Preface

The PJM Market Monitoring Plan provides:

The Market Monitoring Unit shall prepare and submit contemporaneously to the Commission, the State Commissions, the PJM Board, PJM Management and to the PJM Members Committee, annual state-of-the-market reports on the state of competition within, and the efficiency of, the PJM Markets, and quarterly reports that update selected portions of the annual report and which may focus on certain topics of particular interest to the Market Monitoring Unit. The quarterly reports shall not be as extensive as the annual reports. In its annual, quarterly and other reports, the Market Monitoring Unit may make recommendations regarding any matter within its purview. The annual reports shall, and the quarterly reports may, address, among other things, the extent to which prices in the PJM Markets reflect competitive outcomes, the structural competitiveness of the PJM Markets, the effectiveness of bid mitigation rules, and the effectiveness of the PJM Markets in signaling infrastructure investment. These annual reports shall, and the quarterly reports may include recommendations as to whether changes to the Market Monitoring Unit or the Plan are required.¹

Accordingly, Monitoring Analytics, LLC, which serves as the Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) for PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), and is also known as the Independent Market Monitor for PJM (IMM), submits this 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM.²³

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¹ PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) Attachment M (PJM Market Monitoring Plan) § VI.A. Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined have the meaning provided in the OATT, PJM Operating Agreement, PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA), the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement (CTOA) or other tariffs that PJM has on file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission).
² OATT Attachment M.
³ All references to this report should refer to the source as Monitoring Analytics, LLC, and should include the complete name of the report: 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM.
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Introduction

2023 in Review

Reliability is a core goal of PJM. Maintaining and improving competitive markets should also be a core goal of PJM. The goal of competition in PJM is to provide customers reliable wholesale power at the lowest possible price, but no lower. The PJM markets have done that. The PJM markets work, even if not perfectly. The results of PJM markets were reliable in 2023. The results of the energy market were competitive in 2023. The PJM markets bring customers the benefits of competition when the market rules allow competition to work and prevent the exercise of market power.

The markets face a challenge from potentially high levels of expected thermal generator retirements, with no clear source of replacement capacity or the fuel required for that capacity. PJM and its market participants will need to continue to resist the temptation to turn to regulatory solutions based on cost of service rather than markets. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to try to become all knowing system planners, identifying in advance the exact asset value of every resource and deciding exactly where risks lie. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to try to become all knowing system planners, identifying in advance the exact asset value of every resource and deciding exactly where risks lie. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to try to define the correct market prices rather than creating a competitive design that permits market fundamentals to determine prices. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to permit market power to increase prices, rather than defining markets that permit competitive clearing prices.

FERC made an explicit decision to rely on competitive markets rather than traditional regulation to provide just and reasonable rates in PJM. Failing to effectively address market power means that competition cannot effectively replace traditional regulation and cannot result in just and reasonable rates. Competitive markets are not a luxury. Effective market power mitigation is a core part of competitive markets. The goal of competitive markets is reliable power at the lowest possible price. PJM has made proposals in both the capacity market and the energy market that would undermine market power mitigation.

Markets provide incentives for innovation and efficiency. Organized, competitive wholesale power markets are the best way to facilitate the least cost path to decarbonization. Renewables can compete, without guaranteed long term contracts. New entrant solar and wind resources are now competitive with existing coal resources in PJM. The Inflation Reduction Act incentives further reduced the costs of these resources. Innovation will occur in renewable technologies in unpredictable and beneficial ways. But the PJM markets are not perfect. Significant changes to the market design continue, including some that improve markets and some that do not. Significant issues with the market design remain. It is not guaranteed that the market design will successfully adapt to the changing realities, including the role of renewable and intermittent resources, the role of distributed resources, the role of regulated EDCs in competitive wholesale power markets, and the role of states and the federal government in subsidizing resources and in environmental regulation.

While competitive markets are critical, markets alone cannot solve all the issues faced in the PJM wholesale power market. The wholesale power market exists in a broader environment including climate challenges, fuel supply issues and the wider economy that affects the demand for power.

One of the key challenges facing the PJM markets is the potentially high level of expected thermal resource retirements between now and 2030 with no clear source of replacement capacity. Although the exact numbers may vary, an estimated total of between 24,000 MW and 58,000 MW of thermal resources are at risk of retirement, including 4,285 MW of announced retirements, 19,635 MW of retirements as a result of state and federal environmental regulations, and 33,744 MW of retirements for economic reasons, based on expected forward prices.

All of the units at risk may not retire. The actual level of MW that will retire for regulatory and economic reasons is uncertain. The probability of retirement is highest for the units that explicitly plan to retire, very high for units expected to retire for regulatory reasons, and significantly lower for units identified as uneconomic. There is some uncertainty in each category and all of the decisions can be affected by the actions of environmental and economic regulators. If all or most of the retirements related to explicit plans, and related to environmental regulatory reasons, do retire, that will, holding other things constant, tend to increase both
energy and capacity prices. Higher market prices would reduce the MW identified as uneconomic. For example, a doubling of market revenues would reduce the units identified as uneconomic by 14,817 MW or 44 percent.

The level of potential retirements is not unprecedented. Retirements during the 13 year period from 2011 to 2023 were 54,219 MW, comparable to the level of potential retirements over the next seven years. However, the current challenge associated with replacing retiring capacity resources is different than the issues related to retirements in PJM over the past 13 years. Given current technology and the short time period, the retiring capacity can only be replaced by gas fired or dual fuel generation. Renewables can replace a significant amount of the energy output but cannot replace the capacity. Capacity means that the resource is expected to be available when needed, regardless of the time of day or ambient conditions. While all resource types have forced outages, solar resources will not be available when the sun is not shining and wind resources will not be available when the wind is not blowing, regardless of derating values.

The retiring capacity consists primarily of coal steam plants and CTs. If all of the coal units identified as at risk (30,417 MW) are replaced by new gas fired CCs, those new units would require a significant amount of firm gas pipeline capacity if the new units are single fuel. The new CC plants would require 4.8 BCF/day of firm pipeline capacity, based on the maximum output level of the CCs, to replace that coal capacity. If only the coal units identified as at risk based both on explicit plans to retire and on regulatory reasons are replaced, the installed capacity of those coal resources would require 2.0 BCF/day of firm pipeline capacity based on the maximum output level of the CCs to replace that coal capacity. The level of firm pipeline capacity required to replace the capacity and reliability value of the retiring coal units could be reduced if the new CCs invested in dual fuel capability.

The current PJM interconnection queue does not include adequate thermal capacity to replace the potentially retiring thermal capacity. Of the 7,174.8 MW of combined cycle projects in the queue, 3,812.7 MW (53.1 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates and be available to supply energy. Of those 30,067.8 MW, only 11,162.9 MW (5.5 percent of the total) are expected to be capacity resources, based on historical completion rates and ELCC derate factors for storage, wind and solar.

The basic challenge is to first identify and then match supply and demand, of both energy and capacity, so that reliability is maintained. PJM and federal and state regulators cannot hope to balance supply and demand without first having a clear and reasonably accurate measure of both existing and expected supply and demand. Providing clear information to regulators and market participants about the actual and expected supply-demand balance is essential so that decisions about market design, about the timing of environmental regulations, about pipeline siting, and about transmission siting can all recognize the likely impact on the balance between supply and demand and therefore reliability.

Supply is not a fixed number but is a function of other factors including state and federal environmental rules, market design, fuel supply and queue design. Demand is a function of forces in the broader economy. Supply includes existing resources included in the expected retirement category and new supply. The expected retirement category can be affected by environmental regulatory decisions. The new supply category is also affected by environmental regulatory decisions but also by market design and the queue rules governing new entry and fuel supply.

Markets exist in a broader regulatory environment that creates significant constraints for markets. The simple fact is that the sources of new capacity that could fully replace the retiring capacity have not been clearly identified. That task is a complex one and includes significant factors outside the market design, including state and federal environmental policies and siting decisions. While market signals are essential, market signals alone cannot resolve some of the nonmarket constraints.

As part of clarifying the supply demand balance challenges and helping to resolve part of the supply challenge, issues that should be addressed immediately include: identify the availability of firm gas supply; ensure transparent information from pipelines; identify
the need for dual fuel capacity; modify the RMR process; add expedited queue options for retiring resources; and improve the capacity market design.

Given current constraints on the gas pipeline system, the potential sources of the firm gas supply required to replace potential retirements are not clear. It is essential that FERC, the states, PJM, PJM stakeholders and all segments of the gas industry (transportation, storage and commodity) address the issues of firm gas availability and the dual fuel options. PJM should immediately start a process to identify the available and potential sources of gas supply to the PJM market area in order to permit an evaluation of the risks to reliability and the related need for dual fuel capacity. PJM will rely on existing and new gas fired generation in the foreseeable future and it is essential that such resources have the gas supply arrangements that will permit them to provide reliability and flexibility and competitive offers and have accurate real-time information from the gas pipelines about the terms under which gas transportation is available.

The potential level of retirements makes a solution to the RMR (reliability must run) question essential. One of the potential results of an increase in unit retirements is an increased number of RMR contracts that provide for out of market payments to units that PJM defines to be required for reliability, until the PJM transmission grid can be expanded to support reliability. The need for RMR contracts is evidence of a failure in market design. It should never be the case that a resource does not clear in the capacity market auction and then, when it wants to retire as a result, is deemed critical to reliability and not allowed to retire. That does happen in PJM. In addition, the substantial overpayments that result from PJM’s interpretation of the current rules create an incentive to request RMR contracts because the RMR payments generally exceed market revenues.

The definitions of reliability for the capacity market and transmission planners should be the same. That will require a change to the capacity market rules that do not now define reliability as stringently as the transmission planning criteria. In addition, RMR units are included in the supply of capacity for auctions after the unit has declared the intent to retire. Such inclusion overstates market supply and suppresses the capacity market price signal needed to incent the new entry needed to replace the retiring unit. Retiring units should be required to provide notice at least 18 months in advance of retirement, in order to allow the markets to respond. If an RMR is still needed, the rules governing compensation should be clarified to provide for fair compensation, including an incentive, for all the costs that the owners of such units incur in order to provide this service, but no more than that.

Competition starts with open access to the transmission grid. The fundamental purpose of the queue process is to provide open access to the grid and to ensure that the energy from capacity resources is deliverable so that capacity resources can meet their must offer obligations in the energy market and provide reliable energy supply during all conditions. All new generation must go through the queue process. PJM’s queue reforms will improve the management of that access which faces the challenge of integrating a large number of relatively small renewable projects in addition to a smaller number of traditional thermal resources.

Current proposals that generation owners should be permitted to avoid the queue process and directly transfer the generation capacity interconnection rights (CIRs) from retiring units to an affiliate or directly sell the CIRs to an unaffiliated entity should be rejected. In effect, this approach, if adopted by the large number of retiring units, would create a chaotic, bilateral private queue process that would replace and disrupt the recently redesigned PJM queue process.

Rules should be developed to permit PJM to advance projects in the queue if they would resolve immediate reliability issues that result from unit retirements. The rules should be consistent with the flexibility included in the new queue process and add the option for PJM to expedite the interconnection and commercial operation of projects in the queue that would address identified reliability issues, consistent with the standing of the projects in the queue. CIRs from retiring units should be made available to the next resource in the queue that can use them, on the retirement date of the retiring resource.

Given the nonmarket regulatory constraints, a goal of market design should be to be consistent and predictable and transparent. A consistent, predictable and transparent design would provide a stable investment environment for generators and a stable price environment for customers who both consume and invest. New supply
requires competitive incentives and a stable investment environment. The objective of the market design should be markets that work, markets that work for generators and markets that work for customers. The objective of the market design should also be markets that are transparent and understandable to market participants and to regulators. The capacity market design should be as simple as possible to meet its objectives.

The only purpose of the capacity market is to make the energy market work. That means two specific things. The capacity market needs to define the total MWh of energy that are needed to reliably serve load in all hours. The capacity market needs to provide the missing money; the capacity market needs to allow all cleared capacity resources the opportunity to cover their net avoidable costs on an annual basis to ensure the economic sustainability of the reliable energy market. The capacity market is an administrative construct designed to achieve these two purposes.

PJM’s proposed ELCC approach to capacity market design has not been adequately tested, introduces volatility into asset values and capacity market outcomes and relies on PJM’s untested ex ante ELCC model to define the asset values of capacity resources rather than relying on the resource owners to demonstrate asset value based on investment in improved reliability. Risk based on the level of uncertainty created by PJM’s new capacity market design could have a negative impact on the economic viability of units considering retirement.

One of the benefits of competitive power markets is that changes in input prices and changes in the balance of supply and demand are reflected immediately in energy prices for both price decreases and price increases. Energy prices decreased in 2023 compared to 2022. The real-time load-weighted average LMP in 2023 decreased $49.06 per MWh, or 61.2 percent from 2022, from $80.14 per MWh to $31.08 per MWh. This is the largest annual dollar and percent decrease in PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP since competitive markets were introduced in 1999. Of the $49.06 per MWh decrease, 64.7 percent was a direct result of the decreased costs of fuel, emissions allowances, and consumables. Natural gas prices, coal prices, and oil prices decreased in 2023 compared to 2022. The real-time hourly average load in 2023 decreased by 3.0 percent from 2022, from 88,884 MWh to 86,193 MWh.

The total price of wholesale power decreased from $105.30 per MWh in 2022 to $53.42 per MWh in 2023, a decrease of 49.3 percent. Energy (58.2 percent), capacity (7.5 percent) and transmission charges (31.0 percent) are the three largest components of the total price of wholesale power, comprising 96.7 percent of the total price per MWh in 2023. Starting in the third quarter of 2019, the cost of transmission per MWh of wholesale power has been higher than the cost of capacity.

In 2023, generation from coal units decreased 27.9 percent, generation from natural gas units increased 8.4 percent, generation from oil decreased 0.8 percent, generation from wind decreased 8.1 percent, and generation from solar increased 20.1 percent compared to 2022.

Net revenue is a key measure of overall market performance as well as a measure of the incentive to invest in generation to serve PJM markets. Energy market net revenues are significantly affected by energy prices and fuel prices. Energy prices and fuel prices were significantly lower in 2023 than in 2022. Theoretical net revenues from the energy market decreased for all unit types in 2023 compared to 2022. Theoretical energy market net revenues decreased by 44 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT), 46 percent for a new combined cycle (CC), 67 percent for a new coal plant (CP), 57 percent for a new nuclear plant, 61 percent for a new onshore wind plant, 62 percent for a new offshore wind plant and 65 percent for a new solar plant.

Changes in forward energy market prices significantly affect the expected profitability of nuclear plants in PJM. Based on forward prices as of December 29, 2023, for energy, and known forward prices for capacity, all the nuclear plants in PJM are expected to cover their avoidable costs from energy and capacity market revenues in 2024, 2025, and 2026, without subsidies, with the exception of Davis Besse and Perry, both single unit nuclear plants, in 2024.

The evolution of wholesale power markets is far from complete. The PJM markets need rules in order to provide reliable energy through competition. The foundational principle of using markets, with rules to prevent the exercise of market power and provide competitive results, is essential. Private investors, regardless of technology or subsidies, will put capital at risk and earn compensatory returns in markets that
are not skewed in favor of any specific technology and in markets that are stable and that do not add risk and volatility. The core elements of the PJM market design remain robust. The use of locational marginal prices (LMP) in the energy market and locational prices in the capacity market continue to be essential to getting the price signals right. Technological and policy changes do not require that the core elements change. But the market design can be improved and made more reliable and more efficient and more competitive. The markets will also need support from regulators whose decisions create and/or limit the options available to investors in PJM resources. PJM and its market participants will need to continue to resist the temptation to turn to regulatory solutions based on cost of service rather than markets. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to try to become all knowing system planners, identifying in advance the exact asset value of every resource and deciding exactly where risks lie. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to try to define the correct market prices rather than creating a competitive design that permits market fundamentals to determine prices. PJM and its market participants will need to resist the temptation to permit market power to increase prices, rather than defining markets that permit competitive clearing prices. In the interests of all market participants, PJM and its market participants will need to continue to work constructively to refine the competitive market design and to ensure the continued effectiveness of PJM markets in providing customers wholesale power at the lowest possible price, but no lower.

PJM Market Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows selected summary statistics describing PJM markets.

Table 1 PJM market summary statistics: 2022 and 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Hourly Load Plus Exports (MWh)</td>
<td>94,301</td>
<td>92,455</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Hourly Generation Plus Imports (MWh)</td>
<td>96,147</td>
<td>94,165</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak Load Plus Export (MWh)</td>
<td>149,531</td>
<td>152,797</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installed Capacity at December 31 (MW)</td>
<td>183,385</td>
<td>178,253</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Weighted Average Real Time LMP ($/MWh)</td>
<td>$80.14</td>
<td>$31.08</td>
<td>-61.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Congestion Costs ($ Million)</td>
<td>$2,501.3</td>
<td>$1,068.6</td>
<td>-57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Uplift Credits ($ Million)</td>
<td>$284.5</td>
<td>$158.7</td>
<td>-44.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PJM Billing ($ Billion)</td>
<td>$86.24</td>
<td>$48.61</td>
<td>-43.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In Table 1, the MMU uses Total PJM Billing values provided by PJM. For 2019 and after, the MMU has modified the Total PJM Billing calculation to better reflect historical PJM total billing through the PJM settlement process.
PJM Market Background

The PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) operates a centrally dispatched, competitive wholesale electric power market that, as of December 31, 2023, had installed generating capacity of 178,253 megawatts (MW) and 1,091 members including market buyers, sellers and traders of electricity in a region including more than 65 million people in all or parts of 13 states (Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia) and the District of Columbia (Figure 1). 2 3 4

As part of the market operator function, PJM coordinates and directs the operation of the transmission grid and plans transmission expansion improvements to maintain grid reliability in this region.

Figure 1 PJM’s footprint and its 21 control zones

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2 See PJM. “Member List,” which can be accessed at: <http://pjm.com/about-pjm/member-services/member-list.aspx>.
3 See PJM. “Who We Are,” which can be accessed at: <http://pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx>.
4 See the 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Appendix A: “PJM Overview” for maps showing the PJM footprint and its evolution prior to 2023.
In 2023, PJM had gross billings of $48.61 billion, a decrease of 43.6 percent from $86.24 billion in 2022. (Figure 2).

Figure 2 PJM reported monthly billings ($ Billion): January 2008 through December 2023

PJM operates the day-ahead energy market, the real-time energy market, the capacity market, the regulation market, the synchronized reserve market, the secondary reserve market and the financial transmission rights (FTRs) markets.

PJM introduced energy pricing with cost-based offers and market-clearing nodal prices on April 1, 1998, and market-clearing nodal prices with market-based offers on April 1, 1999. PJM introduced the Daily Capacity Market on January 1, 1999, and the Monthly and Multimonthly Capacity Markets for the January through May 1999 period. PJM implemented FTRs on May 1, 1999. PJM implemented the day-ahead energy market and the regulation market on June 1, 2000. PJM modified the regulation market design and added a market in Synchronized Reserve on December 1, 2002. PJM introduced an Auction Revenue Rights (ARR) allocation process and an associated Annual FTR Auction effective June 1, 2003. PJM introduced the RPM capacity market effective June 1, 2007. PJM implemented the DASR market on June 1, 2008, and eliminated it on October 1, 2022. PJM introduced the Capacity Performance capacity market design effective on August 10, 2015, with the Base Residual Auction for 2018/2019.  

Conclusions

This report assesses the competitiveness of the markets managed by PJM in 2023, including market structure, participant behavior and market performance. This report was prepared by and represents the analysis of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, also referred to as the Market Monitoring Unit or MMU.

For each PJM market, the market structure is evaluated as competitive or not competitive, and participant behavior is evaluated as competitive or not competitive. Most important, the outcome of each market, market performance, is evaluated as competitive or not competitive.

The MMU also evaluates the market design for each market. The market design serves as the vehicle for translating participant behavior within the market structure into market performance. This report evaluates the effectiveness of the market design of each PJM market in providing market performance consistent with competitive results.

Market structure refers to the cost, demand, and ownership structure of the market. The three pivotal supplier (TPS) test is the most relevant measure of market structure because it accounts for the ownership of assets and the relationship among the pattern of ownership, the resource costs, and the market demand using actual market conditions with both temporal and geographic granularity. Market shares and the related Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) are also measures of market structure.

Participant behavior refers to the actions of individual market participants, also sometimes referred to as participant conduct.

Market performance refers to the outcomes of the market. Market performance results from the behavior of market participants within a market structure, mediated by market design.

Market design means the rules under which the entire relevant market operates, including the software that implements the market rules. Market rules include the

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definition of the product, the definition of short run marginal cost, rules governing offer behavior, market power mitigation rules, and the definition of demand. Market design is characterized as effective, mixed or flawed. An effective market design provides incentives for competitive behavior and permits competitive outcomes. A mixed market design has significant issues that constrain the potential for competitive behavior to result in competitive market outcomes, and does not have adequate rules to mitigate market power or incent competitive behavior. A flawed market design produces inefficient outcomes which cannot be corrected by competitive behavior.

Energy Market Conclusion
The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of market structure, participant conduct and market performance, including market size, concentration, pivotal suppliers, offer behavior, markup, and price. The MMU concludes that the PJM energy market results were competitive in 2023.

Table 2 The energy market results were competitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure: Aggregate Market</td>
<td>Partially Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure: Local Market</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The aggregate market structure was evaluated as partially competitive because the aggregate market power test based on pivotal suppliers indicates that the aggregate day-ahead market structure was not competitive on 49.0 percent of the days in 2023. The hourly HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) results indicate that the PJM aggregate energy market in 2023 was, on average, unconcentrated by FERC HHI standards. The average HHI was 690 with a minimum of 528 and a maximum of 949. The baseload segment of the supply curve was unconcentrated. The intermediate segment of the supply curve was moderately concentrated on average. The peaking segment of the supply curve was highly concentrated. The fact that the average HHI is in the unconcentrated range does not mean that the aggregate market was competitive in all hours. As demonstrated for the day-ahead market, it is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. It is possible to have an exercise of market power even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power.
- The local market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to the highly concentrated ownership of supply in local markets created by transmission constraints and local reliability issues. The results of the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test, used to test local market structure, indicate the existence of market power in local markets created by transmission constraints. The local market performance is competitive as a result of the application of the TPS test. Transmission constraints create the potential for the exercise of local market power. The goal of PJM’s application of the three pivotal supplier test is to identify local market power and offer cap to competitive offers, correcting for structural issues created by local transmission constraints. There are, however, identified issues with the definition of cost-based offers and the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that need to be addressed because unit owners can exercise market power even when they fail the TPS test.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the analysis of markup shows that marginal units generally make offers at, or close to, their marginal costs in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although the behavior of some participants both routinely and during periods of high demand represents economic withholding. The ownership of marginal units is concentrated. The markups of pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market and of many pivotal suppliers in local markets remain unmitigated due to the lack of aggregate market power mitigation and the flawed implementation of offer caps for resources that fail the TPS test. The markups of those participants affected LMP.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because market results in the energy market reflect the outcome of a competitive market, as PJM prices are set, on average, by marginal units operating at, or close to, their marginal costs in both day-
ahead and real-time energy markets, although high markups for some marginal units did affect prices.

- Market design was evaluated as effective because the analysis shows that the PJM energy market resulted in competitive market outcomes. In general, PJM’s energy market design provides incentives for competitive behavior and results in competitive outcomes. In local markets, where market power is an issue, the market design identifies market power and causes the market to provide competitive market outcomes in most cases although issues with the implementation of market power mitigation and development of cost-based offers remain. The role of UTCs in the day-ahead energy market continues to cause concerns. Market design implementation issues, including inaccuracies in modeling of the transmission system and of generator capabilities as well as inefficiencies in real-time dispatch and price formation, undermine market efficiency in the energy market. PJM resolved the problems with real-time dispatch and pricing effective November 1, 2021. The implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, undermined market efficiency by setting inefficient prices that are inconsistent with the dispatch signals.

