) a single temporally contiguous dispatch of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day, or b) multiple dispatches of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day that are temporally contiguous.

1.3.11A Load Reduction Event.

"Load Reduction Event" shall mean a reduction in demand by a Member or Special Member for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.11A.01 Location.

"Location" as used in the Economic Load Response rules shall mean an end-use customer site as defined by the relevant electric distribution company account number.

1.3.11B   Loss Price.

"Loss Price" shall mean the loss component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.12 Market Operations Center.

"Market Operations Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by or on behalf of a Market Participant to communicate and coordinate with the Office of the Interconnection in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.12A Maximum Emergency.

"Maximum Emergency" shall mean the designation of all or part of the output of a generating unit for which the designated output levels may require extraordinary procedures and therefore are available to the Office of the Interconnection only when the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to run. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the aggregate amount of megawatts that are classified as Maximum Emergency.

1.3.13 Maximum Generation Emergency.

"Maximum Generation Emergency" shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection to address either a generation or transmission emergency in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more Generation Capacity Resources, or Non-Retail Behind The Meter Generation resources to operate at its maximum net or gross electrical power output, subject to the equipment stress limits for such Generation Capacity Resource or Non-Retail Behind The Meter resource in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.13A Maximum Generation Emergency Alert.

"Maximum Generation Emergency Alert" shall mean an alert issued by the Office of the Interconnection to notify PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared, for any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market, for all or any part of such Operating Day.

1.3.14 Minimum Generation Emergency.

"Minimum Generation Emergency" shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more generating resources to operate at or below Normal Minimum Generation, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.14A NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator.

"NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator" shall mean the NERC mechanism that is in effect and being used to calculate the distribution of energy, over specific transmission interfaces, from energy transactions.

1.3.14B Net Benefits Test.

"Net Benefits Test" shall mean a calculation to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in price resulting from the dispatch of Economic Load Response exceeds the cost to other loads resulting from the billing unit effects of the load reduction, as specified in Section 3.3A.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.15 Network Resource.

"Network Resource" shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Tariff.

1.3.16 Network Service User.

"Network Service User" shall mean an entity using Network Transmission Service.

1.3.17 Network Transmission Service.

"Network Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff, or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

1.3.17A Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost.

"Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic F~~f~~orce M~~m~~ajeure; and, (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.17B Non-Synchronized Reserve.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of non-emergency generation resources that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is not electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.17C Non-Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources able and assigned to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve in one or more

specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes to increase the energy output by the amount of assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.17D Non-Variable Loads.

"Non-Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.18 Normal Maximum Generation.

"Normal Maximum Generation" shall mean the highest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.19 Normal Minimum Generation.

"Normal Minimum Generation" shall mean the lowest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.20 Offer Data.

"Offer Data" shall mean the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new resource, and other data and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generation resources and Demand Resource(s) for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the PJM Region, and specified for submission to the PJM Interchange Energy Market for such purposes by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.3.21 Office of the Interconnection Control Center.

"Office of the Interconnection Control Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by the Office of the Interconnection to coordinate and direct the operation of the PJM Region and to administer the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including facilities and equipment used to communicate and coordinate with the Market Participants in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.21A On-Site Generators.

"On-Site Generators" shall mean generation facilities (including Behind The Meter Generation) that (i) are not Capacity Resources, (ii) are not injecting into the grid, (iii) are either synchronized or non-synchronized to the Transmission System, and (iv) can be used to reduce demand for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.22 Operating Day.

"Operating Day" shall mean the daily 24 hour period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the PJM Interchange Energy Market are scheduled.

1.3.23 Operating Margin.

"Operating Margin" shall mean the incremental adjustments, measured in megawatts, required in PJM Region operations in order to accommodate, on a first contingency basis, an operating contingency in the PJM Region resulting from operations in an interconnected Control Area. Such adjustments may result in constraints causing Transmission Congestion Charges, or may result in Ancillary Services charges pursuant to the PJM Tariff.

1.3.24 Operating Margin Customer.

"Operating Margin Customer" shall mean a Control Area purchasing Operating Margin pursuant to an agreement between such other Control Area and the LLC.

1.3.24A Pre-Emergency Load Response Program

The Pre-Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during pre-emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.25 PJM Interchange.

"PJM Interchange" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds, or is exceeded by, the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller; or (e) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (f) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.26 PJM Interchange Export.

"PJM Interchange Export" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load is exceeded by the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup sales; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller.

1.3.27 PJM Interchange Import.

"PJM Interchange Import" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup purchases; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (d) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.28 PJM Open Access Same-time Information System.

"PJM Open Access Same-time Information System" shall mean the electronic communication system for the collection and dissemination of information about transmission services in the PJM Region, established and operated by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with FERC standards and requirements.

1.3.28A Planning Period Quarter.

"Planning Period Quarter" shall mean any of the following three month periods in the Planning Period: June, July and August; September, October and November; December, January and February; or March, April and May.

1.3.28B Planning Period Balance.

"Planning Period Balance" shall mean the entire period of time remaining in the Planning Period following the month that a monthly auction is conducted.

1.3.29 Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

"Point-to-Point Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

1.3.29A PRD Curve.

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29B PRD Provider.

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29C PRD Reservation Price.

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29D PRD Substation.

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29E Price Responsive Demand.

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29F Primary Reserve.

"Primary Reserve" shall mean the total reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is comprised of both Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve.

1.3.30 Ramping Capability.

"Ramping Capability" shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

1.3.30.01 Real-time Congestion Price.

"Real-time Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30.02 Real-time Loss Price.

"Real-time Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30A Real-time Prices.

"Real-time Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B Real-time Energy Market.

"Real-time Energy Market" shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B.01 Real-time System Energy Price.

"Real-time System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.31 Regulation.

"Regulation" shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to increase or decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.31.001 Reserve Penalty Factor.

"Reserve Penalty Factor" shall mean the cost, in $/MWh, associated with being unable to meet a specific reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. A Reserve Penalty Factor will be defined for each reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

1.3.31.01 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.

"Residual Auction Revenue Rights" shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability, including the return to service of existing transmission capability, that was not modeled pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement in compliance with section 7.4.2 (h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to section 7.4.2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Part VI of the Tariff; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Schedule 6 of this Agreement for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

1.3.31.01A Residual Metered Load.

"Residual Metered Load" shall mean all load remaining in an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) after all nodally priced load of entities serving load in such area(s) or territory(ies) has been carved out.

1.3.31.02 Special Member.

"Special Member" shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Section 1.5A.02 of this Schedule or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs.

1.3.32 Spot Market Backup.

"Spot Market Backup" shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

1.3.33 Spot Market Energy.

"Spot Market Energy" shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Section 2 of this Schedule.

1.3.33A State Estimator.

"State Estimator" shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Section 2.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.33B Station Power.

"Station Power" shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used for compressors at a compressed air energy storage facility; (iv) used for charging an Energy Storage Resource; or (v) used in association with restoration or black start service.

1.3.33B.001 Sub-meter.

"Sub-meter" shall mean a metering point for electricity consumption that does not include all electricity consumption for the end-use customer as defined by the electric distribution company account number. PJM shall only accept sub-meter load data from end-use customers for measurement and verification of Regulation service as set forth in the Economic Load Response rules and PJM Manuals.

1.3.33B.01 Synchronized Reserve.

"Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.33B.02 Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve in one or more specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.33B.03 System Energy Price.

"System Energy Price" shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.33C Target Allocation.

"Target Allocation" shall mean the allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits as set forth in Section 5.2.3 of this Schedule or the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits as set forth in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.34 Transmission Congestion Charge.

"Transmission Congestion Charge" shall mean a charge attributable to the increased cost of energy delivered at a given load bus when the transmission system serving that load bus is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide energy for third-party transmission losses in accordance with Section 9.3, which shall be calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.1 of this Schedule.

1.3.35 Transmission Congestion Credit.

"Transmission Congestion Credit" shall mean the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Charges credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.36 Transmission Customer.

"Transmission Customer" shall mean an entity using Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

1.3.37 Transmission Forced Outage.

"Transmission Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate removal from service of a transmission facility by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the transmission facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A removal from service of a transmission facility at the request of the Office of the Interconnection to improve transmission capability shall not constitute a Forced Transmission Outage.

1.3.37A Transmission Loading Relief.

"Transmission Loading Relief" shall mean NERC's procedures for preventing operating security limit violations, as implemented by PJM as the security coordinator responsible for maintaining transmission security for the PJM Region.

1.3.37B Transmission Loading Relief Customer.

"Transmission Loading Relief Customer" shall mean an entity that, in accordance with Section 1.10.6A, has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges during Transmission Loading Relief in order to continue energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region that are increasing the cost of energy in the PJM Region.

1.3.37C Transmission Loss Charge.

"Transmission Loss Charge" shall mean the charges to each Market Participant, Network Customer, or Transmission Customer for the cost of energy lost in the transmission of electricity from a generation resource to load as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

1.3.38 Transmission Planned Outage.

"Transmission Planned Outage" shall mean any transmission outage scheduled in advance for a pre-determined duration and which meets the notification requirements for such outages specified in this Agreement or the PJM Manuals.

1.3.38.01 Up-to Congestion Transaction.

"Up-to Congestion Transaction" shall have the meaning specified in Section 1.10.1A of this Schedule.

1.3.38A Variable Loads.

"Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.38B Virtual Transaction.

"Virtual Transaction" shall mean a Decrement Bid, Increment Offer and/or Up-to Congestion Transaction.

1.3.39 Zonal Base Load.

"Zonal Base Load" shall mean the lowest daily zonal peak load from the twelve month period ending October 21 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which an annual Auction Revenue Right allocation is conducted, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone, when non-extraordinary conditions exist for the applicable twelve month period, as determined by PJM. If the lowest daily zonal peak load from the applicable twelve month period is abnormally low due to extraordinary conditions, as determined by PJM, Zonal Base Load shall mean the next lowest daily zonal peak load that was not affected by extraordinary conditions during the applicable twelve month period, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone. For the purposes of this definition, extraordinary conditions shall mean a significant event, or combination of events, that affect the operation of the bulk power system in an atypical manner and results in an abnormal reduction in the consumption of energy within a Zone.

1.9 Prescheduling.

The following procedures and principles shall govern the prescheduling activities necessary to plan for the reliable operation of the PJM Region and for the efficient operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.9.1 Outage Scheduling.

The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for coordinating and approving requests for outages of generation and transmission facilities as necessary for the reliable operation of the PJM Region, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain records of outages and outage requests of these facilities.

1.9.2 Planned Outages.

(a) A Generator Planned Outage shall be included in Generator Planned Outage schedules established prior to the scheduled start date for the outage, in accordance with standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Generator Planned Outage scheduling for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement~~,~~ and the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the ~~Members~~ Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of such resources. A Market ~~Participant~~ Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from all or part of a generation resource undergoing an approved Generator Planned Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Planned Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval or withdraw a prior approval. Approval ~~for~~ of a Generator Planned Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. The Market Seller shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with an estimate of the amount of time it needs to return to service any Generation Capacity Resource on Generator Planned Outage that is already underway. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds or withdraws its approval of a Generator Planned Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market ~~Participant~~ Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Planned Outage ~~of the Generation Capacity Resource~~ at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall if possible propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market ~~Participant~~ Seller of a Generator Planned Outage.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Transmission Planned Outage scheduling in accordance with procedures specified in~~,~~ the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement~~,~~ and the PJM Manuals, and in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) Transmission Owners shall use reasonable efforts to submit Transmission Planned Outage schedules one year in advance but by no later than the first of the month six months in advance of the requested start date for all outages that are expected to exceed five working days duration, with regular (at least monthly) updates as new information becomes available.

(ii) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided in accordance with the requirements in subsection (i) above, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in ~~this~~ the Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(iii) Transmission Owners shall submit notice of all Transmission Planned Outages to the Office of the Interconnection by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, with updates as new information becomes available.

(iv) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection shall perform this analysis and notify the Transmission Owner in a timely manner if it will require rescheduling of the outage. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under ~~this~~ the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from ~~RTEP~~ outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in ~~this~~ the Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(v) The Office of the Interconnection reserves the right to approve, deny, or reschedule any outage deemed necessary to ensure reliable system operations on a case by case basis regardless of duration or date of submission.

(vi) The Office of the Interconnection shall post notice of Transmission Planned Outages on OASIS upon receipt of such notice from the Transmission Owner; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection shall not post on OASIS notice of any component of a Transmission Planned Outage to the extent such component shall directly reveal a generator outage. In such cases, the Transmission Owner, in addition to providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection as required above, concurrently shall inform the affected Generation Owner of such outage, limiting such communication to that necessary to describe the outage and to coordinate with the Generation Owner on matters of safety to persons, facilities, and equipment. The Transmission Owner shall not notify any other Market Participant of such outage and shall arrange any other necessary coordination through the Office of the Interconnection.

In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that transmission maintenance schedules proposed by one or more Members would significantly affect the efficient and reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may establish alternative schedules, but such alternative shall minimize the economic impact on the Member or Members whose maintenance schedules the Office of the Interconnection proposes to modify.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate resolution of outage or other planning conflicts that may give rise to unreliable system conditions. The Members shall comply with all maintenance schedules established by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.9.3 Generator Maintenance Outages.

(a) A Generator Maintenance Outage may only be scheduled if approved by the Office of the Interconnection prior to the requested start date for the outage, in accordance with subsection (b) hereof and the standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) ~~A Market Participant may request approval for a Generator Maintenance Outage of any Generation Capacity Resource from t~~The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Generator Maintenance Outages for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the ~~timetable and other~~ procedures specified in the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the Market Seller owning or controlling the output of such resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall approve requests for Generator Maintenance Outages for such a Generation Capacity

Resource unless the outage would threaten the adequacy of reserves in, or the reliability of, the PJM Region. A Market Participant shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing an approved full or partial Generator Maintenance Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval, withdraw a prior approval, or rescind a prior approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway. Approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it must rescind its approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway in order to preserve the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection will provide the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource at least 72 hours' notice thereof. The Market Seller shall be required to make the Generation Capacity Resource available for normal operation within 72 hours of such notice. If the generator is not made available for normal operation by 72 hours after the notice of the rescission of the approval of the Generator Maintenance Outage, the remaining time the resource continues on the outage will be classified as a Generator Forced Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds, withdraws or rescinds approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Maintenance Outage at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall, if possible, propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market Seller of a Generator Maintenance Outage.

1.9.4 Forced Outages.

(a) Each Market Seller that owns or controls a pool-scheduled resource, or Generation Capacity Resource whether or not pool-scheduled, shall: (i) advise the Office of the Interconnection of a Generator Forced Outage suffered or anticipated to be suffered by any such resource as promptly as possible; (ii) provide the Office of the Interconnection with the expected date and time that the resource will be made available; and (iii) make a record of the events and circumstances giving rise to the Generator Forced Outage. A Market Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing a Generator Forced Outage. A Generation Capacity Resource committed to PJM loads through an RPM Auction, FRR Capacity Plan, or by designation as a replacement resource under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, that does not deliver all or part of its scheduled energy shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage with respect to such undelivered energy, in accordance with standards and procedures for full and partial Generator Forced Outages specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, and the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive notification of Forced Transmission Outages, and information on the return to service, of Transmission Facilities in the PJM Region in accordance with standards and procedures specified in, as applicable, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the PJM Manuals.

1.9.4A Transmission Outage Acceleration.

(a) Planned Transmission Outages and Forced Transmission Outages otherwise scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 and 1.9.4 respectively of this Schedule may be accelerated or rescheduled at the request of a Generation Owner or other Market Participant in accordance with the terms and conditions of this section 1.9.4A and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Transmission Outages Requiring Coordination With A Specific Generation Owner.

(i) Receipt of Acceleration Request. Prior to a scheduled Planned Transmission Outage associated with the interconnection of a generating unit to the Transmission System, the affected Generation Owner may request that the outage be accelerated or rescheduled.~~;~~

Such Acceleration Request shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals.

(ii) Determination to Accommodate Acceleration Request. Upon receipt of an Acceleration Request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such Acceleration Request. The affected Transmission Owner shall determine, in its sole discretion, whether to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards, and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. In the event that the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an estimate of the cost to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage and the revised schedule for the transmission outage ("Acceleration Estimate").

(iii) Provision of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that the Generation Owner has met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Generation Owner with the Acceleration Estimate. In the event that the Generation Owner does not meet the creditworthiness standard, the Office of the Interconnection shall not provide the Acceleration Estimate and the transmission outage shall not be accelerated or rescheduled. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate, the Generation Owner, within the time period specified in the PJM Manuals, shall notify the Office of the Interconnection as to whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage pursuant to the terms of the Acceleration Estimate.

(iv) Cost Responsibility. In the event the Generation Owner notifies the Office of the Interconnection that it desires to proceed with the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage pursuant to section 1.9.4A(a)(iii), the Generation Owner shall be solely responsible for actual costs incurred by the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage. The Generation Owner's cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete the outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the Generation Owner. After receipt of such notification, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, the Generation Owner shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of the Generation Owner's decision. In the event the Generation Owner desires not to proceed, the transmission outage shall occur according to normal work practices and the Generation Owner shall be responsible for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage as of the date that the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(c) Transmission Outages That Could Cause Congestion Revenue Inadequacy.

(i) Posting of Transmission Outage. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines that a Planned Transmission Outage or Forced Transmission Outage could exceed five days and could cause congestion revenue inadequacy in excess of $500,000, the Office of the Interconnection shall post a notice of such transmission outage on its internet site. Within the time period and pursuant to the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, any Market Participant may request that such transmission outage be accelerated or rescheduled.

(ii) Determination to Accelerate or Reschedule Transmission Outage. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Request(s) pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(i), the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such request(s). The affected Transmission Owner shall determine in its sole discretion whether to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. If the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an Acceleration Estimate. In the event that Market Participants submit requests which would require different schedules for a transmission outage, the Office of the Interconnection, in consultation with the affected Transmission Owner, shall determine the most effective option, which will be included in the Acceleration Estimate.

(iii) Notification of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of transmission outages have met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Market Participants with the Acceleration Estimate and the number of Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage that meet the creditworthiness standards. After receipt of the Acceleration Request, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each requesting Market Participant meeting the creditworthiness standards shall notify the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage as set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, and if it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, the amount it is willing to pay for such acceleration or rescheduling.

(iv) Evaluation of Acceleration Requests. Upon receipt of Market Participant(s) notifications pursuant to subsection 1.9.4A(b)(iii), the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, based on the amount Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling of the transmission outage, whether the transmission outage should be accelerated or rescheduled. The transmission outage shall be accelerated or rescheduled if the amount that the Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage exceeds the Acceleration Estimate by the following margins: (a) for outages to equipment outside a substation, two times the Acceleration Estimate; and (b) for outages to equipment inside a substation, five times the Acceleration Estimate. These margins are designed to provide a reasonable degree of certainty that the actual costs of accelerating or rescheduling the transmission outage will not exceed the amount the Market Participants are willing to pay. In all events, transmission outages will be accelerated or rescheduled pursuant to requests made under section 1.9.4A(c) only when the requested acceleration or rescheduling would reduce the amount of congestion revenue inadequacy resulting from the outage as determined by the Office of the Interconnection.

(v) Cost Responsibility. Each Market Participant which notifies the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(iii) that it is willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling of a transmission outage shall be responsible for the actual costs of such acceleration or rescheduling on a pro-rata basis based on the amount it specified it was willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling. Market Participants' cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete a transmission outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Market Participants of such increase. Within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each affected Market Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of each affected Market Participant's decision. In the event that, because one or more Market Participants determine not to proceed, there would be insufficient funds to pay for the full cost of accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage, the transmission outage shall not continue to be accelerated or rescheduled and shall occur according to normal work practices. In such instance, the Market Participants shall be responsible on a pro-rata basis for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner as of the date the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(d) Posting Revised Transmission Outages. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on its internet site all revised transmission outage schedules resulting from implementation of this section 1.9.4A, pursuant to the procedures in the PJM Manuals, and simultaneously shall notify affected Market Participants or Generation Owners that submitted Acceleration Requests of the Transmission Owner's agreement to accelerate or reschedule the outage.

1.9.5 Market Participant Responsibilities.

Each Market Participant making a bilateral sale covering a period greater than the following Operating Day from a generating resource located within the PJM Region for delivery outside the PJM Region shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered.

1.9.6 Internal Market Buyer Responsibilities.

Each Internal Market Buyer making a bilateral purchase covering a period greater than the following Operating Day shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered. Each Internal Market Buyer shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with details of any load management agreements with customers that allow the Office of the Interconnection to reduce load under specified circumstances.

1.9.7 Market Seller Responsibilities.

(a) Not less than 30 days before a Market Seller's initial offer to sell energy from a given generation resource on the PJM Interchange Energy Market, the Market Seller shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection the information specified in the Offer Data for new generation resources.

(b) Market Sellers authorized to request market-based start-up and no-load fees may choose to submit such fees on either a market or a cost basis. Market Sellers must elect to submit both start-up and no-load fees on either a market basis or a cost basis and any such election shall be submitted on or before March 31 for the period of April 1 through September 30, and on or before September 30 for the period October 1 through March 31. The election of market-based or cost-based start-up and no-load fees shall remain in effect without change throughout the applicable periods.

(i) If a Market Seller chooses to submit market-based start-up and no-load fees, such Market Seller, in its Offer Data, shall submit the level of such fees to the Office of the Interconnection for each generating unit as to which the Market Seller intends to request such fees. The Office of the Interconnection shall reject any request for start-up and no-load fees in a Market Seller's Offer Data that does not conform to the Market Seller's specification on file with the Office of the Interconnection.

(ii) If a Market Seller chooses to submit cost-based start-up and no-load fees, such fees must be calculated as specified in the PJM Manuals and the Market Seller may change both cost-based fees daily and must change both fees as the associated costs change, but no more frequently than daily.

1.9.8 Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

All Transmission Owners shall regularly update and verify facility ratings, subject to review and approval by PJM, in accordance with the following procedures and the procedures in the PJM Manuals:

(a) Each Transmission Owner shall verify to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection all of its transmission facility ratings two months prior to the beginning of the summer season (i.e., on April 1) and two months prior to the beginning of the winter season (i.e., on October 1) each calendar year, and shall provide detailed data justifying such transmission facility ratings when directed by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) In addition to the seasonal verification of all ratings, each Transmission Owner shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection updates to its transmission facility ratings as soon as such Transmission Owner is aware of any changes. Such Transmission Owner shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with detailed data justifying all such transmission facility ratings changes.

(c) All Transmission Owners shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection formal documentation of any procedure for changing facility ratings under specific conditions, including: the detailed conditions under which such procedures will apply, detailed explanations of such procedures, and detailed calculations justifying such pre-established changes to facility ratings. Such procedures must be updated twice each year consistent with the provisions of this ~~section~~Section.

1.9.9 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall perform seasonal operating studies to assess the forecasted adequacy of generating reserves and of the transmission system, in accordance with the procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain and update tables setting forth Operating Reserve and other reserve objectives as specified in the PJM Manuals and as consistent with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive and process requests for firm and non-firm transmission service in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Tariff.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain such data and information relating to generation and transmission facilities in the PJM Region as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the scheduling and dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain an historical database of all transmission facility ratings, and shall review, and may modify or reject, any submitted change or any submitted procedure for pre-established transmission facility rating changes. Any dispute between a Transmission Owner and the Office of the Interconnection concerning transmission facility ratings shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures in schedule 5 to the Operating Agreement; provided, however, that the rating level determined by the Office of the Interconnection shall govern and be effective during the pendency of any such dispute.

(f) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate with other interconnected Control Area as necessary to manage, alleviate or end an Emergency.

1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer's self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales, or Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in Section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection's forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers' offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM

Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

1.10.1A Day-ahead Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.

(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection: (i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer's intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the

Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed the maximum price that may be specified in the PJM Manuals), if any, at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Scheduling of such transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not dynamically scheduled to such entities pursuant to Section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this type is referred to as an "Up-to Congestion Transaction." Such Up-to Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum difference between the source and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The source-sink paths on which an Up-to Congestion Transaction may be submitted are limited to those paths posted on the PJM internet site and determined by the Office of the Interconnection using the following criteria:

Step 1: Start with the historic set of eligible nodes that were available as sources and sinks for interchange transactions on the PJM OASIS.

Step 2: Remove from the list of nodes described in Step 1 all load buses below 69 kV.

Step 3: Remove from the resulting set of nodes from Step 2 all generator buses at which no generators of 100 megawatts or more are connected.

Step 4: Remove from the results of Step 3 all electrically equivalent nodes.

(d) Market Sellers wishing to sell into the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy (including energy from hydropower units), demand reductions, Regulation, Operating Reserves or other services for the following Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller's cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource or an Intermittent Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources and Intermittent Resources may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Market Sellers shall not designate as a Maximum Emergency offer any portion of their ICAP committed as a Base Capacity Resource during the months of June through September when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action, or committed as a Capacity Performance Resource at any time during the Delivery Year when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency ~~O~~offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency ~~O~~offers outside of the conditions stipulated above and to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on either a temporary or long-term basis. This includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier's exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generation resource, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such resource on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all Generation Capacity Resources; and

ix) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00, for all Economic Load Response Resources;

x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus [the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor divided by 2]; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provisions of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,100/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the megawatt of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100 per MWh in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $\$/\Delta MW$) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with start-up and no-load fees, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

(g) Each offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) A Market Seller that wishes to make a generation resource or Demand Resource available to sell Synchronized Reserve shall submit an offer for Synchronized Reserve that shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the energy used by the generation resource to provide the Synchronized Reserve and the generation resource's unit specific opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed the variable operating and maintenance costs for providing Synchronized Reserve plus seven dollars and fifty cents.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, and the offer shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts: (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs).

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Demand Resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Demand Resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. A Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Demand Resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) Market Sellers providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market: 1) a price offer in dollars per megawatt hour; and 2) such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to determine any relevant opportunity costs for the resource(s). The foregoing notwithstanding, to qualify to submit Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves pursuant to this section, the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit energy offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market including start-up and shut-down costs for generation resource and Demand Resources, respectively, and all generation resources that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling

Reserves that a particular resource can provide that service. The MW quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide in a given hour will be determined based on the energy Offer Data submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as detailed in the PJM Manuals.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity's Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

Demand Bid Limit = greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point * 1.3), or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point + 10MW)

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity's highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM's highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity's actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity's expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to Sections 1.10.9 or 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, start-up, no-load and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for start-up and no-load fees, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Section 3 of this Schedule 1. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of start-up and no-load fees, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource's start-up cost, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum

Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

(c) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for start-up or no-load fees.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of dynamic dispatch shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to dynamic dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer's load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer's hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.6A Transmission Loading Relief Customers.

(a) An entity that desires to elect to pay Transmission Congestion Charges in order to continue its energy schedules during an Operating Day over contract paths outside the PJM Region in the event that PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief that otherwise would cause PJM to request security coordinators to curtail such Member's energy schedules shall:

(i) enter its election on OASIS by 12:00 p.m. of the day before the Operating Day, in accordance with procedures established by PJM, which election shall be applicable for the entire Operating Day; and

(ii) if PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief, provide to PJM, at such time and in accordance with procedures established by PJM, the hourly integrated energy schedules that impacted the PJM Region (as indicated from the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator) during the Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) If an entity has made the election specified in Section (a), then PJM shall not request security coordinators to curtail such entity's energy transactions, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

(c) In order to make elections under this Section 1.10.6A, an entity must (i) have met the creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection or provided a letter of credit or other form of security acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection, and (ii) have executed either the Agreement, a Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, or other agreement committing to pay all Transmission Congestion Charges incurred under this Section.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection's forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads they serve; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) Not earlier than 4:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant's inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in Section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Section 3.3A of this Schedule. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Sections 2.4 and 2.5 hereof.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, Ancillary Services Markets or Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and Day-ahead Energy Market.

After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets, Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Section 18.17.1 of the PJM Operating Agreement, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants' non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for any generation resource that was not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee.

(c) With respect to a pool-scheduled resource that is included in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller may not change or otherwise modify its offer to sell energy.

(d) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(e) For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this Section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

3.2 Market Buyers.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy Charges.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be paid for all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(d) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of net hourly PJM Interchange for each Market Buyer, including Generating Market Buyers, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. For Internal Market Buyers that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall include determination of the net energy flows from: (i) tie lines; (ii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by the Market Buyer but delivered to it over another entity's Transmission Facilities; (iii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by another entity but which is directly interconnected with the Market Buyer's transmission system; (iv) deliveries pursuant to bilateral energy sales; (v) receipts pursuant to bilateral energy purchases; and (vi) an adjustment to account for the day-ahead PJM Interchange, calculated as the difference between scheduled withdrawals and injections by that Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market. For External Market Buyers and Internal Market Buyers that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall determine the energy scheduled hourly for delivery to the Market Buyer net of the amounts scheduled by such Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) An Internal Market Buyer shall be charged for Spot Market Energy purchases to the extent of its hourly net purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. An External Market Buyer shall be charged for its Spot Market Energy purchases based on the energy delivered to it, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total charge shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Imports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Buyer.

(f) A Generating Market Buyer shall be paid as a Market Seller for sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net sales into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total payment shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Exports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Seller.

3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Internal Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation shall be charged the following for Regulation dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation: (i) the capability Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; (ii) the amounts, if any, described in subsection (f) of this section; and (iii) the performance Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (g) of this section.

(b) Each Market Seller and Generating Market Buyer shall be credited for each of its resources supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined at a time to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection which shall be no earlier than the day before the Operating Day. In accordance with the PJM Manuals, the total Regulation market-clearing price shall be calculated by optimizing the dispatch profile to obtain the lowest cost combination set of resources that satisfies the Regulation requirement. The market-clearing price for each regulating hour shall be equal to the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during that hour. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the

expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Seller or Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection‘s Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and for the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour and the following shoulder hour during which the Generating Market Buyer or Market Seller provided Regulation. The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource‘s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection‘s Regulation signals from the generation resource‘s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource‘s expected output in the preceding shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource‘s expected output in the following shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the following shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market hour.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

$$\text{Correlation Score} = \mathbf{r}_{\text{Signal,Response}(\delta,\delta+5\text{ Min});\ \delta=0\text{ to }5\text{ Min}}$$

where δ is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

$$\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs}\left((\delta - 5\text{ Minutes}) / (5\text{ Minutes})\right).$$

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error (ε) as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

$$\text{Energy Score} = 1 - 1/n \sum \text{Abs (Error)};$$

$$\text{Error} = \text{Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal))}; \text{ and}$$

n = the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

$$\text{Accuracy Score} = \max\left((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})\right) + (\text{Energy Score}).$$

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the hourly accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its physically determined parameter limitations due to external requirements such as fuel delivery arrangements, for example, will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

Consistent with Sections 1.10.1 and 6.6 hereof, resources with notification or start up times greater than one day that are committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each hour the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any

Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG}, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG} where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller's wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

> LMPDMW equals the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;
>
> AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;
>
> URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

In the event the Office of the Interconnection experiences a technical problem or malfunction with its wind forecasting tool that results in an erroneous forecast for a wind resource during a period of time for which the wind resource is eligible for lost opportunity cost, the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller will attempt to reach a mutually agreeable forecast value for settlement purposes. If the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller do not come to mutual agreement on an acceptable forecast value, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the forecast value that it determines is appropriate.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (1) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals; (2) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (3) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (4) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the hours that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the hours that the offer is economic. The hours that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the hours that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the hours in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any hours required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\text{Ramp\_Request}_t = (\text{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1}) / (\text{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})$$

$$\text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined n section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in subsections (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price less the hourly integrated real-time LMP, with the exception of those hours in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the hourly integrated amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized

Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is the average of the five-minute Locational Marginal Prices calculated during the Synchronized Reserve Event plus an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor and the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor and the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. \$250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. \$400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. \$550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. \$850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) In determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource times (B) the megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource, and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Seller in excess of that Market Seller's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the remainder of the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Seller's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during an hour than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that hour due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant’s aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the

Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Non-Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in paragraph (f) of this section.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve requirement. When the Primary Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve will be determined as the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Primary Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;
ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;
iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and
iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) In determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous hours the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the

Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the MW obligation in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The cost of credits allocated to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources pursuant to this section shall be charged to Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region based on load ratio share (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero), provided that a Load-Serving Entity may satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation, which is equal to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the Load-Serving Entity's load ratio share for the PJM Region, through one or any combination of the following: 1) the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market; 2) and bilateral arrangements. The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges allocated pursuant to this section shall reflect any portion of a Load-Serving Entity's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation that is met by bilateral arrangement(s).

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the

Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP - UB)}

where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)}where:

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the

Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each hour of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each hour of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of hourly energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each hour of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Buyer in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Buyer.

Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Buyer's internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Buyer that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Buyer, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Buyer and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

5.2 Transmission Congestion Credit Calculation.

5.2.1 Eligibility.

(a) Except as provided in Section 5.2.1(b), each holder of a Financial Transmission Right shall receive as a Transmission Congestion Credit a proportional share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges collected for each constrained hour.

(b) If a holder of a Financial Transmission Right between specified delivery and receipt buses acquired the Financial Transmission Right in a Financial Transmission Rights auction (the procedures for which are set forth in Part 7 of this Schedule 1) and (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt buses of the Financial Transmission Right or had an Up-to Congestion Transaction that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a path at or near the path of the Financial Transmission Right; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer, Decrement Bid or Up-to Congestion Transaction is that the difference in Locational Marginal Prices in the Day-ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt buses is greater than the difference in Locational Marginal Prices between such delivery and receipt buses in the Real-time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit, associated with such Financial Transmission Right in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount that the Market Participant paid for the Financial Transmission Right in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) For purposes of Section 5.2.1(b) a bus shall be considered at or near the Financial Transmission Right delivery or receipt bus if seventy-five percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that bus and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus is reflected in the constrained path between the subject Financial Transmission Right delivery and receipt buses that were acquired in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(d) The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits pursuant to this section and section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the FTR holder. If the Office of the Interconnection agrees with such calculation, then it shall impose the forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit accordingly. If the Office of the Interconnection does not agree with the calculation, then it shall impose a forfeiture of Transmission Congestion Credit consistent with its determination. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the Office of the Interconnection's determination, it may exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns and may request an adjustment. This provision is duplicated in section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. An FTR holder objecting to the application of this rule shall have recourse to the Commission for review of the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to its trading activity.

5.2.2 Financial Transmission Rights.

(a) Transmission Congestion Credits will be calculated based upon the Financial Transmission Rights held at the time of the constrained hour. Except as provided in subsection (e) below, Financial Transmission Rights shall be auctioned as set forth in Section 7.

(b) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is negative (a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(c) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right when that difference is positive. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is zero (neither a benefit nor a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(d) In addition to transactions with PJMSettlement in the Financial Transmission Rights auctions administered by the Office of the Interconnection, a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period, may be sold or otherwise transferred to a third party by bilateral agreement, subject to compliance with such procedures as may be established by the Office of the Interconnection for verification of the rights of the purchaser or transferee.

(i) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer to a third party a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period. Such bilateral transactions shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transactions for the transfer of Financial Transmission Rights, the rights and obligations pertaining to the Financial Transmission Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transaction shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. Such bilateral transactions shall not modify the location or reconfigure the Financial Transmission Rights. In no event shall the purchase and sale of a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to a bilateral transaction constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(iii) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any Financial Transmission Right Obligation. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations, including meeting applicable creditworthiness requirements, transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Financial Transmission Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Financial Transmission Rights shall continue to receive all Transmission Congestion Credits attributable to the Financial Transmission Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Financial Transmission Rights.

(iv) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the transferred Financial Transmission Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transaction.

(v) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(vi) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

(e) Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, at their election, may receive a direct allocation of Financial Transmission Rights instead of an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers may make this election for the succeeding two annual FTR auctions after the integration of the new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Such election shall be made prior to the commencement of each annual FTR auction. For purposes of this election, the Allegheny Power Zone shall be considered a new zone with respect to the annual Financial Transmission Right auction in 2003 and 2004. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers in new PJM zones that elect not to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights shall receive allocations of Auction Revenue Rights. During the annual allocation process, the Financial Transmission Right allocation for new PJM zones shall be performed simultaneously with the Auction Revenue Rights allocations in existing and new PJM zones. Prior to the effective date of the initial allocation of FTRs in a new PJM Zone, PJM shall file with FERC, under section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the FTRs and ARRs allocated in accordance with sections 5 and 7 of this Schedule 1.

(f) For Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, that elect to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights, Financial Transmission Rights shall be allocated using the same allocation methodology as is specified for the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights in Section 7.4.2 and in accordance with the following:

(i) Subject to subsection (ii) of this section, all Financial Transmission Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Financial Transmission Right requests made when Financial Transmission Rights are allocated for the new zone are not feasible then Financial Transmission Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the MW level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(ii) If any Financial Transmission Right requests that are equal to or less than a Network Service User's Zonal Base Load for the Zone or fifty percent of its transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load, or fifty percent of megawatts of firm service between the receipt and delivery points of Firm Transmission Customers, are not feasible in the annual allocation and auction processes due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Financial Transmission Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights without their being infeasible for all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes, provided that this subsection (ii) shall not apply if the infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, such increased limits shall be included in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions; unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (ii) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (ii), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM~~force majeure~~ that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Financial Transmission Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates Financial Transmission Rights as a result of this subsection (ii) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Financial Transmission Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights.

(iii) In the event that Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another after an initial or annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights in a new zone, Financial Transmission Rights will be reassigned on a proportional basis from the Network Service User losing the load to the Network Service User that is gaining the Network Load.

(g) At least one month prior to the integration of a new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through the new zone, shall receive an initial allocation of Financial Transmission Rights that will be in effect from the date of the integration of the new zone until the next annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights. Such allocation of Financial Transmission Rights shall be made in accordance with Section 5.2.2(f) of this Schedule.

(h) The following congestion charge crediting and uplift (hereinafter, "mitigation") rules shall apply to each new zone first integrated on any date from May 1, 2004 through May 31, 2005 for which FERC orders such mitigation as a result of a filing for such zone of the type specified in subsection (g) above. Where FERC orders such mitigation, such rules shall remain in effect for such zone from the date of its integration through May 31, 2005. All such mitigation shall terminate for all such zones on May 31, 2005.

1.) Mitigation shall apply only to Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers in such a zone that did not receive an allocation of ARRs or FTRs, as applicable, equal to the ARRs or FTRs such customer requested in the allocation for such zone. Only pro-rated requests that complied with the source, sink, and service level limitations stated in section 7.4.2(f) are eligible for mitigation. Such mitigation shall continue for the period stated above if a customer eligible for mitigation renews or rolls over its service agreement, but shall no longer apply if such a customer redirects its service to alternate points on a firm basis.

2.) The affected customers that will receive mitigation will be notified by PJM of the MW amount of mitigation they will receive based on the difference between the amount of ARRs or FTRs requested and the amount of ARRs or FTRs awarded.

3.) Mitigation provided herein applies only to requests submitted and pro-rated in the interim or annual ARR/FTR allocation process conducted for such zones for the time period specified above.

4.) For each affected customer as described above, PJM each month will provide a mitigation credit to offset any congestion charges incurred by such customer in connection with the MW amount for the contract reservation eligible for mitigation as determined under subsection (2) above. In no event shall the amount of any such credit exceed the net amount of any congestion paid (after taking account of any congestion credits) by such customer during such month with respect to such identified MW amount.

5.) The total cost of all such credits for all mitigated customers in a zone each month shall be charged to and collected from all Network Integration Transmission Service and Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers within such zone that received ARRs or FTRs or that received mitigation under this subsection (h), in proportion to each such customer's share of the total allocated ARR/FTR MWs (including mitigation MWs). Mitigation and uplift shall be determined separately for each such zone.

5.2.3 Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

A Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits for each entity holding a Financial Transmission Right shall be determined for each Financial Transmission Right. Each Financial Transmission Right shall be multiplied by the Day-ahead Congestion Price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Financial Transmission Right, calculated as the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the delivery point(s) minus the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the receipt point(s). For the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Zone is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Zone multiplied by the percent of annual peak load assigned to each node in the Zone. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, for the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Residual Metered Load aggregate is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate multiplied by the percent of the annual peak residual load assigned to each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate. When the FTR Target Allocation is positive, the FTR Target Allocation is a credit to the FTR holder. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is a debit to the FTR holder if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Obligation. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is set to zero if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Option. The total Target Allocation for Network Service Users and Transmission Customers for each hour shall be the sum of the Target Allocations associated with all of the Network Service Users' or Transmission Customers' Financial Transmission Rights.

5.2.4 [Reserved.]

5.2.5 Calculation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

(a) The total of all the positive Target Allocations determined as specified above shall be compared to the total Transmission Congestion Charges in each hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market. If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total of the Transmission Congestion Charges, the Transmission Congestion Credit for each entity holding an FTR shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining Transmission Congestion Charges shall be distributed as described below in Section 5.2.6 "Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges."

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total Transmission Congestion Charges for the hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market, each holder of Financial Transmission Rights shall be assigned a share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges in proportion to its Target Allocations for Financial Transmission Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Financial Transmission Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Transmission Congestion Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period if all FTR holders did not receive Transmission Congestion Credits equal to their Target Allocations, the Office of the Interconnection shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Transmission Congestion Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient FTRs and the actual Transmission Congestion Credits allocated to those FTR holders. A charge assessed pursuant to this section shall also include any aggregate charge assessed pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and shall be allocated to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. The charge shall be calculated and allocated in accordance with the following methodology:

1. The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of uplift required as {[sum of the total monthly deficiencies in FTR Target Allocations for the Planning Period + the sum of the ARR Target Allocation deficiencies determined pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement] – [sum of the total monthly excess ARR revenues and congestion charges for the Planning Period]}.

2. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

3. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an uplift charge to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total uplift] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

5.2.6 Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges.

(a) Excess Transmission Congestion Charges accumulated in a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during that month as compared to its total Target Allocations for the month.

(b) After the excess Transmission Congestion Charge distribution described in Section 5.2.6(a) is performed, any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during the current Planning Period, including previously distributed excess Transmission Congestion Charges, as compared to its total Target Allocation for the Planning Period.

(c) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a Planning Period shall be distributed to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any Auction Revenue Right deficiencies for that Planning Period.

(d) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after a distribution pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall be distributed to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. Any allocation pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be conducted in accordance with the following methodology:

1. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of the Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

2. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an excess Transmission Congestion Charge credit to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after distributions pursuant to subsection (a)-(c) of this section] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules.

(a) Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on cost-based offers, which are always parameter limited. Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on market-based offers conforming to parameter limitations~~non-price offer parameters~~ (“parameter limited schedules”) under the following circumstances:

(i) The ~~Operating Reserve markets~~ Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting, i.e. more flexible, of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues ~~an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“~~a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert~~”)~~; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency, Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iv) For Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency during hot weather operations; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert during hot weather operations; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Hot Weather Alert, or a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert during hot weather operations, for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, p~~P~~arameter limited schedules shall be defined for the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions during hot weather operations, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, and for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years for Capacity Performance Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Cold Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit-specific physically achievable operating parameters for each individual resource on the basis of its operating design characteristics, recognizing that remedial and ongoing investment and maintenance may be required to perform on the basis of those characteristics, for the following parameters:

(i) Economic Minimum;

(ii) Economic Maximum;

(iii) Minimum Down Time;

(iv) Minimum Run Time;

(v) Maximum Daily Starts;

(vi) Maximum Weekly Starts;

(vii) Maximum Run Time;

(viii) Start-up Time; and

(ix) Notification Time.

These unit-specific values shall apply for the generation resource unless it is operating pursuant to an exception from those values under subsection (h) hereof due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. Throughout the analysis process, the Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of a resource's unit-specific parameter limited schedule values.

(c) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generation resources not committed as Capacity Performance Resources:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

Parameter	**Minimum Down Time (Hrs)**	**Minimum Run Time (Hrs)**	**Maximum Daily Starts**	**Maximum Weekly Starts**	**Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW**
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 135 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

(d) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, u~~U~~pon receipt of proposed revised parameter limited schedule values from the Market Monitoring Unit, prepared in accordance with the procedures for periodic review included in section II.B.1 of Attachment M - Appendix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file to revise the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix in section 6.6(c) above accordingly. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the values proposed for revising the matrix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file the values that it determines are appropriate.

(e) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate and provide to Market Sellers for their generation resources unit-specific default values in accordance with section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. The default values set forth in the table in subsection (c) above shall apply for the referenced technology types unless a generation resource is operating pursuant to an exception from the default values under subsection (~~f~~h) due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. For generation resources having the ability to operate on multiple fuels, Market Sellers may submit a parameter limited schedule associated with each fuel type.

(f) For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits shall apply for Capacity Performance Resources, other than Capacity Storage Resources, submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) The combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 24 hours, except when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 14 hours;

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iv) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical operational limitations of the Capacity Performance Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

Capacity Storage Resources that clear in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall:

(i) Have combined start-up and notification times that shall not exceed one hour; and,

(ii) Have a minimum down time that shall not exceed one hour.

(g) For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits for Base Capacity Resources submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) Combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 48 hours;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical limitations of the Base Capacity Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

(~~f~~h) Exceptions to the p~~P~~arameter l~~L~~imited s~~S~~chedule~~ Matrix~~ default or unit-specific values shall be categorized as either a one-time temporary exception, lasting 30 days or less; a period exception, lasting at least 31 days and no more than one year; or a persistent exception, lasting for at least one year.

(i) *Temporary Exceptions*. A temporary exception shall be deemed accepted without prior review by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection upon submission by the Market Seller of the generation resource of written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, at least one business day prior to the commencement of the exception, and shall automatically commence and terminate on the dates specified in such notification, which must be for a period of time lasting 30 days or less, unless the termination date is extended pending a request for a period exception or shortened due to a change in the physical conditions of the unit such that the temporary exception is no longer required. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days following the commencement of the temporary exception its documentation explaining in detail the reasons for the temporary exception, and shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Failure to provide a timely response to such request for additional information shall cause the temporary exception to terminate the following day. The Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing of an early termination of a temporary exception due to changed physical conditions by no later than one business day prior to the early termination date.

Modification of Temporary Exceptions. If, prior to the scheduled termination date, the Market Seller determines that the temporary exception must persist for more than 30 days, the Market Seller must submit to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection a written request to modify the temporary exception to become a period exception or a persistent exception, and provide detailed documentation explaining the reasons for the requested modification of the temporary exception. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operating limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the Market Seller may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits of the resource to support the requested parameters. Such Market Seller shall respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Such request shall be reviewed by the Market Monitoring Unit and must be evaluated by the Office of the Interconnection using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests. Per Section II.B of Attachment M-Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the modification request and provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 days from the date of the modification request. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide its determination whether the request complies with the Tariff and Manuals by no later than 20 days from the date of the modification request. A temporary exception shall be extended and shall not terminate until the date on which the Office of the Interconnection issues its determination of the modification request.

(ii) *Period Exceptions and Persistent Exceptions*. Market Sellers must submit period exception and persistent exception requests to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than the February 28 immediately preceding the twelve month period from June 1 to May 31 during which the exception is requested to commence. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period exception or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operational limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the generation resource may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits for exceptions of the resource to support the requested parameters. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request in accordance with the process set forth in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A Market Seller (i) must submit a parameter limited schedule value consistent with an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on the parameter limited schedule value, may submit its own value to the Office of the Interconnection and to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than April 8. Each exception request must indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the termination date thereof. The proposed parameter limited schedule value submitted by the Market Seller is subject to approval of the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the requirements of the Tariff and the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection may engage the services of a consultant with technical expertise to evaluate the exception request. After it has completed its evaluation of the exception request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, whether the exception request is approved or denied, by no later than April 15. The effective date of the exception, if approved by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be no earlier than June 1. The Office of the Interconnection's determination for an exception shall continue for the period requested and, if requested, for such longer period as the Office of the Interconnection may determine is supported by the data.

The Market Seller shall provide written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection in their evaluations of the Market Seller's request for a period or persistent exception. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 days after receipt of such notice. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 20 days after receipt of the Market Seller's notice. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the exception no longer complies with the Tariff or Manuals, the default values specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall apply.

(i) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of this Section 6.6 shall only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection for its offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day.

7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

7.4.1 Eligibility.

(a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.

(b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:

> (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
>
> (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
>
> (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:

> (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt-year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the historical generation resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year for the Zone, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each

historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the historical generation resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section

7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

(d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).

(e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.

(f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Point-to-Point Transmission Service, as defined in the PJM Tariff, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under

contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

(g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.

(h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM~~force majeure~~ that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

(j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:

i. The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located outside the PJM Region.

ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.

iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.

iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) , the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.

viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.

xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.

xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.

xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

(a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

(d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.

(e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.

(b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.5.

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

ATTACHMENT M – APPENDIX

I. CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA AND INFORMATION

A. Party Access:

1. No Member shall have a right hereunder to receive or review any documents, data or other information of another Member, including documents, data or other information provided to the Market Monitoring Unit, to the extent such documents, data or information have been designated as confidential pursuant to the procedures adopted by the Market Monitoring Unit or to the extent that they have been designated as confidential by such other Member; provided, however, a Member may receive and review any composite documents, data and other information that may be developed based on such confidential documents, data or information if the composite does not disclose any individual Member's confidential data or information.

2. Except as may be provided in this Appendix, the Plan, the PJM Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, the Market Monitoring Unit shall not disclose to PJM Members or to third parties, any documents, data, or other information of a Member or entity applying for Membership, to the extent such documents, data, or other information has been designated confidential pursuant to the procedures adopted by the Market Monitoring Unit or by such Member or entity applying for membership; provided that nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Market Monitoring Unit from providing any such confidential information to its agents, representatives, or contractors to the extent that such person or entity is bound by an obligation to maintain such confidentiality.

The Market Monitoring Unit, its designated agents, representatives, and contractors shall maintain as confidential the electronic tag ("e-Tag") data of an e-Tag Author or Balancing Authority (defined as those terms are used in FERC Order No. 771) to the same extent as Member data under this Section I. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Market Monitoring Unit from sharing with the market monitor of another Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO"), Independent System Operator ("ISO"), upon their request, the e-Tags of an e-Tag Author or Balancing Authority for intra-PJM Region transactions and interchange transactions scheduled to flow into, out of or through the PJM Region, to the extent such market monitor has requested such information as part of its investigation of possible market violations or market design flaws, and to the extent that such market monitor is bound by a tariff provision requiring that the e-Tag data be maintained as confidential, or in the absence of a tariff requirement governing confidentiality, a written agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit consistent with FERC Order No. 771, and any clarifying orders and implementing regulations.

The Market Monitoring Unit shall collect and use confidential information only in connection with its authority under this Appendix, the Plan, the PJM Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff and the retention of such information shall be in accordance with the Office of the Interconnection's data retention policies.

3. Nothing contained herein shall prevent the Market Monitoring Unit from releasing a Member's confidential data or information to a third party provided that the Member has

delivered to the Market Monitoring Unit specific, written authorization for such release setting forth the data or information to be released, to whom such release is authorized, and the period of time for which such release shall be authorized. The Market Monitoring Unit shall limit the release of a Member's confidential data or information to that specific authorization received from the Member. Nothing herein shall prohibit a Member from withdrawing such authorization upon written notice to the Market Monitoring Unit, who shall cease such release as soon as practicable after receipt of such withdrawal notice.

4. Reciprocal provisions to this Section I hereof, delineating the confidentiality requirements of the Office of the Interconnection and PJM members, are set forth in Section 18.17 of the PJM Operating Agreement.

B. Required Disclosure:

1. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing section to the contrary, and subject to the provisions of Section I.C below, if the Market Monitoring Unit is required by applicable law, order, or in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings, to disclose to third parties, information that is otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to the PJM Tariff, PJM Operating Agreement, Attachment M or this Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit may make disclosure of such information; provided, however, that as soon as the Market Monitoring Unit learns of the disclosure requirement and prior to making disclosure, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the affected Member or Members of the requirement and the terms thereof and the affected Member or Members may direct, at their sole discretion and cost, any challenge to or defense against the disclosure requirement. The Market Monitoring Unit shall cooperate with such affected Members to the maximum extent practicable to minimize the disclosure of the information consistent with applicable law. The Market Monitoring Unit shall cooperate with the affected Members to obtain proprietary or confidential treatment of such information by the person to whom such information is disclosed prior to any such disclosure.

2. Nothing in this Section I shall prohibit or otherwise limit the Market Monitoring Unit's use of information covered herein if such information was: (i) previously known to the Market Monitoring Unit without an obligation of confidentiality; (ii) independently developed by or for the Office of the Interconnection and/or the PJM Market Monitor using non-confidential information; (iii) acquired by the Office of the Interconnection and/or the PJM Market Monitor from a third party which is not, to the Office of the Market Monitoring Unit's knowledge, under an obligation of confidence with respect to such information; (iv) which is or becomes publicly available other than through a manner inconsistent with this Section I.

