

2017 State of the Market Report for PJM

MC Special Session
March 22, 2018

Joe Bowring



Monitoring Analytics

Market Monitoring Unit

- **Monitoring Analytics, LLC**
 - Independent company
 - Formed August 1, 2008
- **Independent Market Monitor for PJM**
 - Independent from Market Participants
 - Independent from RTO management
 - Independent from RTO board of managers
- **MMU Accountability**
 - To FERC (per FERC MMU Orders and MM Plan)
 - To PJM markets
 - To PJM Board for administration of the contract



Role of Market Monitoring

- **Market monitoring is required by FERC Orders**
- **Role of competition under FERC regulation**
 - **Mechanism to regulate prices**
 - **Competitive outcome = just and reasonable**
- **FERC has enforcement authority**
- **Relevant model of competition is not laissez faire**
- **Competitive outcomes are not automatic**
- **Detailed rules required**
- **Detailed monitoring required:**
 - **Of participants**
 - **Of RTO**
 - **Of rules**



Role of Market Monitoring

- **Market monitoring is primarily analytical**
 - **Adequacy of market rules**
 - **Compliance with market rules**
 - **Exercise of market power**
 - **Market manipulation**
- **Market monitoring provides inputs to prospective mitigation**
- **Market monitoring provides retrospective mitigation**
- **Market monitoring provides information**
 - **To FERC**
 - **To state regulators**
 - **To market participants**
 - **To RTO**




Market Monitoring Plan

- **Monitor compliance with rules.**
- **Monitor actual or potential design flaws in rules.**
- **Monitor structural problems in the PJM market.**
- **Monitor the potential of market participants to exercise market power.**
- **Monitor for market manipulation.**



PJM's footprint and its 20 control zones



Legend

| | |
|--|--|
| Allegheny Power System (APS) | Duquesne Light (DLCO) |
| American Electric Power Co., Inc. (AEP) | Eastern Kentucky Power Cooperative (EKPC) |
| American Transmission Systems, Inc. (ATSI) | Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCPL) |
| Atlantic Electric Company (AECO) | Metropolitan Edison Company (Met-Ed) |
| Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE) | PECO Energy (PECO) |
| ComEd | Pennsylvania Electric Company (PENELEC) |
| Dayton Power and Light Company (DAY) | Pepco |
| Delmarva Power and Light (DPL) | PPL Electric Utilities (PPL) |
| Dominion | Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG) |
| Duke Energy Ohio/Kentucky (DEOK) | Rockland Electric Company (RECO) |

The energy market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Partially Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Effective |



Recommendations: Energy Market

- **Cost based offers equal to short run marginal cost**
 - Replace Manual 15 with clear definitions for cost-based offers
 - Clear definition of relevant operating expenses
 - Fuel cost policies: algorithmic, verifiable, systematic
- **OEM parameters from CONE unit should be used for performance assessment and uplift**
- **Define explicit rules related to use of transmission penalty factors in setting LMP.**
- **Improve scarcity pricing.**
- **Local market power mitigation improvements (TPS)**
 - Constant markup on price and cost based offers
 - Cost based offer with same fuel as price based offer
 - PLS parameters at least as flexible as price based offer



Total price per MWh by category: 2016 and 2017


| Category | 2016 Percent of | | 2017 Percent of | | Percent Change |
|--|-----------------|--------|-----------------|--------|----------------|
| | 2016 | \$/MWh | 2017 | \$/MWh | |
| Load Weighted Energy | \$29.23 | 58.5% | \$30.99 | 58.2% | 6.0% |
| Capacity | \$10.96 | 21.9% | \$11.23 | 21.1% | 2.5% |
| Capacity | \$10.96 | 21.9% | \$11.23 | 21.1% | 2.5% |
| Capacity (FRR) | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission | \$8.42 | 16.8% | \$9.57 | 18.0% | 13.7% |
| Transmission Service Charges | \$7.81 | 15.6% | \$8.84 | 16.6% | 13.1% |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | \$0.52 | 1.0% | \$0.64 | 1.2% | 24.2% |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | \$0.09 | 0.2% | \$0.10 | 0.2% | 3.4% |
| Transmission Facility Charges | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | (100.0%) |
| Ancillary | \$0.72 | 1.4% | \$0.78 | 1.5% | 8.9% |
| Reactive | \$0.38 | 0.8% | \$0.44 | 0.8% | 14.8% |
| Regulation | \$0.11 | 0.2% | \$0.14 | 0.3% | 26.8% |
| Black Start | \$0.09 | 0.2% | \$0.09 | 0.2% | 4.3% |
| Synchronized Reserves | \$0.05 | 0.1% | \$0.06 | 0.1% | 5.5% |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | \$0.01 | 0.0% | \$0.01 | 0.0% | 1.1% |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | \$0.07 | 0.1% | \$0.05 | 0.1% | (38.7%) |
| Administration | \$0.47 | 0.9% | \$0.52 | 1.0% | 9.6% |
| PJM Administrative Fees | \$0.44 | 0.9% | \$0.48 | 0.9% | 10.0% |
| NERC/RFC | \$0.03 | 0.1% | \$0.03 | 0.1% | 4.2% |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | 3.3% |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | \$0.17 | 0.3% | \$0.14 | 0.3% | (16.9%) |
| Demand Response | \$0.01 | 0.0% | \$0.01 | 0.0% | (35.3%) |
| Load Response | \$0.01 | 0.0% | \$0.01 | 0.0% | (35.3%) |
| Emergency Load Response | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Emergency Energy | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Price | \$49.99 | 100.0% | \$53.24 | 100.0% | 6.5% |

PJM Load: 1998 through 2017


| | PJM Real-Time Demand (MWh) | | | | Year-to-Year Change | | | |
|------|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|
| | Load | | Load Plus Exports | | Load | | Load Plus Exports | |
| | Load | Standard | Demand | Standard | Load | Standard | Demand | Standard |
| | | Deviation | | Deviation | | Deviation | | Deviation |
| 1998 | 28,578 | 5,511 | 28,578 | 5,511 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1999 | 29,641 | 5,955 | 29,641 | 5,955 | 3.7% | 8.1% | 3.7% | 8.1% |
| 2000 | 30,113 | 5,529 | 31,341 | 5,728 | 1.6% | (7.2%) | 5.7% | (3.8%) |
| 2001 | 30,297 | 5,873 | 32,165 | 5,564 | 0.6% | 6.2% | 2.6% | (2.9%) |
| 2002 | 35,776 | 7,976 | 37,676 | 8,145 | 18.1% | 35.8% | 17.1% | 46.4% |
| 2003 | 37,395 | 6,834 | 39,380 | 6,716 | 4.5% | (14.3%) | 4.5% | (17.5%) |
| 2004 | 49,963 | 13,004 | 54,953 | 14,947 | 33.6% | 90.3% | 39.5% | 122.6% |
| 2005 | 78,150 | 16,296 | 85,301 | 16,546 | 56.4% | 25.3% | 55.2% | 10.7% |
| 2006 | 79,471 | 14,534 | 85,696 | 15,133 | 1.7% | (10.8%) | 0.5% | (8.5%) |
| 2007 | 81,681 | 14,618 | 87,897 | 15,199 | 2.8% | 0.6% | 2.6% | 0.4% |
| 2008 | 79,515 | 13,758 | 86,306 | 14,322 | (2.7%) | (5.9%) | (1.8%) | (5.8%) |
| 2009 | 76,034 | 13,260 | 81,227 | 13,792 | (4.4%) | (3.6%) | (5.9%) | (3.7%) |
| 2010 | 79,611 | 15,504 | 85,518 | 15,904 | 4.7% | 16.9% | 5.3% | 15.3% |
| 2011 | 82,541 | 16,156 | 88,466 | 16,313 | 3.7% | 4.2% | 3.4% | 2.6% |
| 2012 | 87,011 | 16,212 | 92,135 | 16,052 | 5.4% | 0.3% | 4.1% | (1.6%) |
| 2013 | 88,332 | 15,489 | 92,879 | 15,418 | 1.5% | (4.5%) | 0.8% | (3.9%) |
| 2014 | 89,099 | 15,763 | 94,471 | 15,677 | 0.9% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.7% |
| 2015 | 88,594 | 16,663 | 92,665 | 16,784 | (0.6%) | 5.7% | (1.9%) | 7.1% |
| 2016 | 88,601 | 17,229 | 93,551 | 17,498 | 0.0% | 3.4% | 1.0% | 4.3% |
| 2017 | 86,618 | 15,170 | 90,755 | 15,082 | (2.2%) | (11.9%) | (3.0%) | (13.8%) |



