## MA Scarcity Pricing Proposal: Price Targets and Related Issues

SPWG

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## **Scarcity Pricing: MA position**

- Scarcity pricing is an important part of market design
- Scarcity pricing does not mean prices over \$1,000



Monitoring Analytics

## The Purpose of the Scarcity Pricing Signal

- Purpose is to signal scarcity
- Purpose is to incent participation
- Setting the resulting energy price too high will result in a wealth transfer, rather than meaningful increase in participation
- Determines the opportunity cost for reserves during scarcity



## MA vs. PJM Basic Mechanics Comparison

Operational	MA	PJM
ORDC	Yes	Yes
Penalty factors drive dispatch in and out of shortage	Yes	Yes
Co-optimization of energy and reserves	Yes	Yes
Opportunity Cost based on LMP	Yes	Yes
Increases and maintains LMP during scarcity	Yes	Yes
Maintain's co-optimization during scarcity	Yes	Yes
Prices signals/compensation consistent with dispatch solution	Yes	Yes



# The PJM and MA Proposals: Conceptually and Operationally Identical

- Concept: Add reserve constraints to the optimization model
- LMP is the incremental cost to serve incremental load at a location while controlling for *all* related constraints
- Reserves are additional constraints to the optimization.
- LMP = Energy + Marginal Losses + Congestion + "Scarcity Adder"
- "Scarcity Adder" is an administrative contribution to marginal bus LMP(s) when short reserves



#### **Example: Synchronized Reserve Target**

- If system runs short of synchronized reserves:
  - LMP at the marginal unit buses set equal to \$1,000.
  - Resulting opportunity costs determined relative to LMP
  - Reserve constraint(s) relaxed, penalty factor of \$1,000 is maintained
    - Dispatch optimization continues
  - Max opportunity cost for reserves = \$1,000
  - Hour ahead market for reserves incorporates opportunity cost in clearing price



#### Two approaches, same mechanism

- Use of Operating Reserve Penalty Factor Curve to drive within hour dispatch and optimization
  - PJM
    - Two cumulative fixed \$850 penalty factors that drive dispatch (within each reserve region)
    - Penalty factor(s) applied to marginal bus LMP (max price \$2,700) during reserve scarcity
  - MA
    - \$1,000 penalty factor(s) that drive dispatch
    - Defined LMP targets (max price \$1,000) on marginal buses during reserve scarcity
    - · Reserve constraint is relaxed to maintain dispatch signal
    - Adder to marginal bus endogenously determined
    - Maintains indifference between LMP and opportunity cost for reserves
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#### "MA Approach" vs. "PJM Approach"

	MC	Max Energy	Max Reserve
Gen A	20	400	50
Gen B	60	400	50
Gen C	800	400	50

Reserve Requirement = 100 MW

MA: LMP goes to \$1000 when scarce, Max Price for Reserves = \$1000 PJM: Penalty Factor = \$850



## **MA Approach**

	Market Pric	es			Dispatch	1				
Total		Energy								
Load/	System	Price	"Scarcity		Energy	Reserves	Energy	Reserves	Energy	Reserves
Energy	Reserve	(LMP)	Adder"	MU	А	А	В	В	С	С
350	100	\$60		В	400	0	350	50	0	50
800	100	\$800		С	400	0	350	50	50	50
1100	100	\$800		С	400	0	350	50	350	50
1110	90	\$1,000	\$940	В	400	0	360	40	350	50
1170	30	\$1,000	\$200	С	400	0	400	0	370	30




## **PJM Approach**

	Market Pric	es			Dispatch	1				
Total		Energy								
Load/	System	Price	"Scarcity		Energy	Reserves	Energy	Reserves	Energy	Reserves
Energy	Reserve	(LMP)	Adder"	MU	А	А	В	В	С	С
350	100	\$60		В	400	0	350	50	0	50
800	100	\$800		С	400	0	350	50	50	50
1100	100	\$800		С	400	0	350	50	350	50
1110	90	\$910	\$850	В	400	0	360	40	350	50
1170	30	\$1,650	\$850	С	400	0	400	0	370	30