3. The Market Monitoring Unit shall impose on any contractors retained to provide technical support or otherwise to assist with the implementation of the Plan or this Appendix a contractual duty of confidentiality consistent with the Plan or this Appendix. A Member shall not be obligated to provide confidential or proprietary information to any contractor that does not assume such a duty of confidentiality, and the Market Monitoring Unit shall not provide any such information to any such contractor without the express written permission of the Member providing the information.

C. <u>Disclosure to FERC and CFTC</u>:

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Section I to the contrary, if the FERC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") or the staff of those commissions, during the course of an investigation or otherwise, requests information from the Market Monitoring Unit that is otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to the PJM Tariff, the PJM Operating Agreement, the Plan or this Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall provide the requested information to the FERC, CFTC or their staff, within the time provided for in the request for information. In providing the information to the FERC or its staff, the Market Monitoring Unit may request, consistent with 18 C.F.R. §§ 1b.20 and 388.112, or to the CFTC or its staff, the Market Monitoring Unit may request, consistent with 17 C.F.R. §§ 11.3 and 145.9, that the information be treated as confidential and non-public by the respective commission and its staff and that the information be withheld from public disclosure. The Market Monitoring Unit shall promptly notify any affected Member(s) if the Market Monitoring Unit receives from the FERC, CFTC or their staff, written notice that the commission has decided to release publicly or has asked for comment on whether such commission should release publicly, confidential information previously provided to a commission Market Monitoring Unit.

2. The foregoing Section I.C.1 shall not apply to requests for production of information under Subpart D of the FERC's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR Part 385) in proceedings before FERC and its administrative law judges. In all such proceedings, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall follow the procedures in Section I.B.

D. <u>Disclosure to Authorized Commissions</u>:

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Section I to the contrary, the Market Monitoring Unit shall disclose confidential information, otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to the PJM Tariff, the PJM Operating Agreement, the Plan or this Appendix, to an Authorized Commission under the following conditions:

(i) The Authorized Commission has provided the FERC with a properly executed Certification in the form attached to the PJM Operating Agreement as Schedule 10A. Upon receipt of the Authorized Commission's Certification, the FERC shall provide public notice of the Authorized Commission's filing pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 385.2009. If any interested party disputes the accuracy and adequacy of the representations contained in the Authorized Commission's Certification, that party may file a protest with the FERC within 14 days of the date of such notice, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 385.211. The Authorized Commission may file a response to any such protest within seven days. Each party shall bear its own costs in connection with such a protest proceeding. If there are material changes in law that affect the accuracy and adequacy of the representations in the Certification filed with the FERC, the Authorized Commission shall, within thirty (30) days, submit an amended Certification identifying such changes. Any such amended Certification shall be subject to the same procedures for comment and review by the FERC as set forth above in this paragraph.

(ii) Neither the Office of the Interconnection nor the Market Monitoring Unit may disclose data to an Authorized Commission during the FERC's consideration of the Certification and any filed protests. If the FERC does not act upon an Authorized Commission's Certification within 90 days of the date of filing, the Certification shall be deemed approved and the Authorized Commission shall be permitted to receive confidential information pursuant to this Section I. In the event that an interested party protests the Authorized Commission's Certification and the FERC approves the Certification, that party may not challenge any Information Request made by the Authorized Commission on the grounds that the Authorized Commission is unable to protect the confidentiality of the information requested, in the absence of a showing of changed circumstances.

(iii) Any confidential information provided to an Authorized Commission pursuant to this Section I shall not be further disclosed by the recipient Authorized Commission except by order of the FERC.

(iv) The Market Monitoring Unit shall be expressly entitled to rely upon such Authorized Commission Certifications in providing confidential information to the Authorized Commission, and shall in no event be liable, or subject to damages or claims of any kind or nature hereunder, due to the ineffectiveness or inaccuracy of such Authorized Commission Certifications.

(v) The Authorized Commission may provide confidential information obtained from the Market Monitoring Unit to such of its employees, attorneys and contractors as needed to examine or handle that information in the course and scope of their work on behalf of the Authorized Commission, provided that (a) the Authorized Commission has internal procedures in place, pursuant to the Certification, to ensure that each person receiving such information agrees to protect the confidentiality of such information (such employees, attorneys or contractors to be defined hereinafter as "Authorized Persons"); (b) the Authorized Commission provides, pursuant to the Certification, a list of such Authorized Persons to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit and updates such list, as necessary, every ninety (90) days; and (c) any third-party contractors provided access to confidential information sign a nondisclosure agreement in the form attached to the PJM Operating Agreement as Schedule 10 before being provided access to any such confidential information.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit may, in the course of discussions with an Authorized Person, orally disclose information otherwise required to be maintained in confidence, without the need for a prior Information Request. Such oral disclosures shall provide enough information to enable the Authorized Person or the Authorized Commission with which that Authorized Person is associated to determine whether additional Information Requests are appropriate. The Market Monitoring Unit will not make any written or electronic disclosures of confidential information to the Authorized Person pursuant to this Section I.D.2. In any such discussions, the Market Monitoring Unit shall ensure that the individual or individuals receiving such confidential information are Authorized Persons as defined herein, orally designate confidential information that is disclosed, and refrain from identifying any specific Affected Member whose information is disclosed. The Market Monitoring Unit shall also be authorized to assist Authorized Persons in interpreting confidential information that is disclosed. The Market

Monitoring Unit shall provide any Affected Member with oral notice of any oral disclosure immediately, but not later than one (1) business day after the oral disclosure. Such oral notice to the Affected Member shall include the substance of the oral disclosure, but shall not reveal any confidential information of any other Member and must be received by the Affected Member before the name of the Affected Member is released to the Authorized Person; provided however, disclosure of the identity of the Affected Party must be made to the Authorized Commission with which the Authorized Person is associated within two (2) business days of the initial oral disclosure.

3. As regards Information Requests:

(i) Information Requests to the Office of the Interconnection and/or Market Monitoring Unit by an Authorized Commission shall be in writing, which shall include electronic communications, addressed to the Market Monitoring Unit, and shall: (a) describe the information sought in sufficient detail to allow a response to the Information Request; (b) provide a general description of the purpose of the Information Request; (c) state the time period for which confidential information is requested; and (d) re-affirm that only Authorized Persons shall have access to the confidential information requested. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide an Affected Member with written notice, which shall include electronic communication, of an Information Request by an Authorized Commission as soon as possible, but not later than two (2) business days after the receipt of the Information Request.

(ii) Subject to the provisions of Section I.D.3(iii) below, the Market Monitoring Unit shall supply confidential information to the Authorized Commission in response to any Information Request within five (5) business days of the receipt of the Information Request, to the extent that the requested confidential information can be made available within such period; provided however, that in no event shall confidential information be released prior to the end of the fourth (4th) business day without the express consent of the Affected Member. To the extent that the Market Monitoring Unit cannot reasonably prepare and deliver the requested confidential information within such five (5) day period, it shall, within such period, provide the Authorized Commission with a written schedule for the provision of such remaining confidential information. Upon providing confidential information to the Authorized Commission, the Market Monitoring Unit shall either provide a copy of the confidential information to the Affected Member(s), or provide a listing of the confidential information disclosed; provided, however, that the Market Monitoring Unit shall not reveal any Member's confidential information to any other Member.

(iii) Notwithstanding Section I.D.3(ii), above, should the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit or an Affected Member object to an Information Request or any portion thereof, any of them may, within four (4) business days following the Market Monitoring Unit's receipt of the Information Request, request, in writing, a conference with the Authorized Commission to resolve differences concerning the scope or timing of the Information Request; provided, however, nothing herein shall require the Authorized Commission to participate in any conference. Any party to the conference may seek assistance from FERC staff in resolution of the dispute or terminate the conference process at any time. Should such conference be refused or terminated by any participant or should such conference not resolve the dispute, then the Office of the Interconnection, Market Monitoring Unit, or the Affected Member may file a complaint with the FERC pursuant to Rule 206 objecting to the Information Request within ten (10) business days following receipt of written notice from any conference participant terminating such conference. Any complaints filed at the FERC objecting to a particular Information Request shall be designated by the party as a "fast track" complaint and each party shall bear its own costs in connection with such FERC proceeding. The grounds for such a complaint shall be limited to the following: (a) the Authorized Commission is no longer able to preserve the confidentiality of the requested information due to changed circumstances relating to the Authorized Commission's ability to protect confidential information arising since the filing of or rejection of a protest directed to the Authorized Commission's Certification; (b) complying with the Information Request would be unduly burdensome to the complainant, and the complainant has made a good faith effort to negotiate limitations in the scope of the requested information; or (c) other exceptional circumstances exist such that complying with the Information Request would result in harm to the complainant. There shall be a presumption that "exceptional circumstances," as used in the prior sentence, does not include circumstances in which an Authorized Commission has requested wholesale market data (or Market Monitoring Unit workpapers that support or explain conclusions or analyses) generated in the ordinary course and scope of the operations of the Market Monitoring Unit. There shall be a presumption that circumstances in which an Authorized Commission has requested personnel files, internal emails and internal company memos, analyses and related work product constitute "exceptional circumstances" as used in the prior sentence. If no complaint challenging the Information Request is filed within the ten (10) day period defined above, the Office of the Interconnection and/or Market Monitoring Unit shall utilize its best efforts to respond to the Information Request promptly. If a complaint is filed, and the Commission does not act on that complaint within ninety (90) days, the complaint shall be deemed denied and the Market Monitoring Unit shall use its best efforts to respond to the Information Request promptly.

(iv) Any Authorized Commission may initiate appropriate legal action at the FERC within ten (10) business days following receipt of information designated as "Confidential," challenging such designation. Any complaints filed at FERC objecting to the designation of information as "Confidential" shall be designated by the party as a "fast track" complaint and each party shall bear its own costs in connection with such FERC proceeding. The party filing such a complaint shall be required to prove that the material disclosed does not merit "Confidential" status because it is publicly available from other sources or contains no trade secret or other sensitive commercial information (with "publicly available" not being deemed to include unauthorized disclosures of otherwise confidential data).

4. In the event of any breach of confidentiality of information disclosed pursuant to an Information Request by an Authorized Commission or Authorized Person:

(i) The Authorized Commission or Authorized Person shall promptly notify the Market Monitoring Unit, who shall, in turn, promptly notify any Affected Member of any inadvertent or intentional release, or possible release, of confidential information provided pursuant to this Section I.

(ii) The Office Market Monitoring Unit shall terminate the right of such Authorized Commission to receive confidential information under this Section I upon written notice to such Authorized Commission unless: (i) there was no harm or damage suffered by the Affected Member; or (ii) similar good cause is shown. Any appeal of the Market Monitoring Unit's actions under this Section I shall be to Commission. An Authorized Commission shall be entitled to reestablish its certification as set forth in Section I.D.1 by submitting a filing with the Commission showing that it has taken appropriate corrective action. If the Commission does not act upon an Authorized Commission's recertification filing with sixty (60) days of the date of the filing, the recertification shall be deemed approved and the Authorized Commission shall be permitted to receive confidential information pursuant to this section.

(iii) The Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit, and/or the Affected Member shall have the right to seek and obtain at least the following types of relief: (a) an order from the FERC requiring any breach to cease and preventing any future breaches; (b) temporary, preliminary, and/or permanent injunctive relief with respect to any breach; and (c) the immediate return of all confidential information to the Market Monitoring Unit.

(iv) No Authorized Person or Authorized Commission shall have responsibility or liability whatsoever under this section for any and all liabilities, losses, damages, demands, fines, monetary judgments, penalties, costs and expenses caused by, resulting from, or arising out of or in connection with the release of confidential information to persons not authorized to receive it, provided that such Authorized Person is an agent, servant, employee or member of an Authorized Commission at the time of such unauthorized release. Nothing in this Section I.D.4(iv) is intended to limit the liability of any person who is not an agent, servant, employee or member of an Authorized Commission at the time of such unauthorized release for any and all economic losses, damages, demands, fines, monetary judgments, penalties, costs and expenses caused by, resulting from, or arising out of or in connection with such unauthorized release.

(v) Any dispute or conflict requesting the relief in Section I.D.4(ii) or I.D.4(iii)(a) above, shall be submitted to the FERC for hearing and resolution. Any dispute or conflict requesting the relief in Section I.D.4(iii)(c) above may be submitted to FERC or any court of competent jurisdiction for hearing and resolution.

E. <u>Market Monitoring</u>:

1. Subject to the requirements of Section E.2, the Market Monitoring Unit may release confidential information of Public Service Electric & Gas Company ("PSE&G"), Consolidated Edison Company of New York ("ConEd"), and their affiliates, and the confidential information of any Member regarding generation and/or transmission facilities located within the PSE&G Zone to the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. ("New York ISO"), the market monitoring unit of New York ISO and the New York ISO Market Advisor to the limited extent that the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit determines necessary to carry out the responsibilities of PJM, New York ISO or the market monitoring units of the Office of the Interconnection and the New York ISO under FERC Opinion No. 476 (see Consolidated Edison Company v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, et al., 108 FERC ¶ 61,120, at P 215 (2004)) to conduct joint investigations to ensure that gaming, abuse of market power, or

similar activities do not take place with regard to power transfers under the contracts that are the subject of FERC Opinion No. 476.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit may release a Member's confidential information pursuant to Section I.E.1 to the New York ISO, the market monitoring unit of the New York ISO and the New York ISO Market Advisor only if the New York ISO, the market monitoring unit of the New York ISO and the New York ISO Market Advisor are subject to obligations limiting the disclosure of such information that are equivalent to or greater than the limitations on disclosure specified in this Section I.E. Information received from the New York ISO, the market monitoring unit of the New York ISO, or the New York ISO Market Advisor under Section I.E.1 that is designated as confidential shall be protected from disclosure in accordance with this Section I.E.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF INPUTS FOR PROSPECTIVE MITIGATION

A. Offer Price Caps:

1. The Market Monitor or his designee shall advise the Office of the Interconnection whether it believes that the cost references, methods and rules included in the Cost Development Guidelines are accurate and appropriate, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall review upon request of a Market Seller, and may review upon its own initiative at any time, the incremental costs (defined in Section 6.4.2 of Schedule 1of the Operating Agreement) included in the Offer Price Cap of a generating unit in order to ensure that the Market Seller has correctly applied the Cost Development Guidelines and that the level of the Offer Price Cap is otherwise acceptable.

3. On or before the 21st day of each month, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate in accordance with the applicable criteria whether each generating unit with an offer cap calculated under Section 6.4.2 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement is eligible to include an adder based on Frequently Mitigated Unit or Associated Unit status, and shall issue a written notice of the applicable adder, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, to the Market Seller for each unit that meets the criteria for Frequently Mitigated Unit or Associated Unit status.

4. Notwithstanding the number of jointly pivotal suppliers in any hour, if the Market Monitoring Unit determines that a reasonable level of competition will not exist based on an evaluation of all facts and circumstances, it may propose to the Commission the removal of offer-capping suspensions otherwise authorized by Section 6.4 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement. Such proposals shall take effect upon Commission acceptance of the Market Monitoring Unit's filing.

B. Minimum Generator Operating Parameters:

1. For the 2014/2015 through 2017/208 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he Market Monitoring Unit shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection a table of default unit class specific parameter limits to be known as the "Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix" to be included in Section 6.6(c) of

Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement. The Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall include default values on a unit-type basis as specified in Section 6.6(c). The Market Monitoring Unit shall review the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix annually, and, in the event it determines that revision is appropriate, shall provide a revised matrix to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than December 31 prior to the annual enrollment period.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify Market Sellers of generation resources and the Office of the Interconnection no later than April 1 of its determination of market power concerns raised regarding each request for a period exception or persistent exception to a value specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix or the parameters defined in Section 6.6 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, provided that the Market Monitoring Unit receives such request by no later than February 28.

If, prior to the scheduled termination date, a Market Seller submits a request to modify a temporary exception, the Market Monitoring Unit shall review such request using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests, and shall provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 days from the date of the modification request.

3. When a Market Seller notifies the Market Monitoring Unit of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection to support a parameter limited schedule period or persistent exception, the Market Monitoring Unit shall make a determination, and provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller, of any change to its determination regarding the exemption request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 days after receipt of such notice.

4. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any risk premium to which it and a Market Seller owning or operating nuclear generation resource agree or its determination if agreement is not obtained. If a Market Seller submits a risk premium for its nuclear generation resource that is inconsistent with its agreement or inconsistent with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding such risk premium, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns pursuant to Attachment M.

C. <u>RPM Must-Offer Obligation</u>:

1. The Market Monitoring Unit shall maintain, post on its website and provide to the Office of the Interconnection prior to each RPM Auction (updated, as necessary, on at least a quarterly basis), a list of Existing Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region that are subject to the "must-offer" obligation set forth in Section 6.6 of Attachment DD.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate requests submitted by Capacity Market Sellers for a determination that a Generation Capacity Resource, or any portion thereof, be removed from Capacity Resource status or exempted from status as a Generation Capacity Resource subject to Section II.C.1 above and inform both the Capacity Market Seller and the

Office of the Interconnection of such determination in writing by no later ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. A Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region shall not be removed from Capacity Resource status to the extent the resource is committed to service of PJM loads as a result of an RPM Auction, FRR Capacity Plan, Locational UCAP transaction and/or by designation as a replacement resource under this Attachment DD.

3. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the data and documentation provided to it by a potential Capacity Market Seller to establish the EFORd to be included in a Sell Offer applicable to each resource pursuant to Section 6.6(b) of Attachment DD. If a Capacity Market Seller timely submits a request for an alternative maximum level of EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for RPM Auctions held prior to the date on which the final EFORds used for a Delivery Year are posted, the Market Monitoring Unit shall attempt to reach agreement with the Capacity Market Seller on the alternate maximum level of the EFORd by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. By no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing, notifying the Capacity Market Seller by copy of the same, of any alternative maximum EFORd to which it and the Capacity Market Seller agree or its determination of the alternative maximum EFORd if agreement is not obtained.

4. The Market Monitoring Unit shall consider the documentation provided to it by a potential Capacity Market Seller pursuant to Section 6.6 of Attachment DD, and determine whether a resource owned or controlled by such Capacity Market Seller meets the criteria to qualify for an exception to the must-offer requirement because the resource (i) is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant auction; (ii) has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity; or (iii) was interconnected to the Transmission System as an Energy Resource and not subsequently converted to a Capacity Resource. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

In order to establish that a resource is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant auction as set forth in (i) above, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that:

A. It has a documented plan in place to retire the resource prior to or during the Delivery Year, and has submitted a notice of Deactivation to the Office of the Interconnection consistent with Section 113.1 of the PJM Tariff, without regard to whether the Office of the Interconnection has requested the Capacity Market Seller to continue to operate the resource beyond its desired deactivation date in accordance with Section 113.2 of the PJM Tariff for the purpose of maintaining the reliability of the PJM Transmission System and the Capacity Market Seller has agreed to do so;

B. Significant physical operational restrictions cause long term or permanent changes to the installed capacity value of the resource, or the resource is under major repair that will extend into the applicable Delivery Year, that will result in the imposition of RPM performance penalties pursuant to Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff;

C. The Capacity Market Seller is involved in an ongoing regulatory proceeding (e.g. – regarding potential environmental restrictions) specific to the resource and has received an order, decision, final rule, opinion or other final directive from the regulatory authority that will result in the retirement of the resource; or,

D. A resource considered an Existing Generating Capacity Resource because it cleared an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction, but which is not yet in service, is unable to achieve full commercial operation prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction. The Capacity Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written sworn, notarized statement of a corporate officer certifying that the resource will not be in full commercial operation prior to the referenced Delivery Year.

5. If a Capacity Market Seller submits for the portion of a Generation Capacity Resource that it owns or controls, and the Office of Interconnection accepts, a Sell Offer (i) at a level of installed capacity that the Market Monitoring Unit believes is inconsistent with the level established under Section 5.6.6 of Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, (ii) at a level of installed capacity inconsistent with its determination of eligibility for an exception listed in Section II.C.4 above, or (iii) a maximum EFORd that the Market Monitoring Unit believes is inconsistent with the maximum level determined under Section II.C.3 of this Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and/or request a determination from the Commission that would require the Generation Capacity Resource to submit a new or revised Sell Offer, notwithstanding any determination to the contrary made under Section 6.6 of Attachment DD.

The Market Monitoring Unit shall also consider the documentation provided by the Capacity Market Seller pursuant to Section 6.6 of Attachment DD, for generation resources for which the Office of the Interconnection has not approved an exception to the must-offer requirement as set forth in Section 6.6(g) of Attachment DD, to determine whether the Capacity Market Seller's failure to offer part or all of one or more generation resources into an RPM Auction would result in an increase of greater than five percent in any Zonal Capacity Price determined through such auction as required by Section 6.6(i) of Attachment DD, and shall inform both the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination by no later than two (2) business days after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

D. <u>Unit Specific Minimum Sell Offers:</u>

1. If a Capacity Market Seller timely submits an exemption *or exception* request , with all of the required supporting documentation as specified in section 5.14(h) of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall review the request and documentation and shall provide in writing

to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than forty five (45) days after receipt of the exemption *or exception* request its determination whether it believes the requested exemption *or exception* should be granted in accordance with the standards and criteria set forth in section 5.14(h). *If the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the Sell Offer proposed in a Unit-Specific Exception request raises market power concerns, it shall advise the Capacity Market Seller of the minimum Sell Offer in the relevant auction that would not raise market power concerns, with such calculation based on the data and documentation received, by no later than forty five (45) days after receipt of the request.*

2. All information submitted to the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit by a Market Participant is subject to verification by the Market Monitoring Unit.

3. In the event that the Market Monitoring Unit reasonably believes that a request for a Competitive Entry Exemption or a Self-Supply Exemption that has been granted contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations or omissions such that the Capacity Market Seller would not have been eligible for the exemption for that MOPR Screened Generation Resource had the request not contained such misrepresentations or omissions, then it shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and Capacity Market Seller of its findings and provide the Office of the Interconnection with all of the data and documentation supporting its findings, and may take any other action required or permitted under Attachment M.

E. Market Seller Offer Caps:

1. Based on the data and calculations submitted by the Capacity Market Sellers for each Existing Generation Capacity Resource and the formulas specified in Section 6.7(d) of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Market Seller Offer Cap for each such resource and provide it to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days before the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit must attempt to reach agreement with the Capacity Market Seller on the appropriate level of the Market Seller Offer Cap by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If such agreement cannot be reached, then the Market Monitoring Unit shall inform the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination of the appropriate level of the Market Seller Offer Cap by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, and the Market Monitoring Unit may pursue any action available to it under Attachment M.

3. Nothing herein shall preclude any Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit from agreeing to, nor require either such entity to agree to, an alternative market seller offer cap determined on a mutually agreeable basis. Any such alternative offer cap shall be filed with the Commission for its approval. This provision is duplicated in Section 6.4(a) of Attachment DD.

F. Mitigation of Offers from Planned Generation Capacity Resources:

Pursuant to Section 6.5 of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources to determine whether market power mitigation should be applied and notify in writing each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer has been determined to be non-competitive and subject to mitigation, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, by no later than one (1) business day after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

G. Data Submission:

Pursuant to Section 6.7 of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit may request additional information from any potential auction participant as deemed necessary by the Market Monitoring Unit, including, without limitation, additional cost data on resources in a class that is not otherwise expected to include the marginal price setting resource. All data submitted to the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit by a Market Participant is subject to verification by the Market Monitoring Unit.

H. Determination of Default Avoidable Cost Rates:

1. The Market Monitoring Unit shall conduct an annual review of the table of default Avoidable Cost Rates included in Section 6.7(c) of Attachment DD and calculated on the bases set forth therein, and determine whether the values included therein need to be updated. If the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the Avoidable Cost Rates need to be updated, it shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection updated values or notice of its determination that updated values are not needed by no later than September 30th of each year.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall indicate in its posted reports on RPM performance the number of Generation Capacity Resources and megawatts per LDA that use the retirement default Avoidable Cost Rates.

3. If a Capacity Market Seller does not elect to use a default Avoidable Cost Rate and has timely provided to the Market Monitoring Unit its request to apply a unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate, along with the data described in Section 6.7 of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Avoidable Cost Rate and provide a unit-specific value to the Capacity Market Seller for each such resource, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction whether it agrees that the unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is acceptable. The Capacity Market Seller and Office of the Interconnection's deadlines relating to the submittal and acceptance of a request for a unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate are delineated in section 6.7(d) of Attachment DD.

I. Determination of PJM Market Revenues:

The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Projected PJM Market Revenues for any Generation Capacity Resource to which the Avoidable Cost Rate is applied pursuant to Section 6.8(d) of Attachment DD, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the

Interconnection of its determination in writing by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

J. <u>Determination of Opportunity Costs</u>:

The Market Monitoring Unit shall review and verify the documentation of prices available to Existing Generation Capacity Resources in markets external to PJM and proposed for inclusion in Opportunity Costs pursuant to Section 6.7(d)(ii) of Attachment DD. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify, in writing, such Generation Capacity Resource and the Office of the Interconnection if it is dissatisfied with the documentation provided and whether it objects to the inclusion of such Opportunity Costs in a Market Seller Offer by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If such Generation Capacity Resource submits a Market Seller Offer that includes Opportunity Costs that have not been documented and verified to the Market Monitoring Unit's satisfaction, then the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request a determination that would require the Generation Capacity Resource to remove them.

III. <u>BLACKSTART SERVICE</u>

A. Upon the submission by a Black Start Unit owner of a request for Black Start Service revenue requirements and changes to the Black Start Service revenue requirements for the Black Start Unit, the Black Start Unit owner and the Market Monitoring Unit shall attempt to agree to values on the level of each component included in the Black Start Service revenue requirements by no later than May 14 of each year. The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the revenue requirement for each Black Start Unit and provide its calculation to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than May 14 of each year.

B. Pursuant to the terms of Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff and the PJM Manuals, the Market Monitoring Unit will analyze any requested generator black start cost changes on an annual basis and shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any costs to which it and the Black Start Unit owner have agreed or the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding any cost components to which agreement has not been obtained. If a Black Start Unit owner includes a cost component inconsistent with its agreement or inconsistent with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding such cost component, and the Office of the Interconnection accepts the Black Start Service revenue requirements submitted by the Black Start Unit owner, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request a determination that would require the Black Start Service generator to utilize the values determined by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection or such other values as determined by the Commission.

IV. <u>DEACTIVATION RATES</u>

1. Upon receipt of a notice to deactivate a generating unit under Part V of the PJM Tariff from the Office of the Interconnection forwarded pursuant to Section 113.1 of the PJM Tariff, the Market Monitoring Unit shall analyze the effects of the proposed deactivation with regard to

potential market power issues and shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the generator owner (of, if applicable, its designated agent) within 30 days of the deactivation request if a market power issue has been identified. Such notice shall include the specific market power impact resulting from the proposed deactivation of the generating unit, as well as an initial assessment of any steps that could be taken to mitigate the market power impact.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit and the generating unit owner shall attempt to come to agreement on the level of each component included in the Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit. In the case of cost of service filing submitted to the Commission in alternative to the Deactivation Cost Credit, the Market Monitoring Unit shall indicate to the generating unit owner in advance of filing its views regarding the proposed method or cost components of recovery. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any costs to which it and the generating unit owner have agreed or the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding any cost components to which agreement has not been obtained. If a generating unit owner includes a cost component inconsistent with its agreement or inconsistent with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding such cost components, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and seek a determination that would require the Generating unit to include an appropriate cost component. This provision is duplicated in Sections 114 and 119 of Part V of the PJM Tariff.

V. <u>OPPORTUNITY COST CALCULATION</u>

The Market Monitoring Unit shall review requests for opportunity cost compensation under Sections 3.2.3(f-3) and 3.2.3B(h) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, discuss with the Office of the Interconnection and individual Market Sellers the amount of compensation, and file exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request a determination of compensation as provided by such sections. These requirements are duplicated in Sections 3.2.3(f-3) and 3.2.3B(h) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

VI. <u>FTR FORFEITURE RULE</u>

The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits as required under Section 5.2.1(b) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, including the determination of the identity of the holder of FTRs and an evaluation of the overall benefits accrued by an entity or affiliated entities trading in FTRs and Virtual Transactions in the Day-ahead Energy Market, and provide such calculations to the Office of the Interconnection. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the FTR holder. If the Office of the Interconnection imposes a forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit in an amount that the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with, then it may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request an adjustment.

VII. <u>FORCED OUTAGE RULE</u>

1. The Market Monitoring Unit shall observe offers submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market to determine whether all or part of a generating unit's capacity (MW) is designated as

Maximum Emergency and (i) such offer in the Real-time Energy Market designates a smaller amount of capacity from that unit as Maximum Emergency for the same time period, and (ii) there is no physical reason to designate a larger amount of capacity as Maximum Emergency in the offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market than in the Real-time Energy Market, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of Interconnection.

2. If the Market Monitoring Unit observes that (i) an offer submitted in the Day-ahead Energy market designates all or part of capacity (MW) of a Generating unit as economic maximum that is less than the economic maximum designated in the offer in the Real-time Energy Market, and (ii) there is no physical reason to designate a lower economic maximum in the offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market than in the offer in the Real-time Energy Market, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of Interconnection.

VIII. DATA COLLECTION AND VERIFICATION

The Market Monitoring Unit shall gather and keep confidential detailed data on the procurement and usage of fuel to produce electric power transmitted in the PJM Region in order to assist the performance of its duties under Attachment M. To achieve this objective, the Market Monitoring Unit shall maintain on its website a mechanism that allows Members to conveniently and confidentially submit such data and develop a manual in consultation with stakeholders that describes the nature of and procedure for collecting data. Members of PJM owning a Generating unit that is located in the PJM Region (including dynamically scheduled units), or is included in a PJM Black Start Service plan, committed as a Generation Capacity Resource for the current or future Delivery Year, or otherwise subject to a commitment to provide service to PJM, shall provide data to the Market Monitoring Unit.

9.4 Definition of Force Majeure:

For the purposes of this section, an event of force majeure shall mean any cause beyond the control of the affected Interconnection Party or Construction Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which, in any of the foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence such party could not reasonably have been expected to avoid, and which, by the exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. Force majeure does not include (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remediable causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected party.

19.2 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events:

Each Interconnection Party shall notify the other Interconnection Parties when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Appendix 2 for a reason other than an event of f~~F~~orce m~~M~~ajeure as defined in Section 9.4 of this Appendix 2. The parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section shall not entitle the receiving Interconnection Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory breach of the Interconnection Service Agreement.

15.4 Definition of Force Majeure:

For the purposes of this section, an event of force majeure shall mean any cause beyond the control of the affected Interconnection Party or Construction Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which, in any of the foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence such party could not reasonably have been expected to avoid, and which, by the exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. Force majeure does not include (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remediable causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected party.

18.2 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events:

Each Construction Party shall notify each other Construction Party when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Appendix 2 for a reason other than an event of f~~F~~orce m~~M~~ajeure as defined in Section 15.4 of this Appendix 2. The Construction Parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section shall not entitle the receiving Construction Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory breach of this Appendix 2.

17.0 Information Access And Audit Rights

17.1 Information Access.

Subject to Applicable Laws and Regulations, each Party shall make available to the other Parties information necessary: (i) to verify the Costs incurred by the other Party for which the requesting Party is responsible under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff; and (ii) to carry out obligations and responsibilities under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff. The Parties shall not use such information for purposes other than those set forth in this Section 17 and to enforce their rights under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff.

17.2 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events.

Each Party shall notify the other Parties when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Upgrade CSA for a reason other than an event of f~~F~~orce m~~M~~ajeure as defined in Section 1.21 of Appendix 2 of this Attachment GG. The Parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section 17 shall not entitle the receiving Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory breach of this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff.

17.3 Audit Rights.

Subject to the requirements of confidentiality of this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff, each Party shall have the right, during normal business hours, and upon prior reasonable notice to the pertinent Party, to audit at its own expense the other Party's accounts and records pertaining to such Party's performance and/or satisfaction of obligations arising under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff. Any audit authorized by this Section 17 shall be performed at the offices where such accounts and records are maintained and shall be limited to those portions of such accounts and records that relate to obligations under this Upgrade CSA. Any request for audit shall be presented to the other Party not later than twenty-four months after the event as to which the audit is sought. Each Party shall preserve all records held by it for the duration of the audit period.

17.4 Waiver.

Any waiver at any time by any Party of its rights with respect to a Breach or Default under this Upgrade CSA, or with respect to any other matters arising in connection with this Upgrade CSA, shall not be deemed a waiver or continuing waiver with respect to any other Breach or Default or other matter.

17.5 Amendments and Rights under the Federal Power Act.

Except as set forth in this Section 17, this Upgrade CSA may be amended, modified, or supplemented only by written agreement of the Parties. Such amendment shall become effective and a part of this Upgrade CSA upon satisfaction of all Applicable Laws and Regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained in this Upgrade CSA shall be construed as affecting in any way any of the rights of any Party with respect to changes in applicable rates or charges under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act and/or FERC's rules and regulations thereunder, or any of the rights of any Party under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act and/or FERC's rules and regulations thereunder. The terms and conditions of this Upgrade CSA shall be amended, as mutually agreed by the Parties, to comply with changes or alterations made necessary by a valid applicable order of any Governmental Authority having jurisdiction hereof.

17.6 Regulatory Requirements.

Each Party's performance of any obligation under this Upgrade CSA for which such Party requires approval or authorization of any Governmental Authority shall be subject to its receipt of such required approval or authorization in the form and substance satisfactory to the receiving Party, or the Party making any required filings with, or providing notice to, such Governmental Authorities, and the expiration of any time period associated therewith. Each Party shall in good faith seek, and shall use Reasonable Efforts to obtain, such required authorizations or approvals as soon as reasonably practicable.

DESIGNATED ENTITY AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

And

____

DESIGNATED ENTITY AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

And

____

This Designated Entity Agreement, including the Schedules attached hereto and incorporated herein (collectively, "Agreement") is made and entered into as of the Effective Date between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Transmission Provider" or "PJM"), and ___________________ ("Designated Entity" [OPTIONAL: or "[short name]"), referred to herein individually as "Party" and collectively as "the Parties."

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, in accordance with FERC Order No. 1000 and Schedule 6 of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement"), Transmission Provider is required to designate among candidates, pursuant to a FERC-approved process, an entity to develop and construct a specified project to expand, replace and/or reinforce the Transmission System operated by Transmission Provider;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(i) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, the Transmission Provider notified Designated Entity that it was designated as the Designated Entity for the Project (described in Schedule A to this Agreement) to be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Designated Entity accepted the designation as the Designated Entity for the Project and therefore has the obligation to construct the Project; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, together with other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency is hereby mutually acknowledged by each Party, the Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:

Article 1 – Definitions

1.0 Defined Terms.

All capitalized terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Part I of the Tariff or in definitions either in the body of this Agreement or its attached Schedules. In the event of any conflict between defined terms set forth in the Tariff or defined terms in this Agreement, including the Schedules, such conflict will be resolved in favor of the terms as defined in this Agreement.

1.1 Confidential Information.

Any confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information of a plan, specification, pattern, procedure, design, device, list, concept, policy, or compilation relating to the Project or Transmission Owner facilities to which the Project will interconnect, which is designated as confidential by the party supplying the information, whether conveyed verbally, electronically, in writing, through inspection, or otherwise, and shall include, but may not be limited to, information relating to the producing party's technology, research and development, business affairs and pricing, land acquisition and vendor contracts relating to the Project.

1.2 Designated Entity Letter of Credit.

Designated Entity Letter of Credit shall mean the letter of credit provided by the Designated Entity pursuant to Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement and Section 3.0 of this Agreement as security associated with the Project.

1.3 Development Schedule.

Development Schedule shall mean the schedule of milestones set forth in Schedule C of this Agreement.

1.4 Effective Date.

Effective Date shall mean the date this Agreement becomes effective pursuant to Section 2.0 of this Agreement.

1.5 Initial Operation.

Initial Operation shall mean the date the Project is (i) energized and (ii) under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.

1.6 Project.

Project shall mean the enhancement or expansion included in the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan described in Schedule A of this Agreement.

1.7 Project Finance Entity.

Project Finance Entity shall mean holder, trustee or agent for holders, of any component of Project Financing.

1.8 Project Financing.

Project Financing shall mean: (a) one or more loans, leases, equity and/or debt financings, together with all modifications, renewals, supplements, substitutions and replacements thereof, the proceeds of which are used to finance or refinance the costs of the Project, any alteration, expansion or improvement to the Project, or the operation of the Project; or (b) loans and/or debt issues secured by the Project.

1.9 Reasonable Efforts.

Reasonable Efforts shall mean such efforts as are consistent with ensuring the timely and effective design and construction of the Project in a manner, which ensures that the Project, once placed in service, meets the requirements of the Project as described in Schedule B and are consistent with Good Utility Practice.

1.10 Required Project In-Service Date.

Required Project In-Service Date shall mean the date the Project is required to: (i) be completed in accordance with the Scope of Work in Schedules B this Agreement, (ii) meet the criteria outlined in Schedule D of this Agreement and (iii) be under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.

Article 2 – Effective Date and Term

2.0 Effective Date.

Subject to regulatory acceptance, this Agreement shall become effective on the date the Agreement has been executed by all Parties, or if this Agreement is filed with FERC for acceptance, rather than reported only in PJM's Electric Quarterly Report, upon the date specified by FERC.

2.1 Term.

This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect from the Effective Date until: (i) the Designated Entity executes the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement; and (ii) the Project (a) has been completed in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, (b) meets all relevant required planning criteria, and (c) is under Transmission Provider's operational dispatch; or (iii) the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Article 8 of this Agreement.

Article 3 – Security

3.0 Obligation to Provide Security.

In accordance with Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Designated Entity shall provide Transmission Provider a letter of credit as acceptable to Transmission Provider (Designated Entity Letter of Credit) or cash security in the amount of $_____, which is three percent of the estimated cost of the Project. Designated Entity is required provide and maintain the Designated Entity Letter of Credit, as required by Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement and Section 3.0 of this Agreement. The Designated Entity Letter of Credit shall remain in full force and effect for the term of this Agreement and for the duration of the obligations arising therefrom in accordance with Article 17.0.

3.1 Distribution of Designated Entity Letter of Credit or Cash Security.

In the event that Transmission Provider draws upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or retains the cash security in accordance with Sections 7.5, 8.0, or 8.1, Transmission Provider shall distribute such funds as determined by FERC.

Article 4 – Project Construction

4.0 Construction of Project by Designated Entity.

Designated Entity shall design, engineer, procure, install and construct the Project, including any modifications thereto, in accordance with: (i) the terms of this Agreement, including but not limited to the Scope of Work in Schedule B and the Development Schedule in Schedule C; (ii) applicable reliability principles, guidelines, and standards of the Applicable Regional Reliability Council and NERC; (iii) the Operating Agreement; (iv) the PJM Manuals; and (v) Good Utility Practice.

4.1 Milestones.

4.1.0 Milestone Dates.

Designated Entity shall meet the milestone dates set forth in the Development Schedule in Schedule C of this Agreement. Milestone dates set forth in Schedule C only may be extended by Transmission Provider in writing. Failure to meet any of the milestone dates specified in Schedule C, or as extended as described in this Section 4.1.0 or Section 4.3.0 of this Agreement, shall constitute a Breach of this Agreement. Transmission Provider reasonably may extend any such milestone date, in the event of delays not caused by the Designated Entity that could not be remedied by the Designated Entity through the exercise of due diligence, or if an extension will not delay the Required Project In-Service Date specified in Schedule C of this Agreement; provided that a corporate officer of the Designated Entity submits a revised Development Schedule containing revised milestones and showing the Project in full operation no later than the Required Project In-Service Date specified in Schedule C of this Agreement.

4.1.1 Right to Inspect.

Upon reasonable notice, Transmission Provider shall have the right to inspect the Project for the purposes of assessing the progress of the Project and satisfaction of milestones. Such inspection shall not be deemed as review or approval by Transmission Provider of any design or construction practices or standards used by the Designated Entity.

4.2 Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards.

For the purposes of this Agreement, applicable technical requirements and standards of the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect shall apply to the design, engineering, procurement, construction and installation of the Project to the extent that the provisions thereof relate to the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner(s) facilities.

4.3 Project Modification.

4.3.0 Project Modification Process.

The Scope of Work and Development Schedule, including the milestones therein, may be revised, as required, in accordance with Transmission Provider's project modification process set forth in the PJM Manuals, or otherwise by Transmission Provider in writing. Such modifications may include alterations as necessary and directed by Transmission Provider to meet the system condition for which the Project was included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

4.3.1 Consent of Transmission Provider to Project Modifications.

Designated Entity may not modify the Project without prior written consent of Transmission Provider, including but not limited to, modifications necessary to obtain siting approval or necessary permits, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed.

4.3.2 Customer Facility Interconnections And Transmission Service Requests.

Designated Entity shall perform or permit the engineering and construction necessary to accommodate the interconnection of Customer Facilities to the Project and transmission service requests that are determined necessary for such interconnections and transmission service requests in accordance with Parts IV and VI, and Parts II and III, respectively, of the Tariff.

4.4 Project Tracking.

The Designated Entity shall provide regular, quarterly construction status reports in writing to Transmission Provider. The reports shall contain, but not be limited to, updates and information specified in the PJM Manuals regarding: (i) current engineering and construction status of the Project; (ii) Project completion percentage, including milestone completion; (iii) current target Project or phase completion date(s); (iv) applicable outage information; and (v) cost expenditures to date and revised projected cost estimates for completion of the Project. Transmission Provider shall use such status reports to post updates regarding the progress of the Project.

4.5 Exclusive Responsibility of Designated Entity.

Designated Entity shall be solely responsible for all planning, design, engineering, procurement, construction, installation, management, operations, safety, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations associated with the Project, including but not limited to obtaining all necessary permits, siting, and other regulatory approvals. Transmission Provider shall have no responsibility to manage, supervise, or ensure compliance or adequacy of same.

Article 5 – Coordination with Third-Parties

5.0 Interconnection Coordination Agreement with Transmission Owner(s).

By the dates specified in the Development Schedule in Schedule C of this Agreement, Designated Entity shall execute or request to file unexecuted with the Commission: (a) an Interconnection Coordination Agreement; and (b) an interconnection agreement among and between Designated Entity, Transmission Provider, and the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect.

5.1 Connection with Entities Not a Party to the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement.

Designated Entity shall not permit any part of the Project facilities to be connected with the facilities of any entity which is not: (i) a party to Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement without an interconnection agreement that contains provisions for the safe and reliable interconnection and operation of such interconnection in accordance with Good Utility Practice, and principles, guidelines and standards of the Applicable Regional Reliability Council and NERC or comparable requirements of an applicable retail tariff or agreement approved by appropriate regulatory authority; or (ii) a party to a separate Designated Entity Agreement.

Article 6 – Insurance

6.0 Designated Entity Insurance Requirements.

Designated Entity shall obtain and maintain in full force and effect such insurance as is consistent with Good Utility Practice. The Transmission Provider shall be included as an Additional Insured in the Designated Entity’s applicable liability insurance policies. The Designated Entity shall provide evidence of compliance with this requirement upon request by the Transmission Provider.

6.1 Subcontractor Insurance.

In accord with Good Utility Practice, Designated Entity shall require each of its subcontractors to maintain and, upon request, provide Designated Entity evidence of insurance coverage of types, and in amounts, commensurate with the risks associated with the services provided by the subcontractor. Bonding and hiring of contractors or subcontractors shall be the Designated Entity’s discretion, but regardless of bonding or the existence or non-existence of insurance, the Designated Entity shall be responsible for the performance or non-performance of any contractor or subcontractor it hires.

Article 7 – Breach and Default

7.0 Breach.

Except as otherwise provided in Article 10, a Breach of this Agreement shall include:

(a) The failure to comply with any term or condition of this Agreement, including but not limited to, any Breach of a representation, warranty, or covenant made in this Agreement, and failure to provide and maintain security in accordance with Section 3.0 of this Agreement;

(b) The failure to meet a milestone or milestone date set forth in the Development Schedule in Schedule C of this Agreement, or as extended in writing as described in Sections 4.1.0 and 4.3.0 of this Agreement;

(c) Assignment of this Agreement in a manner inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement; or

(d) Failure of any Party to provide information or data required to be provided to another Party under this Agreement for such other Party to satisfy its obligations under this Agreement.

7.1 Notice of Breach.

In the event of a Breach, a Party not in Breach of this Agreement shall give written notice of such Breach to the breaching Party, and to any other persons, including a Project Finance Entity, if applicable, that the breaching Party identifies in writing prior to the Breach. Such notice shall set forth, in reasonable detail, the nature of the Breach, and where known and applicable, the steps necessary to cure such Breach.

7.2 Cure and Default.

A Party that commits a Breach and does not take steps to cure the Breach pursuant to Section 7.3 shall be in Default of this Agreement.

7.3 Cure of Breach.

The breaching Party may: (i) cure the Breach within thirty days from the receipt of the notice of Breach or other such date as determined by Transmission Provider to ensure that the Project meets its Required Project In-Service Date set forth in Schedule C; or, (ii) if the Breach cannot be cured within thirty days but may be cured in a manner that ensures that the Project meets the Required Project In-Service Date for the Project, within such thirty day time period, commences in good faith steps that are reasonable and appropriate to cure the Breach and thereafter diligently pursue such action to completion.

7.4 Re-evaluation if Breach Not Cured.

In the event that a breaching Party does not cure a Breach in accordance with Section 7.3 of this Agreement, Transmission Provider shall conduct a re-evaluation pursuant to Section 1.5.8(k) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement. If based on such re-evaluation, the Project is retained in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and the Designated Entity's designation for the Project also is retained, the Parties shall modify this Agreement, including Schedules, as necessary. In all other events, Designated Entity shall be considered in Default of this Agreement, and this Agreement shall terminate in accordance with Section 8.1 of this Agreement.

7.5 Remedies.

Upon the occurrence of an event of Default, the non-Defaulting Party shall be entitled to: (i) commence an action to require the Defaulting Party to remedy such Default and specifically perform its duties and obligations hereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof; (ii) suspend performance hereunder; and (iii) exercise such other rights and remedies as it may have in equity or at law. Upon Default by Designated Entity, Transmission Provider may draw upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit. Nothing in this Section 7.5 is intended in any way to affect the rights of a third-party to seek any remedy it may have in equity or at law from the Designated Entity resulting from Designated Entity's Default of this Agreement.

7.6 Remedies Cumulative.

No remedy conferred by any provision of this Agreement is intended to be exclusive of any other remedy and each and every remedy shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to every other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by statute or otherwise. The election of any one or more remedies shall not constitute a waiver of the right to pursue other available remedies.

7.7 Waiver.

Any waiver at any time by any Party of its rights with respect to a Breach or Default under this Agreement, or with respect to any other matters arising in connection with this Agreement, shall not be deemed a waiver or continuing waiver with respect to any other Breach or Default or other matter.

Article 8 – Early Termination

8.0 Termination by Transmission Provider.

In the event that: (i) pursuant to Section 1.5.8(k) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Transmission Provider determines to remove the Project from the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and/or not to retain Designated Entity's status for the Project; (ii) Transmission Provider otherwise determines pursuant to Regional Transmission Expansion Planning Protocol in Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement that the Project is no longer required to address the specific need for which the Project was included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan; or (iii) an event of f~~F~~orce m~~M~~ajeure, as defined in section 10.0 of this Attachment KK, or other event outside of the Designated Entity's control that, with the exercise of Reasonable Efforts, Designated Entity cannot alleviate and which prevents the Designated Entity from satisfying its obligations under this Agreement, Transmission Provider may terminate this Agreement by providing written notice of termination to Designated Entity, which shall become effective the later of sixty calendar days after the Designated Entity receives such notice or other such date the FERC establishes for the termination. In the event termination pursuant to this Section 8.0 is based on (ii) or (iii) above, Transmission Provider shall not have the right to draw upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or retain the cash security and shall cancel the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or return the cash security within thirty days of the termination of this Agreement.

8.1 Termination by Default.

This Agreement shall terminate in the event a Party is in Default of this Agreement in accordance with Sections 7.2 or 7.4 of this Agreement. Upon Default by Designated Entity, Transmission Provider may draw upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or retain the cash security.

8.2 Filing at FERC.

Transmission Provider shall make the appropriate filing with FERC as required to effectuate the termination of this Agreement pursuant to this Article 8.

Article 9 – Liability and Indemnity

9.0 Liability.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Transmission Provider's liability to the Designated Entity, any third-party, or any other person arising or resulting from any acts or omissions associated in any way with performance under this Agreement shall be limited in the same manner and to the same extent that Transmission Provider's liability is limited to any Transmission Customer, third-party or other person under Section 10.2 of the Tariff arising or resulting from any act or omission in any way associated with service provided under the Tariff or any Service Agreement thereunder.

9.1 Indemnity.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Designated Entity shall at all times indemnify, defend, and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless from, any and all damages, losses, claims, including claims and actions relating to injury to or death of any person or damage to property, demands, suits, recoveries, costs and expenses, court costs, attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third-parties, arising out of or resulting from the Transmission Provider's acts or omissions associated with the performance of its obligations under this Agreement to the same extent and in the same manner that a Transmission Customer is required to indemnify, defend and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless under Section 10.3 of the Tariff.

Article 10 – Force Majeure

10.0 Force Majeure.

For the purpose of this section, an event of f~~F~~orce m~~M~~ajeure shall mean~~s~~ any cause beyond the control of the affected Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightening, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which in any foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. An event of f~~F~~orce m~~M~~ajeure does not include: (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected Party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remedial causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected Party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected Party.

10.1 Notice.

A Party that is unable to carry out an obligation imposed on it by this Agreement due to Force Majeure shall notify the other Party in writing within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the cause relied on.

10.2 Duration of Force Majeure.

A Party shall not be responsible for any non-performance or considered in Breach or Default under this Agreement, for any deficiency or failure to perform any obligation under this Agreement to the extent that such failure or deficiency is due to Force Majeure. A Party shall be excused from whatever performance is affected only for the duration of the Force Majeure and while the Party exercises Reasonable Efforts to alleviate such situation. As soon as the non-performing Party is able to resume performance of its obligations excused because of the occurrence of Force Majeure, such Party shall resume performance and give prompt notice thereof to the other Party. In the event that Designated Entity is unable to perform any of its obligations under this Agreement because of an occurrence of Force Majeure, Transmission Provider may terminate this Agreement in accordance with Section 8.0 of this Agreement.

10.3 Breach or Default of or Force Majeure under Interconnection Coordination Agreement

If either of the following events prevents Designated Entity from performing any of its obligations under this Agreement, such event shall be considered a Force Majeure event under this Agreement and the provisions of this Article 10 shall apply: (i) a breach or default of the Interconnection Coordination Agreement associated with the Project by a party to the Interconnection Coordination Agreement other than the Designated Entity; or (ii) an event of Force Majeure under the Interconnection Coordination Agreement associated with the Project.

Article 11 – Assignment

11.0 Assignment.

A Party may assign all of its rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement in accordance with this Section 11.0. Except for assignments described in Section 11.1 of this Agreement that may not result in the assignment of all rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement to a Project Finance Entity, no partial assignments will be permitted. No Party may assign any of its rights or delegate any of its duties or obligations under this Agreement without prior written consent of the other Party, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed. Any such assignment or delegation made without such written consent shall be null and void. Assignment by the Designated Entity shall be contingent upon, prior to the effective date of the assignment: (i) the Designated Entity or assignee demonstrating to the satisfaction of Transmission Provider that the assignee has the technical competence and financial ability to comply with the requirements of this Agreement and to construct the Project consistent with the assignor's cost estimates for the Project; and (ii) the assignee is eligible to be a Designated Entity for the Project pursuant to Sections 1.5.8(a) and (f) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement. Except as provided in an assignment to a Finance Project Entity to the contrary, for all assignments by any Party, the assignee must assume in a writing, to be provided to the other Party, all rights, duties, and obligations of the assignor arising under this Agreement. Any assignment described herein shall not relieve or discharge the assignor from any of its obligations hereunder absent the written consent of the other Party. In no circumstance, shall an assignment of this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement diminish the rights of the Transmission Provider under this Agreement, the Tariff, or the Operating Agreement. Any assignees that will construct, maintain, or operate the Project shall be subject to, and comply with the terms of this Agreement, the Tariff and the Operating Agreement.

11.1 Project Finance Entity Assignments

11.1.1 Assignment to Project Finance Entity

If an arrangement between the Designated Entity and a Project Finance Entity provides that the Project Finance Entity may assume any of the rights, duties and obligations of the Designated Entity under this Agreement or otherwise provides that the Project Finance Entity may cure a Breach of this Agreement by the Designated Entity, the Project Finance Entity may be assigned this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, or obligations hereunder only upon written consent of the Transmission Provider, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed. In no circumstance, shall an assignment of this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement diminish the rights of the Transmission Provider under this Agreement, the Tariff, or the Operating Agreement.