PJM real-time monthly average hourly load



Average RT generation supply curves: summer



PJM generation by fuel source


| | 2016 | | 2017 | | Change in Output |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|------------------|
| | GWh | Percent | GWh | Percent | |
| Coal | 275,289.4 | 33.9% | 256,613.8 | 31.8% | (6.8%) |
| Bituminous | 241,050.2 | 29.7% | 220,789.4 | 27.3% | (8.4%) |
| Sub Bituminous | 28,949.8 | 3.6% | 28,016.0 | 3.5% | (3.2%) |
| Other Coal | 5,289.5 | 0.7% | 7,808.4 | 1.0% | 47.6% |
| Nuclear | 279,546.4 | 34.4% | 287,575.8 | 35.6% | 2.9% |
| Gas | 217,199.0 | 26.7% | 219,205.1 | 27.1% | 0.9% |
| Natural Gas | 215,021.4 | 26.5% | 216,758.6 | 26.8% | 0.8% |
| Landfill Gas | 2,177.6 | 0.3% | 2,433.1 | 0.3% | 11.7% |
| Other Gas | 0.0 | 0.0% | 13.4 | 0.0% | NA |
| Hydroelectric | 13,686.8 | 1.7% | 14,868.4 | 1.8% | 8.6% |
| Pumped Storage | 4,840.2 | 0.6% | 5,132.6 | 0.6% | 6.0% |
| Run of River | 7,332.8 | 0.9% | 8,119.8 | 1.0% | 10.7% |
| Other Hydro | 1,513.8 | 0.2% | 1,616.0 | 0.2% | 6.8% |
| Wind | 17,716.0 | 2.2% | 20,714.1 | 2.6% | 16.9% |
| Waste | 4,358.9 | 0.5% | 3,984.1 | 0.5% | (8.6%) |
| Solid Waste | 4,139.8 | 0.5% | 3,740.7 | 0.5% | (9.6%) |
| Miscellaneous | 219.2 | 0.0% | 243.4 | 0.0% | 11.1% |
| Oil | 2,163.2 | 0.3% | 2,301.7 | 0.3% | 6.4% |
| Heavy Oil | 270.7 | 0.0% | 174.4 | 0.0% | (35.6%) |
| Light Oil | 340.7 | 0.0% | 340.3 | 0.0% | (0.1%) |
| Diesel | 59.4 | 0.0% | 81.7 | 0.0% | 37.5% |
| Gasoline | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| Kerosene | 74.8 | 0.0% | 15.2 | 0.0% | (79.6%) |
| Jet Oil | 0.0 | 0.0% | 3.1 | 0.0% | NA |
| Other Oil | 1,417.7 | 0.2% | 1,687.0 | 0.2% | 19.0% |
| Solar, Net Energy Metering | 1,019.4 | 0.1% | 1,468.7 | 0.2% | 44.1% |
| Energy Storage | 15.7 | 0.0% | 25.1 | 0.0% | 59.6% |
| Battery | 15.7 | 0.0% | 25.1 | 0.0% | 59.6% |
| Compressed Air | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| Biofuel | 1,541.5 | 0.2% | 1,473.0 | 0.2% | (4.4%) |
| Geothermal | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| Other Fuel Type | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| Total | 812,536.3 | 100.0% | 808,229.7 | 100.0% | (0.5%) |

PJM capacity factor by unit type


| Unit Type | 2016 | | 2017 | | Change in 2017 from 2016 |
|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor | |
| Battery | 15.7 | 0.6% | 25.1 | 0.9% | 0.3% |
| Combined Cycle | 187,657.9 | 62.0% | 195,631.7 | 58.4% | (3.6%) |
| Combustion Turbine | 17,265.2 | 6.9% | 13,390.7 | 5.3% | (1.6%) |
| Diesel | 291.2 | 10.1% | 359.5 | 11.1% | 1.0% |
| Diesel (Landfill gas) | 1,489.0 | 50.3% | 1,642.2 | 50.5% | 0.2% |
| Fuel Cell | 227.6 | 86.4% | 226.7 | 86.2% | (0.1%) |
| Nuclear | 279,546.4 | 91.3% | 287,575.8 | 94.1% | 2.9% |
| Pumped Storage Hydro | 6,077.2 | 13.7% | 6,475.4 | 14.6% | 0.9% |
| Run of River Hydro | 7,609.6 | 31.4% | 8,393.0 | 32.0% | 0.6% |
| Solar | 1,000.9 | 17.3% | 1,463.1 | 17.0% | (0.2%) |
| Steam | 293,624.9 | 41.1% | 272,325.1 | 40.7% | (0.4%) |
| Coal | 276,539.4 | 46.2% | 258,498.3 | 46.6% | 0.4% |
| Natural Gas | 10,463.1 | 12.3% | 7,770.3 | 9.2% | (3.0%) |
| Oil | 258.4 | 1.3% | 154.6 | 0.8% | (0.5%) |
| Biomass | 6,364.0 | 64.0% | 5,901.9 | 59.5% | (4.5%) |
| Wind | 17,716.0 | 27.6% | 20,714.1 | 29.5% | 1.9% |
| Total | 812,521.7 | 47.2% | 808,222.4 | 47.0% | (0.2%) |



Fuel diversity index for energy



PJM real-time generation less real-time load




| Zone | Net Gen Minus Load (GWh) | Zone | Net Gen Minus Load (GWh) | Zone | Net Gen Minus Load (GWh) | Zone | Net Gen Minus Load (GWh) |
|------|--------------------------|----------|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------|
| AECO | (3,315) | ComEd | 33,880 | DPL | (10,516) | PENELEC | 26,656 |
| AEP | 27,058 | DAY | (5,293) | EKPC | (4,659) | Pepco | (20,673) |
| APS | (205) | DEOK | (6,184) | JCPL | (3,874) | PPL | 9,402 |
| ATSI | (25,114) | DLCO | 3,284 | Met-Ed | 6,870 | PSEG | 1,203 |
| BGE | (10,322) | Dominion | (3,056) | PECO | 24,187 | RECO | (1,433) |