- PJM markets are designed to promote competitive outcomes derived from the interaction of supply and demand in each of the PJM markets. Market design itself is the primary means of achieving and promoting competitive outcomes in PJM markets. One of the MMU’s core functions is to identify actual or potential market design flaws. The approach to market power mitigation in PJM has focused on market designs that promote competition (a structural basis for competitive outcomes) and on mitigating market power in instances where the market structure is not competitive and thus where market design alone cannot mitigate market power. FERC relies on effective market power mitigation when it approves market sellers to participate in the PJM market at market based rates. In the PJM energy market, market power mitigation occurs primarily in the case of local market power. When a transmission constraint creates the potential for local market power, PJM applies a structural test to determine if the local market is competitive, applies a behavioral test to determine if generator offers exceed competitive levels and applies a market performance test to determine if such generator offers would affect the market price. There are, however, identified issues with the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that can result in the exercise of local market power even when market power mitigation rules are applied. These issues need to be addressed, but PJM filed proposed new rules at FERC on March 1, 2024, that would exacerbate the issues. FERC recognized these issues in its June 17, 2021, order, but failed to address them in its November 30, 2023 order. Some units with market power have positive markups and some have inflexible parameters, which means that the cost-based offer was not used and that the process for offer capping units that fail the TPS test does not consistently result in competitive market outcomes in the presence of market power. There are issues related to the definition of gas costs includable in energy offers that need to be addressed. There are issues related to the level of maintenance expense includable in energy offers that need to be addressed. There are currently no market power mitigation rules in place that limit the ability to exercise market power when aggregate market conditions are tight and there are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market. Aggregate market power needs to be addressed. Market design must reflect appropriate incentives for competitive behavior, the application of local market power mitigation needs to be fixed, the definition of a competitive offer needs to be fixed, and aggregate market power mitigation rules need to be developed. The importance of these issues is amplified by the rules permitting cost-based offers in excess of $1,000 per MWh.

Capacity Market Conclusion

The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed market structure, participant conduct and market performance in the PJM Capacity Market, including supply, demand, concentration ratios, pivotal suppliers, volumes, prices, outage rates and reliability. The conclusions are a result of the MMU’s evaluation of the 2024/2025 Base

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8 OATT Attachment M (PJM Market Monitoring Plan).
10 The market performance test means that offer capping is not applied if the offer does not exceed the competitive level and therefore market power would not affect market performance.
11 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
12 185 FERC ¶ 61,148 (2023).
13 The values stated in this report for the RTO and LDAs refer to the aggregate level including all nested LDAs unless otherwise specified. For example, RTO values include the entire PJM market and all LDAs. Rest of RTO values are RTO values net of nested LDA values.
Residual Auction.14 The 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction was conducted in 2022, but the results were not posted until February 27, 2023, due to an issue with the DPL South reliability requirement.

Table 3 The capacity market results were competitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure: Aggregate Market</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure: Local Market</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The aggregate market structure was evaluated as not competitive. For almost all auctions held from 2007 to the present, the PJM capacity market failed the three pivotal supplier test (TPS), which is conducted at the time of the auction.15 Structural market power is endemic to the capacity market.
- The local market structure was evaluated as not competitive. For almost every auction held, all LDAs have failed the TPS test, which is conducted at the time of the auction.16
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive in the 2024/2025 BRA after the Commission order addressed the definition of the market seller offer cap by eliminating the net CONE times B offer cap and establishing a competitive market seller offer cap of net ACR, effective September 2, 2021.17 Market power mitigation measures were applied when the capacity market seller failed the market power test for the auction, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, would increase the market clearing price.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive based on the 2024/2025 Base Residual Auction after the Commission order eliminating the net CONE times B offer cap and establishing a competitive market seller offer cap of net ACR, effective September 2, 2021. Although structural market power exists in the capacity market, a competitive outcome can result from the application of market power mitigation rules.
- Market design was evaluated as mixed because while there are many positive features of the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) design and the capacity performance modifications to RPM, there are several features of the RPM design which still threaten competitive outcomes. These include the definition of DR which permits inferior products to substitute for capacity, the replacement capacity issue, the definition of unit offer parameters, and the inclusion of imports which are not substitutes for internal capacity resources.
- As a result of the fact that the capacity market design was found to be not just and reasonable by FERC and a final market design had not been approved, the 2022/2023 Base Residual Auction was delayed and held in May 2021, and for a number of additional reasons, the 2023/2024 Base Residual Auction was delayed and held in June 2022, the 2024/2025 Base Residual Auction was delayed and held in December 2022, and first and second incremental auctions for the 2022/2023 through 2028/2029 Delivery Years are canceled if within 10 months of the revised BRA schedule.18

Synchronized Reserve Market

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market for 2023.

Table 4 The synchronized reserve market results were competitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure: Regional Markets</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The synchronized reserve market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to high levels of supplier concentration in the MAD Reserve Subzone.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the market rules require all available reserves to offer at cost-based offers.

14 See the “Analysis of the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction,” (October 30, 2023) [https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2023/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20242025_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20231030.pdf].
15 In the 2008/2009 RPM Third Incremental Auction, 18 participants in the RTO market passed the TPS test. In the 2008/2009 RPM Second Incremental Auction, 35 participants in the RTO market passed the test. In the 2008/2009 RPM Third Incremental Auction, 36 participants in the RTO passed the TPS test.
16 In the 2012/2013 RPM Base Residual Auction, six participants included in the incremental supply of EMAA passed the TPS test. In the 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction, seven participants in the incremental supply in MAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2012/2013 RPM First Incremental Auction, the inclusion of imports which are not substitutes for internal capacity resources.
17 176 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021), 178 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2022), appeal denied, EPSA, et al. v. FERC, Case No. 21-1214 et al. (DC CIR October 10, 2023). The Commission recognized the market power problem and issued an order correcting the PJM tariff, eliminating the prior offer cap and establishing a competitive market seller offer cap at net ACR, effective September 2, 2021.
Market performance was evaluated as competitive because the interaction of participant behavior with the market design results in competitive prices. In an attempt to counter poor synchronized reserve performance, PJM unilaterally and inappropriately extended the first step of the operating reserve demand curve (ORDC) for synchronized reserve, known as the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, in May 2023.

Market design was evaluated as effective. PJM adopted reforms, including several based on MMU recommendations, removing both physical and economic withholding from the market.

Nonsynchronized Reserve Market Conclusion

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Non-Synchronized Reserve Market for 2023.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure: Regional Markets</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The nonsynchronized reserve market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to moderate levels of supplier concentration for primary reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone and high levels of supplier concentration for primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because all available reserves are included by the PJM markets software, so withholding is not possible.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because the interaction of participant behavior with the market design results in competitive prices.
- Market design was evaluated as effective.

Secondary Reserve Market Conclusion


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The secondary reserve market structure was evaluated as competitive, because the supply of 30-minute reserves was not concentrated in the real-time market. The secondary reserve market was moderately concentrated in the day-ahead market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because all available reserves are included by the PJM software, so withholding is not possible.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because the combination of a competitive market structure and competitive participation resulted in competitive market outcomes.
- The market design was evaluated as effective because the market rules ensure competitive market offers and require repayment of offline cleared secondary reserves that are not available when called on to provide energy in 30 minutes.

Regulation Market Conclusion

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Regulation Market for 2023.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Not Competitive</td>
<td>Flawed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The regulation market structure was evaluated as not competitive because the PJM Regulation Market failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test in 93.8 percent of the hours in 2023.
- Participant behavior in the PJM Regulation Market was evaluated as competitive in 2023 because market power mitigation requires competitive offers when the three pivotal supplier test is failed, although the inclusion of a positive margin raises questions.
• Market performance was evaluated as not competitive, because all units are not paid the same price on an equivalent MW basis.
• Market design was evaluated as flawed. The market design has failed to correctly incorporate a consistent implementation of the marginal benefit factor in optimization, pricing and settlement. The market results continue to include the incorrect definition of opportunity cost. The result is significantly flawed market signals to existing and prospective suppliers of regulation.

FTR Auction Market Conclusion

The 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM focuses on the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period as well as the 2023/2024 Long Term and Annual FTR auctions and ARR allocation, specifically covering June 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023. The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of market structure, participant conduct and market performance, including market size, concentration, offer behavior, and price. The MMU concludes that the PJM FTR auction market results were partially competitive in 2023.

Table 8 The FTR auction markets results were partially competitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Element</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Market Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Structure</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Behavior</td>
<td>Partially Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Performance</td>
<td>Partially Competitive</td>
<td>Flawed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Market structure was evaluated as competitive. The ownership of FTR obligations is unconcentrated for the individual years of the 2023/2026 Long Term FTR Auction, the 2023/2024 Annual FTR Auction and each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions. The ownership of FTR options is moderately or highly concentrated for every Monthly FTR Auction period and moderately concentrated for the 2022/2023 Annual FTR Auction. Ownership of FTRs is disproportionately (78.3 percent) by financial participants. The ownership of ARRs is unconcentrated.

• Participant behavior was evaluated as partially competitive because ARR holders who are the sellers of FTRs have no option to set an acceptable sale price and are not permitted to participate in the market clearing in any way.

• Market performance was evaluated as partially competitive because of the significant and persistent flaws in the market design. Sellers, the ARR holders, cannot set a sale price. Buyers can reclaim some of their purchase price after the market clears if the product does not meet a profitability target. The market resulted in a substantial shortfall in congestion payments to load and significant and unsupportable disparities among zones in the share of congestion returned to load. FTR purchases by financial entities remain persistently profitable in part as a result of the flaws in the market design.

Market design was evaluated as flawed because there are significant, fundamental and persistent flaws in the basic ARR/FTR design. The FTR auction market is not actually a market because the sellers have no independent role in the process. ARR holders cannot determine the price at which they are willing to sell rights to congestion revenue. Buyers have the ability to reclaim some of the price paid for FTRs after the market clears. The market design is not an efficient or effective way to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. The product sold to FTR buyers is incorrectly defined as target allocations rather than a share of congestion revenue. ARR holders’ rights to congestion revenues are not correctly defined because the contract path based assignment of congestion rights is inadequate and incorrect. The ongoing PJM subjective intervention in the FTR market that affects market fundamentals is also an issue and a symptom of the fundamental flaws in the design. The product, the quantity of the product and the price of the product are all incorrectly defined.

The fact that load is not able to define its willingness to sell FTRs or to set the prices at which it is willing to sell FTRs and the fact that load is required to return some of the cleared auction revenue to FTR buyers when FTR profits are deemed to be not adequate, means that the FTR design does not actually function as a market and is evidence of basic flaws in the market design.
Role of MMU

FERC assigns three core functions to MMUs: reporting, monitoring and market design.19 These functions are interrelated and overlap. The PJM Market Monitoring Plan establishes these functions, providing that the MMU is responsible for monitoring; compliance with the PJM Market Rules; actual or potential design flaws in the PJM Market Rules; structural problems in the PJM Markets that may inhibit a robust and competitive market; the actual or potential exercise of market power or violation of the market rules by a Market Participant; PJM’s implementation of the PJM Market Rules or operation of the PJM Markets; and such matters as are necessary to prepare reports.20

Reporting

The MMU performs its reporting function primarily by issuing and filing annual and quarterly state of the market reports; regular reports on market issues, such as RPM auction reports; reports responding to requests from regulators and other authorities; and ad hoc reports on specific topics. The state of the market reports provide a comprehensive analysis of market structure, participant conduct and market performance for the PJM markets. State of the market reports and other reports are intended to inform PJM, the PJM Board, FERC, other regulators, other authorities, market participants, stakeholders and the general public about how well PJM markets achieve the competitive outcomes necessary to realize the goals of regulation through competition, and how the markets can be improved.

The MMU presents reports directly to PJM stakeholders, PJM staff, FERC staff, state commission staff, state commissions, other regulatory agencies and the general public. Report presentations provide an opportunity for interested parties to ask questions, discuss issues, and provide feedback to the MMU.

Monitoring

To perform its monitoring function, the MMU screens and monitors the conduct of Market Participants under the MMU’s broad purview to monitor, investigate, evaluate and report on the PJM Markets.21 The MMU has direct, confidential access to FERC.22 The MMU may also refer matters to the attention of state commissions.23

The MMU monitors market behavior for violations of FERC Market Rules and PJM Market Rules, including the actual or potential exercise of market power.24 The MMU will investigate and refer “Market Violations,” which refer to any of “a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies...”25 26 27 The MMU also monitors PJM for compliance with the rules, in addition to market participants.28

An important component of the monitoring function is the review of inputs to mitigation. The actual or potential exercise of market power is addressed in part through ex ante mitigation rules incorporated in PJM’s market clearing software for the energy market, the capacity market and the regulation market. If a market participant fails the TPS test in any of these markets its offer is set to the lower of its price-based or cost-based offer. This prevents the exercise of market power and ensures competitive pricing, provided that the cost-based offer accurately reflects short run marginal cost.

If cost-based offers do not accurately reflect short run marginal cost, the market power mitigation process does not ensure competitive pricing in PJM markets. The MMU evaluates the fuel cost policy for every unit based on an analysis of the fuel cost policy, in addition to market power, market design, and the actual or potential exercise of market power or violation of the market rules by a Market Participant; PJM’s implementation of the PJM Market Rules or operation of the PJM Markets; and such matters as are necessary to prepare reports.

22 OATT Attachment M § V.I.3.
23 OATT Attachment M § V.I.1.
24 OATT § 1.1 (“FERC Market Rules” mean the market behavior rules and the prohibition against electric energy market manipulation codified by the Commission in its Rules and Regulations at 18 CFR §§ 1.2 and 35.37, respectively; the Commission-approved PJM Market Rules and any related prescriptions or any successor rules that the Commission from time to time may issue, approve or otherwise establish. “PJM Market Rules” mean the rules, standards, procedures, and practices of the PJM Markets set forth in the PJM Tariff, the PJM Operating Agreement, the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement, the PJM Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, the PJM Manuals, the PJM Regional Practices Document, the PJM-Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator Joint Operating Agreement or any other document setting forth market rules.”)
25 FERC defines manipulation as engaging “in any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity.” 18 CFR § 1.2(a)(3). Manipulation may involve behavior that is consistent with the letter of the rules, but violates their spirit. An example is market behavior that is economically meaningless, such as equal and opposite transactions, which may entitle the transacting party to a benefit associated with volume. Unlike market power or rule violations, manipulation must be intentional. The MMU must build its case, including an inference of intent, on the basis of market data.
26 OATT § 1.1.
27 The MMU has no prosecutorial or enforcement authority. The MMU notifies FERC when it identifies a significant market problem or market violation. OATT Attachment M § N.1.f. If the problem or violation involves a market participant, the MMU discusses the matter with the participant(s) involved and analyzes relevant market data. If that investigation produces sufficient credible evidence of a violation, the MMU prepares a formal referral and thereafter undertakes additional investigation of the specific matter only at the direction of FERC staff. Id. If the problem involves an existing or proposed law, rule or practice that exposes PJM markets to the risk that market power or market manipulation could compromise the integrity of the markets, the MMU explains the issue, as appropriate, to FERC, state regulators, stakeholders or other authorities. The MMU may also initiate, participate as a party or provide information or testimony in regulatory or other proceedings.
28 OATT Attachment M § V.I.C.

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the short run marginal cost of generation. Manual 15 should be replaced with a straightforward description of the components of cost offers based on short run marginal costs and the correct calculation of cost offers. The MMU evaluates every offer cap in each capacity market (RPM) auction using data submitted to the MMU through web-based data input systems developed by the MMU.\textsuperscript{29}

The MMU also reviews operational parameter limits included with unit offers, evaluates compliance with the requirement to offer into the energy and capacity markets, evaluates the economic basis for unit retirement requests and evaluates and compares offers in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets.\textsuperscript{30 31 32 33}

The MMU reviews offers and inputs in order to evaluate whether those offers raise market power concerns. Market participants, not the MMU, determine and take responsibility for offers that they submit and the market conduct that those offers represent. If the MMU has a concern about an offer, the MMU may raise that concern with FERC or other regulatory authorities. FERC and other regulators have enforcement and regulatory authority that they may exercise with respect to offers submitted by market participants. PJM also reviews offers, but it does so in order to determine whether offers comply with the PJM tariff and manuals. PJM, in its role as the market operator, may reject an offer that fails to comply with the market rules. The respective reviews performed by the MMU and PJM are separate and non-sequential.

The PJM markets monitored by the MMU include market related procurement processes conducted by PJM, such as for Black Start resources included in the PJM system restoration plan.\textsuperscript{34 35}

The MMU also monitors transmission planning, interconnections and rules for vertical market power issues, and with the introduction of competitive transmission development policy in Order No. 1000, horizontal market power issues.\textsuperscript{36}

### Market Design

In order to perform its role in PJM market design, the MMU evaluates existing and proposed PJM Market Rules and the design of the PJM Markets.\textsuperscript{37} The MMU initiates and proposes changes to the design of such markets or the PJM Market Rules in stakeholder or regulatory proceedings.\textsuperscript{38} In support of this function, the MMU engages in discussions with stakeholders, State Commissions, PJM Management, and the PJM Board; participates in PJM stakeholder meetings or working groups regarding market design matters; publishes proposals, reports or studies on such market design issues; and makes filings with the Commission on market design, market rules and market rule implementation issues, including complaints or petitions.\textsuperscript{39} The MMU also recommends changes to the PJM Market Rules to the staff of the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation, State Commissions, and the PJM Board.\textsuperscript{40} The MMU may provide in its annual, quarterly and other reports “recommendations regarding any matter within its purview.”\textsuperscript{41}

### New Recommendations

Consistent with its core function to “[e]valuate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes,” the MMU recommends specific enhancements to existing market rules and implementation of new rules that are required for competitive results in PJM markets and for continued improvements in the functioning of PJM markets.\textsuperscript{42}

In this 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM, the MMU includes 14 new recommendations made for 2023, two of which are new in this 2023 annual report.\textsuperscript{43}

### New Recommendations from Section 5, Capacity Market

- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market sellers of proposed generation capacity resources, including thermal and intermittent, to submit a

\textsuperscript{29} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.E.
\textsuperscript{30} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.B.
\textsuperscript{31} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.C.
\textsuperscript{32} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § IV.
\textsuperscript{33} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § VII.
\textsuperscript{34} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II(p).
\textsuperscript{35} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § III.
\textsuperscript{36} OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.A.
\textsuperscript{37} OATT Attachment M § IV.D.
\textsuperscript{38} Id.
\textsuperscript{39} Id.; see also, e.g., 171 FERC ¶ 61,039; 167 FERC ¶ 61,084 at PP 70–76, rehe’g denied, 168 FERC ¶ 61,141.
\textsuperscript{40} Id.
\textsuperscript{41} OATT Attachment M § VI.A.
\textsuperscript{42} 18 CFR § 35.28(b)(iii)(ii)(A); see also OATT Attachment M § IV.D.
\textsuperscript{43} New recommendations include all MMU recommendations that were reported for the first time in the 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM or in any of the three quarterly state of the market reports that were published in 2023.
binding notice of intent to offer at least six months prior to the base residual auction. This is consistent with the overall MMU recommendation that all capacity resources have a must offer obligation in the capacity market auctions. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that the same reliability standard be used in capacity auctions as is used by PJM transmission planning. One result of the current design is that a unit may fail to clear in a BRA, decide to retire as a result, but then be found to be needed for reliability by PJM planning and paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) to remain in service while transmission upgrades are made. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) not be included in the calculation of CETO or reliability in the relevant LDA, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that all CIRs be returned to the pool of available interconnection capability on the retirement date of generation resources in order to facilitate competitive entry into the PJM markets, open access to the transmission system and maintain the priority order defined by the queue process. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM not buy any capacity in any IA if PJM has already procured excess reserves. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

New Recommendations from Section 6, Demand Response

• The MMU recommends that PJM report the response of demand capacity resources to dispatch by PJM as the actual change in load rather than simply the difference between the amount of capacity purchased by the customer and the actual metered load. The current approach significantly overstates the response to PJM dispatch. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that demand resources offering as supply in the capacity market be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called. (Priority: High. First reported Q2 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM revise the requirements for reporting expected real time energy load reductions by CSPs to PJM to improve the accuracy and usefulness to PJM’s system operators. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that the Commission require PJM to include in OATT Attachment M the explicit statement that the Market Monitor’s role includes the right to collect information from EDCs and DERA related to actions taken on the distribution system related to DERs. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI. The MMU recommends that PJM revise the performance requirements for demand resources to include an event specific measurement for dispatch occurring outside of Performance Assessment Events and penalties for nonperformance. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

New Recommendations from Section 10, Ancillary Services

• The MMU recommends that the two signal regulation market design be replaced with a one signal regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that black start planning and coordination be on a regional basis and not on a zonal basis and that the costs of black start service be shared on an equal per MWh basis across the region. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and respond to the
notifications. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3, 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

New Recommendation from Section 12, Generation and Transmission Planning

- Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2023. Not adopted.)

Total Price of Wholesale Power

The total price of wholesale power is the total price per MWh of wholesale electricity in PJM markets.\(^4^4\) The total price is an average price. Prices vary by location and time period. The total price includes the price of energy, capacity, transmission service, ancillary services, and administrative fees, regulatory support fees and uplift charges billed through PJM systems. Table 1-9 shows the average price, by component, for 2022 and 2023.

The total costs for each year shown in Table 1-9 equal the total price per MWh, by category, multiplied by the total load. The total costs are different from the total billing values that PJM reports as shown in Figure 1-2. PJM’s reported total billing values represent the total dollars that pass through the PJM settlement process.

Each of the components in Table 1-9 is defined in PJM’s Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) and PJM Operating Agreement and each is collected through PJM’s billing system.

Components of Total Price

- The Energy component is the real-time load weighted average PJM locational marginal price (LMP).
- The Capacity component is the average price per MWh of Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) payments.
- The Transmission Service Charges component is the average price per MWh of network integration charges, and firm and nonfirm point to point transmission service.\(^4^5\)
- The Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) component is the average price per MWh of day-ahead and balancing operating reserves and synchronous condensing charges.\(^4^6\)
- The Reactive component is the average cost per MWh of reactive supply and voltage control from generation and other sources.\(^4^7\)
- The Regulation component is the average cost per MWh of regulation procured through the PJM Regulation Market.\(^4^8\)
- The PJM Administrative Fees component is the average cost per MWh of PJM’s monthly expenses for a number of administrative services, including Advanced Control Center (AC\(^3\)) and OATT Schedule 9 funding of FERC, OPSI, CAPS and the MMU.
- The Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery component is the average cost per MWh of PJM billed (and not otherwise collected through utility rates) costs for transmission upgrades and projects, including annual recovery for the TrAIL and PATH projects.\(^4^9\)
- The Capacity (FRR) component is the average cost per MWh under the Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) Alternative for an eligible LSE to satisfy its Unforced Capacity obligation.\(^5^0\)
- The Emergency Load Response component is the average cost per MWh of the PJM Emergency Load Response Program.\(^5^1\)
- The Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve component is the average cost per MWh of Day-Ahead scheduling reserves procured through the day-ahead scheduling reserve market.\(^5^2\)
- The Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) component is the average cost per MWh of transmission owner scheduling, system control and dispatch services charged to transmission customers.\(^5^3\)

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\(^4^4\) Accounting load is used in the calculation of total price because accounting load is the load customers pay for in PJM settlements. The use of accounting load with losses before June 1, 2007 and without losses after June 1, 2007, is consistent with FERC’s calculation of LMP. Before June 1, 2007, transmission losses were included in accounting load. After June 1, 2007, transmission losses were excluded from accounting load and losses were addressed through the incorporation of marginal loss pricing in LMP.

\(^4^5\) OATT §§ 13.7, 14.5, 27A §§ 34.

\(^4^6\) OATT § 22.3.

\(^4^7\) OATT Schedule 2 and OATT Schedule 2.2.2B. The line item in Table 1-9 includes all reactive services charges.

\(^4^8\) OATT Schedules 2.2.2, 2.2.2A, 2.3.2A; OATT Schedules 3.

\(^4^9\) RAA Schedule R.1.

\(^5^0\) RAA PJM Emergency Load Response Program.

\(^5^1\) OATT Schedule 2.3.

\(^5^2\) OATT Schedule 1A.

\(^5^3\) OATT Schedule 1A.
• The Synchronized Reserve component is the average cost per MWh of synchronized reserve procured through the Synchronized Reserve Market.\footnote{OA Schedule 1 § 3.2.23A.01; PJM OATT Schedule 6.}

• The Black Start component is the average cost per MWh of black start service.\footnote{OATT Schedule 6A. The line item in Table 1-9 includes all Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) charges for Black Start.}

• The RTO Startup and Expansion component is the average cost per MWh of charges to recover AEP, COMED and DAY’s integration expenses.\footnote{OATT Attachments H-13, H-14 and H-15 and Schedule 13.}

• The NERC/RFC component is the average cost per MWh of NERC and RFC charges, plus any reconciliation charges.\footnote{OATT Schedule 10-NERC and OATT Schedule 10-RFC.}

• The Economic Load Response component is the average cost per MWh of day-ahead and real-time economic load response program charges to LSEs.\footnote{OA Schedule 1 § 3.6.}

• The Transmission Facility Charges component is the average cost per MWh of Ramapo Phase Angle Regulators charges allocated to PJM Mid-Atlantic transmission owners.\footnote{OA Schedule 1 § 5.3b.}

• The Nonsynchronized Reserve component is the average cost per MWh of non-synchronized reserve procured through the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market.\footnote{OA Schedule 1 § 3.2.3A.001.}

• The Emergency Energy component is the average cost per MWh of emergency energy.\footnote{OA Schedule 1 § 3.2.6.}
Table 9 shows that energy, capacity and transmission charges are the three largest components of the total price per MWh of wholesale power, comprising 96.7 percent of the total price per MWh in 2023. The total price per MWh of wholesale power decreased from $105.30 in 2022 to $53.42 in 2023, a decrease of 49.3 percent. Starting in the third quarter of 2019, the cost of transmission per MWh of wholesale power has been higher than the cost of capacity.