11.1.2 Assignment By Project Finance Entity

A Project Finance Entity that has been assigned this Agreement or any of the rights, duties or obligations under this Agreement or otherwise is permitted to cure a Breach of this Agreement, as described pursuant to Section 11.1.1 above, may assign this Agreement or any of the rights, duties or obligations under this Agreement to another entity not a Party to this Agreement only: (i) upon the Breach of this Agreement by the Designated Entity; and (ii) with the written consent of the Transmission Provider, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed. In no circumstance, shall an assignment of this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement alter or diminish the rights of the Transmission Provider under this Agreement, the Tariff, or the Operating Agreement. Any assignees that will construct, maintain, or operate the Project shall be subject to, and comply with the Tariff and Operating Agreement.

Article 12 – Information Exchange

12.0 Information Access.

Subject to Applicable Laws and Regulations, each Party shall make available to the other Party information necessary to carry out each Party's obligations and responsibilities under this Agreement, the Operating Agreement, and the Tariff. Such information shall include but not be limited to, information reasonably requested by Transmission Provider to prepare the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. The Parties shall not use such information for purposes other than to carry out their obligations or enforce their rights under this Agreement, the Operating Agreement, and the Tariff.

12.1 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events.

Each Party shall notify the other Party when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Agreement for a reason other than Force Majeure. The Parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section 12.1 shall not entitle the receiving Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory Breach of this Agreement.

Article 13 – Confidentiality

13.0 Confidentiality.

For the purposes of this Agreement, information will be considered and treated as Confidential Information only if it meets the definition of Confidential Information set forth in Section 1.1 of this Agreement and is clearly designated or marked in writing as "confidential" on the face of the document, or, if the information is conveyed orally or by inspection, if the Party providing the information orally informs the Party receiving the information that the information is "confidential." Confidential Information shall be treated consistent with Section 18.17 of the Operating Agreement. A Party shall be responsible for the costs associated with affording confidential treatment to its information.

Article 14 – Regulatory Requirements

14.0 Regulatory Approvals.

Designated Entity shall seek and obtain all required government authority authorizations or approvals as soon as reasonably practicable, and by the milestone dates set forth in the Development Schedule of Schedule C of this Agreement, as applicable.

Article 15 – Representations and Warranties

15.0 General.

Designated Entity hereby represents, warrants and covenants as follows, with these representations, warranties, and covenants effective as to the Designated Entity during the full time this Agreement is effective:

15.0.1 Good Standing

Designated Entity is duly organized or formed, as applicable, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of its State of organization or formation, and is in good standing under the laws of the respective State(s) in which it is incorporated.

15.0.2 Authority

Designated Entity has the right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement, to become a Party thereto and to perform its obligations hereunder. This Agreement is a legal, valid and binding obligation of Designated Entity, enforceable against Designated Entity in accordance with its terms, except as the enforceability thereof may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting creditors' rights generally and by general equitable principles (regardless of whether enforceability is sought in a proceeding in equity or at law).

15.0.3 No Conflict.

The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement does not violate or conflict with the organizational or formation documents, or bylaws or operating agreement, of Designated Entity, or any judgment, license, permit, order, material agreement or instrument applicable to or binding upon Designated Entity or any of its assets.

Article 16 – Operation of Project

16.0 Initial Operation.

The following requirements shall be satisfied prior to Initial Operation of the Project:

16.0.1 Execution of the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement

Designated Entity has executed the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and is able to meet all requirements therein.

16.0.2 Execution of an Interconnection Agreement

Designated Entity has executed an Interconnection Agreement with the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect, or such agreement has been filed unexecuted with the Commission.

16.0.3 Operational Requirements

The Project must meet all applicable operational requirements described in the PJM Manuals.

16.0.4 Parallel Operation

Designated Entity shall have all necessary systems and personnel in place to allow for parallel operation of its facilities with the facilities of the Transmission Owner(s) to which the Project is interconnected consistent with the Interconnection Coordination Agreement associated with the Project.

16.0.5 Synchronization

Designated Entity shall have received any necessary authorization from Transmission Provider and the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect to synchronize with the Transmission System or to energize, as applicable, per the determination of Transmission Provider, the Project.

16.1 Partial Operation.

If the Project is to be completed in phases, the completed part of the Project may operate prior to completion and Required Project In-Service Date set forth in Schedule C of this Agreement, provided that: (i) Designated Entity has notified Transmission Provider of the successful completion of the Project phase; (ii) Transmission Provider has determined that partial operation of the Project will not negatively impact the reliability of the Transmission System; (iii) Designated Entity has demonstrated that the requirements for Initial Operation set forth in Section 16.0 of this Agreement have been met for the Project phase; and (iv) partial operation of the Project is consistent with Applicable Laws and Regulations, Applicable Reliability Standards, and Good Utility Practice.

Article 17 – Survival

17.0 Survival of Rights.

The rights and obligations of the Parties in this Agreement shall survive the termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement to the extent necessary to provide for the determination and enforcement of said obligations arising from acts or events that occurred while this Agreement was in effect. The Liability and Indemnity provisions in Article 9 also shall survive termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement.

Article 18 – Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

18.0 Schedule E – Addendum of Non-Standard Terms and Conditions.

Subject to FERC acceptance or approval, the Parties agree that the terms and conditions set forth in the attached Schedule E are hereby incorporated by reference, and made a part of, this Agreement. In the event of any conflict between a provision of Schedule E that FERC has accepted and any provision of the standard terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement that relates to the same subject matter, the pertinent provision of Schedule E shall control.

Article 19 – Miscellaneous

19.0 Notices.

Any notice or request made to or by any Party regarding this Agreement shall be made by U.S. mail or reputable overnight courier to the addresses set forth below:

Transmission Provider:
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
2750 Monroe Blvd.
Audubon, PA 19403
Attention:

Designated Entity:
____
____
____

Attention:

19.1 No Transmission Service.

This Agreement does not entitle the Designated Entity to take Transmission Service under the Tariff.

19.2 No Rights.

Neither this Agreement nor the construction or the financing of the Project entitles Designated Entity to any rights related to Customer-Funded Upgrades set forth in Subpart C of Part VI of the Tariff.

19.3 Standard of Review.

Future modifications to this Agreement by the Parties or the FERC shall be subject to the just and reasonable standard and the Parties shall not be required to demonstrate that such modifications are required to meet the "public interest" standard of review as described in *United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.*, 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and *Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.*, 350 U.S. 348 (1956).

19.4 No Partnership.

Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, the Parties do not intend to create hereby any joint venture, partnership, association taxable as a corporation, or other entity for the conduct of any business for profit.

19.5 Headings.

The Article and Section headings used in this Agreement are for convenience only and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

19.6 Interpretation.

Wherever the context may require, any noun or pronoun used herein shall include the corresponding masculine, feminine or neuter forms. The singular form of nouns, pronouns and verbs shall include the plural and vice versa.

19.7 Severability.

Each provision of this Agreement shall be considered severable and if for any reason any provision is determined by a court or regulatory authority of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, impaired or invalidated, and such invalid, void or unenforceable provision shall be replaced with valid and enforceable provision or provisions which otherwise give effect to the original intent of the invalid, void or unenforceable provision.

19.8 Further Assurances.

Each Party hereby agrees that it shall hereafter execute and deliver such further instruments, provide all information and take or forbear such further acts and things as may be reasonably required or useful to carry out the intent and purpose of this Agreement and as are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

19.9 Counterparts.

This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts to be construed as one effective as of the Effective Date.

19.10 Governing Law

This Agreement shall be governed under the Federal Power Act and Delaware law, as applicable.

19.11 Incorporation of Other Documents.

The Tariff, the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, as they may be amended from time to time, are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof.

[Signature Page Follows]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by their respective authorized officials.

Transmission Provider: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

By:______________________ _______________ ______________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

Designated Entity: [Name of Designated Entity]

By:______________________ _______________ ______________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

SCHEDULE A

Description of Project

SCHEDULE B

Scope of Work

SCHEDULE C

Development Schedule

Designated Entity shall ensure and demonstrate to the Transmission Provider that it timely has met the following milestones and milestone dates and that the milestones remain in good standing:

[As appropriate include the following standard Milestones, with any revisions, and additional milestones necessary for the Project]:

Milestones and Milestone Dates
Execute Interconnection Coordination Agreement. On or before ______, Designated Entity must execute the Interconnection Coordination Agreement or request the agreement be filed unexecuted.
Demonstrate adequate Project financing. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that adequate project financing has been secured. Project financing must be maintained for the term of this Agreement [add detail if necessary].
Acquisition of all necessary federal, state, county, and local site permits. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that all required federal, state, county and local site permits have been acquired. [add detail if necessary. May provide separate dates for each permit]
Substantial Site Work Completed: On or before _______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that at least 20% of Project site construction is completed. Additionally the Designated Entity must submit updated ratings and the final project drawings to the Transmission Provider.
Delivery of major electrical equipment. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that all major electrical equipment has been delivered to the project site. [add detail if necessary].
Demonstrate required ratings. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that the project meets all required electrical ratings. [add detail if necessary].
Required Project In-Service Date. On or before ______, Designated Entity must: (i) demonstrate that the Project is completed in accordance with the Scope of Work in Schedules B of this Agreement; (ii) meets the criteria outlined in Schedule D of this Agreement; and (iii) is under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.
[Add additional Milestones]

SCHEDULE D

PJM Planning Requirements and Criteria and Required Ratings

SCHEDULE E

Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

INTERCONNECTION COORDINATION AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

____

And

____

INTERCONNECTION COORDINATION AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

[Name of Designated Entity]

And

[Name of Transmission Owners]

This Interconnection Coordination Agreement, including the Schedules attached hereto and incorporated herein (collectively, "Agreement") is made and entered into as of the Effective Date (as specified in Section 2.0) by and among PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Transmission Provider" or "PJM"), ________________ ("Designated Entity") [OPTIONAL: or "[short name]"]), and ________________ ("Transmission Owner" [OPTIONAL ["short name"]) Transmission Provider, Designated Entity and Transmission Owner may be referred to herein individually as "Party" and collectively as "the Parties."

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, in accordance with FERC Order No. 1000 and Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Transmission Provider is required to designate among candidates, pursuant to a FERC-approved process, an entity to develop and construct a specified project to expand, replace and/or reinforce the Transmission System operated by Transmission Provider;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(i) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, the Transmission Provider notified Designated Entity that it was designated as the Designated Entity for the Project (described in Schedule A to this Agreement) to be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Designated Entity accepted the designation as the Designated Entity for the Project and therefore has the obligation to build the Project;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 6 of the Operating Agreement, Transmission Owner has received and accepted the designation from Transmission Provider to construct enhancements or expansions to its transmission facilities in order to effectuate interconnection with the Project, to which Transmission Provider has assigned a PJM upgrade ID identifier, which is unique to such construction modifications;

WHEREAS, the Project will interconnect to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities, and therefore Designated Entity and Transmission Owner shall coordinate with each other to facilitate the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities in a reliable, safe, and timely manner to enable the Project to meet its Required Project

In-Service Date; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, together with other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency is hereby mutually acknowledged by each Party, the Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:

Article 1 – Definitions

1.0 Defined Terms.

All capitalized terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Part I of the Tariff or in definitions either in the body of this Agreement or its attached Schedules. In the event of any conflict between defined terms set forth in the Tariff or defined terms in this Agreement, including the Schedules, such conflict will be resolved in favor of the terms as defined in this Agreement and attached Schedules.

1.1 Confidential Information.

Any confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information of a plan, specification, pattern, procedure, design, device, list, concept, policy, or compilation relating to the Project or Transmission Owner facilities to which the Project will interconnect, which is designated as confidential by the party supplying the information, whether conveyed verbally, electronically, in writing, through inspection, or otherwise, and shall include, but may not be limited to information relating to the producing party's technology, research and development, business affairs and pricing, land acquisition and vendor contracts relating to the Project.

1.2 Effective Date.

Effective Date shall mean the date that this Agreement becomes effective pursuant to Section 2.0 of this Agreement.

1.3 Project.

Project shall mean the enhancement or expansion included in the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to be constructed by the Designated Entity described in Schedule A of this Agreement.

1.4 Project Finance Entity.

Project Finance Entity shall mean holder, trustee or agent for holders, of any component of Project Financing.

1.5 Project Financing.

Project Financing shall mean: (a) one or more loans, leases, equity and/or debt financings, together with all modifications, renewals, supplements, substitutions and replacements thereof, the proceeds of which are used to finance or refinance the costs of the Project, any alteration, expansion or improvement to the Project, or the operation of the Project; or (b) loans and/or debt issues secured by the Project.

1.6 Reasonable Efforts.

Reasonable Efforts shall mean such efforts as are consistent with enabling the timely and effective design, construction, and interconnection to the Transmission System of the Project in a manner, which enables the Project to achieve its Required In-Service Date consistent with Good Utility Practice.

1.7 Required Project In-Service Date.

Required Project In-Service Date shall mean the date that the Project is required to: (i) be completed in accordance with the Scope of Work in Schedules B of the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project; (ii) meet the criteria outlined in Schedule D of the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project; and (iii) be under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.

Article 2 – Effective Date and Term

2.0 Effective Date.

Subject to regulatory acceptance, this Agreement shall become effective on the date the Agreement has been executed by all Parties, or if this Agreement is individually filed with FERC for acceptance, upon the date specified by FERC.

2.1 Term.

This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect from the Effective Date until: (i) the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project expires or terminates; or (ii) the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Article 3 of this Agreement.

Article 3 – Early Termination

3.0 Termination by Transmission Provider.

In the event that: (i) the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project is terminated pursuant to Article 8.0 of that agreement; or (ii) the Project is modified such that it will not interconnect to Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities; Transmission Provider may terminate this Agreement by providing written notice of termination to Designated Entity and Transmission Owner, which shall become effective the later of sixty calendar days after the Designated Entity receives such notice or other such date the FERC establishes for the termination.

3.1 Termination by Default.

This Agreement shall terminate in the event a Party is in default of this Agreement in accordance with Section 5.2 of this Agreement and such termination is approved by Transmission Provider in writing.

3.2 Filing at FERC.

To the extent required by law or regulation, Transmission Provider shall make the appropriate filing with FERC as required to effectuate the termination of this Agreement pursuant to this Article 3.

Article 4 – Coordination

4.0 Designated Entity and Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

The Designated Entity and Transmission Owner shall coordinate with each other as set forth in this Article 4 to facilitate the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities in a reliable, safe, and timely manner to enable the Project to meet its Required Project In-Service Date.

4.0.1 Scope of Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

Transmission Owner shall coordinate with Designated Entity the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities including enhancements or expansions specified in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, identified as PJM Upgrade ID _________ and designated by PJM to the Transmission Owner to make Transmission Owner's transmission facilities ready to receive the interconnection of the Project. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as obligating Transmission Owner to assure that Designated Entity satisfies Designated Entity's obligations under this Agreement, under the Designated Entity Agreement described in Schedule A of this Agreement, nor under any other agreement.

4.0.2 Scope of Designated Entity Responsibilities.

Designated Entity shall coordinate with Transmission Owner, the interconnection of the Project, identified as PJM Upgrade ID ____ to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities including enhancements or expansions specified in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, identified as PJM Upgrade ID _____ and described in Section 4.0.1 of this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as obligating Designated Entity to assure that Transmission Owner satisfies Transmission Owner's obligations under this Agreement, under the Consolidated Transmission Owner's Agreement described in Schedule A of this Agreement, nor under any other agreement.

4.1 Transmission Provider Responsibilities.

Transmission Provider may facilitate the coordination between Designated Entity and Transmission Owner required by this Agreement, including convening meetings with the Designated Entity and the Transmission Owner to further facilitate coordination among the Parties, and to evaluate available options or alternatives to avoid delays, and coordinating outages as described in Section 4.2 of this Agreement.

4.2 Outage Coordination.

Designated Entity and Transmission Owner acknowledge and agree that certain outages of transmission facilities owned by the Transmission Owner may be necessary to complete the process of constructing and interconnecting the Project. Designated Entity and Transmission Owner further acknowledge and agree that any such outages shall be coordinated by and through Transmission Provider. Any delays due to emergency, load or maintenance which affect the timing of outages as required or approved by the Transmission Provider may not be considered a Breach under Article 5.

4.3 Construction and Interconnection.

4.3.1 No Conferral of Rights.

This Agreement shall confer no rights upon either the Designated Entity or the Transmission Owner to enter the right-of-way or property of the other Party, or interconnect its facilities, either physically or electrically, to the facilities of the other Party.

4.3.2 Interconnection Agreement.

Prior to interconnection, the Parties shall enter into an interconnection agreement setting forth the terms and conditions for: (i) the interconnection of the Transmission Owner's and Designated Entity's facilities; and (ii) the ongoing relationship of the Transmission Owner and the Designated Entity with regard to the interconnection. In the event the Parties are unable to agree, a Party may request: (i) dispute resolution consistent with Schedule 5 of the Operating Agreement; or, (ii) the interconnection agreement be filed unexecuted with the Commission.

4.3.3 Other Agreements.

The Parties recognize that, where appropriate, the Parties may enter into other agreements (beyond the interconnection agreement referred to in Section 4.3.2 above) such as construction agreements. Such other agreements shall be filed with FERC, if required. The terms and conditions of such other agreements are not addressed in this Agreement.

Article 5 – Breach and Default

5.0 Breach.

Except as otherwise provided in Article 7 of this Agreement, a breach of this Agreement shall include the failure of any Party to comply with any term or condition of this Agreement, including the Schedules attached hereto.

5.1 Notice of Breach.

In the event of a Breach, a Party not in Breach of this Agreement shall give written notice of such Breach to the breaching Party, the other non-breaching Party and to any other persons, including Project Finance Entities that the breaching Party identifies in writing prior to the Breach. Such notice shall set forth, in reasonable detail, the nature of the Breach, and where known and applicable, the steps necessary to cure such Breach.

5.2 Default.

A Party that commits a Breach and does not take steps to cure the Breach pursuant to Section 5.3 shall be in default of this Agreement.

5.3 Cure of Breach.

A breaching Party may (i) cure the Breach within thirty days from the receipt of the notice of Breach or other such date as determined by Transmission Provider to enable the Project meets its Required Project In-Service Date; or, (ii) if the Breach cannot be cured within thirty days but may be cured in a manner that enables the Project to meet its Required Project In- Service Date, the breaching Party, within such thirty day time period, commences in good faith steps that are reasonable and appropriate to cure the Breach and thereafter diligently pursue such action to completion.

5.4 Remedies.

Upon the occurrence of an event of Default, the non-defaulting Party shall be entitled to: (i) commence an action to require the Defaulting Party to remedy such default and specifically perform its duties and obligations hereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof; (ii) suspend performance hereunder; and (iii) exercise such other rights and remedies as it may have in equity or at law. Nothing in this Section 5.4 is intended in any way to affect the rights of a third-party to seek any remedy it may have in equity or at law from the Designated Entity or the Transmission Owner resulting from Designated Entity's default of this Agreement.

5.5 Remedies Cumulative.

No remedy conferred by any provision of this Agreement is intended to be exclusive of any other remedy and each and every remedy shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to every other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by statute or otherwise. The election of any one or more remedies shall not constitute a waiver of the right to pursue other available remedies.

5.6 Waiver.

Any waiver at any time by any Party of its rights with respect to a Breach or default under this Agreement, or with respect to any other matters arising in connection with this Agreement, shall not be deemed a waiver or continuing waiver with respect to any other Breach or default or other matter.

Article 6 – Liability and Indemnity

6.0 Liability.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Transmission Provider's liability to the Designated Entity, Transmission Owner, any third-party, or any other person arising or resulting from any acts or omissions associated in any way with performance under this Agreement shall be limited in the same manner and to the same extent that Transmission Provider's liability is limited to any Transmission Customer, third-party or other person under Section 10.2 of the Tariff arising or resulting from any act or omission in any way associated with service provided under the Tariff or any Service Agreement thereunder.

6.1 Indemnity.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Designated Entity and Transmission Owner shall at all times indemnify, defend, and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless from, any and all damages, losses, claims, including claims and actions relating to injury to or death of any person or damage to property, demands, suits, recoveries, costs and expenses, court costs, attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third-parties, arising out of or resulting from the Transmission Provider's acts or omissions associated with the performance of its obligations under this Agreement to the same extent and in the same manner that a Transmission Customer is required to indemnify, defend and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless under Section 10.3 of the Tariff.

Article 7 – Force Majeure

7.0 Force Majeure.

For the purpose of this section, an event of f~~F~~orce ~~M~~majeure shall mean~~s~~ any cause beyond the control of the affected Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which in any foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. An event of f~~F~~orce ~~M~~majeure does not include: (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected Party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remedial causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute), which an affected Party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected Party.

7.1 Notice.

A Party that is unable to carry out an obligation imposed on it by this Agreement due to Force Majeure shall notify the other Party in writing within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the cause relied on.

7.2 Duration of Force Majeure.

A Party shall not be responsible for any non-performance or considered in Breach or Default under this Agreement, for any deficiency or failure to perform any obligation under this Agreement to the extent that such failure or deficiency is due to Force Majeure. A Party shall be excused from whatever performance is affected only for the duration of the Force Majeure and while the Party exercises Reasonable Efforts to alleviate such situation. As soon as the non-performing Party is able to resume performance of its obligations excused because of the occurrence of Force Majeure, such Party shall resume performance and give prompt notice thereof to the other Party.

7.3 Breach or Default of or Force Majeure under Designated Entity Agreement

If either of the following events prevents Designated Entity from performing any of its obligations under this Agreement, such event shall be considered a Force Majeure event under this Agreement and the provisions of this Article 7 shall apply: (i) a breach or default of the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project by a party to the Designated Entity Agreement other than the Designated Entity; or (ii) an event of Force Majeure under the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project.

Article 8 – Assignment

8.0 Assignment.

No Party may assign any of its rights or delegate any of its duties or obligations under this Agreement without prior written consent of Transmission Provider, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed.

8.1 Assignment of Designated Entity Agreement.

In the event that the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project is assigned pursuant to Article 11 of the Designated Entity Agreement, this Agreement also shall be assigned contemporaneously with that assignment, without the need for any consent under Section 8.0

above.

Article 9 – Information Exchange

9.0 Information Access.

Subject to Applicable Laws and Regulations, each Party shall make available to the other Parties information necessary to carry out obligations and responsibilities under this Agreement. The Parties shall not use such information for purposes other than to carry out their obligations or enforce their rights under this Agreement.

9.1 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events.

Each Party shall notify the other Parties when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Agreement for a reason other than Force Majeure. The Parties shall cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section 9.1 shall not entitle the receiving Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory Breach of this Agreement.

Article 10 – Confidentiality

10.0 Confidentiality.

For the purposes of this Agreement, information shall be considered and treated as Confidential Information only if it meets the definition of Confidential Information set forth in Section 1.1 of this Agreement and is clearly designated or marked in writing as "confidential" on the face of the document, or, in the case of information conveyed orally, by inspection or by electronic media incapable of being marked as "confidential", if the Party providing the information orally informs the Party receiving the information that the information is "confidential." Confidential Information shall be treated consistent with Section 18.17 of the Operating Agreement. A Party shall be responsible for the costs associated with affording confidential treatment to its information.

Article 11 – Representations and Warranties

11.0 General.

The Parties hereby represent, warrant and covenant as follows, with these representations, warranties, and covenants effective during the full time this Agreement is effective:

11.0.1 Good Standing.

The Party is duly organized or formed, as applicable, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of its State of incorporation, organization or formation, and is in good standing under the laws of the respective State(s) in which it is incorporated, organized or formed.

11.0.2 Authority.

The Party has the right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement, to become a Party thereto and to perform its obligations hereunder. This Agreement is a legal, valid and binding obligation of the Party, enforceable against the Party in accordance with its terms, except as the enforceability thereof may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting creditors' rights generally and by general equitable principles (regardless of whether enforceability is sought in a proceeding in equity or at law).

11.0.3 No Conflict.

The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement does not violate or conflict with the organizational or formation documents, or bylaws or operating agreement, of the Party, or any judgment, license, permit, order, material agreement or instrument applicable to or binding upon Designated Entity or any of its assets.

Article 12 – Survival

12.0 Survival of Rights.

The rights and obligations of the Parties in this Agreement shall survive the termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement to the extent necessary to provide for the determination and enforcement of said obligations arising from acts or events that occurred while this Agreement was in effect. The provisions of Article 6 also shall survive termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement

Article 13 – Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

13.0 Schedule C -- Addendum of Non-Standard Terms and Conditions.

Subject to FERC acceptance or approval, the Parties agree that the terms and conditions set forth in the attached Schedule C are hereby incorporated by reference, and made a part of, this Agreement. In the event of any conflict between a provision of Schedule C that FERC has accepted and any provision of the standard terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement that relates to the same subject matter, the pertinent provision of Schedule C shall control.

Article 14 – Schedules

14.0 Schedule A: Description of the Project.

Schedule A provides a description of the Project to be constructed by the Designated Entity.

14.1 Schedule B: Single Line Diagram.

Schedule B contains a single line diagram that depicts the Project and the Transmission Owner transmission facilities to which the Project will interconnect.

Article 15 – Miscellaneous

15.0 Notices.

Any notice or request made to or by any Party regarding this Agreement shall be made by U.S. mail or reputable overnight courier to the addresses set forth below:

Transmission Provider:
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
2750 Monroe Blvd.
Audubon, PA 19403

Attention:

Designated Entity:
____
____
____
____

Transmission Owner:
____
____
____
____

15.1 Standard of Review.

Future modifications to this Agreement by the Parties or the FERC shall be subject to the just and reasonable standard and the Parties shall not be required to demonstrate that such modifications are required to meet the "public interest" standard of review as described in *United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.*, 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and *Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.*, 350 U.S. 348 (1956).

15.2 No Partnership.

Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, the Parties do not intend to create hereby any joint venture, partnership, association, taxable as a corporation, or other entity for the conduct of any business for profit.

15.3 Headings.

The Article and Section headings used in this Agreement are for convenience only and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

15.4 Interpretation.

Wherever the context may require, any noun or pronoun used herein shall include the corresponding masculine, feminine or neuter forms. The singular form of nouns, pronouns and verbs shall include the plural and vice versa.

15.5 Severability.

Each provision of this Agreement shall be considered severable and if for any reason any provision is determined by a court or regulatory authority of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, impaired or invalidated, and such invalid, void or unenforceable provision shall be replaced with valid and enforceable provision or provisions which otherwise give effect to the original intent of the invalid, void or unenforceable provision.

15.6 Further Assurances.

Each Party hereby agrees that it shall hereafter execute and deliver such further instruments, provide all information and take or forbear such further acts and things as may be reasonably required or useful to carry out the intent and purpose of this Agreement and as are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

15.7 Counterparts.

This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts to be construed as one effective as of the Effective Date.

15.8 Governing Law.

This Agreement shall be governed under the Federal Power Act and Delaware law, as applicable.

15.9 Incorporation of Other Documents.

The Tariff, the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, as they may be amended from time to time, are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof.

[Signature Page Follows]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by their respective authorized officials.

Transmission Provider: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

By: __________________________ __________________ ___________________

Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

Designated Entity: [Name of Designated Entity]

By: __________________________ __________________ ___________________

Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

Transmission Owner: [Name of Transmission Owner]

By: __________________________ __________________ ___________________

Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

SCHEDULE A

Description of Project

SCHEDULE B

Single-Line Diagram

The single line diagram below provides a high level concept of the project. Details of the interconnection point will be fully set forth in an interconnection agreement.

SCHEDULE C

Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

Sections of the

PJM Operating Agreement

(Marked/Redline Format)

OPERATING AGREEMENT

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1.4 Allocation of Costs When a PJM Member is the Registered Entity

1.5

SCHEDULE 12 – PJM MEMBER LIST

RESOLUTION TO AMEND THE PROCEDURES REQUIRING THE RETENTION OF AN INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT TO PROPOSE A LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR THE BOARD OF MANAGERS ELECTION FOR 2001

Definitions C - D

1.6 Capacity Resource.

"Capacity Resource" have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.6.01 Catastrophic Force Majeure.

"Catastrophic Force Majeure" shall not include any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, explosion, or Curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental, military or lawfully established civilian authorities, unless as a consequence of any such action, event, or combination of events, either (i) all, or substantially all, of the Transmission System is unavailable, or (ii) all, or substantially all, of the interstate natural gas pipeline network, interstate rail, interstate highway or federal waterway transportation network serving the PJM Region is unavailable. The Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure has occurred for purposes of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, based on an examination of available evidence. The Office of the Interconnection's determination is subject to review by the Commission.

1.6A Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement.

"Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement" dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

1.7 Control Area.

"Control Area" shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and each Applicable Regional Entity;

(d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

(e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

1.7.01 Control Zone.

"Control Zone" shall mean one Zone or multiple contiguous Zones, as designated in the PJM Manuals.

1.7.01a Counterparty.

"Counterparty" shall mean PJMSettlement as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with Market Participants or other entities, including the agreements and transactions with customers regarding transmission service and other transactions under the PJM Tariff and this Operating Agreement. PJMSettlement shall not be a counterparty to (i) any bilateral transactions between Market Participants, or (ii) with respect to self-supplied or self-scheduled transactions reported to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.7.02 Default Allocation Assessment.

"Default Allocation Assessment" shall mean the assessment determined pursuant to section 15.2.2 of this Agreement.

1.7.03 Demand Resource.

"Demand Resource" shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.7A Designated Entity.

An entity, including an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer, designated by the Office of the Interconnection with the responsibility to construct, own, operate, maintain, and finance Immediate-need Reliability Projects, Short-term Projects, Long-lead Projects, or Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions pursuant to Section 1.5.8 of Schedule 6 of this Agreement.

1.7B [Reserved].

18.9 Catastrophic Force Majeure.

Performance of any obligation arising under this Agreement, owed by a Member to either PJM or to another Member (either directly or indirectly), shall not be excused or suspended by reason of an event of force majeure unless such event constitutes an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure. An event of Catastrophic Force Majeure shall excuse a Member from performing obligations arising under this Agreement during the period such Member's performance is prevented by any event of Catastrophic Force Majeure, provided such event was not caused by such Member's fault or negligence. An event of Catastrophic Force Majeure may suspend but shall not excuse any payment obligation owed by a Member. Any excuse or exception to a performance obligation expressly provided for by specific terms of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, or the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall apply according to their terms and remain in full force and effect without regard to this provision. Unless expressly referenced in any section of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, or the Reliability Assurance Agreement, this provision shall not apply, and not supersede, other force majeure provisions that are expressly applicable to specific obligations arising under any sections of those documents. This provision shall apply in its entirety to all rules, rights and obligations specified in Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Tariff, Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement. Other than this provision, no other force majeure provisions in this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, or the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall apply in any manner to Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Tariff, Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement.~~No Member shall be liable to any other Member for damages or otherwise be in breach of this Agreement to the extent and during the period such Member's performance is prevented by any cause or causes beyond such Member's control and without such Member's fault or negligence, including but not limited to any act, omission, or circumstance occasioned by or in consequence of any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, or curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental, military or lawfully established civilian authorities; provided, however, that any such foregoing event shall not excuse any payment obligation. Upon the occurrence of an event considered by a Member to constitute a force majeure event, such Member shall use due diligence to endeavor to continue to perform its obligations as far as reasonably practicable and to remedy the event, provided that no Member shall be required by this provision to settle any strike or labor dispute.~~

1.3 Definitions.

1.3.1 Acceleration Request.

"Acceleration Request" shall mean a request pursuant to section 1.9.4A of this Schedule to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 or 1.9.4.

1.3.1A Auction Revenue Rights.

"Auction Revenue Rights" or "ARRs" shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Section 7.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B Auction Revenue Rights Credits.

"Auction Revenue Rights Credits" shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B.01 Batch Load Demand Resource.

"Batch Load Demand Resource" shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

1.3.1B.01A Cold Weather Alert.

"Cold Weather Alert" shall mean the notice that PJM provides to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions.

1.3.1B.02 Congestion Price.

"Congestion Price" shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02A Coordinated External Transaction.

"Coordinated External Transaction" shall mean a transaction to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02B Coordinated Transaction Scheduling.

"Coordinated Transaction Scheduling" or "CTS" shall mean the scheduling of Coordinated External Transactions at a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02C CTS Enabled Interface.
"CTS Enabled Interface" shall mean an interface between the PJM Control Area and an adjacent Control Area at which the Office of the Interconnection has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling ("CTS"), designated in Schedule A to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45).

1.3.1B.02D CTS Interface Bid

"CTS Interface Bid" shall mean a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.03 Curtailment Service Provider.

"Curtailment Service Provider" or "CSP" shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Ancillary Services markets, and/or Reliability Pricing Model by causing a reduction in demand.

1.3.1B.04 Day-ahead Congestion Price.

"Day-ahead Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1C Day-ahead Energy Market.

"Day-ahead Energy Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1C.01 Day-ahead Loss Price.

"Day-ahead Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D Day-ahead Prices.

"Day-ahead Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves" shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the Reliability*First* Corporation and SERC.

1.3.1D.02 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement" shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with the Applicable Standards, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

1.3.1D.03 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources" shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

1.3.1D.04 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1D.05 Day-ahead System Energy Price.

"Day-ahead System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E Decrement Bid.

"Decrement Bid" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E.01 Demand Bid

"Demand Bid" shall mean a bid, submitted by a Load Serving Entity in the Day-ahead Energy Market, to purchase energy at its contracted load location, for a specified timeframe and megawatt quantity, that if cleared will result in energy being scheduled at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market and in the physical transfer of energy during the relevant Operating Day.

1.3.1E.02 Demand Bid Limit

"Demand Bid Limit" shall mean the largest MW volume of Demand Bids that may be submitted by a Load Serving Entity for any hour of an Operating Day, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.03 Demand Bid Screening

"Demand Bid Screening" shall mean the process by which Demand Bids are reviewed against the applicable Demand Bid Limit, and rejected if they would exceed that limit, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.04 Demand Resource.

"Demand Resource" shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

1.3.1F Dispatch Rate.

"Dispatch Rate" shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

1.3.1F.01 Emergency Load Response Program

The Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.1G Energy Storage Resource.

"Energy Storage Resource" shall mean flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.

1.3.2 Equivalent Load.

"Equivalent Load" shall mean the sum of a Market Participant's net system requirements to serve its customer load in the PJM Region, if any, plus its net bilateral transactions.

1.3.2A Economic Load Response Participant.

"Economic Load Response Participant" shall mean a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Section 1.5A of this Schedule to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and/or Ancillary Services markets through reductions in demand.

1.3.2A.01 Economic Minimum.

"Economic Minimum" shall mean the lowest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2A.02 Economic Maximum.

"Economic Maximum" shall mean the highest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2B Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

"Energy Market Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of available run hours due to limitations imposed on the unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in PJM Tariff), and (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Energy Market Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same compliance period, which compliance period is determined by the applicable regulatory authority and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Energy Market Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.3 External Market Buyer.

"External Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users outside the PJM Region, or for load in the PJM Region that is not served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.4 External Resource.

"External Resource" shall mean a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the PJM Region.

1.3.5 Financial Transmission Right.

"Financial Transmission Right" or "FTR" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.5A Financial Transmission Right Obligation.

"Financial Transmission Right Obligation" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(b) of this Schedule.

1.3.5B Financial Transmission Right Option.

"Financial Transmission Right Option" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(c) of this Schedule.

1.3.6 Generating Market Buyer.

"Generating Market Buyer" shall mean an Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM Region, or of selling energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere.

1.3.7 Generator Forced Outage.

"Generator Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

1.3.8 Generator Maintenance Outage.

"Generator Maintenance Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform necessary repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility meets the guidelines specified in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9 Generator Planned Outage.

"Generator Planned Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9.01 Hot Weather Alert.

"Hot Weather Alert" shall mean the notice provided by PJM to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for extreme hot and/or humid weather conditions which may cause capacity requirements and/or unit unavailability to be substantially higher than forecast are expected to persist for an extended period.

1.3.9A Increment Offer.

"Increment Offer" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is an offer to sell energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Increment Offer results in scheduled generation at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.9B Interface Pricing Point.

"Interface Pricing Point" shall have the meaning specified in section 2.6A.

1.3.10 Internal Market Buyer.

"Internal Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for ultimate consumption by end-users inside the PJM Region that are served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.11 Inadvertent Interchange.

"Inadvertent Interchange" shall mean the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the individual Control Areas operated by PJM.

1.3.11.01 Load Management.

"Load Management" shall mean a Demand Resource ("DR") as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.11.02 Load Management Event

"Load Management Event" shall mean a) a single temporally contiguous dispatch of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day, or b) multiple dispatches of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day that are temporally contiguous.

1.3.11A Load Reduction Event.

"Load Reduction Event" shall mean a reduction in demand by a Member or Special Member for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.11A.01 Location.

"Location" as used in the Economic Load Response rules shall mean an end-use customer site as defined by the relevant electric distribution company account number.

1.3.11B Loss Price.

"Loss Price" shall mean the loss component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.12 Market Operations Center.

"Market Operations Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by or on behalf of a Market Participant to communicate and coordinate with the Office of the Interconnection in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.12A Maximum Emergency.

"Maximum Emergency" shall mean the designation of all or part of the output of a generating unit for which the designated output levels may require extraordinary procedures and therefore are available to the Office of the Interconnection only when the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to run. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the aggregate amount of megawatts that are classified as Maximum Emergency.

1.3.13 Maximum Generation Emergency.

"Maximum Generation Emergency" shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection to address either a generation or transmission emergency in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more Generation Capacity Resources, or Non-Retail Behind The Meter Generation resources to operate at its maximum net or gross electrical power output, subject to the equipment stress limits for such Generation Capacity Resource or Non-Retail Behind The Meter resource in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.13A Maximum Generation Emergency Alert.

"Maximum Generation Emergency Alert" shall mean an alert issued by the Office of the Interconnection to notify PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared, for any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market, for all or any part of such Operating Day.

1.3.14 Minimum Generation Emergency.

"Minimum Generation Emergency" shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more generating resources to operate at or below Normal Minimum Generation, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.14A NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator.

"NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator" shall mean the NERC mechanism that is in effect and being used to calculate the distribution of energy, over specific transmission interfaces, from energy transactions.

1.3.14B Net Benefits Test.

"Net Benefits Test" shall mean a calculation to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in price resulting from the dispatch of Economic Load Response exceeds the cost to other loads resulting from the billing unit effects of the load reduction, as specified in Section 3.3A.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.15 Network Resource.

"Network Resource" shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Tariff.

1.3.16 Network Service User.

"Network Service User" shall mean an entity using Network Transmission Service.

1.3.17 Network Transmission Service.

"Network Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff, or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

1.3.17A Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost.

"Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic F~~f~~orce M~~m~~ajeure; and, (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.17B Non-Synchronized Reserve.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of non-emergency generation resources that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is not electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.17C Non-Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources able and assigned to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve in one or more

specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes to increase the energy output by the amount of assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.17D Non-Variable Loads.

"Non-Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.18 Normal Maximum Generation.

"Normal Maximum Generation" shall mean the highest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.19 Normal Minimum Generation.

"Normal Minimum Generation" shall mean the lowest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.20 Offer Data.

"Offer Data" shall mean the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new resource, and other data and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generation resources and Demand Resource(s) for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the PJM Region, and specified for submission to the PJM Interchange Energy Market for such purposes by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.3.21 Office of the Interconnection Control Center.

"Office of the Interconnection Control Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by the Office of the Interconnection to coordinate and direct the operation of the PJM Region and to administer the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including facilities and equipment used to communicate and coordinate with the Market Participants in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.21A On-Site Generators.

"On-Site Generators" shall mean generation facilities (including Behind The Meter Generation) that (i) are not Capacity Resources, (ii) are not injecting into the grid, (iii) are either synchronized or non-synchronized to the Transmission System, and (iv) can be used to reduce demand for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.22 Operating Day.

"Operating Day" shall mean the daily 24 hour period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the PJM Interchange Energy Market are scheduled.

1.3.23 Operating Margin.

"Operating Margin" shall mean the incremental adjustments, measured in megawatts, required in PJM Region operations in order to accommodate, on a first contingency basis, an operating contingency in the PJM Region resulting from operations in an interconnected Control Area. Such adjustments may result in constraints causing Transmission Congestion Charges, or may result in Ancillary Services charges pursuant to the PJM Tariff.

1.3.24 Operating Margin Customer.

"Operating Margin Customer" shall mean a Control Area purchasing Operating Margin pursuant to an agreement between such other Control Area and the LLC.

1.3.24A Pre-Emergency Load Response Program

The Pre-Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during pre-emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.25 PJM Interchange.

"PJM Interchange" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds, or is exceeded by, the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller; or (e) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (f) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.26 PJM Interchange Export.

"PJM Interchange Export" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load is exceeded by the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup sales; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller.

1.3.27 PJM Interchange Import.

"PJM Interchange Import" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup purchases; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (d) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.28 PJM Open Access Same-time Information System.

"PJM Open Access Same-time Information System" shall mean the electronic communication system for the collection and dissemination of information about transmission services in the PJM Region, established and operated by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with FERC standards and requirements.

1.3.28A Planning Period Quarter.

"Planning Period Quarter" shall mean any of the following three month periods in the Planning Period: June, July and August; September, October and November; December, January and February; or March, April and May.

1.3.28B Planning Period Balance.

"Planning Period Balance" shall mean the entire period of time remaining in the Planning Period following the month that a monthly auction is conducted.

1.3.29 Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

"Point-to-Point Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

1.3.29A PRD Curve.

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29B PRD Provider.

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29C PRD Reservation Price.

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29D PRD Substation.

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29E Price Responsive Demand.

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29F Primary Reserve.

"Primary Reserve" shall mean the total reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is comprised of both Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve.

1.3.30 Ramping Capability.

"Ramping Capability" shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

1.3.30.01 Real-time Congestion Price.

"Real-time Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30.02 Real-time Loss Price.

"Real-time Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30A Real-time Prices.

"Real-time Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B Real-time Energy Market.

"Real-time Energy Market" shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B.01 Real-time System Energy Price.

"Real-time System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.31 Regulation.

"Regulation" shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to increase or decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.31.001 Reserve Penalty Factor.

"Reserve Penalty Factor" shall mean the cost, in $/MWh, associated with being unable to meet a specific reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. A Reserve Penalty Factor will be defined for each reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

1.3.31.01 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.

"Residual Auction Revenue Rights" shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability, including the return to service of existing transmission capability, that was not modeled pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement in compliance with section 7.4.2(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to section 7.4.2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Part VI of the Tariff; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Schedule 6 of this Agreement for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

1.3.31.01A Residual Metered Load.

"Residual Metered Load" shall mean all load remaining in an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) after all nodally priced load of entities serving load in such area(s) or territory(ies) has been carved out.

1.3.31.02 Special Member.

"Special Member" shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Section 1.5A.02 of this Schedule or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs.

1.3.32 Spot Market Backup.

"Spot Market Backup" shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

1.3.33 Spot Market Energy.

"Spot Market Energy" shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Section 2 of this Schedule.

1.3.33A State Estimator.

"State Estimator" shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Section 2.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.33B Station Power.

"Station Power" shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used for compressors at a compressed air energy storage facility; (iv) used for charging an Energy Storage Resource; or (v) used in association with restoration or black start service.

1.3.33B.001 Sub-meter.

"Sub-meter" shall mean a metering point for electricity consumption that does not include all electricity consumption for the end-use customer as defined by the electric distribution company account number. PJM shall only accept sub-meter load data from end-use customers for measurement and verification of Regulation service as set forth in the Economic Load Response rules and PJM Manuals.

1.3.33B.01 Synchronized Reserve.

"Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.33B.02 Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve in one or more specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.33B.03 System Energy Price.

"System Energy Price" shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.33C Target Allocation.

"Target Allocation" shall mean the allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits as set forth in Section 5.2.3 of this Schedule or the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits as set forth in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.34 Transmission Congestion Charge.

"Transmission Congestion Charge" shall mean a charge attributable to the increased cost of energy delivered at a given load bus when the transmission system serving that load bus is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide energy for third-party transmission losses in accordance with Section 9.3, which shall be calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.1 of this Schedule.

1.3.35 Transmission Congestion Credit.

"Transmission Congestion Credit" shall mean the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Charges credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.36 Transmission Customer.

"Transmission Customer" shall mean an entity using Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

1.3.37 Transmission Forced Outage.

"Transmission Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate removal from service of a transmission facility by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the transmission facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A removal from service of a transmission facility at the request of the Office of the Interconnection to improve transmission capability shall not constitute a Forced Transmission Outage.

1.3.37A Transmission Loading Relief.

"Transmission Loading Relief" shall mean NERC's procedures for preventing operating security limit violations, as implemented by PJM as the security coordinator responsible for maintaining transmission security for the PJM Region.

1.3.37B Transmission Loading Relief Customer.

"Transmission Loading Relief Customer" shall mean an entity that, in accordance with Section 1.10.6A, has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges during Transmission Loading Relief in order to continue energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region that are increasing the cost of energy in the PJM Region.

1.3.37C Transmission Loss Charge.

"Transmission Loss Charge" shall mean the charges to each Market Participant, Network Customer, or Transmission Customer for the cost of energy lost in the transmission of electricity from a generation resource to load as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

1.3.38 Transmission Planned Outage.

"Transmission Planned Outage" shall mean any transmission outage scheduled in advance for a pre-determined duration and which meets the notification requirements for such outages specified in this Agreement or the PJM Manuals.

1.3.38.01 Up-to Congestion Transaction.

"Up-to Congestion Transaction" shall have the meaning specified in Section 1.10.1A of this Schedule.

1.3.38A Variable Loads.

"Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.38B Virtual Transaction.

"Virtual Transaction" shall mean a Decrement Bid, Increment Offer and/or Up-to Congestion Transaction.

1.3.39 Zonal Base Load.

"Zonal Base Load" shall mean the lowest daily zonal peak load from the twelve month period ending October 21 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which an annual Auction Revenue Right allocation is conducted, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone, when non-extraordinary conditions exist for the applicable twelve month period, as determined by PJM. If the lowest daily zonal peak load from the applicable twelve month period is abnormally low due to extraordinary conditions, as determined by PJM, Zonal Base Load shall mean the next lowest daily zonal peak load that was not affected by extraordinary conditions during the applicable twelve month period, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone. For the purposes of this definition, extraordinary conditions shall mean a significant event, or combination of events, that affect the operation of the bulk power system in an atypical manner and results in an abnormal reduction in the consumption of energy within a Zone.

1.9 Prescheduling.

The following procedures and principles shall govern the prescheduling activities necessary to plan for the reliable operation of the PJM Region and for the efficient operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.9.1 Outage Scheduling.

The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for coordinating and approving requests for outages of generation and transmission facilities as necessary for the reliable operation of the PJM Region, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain records of outages and outage requests of these facilities.

1.9.2 Planned Outages.

(a) A Generator Planned Outage shall be included in Generator Planned Outage schedules established prior to the scheduled start date for the outage, in accordance with standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Generator Planned Outage scheduling for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement and the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the ~~Members~~ Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of such resources. A Market ~~Participant~~ Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from all or part of a generation resource undergoing an approved Generator Planned Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Planned Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval or withdraw a prior approval. Approval ~~for~~ of a Generator Planned Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. The Market Seller shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with an estimate of the amount of time it needs to return to service any Generation Capacity Resource on Generator Planned Outage that is already underway. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds or withdraws its approval of a Generator Planned Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market ~~Participant~~ Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Planned Outage ~~of the Generation Capacity Resource~~ at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall if possible propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market ~~Participant~~ Seller of a Generator Planned Outage.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Transmission Planned Outage scheduling in accordance with procedures specified in~~,~~ the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement~~,~~ and the PJM Manuals, and in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) Transmission Owners shall use reasonable efforts to submit Transmission Planned Outage schedules one year in advance but by no later than the first of the month six months in advance of the requested start date for all outages that are expected to exceed five working days duration, with regular (at least monthly) updates as new information becomes available.

(ii) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided in accordance with the requirements in subsection (i) above, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to ~~a~~ the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in ~~this Agreement and~~ the ~~PJM~~ Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(iii) Transmission Owners shall submit notice of all Transmission Planned Outages to the Office of the Interconnection by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, with updates as new information becomes available.

(iv) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection shall perform this analysis and notify the Transmission Owner in a timely manner if it will require rescheduling of the outage. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the~~a~~ Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in ~~this Agreement and~~ the ~~PJM~~ Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(v) The Office of the Interconnection reserves the right to approve, deny, or reschedule any outage deemed necessary to ensure reliable system operations on a case by case basis regardless of duration or date of submission.

(vi) The Office of the Interconnection shall post notice of Transmission Planned Outages on OASIS upon receipt of such notice from the Transmission Owner; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection shall not post on OASIS notice of any component of a Transmission Planned Outage to the extent such component shall directly reveal a generator outage. In such cases, the Transmission Owner, in addition to providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection as required above, concurrently shall inform the affected Generation Owner of such outage, limiting such communication to that necessary to describe the outage and to coordinate with the Generation Owner on matters of safety to persons, facilities, and equipment. The Transmission Owner shall not notify any other Market Participant of such outage and shall arrange any other necessary coordination through the Office of the Interconnection.

In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that transmission maintenance schedules proposed by one or more Members would significantly affect the efficient and reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may establish alternative schedules, but such alternative shall minimize the economic impact on the Member or Members whose maintenance schedules the Office of the Interconnection proposes to modify.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate resolution of outage or other planning conflicts that may give rise to unreliable system conditions. The Members shall comply with all maintenance schedules established by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.9.3 Generator Maintenance Outages.

(a) A Generator Maintenance Outage may only be scheduled if approved by the Office of the Interconnection prior to the requested start date for the outage, in accordance with subsection (b) hereof and the standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) ~~A Market Participant may request approval for a Generator Maintenance Outage of any Generation Capacity Resource from t~~The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Generator Maintenance Outages for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the ~~timetable and other~~ procedures specified in the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the Market Seller owning or controlling the output of such resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall approve requests for Generator Maintenance Outages for such a Generation Capacity Resource unless the outage would threaten the adequacy of reserves in, or the reliability of, the PJM Region. A Market Participant shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing an approved full or partial Generator Maintenance Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval, withdraw a prior approval, or rescind a prior approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway. Approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it must rescind its approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway in order to preserve the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection will provide the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource at least 72 hours' notice thereof. The Market Seller shall be required to make the Generation Capacity Resource available for normal operation within 72 hours of such notice. If the generator is not made available for normal operation by 72 hours after the notice of the rescission of the approval of the Generator Maintenance Outage, the remaining time the resource continues on the outage will be classified as a Generator Forced Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds, withdraws or rescinds approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Maintenance Outage at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall, if possible, propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market Seller of a Generator Maintenance Outage.

1.9.4 Forced Outages.

(a) Each Market Seller that owns or controls a pool-scheduled resource, or ~~a~~ Generation Capacity Resource whether or not pool-scheduled, shall: (i) advise the Office of the Interconnection of a Generator Forced Outage suffered or anticipated to be suffered by any such resource as promptly as possible; (ii) provide the Office of the Interconnection with the expected date and time that the resource will be made available; and (iii) make a record of the events and circumstances giving rise to the Generator Forced Outage. A Market Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing a Generator Forced Outage. A Generation Capacity Resource committed to PJM loads through an RPM Auction, FRR Capacity Plan, or by designation as a replacement resource under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, that does not deliver all or part of its scheduled energy shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage with respect to such undelivered energy, in accordance with standards and procedures for full and partial Generator Forced Outages specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, and the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive notification of Forced Transmission Outages, and information on the return to service, of Transmission Facilities in the PJM Region in accordance with standards and procedures specified in, as applicable, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the PJM Manuals.

1.9.4A Transmission Outage Acceleration.

(a) Planned Transmission Outages and Forced Transmission Outages otherwise scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 and 1.9.4 respectively of this Schedule may be accelerated or rescheduled at the request of a Generation Owner or other Market Participant in accordance with the terms and conditions of this section 1.9.4A and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Transmission Outages Requiring Coordination With A Specific Generation Owner.

(i) Receipt of Acceleration Request. Prior to a scheduled Planned Transmission Outage associated with the interconnection of a generating unit to the Transmission System, the affected Generation Owner may request that the outage be accelerated or rescheduled. Such Acceleration Request shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals.

(ii) Determination to Accommodate Acceleration Request. Upon receipt of an Acceleration Request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such Acceleration Request. The affected Transmission Owner shall determine, in its sole discretion, whether to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards, and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. In the event that the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an estimate of the cost to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage and the revised schedule for the transmission outage ("Acceleration Estimate").

(iii) Provision of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that the Generation Owner has met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Generation Owner with the Acceleration Estimate. In the event that the

Generation Owner does not meet the creditworthiness standard, the Office of the Interconnection shall not provide the Acceleration Estimate and the transmission outage shall not be accelerated or rescheduled. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate, the Generation Owner, within the time period specified in the PJM Manuals, shall notify the Office of the Interconnection as to whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage pursuant to the terms of the Acceleration Estimate.

