FTRs and Congestion

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Congestion Discussion

- Total congestion is total congestion related charges minus total congestion related credits.
- Total Congestion = Total Day Ahead Congestion + Total Balancing Congestion.
- FTR designed to allocate total congestion, not day ahead only congestion, not target allocation.
- Under and over collection (relative to target allocations) allocated in proportion to FTR holder target allocations relative to total FTR target allocations.
- True since the inception of the two settlement system in PJM in 2000.



DA Ahead Congestion

Bus	DA CLMP	DA MW GEN	DA MW Load	Gen Credit	Load Charges	Total Congestion
A	\$50	100	50	\$5,000	\$2,500	(\$2,500)
D	\$100	50	100	\$5,000	\$10,000	\$5,000
Total		150	150	\$10,000	\$12,500	\$2,500

- Gen at A (100 MW) and D (50 MW), Load at A (50 MW) and D (100 MW).
- 50 MW of transfer capability modeled between A and D.
- DA CLMP at Bus A is \$50 and DA CLMP at Bus D is \$100.
- \$50 x 50 MW of transfer = Over collection= \$2,500
- Total Day Ahead Congestion is Total Load Charges Generation Credits = \$2,500



DA Ahead Congestion

Bus	DA CLMP	DA MW GEN	DA MW Load	Gen Credit	Load Charges	Total Congestion
А	\$50	90	50	\$4,500	\$2,500	(\$2,000)
D	\$100	60	100	\$6,000	\$10,000	\$4,000
Total		150	150	\$10,500	\$12,500	\$2,000

- Gen at A (90 MW) and D (60 MW), Load at A (50 MW) and D (100 MW).
- 40 MW of transfer capability modeled between A and D.
- DA CLMP at Bus A is \$50 and DA CLMP at Bus D is \$100.
- \$50 x 40 MW = Overcollection = \$2,000
- Total Day Ahead Congestion is Total Load Charges Generation Credits = \$2,000





- Allocation of congestion rents collected:
 - Provides credit (congestion offset) for transmission access to less expensive generation.
 - Evolved from physical rights to transmission.
 - Should not provide more revenue than congestion collected.
 - **o** Would be over payment to FTR holder
 - Target allocation a distribution metric for under and over allocation, not a guarantee of payout.



Real Time versus Balancing Congestion

DA has 50 MW transfer, RT 40 MW Transfer, CLMP the same (flat gen offers)

				CLMP	Target	
		FTR MW	Flow	Difference	Allocations	Congestion
DA	A to D	50	50	\$50	\$2,500	\$2,500
	Total				\$2,500	\$2,500
				CLMP	Target	
		FTR MW	Flow	Difference	Allocations	Congestion
RT	A to D	50	40	\$50	\$2,500	\$2,000
	Total				\$2,500	\$2,000
				CLMP	Target	Balancing
		FTR MW	Deviation	Difference	Allocations	Congestion
Balancing	A to D	50	(10)	\$50	\$2,500	(\$500)
	Total				\$2,500	(\$500)
DA + Balancing	A to D					\$2,000

	Target	Day Ahead	Balancing	Total	
FTR	Allocation	Congestion	Congestion	Congestion	Funding
A to D	\$ 2.500.00	\$ 2.500.00	\$ (500.00)	\$ 2,000,00	\$ (500.00)





- FTR pay out of \$2,000 offsets congestion completely.
- If FTR pay out is \$2,500, but actual congestion is \$2,000, FTR holders would be subsidized.
- Depending on allocation of the FTRs and the uplift charges, winners and losers, wealth transfers.
- True if single or two settlement.



- If FTR payout to FTR holder is \$2,000 and load charges are \$10,000:
 - If load holds the FTR, Load net congestion bill reflects \$10,000. Provided with \$2,000 offset. No subsidies, no overpayment, no double payment.
 - If third party holds FTR, load net congestion bill reflects \$10,000. Third party gets \$2,000 offset. No subsidies, no overpayment, no double payment.
- If FTR payout to FTR holder is \$2,500 and load charges are \$10,000:
 - If load holds the FTR, Load net congestion bill reflects \$10,000. Provided with \$2,500 "offset." Load provided with \$500 more than congestion incurred. FTR is subsidized. Where there are multiples FTRs and FTR holders, will result in cross subsidies.
 - If load pays the \$500, load breaks even, but FTR overpaid.
 - If third party pay the \$500 difference, FTR is still overpaid (subsidized) by virtual players, wealth transfer to FTR holder (load).
 - If third party load holds the FTR, load net congestion bill reflects \$10,000. No offset to load. Third party paid \$2,500 "offset." Third party provided with \$500 more than congestion incurred.
 - If load pays the \$500 difference, FTR is overpaid (subsidized) by load. Load pays more in congestion than actually realized. Double payment for congestion incurred.
 - If the third party pays the \$500 difference, third party breaks even relative to congestion incurred, but FTR is overpaid.



Real Time versus Balancing Congestion

 DA has 50 MW transfer, RT 50 MW Transfer, CLMP the same (flat gen offers), FTR 100 MW.

				CLMP	Target	
		FTR MW	Flow	Difference	Allocations	Congestion
DA	A to D	100	50	\$50	\$5,000	\$2,500
	Total				\$5,000	\$2,500
				CLMP	Target	
		FTR MW	Flow	Difference	Allocations	Congestion
RT	A to D	100	50	\$50	\$5,000	\$2,500
	Total				\$5,000	\$2,500
				CLMP	Target	Balancing
		FTR MW	Deviation	Difference	Allocations	Congestion
Balancing	A to D	100	-	\$50	\$5,000	\$0
	Total				\$5,000	\$0
DA + Balancing	A to D					\$2,500
Ta	arget Day Ah	ead Balancii	ng To	tal		

Allocation Congestion Congestion

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5,000.00 \$ 2,500.00 \$

\$

Funding

\$ 2,500.00 \$ (2,500.00)

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Congestion/ARR/FTR Product

- No position in PJM day ahead market is held harmless to interactions between the day ahead and real time markets (balancing, uplift)
- All positions are financial day ahead and trued up via (balancing) adjustments, based on actual system conditions.
- Total congestion = DA + Balancing
- Target allocation not a guarantee of FTR payouts
- Total FTR payouts do not exceed total congestion collected.
- True since the inception of the two settlement system in PJM in 2000.



Figure 13-16 FTR target allocation compared to sources of positive and negative congestion revenue



MMU Proposed Options

- 1. Report correct monthly payout ratios
- 2. Eliminate portfolio netting subsidizations
- 3. Eliminate counter flow FTR subsidizations
- 4. Eliminate cross geographic subsidies
- 5. Improve outage modeling in FTR auctions
- 6. Reduce FTR availability on persistently underfunded paths/facilities
- 7. Implement seasonal ARR and FTR allocation methods
- 8. Eliminate over allocation of Stage 1A ARRs



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