### Table 9 Total price per MWh by category: 2022 and 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$/MWh</td>
<td>($ Millions)</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
<td>$/MWh</td>
<td>($ Millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Weighted Energy</td>
<td>$80.14</td>
<td>$62,401</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>$31.08</td>
<td>$23,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>$8.04</td>
<td>$6,259</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td>$3,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>$7.96</td>
<td>$6,201</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>$3.89</td>
<td>$2,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity (FRR)</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.02</td>
<td>$14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity (RMR)</td>
<td>$0.07</td>
<td>$54</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.10</td>
<td>$73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission</td>
<td>$15.12</td>
<td>$11,772</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>$16.54</td>
<td>$12,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Service Charges</td>
<td>$12.77</td>
<td>$9,041</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>$14.13</td>
<td>$10,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery</td>
<td>$2.28</td>
<td>$1,773</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>$2.32</td>
<td>$1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A)</td>
<td>$0.08</td>
<td>$58</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.08</td>
<td>$63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Sceams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA)</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Facility Charges</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancillary</td>
<td>$1.08</td>
<td>$840</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>$0.89</td>
<td>$674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
<td>$387</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>$0.51</td>
<td>$389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>$0.38</td>
<td>$296</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>$0.18</td>
<td>$134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Start</td>
<td>$0.09</td>
<td>$69</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.09</td>
<td>$67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronized Reserves</td>
<td>$0.11</td>
<td>$87</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.10</td>
<td>$74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Reserves</td>
<td>($0.00)</td>
<td>($0)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Synchronized Reserves</td>
<td>($0.01)</td>
<td>($8)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR)</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$11</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>$0.54</td>
<td>$421</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>$0.60</td>
<td>$456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJM Administrative fees</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
<td>$392</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>$0.56</td>
<td>$425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NERC/RFC</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$29</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO Startup and Expansion</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves)</td>
<td>$0.36</td>
<td>$282</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>$0.21</td>
<td>$158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Response</td>
<td>$0.02</td>
<td>$12</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.09</td>
<td>$68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Response</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Load Response</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.08</td>
<td>$61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Energy</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$9</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Price</td>
<td>$105.30</td>
<td>$81,992</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>$53.42</td>
<td>$40,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Load (GWh)</td>
<td>778,624</td>
<td>755,053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost ($ Billions)</td>
<td>$82,09</td>
<td>$40,34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 The totals in the Transmission section of this table include corrections to previously reported totals which did not include a full accounting of Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery costs.
63 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.
64 The total cost in this table does not match the PJM reported total billing due to differences in calculation methods. The total prices in this table are load weighted average system prices per MWh by category, even if each category is not charged on a per MWh basis. PJM’s reported total billing represents the total dollars that pass through the PJM settlement process.
65 The MMU publishes monthly detail of these components of PJM price. See <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/data/pjm_price.shtml>.
Table 10 shows the inflation adjusted average price, by component, for 2022 and 2023. To calculate the inflation adjusted average prices, the individual components’ prices are deflated using the US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (with a base period of January 1998).66

### Table 10 Inflation adjusted total price per MWh by category: 2022 and 202367 68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2022 $/MWh</th>
<th>2022 ($ Millions)</th>
<th>2022 Percent of Total</th>
<th>2023 $/MWh</th>
<th>2023 ($ Millions)</th>
<th>2023 Percent of Total</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Load Weighted Energy</td>
<td>$44.12</td>
<td>$34,356</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>$16.48</td>
<td>$12,444</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>(62.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>$4.70</td>
<td>$3,656</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>$2.21</td>
<td>$1,666</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>(53.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity (FRR)</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$7</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>246.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity (RMR)</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.05</td>
<td>$39</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission</td>
<td>$8.35</td>
<td>$6,501</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>$8.77</td>
<td>$6,622</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Service Charges</td>
<td>$7.05</td>
<td>$5,489</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>$7.49</td>
<td>$5,658</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery</td>
<td>$1.26</td>
<td>$979</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>$1.23</td>
<td>$930</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A)</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$32</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$33</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>(53.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA)</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Facility Charges</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancillary</td>
<td>$0.60</td>
<td>$464</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>$0.47</td>
<td>$356</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>(20.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>$0.27</td>
<td>$213</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>$0.27</td>
<td>$206</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>(6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>$0.21</td>
<td>$163</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>$0.09</td>
<td>$71</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>(56.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Start</td>
<td>$0.05</td>
<td>$38</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.05</td>
<td>$36</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>(3.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronized Reserves</td>
<td>$0.06</td>
<td>$48</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$0.06</td>
<td>$43</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>(15.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Synchronized Reserves</td>
<td>($0.01)</td>
<td>($4)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(216.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR)</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$6</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>$0.30</td>
<td>$232</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>$0.32</td>
<td>$242</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJM Administrative Fees</td>
<td>$0.28</td>
<td>$216</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>$0.30</td>
<td>$225</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NERC/RFPC</td>
<td>$0.02</td>
<td>$16</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.02</td>
<td>$17</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO Startup and Expansion</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves)</td>
<td>$0.20</td>
<td>$155</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>$0.11</td>
<td>$81</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>(44.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Response</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$7</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.05</td>
<td>$36</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>450.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Response</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(31.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Load Response</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$33</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2,300.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Energy</td>
<td>$0.01</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Price</td>
<td>$58.27</td>
<td>$45,374</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>$28.41</td>
<td>$21,453</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>(51.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Load (GWh)</td>
<td>778,624</td>
<td>755,053</td>
<td>(3.0%)</td>
<td>778,624</td>
<td>755,053</td>
<td>(3.0%)</td>
<td>(53.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost ($ Billions)</td>
<td>$45.38</td>
<td>$21.45</td>
<td>(52.7%)</td>
<td>$28.41</td>
<td>$21,453</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>(51.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67 The totals in the Transmission section of this table include corrections to previously reported totals which did not include a full accounting of Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery costs.
68 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.
Figure 3 shows the total price of wholesale power in 2022 and 2023.

**Figure 3 Total price per MWh by category: 2022 and 2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Load Weighted Energy</th>
<th>Transmission</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>$80.14</td>
<td>$31.08</td>
<td>$15.12</td>
<td>$16.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>$80.14</td>
<td>$31.08</td>
<td>$15.12</td>
<td>$16.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section Overviews

Overview: Section 3, Energy Market

Supply and Demand

- **Supply.** In 2023, 6,269 MW of new resources were added in the energy market, and 6,728 MW of resources were retired.

**Market Behavior**

- **Virtual Offers and Bids.** Any market participant in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market can use increment offers, decrement bids, up to congestion transactions, import transactions and export transactions as financial instruments that do not require physical generation or load. The hourly average submitted increment offer MW increased by 14.7 percent and the cleared increment MW increased by 23.5 percent in 2023 compared to 2022. The hourly average submitted decrement bid MW decreased by 13.8 percent and the cleared decrement MW decreased by 6.7 percent in 2023 compared to 2022. The hourly average submitted up to congestion bid MW increased by 54.1 percent and the cleared up to congestion bid MW increased by 50.8 percent in 2023 compared to 2022.
Market Performance

- **Generation Fuel Mix.** In 2023, generation from coal units decreased 27.9 percent, generation from natural gas units increased 8.4 percent, generation from oil units decreased 0.8 percent, generation from wind units decreased 8.1 percent, and generation from solar units increased 20.1 percent compared to 2022.

- **Fuel Diversity.** The fuel diversity of energy generation in 2023, measured by the fuel diversity index for energy (FDI$_{e}$), decreased 3.5 percent compared to 2022.

Figure 5 Fuel diversity index for monthly generation: June 2000 through December 2023

- **Marginal Resources.** In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in 2023, coal units were 9.1 percent and natural gas units were 83.1 percent of marginal resources. In 2022, coal units were 10.0 percent and natural gas units were 75.2 percent of marginal resources.

In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market in 2023, UTCs were 50.0 percent, INCs were 16.7 percent, DECs were 18.0 percent, and generation resources were 15.0 percent of marginal resources. In 2022, UTCs were 48.1 percent, INCs were 19.0 percent, DECs were 23.0 percent, and generation resources were 9.5 percent of marginal resources.

- **Prices.** The real-time load-weighted average LMP in 2023 decreased $49.06 per MWh, or 61.2 percent from 2022, from $80.14 per MWh to $31.08 per MWh. This is the largest dollar and percent decrease in PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP for a year since PJM competitive markets were introduced in 1999.

Figure 6 Real-time monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP: 1999 through 2023

The day-ahead load-weighted average LMP in 2023 decreased $43.51, or 57.7 percent from 2022, from $75.44 per MWh to $31.93 per MWh. This is the largest dollar and percent decrease in PJM day-ahead load-weighted average LMP for a year since the day-ahead energy market was introduced in June 2000.

- **Fast Start Pricing.** The real-time load-weighted average PLMP was $31.08 per MWh in 2023, which is 6.8 percent, $1.97 per MWh, higher than the real-time load-weighted average DLMP of $29.11 per MWh. The day-ahead load-weighted average PLMP was $31.93 per MWh in 2023, which is 0.1 percent, $0.04 per MWh, higher than the day-ahead load-weighted average DLMP of $31.89 per MWh.

- **Components of Real-Time LMP.** In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in 2023, 14.4 percent of the load-weighted LMP was the result of coal costs, 43.7 percent was the result of gas costs, 7.9 percent was the result of emission allowances, 5.2 percent was the result of transmission constraint violation penalty factors, and 2.3 percent was the result of the commitment costs of fast start units.

- **Changes in Real-Time LMP.** Of the $49.06 per MWh decrease in the real-time load weighted average LMP, $29.89 per MWh (60.9 percent) was in the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP, $1.87 per MWh (3.8 percent) was in the emissions cost components of LMP, and $17.29 per MWh (35.3 percent) was in the committed resources cost components of LMP.

Note: The MMU uses the dispatch run marginal resource and sensitivity factor data, rather than the pricing run data, in the analysis of the day-ahead market for January 2022 through June 2023 because the PJM pricing run sensitivity factor data is not correct. Nonetheless, PJM uses LMPs generated in the pricing run as settlement LMPs.
components of LMP, $5.43 per MWh (11.1 percent) was in the sum of the markup, maintenance, and ten percent adder components of LMP, $3.01 per MWh (6.1 percent) was in the transmission constraint penalty factor component of LMP, and $4.99 per MWh (10.2 percent) was in the scarcity component of LMP.

- **Components of Day-Ahead LMP.** In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market in 2023, 19.7 percent of the load-weighted LMP was the result of gas costs, 10.9 percent was the result of coal costs, 21.4 percent was the result of INCs, 28.7 percent was the result of DECs, 3.4 percent was the result of UTCs, and 8.0 percent was the result of positive markup.

- **Changes in Day-Ahead LMP.** Of the $43.51 per MWh decrease in the day-ahead load weighted average LMP, $24.36 per MWh (56.4 percent) was in the virtual trading components LMP, $11.94 per MWh (27.6 percent) was in the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP.

- **Price Convergence.** Hourly and daily price differences between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets fluctuate continuously and substantially from positive to negative. The difference between day-ahead and real-time average prices was -$0.69 per MWh in 2023, and $2.76 per MWh in 2022. The difference between day-ahead and real-time average prices, by itself, is not a measure of the competitiveness or effectiveness of the day-ahead energy market.

**Scarcity**

- **Shortage Intervals.** There were 46 intervals with five minute shortage pricing on 10 days in 2023. These shortages did not correspond with any emergency warning or action.

- **SCED Shortage Intervals.** There were 4,307 five minute intervals, or 4.1 percent of all five minute intervals, in 2023 for which at least one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves, and 1,452 five minute intervals, or 1.4 percent of all five minute intervals, in 2023 for which more than one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves. PJM triggered shortage pricing for 46 five minute intervals, or 0.04 percent of all five minute intervals.

**Competitive Assessment**

**Market Structure**

- **Aggregate Pivotal Suppliers.** The PJM energy market, at times, requires generation from pivotal suppliers to meet load, resulting in aggregate market power even when the HHI level indicates that the aggregate market is unconcentrated. Three suppliers were jointly pivotal in the day-ahead market on 179 days, 49.0 percent of the days, in 2023 and 245 days, 67.1 percent of the days, in 2022.

- **Local Market Power.** In 2023, in the real-time market, the 500 kV system, nine zones, and the PJM/MISO interface experienced congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 100 or more hours. For six out of the top 10 congested facilities (by real-time binding hours) in 2023, the average number of suppliers providing constraint relief was three or fewer. There was a high level of concentration within the local markets for providing relief to the most congested facilities in the PJM Real-Time Energy Market. The local market structure was not competitive.

**Market Behavior**

- **Offer Capping for Local Market Power.** PJM offer caps units when the local market structure is noncompetitive. Offer capping is an effective means of addressing local market power when the rules are designed and implemented properly. Offer capping levels have historically been low in PJM. In the day-ahead energy market, for units committed to provide energy for local constraint relief, offer-capped unit hours were 1.7 percent in both 2022 and 2023. In the real-time energy market, for units committed to provide energy for local constraint relief, offer-capped unit hours decreased from 1.31 percent in 2022 to 1.29 percent in 2023. While overall offer capping levels have been low, there are a significant number of units with persistent structural local market power that would have had a significant impact on prices in the absence of local market power mitigation.
Table 11: Offer capping statistics for energy and reliability: 2018 through 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Real-Time</th>
<th>Day-Ahead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit Hours</td>
<td>MWh Capped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of the application of the TPS test to local markets demonstrates that it is working to identify pivotal owners when the market structure is noncompetitive and to ensure that owners are not subject to offer capping when the market structure is competitive. There are, however, identified issues with the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that can result in the exercise of local market power. These issues need to be addressed.

- **Offer Capping for Reliability.** PJM also offer caps units that are committed for reliability reasons, including for reactive support. In the day-ahead energy market, for units committed for reliability reasons, offer-capped unit hours increased from 0.04 percent in 2022 to 0.13 percent in 2023. In the real-time energy market, for units committed for reliability reasons, offer-capped unit hours increased from 0.05 percent in 2022 to 0.13 percent in 2023. The low offer cap percentages for reliability commitments, relative to offer capping for transmission constraints, do not mean that units committed for reliability reasons do not have market power. All units manually committed for reliability have market power and all are treated as if they had market power.

- **Parameter Mitigation.** In 2023, 31.5 percent of unit hours for units that failed the TPS test in the day-ahead market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their cost-based schedules. On days when cold weather alerts and hot weather alerts were declared, 32.1 percent of unit hours in the day-ahead energy market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their price PLS schedules.

- **Frequently Mitigated Units (FMU) and Associated Units (AU).** In 2023, no units qualified for an FMU adder. In 2022, no units qualified for an FMU adder. In 2021, one unit qualified for an FMU adder.

- **Markup Index.** The markup index is a summary measure of participant offer behavior for individual marginal units. While the average markup index in the real-time market was -0.03 in 2023, some marginal units did have substantial markups. The highest markup for any marginal unit in the real-time market in 2023 was more than $400 per MWh, using unadjusted cost-based offers.

While the average markup index in the day-ahead market was 0.23 in 2023, some marginal units did have substantial markups. The highest markup for any marginal unit in the day-ahead market in 2023 was more than $200 per MWh, using unadjusted cost-based offers.

- **Markup.** The markup frequency distributions show that a significant proportion of units make price-based offers less than the cost-based offers permitted under the PJM market rules. This behavior means that competitive price-based offers reveal actual unit marginal costs and that PJM market rules permit the inclusion of costs in cost-based offers that are not short run marginal costs.

The markup frequency distributions also show that a significant proportion of units were offered with high markups, consistent with the exercise of market power.

**Market Performance**

- **Markup.** The markup conduct of individual owners and units has an identifiable impact on market prices. Markup is a key indicator of the competitiveness of the energy market.

In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in 2023, the unadjusted markup component of LMP was $0.73 per MWh or 2.3 percent of the PJM load-weighted average LMP. July had the highest unadjusted peak markup component, $3.41 per MWh, or 7.1 percent of the real-time peak hour load-weighted average LMP for July.

In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market, INCs, DECs and UTCs have zero markups. In 2023, the unadjusted markup component of LMP was $2.50 per MWh or 7.8 percent of the PJM day-ahead load-weighted average LMP.
Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the analysis of markup shows that marginal units generally make offers at, or close to, their marginal costs in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although the behavior of some participants represents economic withholding.

- **Markup and Local Market Power.** Comparison of the markup behavior of marginal units with TPS test results shows that for 5.0 percent of all real-time marginal unit intervals in 2023, the marginal unit had both local market power as determined by the TPS test and a positive markup. The fact that units with market power had a positive markup means that the cost-based offer was not used, that a higher price-based offer was used, and that the process for offer capping units that fail the TPS test does not consistently result in competitive market outcomes in the presence of market power.

- **Markup and Aggregate Market Power.** In 2023, pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market, committed in the day-ahead market and identified as one of three day-ahead aggregate pivotal suppliers, set real-time market prices with markups over $100 per MWh on 20 days.

### Section 3 Recommendations

#### Market Power

- The MMU recommends that the market rules explicitly require that offers in the energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units. The short run marginal cost should reflect opportunity cost when appropriate. The MMU recommends that the level of incremental costs includable in cost-based offers not exceed the short run marginal cost of the unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

#### Fuel Cost Policies

- The MMU recommends that PJM require that all fuel cost policies be algorithmic, verifiable, and systematic, and accurately reflect short run marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the temporary cost method be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to have an approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Low. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the penalty exemption provision be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to follow their approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

#### Cost-Based Offers

- The MMU recommends that Manual 15 (Cost Development Guidelines) be replaced or updated with a straightforward description of the components of cost-based offers and the mathematically correct calculation of cost-based offers. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Partially adopted Q1 2022.)


- The MMU recommends the removal of all use of cyclic starting and peaking factors from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends the removal of all labor costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

The MMU recommends that market participants be required to document the amount and cost of consumables used when operating in order to verify that the total operating cost is consistent with the total quantity used and the unit characteristics. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Adopted 2023.)

The MMU recommends, given that maintenance costs are currently allowed in cost-based offers, that market participants be permitted to include only variable maintenance costs, linked to verifiable operational events and that can be supported by clear and unambiguous documentation of the operational data (e.g. run hours, MWh, MMBtu) that support the maintenance cycle of the equipment.

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70 Manual 15 has been updated with the correct calculations and descriptions of the cost components for incremental energy offers and no load costs. The start cost calculations have not been approved.
equipment being serviced/replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Partially adopted 2023.)

The MMU recommends explicitly accounting for soak costs and changing the definition of the start heat input for combined cycles to include only the amount of fuel used from first fire to the first breaker close in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Partially Adopted.)

The MMU recommends that soak costs, soak time and the MWh produced during soaking be modeled separately. This will ensure that the time required for units to reach a dispatchable level is known and used in the unit commitment process instead of only being communicated verbally between dispatchers and generators. Separating soak costs from start costs and modeling the MWh produced during soaking allows for a better representation of the costs because it eliminates the need to simply assume the price paid for those MWh. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not Adopted.)

The MMU recommends revising the pumped hydro fuel cost calculation to include day-ahead and real-time power purchases. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

Market Power: TPS Test and Offer Capping

- The MMU recommends that the rules governing the application of the TPS test be clarified and documented. The TPS test application in the day-ahead energy market is not documented. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the process of applying the TPS test in the day-ahead energy market to ensure that all local markets created by binding constraints are tested for market power and to ensure that market sellers with market power are appropriately mitigated to their competitive offers. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that offer capping be applied to units that fail the TPS test in the real-time market that were not offer capped at the time of commitment in the day-ahead market or at a prior time in the real-time market. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation and to ensure that capacity resources meet their obligations to be flexible, that capacity resources be required to use flexible parameters in all offers at all times. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, PJM always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters for all cost-based and all price-based offers during high load conditions such as cold and hot weather alerts and emergency conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM require every market participant to make available at least one cost schedule based on the same hourly fuel type(s) and parameters at least as flexible as their offered price schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that markup be consistently positive or negative across the full MWh range of price and cost-based offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM retain the $1,000 per MWh offer cap in the PJM energy market except when cost-based offers exceed $1,000 per MWh, and retain other existing rules that limit incentives to exercise market power. (Priority: High. First reported 1999. Status: Partially adopted, 1999, 2017.)

- The MMU recommends the elimination of FMU and AU adders. FMU and AU adders no longer serve the purpose for which they were created and interfere with the efficient operation of PJM markets.
Offer Behavior

- The MMU recommends that resources not be allowed to violate the ICAP must offer requirement. The MMU recommends that PJM enforce the ICAP must offer requirement by assigning a forced outage to any unit that is derated in the energy market below its committed ICAP without an outage that reflects the derate. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that intermittent resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets that reflects the limitations of these resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Adopted 2023.)

- The MMU recommends that storage resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets that reflects the limitations of these resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM integrate all the outage reporting tools in order to enforce the ICAP must offer requirement, ensure that outages are reported correctly and eliminate reporting inconsistencies. Generators currently submit availability in three different tools that are not integrated, Markets Gateway, eDART and eGADS. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that gas generators be required to check with pipelines throughout the operating day to confirm that nominations are accepted beyond the NAESB deadlines, that gas generators be required to inform PJM about whether they have gas, and that gas generators be required to place their units on forced outage until the time that pipelines allow nominations to consume gas at a unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

72 The applicability of the FMU and AU adders is limited by the rule implemented in 2014 requiring that net revenues must fall below avoidable costs, but the possibility of FMU and AU adders is still part of the PJM Market Rules.

Capacity Resources

- The MMU recommends that capacity resources be held to the OEM operating parameters of the capacity market CONE reference resource for performance assessment and energy uplift payments and that this standard be applied to all technologies on a uniform basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the parameters which determine nonperformance charges and the amounts of uplift payments should reflect the flexibility goals of the capacity market design. The operational parameters used by generation owners to indicate to PJM operators what a unit is capable of during the operating day should not determine capacity resource performance assessment or uplift payments. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly define the business rules that apply to the unit specific parameter adjustment process, including PJM's implementation of the tariff rules in the PJM manuals to ensure market sellers know the requirements for their resources. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM update the tariff to clarify that all generation resources are subject to unit specific parameter limits on their cost-based offers using the same standard and process as capacity resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM not approve temporary exceptions that are based on pipeline tariff terms that are not enforced at the time, or are based on inferior transportation service procured by the generator. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM require generators that violate their approved turn down ratio (by either using the fixed gen option or increasing their economic minimum) to use the temporary

73 Flexible parameter standards are in place for combined cycle and combustion turbine resources when operating on a parameter limited schedule, but not for other schedules or generating technologies.
parameter exception process that requires market sellers to demonstrate that the request is based on a physical and actual constraint. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends: that gas generators be required to confirm, regularly during the operating day, that they can obtain gas if requested to operate at their economic maximum level; that gas generators provide that information to PJM during the operating day; and that gas generators be required to be on forced outage if they cannot obtain gas during the operating day to meet their must offer requirement as a result of pipeline restrictions, and they do not have backup fuel. As part of this, the MMU recommends that PJM collect data on each individual generator’s fuel supply arrangements at least annually or when such arrangements change, and analyze the associated locational and regional risks to reliability. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, if the capacity market seller offer cap were to be calculated using the historical average balancing ratio, that PJM not include the balancing ratios calculated for localized Performance Assessment Intervals (PAIs), and only include those events that trigger emergencies at a defined zonal or higher level. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

### Accurate System Modeling

- The MMU recommends that PJM explicitly state its policy on the use of transmission penalty factors including: the level of the penalty factors; the triggers for the use of the penalty factors; the appropriate line ratings to trigger the use of penalty factors; the allowed duration of the violation and when the transmission penalty factors will be used to set the shadow price. The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) and included in LMP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted 2020.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM routinely review all transmission facility ratings and any changes to those ratings to ensure that the normal, emergency and load dump ratings used in modeling the transmission system are accurate and reflect standard ratings practice. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM not use closed loop interface or surrogate constraints to artificially override nodal prices based on fundamental LMP logic in order to: accommodate rather than resolve the inadequacies of the demand side resource capacity product; address the inability of the power flow model to incorporate the need for reactive power; accommodate rather than resolve the flaws in PJM’s approach to scarcity pricing; or for any other reason. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM update the outage impact studies, the reliability analyses used in RPM for capacity deliverability, and the reliability analyses used in RTEP for transmission upgrades to be consistent with the more conservative emergency operations (post contingency load dump limit exceedance analysis) in the energy market that were implemented in June 2013. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM include in the tariff or appropriate manual an explanation of the initial creation of hubs, the process for modifying hub definitions and a description of how hub definitions have changed. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all buses with a net withdrawal be treated as load for purposes of calculating load and load-weighted LMP, even if the MW are settled to the generator. The MMU recommends that during hours when a load bus shows a net injection, the energy injection be treated as generation, not negative load, for purposes of calculating generation and load-weighted LMP, even if the injection MW are settled to the load.