(iv) Cost Responsibility. In the event the Generation Owner notifies the Office of the Interconnection that it desires to proceed with the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage pursuant to section 1.9.4A(a)(iii), the Generation Owner shall be solely responsible for actual costs incurred by the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage. The Generation Owner's cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete the outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the Generation Owner. After receipt of such notification, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, the Generation Owner shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of the Generation Owner's decision. In the event the Generation Owner desires not to proceed, the transmission outage shall occur according to normal work practices and the Generation Owner shall be responsible for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage as of the date that the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(c) Transmission Outages That Could Cause Congestion Revenue Inadequacy.

(i) Posting of Transmission Outage. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines that a Planned Transmission Outage or Forced Transmission Outage could exceed five days and could cause congestion revenue inadequacy in excess of $500,000, the Office of the Interconnection shall post a notice of such transmission outage on its internet site. Within the time period and pursuant to the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, any Market Participant may request that such transmission outage be accelerated or rescheduled.

(ii) Determination to Accelerate or Reschedule Transmission Outage. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Request(s) pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(i), the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such request(s). The affected Transmission Owner shall determine in its sole discretion whether to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. If the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an Acceleration Estimate. In the event that Market Participants submit requests which would require different schedules for a transmission outage, the Office of the Interconnection, in consultation with the affected Transmission Owner, shall determine the most effective option, which will be included in the Acceleration Estimate.

(iii) Notification of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of transmission outages have met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Market Participants with the Acceleration Estimate and the number of Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage that meet the creditworthiness standards. After receipt of the Acceleration Request, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each requesting Market Participant meeting the creditworthiness standards shall notify the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage as set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, and if it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, the amount it is willing to pay for such acceleration or rescheduling.

(iv) Evaluation of Acceleration Requests. Upon receipt of Market Participant(s) notifications pursuant to subsection 1.9.4A(b)(iii), the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, based on the amount Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling of the transmission outage, whether the transmission outage should be accelerated or rescheduled. The transmission outage shall be accelerated or rescheduled if the amount that the Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage exceeds the Acceleration Estimate by the following margins: (a) for outages to equipment outside a substation, two times the Acceleration Estimate; and (b) for outages to equipment inside a substation, five times the Acceleration Estimate. These margins are designed to provide a reasonable degree of certainty that the actual costs of accelerating or rescheduling the transmission outage will not exceed the amount the Market Participants are willing to pay. In all events, transmission outages will be accelerated or rescheduled pursuant to requests made under section 1.9.4A(c) only when the requested acceleration or rescheduling would reduce the amount of congestion revenue inadequacy resulting from the outage as determined by the Office of the Interconnection.

(v) Cost Responsibility. Each Market Participant which notifies the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(iii) that it is willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling of a transmission outage shall be responsible for the actual costs of such acceleration or rescheduling on a pro-rata basis based on the amount it specified it was willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling. Market Participants' cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete a transmission outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Market Participants of such increase. Within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each affected Market Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of each affected Market Participant's decision. In the event that, because one or more Market Participants determine not to proceed, there would be insufficient funds to pay for the full cost of accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage, the transmission outage shall not continue to be accelerated or rescheduled and shall occur according to normal work practices. In such instance, the Market Participants shall be responsible on a pro-rata basis for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner as of the date the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(d) Posting Revised Transmission Outages. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on its internet site all revised transmission outage schedules resulting from implementation of this section 1.9.4A, pursuant to the procedures in the PJM Manuals, and simultaneously shall notify affected Market Participants or Generation Owners that submitted Acceleration Requests of the Transmission Owner's agreement to accelerate or reschedule the outage.

1.9.5 Market Participant Responsibilities.

Each Market Participant making a bilateral sale covering a period greater than the following Operating Day from a generating resource located within the PJM Region for delivery outside the PJM Region shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered.

1.9.6 Internal Market Buyer Responsibilities.

Each Internal Market Buyer making a bilateral purchase covering a period greater than the following Operating Day shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered. Each Internal Market Buyer shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with details of any load management agreements with customers that allow the Office of the Interconnection to reduce load under specified circumstances.

1.9.7 Market Seller Responsibilities.

(a) Not less than 30 days before a Market Seller's initial offer to sell energy from a given generation resource on the PJM Interchange Energy Market, the Market Seller shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection the information specified in the Offer Data for new generation resources.

(b) Market Sellers authorized to request market-based start-up and no-load fees may choose to submit such fees on either a market or a cost basis. Market Sellers must elect to submit both start-up and no-load fees on either a market basis or a cost basis and any such election shall be submitted on or before March 31 for the period of April 1 through September 30, and on or before September 30 for the period October 1 through March 31. The election of market-based or cost-based start-up and no-load fees shall remain in effect without change throughout the applicable periods.

(i) If a Market Seller chooses to submit market-based start-up and no-load fees, such Market Seller, in its Offer Data, shall submit the level of such fees to the Office of the Interconnection for each generating unit as to which the Market Seller intends to request such fees. The Office of the Interconnection shall reject any request for start-up and no-load fees in a Market Seller's Offer Data that does not conform to the Market Seller's specification on file with the Office of the Interconnection.

(ii) If a Market Seller chooses to submit cost-based start-up and no-load fees, such fees must be calculated as specified in the PJM Manuals and the Market Seller may change both cost-based fees daily and must change both fees as the associated costs change, but no more frequently than daily.

1.9.8 Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

All Transmission Owners shall regularly update and verify facility ratings, subject to review and approval by PJM, in accordance with the following procedures and the procedures in the PJM Manuals:

(a) Each Transmission Owner shall verify to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection all of its transmission facility ratings two months prior to the beginning of the summer season (i.e., on April 1) and two months prior to the beginning of the winter season (i.e., on October 1) each calendar year, and shall provide detailed data justifying such transmission facility ratings when directed by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) In addition to the seasonal verification of all ratings, each Transmission Owner shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection updates to its transmission facility ratings as soon as such Transmission Owner is aware of any changes. Such Transmission Owner shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with detailed data justifying all such transmission facility ratings changes.

(c) All Transmission Owners shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection formal documentation of any procedure for changing facility ratings under specific conditions, including: the detailed conditions under which such procedures will apply, detailed explanations of such procedures, and detailed calculations justifying such pre-established changes to facility ratings. Such procedures must be updated twice each year consistent with the provisions of this Section.

1.9.9 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall perform seasonal operating studies to assess the forecasted adequacy of generating reserves and of the transmission system, in accordance with the procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain and update tables setting forth Operating Reserve and other reserve objectives as specified in the PJM Manuals and as consistent with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive and process requests for firm and non-firm transmission service in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Tariff.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain such data and information relating to generation and transmission facilities in the PJM Region as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the scheduling and dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain an historical database of all transmission facility ratings, and shall review, and may modify or reject, any submitted change or any submitted procedure for pre-established transmission facility rating changes. Any dispute between a Transmission Owner and the Office of the Interconnection concerning transmission facility ratings shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures in schedule 5 to the Operating Agreement; provided, however, that the rating level determined by the Office of the Interconnection shall govern and be effective during the pendency of any such dispute.

(f) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate with other interconnected Control Area as necessary to manage, alleviate or end an Emergency.

1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer's self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales, or Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in Section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection's forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers' offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM

Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

1.10.1A Day-ahead Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.

(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection:
(i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer's intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed the maximum price that may be specified in the PJM Manuals), if any, at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Scheduling of such transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not dynamically scheduled to such entities pursuant to Section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this type is referred to as an "Up-to Congestion Transaction." Such Up-to Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum difference between the source and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The source-sink paths on which an Up-to Congestion Transaction may be submitted are limited to those paths posted on the PJM internet site and determined by the Office of the Interconnection using the following criteria:

Step 1: Start with the historic set of eligible nodes that were available as sources and sinks for interchange transactions on the PJM OASIS.

Step 2: Remove from the list of nodes described in Step 1 all load buses below 69 kV.

Step 3: Remove from the resulting set of nodes from Step 2 all generator buses at which no generators of 100 megawatts or more are connected.

Step 4: Remove from the results of Step 3 all electrically equivalent nodes.

(d) Market Sellers wishing to sell into the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy (including energy from hydropower units), demand reductions, Regulation, Operating Reserves or other services for the following Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller's cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource or an Intermittent Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources and Intermittent Resources may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Market Sellers shall not designate as a Maximum Emergency offer any portion of their ICAP committed as a Base Capacity Resource during the months of June through September when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action, or committed as a Capacity Performance Resource at any time during the Delivery Year when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency ~~O~~offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency ~~O~~offers outside of the conditions stipulated above and to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on either a temporary or long-term basis. This includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier's exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generation resource, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such resource on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all Generation Capacity Resources; and

ix) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00, for all Economic Load Response Resources;

x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus [the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor divided by 2]; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provisions of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,100/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the megawatt of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100 per MWh in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $/ΔMW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with start-up and no-load fees, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

(g) Each offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) A Market Seller that wishes to make a generation resource or Demand Resource available to sell Synchronized Reserve shall submit an offer for Synchronized Reserve that shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the energy used by the generation resource to provide the Synchronized Reserve and the generation resource's unit specific opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed the variable operating and maintenance costs for providing Synchronized Reserve plus seven dollars and fifty cents.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, and the offer shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts: (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs).

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Demand Resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Demand Resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. A Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Demand Resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) Market Sellers providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market: 1) a price offer in dollars per megawatt hour; and 2) such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to determine any relevant opportunity costs for the resource(s). The foregoing notwithstanding, to qualify to submit Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves pursuant to this section, the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit energy offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market including start-up and shut-down costs for generation resource and Demand Resources, respectively, and all generation resources that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide that service. The MW quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide in a given hour will be determined based on the energy Offer Data submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as detailed in the PJM Manuals.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity's Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

Demand Bid Limit = greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point * 1.3), or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point + 10MW)

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity's highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM's highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity's actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity's expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to Sections 1.10.9 or 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, start-up, no-load and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for start-up and no-load fees, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Section 3 of this Schedule 1. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of start-up and no-load fees, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource's start-up cost, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

(c) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for start-up or no-load fees.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of dynamic dispatch shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to dynamic dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer's load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer's hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.6A Transmission Loading Relief Customers.

(a) An entity that desires to elect to pay Transmission Congestion Charges in order to continue its energy schedules during an Operating Day over contract paths outside the PJM Region in the event that PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief that otherwise would cause PJM to request security coordinators to curtail such Member's energy schedules shall:

(i) enter its election on OASIS by 12:00 p.m. of the day before the Operating Day, in accordance with procedures established by PJM, which election shall be applicable for the entire Operating Day; and

(ii) if PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief, provide to PJM, at such time and in accordance with procedures established by PJM, the hourly integrated energy schedules that impacted the PJM Region (as indicated from the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator) during the Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) If an entity has made the election specified in Section (a), then PJM shall not request security coordinators to curtail such entity's energy transactions, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

(c) In order to make elections under this Section 1.10.6A, an entity must (i) have met the creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection or provided a letter of credit or other form of security acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection, and (ii) have executed either the Agreement, a Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, or other agreement committing to pay all Transmission Congestion Charges incurred under this Section.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection's forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads they serve; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) Not earlier than 4:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant's inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in Section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Section 3.3A of this Schedule. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Sections 2.4 and 2.5 hereof.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, Ancillary Services Markets or Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and Day-ahead Energy Market. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets, Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Section 18.17.1 of the PJM Operating Agreement, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants' non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for any generation resource that was not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee.

(c) With respect to a pool-scheduled resource that is included in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller may not change or otherwise modify its offer to sell energy.

(d) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(e) For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this Section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

3.2 Market Buyers.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy Charges.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be paid for all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(d) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of net hourly PJM Interchange for each Market Buyer, including Generating Market Buyers, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. For Internal Market Buyers that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall include determination of the net energy flows from: (i) tie lines; (ii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by the Market Buyer but delivered to it over another entity's Transmission Facilities; (iii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by another entity but which is directly interconnected with the Market Buyer's transmission system; (iv) deliveries pursuant to bilateral energy sales; (v) receipts pursuant to bilateral energy purchases; and (vi) an adjustment to account for the day-ahead PJM Interchange, calculated as the difference between scheduled withdrawals and injections by that Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market. For External Market Buyers and Internal Market Buyers that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall determine the energy scheduled hourly for delivery to the Market Buyer net of the amounts scheduled by such Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) An Internal Market Buyer shall be charged for Spot Market Energy purchases to the extent of its hourly net purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. An External Market Buyer shall be charged for its Spot Market Energy purchases based on the energy delivered to it, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total charge shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Imports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Buyer.

(f) A Generating Market Buyer shall be paid as a Market Seller for sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net sales into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total payment shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Exports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Seller.

3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Internal Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation shall be charged the following for Regulation dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation: (i) the capability Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; (ii) the amounts, if any, described in subsection (f) of this section; and (iii) the performance Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (g) of this section.

(b) Each Market Seller and Generating Market Buyer shall be credited for each of its resources supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined at a time to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection which shall be no earlier than the day before the Operating Day. In accordance with the PJM Manuals, the total Regulation market-clearing price shall be calculated by optimizing the dispatch profile to obtain the lowest cost combination set of resources that satisfies the Regulation requirement. The market-clearing price for each regulating hour shall be equal to the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during that hour. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the

expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Seller or Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection‘s Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and for the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour and the following shoulder hour during which the Generating Market Buyer or Market Seller provided Regulation. The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource‘s output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection‘s Regulation signals from the generation resource‘s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource‘s expected output in the preceding shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource‘s expected output in the following shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the following shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer in a

Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market hour.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

$$\text{Correlation Score} = \mathbf{r}_{\text{Signal,Response}(\delta,\delta+5\text{ Min});\ \delta=0\text{ to }5\text{ Min}}$$

where δ is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

$$\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs}((\delta - 5\text{ Minutes}) / (5\text{ Minutes})).$$

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error (ε) as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

$$\text{Energy Score} = 1 - 1/n \sum \text{Abs (Error)};$$

$$\text{Error} = \text{Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal))}; \text{ and}$$

n = the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

$$\text{Accuracy Score} = \max((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})) + (\text{Energy Score}).$$

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the hourly accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the

Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM’s direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its physically determined parameter limitations due to external requirements such as fuel delivery arrangements, for example, will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

Consistent with Sections 1.10.1 and 6.6 hereof, resources with notification or start up times greater than one day that are committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each hour the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG}, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG} where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller's wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

LMPDMW equals the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

In the event the Office of the Interconnection experiences a technical problem or malfunction with its wind forecasting tool that results in an erroneous forecast for a wind resource during a period of time for which the wind resource is eligible for lost opportunity cost, the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller will attempt to reach a mutually agreeable forecast value for settlement purposes. If the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller do not come to mutual agreement on an acceptable forecast value, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the forecast value that it determines is appropriate.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (1) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals; (2) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (3) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (4) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for

Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the hours that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the hours that the offer is economic. The hours that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the hours that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the hours in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any hours required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\mathbf{Ramp\_Request}_t = \frac{(\mathbf{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathbf{AOutput}_{t-1})}{(\mathbf{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\mathbf{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathbf{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\mathbf{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathbf{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined n section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing

Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in subsections (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price less the hourly integrated real-time LMP, with the exception of those hours in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized

Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the hourly integrated amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is the average of the five-minute Locational Marginal Prices calculated during the Synchronized Reserve Event plus an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor and the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor and the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) In determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource times (B) the megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource, and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Seller in excess of that Market Seller's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the remainder of the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Seller's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during an hour than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that hour due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Non-Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in paragraph (f) of this section.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve requirement. When the Primary Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve will be determined as the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Primary Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) In determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous hours the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the MW obligation in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The cost of credits allocated to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources pursuant to this section shall be charged to Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region based on load ratio share (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero), provided that a Load-Serving Entity may satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation, which is equal to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the Load-Serving Entity's load ratio share for the PJM Region, through one or any combination of the following: 1) the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market; 2) and bilateral arrangements. The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges allocated pursuant to this section shall reflect any portion of a Load-Serving Entity's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation that is met by bilateral arrangement(s).

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP - UB)}

where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

> (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
>
> (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG where:
>
> URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;
>
> UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;
>
> DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;
>
> UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and
>
> where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)}where:

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the

Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each hour of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each hour of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of hourly energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each hour of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Buyer in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Buyer. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Buyer's internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Buyer that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Buyer, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Buyer and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

5.2 Transmission Congestion Credit Calculation.

5.2.1 Eligibility.

(a) Except as provided in Section 5.2.1(b), each holder of a Financial Transmission Right shall receive as a Transmission Congestion Credit a proportional share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges collected for each constrained hour.

(b) If a holder of a Financial Transmission Right between specified delivery and receipt buses acquired the Financial Transmission Right in a Financial Transmission Rights auction (the procedures for which are set forth in Part 7 of this Schedule 1) and (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt buses of the Financial Transmission Right or had an Up-to Congestion Transaction that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a path at or near the path of the Financial Transmission Right; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer, Decrement Bid or Up-to Congestion Transaction is that the difference in Locational Marginal Prices in the Day-ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt buses is greater than the difference in Locational Marginal Prices between such delivery and receipt buses in the Real-time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit, associated with such Financial Transmission Right in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount that the Market Participant paid for the Financial Transmission Right in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) For purposes of Section 5.2.1(b) a bus shall be considered at or near the Financial Transmission Right delivery or receipt bus if seventy-five percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that bus and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus is reflected in the constrained path between the subject Financial Transmission Right delivery and receipt buses that were acquired in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(d) The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits pursuant to this section and section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the FTR holder. If the Office of the Interconnection agrees with such calculation, then it shall impose the forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit accordingly. If the Office of the Interconnection does not agree with the calculation, then it shall impose a forfeiture of Transmission Congestion Credit consistent with its determination. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the Office of the Interconnection's determination, it may exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns and may request an adjustment. This provision is duplicated in section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. An FTR holder objecting to the application of this rule shall have recourse to the Commission for review of the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to its trading activity.

5.2.2 Financial Transmission Rights.

(a) Transmission Congestion Credits will be calculated based upon the Financial Transmission Rights held at the time of the constrained hour. Except as provided in subsection (e) below, Financial Transmission Rights shall be auctioned as set forth in Section 7.

(b) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is negative (a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(c) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right when that difference is positive. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is zero (neither a benefit nor a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(d) In addition to transactions with PJMSettlement in the Financial Transmission Rights auctions administered by the Office of the Interconnection, a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period, may be sold or otherwise transferred to a third party by bilateral agreement, subject to compliance with such procedures as may be established by the Office of the Interconnection for verification of the rights of the purchaser or transferee.

(i) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer to a third party a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period. Such bilateral transactions shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transactions for the transfer of Financial Transmission Rights, the rights and obligations pertaining to the Financial Transmission Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transaction shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. Such bilateral transactions shall not modify the location or reconfigure the Financial Transmission Rights. In no event shall the purchase and sale of a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to a bilateral transaction constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(iii) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any Financial Transmission Right Obligation. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations, including meeting applicable creditworthiness requirements, transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Financial Transmission Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Financial Transmission Rights shall continue to receive all Transmission Congestion Credits attributable to the Financial Transmission Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Financial Transmission Rights.

(iv) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the transferred Financial Transmission Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transaction.

(v) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(vi) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

(e) Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, at their election, may receive a direct allocation of Financial Transmission Rights instead of an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers may make this election for the succeeding two annual FTR auctions after the integration of the new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Such election shall be made prior to the commencement of each annual FTR auction. For purposes of this election, the Allegheny Power Zone shall be considered a new zone with respect to the annual Financial Transmission Right auction in 2003 and 2004. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers in new PJM zones that elect not to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights shall receive allocations of Auction Revenue Rights. During the annual allocation process, the Financial Transmission Right allocation for new PJM zones shall be performed simultaneously with the Auction Revenue Rights allocations in existing and new PJM zones. Prior to the effective date of the initial allocation of FTRs in a new PJM Zone, PJM shall file with FERC, under section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the FTRs and ARRs allocated in accordance with sections 5 and 7 of this Schedule 1.

(f) For Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, that elect to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights, Financial Transmission Rights shall be allocated using the same allocation methodology as is specified for the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights in Section 7.4.2 and in accordance with the following:

(i) Subject to subsection (ii) of this section, all Financial Transmission Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Financial Transmission Right requests made when Financial Transmission Rights are allocated for the new zone are not feasible then Financial Transmission Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the MW level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(ii) If any Financial Transmission Right requests that are equal to or less than a Network Service User's Zonal Base Load for the Zone or fifty percent of its transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load, or fifty percent of megawatts of firm service between the receipt and delivery points of Firm Transmission Customers, are not feasible in the annual allocation and auction processes due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Financial Transmission Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights without their being infeasible for all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes, provided that this subsection (ii) shall not apply if the infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, such increased limits shall be included in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions; unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (ii) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (ii), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM~~force majeure~~ that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Financial Transmission Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates Financial Transmission Rights as a result of this subsection (ii) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Financial Transmission Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights.

(iii) In the event that Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another after an initial or annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights in a new zone, Financial Transmission Rights will be reassigned on a proportional basis from the Network Service User losing the load to the Network Service User that is gaining the Network Load.

(g) At least one month prior to the integration of a new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through the new zone, shall receive an initial allocation of Financial Transmission Rights that will be in effect from the date of the integration of the new zone until the next annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights. Such allocation of Financial Transmission Rights shall be made in accordance with Section 5.2.2(f) of this Schedule.

(h) The following congestion charge crediting and uplift (hereinafter, "mitigation") rules shall apply to each new zone first integrated on any date from May 1, 2004 through May 31, 2005 for which FERC orders such mitigation as a result of a filing for such zone of the type specified in subsection (g) above. Where FERC orders such mitigation, such rules shall remain in effect for such zone from the date of its integration through May 31, 2005. All such mitigation shall terminate for all such zones on May 31, 2005.

1.) Mitigation shall apply only to Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers in such a zone that did not receive an allocation of ARRs or FTRs, as applicable, equal to the ARRs or FTRs such customer requested in the allocation for such zone. Only pro-rated requests that complied with the source, sink, and service level limitations stated in section 7.4.2(f) are eligible for mitigation. Such mitigation shall continue for the period stated above if a customer eligible for mitigation renews or rolls over its service agreement, but shall no longer apply if such a customer redirects its service to alternate points on a firm basis.

2.) The affected customers that will receive mitigation will be notified by PJM of the MW amount of mitigation they will receive based on the difference between the amount of ARRs or FTRs requested and the amount of ARRs or FTRs awarded.

3.) Mitigation provided herein applies only to requests submitted and pro-rated in the interim or annual ARR/FTR allocation process conducted for such zones for the time period specified above.

4.) For each affected customer as described above, PJM each month will provide a mitigation credit to offset any congestion charges incurred by such customer in connection with the MW amount for the contract reservation eligible for mitigation as determined under subsection (2) above. In no event shall the amount of any such credit exceed the net amount of any congestion paid (after taking account of any congestion credits) by such customer during such month with respect to such identified MW amount.

5.) The total cost of all such credits for all mitigated customers in a zone each month shall be charged to and collected from all Network Integration Transmission Service and Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers within such zone that received ARRs or FTRs or that received mitigation under this subsection (h), in proportion to each such customer's share of the total allocated ARR/FTR MWs (including mitigation MWs). Mitigation and uplift shall be determined separately for each such zone.

5.2.3 Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

A Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits for each entity holding a Financial Transmission Right shall be determined for each Financial Transmission Right. Each Financial Transmission Right shall be multiplied by the Day-ahead Congestion Price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Financial Transmission Right, calculated as the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the delivery point(s) minus the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the receipt point(s). For the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Zone is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Zone multiplied by the percent of annual peak load assigned to each node in the Zone. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, for the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Residual Metered Load aggregate is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate multiplied by the percent of the annual peak residual load assigned to each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate. When the FTR Target Allocation is positive, the FTR Target Allocation is a credit to the FTR holder. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is a debit to the FTR holder if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Obligation. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is set to zero if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Option. The total Target Allocation for Network Service Users and Transmission Customers for each hour shall be the sum of the Target Allocations associated with all of the Network Service Users' or Transmission Customers' Financial Transmission Rights.

5.2.4 [Reserved.]

5.2.5 Calculation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

(a) The total of all the positive Target Allocations determined as specified above shall be compared to the total Transmission Congestion Charges in each hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market. If the total of the Target

Allocations is less than the total of the Transmission Congestion Charges, the Transmission Congestion Credit for each entity holding an FTR shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining Transmission Congestion Charges shall be distributed as described below in Section 5.2.6 "Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges."

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total Transmission Congestion Charges for the hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market, each holder of Financial Transmission Rights shall be assigned a share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges in proportion to its Target Allocations for Financial Transmission Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Financial Transmission Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Transmission Congestion Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period if all FTR holders did not receive Transmission Congestion Credits equal to their Target Allocations, the Office of the Interconnection shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Transmission Congestion Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient FTRs and the actual Transmission Congestion Credits allocated to those FTR holders. A charge assessed pursuant to this section shall also include any aggregate charge assessed pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and shall be allocated to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. The charge shall be calculated and allocated in accordance with the following methodology:

1. The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of uplift required as {[sum of the total monthly deficiencies in FTR Target Allocations for the Planning Period + the sum of the ARR Target Allocation deficiencies determined pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement] – [sum of the total monthly excess ARR revenues and congestion charges for the Planning Period]}.

2. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

3. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an uplift charge to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total uplift] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

5.2.6 Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges.

(a) Excess Transmission Congestion Charges accumulated in a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during that month as compared to its total Target Allocations for the month.

(b) After the excess Transmission Congestion Charge distribution described in Section 5.2.6(a) is performed, any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during the current Planning Period, including previously distributed excess Transmission Congestion Charges, as compared to its total Target Allocation for the Planning Period.

(c) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a Planning Period shall be distributed to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any Auction Revenue Right deficiencies for that Planning Period.

(d) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after a distribution pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall be distributed to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. Any allocation pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be conducted in accordance with the following methodology:

1. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of the Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

2. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an excess Transmission Congestion Charge credit to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after distributions pursuant to subsection (a)-(c) of this section] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules.

(a) Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on cost-based offers, which are always parameter limited. Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on market-based offers conforming to parameter limitations~~non-price offer parameters~~ ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The ~~Operating Reserve markets~~ Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting, i.e. more flexible, of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues ~~an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared~~ ~~("~~a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert~~")~~; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency, Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iv) For Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency during hot weather operations; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert during hot weather operations; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Hot Weather Alert, or a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert during hot weather operations, for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, p~~P~~arameter limited schedules shall be defined for the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions during hot weather operations, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, and for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years for Capacity Performance Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Cold Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit-specific physically achievable operating parameters for each individual resource on the basis of its operating design characteristics, recognizing that remedial and ongoing investment and maintenance may be required to perform on the basis of those characteristics, for the following parameters:

(i) Economic Minimum;

(ii) Economic Maximum;

(iii) Minimum Down Time;

(iv) Minimum Run Time;

(v) Maximum Daily Starts;

(vi) Maximum Weekly Starts;

(vii) Maximum Run Time;

(viii) Start-up Time; and

(ix) Notification Time.

These unit-specific values shall apply for the generation resource unless it is operating pursuant to an exception from those values under subsection (h) hereof due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. Throughout the analysis process, the Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of a resource's unit-specific parameter limited schedule values.

(c) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generation resources not committed as Capacity Performance Resources:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

Parameter	Minimum Down Time (Hrs)	Minimum Run Time (Hrs)	Maximum Daily Starts	Maximum Weekly Starts	Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 135 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

(d) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, u~~U~~pon receipt of proposed revised parameter limited schedule values from the Market Monitoring Unit, prepared in accordance with the procedures for periodic review included in section II.B.1 of Attachment M - Appendix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file to revise the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix in section 6.6(c) above accordingly. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the values proposed for revising the matrix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file the values that it determines are appropriate.

(e) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, t~~T~~he Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate and provide to Market Sellers for their generation resources unit-specific default values in accordance with section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. The default values set forth in the table in subsection (c) above shall apply for the referenced technology types unless a generation resource is operating pursuant to an exception from the default values under subsection (~~f~~h) due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. For generation resources having the ability to operate on multiple fuels, Market Sellers may submit a parameter limited schedule associated with each fuel type.

(f) For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits shall apply for Capacity Performance Resources, other than Capacity Storage Resources, submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) The combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 24 hours, except when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 14 hours;

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iv) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical operational limitations of the Capacity Performance Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

Capacity Storage Resources that clear in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall:

(i) Have combined start-up and notification times that shall not exceed one hour; and,

(ii) Have a minimum down time that shall not exceed one hour.

(g) For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits for Base Capacity Resources submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) Combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 48 hours;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical limitations of the Base Capacity Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

(~~f~~h) Exceptions to the p~~P~~arameter l~~L~~imited s~~S~~chedule ~~Matrix~~ default or unit-specific values shall be categorized as either a one-time temporary exception, lasting 30 days or less; a period exception, lasting at least 31 days and no more than one year; or a persistent exception, lasting for at least one year.

(i) *Temporary Exceptions*. A temporary exception shall be deemed accepted without prior review by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection upon submission by the Market Seller of the generation resource of written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, at least one business day prior to the commencement of the exception, and shall automatically commence and terminate on the dates specified in such notification, which must be for a period of time lasting 30 days or less, unless the termination date is extended pending a request for a period exception or shortened due to a change in the physical conditions of the unit such that the temporary exception is no longer required. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days following the commencement of the temporary exception its documentation explaining in detail the reasons for the temporary exception, and shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Failure to provide a timely response to such request for additional information shall cause the temporary exception to terminate the following day. The Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing of an early termination of a temporary exception due to changed physical conditions by no later than one business day prior to the early termination date.

Modification of Temporary Exceptions. If, prior to the scheduled termination date, the Market Seller determines that the temporary exception must persist for more than 30 days, the Market Seller must submit to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection a written request to modify the temporary exception to become a period exception or a persistent exception, and provide detailed documentation explaining the reasons for the requested modification of the temporary exception. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operating limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the Market Seller may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits of the resource to support the requested parameters. Such Market Seller shall respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Such request shall be reviewed by the Market Monitoring Unit and must be evaluated by the Office of the Interconnection using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests. Per Section II.B of Attachment M-Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the modification request and provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 days from the date of the modification request. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide its determination whether the request complies with the Tariff and Manuals by no later than 20 days from the date of the modification request. A temporary exception shall be extended and shall not terminate until the date on which the Office of the Interconnection issues its determination of the modification request.

(ii) *Period Exceptions and Persistent Exceptions*. Market Sellers must submit period exception and persistent exception requests to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than the February 28 immediately preceding the twelve month period from June 1 to May 31 during which the exception is requested to commence. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period exception or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operational limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the generation resource may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits for exceptions of the resource to support the requested parameters. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request in accordance with the process set forth in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A Market Seller (i) must submit a parameter limited schedule value consistent with an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit under such process~~,~~ or (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on the parameter limited schedule value, may submit its own value to the Office of the Interconnection and to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than April 8. Each exception request must indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the termination date thereof. The proposed parameter limited schedule value submitted by the Market Seller is subject to approval of the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the requirements of the Tariff and the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection may engage the services of a consultant with technical expertise to evaluate the exception request. After it has completed its evaluation of the exception request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, whether the exception request is approved or denied, by no later than April 15. The effective date of the exception, if approved by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be no earlier than June 1. The Office of the Interconnection's determination for an exception shall continue for the period requested and, if requested, for such longer period as the Office of the Interconnection may determine is supported by the data.

The Market Seller shall provide written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection in their evaluations of the Market Seller's request for a period or persistent exception. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 days after receipt of such notice. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 20 days after receipt of the Market Seller's notice. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the exception no longer complies with the Tariff or Manuals, the default values specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall apply.

(i) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of this Section 6.6 shall only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection for its offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day.

7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

7.4.1 Eligibility.

(a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.

(b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:

> (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
>
> (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
>
> (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:

> (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt-year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the historical generation resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year for the Zone, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each

historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the historical generation resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section

7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

(d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).

(e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.

(f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Point-to-Point Transmission Service, as defined in the PJM Tariff, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under

contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

(g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.

(h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM~~force majeure~~ that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

(j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:

i. The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located outside the PJM Region.

ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.

iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.

iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) , the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.

viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.

xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.

xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.

xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

(a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

(d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.

(e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.

(b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.5.

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

SCHEDULE 2 -
COMPONENTS OF COST

(a) Each Market Participant obligated to sell energy on the PJM Interchange Energy Market at cost-based rates may include the following components or their equivalent in the determination of costs for energy supplied to or from the PJM Region:

For generating units powered by boilers
Firing-up cost
Peak-prepared-for maintenance cost

For generating units powered by machines
Starting cost from cold to synchronized operation
For all generating units
Incremental fuel cost
Incremental maintenance cost
No-load cost during period of operation
Incremental labor cost
Other incremental operating costs

For a generating unit that is subject to operational limitations due to energy or environmental limitations imposed on the generating unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in the PJM Tariff), the Market Participant may include in the calculation of its "other incremental operating costs" an amount reflecting the unit-specific Energy Market Opportunity Costs expected to be incurred. Such unit-specific Energy Market Opportunity Costs are calculated by forecasting Locational Marginal Prices based on future contract prices for electricity using PJM Western Hub forward prices, taking into account historical variability and basis differentials for the bus at which the generating unit is located for the prior three year period immediately preceding the relevant compliance period, and subtract therefrom the forecasted costs to generate energy at the bus at which the generating unit is located, as specified in more detail in PJM Manual 15. If the difference between the forecasted Locational Marginal Prices and forecasted costs to generate energy is negative, the resulting Energy Market Opportunity Cost shall be zero. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Participant may submit a request to PJM for consideration and approval of an alternative method of calculating its Energy Market Opportunity Cost if the standard methodology described herein does not accurately represent the Market Participant's Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

For a generating unit that is subject to operational limitations because it only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, or (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic F~~f~~orce M~~m~~ajeure~~-~~, the Market Participant may include in the calculation of its "other incremental operating costs" an amount reflecting the unit-specific Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs expected to be incurred. Such unit-specific Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs are calculated by forecasting Locational Marginal Prices based on future contract prices for electricity using PJM Western Hub forward prices, taking into account historical variability and basis differentials for the bus at which the generating unit is located for the prior three year period immediately preceding the period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and subtract therefrom the forecasted costs to generate energy at the bus at which the generating unit is located, as specified in more detail in PJM Manual 15. If the difference between the forecasted Locational Marginal Prices and forecasted costs to generate energy is negative, the resulting Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost shall be zero.

(b) All fuel costs shall employ the marginal fuel price experienced by the Member.

(c) The PJM Board, upon consideration of the advice and recommendations of the Members Committee, shall from time to time define in detail the method of determining the costs entering into the said components, and the Members shall adhere to such definitions in the preparation of incremental costs used on the Interconnection.

Attachment B

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff
and PJM Operating Agreement

(Identified by Additional Cover Pages)

(Clean Format)

Sections of the

PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Clean Format)

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ATTACHMENT GG - APPENDIX III – GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Definitions – E - F

1.10A Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion:

"Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion" shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

1.10B Economic Minimum:

The lowest incremental MW output level a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.11 Eligible Customer:

(i) Any electric utility (including any Transmission Owner and any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any person generating electric energy for sale for resale is an Eligible Customer under the Tariff. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Provider or Transmission Owner offer the unbundled transmission service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by a Transmission Owner.

(ii) Any retail customer taking unbundled transmission service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Provider or a Transmission Owner offer the transmission service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by a Transmission Owner, is an Eligible Customer under the Tariff. As used in Part VI, Eligible Customer shall mean only those Eligible Customers that have submitted a Completed Application.

1.11.01 Emergency Condition:

A condition or situation (i) that in the judgment of any Interconnection Party is imminently likely to endanger life or property; or (ii) that in the judgment of the Interconnected Transmission Owner or Transmission Provider is imminently likely (as determined in a non-discriminatory manner) to cause a material adverse effect on the security of, or damage to, the Transmission System, the Interconnection Facilities, or the transmission systems or distribution systems to which the Transmission System is directly or indirectly connected; or (iii) that in the judgment of Interconnection Customer is imminently likely (as determined in a non-discriminatory manner) to cause damage to the Customer Facility or to the Customer Interconnection Facilities. System restoration and black start shall be considered Emergency Conditions, provided that a Generation Interconnection Customer is not obligated by an Interconnection Service Agreement to possess black start capability. Any condition or situation that results from lack of sufficient generating capacity to meet load requirements or that results solely from economic conditions shall not constitute an Emergency Condition, unless one or more of the enumerated conditions or situations identified in this definition also exists.

1.11A Energy Resource:

A generating facility that is not a Capacity Resource.

1.11A.01 Energy Settlement Area:

The bus or distribution of busses that represents the physical location of Network Load and by which the obligations of the Network Customer to PJM are settled.

1.11B Energy Transmission Injection Rights:

The rights to schedule energy deliveries at a specified point on the Transmission System. Energy Transmission Injection Rights may be awarded only to a Merchant D.C. Transmission Facility that connects the Transmission System to another control area. Deliveries scheduled using Energy Transmission Injection Rights have rights similar to those under Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

1.11C Environmental Laws:

Applicable Laws or Regulations relating to pollution or protection of the environment, natural resources or human health and safety.

1.12 Facilities Study:

An engineering study conducted by the Transmission Provider (in coordination with the affected Transmission Owner(s)) to determine the required modifications to the Transmission Provider's Transmission System, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide the requested transmission service or to accommodate an Interconnection Request or Upgrade Request. As used in the Interconnection Service Agreement or Construction Service Agreement, Facilities Study shall mean that certain Facilities Study conducted by Transmission Provider (or at its direction) to determine the design and specification of the Interconnection Facilities necessary to accommodate the New Service Customer's New Service Request in accordance with Section 207 of Part VI of the Tariff.

1.12A Federal Power Act:

The Federal Power Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a, et seq.

1.12B FERC:

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or its successor.

1.13 Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:

Transmission Service under this Tariff that is reserved and/or scheduled between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery pursuant to Part II of this Tariff.

1.13A Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights:

The rights to schedule energy and capacity withdrawals from a Point of Interconnection (as defined in Section 1.33A) of a Merchant Transmission Facility with the Transmission System. Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights may be awarded only to a Merchant D.C. Transmission Facility that connects the Transmission System with another control area. Withdrawals scheduled using Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights have rights similar to those under Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

10.1 Force Majeure for Transmission Service:

An event of force majeure under this section shall mean any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any Curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the party claiming force majeure under this section 10.1 that prevents the Transmission Provider, any Transmission Owner or any Transmission Customer from fulfilling any obligation under this Tariff related to the provision of transmission service. An event of force majeure does not include an act of negligence or intentional wrongdoing. Neither the Transmission Provider, the Transmission Owners, PJMSettlement nor the Transmission Customer will be considered in default as to any obligation under this Tariff related to the provision of transmission service if prevented from fulfilling the obligation due to an event of force majeure as described in this section 10.1. However, a party claiming force majeure whose performance under this Tariff is hindered by an event of force majeure as described in this section 10.1 shall make all reasonable efforts to perform its obligations under this Tariff.

230.3 Loss of Capacity Interconnection Rights:

230.3.1 Operational Standards:

To retain Capacity Interconnection Rights, the Generation Capacity Resource associated with the rights must operate or be capable of operating at the capacity level associated with the rights. Operational capability shall be established consistent with Schedule 9 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region and the PJM Manuals. Generation Capacity Resources that meet these operational standards shall retain their Capacity Interconnection Rights regardless of whether they are available as a Generation Capacity Resource or are making sales outside the PJM Region.

230.3.2 Failure to Meet Operational Standards:

This Section 230.3.2 shall apply only in circumstances other than Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource. In the event a Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the operational standards set forth in Section 230.3.1 of the Tariff for any consecutive three-year period (with the first such period commencing on the date the Interconnection Customer must demonstrate commercial operation of the generating unit(s) as specified in the Interconnection Service Agreement), the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such Generation Capacity Resource will lose its Capacity Interconnection Rights in an amount commensurate with the loss of generating capability. Any period during which the Generation Capacity Resource fails to meet the standards set forth in Section 230.3.1 as a result of an event that meets the standards of a force majeure event as defined in section 9.4 of Attachment O, Appendix 2 of the Tariff shall be excluded from such consecutive three-year period, provided that the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights exercises due diligence to remedy the event. A Generation Capacity Resource that loses Capacity Interconnection Rights pursuant to this section may continue Interconnection Service, to the extent of such lost rights, as an Energy Resource in accordance with (and for the remaining term of) its Interconnection Service Agreement and/or applicable terms of the Tariff.

230.3.3 Replacement of Generation:

In the event of the Deactivation of a Generation Capacity Resource (in accordance with Part V and any Applicable Standards), any Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with such facility shall terminate one year from the Deactivation Date unless the holder of such rights (including any holder that acquired the rights after Deactivation) has submitted a new Generation Interconnection Request up to one year after the Deactivation Date which contemplates use of the same Capacity Interconnection Rights. The Interconnection Customer must provide written notification to the Transmission Provider that it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights on or before the date the Interconnection Customer executes the System Impact Study Agreement associated with the Generation Interconnection Request for which it intends to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, Interconnection Customers in the New Services Queue prior to May 1, 2012 must provide written notice of intent to utilize such Capacity Interconnection Rights when it executes its Facilities Study Agreement or, if it has already executed its Facilities Study Agreement, then by November 1, 2012. Such notification of transfer of Capacity Interconnection Rights shall be posted on Transmission Provider's public website. Such new Generation Interconnection Request may include a request to increase Capacity Interconnection Rights in addition to the replacement of the previously deactivated amount as a single Generation Interconnection Request. Transmission Provider may perform thermal, short circuit, and/or stability studies, as necessary and in accordance with its manuals, due to any changes in the electrical characteristics of any newly proposed equipment, or where there is a change in Point of Interconnection, which may result in the loss of a portion or all of the Capacity Interconnection Rights as determined by such studies.

Upon execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement reflecting its new Interconnection Request, the holder of the Capacity Interconnection Rights will retain only such rights that are commensurate with the size in megawatts of the replacement generation, not to exceed the amount of the holder's Capacity Interconnection Rights associated with the facility upon Deactivation. Any desired increase in Capacity Interconnection Rights must be requested in the new Generation Interconnection Request and be accredited through the applicable procedures in Part IV and Part VI of the Tariff. In the event the new Interconnection Request to which this section refers is or is deemed to be terminated and/or withdrawn for any reason at any time, the pertinent Capacity Interconnection Rights shall not terminate until the end of the one year period from the Deactivation Date.

232.7 Loss of Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights:

232.7.1 Operational Standards:

To retain Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights, the associated Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities must operate or be capable of operating at the capacity level associated with the rights. Operational capability shall be established consistent with applicable criteria stated in the PJM Manuals. Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities that meet these operational standards shall retain their Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights regardless of whether they are used to transmit energy within or to points outside the PJM Region.

232.7.2 Failure To Meet Operational Standards:

In the event that any Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities fail to meet the operational standards set forth in Section 232.7.1 of the Tariff for any consecutive three-year period, the holder(s) of the associated Transmission Injection Rights and Transmission Withdrawal Rights will lose such rights in an amount reflecting the loss of first contingency transfer capability. Any period during which the transmission facility fails to meet the standards set forth in Section 232.7.1 as a result of an event that meets the standards of a force majeure event as defined in section 9.4 of Attachment O, Appendix 2 of the Tariff shall be excluded from such consecutive three-year period, provided that the owner of the Merchant D.C. Transmission Facilities and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities exercises due diligence to remedy the event.

1.3 Definitions.

1.3.1 Acceleration Request.

"Acceleration Request" shall mean a request pursuant to section 1.9.4A of this Schedule to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 or 1.9.4.

1.3.1A Auction Revenue Rights.

"Auction Revenue Rights" or "ARRs" shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Section 7.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B Auction Revenue Rights Credits.

"Auction Revenue Rights Credits" shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B.01 Batch Load Demand Resource.

"Batch Load Demand Resource" shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

1.3.1B.01A Cold Weather Alert.

"Cold Weather Alert" shall mean the notice that PJM provides to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions.

1.3.1B.02 Congestion Price.

"Congestion Price" shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02A Coordinated External Transaction.

"Coordinated External Transaction" shall mean a transaction to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02B Coordinated Transaction Scheduling.

"Coordinated Transaction Scheduling" or "CTS" shall mean the scheduling of Coordinated External Transactions at a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02C CTS Enabled Interface.

"CTS Enabled Interface" shall mean an interface between the PJM Control Area and an adjacent Control Area at which the Office of the Interconnection has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling ("CTS"), designated in Schedule A to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45).

1.3.1B.02D CTS Interface Bid

"CTS Interface Bid" shall mean a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.03 Curtailment Service Provider.

"Curtailment Service Provider" or "CSP" shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Ancillary Services markets, and/or Reliability Pricing Model by causing a reduction in demand.

1.3.1B.04 Day-ahead Congestion Price.

"Day-ahead Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1C Day-ahead Energy Market.

"Day-ahead Energy Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1C.01 Day-ahead Loss Price.

"Day-ahead Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D Day-ahead Prices.

"Day-ahead Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves" shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the Reliability*First* Corporation and SERC.

1.3.1D.02 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement" shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with the Applicable Standards, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

1.3.1D.03 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources" shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

1.3.1D.04 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1D.05 Day-ahead System Energy Price.

"Day-ahead System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E Decrement Bid.

"Decrement Bid" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E.01 Demand Bid

"Demand Bid" shall mean a bid, submitted by a Load Serving Entity in the Day-ahead Energy Market, to purchase energy at its contracted load location, for a specified timeframe and megawatt quantity, that if cleared will result in energy being scheduled at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market and in the physical transfer of energy during the relevant Operating Day.

1.3.1E.02 Demand Bid Limit

"Demand Bid Limit" shall mean the largest MW volume of Demand Bids that may be submitted by a Load Serving Entity for any hour of an Operating Day, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.03 Demand Bid Screening

"Demand Bid Screening" shall mean the process by which Demand Bids are reviewed against the applicable Demand Bid Limit, and rejected if they would exceed that limit, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.04 Demand Resource.

"Demand Resource" shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

1.3.1F Dispatch Rate.

"Dispatch Rate" shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

1.3.1F.01 Emergency Load Response Program

The Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.1G Energy Storage Resource.

"Energy Storage Resource" shall mean flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.

1.3.2 Equivalent Load.

"Equivalent Load" shall mean the sum of a Market Participant's net system requirements to serve its customer load in the PJM Region, if any, plus its net bilateral transactions.

1.3.2A Economic Load Response Participant.

"Economic Load Response Participant" shall mean a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Section 1.5A of this Schedule to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and/or Ancillary Services markets through reductions in demand.

1.3.2A.01 Economic Minimum.

"Economic Minimum" shall mean the lowest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2A.02 Economic Maximum.

"Economic Maximum" shall mean the highest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2B Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

"Energy Market Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of available run hours due to limitations imposed on the unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in PJM Tariff), and (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Energy Market Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same compliance period, which compliance period is determined by the applicable regulatory authority and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Energy Market Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.3 External Market Buyer.

"External Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users outside the PJM Region, or for load in the PJM Region that is not served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.4 External Resource.

"External Resource" shall mean a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the PJM Region.

1.3.5 Financial Transmission Right.

"Financial Transmission Right" or "FTR" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.5A Financial Transmission Right Obligation.

"Financial Transmission Right Obligation" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(b) of this Schedule.

1.3.5B Financial Transmission Right Option.

"Financial Transmission Right Option" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(c) of this Schedule.

1.3.6 Generating Market Buyer.

"Generating Market Buyer" shall mean an Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM Region, or of selling energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere.

1.3.7 Generator Forced Outage.

"Generator Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

1.3.8 Generator Maintenance Outage.

"Generator Maintenance Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform necessary repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility meets the guidelines specified in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9 Generator Planned Outage.

"Generator Planned Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9.01 Hot Weather Alert.

"Hot Weather Alert" shall mean the notice provided by PJM to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for extreme hot and/or humid weather conditions which may cause capacity requirements and/or unit unavailability to be substantially higher than forecast are expected to persist for an extended period.

1.3.9A Increment Offer.

"Increment Offer" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is an offer to sell energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Increment Offer results in scheduled generation at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.9B Interface Pricing Point.

"Interface Pricing Point" shall have the meaning specified in section 2.6A.

1.3.10 Internal Market Buyer.

"Internal Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for ultimate consumption by end-users inside the PJM Region that are served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.11 Inadvertent Interchange.

"Inadvertent Interchange" shall mean the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the individual Control Areas operated by PJM.

1.3.11.01 Load Management.

"Load Management" shall mean a Demand Resource ("DR") as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.11.02 Load Management Event

"Load Management Event" shall mean a) a single temporally contiguous dispatch of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day, or b) multiple dispatches of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day that are temporally contiguous.

1.3.11A Load Reduction Event.

"Load Reduction Event" shall mean a reduction in demand by a Member or Special Member for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.11A.01 Location.

"Location" as used in the Economic Load Response rules shall mean an end-use customer site as defined by the relevant electric distribution company account number.

1.3.11B   Loss Price.

"Loss Price" shall mean the loss component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.12 Market Operations Center.

“Market Operations Center” shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by or on behalf of a Market Participant to communicate and coordinate with the Office of the Interconnection in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.12A Maximum Emergency.

“Maximum Emergency” shall mean the designation of all or part of the output of a generating unit for which the designated output levels may require extraordinary procedures and therefore are available to the Office of the Interconnection only when the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to run. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the aggregate amount of megawatts that are classified as Maximum Emergency.

1.3.13 Maximum Generation Emergency.

“Maximum Generation Emergency” shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection to address either a generation or transmission emergency in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more Generation Capacity Resources, or Non-Retail Behind The Meter Generation resources to operate at its maximum net or gross electrical power output, subject to the equipment stress limits for such Generation Capacity Resource or Non-Retail Behind The Meter resource in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.13A Maximum Generation Emergency Alert.

“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert” shall mean an alert issued by the Office of the Interconnection to notify PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared, for any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market, for all or any part of such Operating Day.

1.3.14 Minimum Generation Emergency.

“Minimum Generation Emergency” shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more generating resources to operate at or below Normal Minimum Generation, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.14A NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator.

“NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator” shall mean the NERC mechanism that is in effect and being used to calculate the distribution of energy, over specific transmission interfaces, from energy transactions.

1.3.14B Net Benefits Test.

"Net Benefits Test" shall mean a calculation to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in price resulting from the dispatch of Economic Load Response exceeds the cost to other loads resulting from the billing unit effects of the load reduction, as specified in Section 3.3A.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.15 Network Resource.

"Network Resource" shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Tariff.

1.3.16 Network Service User.

"Network Service User" shall mean an entity using Network Transmission Service.

1.3.17 Network Transmission Service.

"Network Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff, or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

1.3.17A Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost.

"Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure; and, (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.17B Non-Synchronized Reserve.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of non-emergency generation resources that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is not electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.17C Non-Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources able and assigned to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve in one or more

specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes to increase the energy output by the amount of assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.17D Non-Variable Loads.

"Non-Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.18 Normal Maximum Generation.

"Normal Maximum Generation" shall mean the highest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.19 Normal Minimum Generation.

"Normal Minimum Generation" shall mean the lowest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.20 Offer Data.

"Offer Data" shall mean the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new resource, and other data and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generation resources and Demand Resource(s) for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the PJM Region, and specified for submission to the PJM Interchange Energy Market for such purposes by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.3.21 Office of the Interconnection Control Center.

"Office of the Interconnection Control Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by the Office of the Interconnection to coordinate and direct the operation of the PJM Region and to administer the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including facilities and equipment used to communicate and coordinate with the Market Participants in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.21A On-Site Generators.

"On-Site Generators" shall mean generation facilities (including Behind The Meter Generation) that (i) are not Capacity Resources, (ii) are not injecting into the grid, (iii) are either synchronized or non-synchronized to the Transmission System, and (iv) can be used to reduce demand for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.22 Operating Day.

"Operating Day" shall mean the daily 24 hour period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the PJM Interchange Energy Market are scheduled.

1.3.23 Operating Margin.

"Operating Margin" shall mean the incremental adjustments, measured in megawatts, required in PJM Region operations in order to accommodate, on a first contingency basis, an operating contingency in the PJM Region resulting from operations in an interconnected Control Area. Such adjustments may result in constraints causing Transmission Congestion Charges, or may result in Ancillary Services charges pursuant to the PJM Tariff.

1.3.24 Operating Margin Customer.

"Operating Margin Customer" shall mean a Control Area purchasing Operating Margin pursuant to an agreement between such other Control Area and the LLC.

1.3.24A Pre-Emergency Load Response Program

The Pre-Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during pre-emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.25 PJM Interchange.