## **MA Approach: LMP**






## **PJM Approach: LMP**







## MA Approach: Opportunity Cost for Reserves/Penalty Factor



## PJM Approach: Opportunity Cost for Reserves/Penalty Factor




## **MA Approach: LMP under Scarcity**






## **MA Approach: Opportunity Cost/Scarcity**






## **PJM Approach: LMP under Scarcity**





## **PJM Approach: Opportunity Cost/Scarcity**





## MA vs. PJM Approach: Functionally the Same

- Using the same reserve targets, the unit specific operational dispatch signals are identical
  - Using different targets will cause different potential outcomes
- Both mechanisms would move PJM from manual within hour dispatch for reserves to automated within hour dispatch for reserves
- Both represent a change from current operations
- Both would result in a change in what is considered to be "optimal" dispatch



## MA approach is operationally feasible

- PJM proposes to use constraint relaxation to avoid "false positives"
  - allows continued co-optimization under conditions of reserve shortage without having penalty factors affect LMP
  - Internally consistent dispatch result before/after
- PJM has shown that relaxing the constraint is operationally feasible
  - Basis of MA approach, as shown in the example



## MA approach is operationally feasible

- MA's proposal would use constraint relaxation to allow continued co-optimization of energy and reserves during reserve shortage
  - Like PJM proposal, allows continued cooptimization under conditions of reserve shortage without having penalty factors affect LMP
  - Approach is internally consistent before and during reserve shortage
  - Does not require "suspension" of co-optimization when providing a scarcity price
  - Constraint relaxation is the basis of the MA approach



#### MA approach is operationally feasible

- MA's proposed use of constraint relaxation to allow continued co-optimization of energy and reserves during reserve shortage allows
  - Scarcity pricing (\$1,000) that is consistent with PJM current market design (DA vs. RT) and with the ORDC approach
  - Allows for the gradual adoption of higher price caps *if* need is identified



## MA vs. PJM approach: \$1,000 vs. \$2,700

Market Design Issues (\$1,000 vs. \$2,700)	MA	PJM
Market Results compatible with PJM's current market rules/caps	Yes	Not in scarcity
Compatible with RT/DA market design (arbitrage, scheduling)	Yes	No
Would require changes to DA market/Design/Rules	No	Yes
Market Power concerns w/ DA Market Fixes	No	Yes
Internally consistent rules during a transition	Yes	No



## Pricing Under Scarcity: \$1,000 vs. \$2,700

 No evidence that the scarcity signal in the energy market must exceed \$1,000 in order to maintain reliability



## Pricing Under Scarcity: \$1,000 vs. \$2,700

- Capping the market price at \$1,000
  - Makes it possible to arbitrage between DA and RT
  - Not possible to arbitrage between DA and RT at \$2,700 without substantially changing the DA market and introducing market power issues
  - Allows participants to better manage risks in DA market
    - Missed load prediction
    - Tripped unit
    - Is consistent with PJM's current market design \$2,700 in RT is not consistent with PJM's current market design and offer caps
  - Does not require reworking of the DA market



#### Pricing Under Scarcity: \$1,000 vs. \$2,700

- Capping the market price at \$1,000
  - Would set LMP consistently with current resource offer caps and current market design
  - Would ensure full resource stack is dispatched



# Differences between MA and PJM pricing approaches

- Scarcity price level
  - · Price target vs. Fixed adder
  - Not a relevant difference to the core ORDC concept
  - Policy issue
    - Market structure compatibility issue
- One or two reserve targets
  - MA proposes one (Sync)
  - ORDC (either MA or PJM) approach can handle one or two (or more)
- Structure of Tier 2 market
  - Hour ahead structure and 5 minute optimization vs. 5 minute only optimization
    - Limiting assignment/compensation to 5 minute optimization/hourly integrated pricing may reduce reserves/participation



## Challenge under either approach: False Positives

- Morning pickup/min gen events
  - Relaxing the constraint will work
  - Issues:
    - Need rules around when to trigger price effects under either approach
    - Frequency of events