74 PJM created a more transparent process for transmission constraint penalty factors and added it to the tariff in 2020. Policies on reductions in control limits and the duration of violations remain discretionary and undocumented in the PJM Market Rules.

75 This recommendation was the result of load shed events in September, 2013. For detailed discussion, please see 2013 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 3 at 114 – 116.

76 According to minutes from the first meeting of the Energy Market Committee (EMC) on January 28, 1998, the EMC unanimously agreed to be responsible for approving additions, deletions and changes to the hub definitions to be published and modeled by PJM. Since the EMC has become the Market Implementation Committee (MIC), the MIC now appears to be responsible for such changes.

77 There is currently no PJM documentation in the tariff or manuals explaining how hubs are created and how their definitions are changed. The general definition of a hub can be found in the PJM Glossary: <http://www.pjm.com/Glossary.aspx>.
The MMU recommends that PJM identify and collect data on available behind the meter generation resources, including nodal location information and relevant operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM document how LMPs are calculated when demand response is marginal. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM not allow nuclear generators which do not respond to prices or which only respond to manual instructions from the operator to set the LMPs in the real-time market. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM increase the coordination of outage and operational restrictions data submitted by market participants via eDART/eGADs and offer data submitted via Markets Gateway. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM model generators’ operating transitions, including soak time for units with a steam turbine, configuration transitions for combined cycles, and peak operating modes. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM clarify, modify and document its process for dispatching reserves and energy when SCED indicates that supply is less than total demand including forecasted load and reserve requirements. The modifications should define: a SCED process to economically convert reserves to energy; a process for the recall of energy from capacity resources; and the minimum level of synchronized reserves that would trigger load shedding. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM stop capping the system marginal price in RT SCED and instead limit the sum of violated reserve constraint shadow prices used in LPC to $1,700 per MWh. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM adjust the ORDCs during spin events to reduce the reserve requirement for synchronized and primary reserves by the amount of the reserves deployed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

Transparency

- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly document the calculation of shortage prices and implementation of reserve price caps in the PJM manuals, including defining all the components of reserve prices, and all the constraints whose shadow prices are included in reserve prices. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM allow generators to report fuel type on an hourly basis in their offer schedules and to designate schedule availability on an hourly basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM define clear criteria for operator approval of RT SCED cases, including shortage cases, that are used to send dispatch signals to resources, and for pricing, to minimize discretion. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)

Virtual Bids and Offers

- The MMU recommends eliminating up to congestion (UTC) bidding at pricing nodes that aggregate only small sections of transmission zones with few physical assets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends eliminating INC, DEC, and UTC bidding at pricing nodes that allow market participants to profit from modeling issues. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

Section 3 Conclusion

The MMU analyzed key elements of PJM energy market structure, participant conduct and market performance in 2023, including aggregate supply and demand, concentration ratios, aggregate pivotal supplier results, local three pivotal supplier test results, offer capping, markup, marginal units, participation in demand response programs, virtual bids and offers, loads and prices.

78 Fuel type is reported by offer schedule, but it can be inaccurate on an hourly basis.
79 The PJM Market Rules clarify that shortage case approval will be based on RT SCED, but does not address RT SCED case choice or load bias.
Prices are a key outcome of markets. Prices vary across hours, days and years for multiple reasons. Price is an indicator of the level of competition in a market. In a competitive market, prices are directly related to input prices, the marginal cost to serve load. In 2023, LMP decreased by $49.06 per MWh compared to 2022. The largest contributor to decreased prices was the cost of fuel, primarily natural gas and coal. The fuel cost components of LMP (the sum of gas, coal, oil, landfill gas, and consumables) decreased $29.89 per MWh, 60.9 percent of the decrease in LMP. The emissions cost components of LMP decreased by $1.87 per MWh, 3.8 percent of the decrease in LMP. The transmission constraint penalty factor component decreased by $3.01 per MWh, 6.1 percent of the decrease in LMP.

The pattern of prices within days and across months and years illustrates how prices are directly related to supply and demand conditions and illustrates the potential significance of the impact of the price elasticity of demand on prices. Energy market results in 2023 generally reflected supply-demand fundamentals, although the behavior of some participants both routinely and during high demand periods represents economic withholding. Economic withholding occurs when generator offers are greater than competitive levels. In 2023, the markup, ten percent adder, and maintenance cost components, together decreased by $5.43 per MWh or 11.1 percent of the decrease in LMP.

The potential for prolonged and excessively high administrative pricing in the energy market due to reserve penalty factors and transmission constraint penalty factors remains an issue that needs to be addressed.\textsuperscript{80} There also continue to be significant issues with PJM’s scarcity pricing rules, including the absence of a clear trigger based on accurately estimated reserve levels. For example, PJM approved 3.7 percent of solved shortage cases in May 2023, but only 1.1 percent for the year. During Winter Storm Elliott, PJM approved 45.4 percent of SCED shortage solutions. The pattern of shortage case approvals indicates that PJM considers factors that are not documented in the tariff when deciding whether to approve shortage cases.

With or without a capacity market, energy market design must permit scarcity pricing when such pricing is consistent with market conditions and constrained by reasonable rules to ensure that market power is not exercised and ensure no scarcity pricing when such pricing is not consistent with market conditions. Scarcity pricing can serve two functions in wholesale power markets: revenue adequacy and price signals. Scarcity pricing for revenue adequacy, as in PJM’s 2019 ORDC proposal, is not required in PJM, even under the market transition to a fleet with more renewable resources. Scarcity pricing for price signals that reflect market conditions during periods of scarcity is required in PJM. When PJM adds additional reserves to the market for conservative operations, the applicable reserve demand curves should be adjusted accordingly. Scarcity pricing is also part of an appropriate incentive structure facing both load and generation owners in a working wholesale electric power market design. Scarcity pricing must be designed to ensure that market prices reflect actual market conditions, that scarcity pricing occurs with transparent triggers based on measured reserve levels and transparent prices, that scarcity pricing only occurs when scarcity exists, that scarcity pricing not be excessive or punitive, and that there are strong incentives for competitive behavior and strong disincentives to exercise market power. Such administrative scarcity pricing is a key link between energy and capacity markets.

The PJM defined inputs to the dispatch tools, particularly the RT SCED, have substantial effects on energy market outcomes. Transmission line ratings, transmission penalty factors, load forecast bias, and hydro resource schedules change the dispatch of the system, affect prices, and can create significant price increases, particularly through transmission line limit violations. PJM operator interventions to reduce the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings in RT SCED unnecessarily trigger transmission constraint penalty factors and significantly increase prices. Violations of the artificially reduced control limits on constraint line ratings directly increased LMP in 2023. If the control limits had not been artificially reduced for PJM transmission constraints and everything else remained unchanged, fewer constraints would have been violated and the transmission penalty factor’s contribution to the load weighted average LMP in 2023 would have decreased by 99.3 percent from $1.62 to $0.01 per MWh. PJM should evaluate its interventions in the market, consider whether the interventions are appropriate, and provide greater transparency to enhance market efficiency.

\textsuperscript{80} 177 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2021).
Fast start pricing, implemented on September 1, 2021, has disconnected pricing from dispatch instructions and created a greater reliance on uplift rather than price as an incentive to follow PJM’s instructions. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to minimize system production costs, not to minimize uplift. Repricing the market to reflect commitment costs using fast start pricing prioritizes minimizing uplift over minimizing production costs. The tradeoff exists because when commitment costs are included in prices, the price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. Units that start in one hour are not actually fast start units, and their commitment costs are not marginal in a five minute market. The differences between the actual LMP and the fast start LMP will distort the incentive for market participants to behave competitively and to follow PJM’s dispatch instructions. PJM is paying new forms of uplift in an attempt to counter the distorted incentives inherent in fast start pricing. PJM is also using the pricing run to implement other differences from the dispatch run that are not related to fast start pricing, including differences in transmission constraint penalty factors and system marginal price capping. Every difference between the dispatch run and the pricing run introduces another inefficiency in the market. In the two years since fast start pricing was introduced, the market has not responded with new entry of fast start units despite consistently higher LMP when a fast start unit sets price.

PJM’s arguments for changing energy market price formation asserted that fast start pricing and the extended ORDC would price flexibility in the market, but instead they benefit inflexible units. The fast start pricing and extended ORDC solutions undercut LMP logic rather than directly addressing the underlying issues. The solution is not to accept that the inflexible CT should be paid or set price based on its commitment costs rather than its short run marginal costs. The question of why units make inflexible offers should be addressed directly. Are units inflexible because they are old and inefficient, because owners have not invested in increased flexibility or because they serve as a mechanism for the exercise of market power? Are units inflexible because the PJM software does not model combined cycle transitions? The question of how to provide market incentives for investment in flexible units, for investment in increased flexibility of existing units, and for operating at the full extent of existing flexibility should be addressed directly. The question of whether inflexible units should be paid uplift at all should be addressed directly. Marginal cost pricing without paying excess uplift to inflexible units would create incentives for market participants to provide flexible solutions including replacing inefficient units with flexible, efficient units.

The relationship between supply and demand, regardless of the specific market, along with market concentration and the extent of pivotal suppliers, is referred to as the supply-demand fundamentals or economic fundamentals or market structure. The market structure of the PJM aggregate energy market is partially competitive because aggregate market power does exist for a significant number of hours. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. It is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. Even a low HHI may be consistent with the exercise of market power with a low price elasticity of demand. The current market power mitigation rules for the PJM energy market rely on the assumption that the ownership structure of the aggregate market ensures competitive outcomes. This assumption requires that the total demand for energy can be met without the supply from any individual supplier or without the supply from a small group of suppliers. This assumption is not correct. There are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate energy market at times. High markups for some units demonstrate the potential to exercise market power both routinely and during high demand conditions. The existing market power mitigation measures do not address aggregate market power. The MMU is developing an aggregate market power test and will propose market power mitigation rules to address aggregate market power.

The three pivotal supplier test is applied by PJM on an ongoing basis for local energy markets in order to determine whether offer capping is required for transmission constraints. However, there are some

81 See 173 F.R.R. ¶ 61,244 (2020).
82 The MMU reviews PJM’s application of the IPS test and brings issues to the attention of PJM.
issues with the application of market power mitigation in the day-ahead energy market and the real-time energy market when market sellers fail the TPS test. The Commission recognized some of these issues in its order issued on June 17, 2021, but failed to address them in its November 30, 2023 order.\(^83\) \(^84\) PJM continues to ignore the evidence cited by the Commission and denies the prevalence of these issues, instead of ensuring that market power mitigation works as intended and results in efficient market outcomes.\(^85\) Many of these issues can be resolved by simple rule changes. The MMU proposed these rule changes in its response submitted on October 15, 2021, and in the stakeholder process.\(^86\) \(^87\) The MMU recommendations would shorten the solution time of the day-ahead market software, which would help facilitate enhanced combined cycle modelling. The proposal that PJM filed with FERC on March 1, 2024, would weaken market power mitigation as part of implementing the enhanced combined cycle modelling project, although PJM has failed to explain why such weakening makes sense. PJM’s proposals would ensure that the identified issues with the implementation of market power mitigation in the energy market would never be addressed and would be exacerbated. PJM should endorse only solutions that ensure that market power mitigation is protected.

The enforcement of market power mitigation rules is undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. A competitive offer is equal to short run marginal costs. The significance of competition metrics like markup is also undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. The definition of a competitive offer, under the PJM Market Rules, is not currently correct. The definition, that all costs that are related to electric production are short run marginal costs, is not clear or correct. All costs and investments for power generation are related to electric production. Under this definition, some unit owners include costs that are not short run marginal costs in offers, especially maintenance costs. This issue can be resolved by simple rule changes to incorporate a clear and accurate definition of short run marginal costs. This rule also had unintended consequences for market seller offer caps in the capacity market. Maintenance costs includable in energy offers cannot be included in capacity market offer caps based on avoidable costs. As a result, capacity market offer caps based on net avoidable costs were lower than they would have been if maintenance costs had been correctly included in avoidable costs rather than incorrectly defined to be part of short marginal costs of producing energy and includable in energy offers.

A competitive market requires that prices increase when fuel costs increase and that prices decrease when fuel costs decrease. A competitive market does not require that prices increase when markup increases or when PJM artificially triggers transmission constraint penalty factors. The overall energy market results support the conclusion that energy prices in PJM are set, generally, by marginal units operating at, or close to, their marginal costs, although this was not always the case in 2023 or prior years. Given the structure of the energy market which can permit the exercise of aggregate and local market power, the change in some participants’ behavior is a source of concern in the energy market and provides a reason to use correctly defined short run marginal cost as the sole basis for cost-based offers and a reason for implementing an aggregate market power test and correcting the offer capping process for resources with local market power. The MMU concludes that the PJM energy market results were competitive in 2023.

### Overview: Section 4, Energy Uplift

#### Energy Uplift Credits

- **Energy uplift credits.** Total energy uplift credits decreased by $125.7 million, or 44.2 percent, in 2023 compared to 2022, from $284.5 million to $158.7 million.

- **Types of energy uplift credits.** In 2023, total energy uplift credits included $49.7 million in day-ahead generator credits, $84.1 million in balancing generator credits, $22.4 million in lost opportunity cost credits, and $0.6 million in local
constraint control credits. Dispatch differential lost opportunity credits, which are a subset of balancing operating reserves, were implemented as part of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, and were $1.0 million in 2023.

- **Types of units.** In 2023, steam coal units received 63.7 percent of day-ahead generator credits, and combustion turbines received 85.7 percent of balancing generator credits and 84.9 percent of lost opportunity cost credits. Combined cycle units and combustion turbines received 58.9 percent of dispatch differential lost opportunity credits.

- **Day-ahead unit commitment for reliability.** In 2023, 0.3 percent of the total day-ahead generation MWh was scheduled as must run for reliability by PJM, of which 66.9 percent received energy uplift payments.

- **Concentration of energy uplift credits.** In 2023, the top 10 units receiving energy uplift credits received 34.8 percent of all credits and the top 10 organizations received 73.4 percent of all credits. The average HHI for day-ahead operating reserves was 8021, the HHI for balancing generator credits was 2337 and the HHI for lost opportunity cost was 5191, all of which are classified as highly concentrated.

- **Lost opportunity cost credits.** Lost opportunity cost credits decreased by $23.9 million, or 51.7 percent, in 2023, compared to 2022, from $46.3 million to $22.4 million.

  Some combustion turbines and diesels are scheduled day-ahead but not requested in real time, and receive day-ahead lost opportunity cost credits as a result. This was the source of 87.8 percent of the $22.4 million.

- **Following dispatch.** Some units are incorrectly paid uplift despite not meeting uplift eligibility requirements, including not following dispatch, not having the correct commitment status, or not operating with PLS offer parameters. Since 2018, the MMU has made cumulative resettlement requests for the most extreme overpaid units of $16.4 million, of which PJM has resettled only $2.5 million, or 15.1 percent.

- **Daily uplift.** In 2023, balancing generator charges would have been $19.1 million, 22.7 percent, lower if they had been calculated on a daily basis rather than a segmented basis. Uplift was designed to be charged on a daily basis and not on an intraday segmented basis.

- **CT uplift exemption:** The rule that allowed CTs to be paid uplift regardless of how well they followed dispatch was terminated on November 1, 2022. Starting November 1, 2022, CTs are paid uplift if necessary to cover costs based on the lower of actual or desired output (as calculated by PJM based on the dispatch signal), like all other unit types.

### Energy Uplift Charges

- **Energy Uplift Charges.** Total energy uplift charges (equal to total energy uplift credits) decreased by $125.7 million, or 44.2 percent, in 2023 compared to 2022, from $284.5 million to $158.7 million.

- **Types of Energy Uplift Charges.** In 2023, total uplift charges included $49.7 million in day-ahead operating reserve charges, $108.1 million in balancing generator charges, $0.6 million in reactive charges, and $0.5 million in black start services.

- **UTC Uplift.** Effective November 1, 2020, UTC transactions are allocated day-ahead and real-time uplift charges on a basis equivalent to a decrement bid (DEC) at the sink point of the UTC.\(^{88}\)

- **Average Effective Operating Reserve Rates in the Eastern Region.** Day-ahead load, exports, DECs and UTCs paid $0.050 per MWh in the Eastern Region. Real-time load and exports paid an average of $0.062 per MWh. Deviations paid $0.202 per MWh in the Eastern Region.

- **Average Effective Operating Reserve Rates in the Western Region.** Day-ahead load, exports, DECs and UTCs paid $0.050 per MWh in the Western Region. Real-time load and exports paid $0.047 per MWh. Deviations paid $0.159 per MWh in the Western Region.

### Geography of Charges and Credits

- **In 2023, 89.2 percent of all uplift charges allocated regionally (day-ahead operating reserves and balancing generator credits) were paid by MW at control zones, 3.7 percent by MW at hubs and aggregates, and 7.1 percent by MW at interchange interfaces.**

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\(^{88}\) See 172 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2020).
In 2023, generators in the Eastern Region received 44.0 percent of all balancing generator credits, including lost opportunity cost and canceled resources credits.

In 2023, generators in the Western Region received 54.7 percent of all balancing generator credits, including lost opportunity cost and canceled resources credits.

In 2023, external pseudo tied generators received 1.3 percent of all balancing generator credits, including lost opportunity cost and canceled resources credits.

Section 4 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that uplift be paid only based on operating parameters that reflect the flexibility of the benchmark new entrant unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM not pay uplift to units not following dispatch, including uplift related to fast start pricing, and require refunds where it has made such payments. This includes units whose offers are flagged for fixed generation in Markets Gateway because such units are not dispatchable. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM pay uplift based on the offer at the lower of the actual unit output or the dispatch signal MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends eliminating intraday segments from the calculation of uplift payments and returning to calculating the need for uplift based on the entire 24 hour operating day. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends the elimination of day-ahead uplift to ensure that units receive an energy uplift payment based on their real-time output and not their day-ahead scheduled output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that units not be paid lost opportunity cost uplift credits when PJM directs a unit to reduce output based on a transmission constraint or other reliability issue. There is no lost opportunity because the unit is required to reduce for the reliability of the unit and the system. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends reincorporating the use of net regulation revenues as an offset in the calculation of balancing generator credits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that self scheduled units not be paid energy uplift credits for their startup cost when the units are scheduled by PJM to start before the self scheduled hours. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends three modifications to the energy lost opportunity cost calculations:
  - The MMU recommends calculating LOC based on 24 hour daily periods for combustion turbines and diesels scheduled in the day-ahead energy market, but not committed in real time. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
  - The MMU recommends that units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time should be compensated for LOC based on their real-time desired and achievable output, not their scheduled day-ahead output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
  - The MMU recommends that only flexible fast start units (startup plus notification times of 10 minutes or less) and units with short minimum run times (one hour or less) be eligible by default for the LOC compensation to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time. Other units should be eligible for LOC compensation only if PJM explicitly cancels their day-ahead commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that up to congestion (UTC) transactions be required to pay energy uplift charges for both the injection and the withdrawal sides of the UTC. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends allocating the energy uplift credits paid to units scheduled by PJM as must run in the day-ahead energy market for reasons other than voltage/reactive or black start services as a reliability charge to real-time load, real-time exports and real-time wheels. (Priority: Medium.

- The MMU recommends that the total cost of providing reactive support be categorized and allocated as reactive services. Reactive services credits should be calculated consistent with the balancing generator credit calculation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Stakeholder process.)

- The MMU recommends including real-time exports and real-time wheels in the allocation of the cost of providing reactive support to the 500 kV system or above, in addition to real-time load. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends modifications to the calculation of lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units. The lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units should be based on the lesser of the desired output, the estimated output based on actual wind conditions and the capacity interconnection rights (CIRs). The MMU recommends that PJM require wind units to request CIRs based on the maximum output used in the ELCC calculation for wind units. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly identify and classify all reasons for incurring uplift in the day-ahead and the real-time energy markets and the associated uplift charges in order to make all market participants aware of the reasons for these costs and to help ensure a long term solution to the issue of how to allocate the costs of uplift. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the current uplift confidentiality rules in order to allow the disclosure of complete information about the level of uplift by unit and the detailed reasons for the level of uplift credits by unit in the PJM region. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the exemption for CTs and diesels from the requirement to follow dispatch in order to receive uplift. The performance of these resources should be evaluated in a manner consistent with all other resources (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Adopted 2022.)

**Section 4 Conclusion**

Competitive market outcomes result from energy offers equal to short run marginal costs that incorporate flexible operating parameters. When PJM permits a unit to include inflexible operating parameters in its offer and pays uplift based on those inflexible parameters, there is an incentive for the unit to remain inflexible. The rules regarding operating parameters should be implemented in a way that creates incentives for flexible operations rather than inflexible operations. The standard for paying uplift should be the maximum achievable flexibility, based on OEM standards for the benchmark new entrant unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market demand (VRR) curve. Applying a weaker standard effectively subsidizes inflexible units by paying them based on inflexible parameters that result from lack of investment and that could be made more flexible. The result inflates uplift costs, suppresses energy prices, and is an incentive to inflexibility.

It is not appropriate to accept that inflexible units should be paid uplift based on inflexible offers. The question of why units make inflexible offers should be addressed directly. Are units inflexible because they are old and inefficient, because owners have not invested in increased flexibility or because they serve as a mechanism for the exercise of market power? The question of why the inflexible unit was built, whether it was built under cost of service regulation and whether it is efficient to retain the unit should be answered directly. The question of how to provide market incentives for investment in flexible units and for investment in increased flexibility of existing units should be addressed directly. The question of whether inflexible units should be paid uplift at all should be addressed directly. Marginal cost pricing without paying uplift to inflexible units would create incentives for market participants to provide flexible solutions including replacing inefficient units with flexible, efficient units.

Implementing combined cycle modeling, to permit the energy market model optimization to take advantage of the versatility and flexibility of combined cycle technology in commitment and dispatch, would provide significant flexibility without requiring a distortion of...
the market rules. But such modeling should not be used as an excuse to eliminate market power mitigation or an excuse to permit inflexible offers to be paid uplift. There are defined steps that could and should be taken immediately to improve the modeling of combined cycle plants that do not require investment in combined cycle modeling software, including modeling soak time, and accurately accounting for transition times to power augmentation offer segments.

The reduction of uplift payments should not be a goal to be achieved at the expense of the fundamental logic of the LMP system. For example, the use of closed loop interfaces to reduce uplift should be eliminated because it is not consistent with LMP fundamentals and constitutes a form of subjective price setting. The same is true of what PJM terms its CT price setting logic. The same is true of fast start pricing. The same is true of PJM’s proposal to modify the ORDC in order to increase energy prices and reduce uplift.

Accurate short run price signals, equal to the short run marginal cost of generating power, provide market incentives for cost minimizing production to all economically dispatched resources and provide market incentives to load based on the marginal cost of additional consumption. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to minimize system production costs, not to minimize uplift. Repricing the market to reflect commitment costs will create a tradeoff between minimizing production costs and reduction of uplift. The tradeoff will exist because when commitment costs are included in prices, the price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. This tradeoff now exists based on PJM’s recently implemented fast start pricing approach.90 Fast start pricing affects uplift calculations by introducing a new category of uplift in the balancing market, and changing the calculation of uplift in the day-ahead market.