"PJM Interchange" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds, or is exceeded by, the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller; or (e) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (f) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.26 PJM Interchange Export.

"PJM Interchange Export" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load is exceeded by the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup sales; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller.

1.3.27 PJM Interchange Import.

"PJM Interchange Import" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup purchases; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (d) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.28 PJM Open Access Same-time Information System.

"PJM Open Access Same-time Information System" shall mean the electronic communication system for the collection and dissemination of information about transmission services in the PJM Region, established and operated by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with FERC standards and requirements.

1.3.28A Planning Period Quarter.

"Planning Period Quarter" shall mean any of the following three month periods in the Planning Period: June, July and August; September, October and November; December, January and February; or March, April and May.

1.3.28B Planning Period Balance.

"Planning Period Balance" shall mean the entire period of time remaining in the Planning Period following the month that a monthly auction is conducted.

1.3.29 Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

"Point-to-Point Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

1.3.29A PRD Curve.

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29B PRD Provider.

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29C PRD Reservation Price.

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29D PRD Substation.

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29E Price Responsive Demand.

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29F Primary Reserve.

"Primary Reserve" shall mean the total reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is comprised of both Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve.

1.3.30 Ramping Capability.

"Ramping Capability" shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

1.3.30.01 Real-time Congestion Price.

"Real-time Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30.02 Real-time Loss Price.

"Real-time Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30A Real-time Prices.

"Real-time Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B Real-time Energy Market.

"Real-time Energy Market" shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B.01 Real-time System Energy Price.

"Real-time System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.31 Regulation.

"Regulation" shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to increase or decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.31.001 Reserve Penalty Factor.

"Reserve Penalty Factor" shall mean the cost, in $/MWh, associated with being unable to meet a specific reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. A Reserve Penalty Factor will be defined for each reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

1.3.31.01 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.

"Residual Auction Revenue Rights" shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability, including the return to service of existing transmission capability, that was not modeled pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement in compliance with section 7.4.2 (h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to section 7.4.2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Part VI of the Tariff; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Schedule 6 of this Agreement for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

1.3.31.01A Residual Metered Load.

"Residual Metered Load" shall mean all load remaining in an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) after all nodally priced load of entities serving load in such area(s) or territory(ies) has been carved out.

1.3.31.02 Special Member.

"Special Member" shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Section 1.5A.02 of this Schedule or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs.

1.3.32 Spot Market Backup.

"Spot Market Backup" shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

1.3.33 Spot Market Energy.

"Spot Market Energy" shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Section 2 of this Schedule.

1.3.33A State Estimator.

"State Estimator" shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Section 2.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.33B Station Power.

"Station Power" shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used for compressors at a compressed air energy storage facility; (iv) used for charging an Energy Storage Resource; or (v) used in association with restoration or black start service.

1.3.33B.001 Sub-meter.

"Sub-meter" shall mean a metering point for electricity consumption that does not include all electricity consumption for the end-use customer as defined by the electric distribution company account number. PJM shall only accept sub-meter load data from end-use customers for measurement and verification of Regulation service as set forth in the Economic Load Response rules and PJM Manuals.

1.3.33B.01 Synchronized Reserve.

"Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.33B.02 Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve in one or more specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.33B.03 System Energy Price.

"System Energy Price" shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.33C Target Allocation.

"Target Allocation" shall mean the allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits as set forth in Section 5.2.3 of this Schedule or the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits as set forth in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.34 Transmission Congestion Charge.

"Transmission Congestion Charge" shall mean a charge attributable to the increased cost of energy delivered at a given load bus when the transmission system serving that load bus is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide energy for third-party transmission losses in accordance with Section 9.3, which shall be calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.1 of this Schedule.

1.3.35 Transmission Congestion Credit.

"Transmission Congestion Credit" shall mean the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Charges credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.36 Transmission Customer.

"Transmission Customer" shall mean an entity using Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

1.3.37 Transmission Forced Outage.

"Transmission Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate removal from service of a transmission facility by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the transmission facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A removal from service of a transmission facility at the request of the Office of the Interconnection to improve transmission capability shall not constitute a Forced Transmission Outage.

1.3.37A Transmission Loading Relief.

"Transmission Loading Relief" shall mean NERC's procedures for preventing operating security limit violations, as implemented by PJM as the security coordinator responsible for maintaining transmission security for the PJM Region.

1.3.37B Transmission Loading Relief Customer.

"Transmission Loading Relief Customer" shall mean an entity that, in accordance with Section 1.10.6A, has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges during Transmission Loading Relief in order to continue energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region that are increasing the cost of energy in the PJM Region.

1.3.37C Transmission Loss Charge.

“Transmission Loss Charge” shall mean the charges to each Market Participant, Network Customer, or Transmission Customer for the cost of energy lost in the transmission of electricity from a generation resource to load as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

1.3.38 Transmission Planned Outage.

“Transmission Planned Outage” shall mean any transmission outage scheduled in advance for a pre-determined duration and which meets the notification requirements for such outages specified in this Agreement or the PJM Manuals.

1.3.38.01 Up-to Congestion Transaction.

“Up-to Congestion Transaction” shall have the meaning specified in Section 1.10.1A of this Schedule.

1.3.38A Variable Loads.

“Variable Loads” shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.38B Virtual Transaction.

“Virtual Transaction” shall mean a Decrement Bid, Increment Offer and/or Up-to Congestion Transaction.

1.3.39 Zonal Base Load.

“Zonal Base Load” shall mean the lowest daily zonal peak load from the twelve month period ending October 21 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which an annual Auction Revenue Right allocation is conducted, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone, when non-extraordinary conditions exist for the applicable twelve month period, as determined by PJM. If the lowest daily zonal peak load from the applicable twelve month period is abnormally low due to extraordinary conditions, as determined by PJM, Zonal Base Load shall mean the next lowest daily zonal peak load that was not affected by extraordinary conditions during the applicable twelve month period, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone. For the purposes of this definition, extraordinary conditions shall mean a significant event, or combination of events, that affect the operation of the bulk power system in an atypical manner and results in an abnormal reduction in the consumption of energy within a Zone.

1.9 Prescheduling.

The following procedures and principles shall govern the prescheduling activities necessary to plan for the reliable operation of the PJM Region and for the efficient operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.9.1 Outage Scheduling.

The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for coordinating and approving requests for outages of generation and transmission facilities as necessary for the reliable operation of the PJM Region, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain records of outages and outage requests of these facilities.

1.9.2 Planned Outages.

(a) A Generator Planned Outage shall be included in Generator Planned Outage schedules established prior to the scheduled start date for the outage, in accordance with standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Generator Planned Outage scheduling for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement and the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of such resources. A Market Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from all or part of a generation resource undergoing an approved Generator Planned Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Planned Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval or withdraw a prior approval. Approval of a Generator Planned Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. The Market Seller shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with an estimate of the amount of time it needs to return to service any Generation Capacity Resource on Generator Planned Outage that is already underway. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds or withdraws its approval of a Generator Planned Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Planned Outage at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall if possible propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market Seller of a Generator Planned Outage.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Transmission Planned Outage scheduling in accordance with procedures specified in the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the PJM Manuals, and in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) Transmission Owners shall use reasonable efforts to submit Transmission Planned Outage schedules one year in advance but by no later than the first of the month six months in advance of the requested start date for all outages that are expected to exceed five working days duration, with regular (at least monthly) updates as new information becomes available.

(ii) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided in accordance with the requirements in subsection (i) above, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in the Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(iii) Transmission Owners shall submit notice of all Transmission Planned Outages to the Office of the Interconnection by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, with updates as new information becomes available.

(iv) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection shall perform this analysis and notify the Transmission Owner in a timely manner if it will require rescheduling of the outage. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in the Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(v) The Office of the Interconnection reserves the right to approve, deny, or reschedule any outage deemed necessary to ensure reliable system operations on a case by case basis regardless of duration or date of submission.

(vi) The Office of the Interconnection shall post notice of Transmission Planned Outages on OASIS upon receipt of such notice from the Transmission Owner; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection shall not post on OASIS notice of any component of a Transmission Planned Outage to the extent such component shall directly reveal a generator outage. In such cases, the Transmission Owner, in addition to providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection as required above, concurrently shall inform the affected Generation Owner of such outage, limiting such communication to that necessary to describe the outage and to coordinate with the Generation Owner on matters of safety to persons, facilities, and equipment. The Transmission Owner shall not notify any other Market Participant of such outage and shall arrange any other necessary coordination through the Office of the Interconnection.

In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that transmission maintenance schedules proposed by one or more Members would significantly affect the efficient and reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may establish alternative schedules, but such alternative shall minimize the economic impact on the Member or Members whose maintenance schedules the Office of the Interconnection proposes to modify.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate resolution of outage or other planning conflicts that may give rise to unreliable system conditions. The Members shall comply with all maintenance schedules established by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.9.3 Generator Maintenance Outages.

(a) A Generator Maintenance Outage may only be scheduled if approved by the Office of the Interconnection prior to the requested start date for the outage, in accordance with subsection (b) hereof and the standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Generator Maintenance Outages for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the procedures specified in the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the Market Seller owning or controlling the output of such resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall approve requests for Generator Maintenance Outages for such a Generation Capacity Resource unless the outage would threaten the adequacy of reserves in, or the reliability of, the PJM Region. A Market Participant shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing an approved full or partial Generator Maintenance Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval, withdraw a prior approval, or rescind a prior approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway. Approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it must rescind its approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway in order to preserve the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection will provide the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource at least 72 hours' notice thereof. The Market Seller shall be required to make the Generation Capacity Resource available for normal operation within 72 hours of such notice. If the generator is not made available for normal operation by 72 hours after the notice of the rescission of the approval of the Generator Maintenance Outage, the remaining time the resource continues on the outage will be classified as a Generator Forced Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds, withdraws or rescinds approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Maintenance Outage at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall, if possible, propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market Seller of a Generator Maintenance Outage.

1.9.4 Forced Outages.

(a) Each Market Seller that owns or controls a pool-scheduled resource, or Generation Capacity Resource whether or not pool-scheduled, shall: (i) advise the Office of the Interconnection of a Generator Forced Outage suffered or anticipated to be suffered by any such resource as promptly as possible; (ii) provide the Office of the Interconnection with the expected date and time that the resource will be made available; and (iii) make a record of the events and circumstances giving rise to the Generator Forced Outage. A Market Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing a Generator Forced Outage. A Generation Capacity Resource committed to PJM loads through an RPM Auction, FRR Capacity Plan, or by designation as a replacement resource under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, that does not deliver all or part of its scheduled energy shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage with respect to such undelivered energy, in accordance with standards and procedures for full and partial Generator Forced Outages specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, and the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive notification of Forced Transmission Outages, and information on the return to service, of Transmission Facilities in the PJM Region in accordance with standards and procedures specified in, as applicable, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the PJM Manuals.

1.9.4A Transmission Outage Acceleration.

(a) Planned Transmission Outages and Forced Transmission Outages otherwise scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 and 1.9.4 respectively of this Schedule may be accelerated or rescheduled at the request of a Generation Owner or other Market Participant in accordance with the terms and conditions of this section 1.9.4A and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Transmission Outages Requiring Coordination With A Specific Generation Owner.

(i) Receipt of Acceleration Request. Prior to a scheduled Planned Transmission Outage associated with the interconnection of a generating unit to the Transmission System, the affected Generation Owner may request that the outage be accelerated or rescheduled.

Such Acceleration Request shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals.

(ii) Determination to Accommodate Acceleration Request. Upon receipt of an Acceleration Request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such Acceleration Request. The affected Transmission Owner shall determine, in its sole discretion, whether to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards, and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. In the event that the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an estimate of the cost to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage and the revised schedule for the transmission outage ("Acceleration Estimate").

(iii) Provision of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that the Generation Owner has met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Generation Owner with the Acceleration Estimate. In the event that the Generation Owner does not meet the creditworthiness standard, the Office of the Interconnection shall not provide the Acceleration Estimate and the transmission outage shall not be accelerated or rescheduled. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate, the Generation Owner, within the time period specified in the PJM Manuals, shall notify the Office of the Interconnection as to whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage pursuant to the terms of the Acceleration Estimate.

(iv) Cost Responsibility. In the event the Generation Owner notifies the Office of the Interconnection that it desires to proceed with the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage pursuant to section 1.9.4A(a)(iii), the Generation Owner shall be solely responsible for actual costs incurred by the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage. The Generation Owner's cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete the outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the Generation Owner. After receipt of such notification, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, the Generation Owner shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of the Generation Owner's decision. In the event the Generation Owner desires not to proceed, the transmission outage shall occur according to normal work practices and the Generation Owner shall be responsible for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage as of the date that the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(c) Transmission Outages That Could Cause Congestion Revenue Inadequacy.

(i) Posting of Transmission Outage. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines that a Planned Transmission Outage or Forced Transmission Outage could exceed five days and could cause congestion revenue inadequacy in excess of $500,000, the Office of the Interconnection shall post a notice of such transmission outage on its internet site. Within the time period and pursuant to the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, any Market Participant may request that such transmission outage be accelerated or rescheduled.

(ii) Determination to Accelerate or Reschedule Transmission Outage. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Request(s) pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(i), the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such request(s). The affected Transmission Owner shall determine in its sole discretion whether to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. If the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an Acceleration Estimate. In the event that Market Participants submit requests which would require different schedules for a transmission outage, the Office of the Interconnection, in consultation with the affected Transmission Owner, shall determine the most effective option, which will be included in the Acceleration Estimate.

(iii) Notification of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of transmission outages have met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Market Participants with the Acceleration Estimate and the number of Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage that meet the creditworthiness standards. After receipt of the Acceleration Request, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each requesting Market Participant meeting the creditworthiness standards shall notify the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage as set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, and if it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, the amount it is willing to pay for such acceleration or rescheduling.

(iv) Evaluation of Acceleration Requests. Upon receipt of Market Participant(s) notifications pursuant to subsection 1.9.4A(b)(iii), the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, based on the amount Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling of the transmission outage, whether the transmission outage should be accelerated or rescheduled. The transmission outage shall be accelerated or rescheduled if the amount that the Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage exceeds the Acceleration Estimate by the following margins: (a) for outages to equipment outside a substation, two times the Acceleration Estimate; and (b) for outages to equipment inside a substation, five times the Acceleration Estimate. These margins are designed to provide a reasonable degree of certainty that the actual costs of accelerating or rescheduling the transmission outage will not exceed the amount the Market Participants are willing to pay. In all events, transmission outages will be accelerated or rescheduled pursuant to requests made under section 1.9.4A(c) only when the requested acceleration or rescheduling would reduce the amount of congestion revenue inadequacy resulting from the outage as determined by the Office of the Interconnection.

(v) Cost Responsibility. Each Market Participant which notifies the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(iii) that it is willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling of a transmission outage shall be responsible for the actual costs of such acceleration or rescheduling on a pro-rata basis based on the amount it specified it was willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling. Market Participants' cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete a transmission outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Market Participants of such increase. Within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each affected Market Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of each affected Market Participant's decision. In the event that, because one or more Market Participants determine not to proceed, there would be insufficient funds to pay for the full cost of accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage, the transmission outage shall not continue to be accelerated or rescheduled and shall occur according to normal work practices. In such instance, the Market Participants shall be responsible on a pro-rata basis for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner as of the date the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(d) Posting Revised Transmission Outages. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on its internet site all revised transmission outage schedules resulting from implementation of this section 1.9.4A, pursuant to the procedures in the PJM Manuals, and simultaneously shall notify affected Market Participants or Generation Owners that submitted Acceleration Requests of the Transmission Owner's agreement to accelerate or reschedule the outage.

1.9.5 Market Participant Responsibilities.

Each Market Participant making a bilateral sale covering a period greater than the following Operating Day from a generating resource located within the PJM Region for delivery outside the PJM Region shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered.

1.9.6 Internal Market Buyer Responsibilities.

Each Internal Market Buyer making a bilateral purchase covering a period greater than the following Operating Day shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered. Each Internal Market Buyer shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with details of any load management agreements with customers that allow the Office of the Interconnection to reduce load under specified circumstances.

1.9.7 Market Seller Responsibilities.

(a) Not less than 30 days before a Market Seller's initial offer to sell energy from a given generation resource on the PJM Interchange Energy Market, the Market Seller shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection the information specified in the Offer Data for new generation resources.

(b) Market Sellers authorized to request market-based start-up and no-load fees may choose to submit such fees on either a market or a cost basis. Market Sellers must elect to submit both start-up and no-load fees on either a market basis or a cost basis and any such election shall be submitted on or before March 31 for the period of April 1 through September 30, and on or before September 30 for the period October 1 through March 31. The election of market-based or cost-based start-up and no-load fees shall remain in effect without change throughout the applicable periods.

(i) If a Market Seller chooses to submit market-based start-up and no-load fees, such Market Seller, in its Offer Data, shall submit the level of such fees to the Office of the Interconnection for each generating unit as to which the Market Seller intends to request such fees. The Office of the Interconnection shall reject any request for start-up and no-load fees in a Market Seller's Offer Data that does not conform to the Market Seller's specification on file with the Office of the Interconnection.

(ii) If a Market Seller chooses to submit cost-based start-up and no-load fees, such fees must be calculated as specified in the PJM Manuals and the Market Seller may change both cost-based fees daily and must change both fees as the associated costs change, but no more frequently than daily.

1.9.8 Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

All Transmission Owners shall regularly update and verify facility ratings, subject to review and approval by PJM, in accordance with the following procedures and the procedures in the PJM Manuals:

(a) Each Transmission Owner shall verify to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection all of its transmission facility ratings two months prior to the beginning of the summer season (i.e., on April 1) and two months prior to the beginning of the winter season (i.e., on October 1) each calendar year, and shall provide detailed data justifying such transmission facility ratings when directed by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) In addition to the seasonal verification of all ratings, each Transmission Owner shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection updates to its transmission facility ratings as soon as such Transmission Owner is aware of any changes. Such Transmission Owner shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with detailed data justifying all such transmission facility ratings changes.

(c) All Transmission Owners shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection formal documentation of any procedure for changing facility ratings under specific conditions, including: the detailed conditions under which such procedures will apply, detailed explanations of such procedures, and detailed calculations justifying such pre-established changes to facility ratings. Such procedures must be updated twice each year consistent with the provisions of this Section.

1.9.9 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall perform seasonal operating studies to assess the forecasted adequacy of generating reserves and of the transmission system, in accordance with the procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain and update tables setting forth Operating Reserve and other reserve objectives as specified in the PJM Manuals and as consistent with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive and process requests for firm and non-firm transmission service in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Tariff.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain such data and information relating to generation and transmission facilities in the PJM Region as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the scheduling and dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain an historical database of all transmission facility ratings, and shall review, and may modify or reject, any submitted change or any submitted procedure for pre-established transmission facility rating changes. Any dispute between a Transmission Owner and the Office of the Interconnection concerning transmission facility ratings shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures in schedule 5 to the Operating Agreement; provided, however, that the rating level determined by the Office of the Interconnection shall govern and be effective during the pendency of any such dispute.

(f) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate with other interconnected Control Area as necessary to manage, alleviate or end an Emergency.

1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer's self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales, or Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in Section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection's forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers' offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM

Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

1.10.1A Day-ahead Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.

(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection: (i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer's intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the

Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed the maximum price that may be specified in the PJM Manuals), if any, at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Scheduling of such transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not dynamically scheduled to such entities pursuant to Section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this type is referred to as an “Up-to Congestion Transaction.” Such Up-to Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum difference between the source and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The source-sink paths on which an Up-to Congestion Transaction may be submitted are limited to those paths posted on the PJM internet site and determined by the Office of the Interconnection using the following criteria:

Step 1: Start with the historic set of eligible nodes that were available as sources and sinks for interchange transactions on the PJM OASIS.

Step 2: Remove from the list of nodes described in Step 1 all load buses below 69 kV.

Step 3: Remove from the resulting set of nodes from Step 2 all generator buses at which no generators of 100 megawatts or more are connected.

Step 4: Remove from the results of Step 3 all electrically equivalent nodes.

(d) Market Sellers wishing to sell into the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy (including energy from hydropower units), demand reductions, Regulation, Operating Reserves or other services for the following Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller's cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource or an Intermittent Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources and Intermittent Resources may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Market Sellers shall not designate as a Maximum Emergency offer any portion of their ICAP committed as a Base Capacity Resource during the months of June through September when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action, or committed as a Capacity Performance Resource at any time during the Delivery Year when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency offers outside of the conditions stipulated above and to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on either a temporary or long-term basis. This includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier's exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generation resource, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such resource on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all Generation Capacity Resources; and

ix) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00, for all Economic Load Response Resources;

x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus [the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor divided by 2]; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provisions of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,100/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the megawatt of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100 per MWh in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $/ΔMW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with start-up and no-load fees, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

(g) Each offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) A Market Seller that wishes to make a generation resource or Demand Resource available to sell Synchronized Reserve shall submit an offer for Synchronized Reserve that shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the energy used by the generation resource to provide the Synchronized Reserve and the generation resource's unit specific opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed the variable operating and maintenance costs for providing Synchronized Reserve plus seven dollars and fifty cents.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, and the offer shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts: (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs).

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Demand Resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Demand Resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. A Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Demand Resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) Market Sellers providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market: 1) a price offer in dollars per megawatt hour; and 2) such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to determine any relevant opportunity costs for the resource(s). The foregoing notwithstanding, to qualify to submit Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves pursuant to this section, the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit energy offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market including start-up and shut-down costs for generation resource and Demand Resources, respectively, and all generation resources that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling

Reserves that a particular resource can provide that service. The MW quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide in a given hour will be determined based on the energy Offer Data submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as detailed in the PJM Manuals.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity's Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

Demand Bid Limit = greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point * 1.3), or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point + 10MW)

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity's highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM's highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity's actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity's expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to Sections 1.10.9 or 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, start-up, no-load and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for start-up and no-load fees, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Section 3 of this Schedule 1. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of start-up and no-load fees, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource's start-up cost, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum

Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

(c) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for start-up or no-load fees.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of dynamic dispatch shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to dynamic dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer's load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer's hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.6A Transmission Loading Relief Customers.

(a) An entity that desires to elect to pay Transmission Congestion Charges in order to continue its energy schedules during an Operating Day over contract paths outside the PJM Region in the event that PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief that otherwise would cause PJM to request security coordinators to curtail such Member’s energy schedules shall:

(i) enter its election on OASIS by 12:00 p.m. of the day before the Operating Day, in accordance with procedures established by PJM, which election shall be applicable for the entire Operating Day; and

(ii) if PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief, provide to PJM, at such time and in accordance with procedures established by PJM, the hourly integrated energy schedules that impacted the PJM Region (as indicated from the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator) during the Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) If an entity has made the election specified in Section (a), then PJM shall not request security coordinators to curtail such entity’s energy transactions, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

(c) In order to make elections under this Section 1.10.6A, an entity must (i) have met the creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection or provided a letter of credit or other form of security acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection, and (ii) have executed either the Agreement, a Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, or other agreement committing to pay all Transmission Congestion Charges incurred under this Section.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection's forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads they serve; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) Not earlier than 4:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant's inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in Section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Section 3.3A of this Schedule. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Sections 2.4 and 2.5 hereof.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, Ancillary Services Markets or Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and Day-ahead Energy Market.

After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets, Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Section 18.17.1 of the PJM Operating Agreement, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants' non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for any generation resource that was not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee.

(c) With respect to a pool-scheduled resource that is included in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller may not change or otherwise modify its offer to sell energy.

(d) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(e) For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this Section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

3.2 Market Buyers.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy Charges.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be paid for all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(d) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of net hourly PJM Interchange for each Market Buyer, including Generating Market Buyers, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. For Internal Market Buyers that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall include determination of the net energy flows from: (i) tie lines; (ii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by the Market Buyer but delivered to it over another entity's Transmission Facilities; (iii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by another entity but which is directly interconnected with the Market Buyer's transmission system; (iv) deliveries pursuant to bilateral energy sales; (v) receipts pursuant to bilateral energy purchases; and (vi) an adjustment to account for the day-ahead PJM Interchange, calculated as the difference between scheduled withdrawals and injections by that Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market. For External Market Buyers and Internal Market Buyers that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall determine the energy scheduled hourly for delivery to the Market Buyer net of the amounts scheduled by such Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) An Internal Market Buyer shall be charged for Spot Market Energy purchases to the extent of its hourly net purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. An External Market Buyer shall be charged for its Spot Market Energy purchases based on the energy delivered to it, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total charge shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Imports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Buyer.

(f) A Generating Market Buyer shall be paid as a Market Seller for sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net sales into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total payment shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Exports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Seller.

3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Internal Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation shall be charged the following for Regulation dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation: (i) the capability Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; (ii) the amounts, if any, described in subsection (f) of this section; and (iii) the performance Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (g) of this section.

(b) Each Market Seller and Generating Market Buyer shall be credited for each of its resources supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined at a time to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection which shall be no earlier than the day before the Operating Day. In accordance with the PJM Manuals, the total Regulation market-clearing price shall be calculated by optimizing the dispatch profile to obtain the lowest cost combination set of resources that satisfies the Regulation requirement. The market-clearing price for each regulating hour shall be equal to the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during that hour. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the

expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Seller or Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and for the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour and the following shoulder hour during which the Generating Market Buyer or Market Seller provided Regulation. The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in the preceding shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in the following shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the following shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market hour.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

Correlation Score = $r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5\ Min);}$
δ=0 to 5 Min

where δ is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

Delay Score = Abs ((δ- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error (ε) as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

Energy Score = 1 - 1/n $\sum$ Abs (Error);

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n = the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the hourly accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its physically determined parameter limitations due to external requirements such as fuel delivery arrangements, for example, will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

Consistent with Sections 1.10.1 and 6.6 hereof, resources with notification or start up times greater than one day that are committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each hour the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any

Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG}, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG} where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller's wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

> LMPDMW equals the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;
>
> AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;
>
> URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

In the event the Office of the Interconnection experiences a technical problem or malfunction with its wind forecasting tool that results in an erroneous forecast for a wind resource during a period of time for which the wind resource is eligible for lost opportunity cost, the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller will attempt to reach a mutually agreeable forecast value for settlement purposes. If the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller do not come to mutual agreement on an acceptable forecast value, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the forecast value that it determines is appropriate.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (1) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals; (2) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (3) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (4) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the hours that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the hours that the offer is economic. The hours that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the hours that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the hours in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any hours required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\mathbf{Ramp\_Request}_t = \left(\mathbf{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathbf{AOutput}_{t-1}\right) / \left(\mathbf{UDSLAtime}_{t-1}\right)$$

$$\mathbf{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathbf{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\mathbf{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathbf{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined n section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in subsections (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price less the hourly integrated real-time LMP, with the exception of those hours in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the hourly integrated amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized

Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is the average of the five-minute Locational Marginal Prices calculated during the Synchronized Reserve Event plus an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor and the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor and the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) In determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource times (B) the megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource, and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Seller in excess of that Market Seller's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the remainder of the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Seller's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during an hour than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that hour due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the

Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Non-Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in paragraph (f) of this section.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve requirement. When the Primary Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve will be determined as the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Primary Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) In determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous hours the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the

Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the MW obligation in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The cost of credits allocated to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources pursuant to this section shall be charged to Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region based on load ratio share (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero), provided that a Load-Serving Entity may satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation, which is equal to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the Load-Serving Entity's load ratio share for the PJM Region, through one or any combination of the following: 1) the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market; 2) and bilateral arrangements. The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges allocated pursuant to this section shall reflect any portion of a Load-Serving Entity's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation that is met by bilateral arrangement(s).

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the

Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP - UB)}

where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)}where:

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the

Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each hour of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each hour of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of hourly energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each hour of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Buyer in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Buyer.

Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Buyer's internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Buyer that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Buyer, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Buyer and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

5.2 Transmission Congestion Credit Calculation.

5.2.1 Eligibility.

(a) Except as provided in Section 5.2.1(b), each holder of a Financial Transmission Right shall receive as a Transmission Congestion Credit a proportional share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges collected for each constrained hour.

(b) If a holder of a Financial Transmission Right between specified delivery and receipt buses acquired the Financial Transmission Right in a Financial Transmission Rights auction (the procedures for which are set forth in Part 7 of this Schedule 1) and (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt buses of the Financial Transmission Right or had an Up-to Congestion Transaction that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a path at or near the path of the Financial Transmission Right; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer, Decrement Bid or Up-to Congestion Transaction is that the difference in Locational Marginal Prices in the Day-ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt buses is greater than the difference in Locational Marginal Prices between such delivery and receipt buses in the Real-time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit, associated with such Financial Transmission Right in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount that the Market Participant paid for the Financial Transmission Right in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) For purposes of Section 5.2.1(b) a bus shall be considered at or near the Financial Transmission Right delivery or receipt bus if seventy-five percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that bus and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus is reflected in the constrained path between the subject Financial Transmission Right delivery and receipt buses that were acquired in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(d) The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits pursuant to this section and section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the FTR holder. If the Office of the Interconnection agrees with such calculation, then it shall impose the forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit accordingly. If the Office of the Interconnection does not agree with the calculation, then it shall impose a forfeiture of Transmission Congestion Credit consistent with its determination. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the Office of the Interconnection's determination, it may exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns and may request an adjustment. This provision is duplicated in section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. An FTR holder objecting to the application of this rule shall have recourse to the Commission for review of the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to its trading activity.

5.2.2 Financial Transmission Rights.

(a) Transmission Congestion Credits will be calculated based upon the Financial Transmission Rights held at the time of the constrained hour. Except as provided in subsection (e) below, Financial Transmission Rights shall be auctioned as set forth in Section 7.

(b) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is negative (a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(c) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right when that difference is positive. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is zero (neither a benefit nor a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(d) In addition to transactions with PJMSettlement in the Financial Transmission Rights auctions administered by the Office of the Interconnection, a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period, may be sold or otherwise transferred to a third party by bilateral agreement, subject to compliance with such procedures as may be established by the Office of the Interconnection for verification of the rights of the purchaser or transferee.

(i) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer to a third party a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period. Such bilateral transactions shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transactions for the transfer of Financial Transmission Rights, the rights and obligations pertaining to the Financial Transmission Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transaction shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. Such bilateral transactions shall not modify the location or reconfigure the Financial Transmission Rights. In no event shall the purchase and sale of a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to a bilateral transaction constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(iii) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any Financial Transmission Right Obligation. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations, including meeting applicable creditworthiness requirements, transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Financial Transmission Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Financial Transmission Rights shall continue to receive all Transmission Congestion Credits attributable to the Financial Transmission Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Financial Transmission Rights.

(iv) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the transferred Financial Transmission Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transaction.

(v) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(vi) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

(e) Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, at their election, may receive a direct allocation of Financial Transmission Rights instead of an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers may make this election for the succeeding two annual FTR auctions after the integration of the new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Such election shall be made prior to the commencement of each annual FTR auction. For purposes of this election, the Allegheny Power Zone shall be considered a new zone with respect to the annual Financial Transmission Right auction in 2003 and 2004. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers in new PJM zones that elect not to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights shall receive allocations of Auction Revenue Rights. During the annual allocation process, the Financial Transmission Right allocation for new PJM zones shall be performed simultaneously with the Auction Revenue Rights allocations in existing and new PJM zones. Prior to the effective date of the initial allocation of FTRs in a new PJM Zone, PJM shall file with FERC, under section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the FTRs and ARRs allocated in accordance with sections 5 and 7 of this Schedule 1.

(f) For Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, that elect to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights, Financial Transmission Rights shall be allocated using the same allocation methodology as is specified for the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights in Section 7.4.2 and in accordance with the following:

(i) Subject to subsection (ii) of this section, all Financial Transmission Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Financial Transmission Right requests made when Financial Transmission Rights are allocated for the new zone are not feasible then Financial Transmission Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the MW level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(ii) If any Financial Transmission Right requests that are equal to or less than a Network Service User's Zonal Base Load for the Zone or fifty percent of its transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load, or fifty percent of megawatts of firm service between the receipt and delivery points of Firm Transmission Customers, are not feasible in the annual allocation and auction processes due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Financial Transmission Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights without their being infeasible for all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes, provided that this subsection (ii) shall not apply if the infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, such increased limits shall be included in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions; unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (ii) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (ii), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Financial Transmission Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates Financial Transmission Rights as a result of this subsection (ii) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Financial Transmission Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights.

(iii) In the event that Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another after an initial or annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights in a new zone, Financial Transmission Rights will be reassigned on a proportional basis from the Network Service User losing the load to the Network Service User that is gaining the Network Load.

(g) At least one month prior to the integration of a new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through the new zone, shall receive an initial allocation of Financial Transmission Rights that will be in effect from the date of the integration of the new zone until the next annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights. Such allocation of Financial Transmission Rights shall be made in accordance with Section 5.2.2(f) of this Schedule.

(h) The following congestion charge crediting and uplift (hereinafter, "mitigation") rules shall apply to each new zone first integrated on any date from May 1, 2004 through May 31, 2005 for which FERC orders such mitigation as a result of a filing for such zone of the type specified in subsection (g) above. Where FERC orders such mitigation, such rules shall remain in effect for such zone from the date of its integration through May 31, 2005. All such mitigation shall terminate for all such zones on May 31, 2005.

1.) Mitigation shall apply only to Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers in such a zone that did not receive an allocation of ARRs or FTRs, as applicable, equal to the ARRs or FTRs such customer requested in the allocation for such zone. Only pro-rated requests that complied with the source, sink, and service level limitations stated in section 7.4.2(f) are eligible for mitigation. Such mitigation shall continue for the period stated above if a customer eligible for mitigation renews or rolls over its service agreement, but shall no longer apply if such a customer redirects its service to alternate points on a firm basis.

2.) The affected customers that will receive mitigation will be notified by PJM of the MW amount of mitigation they will receive based on the difference between the amount of ARRs or FTRs requested and the amount of ARRs or FTRs awarded.

3.) Mitigation provided herein applies only to requests submitted and pro-rated in the interim or annual ARR/FTR allocation process conducted for such zones for the time period specified above.

4.) For each affected customer as described above, PJM each month will provide a mitigation credit to offset any congestion charges incurred by such customer in connection with the MW amount for the contract reservation eligible for mitigation as determined under subsection (2) above. In no event shall the amount of any such credit exceed the net amount of any congestion paid (after taking account of any congestion credits) by such customer during such month with respect to such identified MW amount.

5.) The total cost of all such credits for all mitigated customers in a zone each month shall be charged to and collected from all Network Integration Transmission Service and Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers within such zone that received ARRs or FTRs or that received mitigation under this subsection (h), in proportion to each such customer's share of the total allocated ARR/FTR MWs (including mitigation MWs). Mitigation and uplift shall be determined separately for each such zone.

5.2.3 Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

A Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits for each entity holding a Financial Transmission Right shall be determined for each Financial Transmission Right. Each Financial Transmission Right shall be multiplied by the Day-ahead Congestion Price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Financial Transmission Right, calculated as the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the delivery point(s) minus the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the receipt point(s). For the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Zone is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Zone multiplied by the percent of annual peak load assigned to each node in the Zone. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, for the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Residual Metered Load aggregate is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate multiplied by the percent of the annual peak residual load assigned to each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate. When the FTR Target Allocation is positive, the FTR Target Allocation is a credit to the FTR holder. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is a debit to the FTR holder if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Obligation. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is set to zero if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Option. The total Target Allocation for Network Service Users and Transmission Customers for each hour shall be the sum of the Target Allocations associated with all of the Network Service Users' or Transmission Customers' Financial Transmission Rights.

5.2.4 [Reserved.]

5.2.5 Calculation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

(a) The total of all the positive Target Allocations determined as specified above shall be compared to the total Transmission Congestion Charges in each hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market. If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total of the Transmission Congestion Charges, the Transmission Congestion Credit for each entity holding an FTR shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining Transmission Congestion Charges shall be distributed as described below in Section 5.2.6 "Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges."

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total Transmission Congestion Charges for the hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market, each holder of Financial Transmission Rights shall be assigned a share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges in proportion to its Target Allocations for Financial Transmission Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Financial Transmission Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Transmission Congestion Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period if all FTR holders did not receive Transmission Congestion Credits equal to their Target Allocations, the Office of the Interconnection shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Transmission Congestion Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient FTRs and the actual Transmission Congestion Credits allocated to those FTR holders. A charge assessed pursuant to this section shall also include any aggregate charge assessed pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and shall be allocated to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. The charge shall be calculated and allocated in accordance with the following methodology:

1. The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of uplift required as {[sum of the total monthly deficiencies in FTR Target Allocations for the Planning Period + the sum of the ARR Target Allocation deficiencies determined pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement] – [sum of the total monthly excess ARR revenues and congestion charges for the Planning Period]}.

2. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

3. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an uplift charge to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total uplift] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

5.2.6 Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges.

(a) Excess Transmission Congestion Charges accumulated in a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during that month as compared to its total Target Allocations for the month.

(b) After the excess Transmission Congestion Charge distribution described in Section 5.2.6(a) is performed, any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during the current Planning Period, including previously distributed excess Transmission Congestion Charges, as compared to its total Target Allocation for the Planning Period.

(c) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a Planning Period shall be distributed to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any Auction Revenue Right deficiencies for that Planning Period.

(d) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after a distribution pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall be distributed to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. Any allocation pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be conducted in accordance with the following methodology:

1. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of the Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

2. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an excess Transmission Congestion Charge credit to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after distributions pursuant to subsection (a)-(c) of this section] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules.

(a) Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on cost-based offers, which are always parameter limited. Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on market-based offers conforming to parameter limitations ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting, i.e. more flexible, of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency, Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iv) For Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency during hot weather operations; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert during hot weather operations; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Hot Weather Alert, or a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert during hot weather operations, for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, parameter limited schedules shall be defined for the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions during hot weather operations, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, and for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years for Capacity Performance Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Cold Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit-specific physically achievable operating parameters for each individual resource on the basis of its operating design characteristics, recognizing that remedial and ongoing investment and maintenance may be required to perform on the basis of those characteristics, for the following parameters:

(i) Economic Minimum;

(ii) Economic Maximum;

(iii) Minimum Down Time;

(iv) Minimum Run Time;

(v) Maximum Daily Starts;

(vi) Maximum Weekly Starts;

(vii) Maximum Run Time;

(viii) Start-up Time; and

(ix) Notification Time.

These unit-specific values shall apply for the generation resource unless it is operating pursuant to an exception from those values under subsection (h) hereof due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. Throughout the analysis process, the Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of a resource's unit-specific parameter limited schedule values.

(c) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generation resources not committed as Capacity Performance Resources:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

Parameter	Minimum Down Time (Hrs)	Minimum Run Time (Hrs)	Maximum Daily Starts	Maximum Weekly Starts	Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 135 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

(d) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, upon receipt of proposed revised parameter limited schedule values from the Market Monitoring Unit, prepared in accordance with the procedures for periodic review included in section II.B.1 of Attachment M - Appendix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file to revise the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix in section 6.6(c) above accordingly. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the values proposed for revising the matrix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file the values that it determines are appropriate.

(e) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate and provide to Market Sellers for their generation resources unit-specific default values in accordance with section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. The default values set forth in the table in subsection (c) above shall apply for the referenced technology types unless a generation resource is operating pursuant to an exception from the default values under subsection (h) due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. For generation resources having the ability to operate on multiple fuels, Market Sellers may submit a parameter limited schedule associated with each fuel type.

(f) For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits shall apply for Capacity Performance Resources, other than Capacity Storage Resources, submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) The combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 24 hours, except when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 14 hours;

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iv) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical operational limitations of the Capacity Performance Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

Capacity Storage Resources that clear in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall:

(i) Have combined start-up and notification times that shall not exceed one hour; and,

(ii) Have a minimum down time that shall not exceed one hour.

(g) For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits for Base Capacity Resources submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) Combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 48 hours;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical limitations of the Base Capacity Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

(h) Exceptions to the parameter limited schedule default or unit-specific values shall be categorized as either a one-time temporary exception, lasting 30 days or less; a period exception, lasting at least 31 days and no more than one year; or a persistent exception, lasting for at least one year.

(i) *Temporary Exceptions*. A temporary exception shall be deemed accepted without prior review by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection upon submission by the Market Seller of the generation resource of written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, at least one business day prior to the commencement of the exception, and shall automatically commence and terminate on the dates specified in such notification, which must be for a period of time lasting 30 days or less, unless the termination date is extended pending a request for a period exception or shortened due to a change in the physical conditions of the unit such that the temporary exception is no longer required. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days following the commencement of the temporary exception its documentation explaining in detail the reasons for the temporary exception, and shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Failure to provide a timely response to such request for additional information shall cause the temporary exception to terminate the following day. The Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing of an early termination of a temporary exception due to changed physical conditions by no later than one business day prior to the early termination date.

Modification of Temporary Exceptions. If, prior to the scheduled termination date, the Market Seller determines that the temporary exception must persist for more than 30 days, the Market Seller must submit to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection a written request to modify the temporary exception to become a period exception or a persistent exception, and provide detailed documentation explaining the reasons for the requested modification of the temporary exception. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operating limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the Market Seller may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits of the resource to support the requested parameters. Such Market Seller shall respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Such request shall be reviewed by the Market Monitoring Unit and must be evaluated by the Office of the Interconnection using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests. Per Section II.B of Attachment M-Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the modification request and provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 days from the date of the modification request. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide its determination whether the request complies with the Tariff and Manuals by no later than 20 days from the date of the modification request. A temporary exception shall be extended and shall not terminate until the date on which the Office of the Interconnection issues its determination of the modification request.

(ii) *Period Exceptions and Persistent Exceptions*. Market Sellers must submit period exception and persistent exception requests to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than the February 28 immediately preceding the twelve month period from June 1 to May 31 during which the exception is requested to commence. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period exception or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operational limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the generation resource may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits for exceptions of the resource to support the requested parameters. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request in accordance with the process set forth in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A Market Seller (i) must submit a parameter limited schedule value consistent with an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on the parameter limited schedule value, may submit its own value to the Office of the Interconnection and to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than April 8. Each exception request must indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the termination date thereof. The proposed parameter limited schedule value submitted by the Market Seller is subject to approval of the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the requirements of the Tariff and the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection may engage the services of a consultant with technical expertise to evaluate the exception request. After it has completed its evaluation of the exception request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring

Unit, whether the exception request is approved or denied, by no later than April 15. The effective date of the exception, if approved by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be no earlier than June 1. The Office of the Interconnection's determination for an exception shall continue for the period requested and, if requested, for such longer period as the Office of the Interconnection may determine is supported by the data.

The Market Seller shall provide written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection in their evaluations of the Market Seller's request for a period or persistent exception. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 days after receipt of such notice. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 20 days after receipt of the Market Seller's notice. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the exception no longer complies with the Tariff or Manuals, the default values specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall apply.

(i) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of this Section 6.6 shall only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection for its offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day.

7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

7.4.1 Eligibility.

(a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.

(b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:

> (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
>
> (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
>
> (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:

> (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt-year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the historical generation resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year for the Zone, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each

historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the historical generation resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section

7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

(d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).

(e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.

(f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Point-to-Point Transmission Service, as defined in the PJM Tariff, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under

contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

(g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.

(h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

(j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:

i. The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located outside the PJM Region.

ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.

iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.

iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) , the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.

viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.

xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.

xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.

xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

(a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

(d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.

(e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.

(b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.5.

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

ATTACHMENT M – APPENDIX

I. CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA AND INFORMATION

A. Party Access:

1. No Member shall have a right hereunder to receive or review any documents, data or other information of another Member, including documents, data or other information provided to the Market Monitoring Unit, to the extent such documents, data or information have been designated as confidential pursuant to the procedures adopted by the Market Monitoring Unit or to the extent that they have been designated as confidential by such other Member; provided, however, a Member may receive and review any composite documents, data and other information that may be developed based on such confidential documents, data or information if the composite does not disclose any individual Member's confidential data or information.

2. Except as may be provided in this Appendix, the Plan, the PJM Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, the Market Monitoring Unit shall not disclose to PJM Members or to third parties, any documents, data, or other information of a Member or entity applying for Membership, to the extent such documents, data, or other information has been designated confidential pursuant to the procedures adopted by the Market Monitoring Unit or by such Member or entity applying for membership; provided that nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Market Monitoring Unit from providing any such confidential information to its agents, representatives, or contractors to the extent that such person or entity is bound by an obligation to maintain such confidentiality.

The Market Monitoring Unit, its designated agents, representatives, and contractors shall maintain as confidential the electronic tag ("e-Tag") data of an e-Tag Author or Balancing Authority (defined as those terms are used in FERC Order No. 771) to the same extent as Member data under this Section I. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Market Monitoring Unit from sharing with the market monitor of another Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO"), Independent System Operator ("ISO"), upon their request, the e-Tags of an e-Tag Author or Balancing Authority for intra-PJM Region transactions and interchange transactions scheduled to flow into, out of or through the PJM Region, to the extent such market monitor has requested such information as part of its investigation of possible market violations or market design flaws, and to the extent that such market monitor is bound by a tariff provision requiring that the e-Tag data be maintained as confidential, or in the absence of a tariff requirement governing confidentiality, a written agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit consistent with FERC Order No. 771, and any clarifying orders and implementing regulations.

The Market Monitoring Unit shall collect and use confidential information only in connection with its authority under this Appendix, the Plan, the PJM Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff and the retention of such information shall be in accordance with the Office of the Interconnection's data retention policies.

3. Nothing contained herein shall prevent the Market Monitoring Unit from releasing a Member's confidential data or information to a third party provided that the Member has

delivered to the Market Monitoring Unit specific, written authorization for such release setting forth the data or information to be released, to whom such release is authorized, and the period of time for which such release shall be authorized. The Market Monitoring Unit shall limit the release of a Member's confidential data or information to that specific authorization received from the Member. Nothing herein shall prohibit a Member from withdrawing such authorization upon written notice to the Market Monitoring Unit, who shall cease such release as soon as practicable after receipt of such withdrawal notice.

4. Reciprocal provisions to this Section I hereof, delineating the confidentiality requirements of the Office of the Interconnection and PJM members, are set forth in Section 18.17 of the PJM Operating Agreement.

B. <u>Required Disclosure</u>:

1. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing section to the contrary, and subject to the provisions of Section I.C below, if the Market Monitoring Unit is required by applicable law, order, or in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings, to disclose to third parties, information that is otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to the PJM Tariff, PJM Operating Agreement, Attachment M or this Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit may make disclosure of such information; provided, however, that as soon as the Market Monitoring Unit learns of the disclosure requirement and prior to making disclosure, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the affected Member or Members of the requirement and the terms thereof and the affected Member or Members may direct, at their sole discretion and cost, any challenge to or defense against the disclosure requirement. The Market Monitoring Unit shall cooperate with such affected Members to the maximum extent practicable to minimize the disclosure of the information consistent with applicable law. The Market Monitoring Unit shall cooperate with the affected Members to obtain proprietary or confidential treatment of such information by the person to whom such information is disclosed prior to any such disclosure.

2. Nothing in this Section I shall prohibit or otherwise limit the Market Monitoring Unit's use of information covered herein if such information was: (i) previously known to the Market Monitoring Unit without an obligation of confidentiality; (ii) independently developed by or for the Office of the Interconnection and/or the PJM Market Monitor using non-confidential information; (iii) acquired by the Office of the Interconnection and/or the PJM Market Monitor from a third party which is not, to the Office of the Market Monitoring Unit's knowledge, under an obligation of confidence with respect to such information; (iv) which is or becomes publicly available other than through a manner inconsistent with this Section I.

3. The Market Monitoring Unit shall impose on any contractors retained to provide technical support or otherwise to assist with the implementation of the Plan or this Appendix a contractual duty of confidentiality consistent with the Plan or this Appendix. A Member shall not be obligated to provide confidential or proprietary information to any contractor that does not assume such a duty of confidentiality, and the Market Monitoring Unit shall not provide any such information to any such contractor without the express written permission of the Member providing the information.

C. <u>Disclosure to FERC and CFTC</u>:

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Section I to the contrary, if the FERC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") or the staff of those commissions, during the course of an investigation or otherwise, requests information from the Market Monitoring Unit that is otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to the PJM Tariff, the PJM Operating Agreement, the Plan or this Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall provide the requested information to the FERC, CFTC or their staff, within the time provided for in the request for information. In providing the information to the FERC or its staff, the Market Monitoring Unit may request, consistent with 18 C.F.R. §§ 1b.20 and 388.112, or to the CFTC or its staff, the Market Monitoring Unit may request, consistent with 17 C.F.R. §§ 11.3 and 145.9, that the information be treated as confidential and non-public by the respective commission and its staff and that the information be withheld from public disclosure. The Market Monitoring Unit shall promptly notify any affected Member(s) if the Market Monitoring Unit receives from the FERC, CFTC or their staff, written notice that the commission has decided to release publicly or has asked for comment on whether such commission should release publicly, confidential information previously provided to a commission Market Monitoring Unit.

2. The foregoing Section I.C.1 shall not apply to requests for production of information under Subpart D of the FERC's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR Part 385) in proceedings before FERC and its administrative law judges. In all such proceedings, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall follow the procedures in Section I.B.

D. <u>Disclosure to Authorized Commissions</u>:

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Section I to the contrary, the Market Monitoring Unit shall disclose confidential information, otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to the PJM Tariff, the PJM Operating Agreement, the Plan or this Appendix, to an Authorized Commission under the following conditions:

(i) The Authorized Commission has provided the FERC with a properly executed Certification in the form attached to the PJM Operating Agreement as Schedule 10A. Upon receipt of the Authorized Commission's Certification, the FERC shall provide public notice of the Authorized Commission's filing pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 385.2009. If any interested party disputes the accuracy and adequacy of the representations contained in the Authorized Commission's Certification, that party may file a protest with the FERC within 14 days of the date of such notice, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 385.211. The Authorized Commission may file a response to any such protest within seven days. Each party shall bear its own costs in connection with such a protest proceeding. If there are material changes in law that affect the accuracy and adequacy of the representations in the Certification filed with the FERC, the Authorized Commission shall, within thirty (30) days, submit an amended Certification identifying such changes. Any such amended Certification shall be subject to the same procedures for comment and review by the FERC as set forth above in this paragraph.

(ii) Neither the Office of the Interconnection nor the Market Monitoring Unit may disclose data to an Authorized Commission during the FERC's consideration of the Certification and any filed protests. If the FERC does not act upon an Authorized Commission's Certification within 90 days of the date of filing, the Certification shall be deemed approved and the Authorized Commission shall be permitted to receive confidential information pursuant to this Section I. In the event that an interested party protests the Authorized Commission's Certification and the FERC approves the Certification, that party may not challenge any Information Request made by the Authorized Commission on the grounds that the Authorized Commission is unable to protect the confidentiality of the information requested, in the absence of a showing of changed circumstances.

(iii) Any confidential information provided to an Authorized Commission pursuant to this Section I shall not be further disclosed by the recipient Authorized Commission except by order of the FERC.

(iv) The Market Monitoring Unit shall be expressly entitled to rely upon such Authorized Commission Certifications in providing confidential information to the Authorized Commission, and shall in no event be liable, or subject to damages or claims of any kind or nature hereunder, due to the ineffectiveness or inaccuracy of such Authorized Commission Certifications.

(v) The Authorized Commission may provide confidential information obtained from the Market Monitoring Unit to such of its employees, attorneys and contractors as needed to examine or handle that information in the course and scope of their work on behalf of the Authorized Commission, provided that (a) the Authorized Commission has internal procedures in place, pursuant to the Certification, to ensure that each person receiving such information agrees to protect the confidentiality of such information (such employees, attorneys or contractors to be defined hereinafter as "Authorized Persons"); (b) the Authorized Commission provides, pursuant to the Certification, a list of such Authorized Persons to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit and updates such list, as necessary, every ninety (90) days; and (c) any third-party contractors provided access to confidential information sign a nondisclosure agreement in the form attached to the PJM Operating Agreement as Schedule 10 before being provided access to any such confidential information.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit may, in the course of discussions with an Authorized Person, orally disclose information otherwise required to be maintained in confidence, without the need for a prior Information Request. Such oral disclosures shall provide enough information to enable the Authorized Person or the Authorized Commission with which that Authorized Person is associated to determine whether additional Information Requests are appropriate. The Market Monitoring Unit will not make any written or electronic disclosures of confidential information to the Authorized Person pursuant to this Section I.D.2. In any such discussions, the Market Monitoring Unit shall ensure that the individual or individuals receiving such confidential information are Authorized Persons as defined herein, orally designate confidential information that is disclosed, and refrain from identifying any specific Affected Member whose information is disclosed. The Market Monitoring Unit shall also be authorized to assist Authorized Persons in interpreting confidential information that is disclosed. The Market

Monitoring Unit shall provide any Affected Member with oral notice of any oral disclosure immediately, but not later than one (1) business day after the oral disclosure. Such oral notice to the Affected Member shall include the substance of the oral disclosure, but shall not reveal any confidential information of any other Member and must be received by the Affected Member before the name of the Affected Member is released to the Authorized Person; provided however, disclosure of the identity of the Affected Party must be made to the Authorized Commission with which the Authorized Person is associated within two (2) business days of the initial oral disclosure.