PJM real-time, load-weighted, average LMP


| | Real-Time, Load-Weighted, Average LMP | | | Year-to-Year Change | | |
|------|---------------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------------------|---------|--------------------|
| | Average | Median | Standard Deviation | Average | Median | Standard Deviation |
| 1998 | \$24.16 | \$17.60 | \$39.29 | NA | NA | NA |
| 1999 | \$34.07 | \$19.02 | \$91.49 | 41.0% | 8.1% | 132.8% |
| 2000 | \$30.72 | \$20.51 | \$28.38 | (9.8%) | 7.9% | (69.0%) |
| 2001 | \$36.65 | \$25.08 | \$57.26 | 19.3% | 22.3% | 101.8% |
| 2002 | \$31.60 | \$23.40 | \$26.75 | (13.8%) | (6.7%) | (53.3%) |
| 2003 | \$41.23 | \$34.96 | \$25.40 | 30.5% | 49.4% | (5.0%) |
| 2004 | \$44.34 | \$40.16 | \$21.25 | 7.5% | 14.9% | (16.3%) |
| 2005 | \$63.46 | \$52.93 | \$38.10 | 43.1% | 31.8% | 79.3% |
| 2006 | \$53.35 | \$44.40 | \$37.81 | (15.9%) | (16.1%) | (0.7%) |
| 2007 | \$61.66 | \$54.66 | \$36.94 | 15.6% | 23.1% | (2.3%) |
| 2008 | \$71.13 | \$59.54 | \$40.97 | 15.4% | 8.9% | 10.9% |
| 2009 | \$39.05 | \$34.23 | \$18.21 | (45.1%) | (42.5%) | (55.6%) |
| 2010 | \$48.35 | \$39.13 | \$28.90 | 23.8% | 14.3% | 58.7% |
| 2011 | \$45.94 | \$36.54 | \$33.47 | (5.0%) | (6.6%) | 15.8% |
| 2012 | \$35.23 | \$30.43 | \$23.66 | (23.3%) | (16.7%) | (29.3%) |
| 2013 | \$38.66 | \$33.25 | \$23.78 | 9.7% | 9.3% | 0.5% |
| 2014 | \$53.14 | \$36.20 | \$76.20 | 37.4% | 8.9% | 220.4% |
| 2015 | \$36.16 | \$27.66 | \$31.06 | (31.9%) | (23.6%) | (59.2%) |
| 2016 | \$29.23 | \$25.01 | \$16.12 | (19.2%) | (9.6%) | (48.1%) |
| 2017 | \$30.99 | \$26.35 | \$19.32 | 6.0% | 5.4% | 19.9% |




PJM real-time, load-weighted, average LMP




PJM real-time, load-weighted, average LMP




Spot average fuel prices



Short run marginal costs of generation



Type of fuel used by real-time marginal units



PJM RT annual, fuel-cost adjusted, load-weighted average LMP


| | 2017 Load-Weighted LMP | 2017 Fuel-Cost Adjusted, Load-Weighted LMP | Change |
|---------|------------------------|--|---------|
| Average | \$30.99 | \$25.39 | (18.1%) |
| | 2016 Load-Weighted LMP | 2017 Fuel-Cost Adjusted, Load-Weighted LMP | Change |
| Average | \$29.23 | \$25.39 | (13.1%) |
| | 2016 Load-Weighted LMP | 2017 Load-Weighted LMP | Change |
| Average | \$29.23 | \$30.99 | 6.0% |



Components of PJM RT (Unadjusted), load-weighted, average LMP

| Element | 2016 | | 2017 | | Change |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|---------|
| | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Percent |
| Gas | \$7.76 | 26.5% | \$12.15 | 39.2% | 12.7% |
| Coal | \$13.44 | 46.0% | \$8.97 | 28.9% | (17.0%) |
| Markup | \$0.27 | 0.9% | \$2.55 | 8.2% | 7.3% |
| Ten Percent Adder | \$2.43 | 8.3% | \$2.39 | 7.7% | (0.6%) |
| VOM | \$2.04 | 7.0% | \$1.70 | 5.5% | (1.5%) |
| NA | \$1.48 | 5.1% | \$0.81 | 2.6% | (2.5%) |
| LPA Rounding Difference | \$0.15 | 0.5% | \$0.78 | 2.5% | 2.0% |
| Oil | \$0.24 | 0.8% | \$0.44 | 1.4% | 0.6% |
| NO _x Cost | \$0.42 | 1.4% | \$0.41 | 1.3% | (0.1%) |
| Increase Generation Adder | \$0.41 | 1.4% | \$0.39 | 1.2% | (0.2%) |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | \$0.32 | 1.1% | \$0.25 | 0.8% | (0.3%) |
| CO ₂ Cost | \$0.09 | 0.3% | \$0.09 | 0.3% | (0.0%) |
| SO ₂ Cost | \$0.07 | 0.3% | \$0.06 | 0.2% | (0.1%) |
| Other | \$0.15 | 0.5% | \$0.06 | 0.2% | (0.3%) |
| Scarcity Adder | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.05 | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Municipal Waste | \$0.04 | 0.1% | \$0.05 | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.04 | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Market-to-Market Adder | \$0.01 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| Uranium | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| Constraint Violation Adder | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| LPA-SCED Differential | (\$0.01) | (0.0%) | (\$0.01) | (0.0%) | 0.0% |
| Decrease Generation Adder | (\$0.03) | (0.1%) | (\$0.07) | (0.2%) | (0.1%) |
| Wind | (\$0.05) | (0.2%) | (\$0.11) | (0.4%) | (0.2%) |
| Total | \$29.23 | 100.0% | \$30.99 | 100.0% | 0.0% |

Days with pivotal suppliers in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market: 2017




Offer capping statistics – energy only

| Year | Real Time | | Day Ahead | |
|------|------------|--------|------------|--------|
| | Unit Hours | MW | Unit Hours | MW |
| | Capped | Capped | Capped | Capped |
| 2013 | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| 2014 | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| 2015 | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| 2016 | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| 2017 | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% |



Monthly bid and cleared INCs, DECs and UTCs



PJM UTC transactions by type of parent


| Category | 2016 | | | | 2017 | | | |
|-----------|-----------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------|---------|
| | Total Up to Congestion Bid MWh | Percent | Total Up to Congestion Cleared MWh | Percent | Total Up to Congestion Bid MWh | Percent | Total Up to Congestion Cleared MWh | Percent |
| Financial | 1,198,418,888 | 96.0% | 282,808,931 | 93.6% | 1,180,634,460 | 98.1% | 293,713,948 | 96.0% |
| Physical | 49,564,960 | 4.0% | 19,231,146 | 6.4% | 23,152,092 | 1.9% | 12,250,315 | 4.0% |
| Total | 1,247,983,848 | 100.0% | 302,040,077 | 100.0% | 1,203,786,552 | 100.0% | 305,964,263 | 100.0% |

Total PJM congestion

| Congestion Costs (Millions) | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| | Congestion Cost | Percent Change | Total PJM Billing | Percent of PJM Billing |
| 2008 | \$2,052 | NA | \$34,306 | 6.0% |
| 2009 | \$719 | (65.0%) | \$26,550 | 2.7% |
| 2010 | \$1,423 | 98.0% | \$34,771 | 4.1% |
| 2011 | \$999 | (29.8%) | \$35,887 | 2.8% |
| 2012 | \$529 | (47.0%) | \$29,181 | 1.8% |
| 2013 | \$677 | 28.0% | \$33,860 | 2.0% |
| 2014 | \$1,932 | 185.5% | \$50,030 | 3.9% |
| 2015 | \$1,385 | (28.3%) | \$42,630 | 3.2% |
| 2016 | \$1,024 | (26.1%) | \$39,050 | 2.6% |
| 2017 | \$698 | (31.9%) | \$40,170 | 1.7% |



PJM monthly total congestion cost



The capacity market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Not Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Mixed |

Recommendations: Capacity Market


- **Implement a MOPR for existing units (MOPR-Ex).**
- **All capacity imports should be deliverable to an LDA.**
- **Consistent definition of a capacity resource as physical at time of auction and delivery year.**
- **Definition of LDA should be dynamic and market based.**
- **Offer cap calculation should be based on economic logic of CP and actual PAH and not default to Net CONE*B.**
- **Net revenue calculation for offer caps should be based on lower of price or cost.**
- **Improve market clearing rules by including make whole and nesting in optimization.**
- **Maintain performance incentives and product definitions in Capacity Performance design.**
- **RMR rules should be modified.**