When units receive substantial revenues through energy uplift payments, these payments are not fully transparent to the market, in part because of the current confidentiality rules. As a result, other market participants, including generation and transmission developers, do not have the opportunity to compete to displace them. As a result, substantial energy uplift payments to a concentrated group of units and organizations have persisted. FERC Order No. 844 authorized the publication of unit specific uplift payments for credits incurred after July 1, 2019.91 However, Order No. 844 failed to require the publication of unit specific uplift credits for the largest units receiving significant uplift payments, inflexible steam units committed for reliability in the day-ahead market.

Uplift payments could be significantly reduced by reversing many of the changes that have been made to the original basic uplift rules. The goal of uplift is to ensure that competitive energy and ancillary service market outcomes do not require efficient resources operating for the PJM system, at the direction of PJM, to operate at a loss. In the original PJM design, uplift was calculated on a daily basis, including all costs and net revenues. But that rule was changed to use only segments of the day. The result is to overstate uplift payments because units may be paid uplift for a day in which their net revenues exceed their costs. In the original PJM design, all net revenues from energy and ancillary services were an offset to uplift payments. But that rule was changed to eliminate net revenue from the regulation market. The result is to overstate uplift payments, for no logical reason.

Uplift payments could also be significantly reduced to a more efficient level by eliminating all day-ahead operating reserve credits. It is illogical and unnecessary to pay units day-ahead operating reserve credits because units do not incur any costs to run and any revenue shortfalls are addressed by balancing generator credits.

On July 16, 2020, following its investigation of the issue, the Commission ordered PJM to revise its rules so that UTCs are required to pay uplift on the withdrawal side (DEC) only.92 The uplift payments for UTCs began on November 1, 2020. The MMU has had a longstanding recommendation that UTCs be required to pay uplift on both the injection and withdrawal sides.93

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90 Fast start pricing was approved by FERC and implemented on September 1, 2021. See 173 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2021).
91 On June 21, 2019, FERC accepted PJM’s Order No. 844 compliance filing. 166 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2019). The filing stated that PJM would begin posting unit specific uplift reports on May 1, 2019. On April 8, 2019, PJM filed for an extension on the implementation date of the zonal uplift reports and unit specific uplift reports to July 1, 2019. On June 28, 2019, FERC accepted PJM’s request for extension of effective dates. 162 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2019).
92 See 172 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2020).
93 On October 17, 2017, PJM filed a proposed tariff change at FERC to allocate uplift to UTC transactions in the same way uplift is allocated to other virtual transactions, as a separate injection and withdrawal deviation. FERC rejected the proposed tariff change. See 162 FERC ¶ 61,019 (2018).
On November 1, 2022, the longstanding rule which exempted CTs from the otherwise generally applicable rules governing the payment of uplift credits, was terminated.\textsuperscript{94} Prior to November 1, CTs were paid uplift regardless of their output and regardless of whether they followed dispatch. As a result of the rule, CTs had no incentive to follow PJM dispatch signals and received excessive uplift credits.

The rule change is expected to reduce balancing generator reserve credits paid to combustion turbines and diesel engines. The rule change is expected to have no impact on lost opportunity cost credits, dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits, reactive service credits, and black start credits, despite CTs also receiving a large share of those credit categories. No impact is expected to these categories because the calculation for these credit categories is not based on distinguishing the PJM calculated desired MW from the actual generation.

PJM needs to pay substantially more attention to the details of uplift payments including accurately tracking whether units are following dispatch, identifying the actual need for units to be dispatched out of merit and determining whether better definitions of constraints would be a more market based approach. PJM pays uplift to units even when they do not operate as requested by PJM, i.e. when units do not follow dispatch. PJM uses dispatcher logs as a primary screen to determine if units are eligible for uplift regardless of how they actually operate or if they followed the PJM dispatch signal. The reliance on dispatcher logs for this purpose is impractical, inefficient, and incorrect. PJM needs to define and implement systematic and verifiable rules for determining when units are following dispatch as a primary screen for eligibility for uplift payments. PJM should not pay uplift to units that do not follow dispatch. PJM continues to pay uplift to units that do not follow dispatch.

The MMU notifies PJM and generators of instances in which, based on the PJM dispatch signal and the real-time output of the unit, it is clear that the unit did not operate as requested by PJM. The MMU sends requests for resettlements to PJM to make the units with the most extreme overpayments ineligible for uplift credits. Since 2018, the MMU has requested that PJM require the return of $16.4 million of incorrect uplift credits of which PJM has resettled only $2.5 million over the last two years, or 15.1 percent. In addition, PJM has refused to accept the return of incorrectly paid uplift credits by generators when the MMU has identified such cases and generators offer to repay the credits.

While energy uplift charges are an appropriate part of the cost of energy, market efficiency would be improved by ensuring that the level and variability of these charges are as low as possible consistent with the reliable operation of the system and consistent with pricing at short run marginal cost. The goal should be to minimize the total incurred energy uplift charges and to increase the transactions over which those charges are spread in order to reduce the impact of energy uplift charges on markets. The result would be to reduce the level of per MWh charges, to reduce the uncertainty associated with uplift charges and to reduce the impact of energy uplift charges on decisions about how and when to participate in PJM markets. The result would also be to increase incentives for flexible operation and to decrease incentives for the continued operation of inflexible and uneconomic resources. PJM does not need a new flexibility product. PJM needs to provide incentives to existing and new entrant resources to unlock the significant flexibility potential that already exists, to end incentives for inflexibility and to stop creating new incentives for inflexibility.

**Overview: Section 5, Capacity Market**

**RPM Capacity Market**

**Market Design**

The Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) Capacity Market is a forward looking, annual, locational market, with a must offer requirement for Existing Generation Capacity Resources and a must buy requirement for load, with performance incentives, that includes clear market power mitigation rules and that permits the direct participation of demand side resources.\textsuperscript{95} Currently, intermittent and storage resources are exempt from the must offer requirement, although that is not a viable long term design element for the capacity market. The fundamental goal of the must offer requirement, which has been in place since the beginning of the capacity market in 1999, is to ensure that the capacity market works, and therefore that the energy market works, based on the inclusion of all demand and all supply, to ensure open access to the transmission system, and to


\textsuperscript{95} The terms “RTO Region,” “RTO,” “PJM Region,” and “PJM” are synonymous in this report and include all capacity within the PJM footprint.
prevent the exercise of market power via withholding of capacity supply. If some resources hold CIRs (capacity interconnection rights) that provide access to the transmission system required for the deliverability of energy, but do not offer, those resources are exercising market power by blocking access to the transmission system that could be used by a resource willing to offer into the capacity market.

Under RPM, capacity obligations are annual.96 Base Residual Auctions (BRA) are held for delivery years that are three years in the future. First, Second and Third Incremental Auctions (IA) are held for each delivery year.97 First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions are conducted 20, 10, and three months prior to the delivery year.98 A Conditional Incremental Auction may be held if there is a need to procure additional capacity resulting from a delay in a planned large transmission upgrade that was modeled in the BRA for the relevant delivery year.99

The 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted in 2023. The 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction was conducted in 2022, but the results were not posted until February 27, 2023, due to an issue with the DPL South reliability requirement.100 101 The 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction was scheduled for June 2023 but postponed until June 2024.102

RPM prices are locational and may vary depending on transmission constraints and local supply and demand conditions.103 Existing generation that qualifies as a capacity resource must be offered into RPM auctions, except for resources owned by entities that elect the fixed resource requirement (FRR) option, and, as a result of Capacity Performance rule changes, except for intermittent and capacity storage resources including hydro. Participation by LSEs is mandatory, except for those entities that elect the FRR option. There is an administratively determined demand curve that defines scarcity pricing levels and that, with the supply curve derived from capacity offers, determines market prices in each BRA. RPM rules provide performance incentives for generation, including the requirement to submit generator outage data and the linking of capacity payments to the level of unforced capacity. The experience with Winter Storm Elliott (Elliott) has made clear that the extremely high penalties created in the CP model are not an effective incentive. Under RPM there are explicit market power mitigation rules that define structural market power, that define offer caps based on the marginal cost of capacity, and that have flexible criteria for competitive offers by new entrants. Market power mitigation is effective only when these definitions are up to date and accurate. Demand resources and energy efficiency resources may be offered directly into RPM auctions and receive the clearing price without mitigation.

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96 Effective for the 2020/2021 and subsequent delivery years, the RPM market design incorporated seasonal capacity resources. Summer period and winter period capacity must be matched either through commercial aggregation or through the optimization in equal MW amounts in the LDA or the lowest common parent LDA.
97 See 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 at P 86 (2009).
98 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER10-366-000 (January 22, 2010).
99 See 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 at P 88 (2009). There have been no Conditional Incremental Auctions.
100 On December 23, 2022, PJM filed revisions to the PJM market rules in Docket No. ER23-729-000 and contemporaneously filed a complaint in Docket No. EL23-19-000 seeking the same revisions. By order issued February 21, 2023, PJM’s revisions were accepted and the complaint was dismissed as moot. 182 FERC ¶ 61,109.
102 See 183 FERC ¶ 61,172 (2023).
103 Transmission constraints are local capacity import capability limitations (low capacity emergency transfer limit (CETL) margin over capacity emergency transfer objective (CETO)) caused by transmission facility limitations, voltage limitations or stability limitations.
Table 12 RPM reserve margin: June 1, 2019, to June 1, 2024

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>01-Jun-19</th>
<th>01-Jun-20</th>
<th>01-Jun-21</th>
<th>01-Jun-22</th>
<th>01-Jun-23</th>
<th>01-Jun-24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forecast peak load ICAP (MW)</td>
<td>151,643.5</td>
<td>148,355.3</td>
<td>149,482.9</td>
<td>149,263.6</td>
<td>149,382.2</td>
<td>151,639.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM peak load ICAP (MW)</td>
<td>12,284.2</td>
<td>11,488.3</td>
<td>11,717.7</td>
<td>28,292.8</td>
<td>29,554.6</td>
<td>30,431.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installed reserve margin (IRM)</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool wide average EFORd</td>
<td>6.08%</td>
<td>5.78%</td>
<td>5.22%</td>
<td>5.08%</td>
<td>4.87%</td>
<td>5.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM committed less deficiency UCAP (MW)</td>
<td>162,276.1</td>
<td>159,560.4</td>
<td>156,633.6</td>
<td>137,944.8</td>
<td>136,408.5</td>
<td>139,810.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM peak load ICAP (MW)</td>
<td>139,359.3</td>
<td>136,309.0</td>
<td>137,255.2</td>
<td>120,740.8</td>
<td>119,592.6</td>
<td>120,903.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve margin ICAP (MW)</td>
<td>33,421.9</td>
<td>33,039.8</td>
<td>28,005.0</td>
<td>24,586.6</td>
<td>23,799.1</td>
<td>26,420.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve margin (%)</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve margin in excess of IRM ICAP (MW)</td>
<td>11,124.4</td>
<td>11,911.9</td>
<td>7,828.5</td>
<td>6,596.3</td>
<td>5,979.8</td>
<td>5,020.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve margin in excess of IRM (%)</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM peak load UCAP (MW)</td>
<td>130,886.3</td>
<td>128,430.3</td>
<td>130,090.5</td>
<td>114,607.2</td>
<td>113,768.4</td>
<td>114,737.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM reliability requirement UCAP (MW)</td>
<td>151,832.0</td>
<td>148,331.5</td>
<td>149,210.1</td>
<td>131,679.9</td>
<td>130,714.7</td>
<td>135,048.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve margin UCAP (MW)</td>
<td>31,389.8</td>
<td>31,130.1</td>
<td>26,543.1</td>
<td>23,337.6</td>
<td>22,640.1</td>
<td>25,073.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW)</td>
<td>10,444.1</td>
<td>11,228.9</td>
<td>7,423.5</td>
<td>6,264.9</td>
<td>5,693.8</td>
<td>4,761.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected replacement capacity UCAP (MW)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Market Structure

- **RPM Installed Capacity.** In 2023, RPM installed capacity decreased 5,135.9 MW or 2.8 percent, from 183,388.8 MW on January 1, to 178,252.9 MW on December 31. Installed capacity includes net capacity imports and exports and can vary on a daily basis.

- **Reserves.** For the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction, the sum of cleared MW that were considered categorically exempt from the must offer requirement and the cleared MW of DR is 16,403.2 MW, or 97.2 percent of required reserves and 65.7 percent of total reserves. These results suggest that the required reserve margin and the actual reserve margin be considered carefully along with the obligations of the resources that the reserve margin assumes will be available.

- **RPM Installed Capacity by Fuel Type.** Of the total installed capacity on December 31, 2023, 49.3 percent was gas; 21.8 percent was coal; 18.1 percent was nuclear; 4.2 percent was hydroelectric; 2.5 percent was oil; 1.9 percent was wind; 0.4 percent was solid waste; and 2.0 percent was solar.

- **Market Concentration.** In the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction, all participants in the total PJM market as well as the LDA RPM markets failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test.107 In the 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auctions, 36 participants out of 51 participants in the total PJM market passed the TPS test, eight participants out of 17 participants in the MAAC LDA market passed the TPS test, and all participants in the EMAAC and BGE LDA markets failed the TPS test. Offer caps were applied to all sell offers for resources which
were subject to mitigation when the capacity market seller did not pass the test, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, increased the market clearing price. 108 109 110

• Imports and Exports. Of the 1,527.1 MW of imports in the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction, 1,397.6 MW cleared. Of the cleared imports, 820.4 MW (58.7 percent) were from MISO.

• Demand Resources. Committed DR was 7,707.9 MW for June 1, 2023, as a result of cleared capacity for demand resources in RPM auctions for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year (8,174.1 MW) less replacement capacity (466.2 MW).

• Energy Efficiency Resources. Committed EE was 5,891.1 MW for June 1, 2023, as a result of cleared MW in RPM auctions for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year (5,896.4 MW) less replacement MW (5.3 MW).

Market Conduct

• 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction. Of the 964 generation resources that submitted Capacity Performance offers, the MMU calculated unit specific offer caps for 22 generation resources (2.3 percent).

• 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction. Of the 250 generation resources that submitted Capacity Performance offers, the MMU calculated unit specific offer caps for five generation resources (2.0 percent).

Market Performance

• The 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted in 2023. The 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction was conducted in 2022, but the results were not posted until February 27, 2023, due to an issue with the DPL South reliability requirement. The weighted average capacity price for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year is $42.01 per MW-day, including all RPM auctions for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year held through 2023.

• For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, RPM annual charges to load are $2.2 billion.

• In the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction, the market performance was determined to be competitive.

Part V Reliability Service (RMR)

• Of the eight companies (24 units) that have provided service following deactivation requests, two companies (seven units) filed to be paid under the deactivation avoidable cost rate (DACR), the formula rate. The other six companies (17 units) filed to be paid under the cost of service recovery rate.

Generator Performance

• Forced Outage Rates. The average PJM EFORd in 2023 was 5.5 percent, a decrease from 7.9 percent in 2022. 111

Figure 8 Outages (MW): 2012 through 2023

• Generator Performance Factors. The PJM aggregate equivalent availability factor in 2023 was 83.2 percent, an increase from 82.0 percent in 2022.

108 See OATT Attachment DD § 6.5.
109 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE resources were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 at P 30 (2009).
110 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource and creating a new definition for Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a generation capacity resource the same in terms of mitigation as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2011).
111 The generator performance analysis includes all PJM capacity resources for which there are data in the PJM generator availability data systems (GADS) database. Data was downloaded from the PJM GADS database on January 24, 2024. EFORd data presented in state of the market reports may be revised based on data submitted after the publication of the reports as generation owners may submit corrections at any time with permission from PJM GADS administrators.
Section 5 Recommendations\textsuperscript{112}

Definition of Capacity

- The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. (Priority: High. First reported Q3, 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the enforcement of a consistent definition of capacity resources. The MMU recommends that the tariff requirement to be a physical resource be enforced and enhanced. The requirement to be a physical resource should apply at the time of auctions and should also constitute a commitment to be physical in the relevant delivery year. The requirement to be a physical resource should be applied to all resource types, including planned generation, demand resources, energy efficiency, and imports.\textsuperscript{113} 114 (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that DR providers be required to have a signed contract with specific customers for specific facilities for specific levels of DR at least six months prior to any capacity auction in which the DR is offered. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that Energy Efficiency Resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market because PJM’s load forecasts have accounted for EE since the 2016 load forecast for the 2019/2020 delivery year, and the tariff rationale for inclusion no longer exists.\textsuperscript{115} (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that intermittent resources, including storage, not be permitted to offer capacity MW based on energy deliveries that exceed their defined deliverability rights (CIRs). Only energy output for such resources at or below the designated CIR/deliverability level should be recognized in the definition of derated capacity (e.g. ELCC). Correctly defined ELCC derating factors are lower than the CIRs required to meet those derating factors. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Adopted 2023.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market participants to meet their deliverability requirements under the same rules. PJM should end the practice of giving away, only to intermittent resources, winter CIRs that appear to exist because other resources paid for the supporting network upgrades. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)\textsuperscript{116}
- The MMU recommends that the must offer rule in the capacity market apply to all capacity resources. There is no reason to exempt intermittent and capacity storage resources, including hydro, and demand resources from the must offer requirement. The same rules should apply to all capacity resources in order to ensure open access to the transmission system and prevent the exercise of market power through withholding. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market sellers of proposed generation capacity resources, including thermal and intermittent, to submit a binding notice of intent to offer at least six months prior to the base residual auction. This is consistent with the overall MMU recommendation that all capacity resources have a must offer obligation in the capacity market auctions. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)

Market Design and Parameters

- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate the shape of the VRR curve. The shape of the VRR curve directly results in load paying substantially more for capacity than load would pay with a vertical demand curve. More specifically, the MMU recommended that the VRR curve be rotated half way towards the vertical demand curve at the reliability requirement in the 2022 Quadrennial Review. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum price on the VRR curve be defined as net CONE. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the test for determining modeled Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) in

\textsuperscript{112} The MMU has identified serious market design issues with RPM and the MMU has made specific recommendations to address those issues. These recommendations have been made in public reports. See Table 5-2.

\textsuperscript{113} See also Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER14-503-000 (December 20, 2013).


\textsuperscript{115} “PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis,” § 3.2 Development of the Forecast, Rev. 3.6 (Nov. 15, 2023).

RPM be redefined. A detailed reliability analysis of all at risk units should be included in the redefined model. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM clear the capacity market based on nodal capacity resource locations and the characteristics of the transmission system consistent with the actual electrical facts of the grid. Absent a fully nodal capacity market clearing process, the MMU recommends that PJM use a non-nested model with all LDAs modeled including VRR curves for all LDAs. Each LDA requirement should be met with the capacity resources located within the LDA and exchanges from neighboring LDAs up to the transmission limit. LDAs should be allowed to price separate if that is the result of the LDA supply curves and the transmission constraints between LDAs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the net revenue offset calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical net revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends changing the RPM solution method to explicitly incorporate the cost of uplift (make whole) payments in the objective function. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) rules, including obligations and performance requirements, be revised and updated to ensure that the rules reflect current market realities and that FRR entities do not unfairly take advantage of those customers paying for capacity in the PJM capacity market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the market clearing results be used in settlements rather than the reallocation process currently used, or that the process of modifying the obligations to pay for capacity be reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM improve the clarity and transparency of its CETL calculations. The MMU also recommends that CETL for capacity imports into PJM be based on the ability to import capacity only where PJM capacity exists and where that capacity has a must offer requirement in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)

Offer Caps, Offer Floors, and Must Offer

- The MMU recommends using the lower of the cost or price-based energy market offer to calculate energy costs in the calculation of the historical net revenues which are an offset to gross ACR in the calculation of unit specific capacity resource offer caps based on net ACR. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends use of the MMU’s Sustainable Market Rule (SMR) in order to protect competition.
in the capacity market from nonmarket revenues.\textsuperscript{119} (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, as part of the MOPR unit specific standard of review, all projects be required to use the same basic modeling assumptions. That is the only way to ensure that projects compete on the basis of actual costs rather than on the basis of modeling assumptions.\textsuperscript{120} (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that modifications to existing resources be subject to market power related offer caps or MOPR offer floors and not be treated as new resources and therefore exempt. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the RPM market power mitigation rule be modified to apply offer caps in all cases when the three pivotal supplier test is failed and the sell offer is greater than the offer cap. This will ensure that market power does not result in an increase in uplift (make whole) payments for seasonal products. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that any combined seasonal resources be required to be in the same LDA and at the same location, in order for the energy market and capacity market to remain synchronized and reliability metrics correctly calculated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the definition of avoidable costs in the tariff be corrected to be consistent with the economic definition. Avoidable costs are costs that are neither short run marginal costs, like fuel or consumables, nor fixed costs like depreciation and rate of return. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity and therefore the competitive offer level for capacity resources and therefore the market seller offer cap. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity whether a new resource or an existing resource. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)\textsuperscript{121}

- The MMU recommends that major maintenance costs be included in the definition of avoidable costs and removed from energy offers because such costs are avoidable costs and not short run marginal costs. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that capacity market sellers be required to explicitly request and support the use of minimum MW quantities (inflexible sell offer segments) and that the requests only be permitted for defined physical reasons. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that relatively small proposed increases in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource be treated as an existing resource and subject to the corresponding market power mitigation rules and no longer be treated as planned and exempt from offer capping. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)\textsuperscript{122}

Performance Incentive Requirements of RPM

- The MMU recommends that any unit not capable of supplying energy equal to its day-ahead must offer requirement (ICAP) be required to reflect an appropriate outage. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that retroactive replacement transactions associated with a failure to perform during a PAI not be allowed and that, more generally, retroactive replacement capacity transactions not be permitted. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that there be an explicit requirement that capacity resource offers in the day-ahead energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units, including flexible operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that Capacity Performance resources be required to perform without excuses.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{119} Brief of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. EL16-49, ER18-1314-000-001; EL18-178 (October 2, 2018).

\textsuperscript{120} See 143 FERC ¶ 61,286 (2013). “We encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider, for example, whether the unit-specific review process would be more effective if PJM requires the use of common modeling assumptions for establishing unit-specific offer floors while, at the same time, allowing sellers to provide support for objective, individual cost advantages. Moreover, we encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider these modifications to the unit-specific review process together with possible enhancements to the calculation of Net CONE.”


Resources that do not perform should not be paid regardless of the reason for nonperformance. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the market data posting rules be modified to allow the disclosure of expected performance, actual performance, shortfall and bonus MW during a PAI by area without the requirement that more than three market participants' data be aggregated for posting. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM require actual seasonal tests as part of the Summer/Winter Capability Testing rules, that the number of tests be limited, and that the ambient conditions under which the tests are performed be defined to reflect seasonal extreme conditions. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM select the time and day that a unit undergoes Net Capability Verification Testing, not the unit owner, and that this information not be communicated in advance to the unit owner. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

Capacity Imports and Exports

- The MMU recommends that all capacity imports be required to be deliverable to PJM load in an identified LDA, zonal or subzonal, or defined combinations of specific zones, e.g. MAAC, prior to the relevant delivery year to ensure that they are full substitutes for internal, physical capacity resources. Pseudo ties alone are not adequate to ensure deliverability to PJM load. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all costs incurred as a result of a pseudo tied unit be borne by the unit itself and included as appropriate in unit offers in the capacity market. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

Deactivations/Retirements

- The MMU recommends that the notification requirement for deactivations be extended from 90 days prior to the date of deactivation to 12 months prior to the date of deactivation and that PJM and the MMU be provided 60 days rather than 30 days to complete their reliability and market power analyses. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends elimination of both the cost of service recovery rate option and the deactivation avoidable cost rate option for providing Part V reliability service (RMR), and their replacement with clear language that provides for the recovery of 100 percent of the actual incremental costs required to operate to provide the service plus an incentive. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that units recover all and only the incremental costs, including incremental investment costs without a cap, required to provide Part V reliability service (RMR service) that the unit owner would not have incurred if the unit owner had deactivated its unit as it proposed, plus a defined incentive payment. Customers should bear no responsibility for paying previously incurred (sunk) costs, including a return on or of prior investments. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the same reliability standard be used in capacity auctions as is used by PJM transmission planning. One result of the current design is that a unit may fail to clear in a BRA, decide to retire as a result, but then be found to be needed for reliability by PJM planning and paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) to remain in service while transmission upgrades are made. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) not be included in the calculation of CETO or reliability in the relevant LDA, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all CIRs be returned to the pool of available interconnection capability on the retirement date of generation resources in order to facilitate competitive entry into the PJM markets, open access to the transmission system and maintain the priority order defined by the
queue process. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

Section 5 Conclusion

The analysis of PJM Capacity Markets begins with market structure, which provides the framework for the actual behavior or conduct of market participants. The analysis examines participant behavior within that market structure. In a competitive market structure, market participants are constrained to behave competitively. In a market with endemic structural market power like the PJM Capacity Market, effective market power mitigation rules are required in order to constrain market participants to behave competitively. The analysis examines market performance, measured by price and the relationship between price and marginal cost, that results from the interaction of market structure and participant behavior.