3. As regards Information Requests:

(i) Information Requests to the Office of the Interconnection and/or Market Monitoring Unit by an Authorized Commission shall be in writing, which shall include electronic communications, addressed to the Market Monitoring Unit, and shall: (a) describe the information sought in sufficient detail to allow a response to the Information Request; (b) provide a general description of the purpose of the Information Request; (c) state the time period for which confidential information is requested; and (d) re-affirm that only Authorized Persons shall have access to the confidential information requested. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide an Affected Member with written notice, which shall include electronic communication, of an Information Request by an Authorized Commission as soon as possible, but not later than two (2) business days after the receipt of the Information Request.

(ii) Subject to the provisions of Section I.D.3(iii) below, the Market Monitoring Unit shall supply confidential information to the Authorized Commission in response to any Information Request within five (5) business days of the receipt of the Information Request, to the extent that the requested confidential information can be made available within such period; provided however, that in no event shall confidential information be released prior to the end of the fourth (4th) business day without the express consent of the Affected Member. To the extent that the Market Monitoring Unit cannot reasonably prepare and deliver the requested confidential information within such five (5) day period, it shall, within such period, provide the Authorized Commission with a written schedule for the provision of such remaining confidential information. Upon providing confidential information to the Authorized Commission, the Market Monitoring Unit shall either provide a copy of the confidential information to the Affected Member(s), or provide a listing of the confidential information disclosed; provided, however, that the Market Monitoring Unit shall not reveal any Member's confidential information to any other Member.

(iii) Notwithstanding Section I.D.3(ii), above, should the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit or an Affected Member object to an Information Request or any portion thereof, any of them may, within four (4) business days following the Market Monitoring Unit's receipt of the Information Request, request, in writing, a conference with the Authorized Commission to resolve differences concerning the scope or timing of the Information Request; provided, however, nothing herein shall require the Authorized Commission to participate in any conference. Any party to the conference may seek assistance from FERC staff in resolution of the dispute or terminate the conference process at any time. Should such conference be refused or terminated by any participant or should such conference not resolve the dispute, then the Office of the Interconnection, Market Monitoring Unit, or the Affected Member may file a complaint with the FERC pursuant to Rule 206 objecting to the Information Request within ten (10) business days following receipt of written notice from any conference participant terminating such conference. Any complaints filed at the FERC objecting to a particular Information Request shall be designated by the party as a "fast track" complaint and each party shall bear its own costs in connection with such FERC proceeding. The grounds for such a complaint shall be limited to the following: (a) the Authorized Commission is no longer able to preserve the confidentiality of the requested information due to changed circumstances relating to the Authorized Commission's ability to protect confidential information arising since the filing of or rejection of a protest directed to the Authorized Commission's Certification; (b) complying with the Information Request would be unduly burdensome to the complainant, and the complainant has made a good faith effort to negotiate limitations in the scope of the requested information; or (c) other exceptional circumstances exist such that complying with the Information Request would result in harm to the complainant. There shall be a presumption that "exceptional circumstances," as used in the prior sentence, does not include circumstances in which an Authorized Commission has requested wholesale market data (or Market Monitoring Unit workpapers that support or explain conclusions or analyses) generated in the ordinary course and scope of the operations of the Market Monitoring Unit. There shall be a presumption that circumstances in which an Authorized Commission has requested personnel files, internal emails and internal company memos, analyses and related work product constitute "exceptional circumstances" as used in the prior sentence. If no complaint challenging the Information Request is filed within the ten (10) day period defined above, the Office of the Interconnection and/or Market Monitoring Unit shall utilize its best efforts to respond to the Information Request promptly. If a complaint is filed, and the Commission does not act on that complaint within ninety (90) days, the complaint shall be deemed denied and the Market Monitoring Unit shall use its best efforts to respond to the Information Request promptly.

(iv) Any Authorized Commission may initiate appropriate legal action at the FERC within ten (10) business days following receipt of information designated as "Confidential," challenging such designation. Any complaints filed at FERC objecting to the designation of information as "Confidential" shall be designated by the party as a "fast track" complaint and each party shall bear its own costs in connection with such FERC proceeding. The party filing such a complaint shall be required to prove that the material disclosed does not merit "Confidential" status because it is publicly available from other sources or contains no trade secret or other sensitive commercial information (with "publicly available" not being deemed to include unauthorized disclosures of otherwise confidential data).

4. In the event of any breach of confidentiality of information disclosed pursuant to an Information Request by an Authorized Commission or Authorized Person:

(i) The Authorized Commission or Authorized Person shall promptly notify the Market Monitoring Unit, who shall, in turn, promptly notify any Affected Member of any inadvertent or intentional release, or possible release, of confidential information provided pursuant to this Section I.

(ii) The Office Market Monitoring Unit shall terminate the right of such Authorized Commission to receive confidential information under this Section I upon written notice to such Authorized Commission unless: (i) there was no harm or damage suffered by the Affected Member; or (ii) similar good cause is shown. Any appeal of the Market Monitoring Unit's actions under this Section I shall be to Commission. An Authorized Commission shall be entitled to reestablish its certification as set forth in Section I.D.1 by submitting a filing with the Commission showing that it has taken appropriate corrective action. If the Commission does not act upon an Authorized Commission's recertification filing with sixty (60) days of the date of the filing, the recertification shall be deemed approved and the Authorized Commission shall be permitted to receive confidential information pursuant to this section.

(iii) The Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit, and/or the Affected Member shall have the right to seek and obtain at least the following types of relief: (a) an order from the FERC requiring any breach to cease and preventing any future breaches; (b) temporary, preliminary, and/or permanent injunctive relief with respect to any breach; and (c) the immediate return of all confidential information to the Market Monitoring Unit.

(iv) No Authorized Person or Authorized Commission shall have responsibility or liability whatsoever under this section for any and all liabilities, losses, damages, demands, fines, monetary judgments, penalties, costs and expenses caused by, resulting from, or arising out of or in connection with the release of confidential information to persons not authorized to receive it, provided that such Authorized Person is an agent, servant, employee or member of an Authorized Commission at the time of such unauthorized release. Nothing in this Section I.D.4(iv) is intended to limit the liability of any person who is not an agent, servant, employee or member of an Authorized Commission at the time of such unauthorized release for any and all economic losses, damages, demands, fines, monetary judgments, penalties, costs and expenses caused by, resulting from, or arising out of or in connection with such unauthorized release.

(v) Any dispute or conflict requesting the relief in Section I.D.4(ii) or I.D.4(iii)(a) above, shall be submitted to the FERC for hearing and resolution. Any dispute or conflict requesting the relief in Section I.D.4(iii)(c) above may be submitted to FERC or any court of competent jurisdiction for hearing and resolution.

E. Market Monitoring:

1. Subject to the requirements of Section E.2, the Market Monitoring Unit may release confidential information of Public Service Electric & Gas Company ("PSE&G"), Consolidated Edison Company of New York ("ConEd"), and their affiliates, and the confidential information of any Member regarding generation and/or transmission facilities located within the PSE&G Zone to the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. ("New York ISO"), the market monitoring unit of New York ISO and the New York ISO Market Advisor to the limited extent that the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit determines necessary to carry out the responsibilities of PJM, New York ISO or the market monitoring units of the Office of the Interconnection and the New York ISO under FERC Opinion No. 476 (see Consolidated Edison Company v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, et al., 108 FERC ¶ 61,120, at P 215 (2004)) to conduct joint investigations to ensure that gaming, abuse of market power, or

similar activities do not take place with regard to power transfers under the contracts that are the subject of FERC Opinion No. 476.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit may release a Member's confidential information pursuant to Section I.E.1 to the New York ISO, the market monitoring unit of the New York ISO and the New York ISO Market Advisor only if the New York ISO, the market monitoring unit of the New York ISO and the New York ISO Market Advisor are subject to obligations limiting the disclosure of such information that are equivalent to or greater than the limitations on disclosure specified in this Section I.E. Information received from the New York ISO, the market monitoring unit of the New York ISO, or the New York ISO Market Advisor under Section I.E.1 that is designated as confidential shall be protected from disclosure in accordance with this Section I.E.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF INPUTS FOR PROSPECTIVE MITIGATION

A. Offer Price Caps:

1. The Market Monitor or his designee shall advise the Office of the Interconnection whether it believes that the cost references, methods and rules included in the Cost Development Guidelines are accurate and appropriate, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall review upon request of a Market Seller, and may review upon its own initiative at any time, the incremental costs (defined in Section 6.4.2 of Schedule 1of the Operating Agreement) included in the Offer Price Cap of a generating unit in order to ensure that the Market Seller has correctly applied the Cost Development Guidelines and that the level of the Offer Price Cap is otherwise acceptable.

3. On or before the 21st day of each month, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate in accordance with the applicable criteria whether each generating unit with an offer cap calculated under Section 6.4.2 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement is eligible to include an adder based on Frequently Mitigated Unit or Associated Unit status, and shall issue a written notice of the applicable adder, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, to the Market Seller for each unit that meets the criteria for Frequently Mitigated Unit or Associated Unit status.

4. Notwithstanding the number of jointly pivotal suppliers in any hour, if the Market Monitoring Unit determines that a reasonable level of competition will not exist based on an evaluation of all facts and circumstances, it may propose to the Commission the removal of offer-capping suspensions otherwise authorized by Section 6.4 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement. Such proposals shall take effect upon Commission acceptance of the Market Monitoring Unit's filing.

B. Minimum Generator Operating Parameters:

1. For the 2014/2015 through 2017/208 Delivery Years, the Market Monitoring Unit shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection a table of default unit class specific parameter limits to be known as the "Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix" to be included in Section 6.6(c) of

Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement. The Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall include default values on a unit-type basis as specified in Section 6.6(c). The Market Monitoring Unit shall review the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix annually, and, in the event it determines that revision is appropriate, shall provide a revised matrix to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than December 31 prior to the annual enrollment period.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify Market Sellers of generation resources and the Office of the Interconnection no later than April 1 of its determination of market power concerns raised regarding each request for a period exception or persistent exception to a value specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix or the parameters defined in Section 6.6 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, provided that the Market Monitoring Unit receives such request by no later than February 28.

If, prior to the scheduled termination date, a Market Seller submits a request to modify a temporary exception, the Market Monitoring Unit shall review such request using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests, and shall provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 days from the date of the modification request.

3. When a Market Seller notifies the Market Monitoring Unit of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection to support a parameter limited schedule period or persistent exception, the Market Monitoring Unit shall make a determination, and provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller, of any change to its determination regarding the exemption request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 days after receipt of such notice.

4. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any risk premium to which it and a Market Seller owning or operating nuclear generation resource agree or its determination if agreement is not obtained. If a Market Seller submits a risk premium for its nuclear generation resource that is inconsistent with its agreement or inconsistent with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding such risk premium, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns pursuant to Attachment M.

C. RPM Must-Offer Obligation:

1. The Market Monitoring Unit shall maintain, post on its website and provide to the Office of the Interconnection prior to each RPM Auction (updated, as necessary, on at least a quarterly basis), a list of Existing Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region that are subject to the "must-offer" obligation set forth in Section 6.6 of Attachment DD.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate requests submitted by Capacity Market Sellers for a determination that a Generation Capacity Resource, or any portion thereof, be removed from Capacity Resource status or exempted from status as a Generation Capacity Resource subject to Section II.C.1 above and inform both the Capacity Market Seller and the

Office of the Interconnection of such determination in writing by no later ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. A Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region shall not be removed from Capacity Resource status to the extent the resource is committed to service of PJM loads as a result of an RPM Auction, FRR Capacity Plan, Locational UCAP transaction and/or by designation as a replacement resource under this Attachment DD.

3. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the data and documentation provided to it by a potential Capacity Market Seller to establish the EFORd to be included in a Sell Offer applicable to each resource pursuant to Section 6.6(b) of Attachment DD. If a Capacity Market Seller timely submits a request for an alternative maximum level of EFORd that may be used in a Sell Offer for RPM Auctions held prior to the date on which the final EFORds used for a Delivery Year are posted, the Market Monitoring Unit shall attempt to reach agreement with the Capacity Market Seller on the alternate maximum level of the EFORd by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year. By no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the Base Residual Auction for the applicable Delivery Year, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing, notifying the Capacity Market Seller by copy of the same, of any alternative maximum EFORd to which it and the Capacity Market Seller agree or its determination of the alternative maximum EFORd if agreement is not obtained.

4. The Market Monitoring Unit shall consider the documentation provided to it by a potential Capacity Market Seller pursuant to Section 6.6 of Attachment DD, and determine whether a resource owned or controlled by such Capacity Market Seller meets the criteria to qualify for an exception to the must-offer requirement because the resource (i) is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant auction; (ii) has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity; or (iii) was interconnected to the Transmission System as an Energy Resource and not subsequently converted to a Capacity Resource. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

In order to establish that a resource is reasonably expected to be physically unable to participate in the relevant auction as set forth in (i) above, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that:

A. It has a documented plan in place to retire the resource prior to or during the Delivery Year, and has submitted a notice of Deactivation to the Office of the Interconnection consistent with Section 113.1 of the PJM Tariff, without regard to whether the Office of the Interconnection has requested the Capacity Market Seller to continue to operate the resource beyond its desired deactivation date in accordance with Section 113.2 of the PJM Tariff for the purpose of maintaining the reliability of the PJM Transmission System and the Capacity Market Seller has agreed to do so;

B. Significant physical operational restrictions cause long term or permanent changes to the installed capacity value of the resource, or the resource is under major repair that will extend into the applicable Delivery Year, that will result in the imposition of RPM performance penalties pursuant to Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff;

C. The Capacity Market Seller is involved in an ongoing regulatory proceeding (e.g. – regarding potential environmental restrictions) specific to the resource and has received an order, decision, final rule, opinion or other final directive from the regulatory authority that will result in the retirement of the resource; or,

D. A resource considered an Existing Generating Capacity Resource because it cleared an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction, but which is not yet in service, is unable to achieve full commercial operation prior to the Delivery Year of the relevant auction. The Capacity Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written sworn, notarized statement of a corporate officer certifying that the resource will not be in full commercial operation prior to the referenced Delivery Year.

5. If a Capacity Market Seller submits for the portion of a Generation Capacity Resource that it owns or controls, and the Office of Interconnection accepts, a Sell Offer (i) at a level of installed capacity that the Market Monitoring Unit believes is inconsistent with the level established under Section 5.6.6 of Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, (ii) at a level of installed capacity inconsistent with its determination of eligibility for an exception listed in Section II.C.4 above, or (iii) a maximum EFORd that the Market Monitoring Unit believes is inconsistent with the maximum level determined under Section II.C.3 of this Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and/or request a determination from the Commission that would require the Generation Capacity Resource to submit a new or revised Sell Offer, notwithstanding any determination to the contrary made under Section 6.6 of Attachment DD.

The Market Monitoring Unit shall also consider the documentation provided by the Capacity Market Seller pursuant to Section 6.6 of Attachment DD, for generation resources for which the Office of the Interconnection has not approved an exception to the must-offer requirement as set forth in Section 6.6(g) of Attachment DD, to determine whether the Capacity Market Seller's failure to offer part or all of one or more generation resources into an RPM Auction would result in an increase of greater than five percent in any Zonal Capacity Price determined through such auction as required by Section 6.6(i) of Attachment DD, and shall inform both the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination by no later than two (2) business days after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

D. Unit Specific Minimum Sell Offers:

1. If a Capacity Market Seller timely submits an exemption *or exception* request , with all of the required supporting documentation as specified in section 5.14(h) of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall review the request and documentation and shall provide in writing

to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than forty five (45) days after receipt of the exemption *or exception* request its determination whether it believes the requested exemption *or exception* should be granted in accordance with the standards and criteria set forth in section 5.14(h). *If the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the Sell Offer proposed in a Unit-Specific Exception request raises market power concerns, it shall advise the Capacity Market Seller of the minimum Sell Offer in the relevant auction that would not raise market power concerns, with such calculation based on the data and documentation received, by no later than forty five (45) days after receipt of the request.*

2. All information submitted to the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit by a Market Participant is subject to verification by the Market Monitoring Unit.

3. In the event that the Market Monitoring Unit reasonably believes that a request for a Competitive Entry Exemption or a Self-Supply Exemption that has been granted contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations or omissions such that the Capacity Market Seller would not have been eligible for the exemption for that MOPR Screened Generation Resource had the request not contained such misrepresentations or omissions, then it shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and Capacity Market Seller of its findings and provide the Office of the Interconnection with all of the data and documentation supporting its findings, and may take any other action required or permitted under Attachment M.

E. Market Seller Offer Caps:

1. Based on the data and calculations submitted by the Capacity Market Sellers for each Existing Generation Capacity Resource and the formulas specified in Section 6.7(d) of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Market Seller Offer Cap for each such resource and provide it to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days before the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit must attempt to reach agreement with the Capacity Market Seller on the appropriate level of the Market Seller Offer Cap by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If such agreement cannot be reached, then the Market Monitoring Unit shall inform the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection of its determination of the appropriate level of the Market Seller Offer Cap by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction, and the Market Monitoring Unit may pursue any action available to it under Attachment M.

3. Nothing herein shall preclude any Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit from agreeing to, nor require either such entity to agree to, an alternative market seller offer cap determined on a mutually agreeable basis. Any such alternative offer cap shall be filed with the Commission for its approval. This provision is duplicated in Section 6.4(a) of Attachment DD.

F. Mitigation of Offers from Planned Generation Capacity Resources:

Pursuant to Section 6.5 of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources to determine whether market power mitigation should be applied and notify in writing each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer has been determined to be non-competitive and subject to mitigation, with a copy to the Office of the Interconnection, by no later than one (1) business day after the close of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

G. <u>Data Submission</u>:

Pursuant to Section 6.7 of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit may request additional information from any potential auction participant as deemed necessary by the Market Monitoring Unit, including, without limitation, additional cost data on resources in a class that is not otherwise expected to include the marginal price setting resource. All data submitted to the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit by a Market Participant is subject to verification by the Market Monitoring Unit.

H. <u>Determination of Default Avoidable Cost Rates</u>:

1. The Market Monitoring Unit shall conduct an annual review of the table of default Avoidable Cost Rates included in Section 6.7(c) of Attachment DD and calculated on the bases set forth therein, and determine whether the values included therein need to be updated. If the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the Avoidable Cost Rates need to be updated, it shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection updated values or notice of its determination that updated values are not needed by no later than September 30th of each year.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit shall indicate in its posted reports on RPM performance the number of Generation Capacity Resources and megawatts per LDA that use the retirement default Avoidable Cost Rates.

3. If a Capacity Market Seller does not elect to use a default Avoidable Cost Rate and has timely provided to the Market Monitoring Unit its request to apply a unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate, along with the data described in Section 6.7 of Attachment DD, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Avoidable Cost Rate and provide a unit-specific value to the Capacity Market Seller for each such resource, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection in writing by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction whether it agrees that the unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is acceptable. The Capacity Market Seller and Office of the Interconnection's deadlines relating to the submittal and acceptance of a request for a unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate are delineated in section 6.7(d) of Attachment DD.

I. <u>Determination of PJM Market Revenues</u>:

The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the Projected PJM Market Revenues for any Generation Capacity Resource to which the Avoidable Cost Rate is applied pursuant to Section 6.8(d) of Attachment DD, and notify the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the

Interconnection of its determination in writing by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction.

J. <u>Determination of Opportunity Costs</u>:

The Market Monitoring Unit shall review and verify the documentation of prices available to Existing Generation Capacity Resources in markets external to PJM and proposed for inclusion in Opportunity Costs pursuant to Section 6.7(d)(ii) of Attachment DD. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify, in writing, such Generation Capacity Resource and the Office of the Interconnection if it is dissatisfied with the documentation provided and whether it objects to the inclusion of such Opportunity Costs in a Market Seller Offer by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the applicable RPM Auction. If such Generation Capacity Resource submits a Market Seller Offer that includes Opportunity Costs that have not been documented and verified to the Market Monitoring Unit's satisfaction, then the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request a determination that would require the Generation Capacity Resource to remove them.

III. <u>BLACKSTART SERVICE</u>

A. Upon the submission by a Black Start Unit owner of a request for Black Start Service revenue requirements and changes to the Black Start Service revenue requirements for the Black Start Unit, the Black Start Unit owner and the Market Monitoring Unit shall attempt to agree to values on the level of each component included in the Black Start Service revenue requirements by no later than May 14 of each year. The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate the revenue requirement for each Black Start Unit and provide its calculation to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than May 14 of each year.

B. Pursuant to the terms of Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff and the PJM Manuals, the Market Monitoring Unit will analyze any requested generator black start cost changes on an annual basis and shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any costs to which it and the Black Start Unit owner have agreed or the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding any cost components to which agreement has not been obtained. If a Black Start Unit owner includes a cost component inconsistent with its agreement or inconsistent with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding such cost component, and the Office of the Interconnection accepts the Black Start Service revenue requirements submitted by the Black Start Unit owner, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request a determination that would require the Black Start Service generator to utilize the values determined by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection or such other values as determined by the Commission.

IV. <u>DEACTIVATION RATES</u>

1. Upon receipt of a notice to deactivate a generating unit under Part V of the PJM Tariff from the Office of the Interconnection forwarded pursuant to Section 113.1 of the PJM Tariff, the Market Monitoring Unit shall analyze the effects of the proposed deactivation with regard to

potential market power issues and shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the generator owner (of, if applicable, its designated agent) within 30 days of the deactivation request if a market power issue has been identified. Such notice shall include the specific market power impact resulting from the proposed deactivation of the generating unit, as well as an initial assessment of any steps that could be taken to mitigate the market power impact.

2. The Market Monitoring Unit and the generating unit owner shall attempt to come to agreement on the level of each component included in the Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit. In the case of cost of service filing submitted to the Commission in alternative to the Deactivation Cost Credit, the Market Monitoring Unit shall indicate to the generating unit owner in advance of filing its views regarding the proposed method or cost components of recovery. The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any costs to which it and the generating unit owner have agreed or the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding any cost components to which agreement has not been obtained. If a generating unit owner includes a cost component inconsistent with its agreement or inconsistent with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination regarding such cost components, the Market Monitoring Unit may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and seek a determination that would require the Generating unit to include an appropriate cost component. This provision is duplicated in Sections 114 and 119 of Part V of the PJM Tariff.

V. <u>OPPORTUNITY COST CALCULATION</u>

The Market Monitoring Unit shall review requests for opportunity cost compensation under Sections 3.2.3(f-3) and 3.2.3B(h) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, discuss with the Office of the Interconnection and individual Market Sellers the amount of compensation, and file exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request a determination of compensation as provided by such sections. These requirements are duplicated in Sections 3.2.3(f-3) and 3.2.3B(h) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

VI. <u>FTR FORFEITURE RULE</u>

The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits as required under Section 5.2.1(b) of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, including the determination of the identity of the holder of FTRs and an evaluation of the overall benefits accrued by an entity or affiliated entities trading in FTRs and Virtual Transactions in the Day-ahead Energy Market, and provide such calculations to the Office of the Interconnection. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the FTR holder. If the Office of the Interconnection imposes a forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit in an amount that the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with, then it may exercise its powers to inform Commission staff of its concerns and request an adjustment.

VII. <u>FORCED OUTAGE RULE</u>

1. The Market Monitoring Unit shall observe offers submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market to determine whether all or part of a generating unit's capacity (MW) is designated as

Maximum Emergency and (i) such offer in the Real-time Energy Market designates a smaller amount of capacity from that unit as Maximum Emergency for the same time period, and (ii) there is no physical reason to designate a larger amount of capacity as Maximum Emergency in the offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market than in the Real-time Energy Market, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of Interconnection.

2. If the Market Monitoring Unit observes that (i) an offer submitted in the Day-ahead Energy market designates all or part of capacity (MW) of a Generating unit as economic maximum that is less than the economic maximum designated in the offer in the Real-time Energy Market, and (ii) there is no physical reason to designate a lower economic maximum in the offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market than in the offer in the Real-time Energy Market, the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Office of Interconnection.

VIII. DATA COLLECTION AND VERIFICATION

The Market Monitoring Unit shall gather and keep confidential detailed data on the procurement and usage of fuel to produce electric power transmitted in the PJM Region in order to assist the performance of its duties under Attachment M. To achieve this objective, the Market Monitoring Unit shall maintain on its website a mechanism that allows Members to conveniently and confidentially submit such data and develop a manual in consultation with stakeholders that describes the nature of and procedure for collecting data. Members of PJM owning a Generating unit that is located in the PJM Region (including dynamically scheduled units), or is included in a PJM Black Start Service plan, committed as a Generation Capacity Resource for the current or future Delivery Year, or otherwise subject to a commitment to provide service to PJM, shall provide data to the Market Monitoring Unit.

9.4 Definition of Force Majeure:

For the purposes of this section, an event of force majeure shall mean any cause beyond the control of the affected Interconnection Party or Construction Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which, in any of the foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence such party could not reasonably have been expected to avoid, and which, by the exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. Force majeure does not include (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected party’s own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remediable causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected party.

19.2 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events:

Each Interconnection Party shall notify the other Interconnection Parties when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Appendix 2 for a reason other than an event of force majeure as defined in Section 9.4 of this Appendix 2. The parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section shall not entitle the receiving Interconnection Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory breach of the Interconnection Service Agreement.

15.4 Definition of Force Majeure:

For the purposes of this section, an event of force majeure shall mean any cause beyond the control of the affected Interconnection Party or Construction Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which, in any of the foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence such party could not reasonably have been expected to avoid, and which, by the exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. Force majeure does not include (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remediable causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected party.

18.2 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events:

Each Construction Party shall notify each other Construction Party when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Appendix 2 for a reason other than an event of force majeure as defined in Section 15.4 of this Appendix 2. The Construction Parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section shall not entitle the receiving Construction Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory breach of this Appendix 2.

17.0 Information Access And Audit Rights

17.1 Information Access.

Subject to Applicable Laws and Regulations, each Party shall make available to the other Parties information necessary: (i) to verify the Costs incurred by the other Party for which the requesting Party is responsible under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff; and (ii) to carry out obligations and responsibilities under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff. The Parties shall not use such information for purposes other than those set forth in this Section 17 and to enforce their rights under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff.

17.2 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events.

Each Party shall notify the other Parties when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Upgrade CSA for a reason other than an event of force majeure as defined in Section 1.21 of Appendix 2 of this Attachment GG. The Parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section 17 shall not entitle the receiving Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory breach of this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff.

17.3 Audit Rights.

Subject to the requirements of confidentiality of this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff, each Party shall have the right, during normal business hours, and upon prior reasonable notice to the pertinent Party, to audit at its own expense the other Party's accounts and records pertaining to such Party's performance and/or satisfaction of obligations arising under this Upgrade CSA and the PJM Tariff. Any audit authorized by this Section 17 shall be performed at the offices where such accounts and records are maintained and shall be limited to those portions of such accounts and records that relate to obligations under this Upgrade CSA. Any request for audit shall be presented to the other Party not later than twenty-four months after the event as to which the audit is sought. Each Party shall preserve all records held by it for the duration of the audit period.

17.4 Waiver.

Any waiver at any time by any Party of its rights with respect to a Breach or Default under this Upgrade CSA, or with respect to any other matters arising in connection with this Upgrade CSA, shall not be deemed a waiver or continuing waiver with respect to any other Breach or Default or other matter.

17.5 Amendments and Rights under the Federal Power Act.

Except as set forth in this Section 17, this Upgrade CSA may be amended, modified, or supplemented only by written agreement of the Parties. Such amendment shall become effective and a part of this Upgrade CSA upon satisfaction of all Applicable Laws and Regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained in this Upgrade CSA shall be construed as affecting in any way any of the rights of any Party with respect to changes in applicable rates or charges under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act and/or FERC's rules and regulations thereunder, or any of the rights of any Party under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act and/or FERC's rules and regulations thereunder. The terms and conditions of this Upgrade CSA shall be amended, as mutually agreed by the Parties, to comply with changes or alterations made necessary by a valid applicable order of any Governmental Authority having jurisdiction hereof.

17.6 Regulatory Requirements.

Each Party's performance of any obligation under this Upgrade CSA for which such Party requires approval or authorization of any Governmental Authority shall be subject to its receipt of such required approval or authorization in the form and substance satisfactory to the receiving Party, or the Party making any required filings with, or providing notice to, such Governmental Authorities, and the expiration of any time period associated therewith. Each Party shall in good faith seek, and shall use Reasonable Efforts to obtain, such required authorizations or approvals as soon as reasonably practicable.

DESIGNATED ENTITY AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

And

____

DESIGNATED ENTITY AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

And

____

This Designated Entity Agreement, including the Schedules attached hereto and incorporated herein (collectively, "Agreement") is made and entered into as of the Effective Date between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Transmission Provider" or "PJM"), and ___________________ ("Designated Entity" [OPTIONAL: or "[short name]"), referred to herein individually as "Party" and collectively as "the Parties."

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, in accordance with FERC Order No. 1000 and Schedule 6 of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement"), Transmission Provider is required to designate among candidates, pursuant to a FERC-approved process, an entity to develop and construct a specified project to expand, replace and/or reinforce the Transmission System operated by Transmission Provider;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(i) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, the Transmission Provider notified Designated Entity that it was designated as the Designated Entity for the Project (described in Schedule A to this Agreement) to be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Designated Entity accepted the designation as the Designated Entity for the Project and therefore has the obligation to construct the Project; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, together with other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency is hereby mutually acknowledged by each Party, the Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:

Article 1 – Definitions

1.0 Defined Terms.

All capitalized terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Part I of the Tariff or in definitions either in the body of this Agreement or its attached Schedules. In the event of any conflict between defined terms set forth in the Tariff or defined terms in this Agreement, including the Schedules, such conflict will be resolved in favor of the terms as defined in this Agreement.

1.1 Confidential Information.

Any confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information of a plan, specification, pattern, procedure, design, device, list, concept, policy, or compilation relating to the Project or Transmission Owner facilities to which the Project will interconnect, which is designated as confidential by the party supplying the information, whether conveyed verbally, electronically, in writing, through inspection, or otherwise, and shall include, but may not be limited to, information relating to the producing party's technology, research and development, business affairs and pricing, land acquisition and vendor contracts relating to the Project.

1.2 Designated Entity Letter of Credit.

Designated Entity Letter of Credit shall mean the letter of credit provided by the Designated Entity pursuant to Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement and Section 3.0 of this Agreement as security associated with the Project.

1.3 Development Schedule.

Development Schedule shall mean the schedule of milestones set forth in Schedule C of this Agreement.

1.4 Effective Date.

Effective Date shall mean the date this Agreement becomes effective pursuant to Section 2.0 of this Agreement.

1.5 Initial Operation.

Initial Operation shall mean the date the Project is (i) energized and (ii) under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.

1.6 Project.

Project shall mean the enhancement or expansion included in the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan described in Schedule A of this Agreement.

1.7 Project Finance Entity.

Project Finance Entity shall mean holder, trustee or agent for holders, of any component of Project Financing.

1.8 Project Financing.

Project Financing shall mean: (a) one or more loans, leases, equity and/or debt financings, together with all modifications, renewals, supplements, substitutions and replacements thereof, the proceeds of which are used to finance or refinance the costs of the Project, any alteration, expansion or improvement to the Project, or the operation of the Project; or (b) loans and/or debt issues secured by the Project.

1.9 Reasonable Efforts.

Reasonable Efforts shall mean such efforts as are consistent with ensuring the timely and effective design and construction of the Project in a manner, which ensures that the Project, once placed in service, meets the requirements of the Project as described in Schedule B and are consistent with Good Utility Practice.

1.10 Required Project In-Service Date.

Required Project In-Service Date shall mean the date the Project is required to: (i) be completed in accordance with the Scope of Work in Schedules B this Agreement, (ii) meet the criteria outlined in Schedule D of this Agreement and (iii) be under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.

Article 2 – Effective Date and Term

2.0 Effective Date.

Subject to regulatory acceptance, this Agreement shall become effective on the date the Agreement has been executed by all Parties, or if this Agreement is filed with FERC for acceptance, rather than reported only in PJM's Electric Quarterly Report, upon the date specified by FERC.

2.1 Term.

This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect from the Effective Date until: (i) the Designated Entity executes the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement; and (ii) the Project (a) has been completed in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, (b) meets all relevant required planning criteria, and (c) is under Transmission Provider's operational dispatch; or (iii) the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Article 8 of this Agreement.

Article 3 – Security

3.0 Obligation to Provide Security.

In accordance with Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Designated Entity shall provide Transmission Provider a letter of credit as acceptable to Transmission Provider (Designated Entity Letter of Credit) or cash security in the amount of $_____, which is three percent of the estimated cost of the Project. Designated Entity is required provide and maintain the Designated Entity Letter of Credit, as required by Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement and Section 3.0 of this Agreement. The Designated Entity Letter of Credit shall remain in full force and effect for the term of this Agreement and for the duration of the obligations arising therefrom in accordance with Article 17.0.

3.1 Distribution of Designated Entity Letter of Credit or Cash Security.

In the event that Transmission Provider draws upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or retains the cash security in accordance with Sections 7.5, 8.0, or 8.1, Transmission Provider shall distribute such funds as determined by FERC.

Article 4 – Project Construction

4.0 Construction of Project by Designated Entity.

Designated Entity shall design, engineer, procure, install and construct the Project, including any modifications thereto, in accordance with: (i) the terms of this Agreement, including but not limited to the Scope of Work in Schedule B and the Development Schedule in Schedule C; (ii) applicable reliability principles, guidelines, and standards of the Applicable Regional Reliability Council and NERC; (iii) the Operating Agreement; (iv) the PJM Manuals; and (v) Good Utility Practice.

4.1 Milestones.

4.1.0 Milestone Dates.

Designated Entity shall meet the milestone dates set forth in the Development Schedule in Schedule C of this Agreement. Milestone dates set forth in Schedule C only may be extended by Transmission Provider in writing. Failure to meet any of the milestone dates specified in Schedule C, or as extended as described in this Section 4.1.0 or Section 4.3.0 of this Agreement, shall constitute a Breach of this Agreement. Transmission Provider reasonably may extend any such milestone date, in the event of delays not caused by the Designated Entity that could not be remedied by the Designated Entity through the exercise of due diligence, or if an extension will not delay the Required Project In-Service Date specified in Schedule C of this Agreement; provided that a corporate officer of the Designated Entity submits a revised Development Schedule containing revised milestones and showing the Project in full operation no later than the Required Project In-Service Date specified in Schedule C of this Agreement.

4.1.1 Right to Inspect.

Upon reasonable notice, Transmission Provider shall have the right to inspect the Project for the purposes of assessing the progress of the Project and satisfaction of milestones. Such inspection shall not be deemed as review or approval by Transmission Provider of any design or construction practices or standards used by the Designated Entity.

4.2 Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards.

For the purposes of this Agreement, applicable technical requirements and standards of the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect shall apply to the design, engineering, procurement, construction and installation of the Project to the extent that the provisions thereof relate to the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner(s) facilities.

4.3 Project Modification.

4.3.0 Project Modification Process.

The Scope of Work and Development Schedule, including the milestones therein, may be revised, as required, in accordance with Transmission Provider's project modification process set forth in the PJM Manuals, or otherwise by Transmission Provider in writing. Such modifications may include alterations as necessary and directed by Transmission Provider to meet the system condition for which the Project was included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

4.3.1 Consent of Transmission Provider to Project Modifications.

Designated Entity may not modify the Project without prior written consent of Transmission Provider, including but not limited to, modifications necessary to obtain siting approval or necessary permits, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed.

4.3.2 Customer Facility Interconnections And Transmission Service Requests.

Designated Entity shall perform or permit the engineering and construction necessary to accommodate the interconnection of Customer Facilities to the Project and transmission service requests that are determined necessary for such interconnections and transmission service requests in accordance with Parts IV and VI, and Parts II and III, respectively, of the Tariff.

4.4 Project Tracking.

The Designated Entity shall provide regular, quarterly construction status reports in writing to Transmission Provider. The reports shall contain, but not be limited to, updates and information specified in the PJM Manuals regarding: (i) current engineering and construction status of the Project; (ii) Project completion percentage, including milestone completion; (iii) current target Project or phase completion date(s); (iv) applicable outage information; and (v) cost expenditures to date and revised projected cost estimates for completion of the Project. Transmission Provider shall use such status reports to post updates regarding the progress of the Project.

4.5 Exclusive Responsibility of Designated Entity.

Designated Entity shall be solely responsible for all planning, design, engineering, procurement, construction, installation, management, operations, safety, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations associated with the Project, including but not limited to obtaining all necessary permits, siting, and other regulatory approvals. Transmission Provider shall have no responsibility to manage, supervise, or ensure compliance or adequacy of same.

Article 5 – Coordination with Third-Parties

5.0 Interconnection Coordination Agreement with Transmission Owner(s).

By the dates specified in the Development Schedule in Schedule C of this Agreement, Designated Entity shall execute or request to file unexecuted with the Commission: (a) an Interconnection Coordination Agreement; and (b) an interconnection agreement among and between Designated Entity, Transmission Provider, and the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect.

5.1 Connection with Entities Not a Party to the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement.

Designated Entity shall not permit any part of the Project facilities to be connected with the facilities of any entity which is not: (i) a party to Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement without an interconnection agreement that contains provisions for the safe and reliable interconnection and operation of such interconnection in accordance with Good Utility Practice, and principles, guidelines and standards of the Applicable Regional Reliability Council and NERC or comparable requirements of an applicable retail tariff or agreement approved by appropriate regulatory authority; or (ii) a party to a separate Designated Entity Agreement.

Article 6 – Insurance

6.0 Designated Entity Insurance Requirements.

Designated Entity shall obtain and maintain in full force and effect such insurance as is consistent with Good Utility Practice. The Transmission Provider shall be included as an Additional Insured in the Designated Entity's applicable liability insurance policies. The Designated Entity shall provide evidence of compliance with this requirement upon request by the Transmission Provider.

6.1 Subcontractor Insurance.

In accord with Good Utility Practice, Designated Entity shall require each of its subcontractors to maintain and, upon request, provide Designated Entity evidence of insurance coverage of types, and in amounts, commensurate with the risks associated with the services provided by the subcontractor. Bonding and hiring of contractors or subcontractors shall be the Designated Entity's discretion, but regardless of bonding or the existence or non-existence of insurance, the Designated Entity shall be responsible for the performance or non-performance of any contractor or subcontractor it hires.

Article 7 – Breach and Default

7.0 Breach.

Except as otherwise provided in Article 10, a Breach of this Agreement shall include:

(a) The failure to comply with any term or condition of this Agreement, including but not limited to, any Breach of a representation, warranty, or covenant made in this Agreement, and failure to provide and maintain security in accordance with Section 3.0 of this Agreement;

(b) The failure to meet a milestone or milestone date set forth in the Development Schedule in Schedule C of this Agreement, or as extended in writing as described in Sections 4.1.0 and 4.3.0 of this Agreement;

(c) Assignment of this Agreement in a manner inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement; or

(d) Failure of any Party to provide information or data required to be provided to another Party under this Agreement for such other Party to satisfy its obligations under this Agreement.

7.1 Notice of Breach.

In the event of a Breach, a Party not in Breach of this Agreement shall give written notice of such Breach to the breaching Party, and to any other persons, including a Project Finance Entity, if applicable, that the breaching Party identifies in writing prior to the Breach. Such notice shall set forth, in reasonable detail, the nature of the Breach, and where known and applicable, the steps necessary to cure such Breach.

7.2 Cure and Default.

A Party that commits a Breach and does not take steps to cure the Breach pursuant to Section 7.3 shall be in Default of this Agreement.

7.3 Cure of Breach.

The breaching Party may: (i) cure the Breach within thirty days from the receipt of the notice of Breach or other such date as determined by Transmission Provider to ensure that the Project meets its Required Project In-Service Date set forth in Schedule C; or, (ii) if the Breach cannot be cured within thirty days but may be cured in a manner that ensures that the Project meets the Required Project In-Service Date for the Project, within such thirty day time period, commences in good faith steps that are reasonable and appropriate to cure the Breach and thereafter diligently pursue such action to completion.

7.4 Re-evaluation if Breach Not Cured.

In the event that a breaching Party does not cure a Breach in accordance with Section 7.3 of this Agreement, Transmission Provider shall conduct a re-evaluation pursuant to Section 1.5.8(k) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement. If based on such re-evaluation, the Project is retained in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and the Designated Entity's designation for the Project also is retained, the Parties shall modify this Agreement, including Schedules, as necessary. In all other events, Designated Entity shall be considered in Default of this Agreement, and this Agreement shall terminate in accordance with Section 8.1 of this Agreement.

7.5 Remedies.

Upon the occurrence of an event of Default, the non-Defaulting Party shall be entitled to: (i) commence an action to require the Defaulting Party to remedy such Default and specifically perform its duties and obligations hereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof; (ii) suspend performance hereunder; and (iii) exercise such other rights and remedies as it may have in equity or at law. Upon Default by Designated Entity, Transmission Provider may draw upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit. Nothing in this Section 7.5 is intended in any way to affect the rights of a third-party to seek any remedy it may have in equity or at law from the Designated Entity resulting from Designated Entity's Default of this Agreement.

7.6 Remedies Cumulative.

No remedy conferred by any provision of this Agreement is intended to be exclusive of any other remedy and each and every remedy shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to every other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by statute or otherwise. The election of any one or more remedies shall not constitute a waiver of the right to pursue other available remedies.

7.7 Waiver.

Any waiver at any time by any Party of its rights with respect to a Breach or Default under this Agreement, or with respect to any other matters arising in connection with this Agreement, shall not be deemed a waiver or continuing waiver with respect to any other Breach or Default or other matter.

Article 8 – Early Termination

8.0 Termination by Transmission Provider.

In the event that: (i) pursuant to Section 1.5.8(k) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Transmission Provider determines to remove the Project from the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and/or not to retain Designated Entity's status for the Project; (ii) Transmission Provider otherwise determines pursuant to Regional Transmission Expansion Planning Protocol in Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement that the Project is no longer required to address the specific need for which the Project was included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan; or (iii) an event of force majeure, as defined in section 10.0 of this Attachment KK, or other event outside of the Designated Entity's control that, with the exercise of Reasonable Efforts, Designated Entity cannot alleviate and which prevents the Designated Entity from satisfying its obligations under this Agreement, Transmission Provider may terminate this Agreement by providing written notice of termination to Designated Entity, which shall become effective the later of sixty calendar days after the Designated Entity receives such notice or other such date the FERC establishes for the termination. In the event termination pursuant to this Section 8.0 is based on (ii) or (iii) above, Transmission Provider shall not have the right to draw upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or retain the cash security and shall cancel the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or return the cash security within thirty days of the termination of this Agreement.

8.1 Termination by Default.

This Agreement shall terminate in the event a Party is in Default of this Agreement in accordance with Sections 7.2 or 7.4 of this Agreement. Upon Default by Designated Entity, Transmission Provider may draw upon the Designated Entity Letter of Credit or retain the cash security.

8.2 Filing at FERC.

Transmission Provider shall make the appropriate filing with FERC as required to effectuate the termination of this Agreement pursuant to this Article 8.

Article 9 – Liability and Indemnity

9.0 Liability.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Transmission Provider's liability to the Designated Entity, any third-party, or any other person arising or resulting from any acts or omissions associated in any way with performance under this Agreement shall be limited in the same manner and to the same extent that Transmission Provider's liability is limited to any Transmission Customer, third-party or other person under Section 10.2 of the Tariff arising or resulting from any act or omission in any way associated with service provided under the Tariff or any Service Agreement thereunder.

9.1 Indemnity.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Designated Entity shall at all times indemnify, defend, and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless from, any and all damages, losses, claims, including claims and actions relating to injury to or death of any person or damage to property, demands, suits, recoveries, costs and expenses, court costs, attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third-parties, arising out of or resulting from the Transmission Provider's acts or omissions associated with the performance of its obligations under this Agreement to the same extent and in the same manner that a Transmission Customer is required to indemnify, defend and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless under Section 10.3 of the Tariff.

Article 10 – Force Majeure

10.0 Force Majeure.

For the purpose of this section, an event of force majeure shall mean any cause beyond the control of the affected Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightening, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which in any foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. An event of force majeure does not include: (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected Party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remedial causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute) which an affected Party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected Party.

10.1 Notice.

A Party that is unable to carry out an obligation imposed on it by this Agreement due to Force Majeure shall notify the other Party in writing within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the cause relied on.

10.2 Duration of Force Majeure.

A Party shall not be responsible for any non-performance or considered in Breach or Default under this Agreement, for any deficiency or failure to perform any obligation under this Agreement to the extent that such failure or deficiency is due to Force Majeure. A Party shall be excused from whatever performance is affected only for the duration of the Force Majeure and while the Party exercises Reasonable Efforts to alleviate such situation. As soon as the non-performing Party is able to resume performance of its obligations excused because of the occurrence of Force Majeure, such Party shall resume performance and give prompt notice thereof to the other Party. In the event that Designated Entity is unable to perform any of its obligations under this Agreement because of an occurrence of Force Majeure, Transmission Provider may terminate this Agreement in accordance with Section 8.0 of this Agreement.

10.3 Breach or Default of or Force Majeure under Interconnection Coordination Agreement

If either of the following events prevents Designated Entity from performing any of its obligations under this Agreement, such event shall be considered a Force Majeure event under this Agreement and the provisions of this Article 10 shall apply: (i) a breach or default of the Interconnection Coordination Agreement associated with the Project by a party to the Interconnection Coordination Agreement other than the Designated Entity; or (ii) an event of Force Majeure under the Interconnection Coordination Agreement associated with the Project.

Article 11 – Assignment

11.0 Assignment.

A Party may assign all of its rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement in accordance with this Section 11.0. Except for assignments described in Section 11.1 of this Agreement that may not result in the assignment of all rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement to a Project Finance Entity, no partial assignments will be permitted. No Party may assign any of its rights or delegate any of its duties or obligations under this Agreement without prior written consent of the other Party, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed. Any such assignment or delegation made without such written consent shall be null and void. Assignment by the Designated Entity shall be contingent upon, prior to the effective date of the assignment: (i) the Designated Entity or assignee demonstrating to the satisfaction of Transmission Provider that the assignee has the technical competence and financial ability to comply with the requirements of this Agreement and to construct the Project consistent with the assignor's cost estimates for the Project; and (ii) the assignee is eligible to be a Designated Entity for the Project pursuant to Sections 1.5.8(a) and (f) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement. Except as provided in an assignment to a Finance Project Entity to the contrary, for all assignments by any Party, the assignee must assume in a writing, to be provided to the other Party, all rights, duties, and obligations of the assignor arising under this Agreement. Any assignment described herein shall not relieve or discharge the assignor from any of its obligations hereunder absent the written consent of the other Party. In no circumstance, shall an assignment of this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement diminish the rights of the Transmission Provider under this Agreement, the Tariff, or the Operating Agreement. Any assignees that will construct, maintain, or operate the Project shall be subject to, and comply with the terms of this Agreement, the Tariff and the Operating Agreement.

11.1 Project Finance Entity Assignments

11.1.1 Assignment to Project Finance Entity

If an arrangement between the Designated Entity and a Project Finance Entity provides that the Project Finance Entity may assume any of the rights, duties and obligations of the Designated Entity under this Agreement or otherwise provides that the Project Finance Entity may cure a Breach of this Agreement by the Designated Entity, the Project Finance Entity may be assigned this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, or obligations hereunder only upon written consent of the Transmission Provider, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed. In no circumstance, shall an assignment of this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement diminish the rights of the Transmission Provider under this Agreement, the Tariff, or the Operating Agreement.

11.1.2 Assignment By Project Finance Entity

A Project Finance Entity that has been assigned this Agreement or any of the rights, duties or obligations under this Agreement or otherwise is permitted to cure a Breach of this Agreement, as described pursuant to Section 11.1.1 above, may assign this Agreement or any of the rights, duties or obligations under this Agreement to another entity not a Party to this Agreement only: (i) upon the Breach of this Agreement by the Designated Entity; and (ii) with the written consent of the Transmission Provider, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed. In no circumstance, shall an assignment of this Agreement or any of the rights, duties, and obligations under this Agreement alter or diminish the rights of the Transmission Provider under this Agreement, the Tariff, or the Operating Agreement. Any assignees that will construct, maintain, or operate the Project shall be subject to, and comply with the Tariff and Operating Agreement.

Article 12 – Information Exchange

12.0 Information Access.

Subject to Applicable Laws and Regulations, each Party shall make available to the other Party information necessary to carry out each Party's obligations and responsibilities under this Agreement, the Operating Agreement, and the Tariff. Such information shall include but not be limited to, information reasonably requested by Transmission Provider to prepare the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. The Parties shall not use such information for purposes other than to carry out their obligations or enforce their rights under this Agreement, the Operating Agreement, and the Tariff.

12.1 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events.

Each Party shall notify the other Party when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Agreement for a reason other than Force Majeure. The Parties agree to cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section 12.1 shall not entitle the receiving Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory Breach of this Agreement.

Article 13 – Confidentiality

13.0 Confidentiality.

For the purposes of this Agreement, information will be considered and treated as Confidential Information only if it meets the definition of Confidential Information set forth in Section 1.1 of this Agreement and is clearly designated or marked in writing as "confidential" on the face of the document, or, if the information is conveyed orally or by inspection, if the Party providing the information orally informs the Party receiving the information that the information is "confidential." Confidential Information shall be treated consistent with Section 18.17 of the Operating Agreement. A Party shall be responsible for the costs associated with affording confidential treatment to its information.

Article 14 – Regulatory Requirements

14.0 Regulatory Approvals.

Designated Entity shall seek and obtain all required government authority authorizations or approvals as soon as reasonably practicable, and by the milestone dates set forth in the Development Schedule of Schedule C of this Agreement, as applicable.

Article 15 – Representations and Warranties

15.0 General.

Designated Entity hereby represents, warrants and covenants as follows, with these representations, warranties, and covenants effective as to the Designated Entity during the full time this Agreement is effective:

15.0.1 Good Standing

Designated Entity is duly organized or formed, as applicable, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of its State of organization or formation, and is in good standing under the laws of the respective State(s) in which it is incorporated.

15.0.2 Authority

Designated Entity has the right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement, to become a Party thereto and to perform its obligations hereunder. This Agreement is a legal, valid and binding obligation of Designated Entity, enforceable against Designated Entity in accordance with its terms, except as the enforceability thereof may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting creditors' rights generally and by general equitable principles (regardless of whether enforceability is sought in a proceeding in equity or at law).

15.0.3 No Conflict.

The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement does not violate or conflict with the organizational or formation documents, or bylaws or operating agreement, of Designated Entity, or any judgment, license, permit, order, material agreement or instrument applicable to or binding upon Designated Entity or any of its assets.

Article 16 – Operation of Project

16.0 Initial Operation.

The following requirements shall be satisfied prior to Initial Operation of the Project:

16.0.1 Execution of the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement

Designated Entity has executed the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and is able to meet all requirements therein.

16.0.2 Execution of an Interconnection Agreement

Designated Entity has executed an Interconnection Agreement with the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect, or such agreement has been filed unexecuted with the Commission.

16.0.3 Operational Requirements

The Project must meet all applicable operational requirements described in the PJM Manuals.

16.0.4 Parallel Operation

Designated Entity shall have all necessary systems and personnel in place to allow for parallel operation of its facilities with the facilities of the Transmission Owner(s) to which the Project is interconnected consistent with the Interconnection Coordination Agreement associated with the Project.

16.0.5 Synchronization

Designated Entity shall have received any necessary authorization from Transmission Provider and the Transmission Owner(s) to whose facilities the Project will interconnect to synchronize with the Transmission System or to energize, as applicable, per the determination of Transmission Provider, the Project.

16.1 Partial Operation.

If the Project is to be completed in phases, the completed part of the Project may operate prior to completion and Required Project In-Service Date set forth in Schedule C of this Agreement, provided that: (i) Designated Entity has notified Transmission Provider of the successful completion of the Project phase; (ii) Transmission Provider has determined that partial operation of the Project will not negatively impact the reliability of the Transmission System; (iii) Designated Entity has demonstrated that the requirements for Initial Operation set forth in Section 16.0 of this Agreement have been met for the Project phase; and (iv) partial operation of the Project is consistent with Applicable Laws and Regulations, Applicable Reliability Standards, and Good Utility Practice.

Article 17 – Survival

17.0 Survival of Rights.

The rights and obligations of the Parties in this Agreement shall survive the termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement to the extent necessary to provide for the determination and enforcement of said obligations arising from acts or events that occurred while this Agreement was in effect. The Liability and Indemnity provisions in Article 9 also shall survive termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement.