PJM installed capacity by fuel source


| | 1-Jan-17 MW | Percent | 31-May-17 MW | Percent | 1-Jun-17 MW | Percent | 31-Dec-17 MW | Percent |
|---------------|----------------|---------|-----------------|---------|----------------|---------|-----------------|---------|
| Coal | 66,622.2 | 36.5% | 66,941.3 | 36.5% | 65,688.0 | 35.9% | 65,144.0 | 35.4% |
| Gas | 65,110.3 | 35.7% | 65,787.1 | 35.9% | 66,397.6 | 36.3% | 67,726.4 | 36.8% |
| Hydroelectric | 8,850.4 | 4.9% | 8,850.4 | 4.8% | 8,870.2 | 4.8% | 8,856.2 | 4.8% |
| Nuclear | 33,043.4 | 18.1% | 33,103.7 | 18.0% | 33,163.5 | 18.1% | 33,163.5 | 18.0% |
| Oil | 6,733.6 | 3.7% | 6,687.0 | 3.6% | 6,684.4 | 3.7% | 6,672.2 | 3.6% |
| Solar | 262.3 | 0.1% | 268.0 | 0.1% | 366.8 | 0.2% | 373.2 | 0.2% |
| Solid waste | 769.4 | 0.4% | 769.4 | 0.4% | 814.4 | 0.4% | 809.4 | 0.4% |
| Wind | 1,019.1 | 0.6% | 1,079.1 | 0.6% | 1,114.3 | 0.6% | 1,136.7 | 0.6% |
| Total | 182,410.7 | 100.0% | 183,486.0 | 100.0% | 183,099.2 | 100.0% | 183,881.6 | 100.0% |




Percent of PJM installed capacity by fuel source




Fuel Diversity Index for PJM installed capacity



PJM EFORd




PJM capacity prices




PJM capacity prices


2017/2018




2018/2019




2019/2020




2020/2021




New entrant CT net revenue




New entrant CC net revenue




New entrant CP net revenue



New entrant nuclear net revenue



Historical new entrant CC revenue adequacy



Proportion of units recovering avoidable costs

| Technology | Units with full recovery from energy and ancillary net revenue | | | | | | | Units with full recovery from all markets | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| CC - Combined Cycle | 55% | 46% | 50% | 72% | 59% | 63% | 62% | 85% | 79% | 79% | 95% | 88% | 93% | 86% |
| CT - Aero Derivative | 15% | 6% | 6% | 53% | 15% | 8% | 23% | 100% | 96% | 76% | 98% | 100% | 99% | 99% |
| CT - Industrial Frame | 26% | 23% | 17% | 38% | 13% | 8% | 18% | 99% | 98% | 83% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| Coal Fired | - | - | 25% | 78% | 18% | 19% | 19% | - | - | 54% | 83% | 69% | 40% | 52% |
| Diesel | 48% | 42% | 37% | 69% | 56% | 33% | 46% | 100% | 100% | 77% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Hydro | 74% | 61% | 95% | 97% | 81% | 79% | 95% | 81% | 77% | 97% | 98% | 100% | 100% | 97% |
| Nuclear | - | - | 79% | 100% | 53% | 16% | 21% | - | - | 95% | 100% | 89% | 58% | 68% |
| Oil or Gas Steam | 8% | 6% | 11% | 15% | 3% | 0% | 9% | 92% | 78% | 86% | 85% | 91% | 88% | 88% |
| Pumped Storage | 100% | 100% | 95% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |



Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall): historical price data 2013 through 2017

| | ICAP | Surplus (Shortfall) (\$/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------------------|--------|---------|----------|---------|--------------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| | | 100% of NEI Capital Costs | | | | | 2/3 of NEI Capital Costs | | | | | 1/3 of NEI Capital Costs | | | | |
| | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,777 | \$3.6 | \$13.8 | \$4.2 | (\$0.8) | \$1.4 | \$5.6 | \$15.8 | \$6.3 | \$1.3 | \$3.5 | \$7.7 | \$17.9 | \$8.3 | \$3.3 | \$5.5 |
| Braidwood | 2,330 | (\$0.4) | \$9.3 | (\$0.2) | (\$3.5) | (\$2.7) | \$1.6 | \$11.3 | \$1.9 | (\$1.5) | (\$0.6) | \$3.7 | \$13.4 | \$3.9 | \$0.6 | \$1.4 |
| Byron | 2,300 | (\$1.5) | \$7.0 | (\$5.1) | (\$9.9) | (\$3.9) | \$0.6 | \$9.0 | (\$3.1) | (\$7.8) | (\$1.8) | \$2.6 | \$11.1 | (\$1.0) | (\$5.8) | \$0.2 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,716 | \$16.4 | \$33.5 | \$15.1 | \$6.8 | \$4.9 | \$18.5 | \$35.5 | \$17.2 | \$8.9 | \$7.0 | \$20.5 | \$37.6 | \$19.2 | \$10.9 | \$9.0 |
| Cook | 2,071 | \$3.5 | \$12.4 | \$3.8 | (\$0.9) | \$0.3 | \$5.5 | \$14.5 | \$5.8 | \$1.2 | \$2.4 | \$7.6 | \$16.5 | \$7.9 | \$3.2 | \$4.4 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | (\$4.3) | \$9.4 | \$1.4 | (\$4.6) | (\$7.6) | (\$1.4) | \$12.2 | \$4.3 | (\$1.7) | (\$4.8) | \$1.5 | \$15.1 | \$7.2 | \$1.2 | (\$1.9) |
| Dresden | 1,787 | \$1.2 | \$11.1 | \$1.3 | (\$1.9) | (\$1.3) | \$3.2 | \$13.2 | \$3.4 | \$0.1 | \$0.7 | \$5.3 | \$15.2 | \$5.4 | \$2.2 | \$2.8 |
| Hope Creek | 1,161 | \$14.2 | \$27.9 | \$7.2 | (\$2.6) | \$0.1 | \$16.2 | \$30.0 | \$9.3 | (\$0.6) | \$2.2 | \$18.3 | \$32.0 | \$11.3 | \$1.5 | \$4.2 |
| LaSalle | 2,238 | \$0.3 | \$9.8 | \$0.1 | (\$3.9) | (\$3.0) | \$2.3 | \$11.8 | \$2.2 | (\$1.8) | (\$0.9) | \$4.4 | \$13.9 | \$4.2 | \$0.2 | \$1.1 |
| Limerick | 2,296 | \$14.0 | \$27.7 | \$7.5 | (\$2.5) | \$0.3 | \$16.1 | \$29.7 | \$9.5 | (\$0.4) | \$2.4 | \$18.1 | \$31.8 | \$11.6 | \$1.6 | \$4.4 |
| North Anna | 1,891 | \$7.9 | \$25.3 | \$11.9 | \$2.7 | \$3.6 | \$9.9 | \$27.3 | \$14.0 | \$4.7 | \$5.6 | \$12.0 | \$29.4 | \$16.0 | \$6.8 | \$7.7 |
| Oyster Creek | 615 | \$5.6 | \$19.0 | (\$1.9) | (\$11.8) | (\$8.9) | \$8.5 | \$21.9 | \$1.0 | (\$8.9) | (\$6.0) | \$11.4 | \$24.8 | \$3.9 | (\$6.0) | (\$3.1) |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | (\$4.7) | \$2.6 | (\$6.7) | (\$9.8) | (\$4.6) | (\$2.7) | \$4.7 | (\$4.6) | (\$7.7) | (\$2.5) | (\$0.6) | \$6.7 | (\$2.6) | (\$5.7) | (\$0.5) |
| Peach Bottom | 2,251 | \$14.1 | \$27.5 | \$6.8 | (\$2.8) | \$0.1 | \$16.2 | \$29.5 | \$8.8 | (\$0.7) | \$2.2 | \$18.2 | \$31.6 | \$10.9 | \$1.3 | \$4.2 |
| Perry | 1,240 | (\$3.7) | \$8.3 | \$2.2 | (\$4.6) | (\$6.6) | (\$0.8) | \$11.2 | \$5.1 | (\$1.7) | (\$3.7) | \$2.0 | \$14.1 | \$8.0 | \$1.2 | (\$0.8) |
| Salem | 2,332 | \$14.1 | \$27.9 | \$7.2 | (\$2.6) | \$0.1 | \$16.2 | \$29.9 | \$9.2 | (\$0.6) | \$2.2 | \$18.2 | \$32.0 | \$11.3 | \$1.5 | \$4.2 |
| Surry | 1,690 | \$7.3 | \$23.7 | \$11.8 | \$2.3 | \$3.4 | \$9.4 | \$25.7 | \$13.8 | \$4.3 | \$5.5 | \$11.4 | \$27.8 | \$15.9 | \$6.4 | \$7.5 |
| Susquehanna | 2,520 | \$12.9 | \$26.5 | \$7.3 | (\$2.2) | \$0.5 | \$15.0 | \$28.6 | \$9.3 | (\$0.1) | \$2.5 | \$17.0 | \$30.6 | \$11.4 | \$1.9 | \$4.6 |
| Three Mile Island | 805 | \$3.3 | \$16.3 | (\$4.0) | (\$12.6) | (\$9.3) | \$6.1 | \$19.2 | (\$1.1) | (\$9.7) | (\$6.4) | \$9.0 | \$22.1 | \$1.8 | (\$6.8) | (\$3.5) |



Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall): forward price data 2013 through 2017

| | Surplus (Shortfall) (\$/MWh) | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------------|---------|---------|
| | 100% of NEI Capital Costs | | | 2/3 of NEI Capital Costs | | | 1/3 of NEI Capital Costs | | |
| | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| Beaver Valley | \$8.81 | \$8.16 | \$6.41 | \$10.86 | \$10.21 | \$8.46 | \$12.91 | \$12.26 | \$10.51 |
| Braidwood | \$4.28 | \$6.45 | \$5.75 | \$6.33 | \$8.50 | \$7.80 | \$8.38 | \$10.55 | \$9.85 |
| Byron | \$4.64 | \$5.59 | \$4.95 | \$6.69 | \$7.64 | \$7.00 | \$8.74 | \$9.69 | \$9.05 |
| Calvert Cliffs | \$10.93 | \$10.65 | \$9.10 | \$12.98 | \$12.70 | \$11.15 | \$15.03 | \$14.75 | \$13.20 |
| Cook | \$7.57 | \$6.94 | \$5.22 | \$9.62 | \$8.99 | \$7.27 | \$11.67 | \$11.04 | \$9.32 |
| Davis Besse | (\$1.04) | (\$1.57) | (\$3.30) | \$1.85 | \$1.32 | (\$0.41) | \$4.74 | \$4.21 | \$2.48 |
| Dresden | \$6.68 | \$8.41 | \$7.74 | \$8.73 | \$10.46 | \$9.79 | \$10.78 | \$12.51 | \$11.84 |
| Hope Creek | \$7.46 | \$7.19 | \$6.93 | \$9.51 | \$9.24 | \$8.98 | \$11.56 | \$11.29 | \$11.03 |
| LaSalle | \$4.38 | \$6.49 | \$5.80 | \$6.43 | \$8.54 | \$7.85 | \$8.48 | \$10.59 | \$9.90 |
| Limerick | \$8.00 | \$7.74 | \$7.48 | \$10.05 | \$9.79 | \$9.53 | \$12.10 | \$11.84 | \$11.58 |
| North Anna | \$10.77 | \$10.32 | \$8.53 | \$12.82 | \$12.37 | \$10.58 | \$14.87 | \$14.42 | \$12.63 |
| Oyster Creek | (\$1.56) | (\$1.53) | (\$1.79) | \$1.33 | \$1.36 | \$1.10 | \$4.22 | \$4.25 | \$3.99 |
| Quad Cities | \$2.77 | \$4.36 | \$3.65 | \$4.82 | \$6.41 | \$5.70 | \$6.87 | \$8.46 | \$7.75 |
| Peach Bottom | \$7.46 | \$7.29 | \$7.04 | \$9.51 | \$9.34 | \$9.09 | \$11.56 | \$11.39 | \$11.14 |
| Perry | \$0.04 | (\$0.58) | (\$2.32) | \$2.93 | \$2.31 | \$0.57 | \$5.82 | \$5.20 | \$3.46 |
| Salem | \$7.44 | \$7.16 | \$6.90 | \$9.49 | \$9.21 | \$8.95 | \$11.54 | \$11.26 | \$11.00 |
| Surry | \$10.39 | \$9.86 | \$8.08 | \$12.44 | \$11.91 | \$10.13 | \$14.49 | \$13.96 | \$12.18 |
| Susquehanna | \$6.35 | \$5.97 | \$4.44 | \$8.40 | \$8.02 | \$6.49 | \$10.45 | \$10.07 | \$8.54 |
| Three Mile Island | (\$3.41) | (\$3.78) | (\$5.29) | (\$0.52) | (\$0.89) | (\$2.40) | \$2.37 | \$2.00 | \$0.49 |


Profile of units at risk of retirement

| Technology | No. Units | ICAP (MW) | Avg. 2017 Run Hrs | Avg. Unit Age (Yrs) | Avg. Heat Rate (Btu/MWh) |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| CC - Combined Cycle | 5 | 590 | 497 | 33 | 11,302 |
| CT - Aero Derivative | 10 | 254 | 137 | 41 | 13,724 |
| CT - Industrial Frame | 40 | 955 | 94 | 41 | 14,434 |
| Coal Fired (high) | 46 | 21,039 | 3,346 | 46 | 10,428 |
| Coal Fired (low) (90% ACR recovery) | 38 | 17,302 | 3,304 | 46 | 10,390 |
| Diesel or Oil or Gas Steam | 12 | 889 | 968 | 36 | 11,701 |
| Nuclear (high) | 5 | 7,058 | - | 38 | - |
| Nuclear (low) (forward looking) | 3 | 2,939 | - | 38 | - |
| Total (high) | 118 | 30,785 | 1,560 | 42 | 12,312 |
| Total (low) | 108 | 22,929 | 1,404 | 42 | 12,441 |

PJM reserve margin: 2016 to 2020

| | Generation and DR RPM Committed Less Deficiency UCAP (MW) | Forecast Peak Load | FRR Peak Load | PRD | RPM Peak Load | IRM | Pool Wide Average EFORd | Generation and DR RPM Committed Less Deficiency ICAP (MW) | Reserve Margin | Reserve Margin in Excess of IRM Percent | ICAP (MW) |
|-----------|---|-----------------------|------------------|-------|------------------|-------|-------------------------------|---|-------------------|---|-----------|
| 01-Jun-16 | 160,883.3 | 152,356.6 | 12,511.6 | 0.0 | 139,845.0 | 16.4% | 5.91% | 170,988.7 | 22.3% | 5.9% | 8,209.2 |
| 01-Jun-17 | 163,871.2 | 153,230.1 | 12,837.5 | 0.0 | 140,392.6 | 16.6% | 5.94% | 174,219.9 | 24.1% | 7.5% | 10,522.1 |
| 01-Jun-18 | 168,841.6 | 152,407.9 | 12,732.9 | 0.0 | 139,675.0 | 16.1% | 6.07% | 179,752.6 | 28.7% | 12.6% | 17,589.9 |
| 01-Jun-19 | 166,715.0 | 154,510.0 | 12,559.0 | 0.0 | 141,951.0 | 16.6% | 6.59% | 178,476.6 | 25.7% | 9.1% | 12,961.7 |
| 01-Jun-20 | 163,399.0 | 153,915.0 | 12,200.6 | 558.0 | 141,156.4 | 16.6% | 6.59% | 174,926.7 | 23.9% | 7.3% | 10,338.3 |

