MMU Incremental Auction Recommendation – Package B

IASTF 6/27/2017 Joe Bowring



Number of Incremental Auctions (1)

- One IA held 3 months prior to start of DY
- Adopt the PJM language for First IA and Second IA on timing and conditions, except that clarity is needed regarding changes in CETL and applicability to LDAs
- Reducing the number of IAs will limit speculative opportunities and eliminate unnecessary auctions

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Capacity Resource Must Offer (3)

- Must Offer provisions are in place to prevent the exercise of market power by market participants against other market participants
- Must Offer provisions are in place to prevent withholding
- Must Offer provisions are consistent with competitive markets
- The combination of Must Offer and Must Buy provisions ensure that the capacity market produces competitive results



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PJM Sell Offers (7,8,9)

- PJM will review the release of capacity if the updated reliability requirement is less than the prior utilized reliability requirement by more than three percent.
- The default should be to release no capacity



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PJM Sell Offers (7,8,9)

- PJM will release capacity in cases that increase the overall welfare of capacity market sellers and buyers
- The determination of release quantities and prices must incorporate consideration for both capacity and energy market benefits.
- The cost benefit study should be similar to the analysis used to produce the PJM CP Initiative report published on October 23, 2014





Mitigation (10)

- Market power mitigation is a necessary component of capacity market auctions due to endemic structural market power in the capacity market
- Market power mitigation is required for competitive results in the capacity market





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