Article 18 – Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

18.0 Schedule E – Addendum of Non-Standard Terms and Conditions.

Subject to FERC acceptance or approval, the Parties agree that the terms and conditions set forth in the attached Schedule E are hereby incorporated by reference, and made a part of, this Agreement. In the event of any conflict between a provision of Schedule E that FERC has accepted and any provision of the standard terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement that relates to the same subject matter, the pertinent provision of Schedule E shall control.

Article 19 – Miscellaneous

19.0 Notices.

Any notice or request made to or by any Party regarding this Agreement shall be made by U.S. mail or reputable overnight courier to the addresses set forth below:

Transmission Provider:
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
2750 Monroe Blvd.
Audubon, PA 19403
Attention:

Designated Entity:
____
____
____

Attention:

19.1 No Transmission Service.

This Agreement does not entitle the Designated Entity to take Transmission Service under the Tariff.

19.2 No Rights.

Neither this Agreement nor the construction or the financing of the Project entitles Designated Entity to any rights related to Customer-Funded Upgrades set forth in Subpart C of Part VI of the Tariff.

19.3 Standard of Review.

Future modifications to this Agreement by the Parties or the FERC shall be subject to the just and reasonable standard and the Parties shall not be required to demonstrate that such modifications are required to meet the "public interest" standard of review as described in *United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.*, 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and *Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.*, 350 U.S. 348 (1956).

19.4 No Partnership.

Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, the Parties do not intend to create hereby any joint venture, partnership, association taxable as a corporation, or other entity for the conduct of any business for profit.

19.5 Headings.

The Article and Section headings used in this Agreement are for convenience only and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

19.6 Interpretation.

Wherever the context may require, any noun or pronoun used herein shall include the corresponding masculine, feminine or neuter forms. The singular form of nouns, pronouns and verbs shall include the plural and vice versa.

19.7 Severability.

Each provision of this Agreement shall be considered severable and if for any reason any provision is determined by a court or regulatory authority of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, impaired or invalidated, and such invalid, void or unenforceable provision shall be replaced with valid and enforceable provision or provisions which otherwise give effect to the original intent of the invalid, void or unenforceable provision.

19.8 Further Assurances.

Each Party hereby agrees that it shall hereafter execute and deliver such further instruments, provide all information and take or forbear such further acts and things as may be reasonably required or useful to carry out the intent and purpose of this Agreement and as are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

19.9 Counterparts.

This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts to be construed as one effective as of the Effective Date.

19.10 Governing Law

This Agreement shall be governed under the Federal Power Act and Delaware law, as applicable.

19.11 Incorporation of Other Documents.

The Tariff, the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, as they may be amended from time to time, are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof.

[Signature Page Follows]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by their respective authorized officials.

Transmission Provider: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

By:______________________ _______________ ______________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

Designated Entity: [Name of Designated Entity]

By:______________________ _______________ ______________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

SCHEDULE A

Description of Project

SCHEDULE B

Scope of Work

SCHEDULE C

Development Schedule

Designated Entity shall ensure and demonstrate to the Transmission Provider that it timely has met the following milestones and milestone dates and that the milestones remain in good standing:

[As appropriate include the following standard Milestones, with any revisions, and additional milestones necessary for the Project]:

Milestones and Milestone Dates
Execute Interconnection Coordination Agreement. On or before ______, Designated Entity must execute the Interconnection Coordination Agreement or request the agreement be filed unexecuted.
Demonstrate adequate Project financing. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that adequate project financing has been secured. Project financing must be maintained for the term of this Agreement [add detail if necessary].
Acquisition of all necessary federal, state, county, and local site permits. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that all required federal, state, county and local site permits have been acquired. [add detail if necessary. May provide separate dates for each permit]
Substantial Site Work Completed: On or before _______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that at least 20% of Project site construction is completed. Additionally the Designated Entity must submit updated ratings and the final project drawings to the Transmission Provider.
Delivery of major electrical equipment. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that all major electrical equipment has been delivered to the project site. [add detail if necessary].
Demonstrate required ratings. On or before ______, Designated Entity must demonstrate that the project meets all required electrical ratings. [add detail if necessary].
Required Project In-Service Date. On or before ______, Designated Entity must: (i) demonstrate that the Project is completed in accordance with the Scope of Work in Schedules B of this Agreement; (ii) meets the criteria outlined in Schedule D of this Agreement; and (iii) is under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.
[Add additional Milestones]

SCHEDULE D

PJM Planning Requirements and Criteria and Required Ratings

SCHEDULE E

Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

INTERCONNECTION COORDINATION AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

____

And

____

INTERCONNECTION COORDINATION AGREEMENT

Between

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

[Name of Designated Entity]

And

[Name of Transmission Owners]

This Interconnection Coordination Agreement, including the Schedules attached hereto and incorporated herein (collectively, “Agreement”) is made and entered into as of the Effective Date (as specified in Section 2.0) by and among PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“Transmission Provider” or “PJM”), ________________ (“Designated Entity”) [OPTIONAL: or “[short name]”]), and ________________ (“Transmission Owner” [OPTIONAL [“short name”]) Transmission Provider, Designated Entity and Transmission Owner may be referred to herein individually as “Party” and collectively as “the Parties.”

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, in accordance with FERC Order No. 1000 and Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Transmission Provider is required to designate among candidates, pursuant to a FERC-approved process, an entity to develop and construct a specified project to expand, replace and/or reinforce the Transmission System operated by Transmission Provider;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(i) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, the Transmission Provider notified Designated Entity that it was designated as the Designated Entity for the Project (described in Schedule A to this Agreement) to be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(j) of Schedule 6 of the Operating Agreement, Designated Entity accepted the designation as the Designated Entity for the Project and therefore has the obligation to build the Project;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 6 of the Operating Agreement, Transmission Owner has received and accepted the designation from Transmission Provider to construct enhancements or expansions to its transmission facilities in order to effectuate interconnection with the Project, to which Transmission Provider has assigned a PJM upgrade ID identifier, which is unique to such construction modifications;

WHEREAS, the Project will interconnect to the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, and therefore Designated Entity and Transmission Owner shall coordinate with each other to facilitate the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities in a reliable, safe, and timely manner to enable the Project to meet its Required Project

In-Service Date; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, together with other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency is hereby mutually acknowledged by each Party, the Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:

Article 1 – Definitions

1.0 Defined Terms.

All capitalized terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Part I of the Tariff or in definitions either in the body of this Agreement or its attached Schedules. In the event of any conflict between defined terms set forth in the Tariff or defined terms in this Agreement, including the Schedules, such conflict will be resolved in favor of the terms as defined in this Agreement and attached Schedules.

1.1 Confidential Information.

Any confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information of a plan, specification, pattern, procedure, design, device, list, concept, policy, or compilation relating to the Project or Transmission Owner facilities to which the Project will interconnect, which is designated as confidential by the party supplying the information, whether conveyed verbally, electronically, in writing, through inspection, or otherwise, and shall include, but may not be limited to information relating to the producing party's technology, research and development, business affairs and pricing, land acquisition and vendor contracts relating to the Project.

1.2 Effective Date.

Effective Date shall mean the date that this Agreement becomes effective pursuant to Section 2.0 of this Agreement.

1.3 Project.

Project shall mean the enhancement or expansion included in the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to be constructed by the Designated Entity described in Schedule A of this Agreement.

1.4 Project Finance Entity.

Project Finance Entity shall mean holder, trustee or agent for holders, of any component of Project Financing.

1.5 Project Financing.

Project Financing shall mean: (a) one or more loans, leases, equity and/or debt financings, together with all modifications, renewals, supplements, substitutions and replacements thereof, the proceeds of which are used to finance or refinance the costs of the Project, any alteration, expansion or improvement to the Project, or the operation of the Project; or (b) loans and/or debt issues secured by the Project.

1.6 Reasonable Efforts.

Reasonable Efforts shall mean such efforts as are consistent with enabling the timely and effective design, construction, and interconnection to the Transmission System of the Project in a manner, which enables the Project to achieve its Required In-Service Date consistent with Good Utility Practice.

1.7 Required Project In-Service Date.

Required Project In-Service Date shall mean the date that the Project is required to: (i) be completed in accordance with the Scope of Work in Schedules B of the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project; (ii) meet the criteria outlined in Schedule D of the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project; and (iii) be under Transmission Provider operational dispatch.

Article 2 – Effective Date and Term

2.0 Effective Date.

Subject to regulatory acceptance, this Agreement shall become effective on the date the Agreement has been executed by all Parties, or if this Agreement is individually filed with FERC for acceptance, upon the date specified by FERC.

2.1 Term.

This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect from the Effective Date until: (i) the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project expires or terminates; or (ii) the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Article 3 of this Agreement.

Article 3 – Early Termination

3.0 Termination by Transmission Provider.

In the event that: (i) the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project is terminated pursuant to Article 8.0 of that agreement; or (ii) the Project is modified such that it will not interconnect to Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities; Transmission Provider may terminate this Agreement by providing written notice of termination to Designated Entity and Transmission Owner, which shall become effective the later of sixty calendar days after the Designated Entity receives such notice or other such date the FERC establishes for the termination.

3.1 Termination by Default.

This Agreement shall terminate in the event a Party is in default of this Agreement in accordance with Section 5.2 of this Agreement and such termination is approved by Transmission Provider in writing.

3.2 Filing at FERC.

To the extent required by law or regulation, Transmission Provider shall make the appropriate filing with FERC as required to effectuate the termination of this Agreement pursuant to this Article 3.

Article 4 – Coordination

4.0 Designated Entity and Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

The Designated Entity and Transmission Owner shall coordinate with each other as set forth in this Article 4 to facilitate the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities in a reliable, safe, and timely manner to enable the Project to meet its Required Project In-Service Date.

4.0.1 Scope of Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

Transmission Owner shall coordinate with Designated Entity the interconnection of the Project to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities including enhancements or expansions specified in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, identified as PJM Upgrade ID _________ and designated by PJM to the Transmission Owner to make Transmission Owner's transmission facilities ready to receive the interconnection of the Project. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as obligating Transmission Owner to assure that Designated Entity satisfies Designated Entity's obligations under this Agreement, under the Designated Entity Agreement described in Schedule A of this Agreement, nor under any other agreement.

4.0.2 Scope of Designated Entity Responsibilities.

Designated Entity shall coordinate with Transmission Owner, the interconnection of the Project, identified as PJM Upgrade ID ____ to the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities including enhancements or expansions specified in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, identified as PJM Upgrade ID _____ and described in Section 4.0.1 of this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as obligating Designated Entity to assure that Transmission Owner satisfies Transmission Owner's obligations under this Agreement, under the Consolidated Transmission Owner's Agreement described in Schedule A of this Agreement, nor under any other agreement.

4.1 Transmission Provider Responsibilities.

Transmission Provider may facilitate the coordination between Designated Entity and Transmission Owner required by this Agreement, including convening meetings with the Designated Entity and the Transmission Owner to further facilitate coordination among the Parties, and to evaluate available options or alternatives to avoid delays, and coordinating outages as described in Section 4.2 of this Agreement.

4.2 Outage Coordination.

Designated Entity and Transmission Owner acknowledge and agree that certain outages of transmission facilities owned by the Transmission Owner may be necessary to complete the process of constructing and interconnecting the Project. Designated Entity and Transmission Owner further acknowledge and agree that any such outages shall be coordinated by and through Transmission Provider. Any delays due to emergency, load or maintenance which affect the timing of outages as required or approved by the Transmission Provider may not be considered a Breach under Article 5.

4.3 Construction and Interconnection.

4.3.1 No Conferral of Rights.

This Agreement shall confer no rights upon either the Designated Entity or the Transmission Owner to enter the right-of-way or property of the other Party, or interconnect its facilities, either physically or electrically, to the facilities of the other Party.

4.3.2 Interconnection Agreement.

Prior to interconnection, the Parties shall enter into an interconnection agreement setting forth the terms and conditions for: (i) the interconnection of the Transmission Owner's and Designated Entity's facilities; and (ii) the ongoing relationship of the Transmission Owner and the Designated Entity with regard to the interconnection. In the event the Parties are unable to agree, a Party may request: (i) dispute resolution consistent with Schedule 5 of the Operating Agreement; or, (ii) the interconnection agreement be filed unexecuted with the Commission.

4.3.3 Other Agreements.

The Parties recognize that, where appropriate, the Parties may enter into other agreements (beyond the interconnection agreement referred to in Section 4.3.2 above) such as construction agreements. Such other agreements shall be filed with FERC, if required. The terms and conditions of such other agreements are not addressed in this Agreement.

Article 5 – Breach and Default

5.0 Breach.

Except as otherwise provided in Article 7 of this Agreement, a breach of this Agreement shall include the failure of any Party to comply with any term or condition of this Agreement, including the Schedules attached hereto.

5.1 Notice of Breach.

In the event of a Breach, a Party not in Breach of this Agreement shall give written notice of such Breach to the breaching Party, the other non-breaching Party and to any other persons, including Project Finance Entities that the breaching Party identifies in writing prior to the Breach. Such notice shall set forth, in reasonable detail, the nature of the Breach, and where known and applicable, the steps necessary to cure such Breach.

5.2 Default.

A Party that commits a Breach and does not take steps to cure the Breach pursuant to Section 5.3 shall be in default of this Agreement.

5.3 Cure of Breach.

A breaching Party may (i) cure the Breach within thirty days from the receipt of the notice of Breach or other such date as determined by Transmission Provider to enable the Project meets its Required Project In-Service Date; or, (ii) if the Breach cannot be cured within thirty days but may be cured in a manner that enables the Project to meet its Required Project In- Service Date, the breaching Party, within such thirty day time period, commences in good faith steps that are reasonable and appropriate to cure the Breach and thereafter diligently pursue such action to completion.

5.4 Remedies.

Upon the occurrence of an event of Default, the non-defaulting Party shall be entitled to: (i) commence an action to require the Defaulting Party to remedy such default and specifically perform its duties and obligations hereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof; (ii) suspend performance hereunder; and (iii) exercise such other rights and remedies as it may have in equity or at law. Nothing in this Section 5.4 is intended in any way to affect the rights of a third-party to seek any remedy it may have in equity or at law from the Designated Entity or the Transmission Owner resulting from Designated Entity's default of this Agreement.

5.5 Remedies Cumulative.

No remedy conferred by any provision of this Agreement is intended to be exclusive of any other remedy and each and every remedy shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to every other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by statute or otherwise. The election of any one or more remedies shall not constitute a waiver of the right to pursue other available remedies.

5.6 Waiver.

Any waiver at any time by any Party of its rights with respect to a Breach or default under this Agreement, or with respect to any other matters arising in connection with this Agreement, shall not be deemed a waiver or continuing waiver with respect to any other Breach or default or other matter.

Article 6 – Liability and Indemnity

6.0 Liability.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Transmission Provider's liability to the Designated Entity, Transmission Owner, any third-party, or any other person arising or resulting from any acts or omissions associated in any way with performance under this Agreement shall be limited in the same manner and to the same extent that Transmission Provider's liability is limited to any Transmission Customer, third-party or other person under Section 10.2 of the Tariff arising or resulting from any act or omission in any way associated with service provided under the Tariff or any Service Agreement thereunder.

6.1 Indemnity.

For the purposes of this Agreement, Designated Entity and Transmission Owner shall at all times indemnify, defend, and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless from, any and all damages, losses, claims, including claims and actions relating to injury to or death of any person or damage to property, demands, suits, recoveries, costs and expenses, court costs, attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third-parties, arising out of or resulting from the Transmission Provider's acts or omissions associated with the performance of its obligations under this Agreement to the same extent and in the same manner that a Transmission Customer is required to indemnify, defend and save Transmission Provider and its directors, managers, members, shareholders, officers and employees harmless under Section 10.3 of the Tariff.

Article 7 – Force Majeure

7.0 Force Majeure.

For the purpose of this section, an event of force majeure shall mean any cause beyond the control of the affected Party, including but not restricted to, acts of God, flood, drought, earthquake, storm, fire, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance or disobedience, labor dispute, labor or material shortage, sabotage, acts of public enemy, explosions, orders, regulations or restrictions imposed by governmental, military, or lawfully established civilian authorities, which in any foregoing cases, by exercise of due diligence, it has been unable to overcome. An event of force majeure does not include: (i) a failure of performance that is due to an affected Party's own negligence or intentional wrongdoing; (ii) any removable or remedial causes (other than settlement of a strike or labor dispute), which an affected Party fails to remove or remedy within a reasonable time; or (iii) economic hardship of an affected Party.

7.1 Notice.

A Party that is unable to carry out an obligation imposed on it by this Agreement due to Force Majeure shall notify the other Party in writing within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the cause relied on.

7.2 Duration of Force Majeure.

A Party shall not be responsible for any non-performance or considered in Breach or Default under this Agreement, for any deficiency or failure to perform any obligation under this Agreement to the extent that such failure or deficiency is due to Force Majeure. A Party shall be excused from whatever performance is affected only for the duration of the Force Majeure and while the Party exercises Reasonable Efforts to alleviate such situation. As soon as the non-performing Party is able to resume performance of its obligations excused because of the occurrence of Force Majeure, such Party shall resume performance and give prompt notice thereof to the other Party.

7.3 Breach or Default of or Force Majeure under Designated Entity Agreement

If either of the following events prevents Designated Entity from performing any of its obligations under this Agreement, such event shall be considered a Force Majeure event under this Agreement and the provisions of this Article 7 shall apply: (i) a breach or default of the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project by a party to the Designated Entity Agreement other than the Designated Entity; or (ii) an event of Force Majeure under the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project.

Article 8 – Assignment

8.0 Assignment.

No Party may assign any of its rights or delegate any of its duties or obligations under this Agreement without prior written consent of Transmission Provider, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or delayed.

8.1 Assignment of Designated Entity Agreement.

In the event that the Designated Entity Agreement associated with the Project is assigned pursuant to Article 11 of the Designated Entity Agreement, this Agreement also shall be assigned contemporaneously with that assignment, without the need for any consent under Section 8.0

above.

Article 9 – Information Exchange

9.0 Information Access.

Subject to Applicable Laws and Regulations, each Party shall make available to the other Parties information necessary to carry out obligations and responsibilities under this Agreement. The Parties shall not use such information for purposes other than to carry out their obligations or enforce their rights under this Agreement.

9.1 Reporting of Non-Force Majeure Events.

Each Party shall notify the other Parties when it becomes aware of its inability to comply with the provisions of this Agreement for a reason other than Force Majeure. The Parties shall cooperate with each other and provide necessary information regarding such inability to comply, including, but not limited to, the date, duration, reason for the inability to comply, and corrective actions taken or planned to be taken with respect to such inability to comply. Notwithstanding the foregoing, notification, cooperation or information provided under this Section 9.1 shall not entitle the receiving Party to allege a cause of action for anticipatory Breach of this Agreement.

Article 10 – Confidentiality

10.0 Confidentiality.

For the purposes of this Agreement, information shall be considered and treated as Confidential Information only if it meets the definition of Confidential Information set forth in Section 1.1 of this Agreement and is clearly designated or marked in writing as "confidential" on the face of the document, or, in the case of information conveyed orally, by inspection or by electronic media incapable of being marked as "confidential", if the Party providing the information orally informs the Party receiving the information that the information is "confidential." Confidential Information shall be treated consistent with Section 18.17 of the Operating Agreement. A Party shall be responsible for the costs associated with affording confidential treatment to its information.

Article 11 – Representations and Warranties

11.0 General.

The Parties hereby represent, warrant and covenant as follows, with these representations, warranties, and covenants effective during the full time this Agreement is effective:

11.0.1 Good Standing.

The Party is duly organized or formed, as applicable, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of its State of incorporation, organization or formation, and is in good standing under the laws of the respective State(s) in which it is incorporated, organized or formed.

11.0.2 Authority.

The Party has the right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement, to become a Party thereto and to perform its obligations hereunder. This Agreement is a legal, valid and binding obligation of the Party, enforceable against the Party in accordance with its terms, except as the enforceability thereof may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting creditors' rights generally and by general equitable principles (regardless of whether enforceability is sought in a proceeding in equity or at law).

11.0.3 No Conflict.

The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement does not violate or conflict with the organizational or formation documents, or bylaws or operating agreement, of the Party, or any judgment, license, permit, order, material agreement or instrument applicable to or binding upon Designated Entity or any of its assets.

Article 12 – Survival

12.0 Survival of Rights.

The rights and obligations of the Parties in this Agreement shall survive the termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement to the extent necessary to provide for the determination and enforcement of said obligations arising from acts or events that occurred while this Agreement was in effect. The provisions of Article 6 also shall survive termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Agreement

Article 13 – Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

13.0 Schedule C -- Addendum of Non-Standard Terms and Conditions.

Subject to FERC acceptance or approval, the Parties agree that the terms and conditions set forth in the attached Schedule C are hereby incorporated by reference, and made a part of, this Agreement. In the event of any conflict between a provision of Schedule C that FERC has accepted and any provision of the standard terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement that relates to the same subject matter, the pertinent provision of Schedule C shall control.

Article 14 – Schedules

14.0 Schedule A: Description of the Project.

Schedule A provides a description of the Project to be constructed by the Designated Entity.

14.1 Schedule B: Single Line Diagram.

Schedule B contains a single line diagram that depicts the Project and the Transmission Owner transmission facilities to which the Project will interconnect.

Article 15 – Miscellaneous

15.0 Notices.

Any notice or request made to or by any Party regarding this Agreement shall be made by U.S. mail or reputable overnight courier to the addresses set forth below:

Transmission Provider:
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
2750 Monroe Blvd.
Audubon, PA 19403

Attention:

Designated Entity:
____
____
____
____

Transmission Owner:
____
____
____
____

15.1 Standard of Review.

Future modifications to this Agreement by the Parties or the FERC shall be subject to the just and reasonable standard and the Parties shall not be required to demonstrate that such modifications are required to meet the "public interest" standard of review as described in *United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.*, 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and *Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.*, 350 U.S. 348 (1956).

15.2 No Partnership.

Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, the Parties do not intend to create hereby any joint venture, partnership, association, taxable as a corporation, or other entity for the conduct of any business for profit.

15.3 Headings.

The Article and Section headings used in this Agreement are for convenience only and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

15.4 Interpretation.

Wherever the context may require, any noun or pronoun used herein shall include the corresponding masculine, feminine or neuter forms. The singular form of nouns, pronouns and verbs shall include the plural and vice versa.

15.5 Severability.

Each provision of this Agreement shall be considered severable and if for any reason any provision is determined by a court or regulatory authority of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, impaired or invalidated, and such invalid, void or unenforceable provision shall be replaced with valid and enforceable provision or provisions which otherwise give effect to the original intent of the invalid, void or unenforceable provision.

15.6 Further Assurances.

Each Party hereby agrees that it shall hereafter execute and deliver such further instruments, provide all information and take or forbear such further acts and things as may be reasonably required or useful to carry out the intent and purpose of this Agreement and as are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

15.7 Counterparts.

This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts to be construed as one effective as of the Effective Date.

15.8 Governing Law.

This Agreement shall be governed under the Federal Power Act and Delaware law, as applicable.

15.9 Incorporation of Other Documents.

The Tariff, the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, as they may be amended from time to time, are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof.

[Signature Page Follows]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by their respective authorized officials.

Transmission Provider: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

By: __________________________ __________________ ___________________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

Designated Entity: [Name of Designated Entity]

By: __________________________ __________________ ___________________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

Transmission Owner: [Name of Transmission Owner]

By: __________________________ __________________ ___________________
Name Title Date

Printed name of signer: ____

SCHEDULE A

Description of Project

SCHEDULE B

Single-Line Diagram

The single line diagram below provides a high level concept of the project. Details of the interconnection point will be fully set forth in an interconnection agreement.

SCHEDULE C

Non-Standard Terms and Conditions

Sections of the

PJM Operating Agreement

(Clean Format)

OPERATING AGREEMENT
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SCHEDULE 12 – PJM MEMBER LIST

RESOLUTION TO AMEND THE PROCEDURES REQUIRING THE RETENTION OF AN INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT TO PROPOSE A LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR THE BOARD OF MANAGERS ELECTION FOR 2001

Definitions C - D

1.6 Capacity Resource.

"Capacity Resource" have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.6.01 Catastrophic Force Majeure.

"Catastrophic Force Majeure" shall not include any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, explosion, or Curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental, military or lawfully established civilian authorities, unless as a consequence of any such action, event, or combination of events, either (i) all, or substantially all, of the Transmission System is unavailable, or (ii) all, or substantially all, of the interstate natural gas pipeline network, interstate rail, interstate highway or federal waterway transportation network serving the PJM Region is unavailable. The Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure has occurred for purposes of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, based on an examination of available evidence. The Office of the Interconnection's determination is subject to review by the Commission.

1.6A Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement.

"Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement" dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

1.7 Control Area.

"Control Area" shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and each Applicable Regional Entity;

(d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

(e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

1.7.01 Control Zone.

"Control Zone" shall mean one Zone or multiple contiguous Zones, as designated in the PJM Manuals.

1.7.01a Counterparty.

"Counterparty" shall mean PJMSettlement as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with Market Participants or other entities, including the agreements and transactions with customers regarding transmission service and other transactions under the PJM Tariff and this Operating Agreement. PJMSettlement shall not be a counterparty to (i) any bilateral transactions between Market Participants, or (ii) with respect to self-supplied or self-scheduled transactions reported to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.7.02 Default Allocation Assessment.

"Default Allocation Assessment" shall mean the assessment determined pursuant to section 15.2.2 of this Agreement.

1.7.03 Demand Resource.

"Demand Resource" shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.7A Designated Entity.

An entity, including an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer, designated by the Office of the Interconnection with the responsibility to construct, own, operate, maintain, and finance Immediate-need Reliability Projects, Short-term Projects, Long-lead Projects, or Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions pursuant to Section 1.5.8 of Schedule 6 of this Agreement.

1.7B [Reserved].

18.9 Catastrophic Force Majeure.

Performance of any obligation arising under this Agreement, owed by a Member to either PJM or to another Member (either directly or indirectly), shall not be excused or suspended by reason of an event of force majeure unless such event constitutes an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure. An event of Catastrophic Force Majeure shall excuse a Member from performing obligations arising under this Agreement during the period such Member's performance is prevented by any event of Catastrophic Force Majeure, provided such event was not caused by such Member's fault or negligence. An event of Catastrophic Force Majeure may suspend but shall not excuse any payment obligation owed by a Member. Any excuse or exception to a performance obligation expressly provided for by specific terms of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, or the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall apply according to their terms and remain in full force and effect without regard to this provision. Unless expressly referenced in any section of this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, or the Reliability Assurance Agreement, this provision shall not apply, and not supersede, other force majeure provisions that are expressly applicable to specific obligations arising under any sections of those documents. This provision shall apply in its entirety to all rules, rights and obligations specified in Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Tariff, Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement. Other than this provision, no other force majeure provisions in this Agreement, the PJM Tariff, or the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall apply in any manner to Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Tariff, Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement, and the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3 Definitions.

1.3.1 Acceleration Request.

"Acceleration Request" shall mean a request pursuant to section 1.9.4A of this Schedule to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 or 1.9.4.

1.3.1A Auction Revenue Rights.

"Auction Revenue Rights" or "ARRs" shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Section 7.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B Auction Revenue Rights Credits.

"Auction Revenue Rights Credits" shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.1B.01 Batch Load Demand Resource.

"Batch Load Demand Resource" shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

1.3.1B.01A Cold Weather Alert.

"Cold Weather Alert" shall mean the notice that PJM provides to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions.

1.3.1B.02 Congestion Price.

"Congestion Price" shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02A Coordinated External Transaction.

"Coordinated External Transaction" shall mean a transaction to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02B Coordinated Transaction Scheduling.

"Coordinated Transaction Scheduling" or "CTS" shall mean the scheduling of Coordinated External Transactions at a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.02C CTS Enabled Interface.

"CTS Enabled Interface" shall mean an interface between the PJM Control Area and an adjacent Control Area at which the Office of the Interconnection has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling ("CTS"), designated in Schedule A to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45).

1.3.1B.02D CTS Interface Bid

"CTS Interface Bid" shall mean a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.1B.03 Curtailment Service Provider.

"Curtailment Service Provider" or "CSP" shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Ancillary Services markets, and/or Reliability Pricing Model by causing a reduction in demand.

1.3.1B.04 Day-ahead Congestion Price.

"Day-ahead Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1C Day-ahead Energy Market.

"Day-ahead Energy Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1C.01 Day-ahead Loss Price.

"Day-ahead Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D Day-ahead Prices.

"Day-ahead Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1D.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves" shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the Reliability*First* Corporation and SERC.

1.3.1D.02 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement" shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with the Applicable Standards, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

1.3.1D.03 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources" shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

1.3.1D.04 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market.

"Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market" shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

1.3.1D.05 Day-ahead System Energy Price.

"Day-ahead System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E Decrement Bid.

"Decrement Bid" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.1E.01 Demand Bid

"Demand Bid" shall mean a bid, submitted by a Load Serving Entity in the Day-ahead Energy Market, to purchase energy at its contracted load location, for a specified timeframe and megawatt quantity, that if cleared will result in energy being scheduled at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market and in the physical transfer of energy during the relevant Operating Day.

1.3.1E.02 Demand Bid Limit

"Demand Bid Limit" shall mean the largest MW volume of Demand Bids that may be submitted by a Load Serving Entity for any hour of an Operating Day, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.03 Demand Bid Screening

"Demand Bid Screening" shall mean the process by which Demand Bids are reviewed against the applicable Demand Bid Limit, and rejected if they would exceed that limit, as determined pursuant to Section 1.10.1B of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.1E.04 Demand Resource.

"Demand Resource" shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

1.3.1F Dispatch Rate.

"Dispatch Rate" shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

1.3.1F.01 Emergency Load Response Program

The Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.1G Energy Storage Resource.

"Energy Storage Resource" shall mean flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.

1.3.2 Equivalent Load.

"Equivalent Load" shall mean the sum of a Market Participant's net system requirements to serve its customer load in the PJM Region, if any, plus its net bilateral transactions.

1.3.2A Economic Load Response Participant.

"Economic Load Response Participant" shall mean a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Section 1.5A of this Schedule to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and/or Ancillary Services markets through reductions in demand.

1.3.2A.01 Economic Minimum.

"Economic Minimum" shall mean the lowest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2A.02 Economic Maximum.

"Economic Maximum" shall mean the highest incremental MW output level, submitted to PJM market systems by a Market Participant, that a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

1.3.2B Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

"Energy Market Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of available run hours due to limitations imposed on the unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in PJM Tariff), and (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Energy Market Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same compliance period, which compliance period is determined by the applicable regulatory authority and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Energy Market Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.3 External Market Buyer.

"External Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users outside the PJM Region, or for load in the PJM Region that is not served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.4 External Resource.

"External Resource" shall mean a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the PJM Region.

1.3.5 Financial Transmission Right.

"Financial Transmission Right" or "FTR" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.5A Financial Transmission Right Obligation.

"Financial Transmission Right Obligation" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(b) of this Schedule.

1.3.5B Financial Transmission Right Option.

"Financial Transmission Right Option" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(c) of this Schedule.

1.3.6 Generating Market Buyer.

"Generating Market Buyer" shall mean an Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM Region, or of selling energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere.

1.3.7 Generator Forced Outage.

"Generator Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

1.3.8 Generator Maintenance Outage.

"Generator Maintenance Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform necessary repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility meets the guidelines specified in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9 Generator Planned Outage.

"Generator Planned Outage" shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

1.3.9.01 Hot Weather Alert.

"Hot Weather Alert" shall mean the notice provided by PJM to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for extreme hot and/or humid weather conditions which may cause capacity requirements and/or unit unavailability to be substantially higher than forecast are expected to persist for an extended period.

1.3.9A Increment Offer.

"Increment Offer" shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is an offer to sell energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Increment Offer results in scheduled generation at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

1.3.9B Interface Pricing Point.

"Interface Pricing Point" shall have the meaning specified in section 2.6A.

1.3.10 Internal Market Buyer.

"Internal Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for ultimate consumption by end-users inside the PJM Region that are served by Network Transmission Service.

1.3.11 Inadvertent Interchange.

"Inadvertent Interchange" shall mean the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the individual Control Areas operated by PJM.

1.3.11.01 Load Management.

"Load Management" shall mean a Demand Resource ("DR") as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.11.02 Load Management Event

"Load Management Event" shall mean a) a single temporally contiguous dispatch of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day, or b) multiple dispatches of Demand Resources in a Compliance Aggregation Area during an Operating Day that are temporally contiguous.

1.3.11A Load Reduction Event.

"Load Reduction Event" shall mean a reduction in demand by a Member or Special Member for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.11A.01 Location.

"Location" as used in the Economic Load Response rules shall mean an end-use customer site as defined by the relevant electric distribution company account number.

1.3.11B Loss Price.

"Loss Price" shall mean the loss component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.12 Market Operations Center.

"Market Operations Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by or on behalf of a Market Participant to communicate and coordinate with the Office of the Interconnection in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.12A Maximum Emergency.

"Maximum Emergency" shall mean the designation of all or part of the output of a generating unit for which the designated output levels may require extraordinary procedures and therefore are available to the Office of the Interconnection only when the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to run. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the aggregate amount of megawatts that are classified as Maximum Emergency.

1.3.13 Maximum Generation Emergency.

"Maximum Generation Emergency" shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection to address either a generation or transmission emergency in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more Generation Capacity Resources, or Non-Retail Behind The Meter Generation resources to operate at its maximum net or gross electrical power output, subject to the equipment stress limits for such Generation Capacity Resource or Non-Retail Behind The Meter resource in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.13A Maximum Generation Emergency Alert.

"Maximum Generation Emergency Alert" shall mean an alert issued by the Office of the Interconnection to notify PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared, for any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market, for all or any part of such Operating Day.

1.3.14 Minimum Generation Emergency.

"Minimum Generation Emergency" shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more generating resources to operate at or below Normal Minimum Generation, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

1.3.14A NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator.

"NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator" shall mean the NERC mechanism that is in effect and being used to calculate the distribution of energy, over specific transmission interfaces, from energy transactions.

1.3.14B Net Benefits Test.

"Net Benefits Test" shall mean a calculation to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in price resulting from the dispatch of Economic Load Response exceeds the cost to other loads resulting from the billing unit effects of the load reduction, as specified in Section 3.3A.4 of this Schedule.

1.3.15 Network Resource.

"Network Resource" shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Tariff.

1.3.16 Network Service User.

"Network Service User" shall mean an entity using Network Transmission Service.

1.3.17 Network Transmission Service.

"Network Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff, or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

1.3.17A Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost.

"Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost" shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure; and, (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement.

1.3.17B Non-Synchronized Reserve.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of non-emergency generation resources that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is not electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.17C Non-Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Non-Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources able and assigned to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve in one or more

specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes to increase the energy output by the amount of assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.17D Non-Variable Loads.

"Non-Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.18 Normal Maximum Generation.

"Normal Maximum Generation" shall mean the highest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.19 Normal Minimum Generation.

"Normal Minimum Generation" shall mean the lowest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

1.3.20 Offer Data.

"Offer Data" shall mean the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new resource, and other data and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generation resources and Demand Resource(s) for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the PJM Region, and specified for submission to the PJM Interchange Energy Market for such purposes by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.3.21 Office of the Interconnection Control Center.

"Office of the Interconnection Control Center" shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by the Office of the Interconnection to coordinate and direct the operation of the PJM Region and to administer the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including facilities and equipment used to communicate and coordinate with the Market Participants in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

1.3.21A On-Site Generators.

"On-Site Generators" shall mean generation facilities (including Behind The Meter Generation) that (i) are not Capacity Resources, (ii) are not injecting into the grid, (iii) are either synchronized or non-synchronized to the Transmission System, and (iv) can be used to reduce demand for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.3.22 Operating Day.

"Operating Day" shall mean the daily 24 hour period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the PJM Interchange Energy Market are scheduled.

1.3.23 Operating Margin.

"Operating Margin" shall mean the incremental adjustments, measured in megawatts, required in PJM Region operations in order to accommodate, on a first contingency basis, an operating contingency in the PJM Region resulting from operations in an interconnected Control Area. Such adjustments may result in constraints causing Transmission Congestion Charges, or may result in Ancillary Services charges pursuant to the PJM Tariff.

1.3.24 Operating Margin Customer.

"Operating Margin Customer" shall mean a Control Area purchasing Operating Margin pursuant to an agreement between such other Control Area and the LLC.

1.3.24A Pre-Emergency Load Response Program

The Pre-Emergency Load Response Program is the program by which Curtailment Service Providers may be compensated by PJM for Demand Resources that will reduce load when dispatched by PJM during pre-emergency conditions, and is described in Section 8 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Section 8 of Attachment K-Appendix of the Tariff.

1.3.25 PJM Interchange.

"PJM Interchange" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds, or is exceeded by, the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller; or (e) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (f) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.26 PJM Interchange Export.

"PJM Interchange Export" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load is exceeded by the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup sales; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller.

1.3.27 PJM Interchange Import.

"PJM Interchange Import" shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup purchases; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (d) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

1.3.28 PJM Open Access Same-time Information System.

"PJM Open Access Same-time Information System" shall mean the electronic communication system for the collection and dissemination of information about transmission services in the PJM Region, established and operated by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with FERC standards and requirements.

1.3.28A Planning Period Quarter.

"Planning Period Quarter" shall mean any of the following three month periods in the Planning Period: June, July and August; September, October and November; December, January and February; or March, April and May.

1.3.28B Planning Period Balance.

"Planning Period Balance" shall mean the entire period of time remaining in the Planning Period following the month that a monthly auction is conducted.

1.3.29 Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

"Point-to-Point Transmission Service" shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

1.3.29A PRD Curve.

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29B PRD Provider.

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29C PRD Reservation Price.

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29D PRD Substation.

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29E Price Responsive Demand.

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

1.3.29F Primary Reserve.

"Primary Reserve" shall mean the total reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes of a request from the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is comprised of both Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve.

1.3.30 Ramping Capability.

"Ramping Capability" shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

1.3.30.01 Real-time Congestion Price.

"Real-time Congestion Price" shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30.02 Real-time Loss Price.

"Real-time Loss Price" shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30A Real-time Prices.

"Real-time Prices" shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B Real-time Energy Market.

"Real-time Energy Market" shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.30B.01 Real-time System Energy Price.

"Real-time System Energy Price" shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

1.3.31 Regulation.

"Regulation" shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to increase or decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

1.3.31.001 Reserve Penalty Factor.

"Reserve Penalty Factor" shall mean the cost, in $/MWh, associated with being unable to meet a specific reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. A Reserve Penalty Factor will be defined for each reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

1.3.31.01 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.

"Residual Auction Revenue Rights" shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability, including the return to service of existing transmission capability, that was not modeled pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement in compliance with section 7.4.2(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to section 7.4.2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Part VI of the Tariff; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Schedule 6 of this Agreement for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

1.3.31.01A Residual Metered Load.

"Residual Metered Load" shall mean all load remaining in an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) after all nodally priced load of entities serving load in such area(s) or territory(ies) has been carved out.

1.3.31.02 Special Member.

"Special Member" shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Section 1.5A.02 of this Schedule or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs.

1.3.32 Spot Market Backup.

"Spot Market Backup" shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

1.3.33 Spot Market Energy.

"Spot Market Energy" shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Section 2 of this Schedule.

1.3.33A State Estimator.

"State Estimator" shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Section 2.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.33B Station Power.

"Station Power" shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used for compressors at a compressed air energy storage facility; (iv) used for charging an Energy Storage Resource; or (v) used in association with restoration or black start service.

1.3.33B.001 Sub-meter.

"Sub-meter" shall mean a metering point for electricity consumption that does not include all electricity consumption for the end-use customer as defined by the electric distribution company account number. PJM shall only accept sub-meter load data from end-use customers for measurement and verification of Regulation service as set forth in the Economic Load Response rules and PJM Manuals.

1.3.33B.01 Synchronized Reserve.

"Synchronized Reserve" shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

1.3.33B.02 Synchronized Reserve Event.

"Synchronized Reserve Event" shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled to provide Synchronized Reserve in one or more specified Reserve Zones or Reserve Sub-zones, within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

1.3.33B.03 System Energy Price.

"System Energy Price" shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

1.3.33C Target Allocation.

"Target Allocation" shall mean the allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits as set forth in Section 5.2.3 of this Schedule or the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits as set forth in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

1.3.34 Transmission Congestion Charge.

"Transmission Congestion Charge" shall mean a charge attributable to the increased cost of energy delivered at a given load bus when the transmission system serving that load bus is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide energy for third-party transmission losses in accordance with Section 9.3, which shall be calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.1 of this Schedule.

1.3.35 Transmission Congestion Credit.

"Transmission Congestion Credit" shall mean the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Charges credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.2 of this Schedule.

1.3.36 Transmission Customer.

"Transmission Customer" shall mean an entity using Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

1.3.37 Transmission Forced Outage.

"Transmission Forced Outage" shall mean an immediate removal from service of a transmission facility by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the transmission facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A removal from service of a transmission facility at the request of the Office of the Interconnection to improve transmission capability shall not constitute a Forced Transmission Outage.

1.3.37A Transmission Loading Relief.

"Transmission Loading Relief" shall mean NERC's procedures for preventing operating security limit violations, as implemented by PJM as the security coordinator responsible for maintaining transmission security for the PJM Region.

1.3.37B Transmission Loading Relief Customer.

"Transmission Loading Relief Customer" shall mean an entity that, in accordance with Section 1.10.6A, has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges during Transmission Loading Relief in order to continue energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region that are increasing the cost of energy in the PJM Region.

1.3.37C Transmission Loss Charge.

"Transmission Loss Charge" shall mean the charges to each Market Participant, Network Customer, or Transmission Customer for the cost of energy lost in the transmission of electricity from a generation resource to load as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

1.3.38 Transmission Planned Outage.

"Transmission Planned Outage" shall mean any transmission outage scheduled in advance for a pre-determined duration and which meets the notification requirements for such outages specified in this Agreement or the PJM Manuals.

1.3.38.01 Up-to Congestion Transaction.

"Up-to Congestion Transaction" shall have the meaning specified in Section 1.10.1A of this Schedule.

1.3.38A Variable Loads.

"Variable Loads" shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

1.3.38B Virtual Transaction.

"Virtual Transaction" shall mean a Decrement Bid, Increment Offer and/or Up-to Congestion Transaction.

1.3.39 Zonal Base Load.

"Zonal Base Load" shall mean the lowest daily zonal peak load from the twelve month period ending October 21 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which an annual Auction Revenue Right allocation is conducted, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone, when non-extraordinary conditions exist for the applicable twelve month period, as determined by PJM. If the lowest daily zonal peak load from the applicable twelve month period is abnormally low due to extraordinary conditions, as determined by PJM, Zonal Base Load shall mean the next lowest daily zonal peak load that was not affected by extraordinary conditions during the applicable twelve month period, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone. For the purposes of this definition, extraordinary conditions shall mean a significant event, or combination of events, that affect the operation of the bulk power system in an atypical manner and results in an abnormal reduction in the consumption of energy within a Zone.

1.9 Prescheduling.

The following procedures and principles shall govern the prescheduling activities necessary to plan for the reliable operation of the PJM Region and for the efficient operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

1.9.1 Outage Scheduling.

The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for coordinating and approving requests for outages of generation and transmission facilities as necessary for the reliable operation of the PJM Region, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain records of outages and outage requests of these facilities.

1.9.2 Planned Outages.

(a) A Generator Planned Outage shall be included in Generator Planned Outage schedules established prior to the scheduled start date for the outage, in accordance with standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Generator Planned Outage scheduling for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement and the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of such resources. A Market Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from all or part of a generation resource undergoing an approved Generator Planned Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Planned Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval or withdraw a prior approval. Approval of a Generator Planned Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. The Market Seller shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with an estimate of the amount of time it needs to return to service any Generation Capacity Resource on Generator Planned Outage that is already underway. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds or withdraws its approval of a Generator Planned Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Planned Outage at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall if possible propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market Seller of a Generator Planned Outage.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct Transmission Planned Outage scheduling in accordance with procedures specified in the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the PJM Manuals, and in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) Transmission Owners shall use reasonable efforts to submit Transmission Planned Outage schedules one year in advance but by no later than the first of the month six months in advance of the requested start date for all outages that are expected to exceed five working days duration, with regular (at least monthly) updates as new information becomes available.

(ii) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided in accordance with the requirements in subsection (i) above, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in the Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(iii) Transmission Owners shall submit notice of all Transmission Planned Outages to the Office of the Interconnection by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, with updates as new information becomes available.

(iv) If notice of a Transmission Planned Outage is not provided by the first day of the month preceding the month the outage will commence, and if such outage is determined by the Office of the Interconnection to have the potential to cause significant system impacts, including but not limited to reliability impacts and transmission system congestion, then the Office of the Interconnection may require the Transmission Owner to implement an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid such impacts. The Office of the Interconnection shall perform this analysis and notify the Transmission Owner in a timely manner if it will require rescheduling of the outage. The Office of the Interconnection may, however, if requested by the Transmission Owner, dispatch generation or reductions in demand in order to avoid implementing an alternative outage schedule for its Transmission Facilities to extent consistent with its obligations under the Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff and provided the Office of the

Interconnection determines that such dispatch would not adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practices. A Transmission Owner that makes such a dispatch request pursuant to this section shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred had the Office of the Interconnection implemented an alternative outage schedule to reduce or avoid reliability and congestion impacts. The Office of the Interconnection may, at the Transmission Owner's consent, directly assign to the Transmission Owner all generation and other costs resulting from the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch of generation or reductions in demand arising from outages associated with RTEP upgrades not submitted consistent with the timelines set forth in the Tariff and the PJM Operating Agreement and where such outage is required to meet the reliability-based in-service date of the RTEP upgrade project.

(v) The Office of the Interconnection reserves the right to approve, deny, or reschedule any outage deemed necessary to ensure reliable system operations on a case by case basis regardless of duration or date of submission.

(vi) The Office of the Interconnection shall post notice of Transmission Planned Outages on OASIS upon receipt of such notice from the Transmission Owner; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection shall not post on OASIS notice of any component of a Transmission Planned Outage to the extent such component shall directly reveal a generator outage. In such cases, the Transmission Owner, in addition to providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection as required above, concurrently shall inform the affected Generation Owner of such outage, limiting such communication to that necessary to describe the outage and to coordinate with the Generation Owner on matters of safety to persons, facilities, and equipment. The Transmission Owner shall not notify any other Market Participant of such outage and shall arrange any other necessary coordination through the Office of the Interconnection.

In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that transmission maintenance schedules proposed by one or more Members would significantly affect the efficient and reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may establish alternative schedules, but such alternative shall minimize the economic impact on the Member or Members whose maintenance schedules the Office of the Interconnection proposes to modify.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate resolution of outage or other planning conflicts that may give rise to unreliable system conditions. The Members shall comply with all maintenance schedules established by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.9.3 Generator Maintenance Outages.

(a) A Generator Maintenance Outage may only be scheduled if approved by the Office of the Interconnection prior to the requested start date for the outage, in accordance with subsection (b) hereof and the standards and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Generator Maintenance Outages for Generation Capacity Resources in accordance with the procedures specified in the PJM Manuals and in consultation with the Market Seller owning or controlling the output of such resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall approve requests for Generator Maintenance Outages for such a Generation Capacity Resource unless the outage would threaten the adequacy of reserves in, or the reliability of, the PJM Region. A Market Participant shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or to satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing an approved full or partial Generator Maintenance Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage would significantly affect the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection may withhold approval, withdraw a prior approval, or rescind a prior approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway. Approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage of a Generation Capacity Resource shall be withheld or withdrawn only as necessary to ensure the adequacy of reserves or the reliability of the PJM Region in connection with anticipated implementation or avoidance of Emergency procedures. In addition, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it must rescind its approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage that is already underway in order to preserve the reliable operation of the PJM Region, the Office of the Interconnection will provide the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource at least 72 hours' notice thereof. The Market Seller shall be required to make the Generation Capacity Resource available for normal operation within 72 hours of such notice. If the generator is not made available for normal operation by 72 hours after the notice of the rescission of the approval of the Generator Maintenance Outage, the remaining time the resource continues on the outage will be classified as a Generator Forced Outage. If the Office of the Interconnection withholds, withdraws or rescinds approval of a Generator Maintenance Outage, it shall coordinate with the Market Seller owning or controlling the resource to reschedule the Generator Maintenance Outage at the earliest practical time. The Office of the Interconnection shall, if possible, propose alternative schedules with the intent of minimizing the economic impact on the Market Seller of a Generator Maintenance Outage.

1.9.4 Forced Outages.

(a) Each Market Seller that owns or controls a pool-scheduled resource, or Generation Capacity Resource whether or not pool-scheduled, shall: (i) advise the Office of the Interconnection of a Generator Forced Outage suffered or anticipated to be suffered by any such resource as promptly as possible; (ii) provide the Office of the Interconnection with the expected date and time that the resource will be made available; and (iii) make a record of the events and circumstances giving rise to the Generator Forced Outage. A Market Seller shall not be expected to submit offers for the sale of energy or other services, or satisfy delivery obligations, from a generation resource undergoing a Generator Forced Outage. A Generation Capacity Resource committed to PJM loads through an RPM Auction, FRR Capacity Plan, or by designation as a replacement resource under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, that does not deliver all or part of its scheduled energy shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage with respect to such undelivered energy, in accordance with standards and procedures for full and partial Generator Forced Outages specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, and the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive notification of Forced Transmission Outages, and information on the return to service, of Transmission Facilities in the PJM Region in accordance with standards and procedures specified in, as applicable, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the PJM Manuals.

1.9.4A Transmission Outage Acceleration.

(a) Planned Transmission Outages and Forced Transmission Outages otherwise scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 and 1.9.4 respectively of this Schedule may be accelerated or rescheduled at the request of a Generation Owner or other Market Participant in accordance with the terms and conditions of this section 1.9.4A and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Transmission Outages Requiring Coordination With A Specific Generation Owner.

(i) Receipt of Acceleration Request. Prior to a scheduled Planned Transmission Outage associated with the interconnection of a generating unit to the Transmission System, the affected Generation Owner may request that the outage be accelerated or rescheduled. Such Acceleration Request shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals.

(ii) Determination to Accommodate Acceleration Request. Upon receipt of an Acceleration Request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such Acceleration Request. The affected Transmission Owner shall determine, in its sole discretion, whether to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards, and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. In the event that the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an estimate of the cost to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage and the revised schedule for the transmission outage ("Acceleration Estimate").

(iii) Provision of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that the Generation Owner has met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Generation Owner with the Acceleration Estimate. In the event that the Generation Owner does not meet the creditworthiness standard, the Office of the Interconnection shall not provide the Acceleration Estimate and the transmission outage shall not be accelerated or rescheduled. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate, the Generation Owner, within the time period specified in the PJM Manuals, shall notify the Office of the

Interconnection as to whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage pursuant to the terms of the Acceleration Estimate.

(iv) Cost Responsibility. In the event the Generation Owner notifies the Office of the Interconnection that it desires to proceed with the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage pursuant to section 1.9.4A(a)(iii), the Generation Owner shall be solely responsible for actual costs incurred by the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage. The Generation Owner's cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete the outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the Generation Owner. After receipt of such notification, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, the Generation Owner shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of the Generation Owner's decision. In the event the Generation Owner desires not to proceed, the transmission outage shall occur according to normal work practices and the Generation Owner shall be responsible for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner for the acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage as of the date that the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(c) Transmission Outages That Could Cause Congestion Revenue Inadequacy.

(i) Posting of Transmission Outage. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines that a Planned Transmission Outage or Forced Transmission Outage could exceed five days and could cause congestion revenue inadequacy in excess of $500,000, the Office of the Interconnection shall post a notice of such transmission outage on its internet site. Within the time period and pursuant to the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, any Market Participant may request that such transmission outage be accelerated or rescheduled.

(ii) Determination to Accelerate or Reschedule Transmission Outage. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Request(s) pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(i), the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of such request(s). The affected Transmission Owner shall determine in its sole discretion whether to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage. In making this determination, the affected Transmission Owner shall follow Good Utility Practice, applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards, and applicable company safety standards and shall consider any requirements contained in pertinent collective bargaining agreements. If the affected Transmission Owner determines to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, it shall provide the Office of the Interconnection, within the time set forth in the PJM Manuals, an Acceleration Estimate. In the event that Market Participants submit requests which would require different schedules for a transmission outage, the Office of the Interconnection, in consultation with the affected Transmission Owner, shall determine the most effective option, which will be included in the Acceleration Estimate.