Map of PJM unit retirements: 2011 through 2020



RMR history

| Unit Names | Owner | ICAP (MW) | Cost Recovery Method | Docket Numbers | Start of Term | End of Term |
|---------------------------------------|---|-----------|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------|
| B.L. England 2 | RC Cape May Holdings, LLC | 150.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER17-1083 | 01-May-17 | 01-May-19 |
| Yorktown 1 | Dominion Virginia Power | 159.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER17-750 | 06-Jan-17 | 13-Mar-18 |
| Yorktown 2 | Dominion Virginia Power | 164.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER17-750 | 06-Jan-17 | 13-Mar-18 |
| B.L. England 3 | RC Cape May Holdings, LLC | 148.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER17-1083 | 01-May-17 | 24-Jan-18 |
| Ashtabula | FirstEnergy Service Company | 210.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 11-Apr-15 |
| Eastlake 1 | FirstEnergy Service Company | 109.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Eastlake 2 | FirstEnergy Service Company | 109.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Eastlake 3 | FirstEnergy Service Company | 109.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Lakeshore | FirstEnergy Service Company | 190.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Elrama 4 | GenOn Power Midwest, LP | 171.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER12-1901 | 01-Jun-12 | 01-Oct-12 |
| Niles 1 | GenOn Power Midwest, LP | 109.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER12-1901 | 01-Jun-12 | 01-Oct-12 |
| Cromby 2 and Diesel | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | 203.7 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER10-1418 | 01-Jun-11 | 01-Jan-12 |
| Eddystone 2 | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | 309.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER10-1418 | 01-Jun-11 | 01-Jun-12 |
| Brunot Island CT2A, CT2B, CT3 and CC4 | Orion Power MidWest, L.P. | 244.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER06-993 | 16-May-06 | 05-Jul-07 |
| Hudson 1 | PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC | 355.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER05-644, ER11-2688 | 25-Feb-05 | 08-Dec-11 |
| Sewaren 1-4 | PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC | 453.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER05-644 | 25-Feb-05 | 01-Sep-08 |



Recommendations: Energy Market Uplift


- **PJM should not use closed loop interfaces to override LMP logic to accommodate:**
 - Issues with DR product, e.g. non nodal.
 - Issues with reactive power modeling.
 - Issues with scarcity pricing, e.g. not locational.
- **PJM should not use price setting logic to override LMP logic to reduce uplift.**
- **Reduce uplift**
 - Increase transparency
 - Require flexible parameters
 - Eliminate day ahead uplift.
 - Eliminate segmentation
 - Include regulation net revenue offset in uplift calculation.
 - UTCs should pay uplift.

Total energy uplift charges

| | Total Energy Uplift Charges (Millions) | Change (Millions) | Percent Change | Energy Uplift as a Percent of Total PJM Billing |
|------|---|-------------------|----------------|---|
| 2001 | \$284.0 | \$67.0 | 30.9% | 8.5% |
| 2002 | \$273.7 | (\$10.3) | (3.6%) | 5.8% |
| 2003 | \$376.5 | \$102.8 | 37.6% | 5.4% |
| 2004 | \$537.6 | \$161.1 | 42.8% | 6.1% |
| 2005 | \$712.6 | \$175.0 | 32.6% | 3.1% |
| 2006 | \$365.6 | (\$347.0) | (48.7%) | 1.7% |
| 2007 | \$503.3 | \$137.7 | 37.7% | 1.6% |
| 2008 | \$474.3 | (\$29.0) | (5.8%) | 1.4% |
| 2009 | \$322.7 | (\$151.6) | (32.0%) | 1.2% |
| 2010 | \$623.2 | \$300.5 | 93.1% | 1.8% |
| 2011 | \$603.4 | (\$19.8) | (3.2%) | 1.7% |
| 2012 | \$649.8 | \$46.4 | 7.7% | 2.2% |
| 2013 | \$843.0 | \$193.2 | 29.7% | 2.5% |
| 2014 | \$961.2 | \$118.2 | 14.0% | 1.9% |
| 2015 | \$312.0 | (\$649.2) | (67.5%) | 0.7% |
| 2016 | \$136.7 | (\$824.5) | (85.8%) | 0.3% |
| 2017 | \$129.1 | (\$7.5) | (5.5%) | 0.3% |



Energy uplift charges changes by category



Energy uplift credits by unit type: 2017

| Unit Type | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve | Balancing Operating Reserve | Canceled Resources | Local Constraints Control | Lost Opportunity Cost | Reactive Services | Synchronous Condensing | Black Start Services |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Combined Cycle | 9.2% | 8.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 10.7% | 3.9% | 0.0% | 20.2% |
| Combustion Turbine | 3.4% | 76.3% | 2.7% | 90.3% | 67.3% | 2.9% | 0.0% | 79.8% |
| Diesel | 0.1% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 2.1% | 3.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Hydro | 0.0% | 0.0% | 97.3% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Nuclear | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Solar | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Coal | 78.7% | 11.8% | 0.0% | 7.6% | 5.7% | 84.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Others | 8.7% | 3.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 8.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Wind | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 12.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total (Millions) | \$24.7 | \$67.4 | \$0.0 | \$1.4 | \$14.6 | \$20.4 | \$0.0 | \$0.3 |



Top 10 units and organizations energy uplift credits: 2017

| Category | Type | Top 10 Units | | Top 10 Organizations | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------|
| | | Credits (Millions) | Credits Share | Credits (Millions) | Credits Share |
| Day-Ahead Operating Reserve | Generators | \$19.0 | 77.0% | \$24.0 | 97.0% |
| | Canceled Resources | \$0.0 | 100.0% | \$0.0 | 100.0% |
| Balancing Operating Reserve | Generators | \$9.1 | 13.6% | \$48.8 | 72.4% |
| | Local Constraints Control | \$1.0 | 75.1% | \$1.4 | 100.0% |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | \$3.0 | 20.3% | \$10.3 | 70.7% |
| Reactive Services | | \$18.8 | 92.1% | \$20.4 | 99.9% |
| Synchronous Condensing | | \$0.0 | 0.0% | \$0.0 | 0.0% |
| Black Start Services | | \$0.1 | 40.8% | \$0.2 | 93.6% |
| Total | | \$42.6 | 33.1% | \$100.3 | 77.9% |



Operating reserve rates statistics (\$/MWh): 2017


| Region | Transaction | Rates Charged (\$/MWh) | | | Standard Deviation |
|--------|-------------|------------------------|---------|---------|--------------------|
| | | Maximum | Average | Minimum | |
| East | INC | 3.793 | 0.355 | 0.000 | 0.498 |
| | DEC | 3.860 | 0.386 | 0.002 | 0.498 |
| | DA Load | 0.346 | 0.030 | 0.000 | 0.042 |
| | RT Load | 0.869 | 0.037 | 0.000 | 0.073 |
| | Deviation | 3.793 | 0.355 | 0.000 | 0.498 |
| West | INC | 2.782 | 0.327 | 0.000 | 0.438 |
| | DEC | 2.816 | 0.357 | 0.002 | 0.437 |
| | DA Load | 0.346 | 0.030 | 0.000 | 0.042 |
| | RT Load | 0.390 | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.048 |
| | Deviation | 2.782 | 0.327 | 0.000 | 0.438 |