The capacity market is, by design, always tight in the sense that total supply is generally only slightly larger than demand. The PJM Capacity Market is a locational market and local markets can and do have different supply demand balances than the aggregate market. While the market may be long at times, that is not the equilibrium state. Capacity in excess of demand is not sold and, if it does not earn or does not expect to earn adequate revenues in future capacity markets, or in other markets, or does not have value as a hedge, may be expected to retire, provided the market sets appropriate price signals to reflect the availability of excess supply. The demand for capacity includes expected peak load plus a reserve margin, and points on the demand curve, called the Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve, exceed peak load plus the reserve margin. The shape of the VRR curve results in the purchase of excess capacity and higher payments by customers. The impact of the VRR curve shape used in the 2024/2025 BRA compared to a vertical demand curve was a significant increase in customer payments for load as a result of buying more capacity than needed for reliability and paying a price above the competitive level as a result. The defined reliability goal is to have total supply greater than or equal to the defined demand for capacity. The level of purchased demand under RPM has generally exceeded expected peak load plus the target reserve margin, resulting in reserve margins that exceed the target. Demand for capacity is almost entirely inelastic because the market rules require loads to purchase their share of the system capacity requirement. The VRR demand curve is everywhere inelastic. The result is that any supplier that owns more capacity than the typically small difference between total supply and the defined demand is individually pivotal and therefore has structural market power. Any supplier that, jointly with two other suppliers, owns more capacity than the difference between supply and demand either in aggregate or for a local market is jointly pivotal and therefore has structural market power.

For the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction, the level of committed demand resources (8,083.9 MW UCAP) almost equals the entire level of excess capacity (8,086.8 MW). This is consistent with PJM effectively not relying on demand response for reliability in actual operations. The excess is a result of the flawed rules permitting the participation of inferior demand side resources in the capacity market. Maintaining the persistent excess has meant that PJM markets have never experienced the results of reliance on demand side resources as part of the required reserve margin, rather than as excess above the required reserve margin. PJM markets have never experienced the implications of the definition of demand side resources as a purely emergency capacity resource that triggers a PAI whenever called and can set prices at shortage levels simply by being called, when demand side resources are a significant share of required reserves. Rule changes implemented following Winter Storm Elliott eliminated the automatic triggering of a PAI when demand resources are called.123

The market design for capacity leads to structural market power in the capacity market. The capacity market is unlikely ever to approach a competitive market structure in the absence of a substantial and unlikely structural change that results in much greater diversity of ownership. Market power is and will remain endemic to the structure of the PJM Capacity Market. Nonetheless a competitive outcome can be assured by appropriate market power mitigation rules. Detailed market power mitigation rules are included in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT or Tariff). Reliance on the RPM design for competitive outcomes means reliance on the market power mitigation rules. Attenuation of those rules means that market participants are not able to rely on the competitiveness of the market outcomes. The market power rules applied in the 2021/2022 BRA and the 2022/2023 BRA were significantly flawed, as

illustrated by the results of the 2021/2022 BRA and the 2022/2023 BRA. Competitive outcomes require continued improvement of the rules and ongoing monitoring of market participant behavior and market performance. The incorrect definition of the offer caps in the 2021/2022 BRA and the 2022/2023 BRA resulted in noncompetitive offers and a noncompetitive outcome. The market power rules were corrected by the Commission in an order issued on September 2, 2021, but the modified market power rules were not implemented in the 2022/2023 BRA. The result was that capacity market prices were above the competitive level in the 2022/2023 BRA. In addition, the inclusion of offers that were not consistent with the defined terms of the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) based on the MMU’s review, but were accepted by PJM, had a significant impact on the auction results in the 2022/2023 BRA.

The implementation of the market power mitigation rules effective September 2, 2021, that corrected the definition of the market seller offer cap in the 2023/2024 BRA resolved the market power issues from the prior two BRAs. The results of the 2023/2024 BRA and the 2024/2025 BRA were competitive.

In the capacity market, as in other markets, market power is the ability of a market participant to increase the market price above the competitive level or to decrease the market price below the competitive level. In order to evaluate whether actual prices reflect the exercise of market power, it is necessary to evaluate whether market offers are consistent with competitive offers.

The definition of the market seller offer cap was changed with the introduction of the Capacity Performance (CP) rules, from offer caps based on the marginal cost of capacity to offer caps based on Net CONE. But the CP market seller offer cap was based on strong assumptions that are not correct. The derivation of the CP market seller offer cap was based on PJM’s assertion that the target price of the capacity market should be Net CONE, and simply assumed the answer. The logic underlying the CP market seller offer cap was circular. The CP market seller offer cap was incorrectly and significantly overstated as a result.

PJM’s filing of the CP design made clear that PJM was abandoning offer caps that were based on verifiable calculations of the marginal cost of providing capacity in favor of an approach that explicitly relied on wishful thinking about competitive forces resulting in competitive offers, despite the fact that the filing elsewhere recognized the high levels of concentration and the need to protect against market power in the capacity market. PJM ignored the economic logic of marginal cost. PJM simply asserted that Net CONE was the target clearing price of the capacity market. PJM’s filing explicitly stated that “By design, over time the marginal offer needed to clear the market will be priced at Net CONE, and all other resources that clear the market will be compensated at that Net CONE price.” PJM did not include a derivation of the offer cap in its CP filing, but simply asserted that Net CONE was the definition of a competitive offer. There was not a single reference to opportunity cost as the basis for the market seller offer cap in the PJM filing.

In subsequent filings, PJM included the mathematical derivation of the market seller offer cap. But the circular logic of the derivation inevitably concluded that Net CONE times B was the competitive offer. There were two key assumptions that led to that result. The derivation started by assuming that Net CONE was the target clearing price for the capacity market. PJM stated, in explaining the penalty rate, “Net CONE is the proper measure of the value of capacity.” That assumption/assumption was the basis for using Net CONE as the penalty rate. The penalty rate, adjusted for the reduced obligation defined by B, became the market seller offer cap. In addition to assuming the answer by setting the penalty rate based on net CONE, the second key counterfactual assumption was that capacity resources have the ability to costlessly switch between capacity resource status and energy only status.

The mathematical derivation also included some additional unsupported and incorrect assumptions: there

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127 176 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021); 178 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2022); appeal denied, Vistra Corp., et al. v. FERC, Case No. 21-1214 (D.C. Cir. October 10, 2023).
129 See page 55 of CP Filing.
130 PJM did not multiply Net CONE by B in its CP filing of December 12, 2014.
131 For a detailed derivation, see Erzsa to February 23, 2015 Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER15-623, et al. (February 27, 2015).
132 See page 43 of CP Filing.
are a reasonably expected number of PAI; the number of PAI used in the calculation of the nonperformance charge rate is the same as the expected PAI (360); the number of performance intervals that define the total payments must equal the denominator of the performance penalty rate; the bonus payment rate for units that overperform equals the penalty rate for units that underperform; and penalties are imposed by PJM for all cases of noncompliance as defined in the tariff and there are no excuses.

Those assumptions were not even close to being correct for the 2022/2023 BRA and Net CONE times B was not the correct offer cap as a result.

The MMU supported the modified CP filing and prepared the mathematical appendix. However, after evaluating the offer behavior and results of the capacity market auctions under CP and the actual PAI evidence and the failure to include updated PAI data in the definition of the offer cap, it became clear to the MMU that the CP model was a mistake. The market seller offer cap of Net CONE times B was ultimately a failed experiment based on the third demonstrably false assumption that competitive forces in the PJM Capacity Market would produce competitive outcomes despite an offer cap that was above the competitive level. The structure of the PJM Capacity Market is not competitive and the purpose of market power mitigation is to produce competitive results despite that fact. The Net CONE times B offer cap assumed competition where it did not exist and led to noncompetitive outcomes and led to customers being overcharged by a combined $1.454 billion in the 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 BRAs. The logical circularity of the argument as well as the fact that key assumptions are incorrect, means that the CP market seller offer cap was not based on economics or logic or math.

The correct definition of a competitive offer is the marginal cost of capacity, net ACR, where ACR includes an explicit accounting for the costs of mitigating risk, including the risk associated with capacity market nonperformance penalties, and the relevant costs of acquiring fuel, including natural gas. In response to a complaint filed by the MMU, the Commission replaced the Net CONE times B market seller offer cap with an ACR offer cap in the September 2nd Order.

The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. The use of Net CONE as the basis for the penalty rate is unsupported by economic logic. The use of Net CONE to establish penalties is a form of arbitrary administrative pricing that creates arbitrarily high risk for generators, creates complexity in the calculation of CPQR and ultimately raises the price of capacity. Rather than penalizing capacity resources for nonperformance, capacity resources should be paid the daily price of capacity only to the extent that they are available to produce energy or provide reserves, as required by PJM on a daily/hourly basis, based on their cleared capacity (ICAP). This is a positive performance incentive based on the market price of capacity rather than a penalty based on an arbitrary assumption. This would mean that capacity resources are paid to provide energy and reserves based on their full ICAP and are not paid a bonus for doing so. The reduced payments for capacity would directly reduce customers’ bills for capacity. This would also end the pretense that there will be penalty payments to fund bonus payments. This would also end the need for complex CPQR calculations based on the penalty rate and assumptions about the number and timing of PAI.

CP has not worked as the theory suggested. PAI events are high impact low probability events. The failure of the PAI incentives to prevent a very high level of outages illustrates the weakness of incentives based on this type of event. The actual performance standards were unacceptably weakened in the CP model. The standard of performance in the CP model is B * (1 – EFORd) for a unit, where B is the balancing ratio and EFORd is the forced outage rate. For example, if B were 80 percent, the actual required performance for a unit with a 10 percent EFORd would be only 72 percent of ICAP (.80 * .90). For units with high historical forced outage rates, the required performance is even lower. The obligation to perform should equal the full ICAP value of a unit, consistent with the associated must offer obligation in the energy market for capacity resources.
The fundamental mistake of the CP design was to attempt to recreate energy market incentives in the capacity market. The CP model was an explicit attempt to bring energy market shortage pricing into the capacity market design. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The CP design focused on a small number of critical hours (performance assessment hours or PAH, translated into five minute intervals as PAI) and imposed large penalties on generators that failed to produce energy only during those hours. But the use of capacity market penalties rather than energy market incentives created a new risk. While there are differences of opinion about how to value the risk, this CP risk is not risk that is fundamental to the operation of a wholesale power market. This is risk created by the CP design in order, in unsupported concept, to provide an incentive to produce energy during high demand hours that is even higher than the energy market incentive, amplified by an operating reserve demand curves (ORDC). The risk created by CP is not limited to risk for individual generators, but extends to the viability of the market. If penalties create bankruptcies that threaten the viability of required energy output from the affected units, there is a risk to the market.

Winter Storm Elliott provided the first real test of the CP design. Elliott showed that the CP design does not provide effective incentives. There was an extremely high forced outage level during Winter Storm Elliott despite the incentives and despite the fact that the effectively uncapped market seller offer cap (MSOC) was in place (Net CONE times B) for RPM auctions conducted for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year that included Winter Storm Elliott. In addition, it has been clear from prior, very brief and local PAI events that the process of defining excuses and retroactive replacement transactions, imposing penalties and paying bonuses is complex and very difficult to administer, and includes substantial subjective elements. PAI incentives are not effective market incentives. PAI incentives are administrative and nonmarket incentives that are not compatible with an effective market design. The energy market clearing, in contrast, is transparent and efficient and timely. While there are issues with the details of energy market pricing that must be addressed, including shortage pricing, the energy market does not include or create the significant and long lasting uncertainty created by the PAI rules as exhibited most dramatically by the results of Elliott. The PAI design creates an administrative process that adds unacceptable uncertainty to the process and that can never approach the effectiveness of the energy market in providing price signals and timely settlement.

The MMU recommends that the must offer rule in the capacity market apply to all capacity resources. The fundamental mistake of the CP design was to attempt to recreate energy market incentives in the capacity market. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The CP model was an explicit attempt to bring energy market shortage pricing into the capacity market design. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market.
must offer requirement for capacity resources. The capacity market can work only if both are enforced.

It is not clear why intermittents and storage were exempted from the must offer obligation to date, and no explicit reason stated, but as the role of intermittents and storage grows it is essential to reestablish the must offer obligation for all resources. The capacity market has included balanced must buy and must sell obligations from its inception.

The MMU concludes that the results of the 2024/2025 RPM Base Residual Auction were competitive. A competitive offer in the capacity market is equal to net ACR.\(^{139}\) The ACR values were based on data provided by the participants and were consistent with competitive offers for the relevant capacity.

The MMU also concludes that market prices were significantly affected by flaws in the capacity market rules and in the application of the capacity market rules by PJM, including the shape of the VRR curve; the overstatement of intermittent MW offers; the inclusion of sell offers from DR; and capacity imports.

The MMU also concludes that, although not an issue in the 2024/2025 Base Residual Auction, the rules permit the exercise of market power without mitigation for seasonal products through uplift payments for noncompetitive offers, rather than through higher prices.\(^{140}\) Although the impact did not arise in the 2024/2025 Base Residual Auction, the issue should be addressed immediately in order to prevent the impact from increasing and because the solution is simple.

Changes to the capacity market design have addressed some but not all of the significant recommendations made by the MMU in prior reports. The MMU had recommended the elimination of the 2.5 percent demand adjustment (Short-Term Resource Procurement Target). The MMU had recommended that the performance incentives in the capacity market design be strengthened.

The MMU had recommended that generation capacity resources pay penalties if they fail to produce energy when called upon during any of the hours defined as critical. The MMU had recommended that the net revenue calculation used by PJM to calculate the Net Cost of New Entry (CONE) VRR parameter reflect the actual flexibility of units in responding to price signals rather than using assumed fixed operating blocks that are not a result of actual unit limitations. The MMU had recommended that all capacity imports be required to be pseudo tied in order to ensure that imports are as close to full substitutes for internal, physical capacity resources as possible. The MMU had recommended that the definition of demand side resources be modified in order to ensure that such resources are full substitutes for and provide the same value in the capacity market as generation resources, although this recommendation has not been incorporated in PJM rules. The MMU had recommended that both the Limited and the Extended Summer DR products be eliminated and that the restrictions on the availability of Annual DR be eliminated in order to ensure that the DR product has the same unlimited obligation to provide capacity year round as Generation Capacity Resources. The MMU had recommended that the EE addback calculation be corrected. The MMU had recommended that the default Avoidable Cost Rate (ACR) escalation method be modified in order to ensure accuracy and eliminate double counting.

The MMU is required to identify market issues and to report them to the Commission and to market participants. The Commission decides on any action related to the MMU’s findings.

The MMU has identified serious market design issues with RPM and the MMU has made specific recommendations.

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\(^{139}\) 174 FERC ¶ 61,212 (“March 18th Order”) at 65.

\(^{140}\) PJM uses various terms for uplift including make whole payments (often used in the capacity market) and operating reserve payments (often used in the energy market). The term uplift is used in this report to refer to out of market payments made by PJM to market participants in addition to market revenues.
to address those issues.141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151

In 2023, the MMU prepared a number of RPM related reports and testimony, shown in Table 5–2.

The PJM markets have worked to provide incentives to entry and to retain capacity. PJM had excess reserves of 5,979.8 ICAP MW (5,693.8 MW UCAP) on June 1, 2023, and will have excess reserves of 5,020.8 ICAP MW (4,761.4 MW UCAP) on June 1, 2024, based on current positions.152 A majority of capacity investments in PJM were financed by market sources.153 Of the 51,857.2 MW of additional capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2007/2008 through 2022/2023 Delivery Years, 39,471.5 MW (76.1 percent) were based on market funding. Of the 3,824.1 MW of additional capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2023/2024 through 2024/2025 Delivery Years, 3,284.6 MW (85.9 percent) were based on market funding. Those investments were made based on the assumption that markets would be allowed to work and that inefficient units would exit.

It is essential that any approach to the PJM markets incorporate a consistent view of how the preferred market design is expected to provide competitive results in a sustainable market design over the long run. A sustainable market design means a market design that results in appropriate incentives to competitive market participants to retire units and to invest in new units over time such that reliability is ensured as a result of the functioning of the market.

A sustainable competitive wholesale power market must recognize three salient structural elements: state nonmarket revenues for renewable energy; a significant level of generation resources subject to cost of service regulation; and the structure and performance of the existing market based generation fleet.

In order to attract and retain adequate resources for the reliable operation of the energy market, revenues from PJM energy, ancillary services and capacity markets must be adequate for those resources. That adequacy requires a capacity market. The capacity market plays the essential role of equilibrating the revenues necessary to incent competitive entry and exit of the resources needed for reliability, with the revenues from the energy market that are directly affected by nonmarket sources.

Price suppression below the competitive level in the capacity market should not be acceptable and is not consistent with a competitive market design. Harmonizing means that the integrity of each paradigm is maintained and respected. Harmonizing permits nonmarket resources to have an unlimited impact on energy markets and energy prices. Harmonizing means designing a capacity market to account for these energy market impacts, clearly limiting the impact of nonmarket revenues on the capacity market and ensuring competitive outcomes in the capacity market and thus in the entire market.

Overview: Section 6, Demand Response

- **Demand Response Activity.** Demand response activity includes economic demand response (economic resources), emergency and pre-emergency demand response (demand resources), synchronized reserves and regulation. Economic demand response participates in the energy market. Emergency and pre-emergency demand response participates in the capacity market and energy market.154 Demand response resources participate in the synchronized reserve market. Demand response resources participate in the regulation market.

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152 The calculated reserve margin for June 1, 2024, does not account for cleared buy bids that have not been used in replacement capacity transactions.
154 Emergency demand response refers to both emergency and pre-emergency demand response.
Total demand response revenue decreased by $277.4 million, 61.9 percent, from $448.1 million in 2022 to $170.7 million in 2023, primarily due to a decrease in capacity market prices and revenue. Emergency demand response revenue accounted for 90.0 percent of all demand response revenue, economic demand response for 2.1 percent, demand response in the synchronized reserve market for 3.6 percent and demand response in the regulation market for 4.3 percent.

Total emergency demand response revenue decreased by $260.2 million, 62.9 percent, from $413.9 million in 2022 to $153.7 million in 2023. This decrease consisted of 86.7 percent of capacity market revenue and 13.3 percent of emergency energy revenue.

Economic demand response revenue decreased by $7.4 million, 67.5 percent, from $10.9 million in 2022 to $3.5 million in 2023. Demand response revenue in the synchronized reserve market decreased by $8.6 million, 58.1 percent, from $14.9 million in 2022 to $6.2 million in 2023. Demand response revenue in the regulation market decreased by $1.2 million, 14.0 percent, from $8.5 million in 2022 to $7.3 million in 2023.

- **Demand Response Energy Payments are Uplift.** Energy payments to emergency and economic demand response resources are uplift. LMP does not cover energy payments although emergency and economic demand response can and does set LMP. Energy payments to emergency demand resources are paid by PJM market participants in proportion to their net purchases in the real-time market. Energy payments to economic demand resources are paid by real-time exports from PJM and real-time loads in each zone for which the load-weighted, average real-time LMP for the hour during which the reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the net benefits test price for that month.\(^{157}\)

- **Demand Response Market Concentration.** The ownership of economic load response resources was highly concentrated in 2022 and 2023. The HHI for economic resource reductions increased by 1268 points from 7961 in 2022 to 9229 in 2023. The ownership of emergency load response resources is highly concentrated. The HHI for emergency load response committed MW was 2051 for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. In the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, the four largest CSPs owned 82.8 percent of all committed demand response UCAP MW. The HHI for emergency demand response committed MW is 2295 for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. In the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, the four largest CSPs own 85.6 percent of all committed demand response UCAP MW.

- **Limited Locational Dispatch of Demand Resources.** With full implementation of the Capacity Performance rules in the capacity market in the 2020/2021 Delivery Year, PJM should be able to individually dispatch any capacity performance resource, including demand resources. But PJM cannot dispatch demand resources by node with the current rules because demand resources are not registered to a node. Aggregation rules allow a demand resource that incorporates many small End Use Customers to span an entire zone, which is inconsistent with nodal dispatch.

- **Energy Efficiency.** Energy efficiency resources are not capacity resources in PJM. The total MW of energy efficiency resources committed in RPM increased by 30.1 percent in the last capacity market base auction, from 5,896.4 MW in the 2023/2024 Delivery Year to 7,668.7 MW in the 2024/2025 Delivery Year. In the 2024/2025 Delivery Year, although EE is not a capacity resource, EE MW paid in the auction were equal to 5.2 percent of all cleared capacity MW.\(^{157}\)

• **Energy Efficiency Market Concentration.** The HHI for Energy Efficiency on an aggregate market basis shows that ownership is highly concentrated. The four largest companies typically contribute 90 percent or greater of all committed Energy Efficiency UCAP MW. The HHI for Energy Efficiency resources shows that ownership is highly concentrated for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year, with an HHI value of 5624. In the 2024/2025 Delivery Year, the four largest companies own 98.0 percent of all committed Energy Efficiency UCAP MW.

**Section 6 Recommendations**

- The MMU recommends that PJM report the response of demand capacity resources to dispatch by PJM as the actual change in load rather than simply the difference between the amount of capacity purchased by the customer and the actual metered load. The current approach significantly overstates the response to PJM dispatch. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that demand resources offering as supply in the capacity market be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called. (Priority: High. First reported Q2 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, as an alternative to including demand resources as supply in the capacity market, that demand resources have the option to be on the demand side of the markets, that customers be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion, that customer payments be determined only by metered load, and that PJM forecasts immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the option to specify a minimum dispatch price (strike price) for demand resources be eliminated and that participating resources receive the hourly real-time LMP less any generation component of their retail rate.\(^{158}\) (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the maximum offer for demand resources be the same as the maximum offer for generation resources and that the same cost verification rules applied to generation resources apply to demand resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the demand resources be treated as economic resources, responding to economic price signals like other capacity resources. The MMU recommends that demand resources not be treated as emergency resources, not trigger a PJM emergency and not trigger a Performance Assessment Interval. The MMU recommends that demand resources be available for every hour of the year. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Partially Adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the Emergency Program Energy Only option be eliminated because the opportunity to receive the appropriate energy market incentive is already provided in the economic program. (Priority: Low. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that demand resources be required to provide their nodal location, comparable to generation resources. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM require nodal dispatch of demand resources with no advance notice required or, if nodal location is not required, subzonal dispatch of demand resources with no advance notice required. The MMU recommends that, if PJM continues to use subzones for any purpose, PJM clearly define the role of subzones in the dispatch of demand response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM not remove any defined subzones and maintain a public record of all created and removed subzones. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

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• The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the measurement of compliance across zones within a compliance aggregation area (CAA). The multiple zone approach is less locational than the zonal and subzonal approach and creates larger mismatches between the locational need for the resources and the actual response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that measurement and verification methods for demand resources be modified to reflect compliance more accurately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that compliance rules be revised to include submittal of all necessary hourly load data, and that negative values be included when calculating event compliance across hours and registrations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM adopt the ISO-NE five-minute metering requirements in order to ensure that operators have the necessary information for reliability and that market payments to demand resources be calculated based on interval meter data at the site of the demand reductions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends demand response event compliance be calculated on a five minute basis for all capacity performance resources and that the penalty structure reflect five minute compliance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that load management testing be initiated by PJM with advance notice to CSPs identical to the actual lead time required in an emergency in order to accurately represent the conditions of an emergency event. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially Adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that shutdown cost be defined as the cost to curtail load for a given period that does not vary with the measured reduction or, for behind the meter generators, be the start cost defined in Manual 15 for generators. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that the Net Benefits Test be eliminated and that demand response resources be paid LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that the tariff rules for demand response clarify that a resource and its CSP, if any, must notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and must terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at defined levels because load has been reduced or eliminated, as in the case of bankrupt and/or out of service facilities. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that there be only one demand response product in the capacity market, with an obligation to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that the lead times for demand resources be shortened to 30 minutes with a one hour minimum dispatch for all resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)

• The MMU recommends setting the baseline for measuring capacity compliance under winter compliance at the customers’ PLC, similar to GLD, to avoid double counting. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)

• The MMU recommends the Relative Root Mean Squared Test be required for all demand resources with a CBL. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Partially adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that the limits imposed on the pre-emergency and emergency demand response share of the synchronized reserve market be eliminated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Adopted 2022.)