(iii) Notification of Acceleration Estimate. Upon receipt of the Acceleration Estimate and verification that Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of transmission outages have met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Market Participants with the Acceleration Estimate and the number of Market Participants requesting acceleration or rescheduling of the transmission outage that meet the creditworthiness standards. After receipt of the Acceleration Request, within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each requesting Market Participant meeting the creditworthiness standards shall notify the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage as set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, and if it desires to accelerate or reschedule the transmission outage, the amount it is willing to pay for such acceleration or rescheduling.

(iv) Evaluation of Acceleration Requests. Upon receipt of Market Participant(s) notifications pursuant to subsection 1.9.4A(b)(iii), the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, based on the amount Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling of the transmission outage, whether the transmission outage should be accelerated or rescheduled. The transmission outage shall be accelerated or rescheduled if the amount that the Market Participants collectively are willing to pay for accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage exceeds the Acceleration Estimate by the following margins: (a) for outages to equipment outside a substation, two times the Acceleration Estimate; and (b) for outages to equipment inside a substation, five times the Acceleration Estimate. These margins are designed to provide a reasonable degree of certainty that the actual costs of accelerating or rescheduling the transmission outage will not exceed the amount the Market Participants are willing to pay. In all events, transmission outages will be accelerated or rescheduled pursuant to requests made under section 1.9.4A(c) only when the requested acceleration or rescheduling would reduce the amount of congestion revenue inadequacy resulting from the outage as determined by the Office of the Interconnection.

(v) Cost Responsibility. Each Market Participant which notifies the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to section 1.9.4A(b)(iii) that it is willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling of a transmission outage shall be responsible for the actual costs of such acceleration or rescheduling on a pro-rata basis based on the amount it specified it was willing to pay for the acceleration or rescheduling. Market Participants' cost responsibility is not relieved, if, despite the good faith efforts of the Transmission Owner, the amount of costs set forth in the Acceleration Estimate is exceeded by less than 20 percent, or the Transmission Owner is unable successfully to complete a transmission outage pursuant to the revised schedule set forth in the Acceleration Estimate. Prior to incurring costs exceeding 120 percent of the cost estimate set forth in the Acceleration Estimate, the affected Transmission Owner shall advise the Office of the Interconnection of such increase, and the Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Market Participants of such increase. Within the time period set forth in the PJM Manuals, each affected Market Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether it desires to continue with the revised transmission outage schedule and pay the additional costs. The Office of the Interconnection then shall notify the affected Transmission Owner of each affected Market Participant's decision. In the event that, because one or more Market Participants determine not to proceed, there would be insufficient funds to pay for the full cost of accelerating or rescheduling a transmission outage, the transmission outage shall not continue to be accelerated or rescheduled and shall occur according to normal work practices. In such instance, the Market Participants shall be responsible on a pro-rata basis for all incurred costs and committed costs and obligations of the affected Transmission Owner as of the date the affected Transmission Owner notified the Office of the Interconnection of the increase in costs.

(d) Posting Revised Transmission Outages. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on its internet site all revised transmission outage schedules resulting from implementation of this section 1.9.4A, pursuant to the procedures in the PJM Manuals, and simultaneously shall notify affected Market Participants or Generation Owners that submitted Acceleration Requests of the Transmission Owner's agreement to accelerate or reschedule the outage.

1.9.5 Market Participant Responsibilities.

Each Market Participant making a bilateral sale covering a period greater than the following Operating Day from a generating resource located within the PJM Region for delivery outside the PJM Region shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered.

1.9.6 Internal Market Buyer Responsibilities.

Each Internal Market Buyer making a bilateral purchase covering a period greater than the following Operating Day shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, information regarding the source of the energy, the load sink, the energy schedule, and the amount of energy being delivered. Each Internal Market Buyer shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with details of any load management agreements with customers that allow the Office of the Interconnection to reduce load under specified circumstances.

1.9.7 Market Seller Responsibilities.

(a) Not less than 30 days before a Market Seller's initial offer to sell energy from a given generation resource on the PJM Interchange Energy Market, the Market Seller shall furnish to the Office of the Interconnection the information specified in the Offer Data for new generation resources.

(b) Market Sellers authorized to request market-based start-up and no-load fees may choose to submit such fees on either a market or a cost basis. Market Sellers must elect to submit both start-up and no-load fees on either a market basis or a cost basis and any such election shall be submitted on or before March 31 for the period of April 1 through September 30, and on or before September 30 for the period October 1 through March 31. The election of market-based or cost-based start-up and no-load fees shall remain in effect without change throughout the applicable periods.

(i) If a Market Seller chooses to submit market-based start-up and no-load fees, such Market Seller, in its Offer Data, shall submit the level of such fees to the Office of the Interconnection for each generating unit as to which the Market Seller intends to request such fees. The Office of the Interconnection shall reject any request for start-up and no-load fees in a Market Seller's Offer Data that does not conform to the Market Seller's specification on file with the Office of the Interconnection.

(ii) If a Market Seller chooses to submit cost-based start-up and no-load fees, such fees must be calculated as specified in the PJM Manuals and the Market Seller may change both cost-based fees daily and must change both fees as the associated costs change, but no more frequently than daily.

1.9.8 Transmission Owner Responsibilities.

All Transmission Owners shall regularly update and verify facility ratings, subject to review and approval by PJM, in accordance with the following procedures and the procedures in the PJM Manuals:

(a) Each Transmission Owner shall verify to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection all of its transmission facility ratings two months prior to the beginning of the summer season (i.e., on April 1) and two months prior to the beginning of the winter season (i.e., on October 1) each calendar year, and shall provide detailed data justifying such transmission facility ratings when directed by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) In addition to the seasonal verification of all ratings, each Transmission Owner shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection updates to its transmission facility ratings as soon as such Transmission Owner is aware of any changes. Such Transmission Owner shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with detailed data justifying all such transmission facility ratings changes.

(c) All Transmission Owners shall submit to the Operations Planning Department (or successor Department) of the Office of the Interconnection formal documentation of any procedure for changing facility ratings under specific conditions, including: the detailed conditions under which such procedures will apply, detailed explanations of such procedures, and detailed calculations justifying such pre-established changes to facility ratings. Such procedures must be updated twice each year consistent with the provisions of this Section.

1.9.9 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall perform seasonal operating studies to assess the forecasted adequacy of generating reserves and of the transmission system, in accordance with the procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain and update tables setting forth Operating Reserve and other reserve objectives as specified in the PJM Manuals and as consistent with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall receive and process requests for firm and non-firm transmission service in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Tariff.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain such data and information relating to generation and transmission facilities in the PJM Region as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the scheduling and dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall maintain an historical database of all transmission facility ratings, and shall review, and may modify or reject, any submitted change or any submitted procedure for pre-established transmission facility rating changes. Any dispute between a Transmission Owner and the Office of the Interconnection concerning transmission facility ratings shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures in schedule 5 to the Operating Agreement; provided, however, that the rating level determined by the Office of the Interconnection shall govern and be effective during the pendency of any such dispute.

(f) The Office of the Interconnection shall coordinate with other interconnected Control Area as necessary to manage, alleviate or end an Emergency.

1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer's self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales, or Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Section 1.13 of this Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in Section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection's forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers' offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM

Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

1.10.1A Day-ahead Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.

(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection:
(i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer's intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed the maximum price that may be specified in the PJM Manuals), if any, at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Scheduling of such transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not dynamically scheduled to such entities pursuant to Section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this type is referred to as an "Up-to Congestion Transaction." Such Up-to Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum difference between the source and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The source-sink paths on which an Up-to Congestion Transaction may be submitted are limited to those paths posted on the PJM internet site and determined by the Office of the Interconnection using the following criteria:

Step 1: Start with the historic set of eligible nodes that were available as sources and sinks for interchange transactions on the PJM OASIS.

Step 2: Remove from the list of nodes described in Step 1 all load buses below 69 kV.

Step 3: Remove from the resulting set of nodes from Step 2 all generator buses at which no generators of 100 megawatts or more are connected.

Step 4: Remove from the results of Step 3 all electrically equivalent nodes.

(d) Market Sellers wishing to sell into the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy (including energy from hydropower units), demand reductions, Regulation, Operating Reserves or other services for the following Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller's cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource or an Intermittent Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources and Intermittent Resources may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Market Sellers shall not designate as a Maximum Emergency offer any portion of their ICAP committed as a Base Capacity Resource during the months of June through September when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action, or committed as a Capacity Performance Resource at any time during the Delivery Year when PJM has issued a Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert or declared an Emergency Action. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency offers outside of the conditions stipulated above and to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on either a temporary or long-term basis. This includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier's exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generation resource, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such resource on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all Generation Capacity Resources; and

ix) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00, for all Economic Load Response Resources;

x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, minus $1.00;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provision of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus [the applicable Primary Reserve Penalty Factor divided by 2]; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Section A.2 of Attachment DD-1 of the Tariff and the parallel provisions of Schedule 6 of the RAA, $1,100/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the megawatt of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100 per MWh in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in \$/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in \$/ΔMW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to \$12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with start-up and no-load fees, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Sections 3.2.3 and 6.6 hereof.

(g) Each offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) A Market Seller that wishes to make a generation resource or Demand Resource available to sell Synchronized Reserve shall submit an offer for Synchronized Reserve that shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the energy used by the generation resource to provide the Synchronized Reserve and the generation resource's unit specific opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed the variable operating and maintenance costs for providing Synchronized Reserve plus seven dollars and fifty cents.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, and the offer shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts: (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs).

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Demand Resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Demand Resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. A Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Demand Resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) Market Sellers providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market: 1) a price offer in dollars per megawatt hour; and 2) such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to determine any relevant opportunity costs for the resource(s). The foregoing notwithstanding, to qualify to submit Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves pursuant to this section, the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit energy offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market including start-up and shut-down costs for generation resource and Demand Resources, respectively, and all generation resources that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide that service. The MW quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide in a given hour will be determined based on the energy Offer Data submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as detailed in the PJM Manuals.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity's Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity's Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

Demand Bid Limit = greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point * 1.3), or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point + 10MW)

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity's highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM's highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity's actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity's expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to Sections 1.10.9 or 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, start-up, no-load and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for start-up and no-load fees, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Section 3 of this Schedule 1. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of start-up and no-load fees, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource's start-up cost, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

(c) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for start-up or no-load fees.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of dynamic dispatch shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to dynamic dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer's load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer's hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.6A Transmission Loading Relief Customers.

(a) An entity that desires to elect to pay Transmission Congestion Charges in order to continue its energy schedules during an Operating Day over contract paths outside the PJM Region in the event that PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief that otherwise would cause PJM to request security coordinators to curtail such Member's energy schedules shall:

(i) enter its election on OASIS by 12:00 p.m. of the day before the Operating Day, in accordance with procedures established by PJM, which election shall be applicable for the entire Operating Day; and

(ii) if PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief, provide to PJM, at such time and in accordance with procedures established by PJM, the hourly integrated energy schedules that impacted the PJM Region (as indicated from the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator) during the Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) If an entity has made the election specified in Section (a), then PJM shall not request security coordinators to curtail such entity's energy transactions, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

(c) In order to make elections under this Section 1.10.6A, an entity must (i) have met the creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection or provided a letter of credit or other form of security acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection, and (ii) have executed either the Agreement, a Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, or other agreement committing to pay all Transmission Congestion Charges incurred under this Section.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection's forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads they serve; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) Not earlier than 4:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant's inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in Section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Section 3.3A of this Schedule. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Sections 2.4 and 2.5 hereof.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, Ancillary Services Markets or Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and Day-ahead Energy Market. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets, Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Section 18.17.1 of the PJM Operating Agreement, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants' non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for any generation resource that was not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee.

(c) With respect to a pool-scheduled resource that is included in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller may not change or otherwise modify its offer to sell energy.

(d) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(e) For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this Section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

3.2 Market Buyers.

3.2.1 Spot Market Energy Charges.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be paid for all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(d) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of net hourly PJM Interchange for each Market Buyer, including Generating Market Buyers, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. For Internal Market Buyers that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall include determination of the net energy flows from: (i) tie lines; (ii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by the Market Buyer but delivered to it over another entity's Transmission Facilities; (iii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by another entity but which is directly interconnected with the Market Buyer's transmission system; (iv) deliveries pursuant to bilateral energy sales; (v) receipts pursuant to bilateral energy purchases; and (vi) an adjustment to account for the day-ahead PJM Interchange, calculated as the difference between scheduled withdrawals and injections by that Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market. For External Market Buyers and Internal Market Buyers that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall determine the energy scheduled hourly for delivery to the Market Buyer net of the amounts scheduled by such Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) An Internal Market Buyer shall be charged for Spot Market Energy purchases to the extent of its hourly net purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. An External Market Buyer shall be charged for its Spot Market Energy purchases based on the energy delivered to it, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total charge shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Imports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Buyer.

(f) A Generating Market Buyer shall be paid as a Market Seller for sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net sales into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total payment shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Exports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Seller.

3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Internal Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation shall be charged the following for Regulation dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation: (i) the capability Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; (ii) the amounts, if any, described in subsection (f) of this section; and (iii) the performance Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (g) of this section.

(b) Each Market Seller and Generating Market Buyer shall be credited for each of its resources supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific inter-temporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.

(c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined at a time to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection which shall be no earlier than the day before the Operating Day. In accordance with the PJM Manuals, the total Regulation market-clearing price shall be calculated by optimizing the dispatch profile to obtain the lowest cost combination set of resources that satisfies the Regulation requirement. The market-clearing price for each regulating hour shall be equal to the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during that hour. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.

(d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the

expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the regulating hour is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Seller or Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and for the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour and the following shoulder hour during which the Generating Market Buyer or Market Seller provided Regulation. The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in the preceding shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in the following shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the following shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer in a

Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market hour.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

$$\text{Correlation Score} = r_{\text{Signal,Response}(\delta,\delta+5\text{ Min});\ \delta=0\text{ to }5\text{ Min}}$$

where δ is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

$$\text{Delay Score} = \text{Abs}\left((\delta - 5\text{ Minutes}) / (5\text{ Minutes})\right).$$

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error (ε) as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

$$\text{Energy Score} = 1 - 1/n \sum \text{Abs (Error)};$$

$$\text{Error} = \text{Average of Abs}\left((\text{Response} - \text{Regulation Signal}) / (\text{Hourly Average Regulation Signal})\right);\ \text{and}$$

n = the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

$$\text{Accuracy Score} = \max\left((\text{Delay Score}) + (\text{Correlation Score})\right) + (\text{Energy Score}).$$

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the hourly accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

(iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the

Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its physically determined parameter limitations due to external requirements such as fuel delivery arrangements, for example, will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

Consistent with Sections 1.10.1 and 6.6 hereof, resources with notification or start up times greater than one day that are committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each hour the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG}, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG} where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(f-4) A Market Seller's wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP – UB)}, where:

LMPDMW equals the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

In the event the Office of the Interconnection experiences a technical problem or malfunction with its wind forecasting tool that results in an erroneous forecast for a wind resource during a period of time for which the wind resource is eligible for lost opportunity cost, the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller will attempt to reach a mutually agreeable forecast value for settlement purposes. If the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller do not come to mutual agreement on an acceptable forecast value, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the forecast value that it determines is appropriate.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (1) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals; (2) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (3) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (4) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.

(iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for

Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the hours that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the hours that the offer is economic. The hours that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the hours that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the hours in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any hours required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than $1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to $1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed $1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\text{Ramp\_Request}_t = {(\text{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1})} / {(\text{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left(\text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1}\right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case_Eff_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.

- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.

- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.

- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh - Day-Ahead MWh.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined n section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing

Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in subsections (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price less the hourly integrated real-time LMP, with the exception of those hours in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized

Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the hourly integrated amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is the average of the five-minute Locational Marginal Prices calculated during the Synchronized Reserve Event plus an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor and the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor and the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) In determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource times (B) the megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource, and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Seller in excess of that Market Seller's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the remainder of the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Seller's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during an hour than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that hour due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all hours the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource’s output or the Demand Resource’s consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource’s consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Non-Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in paragraph (f) of this section.

(b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each hour of the operating day. The hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the average of all 5-minute clearing prices calculated during the operating hour. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve requirement. When the Primary Reserve requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve will be determined as the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a voltage reduction action as described in the PJM Manuals or a manual load dump action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Primary Reserve Penalty Factors shall each be phased in as described below:

i. $250/MWh for the 2012/2013 Delivery Year;

ii. $400/MWh for the 2013/2014 Delivery Year;

iii. $550/MWh for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year; and

iv. $850/MWh as of the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding $1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) In determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous hours the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the MW obligation in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The cost of credits allocated to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources pursuant to this section shall be charged to Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region based on load ratio share (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero), provided that a Load-Serving Entity may satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation, which is equal to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the Load-Serving Entity's load ratio share for the PJM Region, through one or any combination of the following: 1) the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market; 2) and bilateral arrangements. The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges allocated pursuant to this section shall reflect any portion of a Load-Serving Entity's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation that is met by bilateral arrangement(s).

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(LMPDMW - AG) x (URTLMP - UB)}

where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:

> (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
>
> (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP – UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP – UB) x DAG where:
>
> URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;
>
> UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;
>
> DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;
>
> UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and
>
> where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)}where:

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the

Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each hour of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each hour of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of hourly energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each hour of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

3.2.7 Billing.

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Buyer in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Buyer. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Buyer's internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Buyer that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Buyer, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Buyer and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

5.2 Transmission Congestion Credit Calculation.

5.2.1 Eligibility.

(a) Except as provided in Section 5.2.1(b), each holder of a Financial Transmission Right shall receive as a Transmission Congestion Credit a proportional share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges collected for each constrained hour.

(b) If a holder of a Financial Transmission Right between specified delivery and receipt buses acquired the Financial Transmission Right in a Financial Transmission Rights auction (the procedures for which are set forth in Part 7 of this Schedule 1) and (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt buses of the Financial Transmission Right or had an Up-to Congestion Transaction that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a path at or near the path of the Financial Transmission Right; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer, Decrement Bid or Up-to Congestion Transaction is that the difference in Locational Marginal Prices in the Day-ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt buses is greater than the difference in Locational Marginal Prices between such delivery and receipt buses in the Real-time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit, associated with such Financial Transmission Right in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount that the Market Participant paid for the Financial Transmission Right in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) For purposes of Section 5.2.1(b) a bus shall be considered at or near the Financial Transmission Right delivery or receipt bus if seventy-five percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that bus and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus is reflected in the constrained path between the subject Financial Transmission Right delivery and receipt buses that were acquired in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(d) The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits pursuant to this section and section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the FTR holder. If the Office of the Interconnection agrees with such calculation, then it shall impose the forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit accordingly. If the Office of the Interconnection does not agree with the calculation, then it shall impose a forfeiture of Transmission Congestion Credit consistent with its determination. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the Office of the Interconnection's determination, it may exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns and may request an adjustment. This provision is duplicated in section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. An FTR holder objecting to the application of this rule shall have recourse to the Commission for review of the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to its trading activity.

5.2.2 Financial Transmission Rights.

(a) Transmission Congestion Credits will be calculated based upon the Financial Transmission Rights held at the time of the constrained hour. Except as provided in subsection (e) below, Financial Transmission Rights shall be auctioned as set forth in Section 7.

(b) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is negative (a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(c) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right when that difference is positive. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is positive (a benefit to the Financial Transmission Right holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is zero (neither a benefit nor a liability to the holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(d) In addition to transactions with PJMSettlement in the Financial Transmission Rights auctions administered by the Office of the Interconnection, a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period, may be sold or otherwise transferred to a third party by bilateral agreement, subject to compliance with such procedures as may be established by the Office of the Interconnection for verification of the rights of the purchaser or transferee.

(i) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer to a third party a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified monthly period. Such bilateral transactions shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transactions for the transfer of Financial Transmission Rights, the rights and obligations pertaining to the Financial Transmission Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transaction shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. Such bilateral transactions shall not modify the location or reconfigure the Financial Transmission Rights. In no event shall the purchase and sale of a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to a bilateral transaction constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(iii) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any Financial Transmission Right Obligation. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations, including meeting applicable creditworthiness requirements, transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Financial Transmission Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Financial Transmission Rights shall continue to receive all Transmission Congestion Credits attributable to the Financial Transmission Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Financial Transmission Rights.

(iv) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the transferred Financial Transmission Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transaction.

(v) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(vi) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

(e) Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, at their election, may receive a direct allocation of Financial Transmission Rights instead of an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers may make this election for the succeeding two annual FTR auctions after the integration of the new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Such election shall be made prior to the commencement of each annual FTR auction. For purposes of this election, the Allegheny Power Zone shall be considered a new zone with respect to the annual Financial Transmission Right auction in 2003 and 2004. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers in new PJM zones that elect not to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights shall receive allocations of Auction Revenue Rights. During the annual allocation process, the Financial Transmission Right allocation for new PJM zones shall be performed simultaneously with the Auction Revenue Rights allocations in existing and new PJM zones. Prior to the effective date of the initial allocation of FTRs in a new PJM Zone, PJM shall file with FERC, under section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the FTRs and ARRs allocated in accordance with sections 5 and 7 of this Schedule 1.

(f) For Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, that elect to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights, Financial Transmission Rights shall be allocated using the same allocation methodology as is specified for the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights in Section 7.4.2 and in accordance with the following:

(i) Subject to subsection (ii) of this section, all Financial Transmission Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Financial Transmission Right requests made when Financial Transmission Rights are allocated for the new zone are not feasible then Financial Transmission Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the MW level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(ii) If any Financial Transmission Right requests that are equal to or less than a Network Service User's Zonal Base Load for the Zone or fifty percent of its transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load, or fifty percent of megawatts of firm service between the receipt and delivery points of Firm Transmission Customers, are not feasible in the annual allocation and auction processes due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Financial Transmission Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights without their being infeasible for all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes, provided that this subsection (ii) shall not apply if the infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, such increased limits shall be included in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions; unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (ii) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (ii), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Financial Transmission Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule

1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates Financial Transmission Rights as a result of this subsection (ii) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Financial Transmission Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights.

(iii) In the event that Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another after an initial or annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights in a new zone, Financial Transmission Rights will be reassigned on a proportional basis from the Network Service User losing the load to the Network Service User that is gaining the Network Load.

(g) At least one month prior to the integration of a new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through the new zone, shall receive an initial allocation of Financial Transmission Rights that will be in effect from the date of the integration of the new zone until the next annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights. Such allocation of Financial Transmission Rights shall be made in accordance with Section 5.2.2(f) of this Schedule.

(h) The following congestion charge crediting and uplift (hereinafter, "mitigation") rules shall apply to each new zone first integrated on any date from May 1, 2004 through May 31, 2005 for which FERC orders such mitigation as a result of a filing for such zone of the type specified in subsection (g) above. Where FERC orders such mitigation, such rules shall remain in effect for such zone from the date of its integration through May 31, 2005. All such mitigation shall terminate for all such zones on May 31, 2005.

1.) Mitigation shall apply only to Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers in such a zone that did not receive an allocation of ARRs or FTRs, as applicable, equal to the ARRs or FTRs such customer requested in the allocation for such zone. Only pro-rated requests that complied with the source, sink, and service level limitations stated in section 7.4.2(f) are eligible for mitigation. Such mitigation shall continue for the period stated above if a customer eligible for mitigation renews or rolls over its service agreement, but shall no longer apply if such a customer redirects its service to alternate points on a firm basis.

2.) The affected customers that will receive mitigation will be notified by PJM of the MW amount of mitigation they will receive based on the difference between the amount of ARRs or FTRs requested and the amount of ARRs or FTRs awarded.

3.) Mitigation provided herein applies only to requests submitted and pro-rated in the interim or annual ARR/FTR allocation process conducted for such zones for the time period specified above.

4.) For each affected customer as described above, PJM each month will provide a mitigation credit to offset any congestion charges incurred by such customer in connection with the MW amount for the contract reservation eligible for mitigation as determined under subsection (2) above. In no event shall the amount of any such credit exceed the net amount of any congestion paid (after taking account of any congestion credits) by such customer during such month with respect to such identified MW amount.

5.) The total cost of all such credits for all mitigated customers in a zone each month shall be charged to and collected from all Network Integration Transmission Service and Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers within such zone that received ARRs or FTRs or that received mitigation under this subsection (h), in proportion to each such customer's share of the total allocated ARR/FTR MWs (including mitigation MWs). Mitigation and uplift shall be determined separately for each such zone.

5.2.3 Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

A Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits for each entity holding a Financial Transmission Right shall be determined for each Financial Transmission Right. Each Financial Transmission Right shall be multiplied by the Day-ahead Congestion Price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Financial Transmission Right, calculated as the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the delivery point(s) minus the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the receipt point(s). For the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Zone is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Zone multiplied by the percent of annual peak load assigned to each node in the Zone. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, for the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Residual Metered Load aggregate is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate multiplied by the percent of the annual peak residual load assigned to each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate. When the FTR Target Allocation is positive, the FTR Target Allocation is a credit to the FTR holder. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is a debit to the FTR holder if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Obligation. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is set to zero if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Option. The total Target Allocation for Network Service Users and Transmission Customers for each hour shall be the sum of the Target Allocations associated with all of the Network Service Users' or Transmission Customers' Financial Transmission Rights.

5.2.4 [Reserved.]

5.2.5 Calculation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

(a) The total of all the positive Target Allocations determined as specified above shall be compared to the total Transmission Congestion Charges in each hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market. If the total of the Target

Allocations is less than the total of the Transmission Congestion Charges, the Transmission Congestion Credit for each entity holding an FTR shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining Transmission Congestion Charges shall be distributed as described below in Section 5.2.6 "Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges."

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total Transmission Congestion Charges for the hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market, each holder of Financial Transmission Rights shall be assigned a share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges in proportion to its Target Allocations for Financial Transmission Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Financial Transmission Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Transmission Congestion Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period if all FTR holders did not receive Transmission Congestion Credits equal to their Target Allocations, the Office of the Interconnection shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Transmission Congestion Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient FTRs and the actual Transmission Congestion Credits allocated to those FTR holders. A charge assessed pursuant to this section shall also include any aggregate charge assessed pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and shall be allocated to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. The charge shall be calculated and allocated in accordance with the following methodology:

1. The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of uplift required as {[sum of the total monthly deficiencies in FTR Target Allocations for the Planning Period + the sum of the ARR Target Allocation deficiencies determined pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement] – [sum of the total monthly excess ARR revenues and congestion charges for the Planning Period]}.

2. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

3. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an uplift charge to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total uplift] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

5.2.6 Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges.

(a) Excess Transmission Congestion Charges accumulated in a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during that month as compared to its total Target Allocations for the month.

(b) After the excess Transmission Congestion Charge distribution described in Section 5.2.6(a) is performed, any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a month shall be distributed to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the holder during the current Planning Period, including previously distributed excess Transmission Congestion Charges, as compared to its total Target Allocation for the Planning Period.

(c) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a Planning Period shall be distributed to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any Auction Revenue Right deficiencies for that Planning Period.

(d) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after a distribution pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall be distributed to all FTR holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. Any allocation pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be conducted in accordance with the following methodology:

1. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of the Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

2. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an excess Transmission Congestion Charge credit to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after distributions pursuant to subsection (a)-(c) of this section] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules.

(a) Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on cost-based offers, which are always parameter limited. Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on market-based offers conforming to parameter limitations ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting, i.e. more flexible, of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency, Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iv) For Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency during hot weather operations; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert during hot weather operations; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Hot Weather Alert, or a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert during hot weather operations, for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, parameter limited schedules shall be defined for the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions during hot weather operations, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, and for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years for Capacity Performance Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Cold Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions, and when the resource is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit-specific physically achievable operating parameters for each individual resource on the basis of its operating design characteristics, recognizing that remedial and ongoing investment and maintenance may be required to perform on the basis of those characteristics, for the following parameters:

(i) Economic Minimum;

(ii) Economic Maximum;

(iii) Minimum Down Time;

(iv) Minimum Run Time;

(v) Maximum Daily Starts;

(vi) Maximum Weekly Starts;

(vii) Maximum Run Time;

(viii) Start-up Time; and

(ix) Notification Time.

These unit-specific values shall apply for the generation resource unless it is operating pursuant to an exception from those values under subsection (h) hereof due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. Throughout the analysis process, the Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of a resource's unit-specific parameter limited schedule values.

(c) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generation resources not committed as Capacity Performance Resources:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

Parameter	Minimum Down Time (Hrs)	Minimum Run Time (Hrs)	Maximum Daily Starts	Maximum Weekly Starts	Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 135 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

(d) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, upon receipt of proposed revised parameter limited schedule values from the Market Monitoring Unit, prepared in accordance with the procedures for periodic review included in section II.B.1 of Attachment M - Appendix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file to revise the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix in section 6.6(c) above accordingly. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the values proposed for revising the matrix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file the values that it determines are appropriate.

(e) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate and provide to Market Sellers for their generation resources unit-specific default values in accordance with section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. The default values set forth in the table in subsection (c) above shall apply for the referenced technology types unless a generation resource is operating pursuant to an exception from the default values under subsection (h) due to physical operational limitations that prevent the resource from meeting the minimum parameters. For generation resources having the ability to operate on multiple fuels, Market Sellers may submit a parameter limited schedule associated with each fuel type.

(f) For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits shall apply for Capacity Performance Resources, other than Capacity Storage Resources, submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) The combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 24 hours, except when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 14 hours;

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iv) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical operational limitations of the Capacity Performance Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

Capacity Storage Resources that clear in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall:

(i) Have combined start-up and notification times that shall not exceed one hour; and,

(ii) Have a minimum down time that shall not exceed one hour.

(g) For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits for Base Capacity Resources submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day:

(i) Combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 48 hours;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based solely on the physical limitations of the Base Capacity Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

(h) Exceptions to the parameter limited schedule default or unit-specific values shall be categorized as either a one-time temporary exception, lasting 30 days or less; a period exception, lasting at least 31 days and no more than one year; or a persistent exception, lasting for at least one year.

(i) *Temporary Exceptions*. A temporary exception shall be deemed accepted without prior review by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection upon submission by the Market Seller of the generation resource of written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, at least one business day prior to the commencement of the exception, and shall automatically commence and terminate on the dates specified in such notification, which must be for a period of time lasting 30 days or less, unless the termination date is extended pending a request for a period exception or shortened due to a change in the physical conditions of the unit such that the temporary exception is no longer required. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days following the commencement of the temporary exception its documentation explaining in detail the reasons for the temporary exception, and shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Failure to provide a timely response to such request for additional information shall cause the temporary exception to terminate the following day. The Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing of an early termination of a temporary exception due to changed physical conditions by no later than one business day prior to the early termination date.

Modification of Temporary Exceptions. If, prior to the scheduled termination date, the Market Seller determines that the temporary exception must persist for more than 30 days, the Market Seller must submit to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection a written request to modify the temporary exception to become a period exception or a persistent exception, and provide detailed documentation explaining the reasons for the requested modification of the temporary exception. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operating limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the Market Seller may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits of the resource to support the requested parameters. Such Market Seller shall respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days after such request. Such request shall be reviewed by the Market Monitoring Unit and must be evaluated by the Office of the Interconnection using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests. Per Section II.B of Attachment M-Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the modification request and provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 days from the date of the modification request. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide its determination whether the request complies with the Tariff and Manuals by no later than 20 days from the date of the modification request. A temporary exception shall be extended and shall not terminate until the date on which the Office of the Interconnection issues its determination of the modification request.

(ii) *Period Exceptions and Persistent Exceptions*. Market Sellers must submit period exception and persistent exception requests to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than the February 28 immediately preceding the twelve month period from June 1 to May 31 during which the exception is requested to commence. Market Sellers shall supply for each generation resource the required historical unit operating data in support of the period exception or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operational limits for the resource for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the generation resource may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits for exceptions of the resource to support the requested parameters. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request in accordance with the process set forth in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A Market Seller (i) must submit a parameter limited schedule value consistent with an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit under such process or (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on the parameter limited schedule value, may submit its own value to the Office of the Interconnection and to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than April 8. Each exception request must indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the termination date thereof. The proposed parameter limited schedule value submitted by the Market Seller is subject to approval of the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the requirements of the Tariff and the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection may engage the services of a consultant with technical expertise to evaluate the exception request. After it has completed its evaluation of the exception request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring

Unit, whether the exception request is approved or denied, by no later than April 15. The effective date of the exception, if approved by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be no earlier than June 1. The Office of the Interconnection's determination for an exception shall continue for the period requested and, if requested, for such longer period as the Office of the Interconnection may determine is supported by the data.

The Market Seller shall provide written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection in their evaluations of the Market Seller's request for a period or persistent exception. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 days after receipt of such notice. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 20 days after receipt of the Market Seller's notice. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the exception no longer complies with the Tariff or Manuals, the default values specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall apply.

(i) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of this Section 6.6 shall only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection for its offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day.

7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

7.4.1 Eligibility.

(a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.

(b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:

> (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
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> (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
>
> (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:

> (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt-year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the historical generation resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year for the Zone, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each

historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the historical generation resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section

7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

(d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).

(e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.

(f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Point-to-Point Transmission Service, as defined in the PJM Tariff, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under

contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

(g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.

(h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

(j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:

i. The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located outside the PJM Region.

ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.

iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.

iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) , the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.

viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.

xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.

xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.

xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

(a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

(d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.

(e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.

(b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.5.

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

SCHEDULE 2 -
COMPONENTS OF COST

(a) Each Market Participant obligated to sell energy on the PJM Interchange Energy Market at cost-based rates may include the following components or their equivalent in the determination of costs for energy supplied to or from the PJM Region:

<u>For generating units powered by boilers</u>
Firing-up cost
Peak-prepared-for maintenance cost

<u>For generating units powered by machines</u>
Starting cost from cold to synchronized operation
For all generating units
Incremental fuel cost
Incremental maintenance cost
No-load cost during period of operation
Incremental labor cost
Other incremental operating costs

For a generating unit that is subject to operational limitations due to energy or environmental limitations imposed on the generating unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in the PJM Tariff), the Market Participant may include in the calculation of its "other incremental operating costs" an amount reflecting the unit-specific Energy Market Opportunity Costs expected to be incurred. Such unit-specific Energy Market Opportunity Costs are calculated by forecasting Locational Marginal Prices based on future contract prices for electricity using PJM Western Hub forward prices, taking into account historical variability and basis differentials for the bus at which the generating unit is located for the prior three year period immediately preceding the relevant compliance period, and subtract therefrom the forecasted costs to generate energy at the bus at which the generating unit is located, as specified in more detail in PJM Manual 15. If the difference between the forecasted Locational Marginal Prices and forecasted costs to generate energy is negative, the resulting Energy Market Opportunity Cost shall be zero. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Participant may submit a request to PJM for consideration and approval of an alternative method of calculating its Energy Market Opportunity Cost if the standard methodology described herein does not accurately represent the Market Participant's Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

For a generating unit that is subject to operational limitations because it only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, or (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure, the Market Participant may include in the calculation of its "other incremental operating costs" an amount reflecting the unit-specific Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs expected to be incurred. Such unit-specific Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs are calculated by forecasting Locational Marginal Prices based on future contract prices for electricity using PJM Western Hub forward prices, taking into account historical variability and basis differentials for the bus at which the generating unit is located for the prior three year period immediately preceding the period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and subtract therefrom the forecasted costs to generate energy at the bus at which the generating unit is located, as specified in more detail in PJM Manual 15. If the difference between the forecasted Locational Marginal Prices and forecasted costs to generate energy is negative, the resulting Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost shall be zero.

(b) All fuel costs shall employ the marginal fuel price experienced by the Member.

(c) The PJM Board, upon consideration of the advice and recommendations of the Members Committee, shall from time to time define in detail the method of determining the costs entering into the said components, and the Members shall adhere to such definitions in the preparation of incremental costs used on the Interconnection.

2017 PJM Training

Day-Ahead Energy Market

PJM State & Member Training Dept.

Objectives

Students will be able to:

- Identify the process and procedures for participating in the Day-Ahead Market

Markets Gateway Intro

Uses of Markets Gateway

- PJM Markets Gateway is the system that PJM Market Participants use to participate in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, Synchronized Reserve Market, and Regulation Market. Market Participants can use PJM Markets Gateway to prepare and submit:
  - Generation offers
  - Regulation offers
  - Synchronized reserve offers
  - Demand bids
  - Increment offers and decrement bids
  - Load response bids

Uses of Markets Gateway

- Enter bilateral regulation and reserve transactions
- Review public and private Day-Ahead Energy and Ancillary Services market results

Interfacing with Markets Gateway

- **Web-based Interactions** — access is provided through a series of web-based interactive displays, which are accessible through the internet
- **XML-formatted File Exchange** — input and output files that are posted or downloaded, using the market user interface (MUI) or another participant-created application

PJM Day-Ahead Market

Capacity Resource Requirements

- Any generator that is a PJM generation capacity resource that has an RPM Resource Commitment:
  - Must submit an offer schedule into the Day-ahead Market even if it is self-scheduled or unavailable due to outage
- Generation capacity resources shall submit:
  - A schedule of availability for the next seven days
  - May submit non-binding offer prices for the days beyond the next Operating Day
- The set of offer data last submitted for each generation capacity resource
  - Shall remain in effect for each day until specifically superseded by subsequent offers

PJM Markets Timeline



Unit Parameters

Unit Parameters

- Each generator has different characteristics that it submits to PJM along with their energy offer
- These variables can be cost-based, price-based, time-based, or physical parameters

Unit Parameters

- Generators can be cost-based or price-based:
  - Determined for each new unit or new unit ownership
    - Cost (per cost development guidelines)
    - Price (per participants offer strategy)
    - **A generation capacity resource offer may not exceed $2000/MWh**

Energy Market Offer Cap: Cost-Based Offers

- For the purposes of setting LMP, all offers are capped at $2,000/MWh
  - Cost-based offers above $2000/MWh will not be eligible to set LMP
- Generation resources with demonstrated costs above $2,000/MWh can recover those costs through make-whole payments
  - The 10% adder will not apply to costs above $2,000/MWh
- Participants wishing to enter cost-based offers above $2,000/MWh will need to contact the Markets Hotline to get assistance to enter such offers
  - Cost-based offers above $2,000/MWh will be considered in merit order for dispatch purposes

Energy Market Offer Cap: Price-Based Offers

- Price-based offers will be capped at the lower of $2,000/MWh or the corresponding cost-based offer when costs are above $1,000/MWh
  - Remain capped at $1,000/MWh when the corresponding cost-based offers are at or below $1,000/MWh

Example:

If a unit's cost offer is $1500, the price offer can be no higher than $1500

If a unit's cost offer is $800, the price offer can be no higher than $1000

If a unit's cost offer is $2200, the price offer can be no higher than $2000

Shortage Pricing

- Max energy price = energy offer cap + 2 * Reserve penalty factor
  - Yields $3,700/MWh max energy price under shortage conditions going forward

- Current offer cap rules apply year round

Notification and Startup Times

The following information can be changed on the Schedule Detail page:

Notification Times:
The time interval in hours, between PJM notification and the start sequence of a generating unit that is currently in one of three temperature states

- **Hot Notification Time**
- **Inter Notification Time**
- **Cold Notification Time**

Startup Times:
The time interval, measured in hours, from the actual unit start sequence to the breaker close for a generating unit in one of the three temperature states

- **Hot Startup Time**
- **Inter Startup Time**
- **Cold Startup Time**

Start Costs for Price-Based Units

1. Price-based units choosing price-based start-up and no-load costs can only change them twice per year effective for two six month periods
   - Entered on Unit Detail page

2. Price-based units have the option to submit cost-based start-up and no-load costs on a daily basis
   - Entered on Schedule Detail page
   - Must stay as cost-based start-up and no-load costs for the entire 6-month period
   - Choice between using cost-based or price-based start up and no-load fees can be made twice a year



Bi-annual Periods for *Price Based* Start Costs

Period	Period Covers:	Submit By:
1	April 1st to September 30th	10:30 Hours March 31st
2	October 1st to March 31st	10:30 Hours September 30th

If a priced based unit chooses the price-based start-up and no-load fees option, the decision cannot be changed until the next open enrollment period takes place

Use Start Costs

- The generation owner determines whether PJM should use the startup and no load information for their unit (price-based or cost-based) on a daily basis
- This is accomplished by marking the Use Startup No Load switch available and unavailable on the ***Schedule Detail*** web page



Markets Gateway

Unit Parameters

Unit Parameters in Markets Gateway

Unit

- Unit Status
- Resource Type
- MW Operating Limits
- Ramp Rates
- Weather and Wind Forecasts
- Startup & No-Load Costs for **price-based units**

Schedule

- Schedule Types and Selection
- Offer Curves
- MW Operating Limits
- Startup & No-Load Cost for **cost-based schedules**
- Startup/No-Load switch
- Startup and Notification times
- Min and Max Data
- Condenser Data

Hourly Updates

- Commit Status
- MW Operating Limits
- Notification Time

Unit Detail

Unit default values are entered on the page

- **Emergency Max (MW)** - The MW energy level at which the operating company operates the generating unit once PJM requests Maximum Emergency Generation
  - This represents the highest short-term MW level a generating unit can produce and may require extraordinary procedures to produce the desired output
- **Economic Max (MW)** - The highest unrestricted level of energy, in MW, that the operating company operates the unit
  - This represents the highest output available from the unit for economic dispatch

Unit Detail

- **Economic Min (MW)** - The minimum energy available from the unit for economic dispatch

- **Emergency Min (MW)** - The lowest level of energy in MW the unit can produce and maintain a stable level of operation. The Operating Company operates the unit at this level during a Minimum Generation Emergency

- **CIR** - Indicates the MW value of the Capacity Interconnection Rights of the wind resource
  - For a wind resource, the Economic Min and Emergency Min must be less than or equal to the resource's CIR value

Unit Detail

- **Default Ramp Rate (MW/Min)** – The default energy ramp rate, in MW/minute, for increasing or decreasing a unit's output
  - This average rate is used by PJM in the Day-Ahead commitment process
- Use the **Unit Detail** web page to change the Startup and no-load costs during the open enrollment periods
  - Period 1 Cost Based Startup Cost and Period 2 Cost Based Startup Cost
    - Indicates whether or not a unit's startup and no-load are cost based for Period 1 and Period 2 respectively

Energy Ramp Rates

The MW segment ramp rates are used during real-time operations

- **A maximum of 10 Ramp Rate segments can be defined**
- The first MW/ramp rate segment represents the ramp rate from 0 MW/0 Min to the first MW/Min point
- The second MW/ramp rate point represents the ramp rate from the first MW point to the second MW point (and so on)

Synchronized Reserve Ramp Rates

- Synchronized reserve ramp rates may be specified for Tier 1 resources (MW/min)
- A maximum of 10 ramp rate segments can be defined
- These rates must be greater than or equal to the real time economic ramp rate(s) submitted for the unit
  - Synchronized ramp rates that exceed economic ramp rates must be justified via submission of actual data from past synchronized events to the PJM Performance Compliance Department

Schedule Parameters

Price-Based Unit Schedule Requirements

Units must have at least one cost-based schedule and at least one price-based schedules available:

1. Cost-based schedule must be parameter limited
2. Two price-based schedules
   a) Non-parameter limited
   b) Parameter limited - (Required)

Schedule Manager

Schedules define the offer and offer type

- Multiple schedules can be created
  - Schedule Name (8 characters)– Name used to reference schedule offer
  - Schedule Description (40 characters) – Text description of the schedule
  - Schedule Type
    - 1 - 69 and 80 - 90 — cost-based parameter limited schedules (PLS)
    - 70 - 79 — Price PLS schedules
    - 91 - 99 — price-based schedules

* Editing, Adding or Deleting is not permitted when market is closed

Schedule Detail

Market Type

- **DayAhead** - Indicates whether the schedule is available for the day-ahead market
- **Balancing** - Indicates whether or not the schedule is available for the balancing market (used for re-bidding period)
- **Both** - Indicates whether or not the schedule is available for both the day-ahead market and balancing market (used for re-bidding period)
- **Use Startup No Load** - The generation owner determines whether PJM should use the startup and no load information for their unit (price-based or cost-based) on a daily basis

Schedule Detail

- **Minimum Downtime** (hour) — The minimum number of hours between when the unit shuts-down and the next time the unit is put online
- **Minimum Runtime** (hour) — The minimum number of hours a unit must run
- **Maximum Weekly Starts** — The maximum number of times a unit can be started in one week
- **Maximum Runtime** (hour) — The max number of hours a unit can run before it needs to be shut down
- **Maximum Daily Starts** — The maximum number of times that a unit can be started in a day
- **Maximum Weekly Energy** (MWh) — The maximum amount of energy, reported in MWh, that the unit can produce in one week used for study purposes

Schedule Offers

- Up to 10 pairs of MW and pricing points can be created or modified for each price schedule
- The Offer Slope selection can be used to calculate the schedule's offer when dispatched between MW segments

*Cannot be changed for today or the next day when the market is closed

Schedule Selection

The Schedule Selection web page is used to mark schedules as Available or Not Available and allows the user to modify the no load cost, cold start cost, intermediate start cost and hot start cost

- At least one cost-based schedule must be made available in both the Day-Ahead Market and in the Balancing Market
- Two price-based schedules available:
  a) Non-parameter limited
  b) Parameter limited

Schedule Restriction

- Used to identify operational restrictions due to
  - De-mineralized water
  - Emissions
  - Fuel
- Data entered will carry forward until updated by the user
- Dual Fuel Capability field
  - Mandatory field
  - Used to identify the ability of a unit to switch to an alternate type of fuel

Schedule Availability Update

- “Use Cost Schedule in Real Time Flag” must be selected between 14:15 - 21:00 Day before the operating day to be in effect
  - Yes
    - No price schedules will be available in Real-Time (except DA commitments)
    - Option to make cost schedules available/unavailable intraday (1 available cost schedule per fuel type, per hour)
  - No
    - Unit is not able to change Cost Schedule Availability in Real Time
- **Notification Time** changes on this display have priority over Notification Times on Unit Hourly Update and Schedule Detail pages

Intra-Day Cost Schedule Switching Process

- Schedules for uncommitted generators can be made available or unavailable hourly to more accurately reflect the resources cost
  a) Sliding lock out
     i. Can only change schedule availability three plus hours in advance of operating hour
- Committed resources are unable to change cost schedule availability for Day-Ahead or RAC committed hours
  a) Units may change cost schedule availability for hours *after* the *last DA/RAC committed* hour
  b) For RAC committed units, PJM Dispatch will provide a run profile
- Units committed in Real Time are unable to change cost schedules until released
  - Schedules can be changed in Markets Gateway, but PJM will run unit on committed schedule until released
  - Only exception would be if unit must switch fuels (i.e. gas → oil) after initial commitment and/or min run time met due to lack of fuel and still required by PJM
- Only 1 Cost Schedule (per fuel type) can be made available each hour

Parameter Limited Schedules

Parameter-Limited Schedules

- Generation resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on non-price offer parameters (“Parameter Limited Schedules”)
- Parameter limits are **limitations** that **could be imposed** on the parameters that generators submit as part of their offer
- PJM posts unit class specific parameter limits in Section 6.6 of Schedule 1 in the **Operating Agreement**
  - A Capacity Market Seller that does not believe its Generation Capacity Resource can meet the unit-specific values determined by the Office of the Interconnection due to actual operating constraints, and who desires to establish adjusted unit-specific parameters for those resources may request adjusted unit-specific parameter limitations.

Unit Specific Parameters For Capacity Performance Resources

For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, parameter limited schedules shall be defined for the following parameters

Parameter	Definition Location
Turn Down Ratio	PJM OATT
Minimum Down Time	PJM OATT
Minimum Run Time	PJM OATT
Maximum Daily Starts	PJM OATT
Maximum Weekly Starts	PJM OATT
Maximum run Time	PJM OATT
Start-up Time	PJM OATT
Notification Time	PJM OATT

Additional Parameters for Base and CP resources

OA Schedule 1 Sec 6.6

For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generation resources not committed as Capacity Performance Resources:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

Parameter	Minimum Down Time (Hrs)	Minimum Run Time (Hrs)	Maximum Daily Starts	Maximum Weekly Starts	Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 135 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More

OA Schedule 1 Sec 6.6

For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generation resources not committed as Capacity Performance Resources:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix					
Parameter	**Minimum Down Time (Hrs)**	**Minimum Run Time (Hrs)**	**Maximum Daily Starts**	**Maximum Weekly Starts**	**Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW**
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

Operating Scenario	PJM Selected Schedule
Normal Operations	*Generators continue on their Price Schedule and non-limited parameters*
Generator Fails the Three Pivotal Supplier Test (TPS)	*Generators are placed on the lower production cost of the cost schedule or price schedule*

Switched to Price Parameter-Limited Schedule

Capacity resources may be subject to their Price Parameter-Limited Schedule under the following circumstances:

I. For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years (non CP resources), the Office of the Interconnection:

1. declares a Maximum Generation Emergency
2. issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert
3. schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

Switched to Price Parameter-Limited Schedule

II. For Capacity Performance Resources, the Office of the Interconnection:

1. declares a Maximum Generation Emergency
2. issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert
3. schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency, Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

Switched to Price Parameter-Limited Schedule

III. For Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection

1. declares a Maximum Generation Emergency during hot weather operations
2. issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert during hot weather operations
3. schedules units based on the anticipation of a Hot Weather Alert, or a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert during hot weather operations, for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

Three Pivotal Supplier Test

Three Pivotal Supplier Test

- The TPS test is a test for structural market power. The test examines the concentration of ownership of the supply compared to the level of demand
  - The test does not examine the competitiveness of offers or other factors. It is a test of ownership concentration relative to demand
- PJM utilizes the Three Pivotal Supplier (TPS) Test to mitigate market power for:
  - Transmission Constraints
  - Regulation Market
  - RPM
  - Shortage Pricing

Three Pivotal Supplier Test

- A test failure means that the ownership of the supply needed is concentrated among few suppliers:
  - Those suppliers have the potential to exercise market power (structural market power)
  - It does not mean those suppliers are attempting to exercise market power
  - A test failure triggers mitigation as a preventative step in the event of a concentration of ownership

Basic Theoretical Concepts of TPS

- Each supplier is ranked from largest to smallest offered MW of eligible supply
- If there are not enough MWs to satisfy the constraint without using the top two suppliers' output plus the output of the supplier being tested, then those three suppliers are jointly pivotal
- Because the supply can be constrained by those three owners and the demand could potentially not be satisfied, they are considered to have structural market power
- If any test supplier fails, then the top two suppliers also fail
  - **Resources that fail TPS are placed on the lower production cost of the cost schedule or price schedule**

Questions?

PJM Client Management & Services

Telephone: (610) 666-8980

Toll Free Telephone: (866) 400-8980

Website: www.pjm.com

Member Community

The Member Community is PJM's self-service portal for members to search for answers to their questions or to track and/or open cases with Client Management & Services

Appendix

Real-Time Values

Real-Time Value Overview

Who Uses?	What Parameters?	Why Used?	How Are Parameters Communicated?
CP and Non- CP Resources When the resource cannot operate according to the unit specific parameters (CP and Base Capacity) or default PLS (non-CP) or exceptions	Turn Down Ratio Minimum Down Time Minimum Run Time Maximum Run Time Start Up Time (Hot/Warm/Cold) Notification Time	Meant to capture a resource's current operational capabilities	Markets Gateway Tool Day Ahead: Parameter Limits tool Real Time: 1-Operational restrictions 2-Use hourly updates tab (Notification Time, Eco Min/Eco Max) AND Communicate to dispatch

***A case by case evaluation will be completed for make whole payments**

- Not all Real Time Values qualify for make-whole payments (i.e.- Notification Time)
- Market Seller shall follow the "Temporary Exception" process if they request the modified operational parameters to be considered for 'Make-Whole' payments

* Tariff, Attachment K Appendix (Section 3.2.3)

Real-Time Values - Submitting in Real Time

Submitting Real-Time Values in Real Time:
Operational Restrictions Open Text Field



Exception Tab



Submit Exception Parameter Limits

The Exception Parameter Limits web page is used to submit a parameter limit exception request. On a daily basis, each generation supplier may submit notification to PJM that changed physical operational limitations at the unit require a temporary exception to the unit's parameters. Each generation supplier must supply the required unit operating data in support of the exception.

Submit Exception Parameter Limits

The process and timeline for submitting a daily exception is as follows:

- By 10:30 am prior to the close of DAM
- Initial Deadline to request a parameter exception that will begin the next operating day
- PLS Schedules (both Price & Cost) will be revised in Markets Gateway to change the parameter limit for the next operating day
- Daily Exception Requests should be submitted via Markets Gateway by 1:30 pm prior to operating day (close of the DAM)

Submit Exception Parameter Limits

PJM must receive a complete exception request that includes:

- Unit Name
- Parameter Limit Requested
- Reason for Daily Exception Request
- eDart ticket
- Justification for Daily Exception Request, including required unit operating data in support of the exception
- Date on which the exception period will end. Exceptions granted may not continue past the beginning of the next period.