Current and proposed average energy uplift rate by transaction: 2016 and 2017

| | | 2016 | | | 2017 | | |
|------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | Current Rates (\$/MWh) | Proposed Rates - 100% UTC (\$/MWh) | Proposed Rates - 0% UTC (\$/MWh) | Current Rates (\$/MWh) | Proposed Rates - 100% UTC (\$/MWh) | Proposed Rates - 0% UTC (\$/MWh) |
| East | Transaction | | | | | | |
| | INC | 0.347 | 0.027 | 0.093 | 0.355 | 0.012 | 0.040 |
| | DEC | 0.418 | 0.027 | 0.093 | 0.386 | 0.012 | 0.040 |
| | DA Load | 0.071 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.030 | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| | RT Load | 0.031 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.037 | 0.027 | 0.027 |
| | Deviation | 0.347 | 0.387 | 0.451 | 0.355 | 0.504 | 0.531 |
| West | INC | 0.302 | 0.022 | 0.078 | 0.327 | 0.011 | 0.037 |
| | DEC | 0.372 | 0.022 | 0.078 | 0.357 | 0.011 | 0.037 |
| | DA Load | 0.071 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.030 | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| | RT Load | 0.023 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.027 |
| | Deviation | 0.302 | 0.312 | 0.366 | 0.327 | 0.415 | 0.440 |
| UTC | East to East | NA | 0.055 | 0.186 | NA | 0.024 | 0.081 |
| | West to West | NA | 0.044 | 0.156 | NA | 0.021 | 0.074 |
| | East to/from West | NA | 0.049 | 0.171 | NA | 0.023 | 0.077 |



PJM Closed loop interfaces map




Recommendations: Demand Response


- **Demand response should be removed from PJM capacity market.**
 - **On demand side of market**
 - **Redesign to facilitate customers' response to prices**
 - **Payment should be immediate**
 - **Impact on forecasts should be immediate**
 - **Metered use is sole basis for payment. No M&V.**
- **Eliminate guaranteed DR strike price; pay LMP**
- **DR offer cap should be the same as generation**
- **Demand response should be fully nodal**
- **Demand response should be an economic resource**
- **M&V: cap baselines at PLC uniformly including winter**
- **Eliminate net benefits test**
- **Eliminate bankrupt (partial/total) customers from program**



Economic program credits and MWh by month



Demand response revenue by market




Recommendations: Transactions


- **Submit transactions consistent with power flow not scheduled paths.**
- **Implement rules to prevent breaking up transactions to evade rules.**
- **Implement rules to prevent sham scheduling.**
- **Eliminate outdated definitions of interface pricing points.**
- **Permit unlimited spot imports.**
- **Interchange pricing should reflect LMP logic.**
 - **No need for scheduling physical transactions.**
- **Make actual flow data available for eastern interconnection to MMUs and RTOs/ISOs.**



PJM's footprint and its external DA and RT scheduling interfaces



PJM RT and DA scheduled import and export transaction volume history



The regulation market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|----------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Market Structure | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Flawed |

The tier 2 synchronized reserve market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Market Structure: Regional Markets | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Mixed |

The day-ahead scheduling reserve market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|----------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Market Structure | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Mixed | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Mixed |

Recommendations: Ancillary Services

- Regulation market should incorporate consistent application of marginal benefit factor including optimization, assignment and settlements.
- LOC should be based on unit's operating schedule in the energy market.
- Eliminate payment of Tier 2 price to Tier 1 when non-synchronized reserve price > 0 .
- Eliminate DASR Market.
- The cost of reactive capability should be incorporated in the capacity market.
- Implement rules governing tier 1 biasing.
- Minimum tank suction levels should be fixed.



Average price and cost for PJM regulation

| Year | Weighted Regulation Market Price | Weighted Regulation Market Cost | Regulation Price as Percent Cost |
|------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2009 | \$22.99 | \$30.68 | 74.9% |
| 2010 | \$18.00 | \$32.86 | 54.8% |
| 2011 | \$16.48 | \$29.72 | 55.5% |
| 2012 | \$19.02 | \$25.32 | 75.1% |
| 2013 | \$30.85 | \$35.79 | 86.2% |
| 2014 | \$44.48 | \$53.82 | 82.6% |
| 2015 | \$31.92 | \$38.36 | 83.2% |
| 2016 | \$15.73 | \$18.13 | 86.7% |
| 2017 | \$16.78 | \$23.02 | 72.9% |

Components of regulation cost: 2016 through 2017

| Year | Month | Scheduled Regulation (MW) | Cost of Regulation Capability (\$/MW) | Cost of Regulation Performance (\$/MW) | Opportunity Cost (\$/MW) | Total Cost (\$/MW) |
|-------------|-------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 2016 | Jan | 412,599.7 | \$14.49 | \$1.97 | \$1.95 | \$18.41 |
| | Feb | 383,918.8 | \$16.00 | \$2.61 | \$1.40 | \$20.01 |
| | Mar | 396,882.6 | \$12.01 | \$2.25 | \$1.14 | \$15.40 |
| | Apr | 384,853.5 | \$17.38 | \$2.70 | \$1.67 | \$21.76 |
| | May | 391,328.7 | \$13.56 | \$3.50 | \$1.39 | \$18.45 |
| | Jun | 379,273.1 | \$13.33 | \$1.38 | \$1.10 | \$15.81 |
| | Jul | 386,423.4 | \$16.52 | \$2.27 | \$1.80 | \$20.60 |
| | Aug | 386,057.1 | \$16.74 | \$1.66 | \$1.56 | \$19.96 |
| | Sep | 376,493.8 | \$16.68 | \$2.32 | \$1.68 | \$20.67 |
| | Oct | 389,241.0 | \$14.11 | \$2.73 | \$1.19 | \$18.04 |
| | Nov | 374,665.6 | \$11.28 | \$3.11 | \$1.03 | \$15.42 |
| | Dec | 391,549.0 | \$10.14 | \$1.73 | \$1.25 | \$13.11 |
| 2016 Annual | | 4,653,286.2 | \$14.35 | \$2.35 | \$1.43 | \$18.14 |
| 2017 | Jan | 395,801.8 | \$13.19 | \$2.43 | \$1.69 | \$17.31 |
| | Feb | 356,168.1 | \$9.91 | \$3.68 | \$1.38 | \$14.97 |
| | Mar | 375,627.5 | \$13.93 | \$6.99 | \$1.98 | \$22.91 |
| | Apr | 371,527.5 | \$12.94 | \$9.78 | \$1.64 | \$24.36 |
| | May | 367,839.9 | \$16.77 | \$5.78 | \$1.77 | \$24.31 |
| | Jun | 386,015.3 | \$10.81 | \$7.95 | \$1.26 | \$20.02 |
| | Jul | 406,828.4 | \$13.19 | \$6.37 | \$1.82 | \$21.38 |
| | Aug | 403,294.0 | \$10.10 | \$9.34 | \$1.38 | \$20.82 |
| | Sep | 354,990.9 | \$18.83 | \$8.82 | \$1.96 | \$29.61 |
| | Oct | 365,994.1 | \$13.88 | \$8.51 | \$1.67 | \$24.07 |
| | Nov | 351,119.3 | \$14.55 | \$6.12 | \$2.09 | \$22.77 |
| | Dec | 395,269.5 | \$24.30 | \$5.29 | \$4.28 | \$33.86 |
| 2017 Annual | | 4,530,476.4 | \$14.37 | \$6.76 | \$1.91 | \$23.03 |