• The MMU recommends that 30 minute pre-emergency and emergency demand response be considered to be 30 minute reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that energy efficiency resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market and that PJM should ensure that the impact

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160 See ISO-NE Tariff, Section III, Market Rule 1, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2, “Demand Response,” [http://www.iso-ne.com/regulatory/tariff/sect_3/mr1_append-e.pdf](http://www.iso-ne.com/regulatory/tariff/sect_3/mr1_append-e.pdf). Accessed October 17, 2017. ISO-NE requires that DR have an interval meter with five-minute data reported to the ISO and each behind the meter generator is required to have a separate interval meter. After June 1, 2017, demand response resources in ISO-NE must also be registered at a single node.

161 PJM’s Capacity Performance design requires resources to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year, but demand resources still have a limited mandatory compliance window.
of EE measures on the load forecast is incorporated immediately rather than with the existing lag. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Partially Adopted 2016.)

- The MMU recommends that, if energy efficiency resources remain in the capacity market, PJM codify eligibility requirements to claim the capacity rights to energy efficiency installations in the tariff and that PJM institute a registration system to track claims to capacity rights to energy efficiency installations and document installation periods of energy efficiency installations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM include a 5.0 MW maximum size cap on DER aggregations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI. The MMU recommends that PJM revise the performance requirements for demand resources to include an event specific measurement for dispatch occurring outside of Performance Assessment Events and penalties for nonperformance. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

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### Section 6 Conclusion

A fully functional demand side of the electricity market means that End Use Customers or their designated intermediaries will have the ability to see real-time energy price signals in real time, will have the ability to react to real-time prices in real time and will have the ability to receive the direct benefits or costs of changes in real-time energy use. In addition, customers or their designated intermediaries will have the ability to see current capacity prices, will have the ability to react to capacity prices and will have the ability to receive the direct benefits or costs of changes in the demand for capacity in the same year in which demand for capacity changes. A functional demand side of these markets means that customers will have the ability to make decisions about levels of power consumption based both on how customers value the power and on the actual cost of that power.

In the energy market, if there is to be a demand side program, demand resources should be paid the value of energy, which is LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. There is no reason to have the net benefits test. The necessity for the net benefits test is an illustration of the illogical approach to demand side compensation embodied in paying full LMP to demand resources. The benefit of demand side resources is not that they suppress market prices, but that customers can choose not to consume at the current price of power, that individual customers benefit from their choices and that the choices of all customers are reflected in market prices. If customers face the market price, customers should have the ability to not purchase power and the market impact of that choice does not require a test for appropriateness.
If demand resources are to continue competing directly with generation capacity resources in the PJM Capacity Market, the product must be defined such that it can actually serve as a substitute for generation. This is a prerequisite to a functional market design. Demand resources do not have a must offer requirement into the day-ahead energy market, are able to offer above $1,000 per MWh without providing a fuel cost policy, or any rationale for the offer. Demand resources do not have telemetry requirements similar to other Capacity Performance resources. Until July 30, 2023, including Elliott, PJM automatically, and inappropriately, triggered a PAI when demand resources are dispatched.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources offering as supply in the capacity market should be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should be defined in PJM rules as an economic resource, as generation is defined. Demand resources should be required to offer in the day-ahead energy market and should be called when the resources are required and prior to the declaration of an emergency. Demand resources should be available for every hour of the year. The fact that demand resources are only obligated to respond for defined time periods meant that PJM could not fully use demand resources during Winter Storm Elliott (Elliott). Demand resources should be treated as economic resources like any other capacity resource. Demand resources should be called whenever economic and paid the LMP rather than an inflated strike price up to $1,849 per MWh that is set by the seller.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should be subject to robust measurement and verification techniques to ensure that transitional DR programs incent the desired behavior. The methods used in PJM programs today are not adequate to determine and quantify deliberate actions taken to reduce consumption.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should provide a nodal location and should be dispatched nodally to enhance the effectiveness of demand resources and to permit the efficient functioning of the energy market. Both subzonal and multi-zone compliance should be eliminated because they are inconsistent with an efficient nodal market.

In order to be a substitute for generation, compliance by demand resources with PJM dispatch instructions should include both increases and decreases in load. Compliance of demand resources for capacity purposes during a Performance Assessment Event is measured relative to either Peak Load Contribution or Winter Peak Load, which are static values. If a demand resource’s metered load increases above these reference values during a PAI, the current method applied by PJM simply ignores increases in load and thus artificially overstates compliance.163

In order to be a substitute for generation, Actual Performance of demand resources during a Performance Assessment Event should be determined consistent with that of generation and should not be netted across the Emergency Action Area (EAA). The Capacity Market Seller’s Performance Shortfalls for Demand Resources in the EAA are netted to determine a net EAA Performance Shortfall for the Performance Assessment Interval. Any net positive EAA Performance Shortfall is allocated to the Capacity Market Seller’s demand resources that under complied within the EAA on a prorata basis based on the under compliance MW, and such seller’s demand resources will be assessed a Performance Shortfall for the Performance Assessment Interval. Any net negative EAA Performance Shortfall is allocated to the Market Seller’s Demand Resources that over complied within the EAA on a prorata basis based on over compliance MW, and such Market Seller’s Demand Resources will be assessed Bonus Performance. Netting of performance of Demand Resources across the EAA is inconsistent with the performance measurement of other Capacity Performance resources.

In order to be a substitute for generation, any demand resource and its Curtailment Service Provider (CSP), should be required to notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and to terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at the specified level, such as in the case of bankrupt and out of service facilities. Generation resources are required to inform PJM of any change

in availability status, including outages and shutdown status.

As an alternative to being a substitute for generation in the capacity market, demand response resources should have the option to be on the demand side of the capacity market rather than on the supply side. Rather than detailed demand response programs with their attendant complex and difficult to administer rules, customers would be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion and the level of usage paid for would be defined by metered usage rather than a complex and inaccurate measurement protocol, and PJM forecasts would immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior.

The MMU peak shaving proposal at the Summer-Only Demand Response Senior Task Force (SODRSTF) is an example of how to create a demand side product that is on the demand side of the market and not on the supply side. The MMU proposal was based on the BGE load forecasting program and the Pennsylvania Act 129 Utility Program. Under the MMU proposal, participating load would inform PJM prior to an RPM auction of the MW participating, the months and hours of participation and the temperature humidity index (THI) threshold at which load would be reduced. PJM would reduce the load forecast used in the RPM auction based on the designated reductions. Load would agree to curtail demand to at or below a defined FSL, less than the customer PLC, when the THI exceeds a defined level or load exceeds a specified threshold. By relying on metered load and the PLC, load can reduce its demand for capacity and that reduction can be verified without complicated and inaccurate metrics to estimate load reductions. Under PJM’s weakened version of the program, performance is be measured under the current economic demand response CBL rules which means relying on load estimates rather than actual metered load. PJM’s proposal includes only a THI curtailment trigger and not an overall load curtailment trigger.

The long term appropriate end state for demand resources in the PJM markets should be comparable to the demand side of any market. Customers should use energy as they wish, accounting for market prices in any way they like, and that usage will determine the amount of capacity and energy for which each customer pays. There would be no counterfactual measurement and verification.

Under this approach, customers that wish to avoid capacity payments would reduce their load during expected high load hours, not limited to a small number of peak hours. Capacity costs would be assigned to LSEs and by LSEs to customers, based on actual load on the system during these hours. Customers wishing to avoid high energy prices would reduce their load during high price hours. Customers would pay for what they actually use, as measured by meters, rather than relying on flawed measurement and verification methods. No measurement and verification estimates are required. No promises of future reductions which can only be verified by inaccurate and biased measurement and verification methods are required. To the extent that customers enter into contracts with CSPs or LSEs to manage their payments, measurement and verification can be negotiated as part of a bilateral commercial contract between a customer and its CSP or LSE. But the system would be paid for actual, metered usage, regardless of which contractual party takes that obligation.

This approach provides more flexibility to customers to limit usage at their discretion. There is no requirement to be available year round or every hour of every day. There is no 30 minute notice requirement. There is no requirement to offer energy into the day-ahead market. All decisions about interrupting are up to the customers only and they may enter into bilateral commercial arrangements with CSPs at their sole discretion. Customers would pay for capacity and energy depending solely on metered load.

A transition to this end state should be defined in order to ensure that appropriate levels of demand side response are incorporated in PJM’s load forecasts and thus in the demand curve in the capacity market. That transition should be defined by the PRD rules, modified as proposed by the MMU.

This approach would work under the CP design in the capacity market. This approach is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court decision in EPSA as it does
not depend on whether FERC has jurisdiction over the demand side. This approach will allow FERC to more fully realize its overriding policy objective to create competitive and efficient wholesale energy markets. The decision of the Supreme Court addressed jurisdictional issues and did not address the merits of FERC’s approach. The Supreme Court’s decision has removed the uncertainty surrounding the jurisdictional issues and created the opportunity for FERC to revisit its approach to demand side.

Any discussion of demand resource performance during a PAI must recognize the significant problems with the definition of performance for demand resources. As defined by PJM rules, performance, contrary to intuition, does not mean actually reducing load in response to a PJM request for demand resources. Performance means only that, on a net portfolio basis, the amount of capacity paid for in the capacity market (PLC) minus actual metered load is equal to the amount of demand side capacity sold in the capacity market (ICAP). If a demand resource location was already at a reduced load level when PJM called a PAI, the demand resource would be deemed to have performed if the PLC less the metered load level was equal to the ICAP sold in the capacity market. The standard reporting of demand side response is therefore misleading because it includes loads that were already lower for any reason as a response. That is exactly what happened during Winter Storm Elliott.

In concept, Energy Efficiency Resources (EE) reflect investments in measures that improve the energy efficiency of various applications compared to current practices and standards. The original rationale for the inclusion of EE in the PJM capacity market was that the load forecasts did not account for the impact of EE on demand for four years. That is no longer true. EE is not actually included in the capacity market. EE is not a capacity resource in PJM. EE does not directly affect the price for capacity in the capacity markets. EE payments are a subsidy paid directly by load via an uplift charge, through the capacity market mechanism. EE should not continue to be paid the capacity market clearing price because PJM’s load forecasts now account for EE. Revisions to the PJM load forecast to incorporate energy efficiency were endorsed at the November 19, 2015, MRC with EE explicitly incorporated in PJM load forecasts beginning with auctions conducted in 2016 for delivery years 2016/2017 and forward. Concurrently, PJM began use of an addback method to reflect the inclusion of EE in the peak load forecast. EE is already compensated through the markets to the extent that it actually reduces customer payments for energy and capacity. The removal of EE from the capacity market mechanism would make it unnecessary to address the multiple outstanding issues related to the almost impossible task of accurately measuring the impact of EE, determining the ownership of the imputed savings, and ensuring that the resources are not paid for more than four years. Even if EE were measurable, EE is required to support energy usage reductions for only 416 hours per year, only 4.7 percent of all hours, which is not consistent with the must offer obligations of other capacity resources.

Overview: Section 7, Net Revenue

- Energy market net revenues are significantly affected by energy prices and fuel prices. Energy prices and fuel prices were significantly lower in 2023 than in 2022. The net effects were that in 2023, average energy market theoretical net revenues decreased by 44 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT), 46 percent for a new combined cycle (CC), 67 percent for a new coal plant (CP), 57 percent for a new nuclear plant, 97 percent for a new diesel (DS), 61 percent for a new onshore wind installation, 62 percent for a new offshore wind installation and 65 percent for a new solar installation.
- The price of natural gas and coal decreased in 2023. The marginal costs of a new CC and CT were less than the marginal cost of a new CP in 2023.
- In 2023, spark spreads, dark spreads, and the volatility of both spark spreads and dark spreads decreased in BGE, COMED, PSEG, and Western Hub compared to 2022.
- In 2023, capacity market revenue accounted for 27 percent of theoretical total net revenues for a new CT, 20 percent for a new CC, 54 percent for a new CP, 8 percent for a new nuclear plant, 72 percent for a new DS, 2 percent for a new onshore wind installation, 4 percent for a new offshore wind installation and 3 percent for a new solar installation.
- In 2023, no new CT, CC, CP, nuclear, or DS units would have received sufficient total net revenue to cover levelized total costs in any zone.

- In 2023, a theoretical new entrant onshore wind installation would not have received sufficient net revenue to cover levelized total costs in any of the four zones analyzed. Total net revenues would have covered between 49 and 57 percent of levelized total costs of in AEP, APS, COMED and PE. Renewable energy credits (RECs) were an average of 50 percent of the total net revenue of an onshore wind installation.

- In 2023, a theoretical new entrant offshore wind installation would not have received sufficient net revenue to cover levelized total costs in any of the three zones analyzed. Total net revenues would have covered between 27 and 32 percent of levelized total costs. Renewable energy credits were an average of 56 percent of the total net revenue of an offshore wind installation.

- In 2023, a theoretical new entrant solar installation would have received sufficient net revenue to cover more than 100 percent of levelized total costs in ACEC, JCPLC and PSEG and between 78 and 98 percent of levelized total costs in DPL and DOM. Renewable energy credits were an average of 77 percent of the total net revenue of a solar installation.

- In 2023, most units did not achieve full recovery of avoidable costs through net revenue from energy...
and ancillary services markets alone, illustrating the critical role of the capacity market in providing incentives for continued operation and investment. In 2023, capacity market revenue was sufficient to cover the shortfall between net energy revenue and avoidable costs for the majority of units and technology types in PJM, with the exception of coal and CT units.

- All existing PJM nuclear plants are expected to cover their avoidable costs from energy and capacity market revenues in 2024, 2025, and 2026, without subsidies, with the exception of Davis Besse and Perry, both single unit nuclear plants, in 2024.

- New entrant solar and wind resources are competitive with existing coal resources, including the effect of current federal tax subsidies and RECs revenues available to the intermittent resources.

- Between 42,877 and 57,694 MW of capacity are at risk of retirement by 2030, consisting of 4,285 MW currently announced retirements, 19,635 MW expected to retire for regulatory reasons, and between 18,957 and 33,774 MW expected to be uneconomic. This capacity consists primarily of coal plants and CT units. Replacing the capacity of the retiring non-gas resources with gas-fired capacity would require between 1.9 and 4.8 BCF/day of new firm gas supply depending on the MW at risk and the extent to which new gas fired capacity is dual fuel.

Section 7 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that the net revenue calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

Section 7 Conclusion

Wholesale electric power markets are affected by externally imposed reliability requirements. A regulatory authority external to the market makes a determination as to the acceptable level of reliability which is enforced through a requirement to maintain a target level of installed or unforced capacity. The requirement to maintain a target level of installed capacity can be enforced via a variety of mechanisms, including government construction of generation, full requirement contracts with developers to construct and operate generation, state utility commission mandates to construct capacity, or capacity markets of various types. Regardless of the enforcement mechanism, the exogenous requirement to construct capacity in excess of what is constructed in response to energy market signals alone has an impact on energy markets. The reliability requirement results in maintaining a level of capacity in excess of the level that would result from the operation of an energy market alone. The result of that additional capacity is to reduce the level and volatility of energy market prices and to reduce the duration of high energy market prices. This, in turn, reduces net revenue to generation owners which reduces the incentive to invest. The exact level of both aggregate and locational excess capacity is a function of the calculation methods used by RTOs and ISOs. A basic purpose of the capacity market is allow all cleared capacity resources the opportunity to cover their net avoidable costs on an annual basis to ensure the economic sustainability of the reliable energy market.

Overview: Section 8, Environmental and Renewables

Federal Environmental Regulation

- MATS. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule (MATS) applies the Clean Air Act (CAA) maximum achievable control technology (MACT) requirement to new or modified sources of emissions of mercury and arsenic, acid gas, nickel, selenium and cyanide. On February 13, 2023, the EPA issued a final rule reaffirming that it remains appropriate and necessary to regulate hazardous air pollutants (HAP), including mercury, from power plants after considering cost. This action revokes a 2020 finding that it was not appropriate and necessary to regulate coal and oil fired power plants under CAA § 112, and would restore the basis for the MATS rule. On April 3, 2023, the EPA proposed

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to strengthen and update the MATS rule to reflect recent developments in control technologies and the performance of coal fired plants.172

- Air Quality Standards (NOx and SO2 Emissions). The CAA requires each state to attain and maintain compliance with fine particulate matter (PM) and ozone national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). The CAA also requires that each state prohibit emissions that significantly interfere with the ability of another state to meet NAAQS.173 On March 15, 2021, the EPA finalized decreases to allowable emissions under the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and the 2008 ozone NAAQS for 10 PJM states.174 On February 28, 2022, the EPA proposed a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), to be known as the “Transport Rule,” for 26 states that addresses the contribution of those states to problems in other states in attaining and maintaining the 2015 Ozone NAAQS.175 The proposed FIP requirements would establish ozone season NOx emissions budgets for electric generating units in the PJM states, excluding North Carolina and the District of Columbia. On January 6, 2023, the EPA proposed to lower the primary annual PM2.5 standard to 9.0 to 10.0 µg/m3 from 12.0 µg/m3.176

- NSR. On August 1, 2019, the EPA proposed to reform the New Source Review (NSR) permitting program.177 NSR requires new projects and existing projects receiving major overhauls that significantly increase emissions to obtain permits.

- RICE. Stationary reciprocating internal combustion engines (RICE) are electrical generation facilities like diesel engines typically used for backup, emergency or supplemental power. RICE must be tested annually.178 RICE do not have to meet the same emissions standards if they are stationary emergency RICE. Environmental regulations allow stationary emergency RICE participating in demand response programs to operate for up to 100 hours per calendar year when providing emergency demand response when there is a PJM declared NERC Energy Emergency Alert Level 2 or there are five percent voltage/frequency deviations.

PJM does not prevent stationary emergency RICE that cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of EPA emissions standards from participating in PJM markets as DR. Some stationary emergency RICE that cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of emissions standards are now included in DR portfolios. Stationary emergency RICE should be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of emissions standards.

- Greenhouse Gas Emissions. On May 23, 2023, the EPA proposed five separate actions under CAA § 111(a)(1) addressing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel-fired electric generating units (EGUs):179 The proposed new source performance standards (NSPS) and emission guidelines reflect the application of the best system of emission reduction (BSER). The proposal includes emission guidelines for GHG emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired steam generating EGUs (including coal, oil or gas). For coal fired EGUs, compliance is required by January 1, 2030, with standards that vary based on whether the EGU commits to retire before 2032, 2035, 2040, or does not commit to retire before 2040.180 The EPA proposes to repeal the Affordable Clean Energy Rule.181

- Cooling Water Intakes. An EPA rule implementing Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires that cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts.182

- Waters of the United States. On December 30, 2022, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers announced a final rule revising the definition of WOTUS.183 The rule will become effective on March 20, 2023. A recent Supreme Court decision

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178 See 40 CFR § 63.66400.


180 Carbon Pollution Rule at 33171–33373.

181 Carbon Pollution Rule at 33343.


substantially narrowed the definition of WOTUS to encompass “only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic[al] features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.” 184 On August 29, 2023, the EPA issued a final rule modifying its December 30, 2022, rule to define adjacent wetlands consistent with the Supreme Court holding.185

- **Effluents.** Under the CWA, the EPA regulates (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)) discharges from and intakes to power plants, including water cooling systems at steam electric power generating stations. Since 2015, the EPA has been strengthening certain discharge limits applicable to steam generating units, and some plant owners have already indicated an intent to close certain generating units as a result. In March 2023, the EPA proposed to further strengthen regulation of effluent discharges.186

- **Coal Ash.** The EPA administers the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which governs the disposal of solid and hazardous waste. 187 The EPA has adopted significant changes to the implementing regulations that will require closing noncompliant impoundments, and, as a result, the host power plant. The EPA is implementing a process for extensions to as late as October 17, 2028. The EPA is reviewing applications received from PJM plant owners for extensions of the revised Coal Combustion Residuals Rule.

**State Environmental Regulation**

- **Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).** The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a CO2 emissions cap and trade agreement among Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont that applies to power generation facilities. New Jersey rejoined on January 1, 2020.188 Virginia joined RGGI on January 1, 2021, and left RGGI on December 31, 2023. A challenge to Virginia’s leaving RGGI is pending.189 Pennsylvania took action to join RGGI on April 23, 2022, but such action has been enjoined by court order on appeal.190 191 A decision on the merits of the appeal is pending at the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The auction price in the December 6, 2023, RGGI auction was $14.88 per short ton, or $16.40 per metric tonne.

- **Illinois Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA).** On September 16, 2021, the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA) became effective. CEJA created an expanded nuclear subsidy program. CEJA mandated that all fossil fuel plants close by 2045. CEJA established emissions caps for investor owned, gas-fired units with three years of operating history, effective October 1, 2021, on a rolling 12 month basis. More than 10,000 MW of capacity are currently affected.

- **Carbon Price.** If the price of carbon were $50.00 per metric tonne, short run marginal costs would have increased by $24.45 per MWh or 96.7 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT) unit, $16.85 per MWh or 97.3 percent for a new combined cycle (CC) unit and $43.12 per MWh or 115.6 percent for a new coal plant (CP) for 2023.

**State Renewable Portfolio Standards**

- **RPS.** In PJM, ten of 14 jurisdictions have enacted legislation requiring that a defined percentage of retail suppliers’ load be served by renewable resources, for which definitions vary. These are typically known as renewable portfolio standards, or RPS. As of December 31, 2023, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, DC have renewable portfolio standards. Indiana has a voluntary renewable portfolio standard. Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia do not have renewable portfolio standards.

- **RPS Cost.** The cost of complying with RPS, as reported by the states, is $9.4 billion over the eight year period from 2014 through 2021, an average

184 See Sackett et al. v. EPA et al., No. 21-454 (S. Ct. 2023), slip op. at 14.
187 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.
189 See Floyd County Circuit Court, Virginia, Case No. C21300073-00.
annual RPS compliance cost of $1.2 billion. The compliance cost for 2021, the most recent year with almost complete data, was $2.1 billion.192

Emissions Controls in PJM Markets

- **Regulations.** Environmental regulations affect decisions about emission control investments in existing units, investment in new units and decisions to retire units. As a result of environmental regulations and agreements to limit emissions, many PJM units burning fossil fuels have installed emission control technology.

- **Emissions Controls.** In PJM, as of December 31, 2023, 97.4 percent of coal steam MW had some type of flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) technology to reduce SO₂ emissions, 99.8 percent of coal steam MW had some type of particulate matter (PM) control, and 99.8 percent of coal steam MW had NOₓ emission control technology. All coal steam units in PJM are compliant with the state and federal emissions limits established by MATS.

Renewable Generation

- **Renewable Generation.** Wind and solar generation was 4.9 percent of total generation in PJM for 2023. RPS Tier I generation was 6.1 percent of total generation in PJM and RPS Tier II generation was 2.1 percent of total generation in PJM for 2023. Only Tier I generation is defined to be renewable but Tier 1 includes some carbon emitting generation.

- **PJM states with RPS rely heavily on imports and generation from behind the meter resources for RPS compliance. In 2023, Tier I generation in PJM met only 46.4 percent of the Tier I RPS requirements.

Section 8 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that renewable energy credit markets based on state renewable portfolio standards be brought into PJM markets as they are an increasingly important component of the wholesale energy market. The MMU recommends that there be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that jurisdictions with a renewable portfolio standard make the price and quantity data on supply and demand more transparent. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the Commission reconsider its disclaimer of jurisdiction over RECs markets because, given market changes since that decision, it is clear that RECs materially affect jurisdictional rates. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that load and generation located at separate nodes be treated as separate resources in order to ensure that load and generation face consistent incentives throughout the markets. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that stationary emergency RICE be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet the capacity market requirements to be DR as a result of emissions standards that impose environmental run hour limitations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

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192 The 2021 compliance cost value for PJM states does not include Michigan or North Carolina. Based on past data these states generally account for less than 0.5 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states.
Section 8 Conclusion

Environmental requirements and renewable energy mandates at both the federal and state levels have a significant impact on the cost of energy and capacity in PJM markets.

Environmental requirements and initiatives at both the federal and state levels, and state renewable energy mandates and associated subsidies have resulted in the construction of substantial amounts of renewable capacity in the PJM footprint, especially wind and solar resources, and the retirement of emitting resources. Renewable energy credit (REC) markets created by state programs, federal subsidies, and federal tax credits have significant impacts on PJM wholesale markets. But state renewables programs in PJM are not coordinated with one another, are generally not consistent with the PJM market design or PJM prices, have widely differing objectives, including supporting some emitting resources, have widely differing implied prices of carbon and are not transparent on pricing and quantities. The effectiveness of state renewables programs would be enhanced if they were coordinated with one another and with PJM markets, and if they increased transparency. States could evaluate the impacts of a range of carbon prices if PJM would provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. A single carbon price across PJM, established by the states, would be the most efficient way to reduce carbon output, if that is the goal.