The FTR Auction Markets results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|----------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Flawed |

Recommendations: FTR/ARR

- **ARR/FTR design should be modified to ensure that all congestion revenues are returned to load.**
- **All FTR auction revenues should be returned to load.**
- **Eliminate use of generation to load contract paths for allocating ARR.**
- **Modify long term FTRs to include only a one year ahead FTR**
- **Ensure that full transmission capability of system be allocated to ARRs**
- **Eliminate portfolio netting.**

FTR payout ratio



PJM reported FTR payout ratio

| Planning Period | FTR Payout Ratio |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 2003/2004 | 97.7% |
| 2004/2005 | 100.0% |
| 2005/2006 | 90.7% |
| 2006/2007 | 100.0% |
| 2007/2008 | 100.0% |
| 2008/2009 | 100.0% |
| 2009/2010 | 96.9% |
| 2010/2011 | 85.0% |
| 2011/2012 | 80.6% |
| 2012/2013 | 67.8% |
| 2013/2014 | 72.8% |
| 2014/2015 | 100.0% |
| 2015/2016 | 100.0% |
| 2016/2017 | 100.0% |
| 2017/2018 | 100.0% |



Historic Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR Allocations



ARR holder total congestion offset (\$M)

| Planning Period | Old | | | | | Current | | | | |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | ARR Credits | FTR Credits | Total Congestion | Total ARR/FTR Offset | Percent Offset | New Offset | Old Revenue Received | Current Revenue Received | ARR Holder Change | FTR Over Payment |
| 2011/2012 | \$512.2 | \$249.8 | \$770.6 | \$762.0 | 98.9% | 83.3% | \$762.0 | \$598.6 | (\$163.4) | \$113.9 |
| 2012/2013 | \$349.5 | \$181.9 | \$575.8 | \$531.4 | 92.3% | 68.0% | \$531.4 | \$275.9 | (\$255.5) | \$62.1 |
| 2013/2014 | \$337.7 | \$456.4 | \$1,777.1 | \$794.0 | 44.7% | 43.2% | \$794.0 | \$574.1 | (\$219.9) | \$0.0 |
| 2014/2015 | \$482.4 | \$404.4 | \$1,390.9 | \$886.8 | 63.8% | 57.2% | \$886.8 | \$686.6 | (\$200.2) | \$400.6 |
| 2015/2016 | \$635.3 | \$223.4 | \$992.6 | \$858.8 | 86.5% | 78.2% | \$858.8 | \$744.8 | (\$113.9) | \$188.9 |
| 2016/2017 | \$640.0 | \$169.1 | \$824.6 | \$809.1 | 98.1% | 89.5% | \$809.1 | \$727.7 | (\$81.4) | \$179.0 |
| 2017/2018* | \$334.0 | \$98.4 | \$477.7 | \$432.4 | 90.5% | 79.4% | \$432.4 | \$395.9 | (\$36.5) | \$80.4 |
| Total | \$3,291.2 | \$1,783.3 | \$6,809.3 | \$5,074.4 | 74.5% | 64.6% | \$5,074.4 | \$4,003.7 | (\$1,070.7) | \$1,024.7 |

* Seven months of 2017/2018 planning period



FTR profits by organization type

| Organization Type | Prevailing Flow | FTR Direction | | All | |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | Self Scheduled Prevailing Flow | Self Scheduled Counter Flow | | |
| Financial | \$40,811,499 | | \$46,900,257 | \$87,711,756 | |
| Physical | (\$9,369,683) | | \$10,028,710 | \$659,026 | |
| Physical ARR Holder | \$17,192,244 | \$87,292,443 | \$14,251,815 | (\$1,834,752) | \$31,444,059 |
| Total | \$48,634,060 | \$87,292,443 | \$71,180,781 | (\$1,834,752) | \$119,814,841 |



Estimated additional Long Term FTR Auction revenue at Annual FTR Auction prices

| Planning Period | Long Term FTR Product | | | | Total Difference |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|
| | Year 3 | Year 2 | Year 1 | Three Year | |
| 2014/2015 | \$59,598,642 | \$30,284,173 | \$52,030,909 | \$926,989 | \$142,840,713 |
| 2015/2016 | \$67,896,588 | \$40,975,278 | \$9,936,078 | \$303,082 | \$119,111,026 |
| 2016/2017 | \$42,378,048 | \$3,854,373 | \$11,055,824 | \$1,079,901 | \$58,368,147 |
| 2017/2018 | \$6,134,076 | (\$1,841,715) | \$12,396,817 | \$227,524 | \$16,916,702 |
| Total | \$176,007,354 | \$73,272,109 | \$85,419,628 | \$2,537,496 | \$337,236,587 |

Long Term and Annual Auction cleared FTR MW

| Long Term FTR Product | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|---------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Planning Period | Year 3 | Year 2 | Year 1 | Total Long Term | Annual (including self scheduled) | Long Term Percent of Total Cleared |
| 2014/2015 | 81,666 | 86,754 | 131,911 | 300,330 | 356,522 | 45.7% |
| 2015/2016 | 89,419 | 99,329 | 123,400 | 312,148 | 355,682 | 46.7% |
| 2016/2017 | 97,837 | 95,637 | 107,182 | 300,656 | 397,258 | 43.1% |
| 2017/2018 | 69,161 | 86,323 | 108,126 | 263,609 | 493,683 | 34.8% |

Long Term FTR Auction compared to Annual FTR Auction

| Long Term FTR Product | | | | | | Long Term Percent of Total Net Revenue |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Planning Period | Year 3 | Year 2 | Year 1 | Total Long Term | Annual (including self scheduled) | |
| 2014/2015 | \$13,016,512 | \$7,176,209 | \$6,863,135 | \$27,055,856 | \$735,998,448 | 3.5% |
| 2015/2016 | \$12,479,874 | \$7,378,550 | \$5,156,206 | \$25,014,630 | \$893,043,415 | 2.7% |
| 2016/2017 | \$7,624,149 | \$2,105,984 | \$11,087,250 | \$20,817,382 | \$861,031,182 | 2.4% |
| 2017/2018 | \$1,670,521 | \$7,210,445 | \$9,763,312 | \$18,644,279 | \$513,587,222 | 3.5% |



Status of MMU reported recommendations: 1999 through 2017

| Status | Priority High | Priority Medium | Priority Low | Total | Percent of Total |
|--|---------------|-----------------|--------------|-------|------------------|
| Adopted | 20 | 15 | 19 | 54 | 22.5% |
| Partially Adopted (Continued Recommendation) | 5 | 7 | 6 | 18 | 7.5% |
| Partially Adopted (Recommendation Closed) | 2 | 4 | 5 | 11 | 4.6% |
| Partially Adopted (Total) | 7 | 11 | 11 | 29 | 12.1% |
| Not Adopted | 32 | 63 | 35 | 130 | 54.2% |
| Not Adopted (Pending before FERC) | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2.5% |
| Not Adopted (Stakeholder Process) | 2 | 6 | 2 | 10 | 4.2% |
| Not Adopted (Total) | 38 | 71 | 37 | 146 | 60.8% |
| Replaced by Newer Recommendation | 1 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 3.3% |
| Withdrawn | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1.3% |
| Total | 66 | 103 | 71 | 240 | 100.0% |



Market Monitoring Unit

The State of the Market Report is the work of the entire Market Monitoring Unit.



Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue
Suite 160
Eagleville, PA
19403
(610) 271-8050

MA@monitoringanalytics.com
www.MonitoringAnalytics.com