But in the absence of a PJM market carbon price, a single PJM market for RECs would contribute significantly to market efficiency and to the procurement of renewable resources in a least cost manner. Ideally, there would be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. States would continue to have the option to create separate RECs for additional products that did not fit the product definition, e.g. waste coal, trash incinerators, or black liquor.

RECs are an important mechanism used by PJM states to implement environmental policy. RECs clearly affect prices in the PJM wholesale power market. Some resources are not economic except for the ability to purchase or sell RECs. RECs provide out of market payments to qualifying renewable resources, primarily wind and solar. The credits provide an incentive to make negative energy offers and more generally provide an incentive to enter the market, to remain in the market and to operate whenever possible. These subsidies affect the offer behavior and the operational behavior of these resources in PJM markets and in some cases the existence of these resources and thus the market prices and the mix of clearing resources.

RECs markets are, as an economic fact, integrated with PJM markets including energy and capacity markets, but are not formally recognized as part of PJM markets. It would be preferable to have a single, transparent market for RECs operated by the PJM RTO on behalf of the states that would meet the standards and requirements of all states in the PJM footprint. This would provide better information for market participants about supply and demand and prices and contribute to a more efficient and competitive market and to better price formation. This could also facilitate entry by qualifying renewable resources by reducing the risks associated with lack of transparent market data.

Existing REC markets are not consistently or adequately transparent. Data on REC prices, clearing quantities and markets are not publicly available for all PJM states. The economic logic of RPS programs and the associated REC and SREC prices is not always clear. The price of carbon implied by REC prices ranges from $16.04 per tonne in
Ohio to $42.53 per tonne in Virginia. The price of carbon implied by SREC prices ranges from $81.07 per tonne in Pennsylvania to $489.15 per tonne in Washington, DC. The effective prices for carbon compare to the RGGI clearing price in December 2023 of $16.40 per tonne and to the social cost of carbon which is estimated in the range of $50 per tonne.\(^{193}\) \(^{194}\) The impact on the cost of generation from a new combined cycle unit of a $50 per tonne carbon price would be $16.85 per MWh.\(^{195}\) The impact of an $800 per tonne carbon price would be $269.59 per MWh. This wide range of implied carbon prices is not consistent with an efficient, competitive, least cost approach to the reduction of carbon emissions.

In addition, even the explicit environmental goals of RPS programs are not clear. While RPS is frequently considered to target carbon emissions, Tier 1 resources include some carbon emitting generation and Tier 2 resources include additional carbon emitting generation.

PJM markets provide a flexible mechanism for incorporating the costs of environmental controls and meeting environmental requirements in a cost effective manner. Costs for environmental controls are part of offers for capacity resources in the PJM Capacity Market. The costs of emissions credits are included in energy offers. PJM markets also provide a flexible mechanism that incorporates renewable resources and the impacts of renewable energy credit markets, and ensures that renewable resources have access to a broad market. PJM markets provide efficient price signals that permit valuation of resources with very different characteristics when they provide the same product.

If the states chose this policy option, PJM markets could also provide a flexible mechanism to limit carbon output, for example by incorporating a consistent carbon price in unit offers which would be reflected in PJM’s economic dispatch. If there is a social decision to limit carbon output, a consistent carbon price would be the most efficient way to implement that decision. The states in PJM could agree, if they decided it was in their interests, with the appropriate information, on a carbon price and on how to allocate the revenues from a carbon price that would make all states better off. A mechanism like RGGI leaves all decision making with the states. The carbon price would not be FERC jurisdictional or subject to PJM decisions. The MMU continues to recommend that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. The results of the analysis would include the impact on the dispatch of every unit, the impact on energy prices and the carbon pricing revenues that would flow to each state.

For example, states receiving high levels of revenue could shift revenue to states disproportionately hurt by a carbon price if they believed that all states would be better off as a result. A carbon price would also be an alternative to specific subsidies to individual nuclear power plants and to the current wide range of implied carbon prices embedded in RPS programs and instead provide a market signal to which any resource could respond. The imposition of specific and prescriptive environmental dispatch rules would, in contrast, pose a threat to economic dispatch and efficient markets and create very difficult market power monitoring and mitigation issues. The provision of subsidies to individual units creates a discriminatory regime that is not consistent with competition. The use of inconsistent implied carbon prices by state is also inconsistent with an efficient market and inconsistent with the least cost approach to meeting state environmental goals.

The annual average cost of complying with RPS over the eight year period from 2014 through 2021 for the 10 jurisdictions that had RPS was $1.2 billion, or a total of $9.4 billion over eight years. The RPS compliance cost for 2021, the most recent year for which there is almost complete data, was $2.1 billion.\(^{196}\) RPS costs are payments by customers to the sellers of qualifying resources. The revenues from carbon pricing flow to the states.

If all the PJM states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances would be approximately $5.2 billion per year if the carbon price


\(^{195}\) The cost impact calculation assumes a heat rate of 6,296 MMBtu per MWh and a carbon emissions rate of 2,391 kg per MMBtu. The $800 per tonne carbon price represents the approximate upper end of the carbon prices implied by the 2022 REC and SREC prices in the PJM jurisdictions with RPS. Additional cost impacts are provided in Table 8-7.

\(^{196}\) The 2021 compliance cost value for PJM states does not include Illinois, Michigan or North Carolina. Based on past data these states generally account for 3.0 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states.
were $14.88 per short ton and emissions levels were five percent below 2022 emission levels. If all the PJM states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances would be approximately $17.5 billion if the carbon price were $50 per short ton and emission levels were five percent below 2022 levels. If only the current RPS states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances at $14.88 per short ton would be about $3.4 billion. The costs of a carbon price are the impact on energy market prices, net of the revenue returned to states/customers.

Overview: Section 9, Interchange Transactions

Interchange Transaction Activity

- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In 2023, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the real-time energy market in all months. In 2023, the real-time net interchange was -39,897.2 GWh. The real-time net interchange in 2022 was -31,864.8 GWh. The real-time net interchange in 2023 was -31,864.8 GWh.

Figure 14 Scheduled import and export transaction volume history: January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2023

- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In 2023, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the day-ahead energy market in all months. In 2023, the total day-ahead net interchange was -34,267.2 GWh. The day-ahead net interchange in 2022 was -26,132.5 GWh.

- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead and the Real-Time Energy Market.** In 2023, gross imports in the day-ahead energy market were 107.3 percent of gross imports in the real-time energy market (105.6 percent in 2022). In 2023, gross exports in the day-ahead energy market were 91.7 percent of the gross exports in the real-time energy market (89.8 percent in 2022).

- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In 2023, there were net scheduled exports at 14 of PJM’s 19 interfaces in the real-time energy market.

- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In 2023, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM’s seven interface pricing points eligible for real-time transactions in the real-time energy market.

- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In 2023, there were net scheduled exports at 15 of PJM’s 19 interfaces in the day-ahead energy market.

- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In 2023, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM’s seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions in the real-time energy market.

- **Up To Congestion Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In 2023, up to congestion transactions were net exports at five of PJM’s seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions in the day-ahead energy market.

- **Inadvertent Interchange.** In 2023, net scheduled interchange was -39,897.2 GWh and net actual interchange was -40,003.7 GWh, a difference of 106.5 GWh. In 2022, the difference was 153.4 GWh. This difference is inadvertent interchange.

- **Loop Flows.** In 2023, the Northern Indiana Public Service (NIPS) Interface had the largest loop flows of any interface with -107.9 GWh of net scheduled interchange and -12,398.8 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 12,291.0 GWh. In 2023, the SOUTH interface pricing point had the largest loop flows of any interface pricing point.
with 7,820.8 GWh of net scheduled interchange and 13,857.8 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 6,037.5 GWh.

Interactions with Bordering Areas

PJM Interface Pricing with Organized Markets

- **PJM and MISO Interface Prices.** In 2023, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface in 59.6 percent of the hours.

- **PJM and New York ISO Interface Prices.** In 2023, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/NYISO Interface and the NYISO/PJM proxy bus in 62.1 percent of the hours.

- **Neptune Underwater Transmission Line to Long Island, New York.** In 2023, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Neptune Interface and the NYISO Neptune bus in 82.5 percent of the hours.

- **Linden Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT) Facility.** In 2023, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Linden Interface and the NYISO Linden bus in 78.3 percent of the hours.

- **Hudson DC Line.** In 2023, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Hudson Interface and the NYISO Hudson bus in 72.5 percent of the hours.

Interchange Transaction Issues

- **PJM Transmission Loading Relief Procedures (TLRs).** PJM issued zero TLRs of level 3a or higher in 2023, and one such TLR in 2022.

- **Up To Congestion.** The average number of up to congestion bids submitted in the day-ahead energy market increased by 38.7 percent, from 43,636 bids per day in 2022 to 60,524 bids per day in 2023. The average cleared volume of up to congestion bids submitted in the day-ahead energy market increased by 50.8 percent, from 317,744 MWh per day in 2022, to 479,134 MWh per day in 2023.

Section 9 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU recommends that PJM apply after the fact market settlement adjustments to identified sham scheduling segments to ensure that market participants cannot benefit from sham scheduling. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule by concealing the true source or sink of the transaction. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the locational price impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the MISO interface pricing point. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM monitor, and adjust as necessary, the weights applied to the components of the interfaces to ensure that the interface prices reflect ongoing changes in system conditions. The MMU also recommends that PJM review the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual interface pricing points to reflect changes to the impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines as a result of system topology changes. The MMU recommends that this review occur at least
annually. (Priority: Low. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, in order to permit a complete analysis of loop flow, FERC and NERC ensure that the identified data are made available to market monitors as well as other industry entities determined appropriate by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2003. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that would remove the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams. Such a solution would include an optimized, but limited, joint dispatch approach that uses supply curves and treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to other constraints within an LMP market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports as well as unlimited nonfirm point to point willing to pay congestion imports and exports at all PJM interfaces in order to improve the efficiency of the market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1800 on the day prior, to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes. These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be used to meet load in the most economic manner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted, 2015.)

- The MMU recommends modifications to the FFE calculation to ensure that FFE calculations reflect the current capability of the transmission system as it evolves. The MMU recommends that the Commission set a deadline for PJM and MISO to resolve the FFE freeze date and related issues. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends clear, explicit and detailed rules that define the conditions under which PJM will and will not recall energy from PJM capacity resources and prohibit new energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends that those rules define the conditions under which PJM will purchase emergency energy while at the same time not recalling energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends clear rules governing when PJM may recall capacity backed exports. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)

Section 9 Conclusion

Transactions between PJM and multiple balancing authorities in the Eastern Interconnection are part of a single energy market. While some of these balancing authorities are termed market areas and some are termed nonmarket areas, all electricity transactions are part of a single energy market. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between market and nonmarket areas. Market areas, like PJM, include essential features of an energy market including locational marginal pricing, financial congestion offsets (FTRs and ARRs in PJM) and transparent, least cost, security constrained economic dispatch for all available generation. Nonmarket areas do not include these features. Pricing in the market areas is transparent and pricing in the nonmarket areas is not transparent.

The MMU’s recommendations related to transactions with external balancing authorities all share the goal of improving the economic efficiency of interchange transactions. The standard of comparison is an LMP market. In an LMP market, redispatch based on LMP and competitive generator offers results in an efficient dispatch and efficient prices. The goal of designing interface transaction rules should be to match the outcomes that would exist in an LMP market across the interfaces.

It is not appropriate to have special pricing agreements between PJM and any external entity. The same market pricing should apply to all transactions. External entities wishing to receive the benefits of the PJM LMP market should join PJM.

In 2020, PJM terminated a number of interface pricing points, consistent with longstanding MMU
recommendations. Following the termination of the Northwest pricing point on October 1, 2020, PJM failed to correctly map the pricing points to transactions that had been mapped to the Northwest pricing point to pricing points that are consistent with electrical impacts on the PJM system. On October 1, 2022, PJM terminated the Southeast and Southwest interface pricing points. The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the electrical impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM. The MMU continues to recommend the termination of the Ontario interface pricing point. The Ontario interface pricing point is noncontiguous to the PJM footprint that creates opportunities for market participants to engage in sham scheduling activities.

Overview: Section 10, Ancillary Services

Primary Reserve

Primary reserves consist of both synchronized and nonsynchronized reserves that can provide energy within 10 minutes and sustain that output for at least 30 minutes during a contingency event. PJM made several changes to the primary reserve market, effective October 1, 2022. These included a must offer requirement and correction of misspecified cost-based offers. By removing opportunities for physical and economic withholding, the changes resulted in clearing increased quantities of available synchronized reserves at competitive prices. Starting in May 2023, to compensate for poor resource performance, PJM increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, which in turn increased the primary reserve reliability requirement. This increased demand caused artificial reserve shortages even though the market cleared over one thousand MW more than it normally would have cleared.

Market Structure

• Supply. Primary reserve is satisfied by both synchronized reserve (generation or demand response currently synchronized to the grid and available within 10 minutes) and nonsynchronized reserve (generation currently offline but available to start and provide energy within 10 minutes).

• Demand. The PJM primary reserve requirement is equal to the extended reserve requirement plus the primary reserve reliability requirement. The primary reserve reliability requirement is equal to 150 percent of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. Starting in May, PJM increased the size of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the most severe single contingency (MSSC), in effect increasing the primary reserve reliability requirement to 195 percent of the MSSC. In 2023, the real-time average primary reserve requirement was 3,094.3 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 2,552.0 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.

• Market Concentration. Both the Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone Market and the RTO Reserve Zone Market for primary reserve were characterized by structural market power in 2023. The average HHI for real-time primary reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone was 1148, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The average HHI for dayahead primary reserve in the RTO Zone was 1175, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The average HHI for real-time primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2082, which is classified as highly concentrated. The average HHI for day-ahead primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 1869, which is classified as highly concentrated.

Synchronized Reserve Market

Synchronized reserves include all capacity synchronized to the grid and available to satisfy PJM’s power balance requirements within 10 minutes. This includes online resources loaded below their full output, storage or
condensing resources synchronized to the grid but consuming energy, and 10 minute demand response capability. As of October 1, 2022, all generation capacity resources must offer their full synchronized reserve capability to the PJM market at all times. PJM jointly optimizes energy, synchronized reserve, primary reserve, and secondary reserve needs in both the day-ahead and real-time markets. Synchronized reserve prices are based on opportunity costs calculated by PJM in the market optimization and the anticipated cost of a performance penalty. All real-time cleared synchronized reserves are obligated to perform when PJM initiates a synchronized reserve event based on a loss of supply.

Market Structure
- **Supply.** In 2023, the average supply of available synchronized reserve was 5,645.1 MW in the RTO Zone of which 2,740.7 MW on average was located in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Demand.** The synchronized reserve requirement is equal to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement plus the extended reserve requirement, with a default level of 190 MW. The synchronized reserve reliability requirement is normally equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). Since mid-May, PJM has set the reliability requirement to 130 percent of the MSSC for the RTO Reserve Zone. The average hourly synchronized reserve requirement in 2023 was 2,133.4 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 1,766.0 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Market Concentration.** The Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone Market for synchronized reserve was characterized by structural market power in 2023. The average HHI for real-time synchronized reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone was 895, which is classified as unconcentrated. The average HHI for day-ahead synchronized reserve in the RTO Zone was 931, which is classified as unconcentrated. The average HHI for real-time synchronized reserve in the MAD Subzone was 2058, which is classified as highly concentrated. The average HHI for day-ahead synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 1782, which is classified as moderately concentrated.

Market Conduct
- **Offers.** There is a must offer requirement for synchronized reserve. All nonemergency generation capacity resources are required to offer their full synchronized reserve capability. PJM calculates the available synchronized reserve for all conventional resources based on the energy offer ramp rate, energy dispatch point, and the lesser of the synchronized reserve maximum or economic maximum output. Hydro resources, energy storage resources, and demand response resources submit their available synchronized reserve MW. Wind, solar, and nuclear resources are by default considered incapable of providing synchronized reserve, but may offer with an exception approved by PJM. Synchronized reserve offers are capped at cost plus the expected value of performance penalties. PJM calculates opportunity costs based on LMP.

Market Performance
- **Price.** In 2023, for the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone, the weighted average real-time price for synchronized reserve was $1.98 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $3.40 per MWh. In 2023, for the RTO Reserve Zone, the weighted average real-time price for synchronized reserve was $1.83 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $3.14 per MWh.

Nonsynchronized Reserve
Nonsynchronized reserve is comprised of nonemergency energy resources not currently synchronized to the grid that can provide energy within 10 minutes. Nonsynchronized reserve is available to meet the primary reserve requirement above the synchronized reserve requirement.

Market Structure
- **Supply.** In 2023, the average supply of eligible and available nonsynchronized reserve was 1,013.1 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 627.3 MW on average was available in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Demand.** Demand for nonsynchronized reserve is the primary reserve requirement, which is satisfied jointly by synchronized and nonsynchronized reserves.¹⁹⁸

Market Conduct

• Offers. For all conventional units, generation owners do not submit supply offers for nonsynchronized reserve. Nonemergency generation resources that are available to provide energy and can start in 10 minutes or less are defined to be available for nonsynchronized reserves. For non-hydroelectric units, PJM calculates the MW available from a unit based on the unit’s energy offer. Hydroelectric units set their own offered reserve amount. For all units, the offer price of nonsynchronized reserve is $0 per MWh.199

Market Performance

• Price. The nonsynchronized reserve price is determined by the marginal primary reserve resource. In 2023, the nonsynchronized reserve weighted average real-time price for all intervals in the RTO Reserve Zone was $0.60 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $1.03 per MWh. In 2023, the nonsynchronized reserve weighted average real-time price for all intervals in the MAD Reserve Subzone was $0.76 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $1.10 per MWh.

30-Minute Reserve Market

The supply of 30-minute reserves consists of resources, online or offline, which can respond within 30 minutes. This includes primary reserves and secondary reserves. Secondary reserves are resources that take more than 10 minutes to convert to energy, but less than 30 minutes. This includes the unloaded capacity of online generation that can be achieved according to the resource ramp rates in 10 to 30 minutes. It also includes offline resources that offer a time to start of less than 30 minutes. Secondary reserves can only be used to satisfy the 30-minute reserve requirement.

Market Structure

• Supply. In 2023, the average cleared 30-minute reserves was 16,684.3 MW in the day-ahead market and 14,647.6 MW in the real-time 30-minute market. Unlike the day-ahead market, due to a PJM software error, the real-time market did not clear all available 30-minute reserves when the market clearing price was $0 per MWh prior to May 17, 2023. In 2023, an average of 13,144.0 MW of secondary reserves was cleared in the day-ahead market and 11,529.8 MW of secondary reserves was cleared in the real-time market.

• Demand. The 30-minute reserve requirement is equal to the extended reserve requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MW, plus the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement, which has a shortage penalty price of $850 per MW. The 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is equal to the maximum of: the primary reserve reliability requirement; the largest active gas contingency; or 3,000 MW. Since PJM increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in May 2023, the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is frequently equal to the primary reserve requirement. In 2023, the average 30-minute requirement was 3,370.8 MW in the real-time market and 3,476.8 MW in the day-ahead market.

• Market Concentration. The RTO Reserve Zone Market for 30-minute reserves was characterized by moderate structural market power in 2023. For 2023, the average HHI for real-time 30-minute reserves was 901, which is classified as unconcentrated. For 2023, the average HHI for day-ahead 30-minute reserves was 1093, which is classified as moderately concentrated.

Market Conduct

In both the day-ahead and real-time 30-minute reserves markets, PJM uses only lost opportunity costs to determine price, not submitted offers. The offer price of offline secondary reserve is $0.00 per MWh. For online secondary reserves, PJM calculates an opportunity cost based on LMP. The amount of secondary reserve available from conventional resources is calculated based on the resources’ energy offers. Hydroelectric resources, energy storage resources, and load response resources must specify their offered MW separately.

Market Performance

The average day-ahead price for secondary reserves in 2023 was $0.00 per MWh. The average real-time price for secondary reserves in 2023 was $0.00 per MWh.

Regulation Market

The PJM Regulation Market is a real-time market. Regulation is provided by generation resources and

demand response resources that qualify to follow one of two regulation signals, RegA or RegD. PJM jointly optimizes regulation with synchronized reserve and energy to provide all three products at least cost. The PJM regulation market design includes three clearing price components: capability; performance; and opportunity cost. The RegA signal is designed for energy unlimited resources with physically constrained ramp rates. The RegD signal is designed for energy limited resources with fast ramp rates. In the regulation market RegD MW are converted to effective MW using a marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS), called a marginal benefit factor (MBF). Correctly implemented, the MBF would be the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between RegA and RegD, holding the level of regulation service constant. The current market design is critically flawed as it has not properly implemented the MBF as an MRTS between RegA and RegD resource MW and the MBF has not been consistently applied in the optimization, clearing and settlement of the regulation market.

Market Structure

- **Supply.** In 2023, the average hourly offered supply of regulation for nonramp hours was 693.7 performance adjusted MW (706.0 effective MW). This was a decrease of 53.0 performance adjusted MW (a decrease of 50.4 effective MW) from 2022. In 2023, the average hourly offered supply of regulation for ramp hours was 1,004.6 performance adjusted MW (1,045.0 effective MW). This was a decrease of 97.0 performance adjusted MW (a decrease of 65.3 effective MW) from 2022, when the average hourly supply of regulation was 1,101.6 performance adjusted MW (1,110.3 effective MW).

- **Demand.** The hourly regulation demand is 525.0 effective MW for nonramp hours and 800.0 effective MW for ramp hours.

- **Supply and Demand.** The nonramp regulation requirement of 525.0 effective MW was provided by a combination of cleared RegA and RegD resources equal to 478.3 hourly average performance adjusted actual MW in 2023. This is a decrease of 13.3 performance adjusted actual MW from 2022, when the average hourly total regulation cleared performance adjusted actual MW for nonramp hours were 465.0 performance adjusted actual MW.

The ramp regulation requirement of 800.0 effective MW was provided by a combination of cleared RegA and RegD resources equal to 706.3 hourly average performance adjusted actual MW in 2023. This is a decrease of 8.6 performance adjusted actual MW from 2022, where the average hourly regulation cleared MW for ramp hours were 715.0 performance adjusted actual MW.

The ratio of the average hourly offered supply of regulation to average hourly regulation demand (performance adjusted cleared MW) for nonramp hours was 1.45 in 2023 (1.60 in 2022). The ratio of the average hourly offered supply of regulation to average hourly regulation demand (performance adjusted cleared MW) for ramp hours was 1.42 in 2023 (1.54 in 2022).

- **Market Concentration.** In 2023, the three pivotal supplier test was failed in 93.8 percent of hours. In 2023, the effective MW weighted average HHI of RegA resources was 2323 which is highly concentrated and the effective MW weighted average HHI of RegD resources was 1607 which is moderately concentrated. The effective MW weighted average HHI of all resources was 1250, which is moderately concentrated.

Market Conduct

- **Offers.** Daily regulation offer prices are submitted for each unit by the unit owner. Owners are required to submit a cost-based offer and may submit a price-based offer. Offers include both a capability offer and a performance offer. Owners must specify which signal type the unit will be following, RegA or RegD. In 2023, there were 219 resources following the RegA signal and 61 resources following the RegD signal.

Market Performance

- **Price and Cost.** The weighted average clearing price for regulation was $22.69 per MW of regulation in 2023, a decrease of $30.84 per MW, or 57.6 percent, from the weighted average clearing price of $53.53 per MW in 2022. The weighted average cost of regulation in 2023 was $29.32 per MW of regulation, a decrease of 55.0 percent, from the weighted average cost of $65.10 per MW in 2022.

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• **Prices.** RegD resources continue to be incorrectly compensated relative to RegA resources due to an inconsistent application of the marginal benefit factor in the optimization, assignment and settlement processes. If the regulation market were functioning efficiently and competitively, RegD and RegA resources would be paid the same price per effective MW.

• **Marginal Benefit Factor.** The marginal benefit factor (MBF) is intended to measure the operational substitutability of RegD resources for RegA resources. The marginal benefit factor is incorrectly defined and applied in the PJM market clearing. The current incorrect and inconsistent implementation of the MBF has resulted in the PJM Regulation Market over procuring RegD relative to RegA in most hours and in an inefficient market signal about the value of RegD in every hour.

**Black Start Service**

Black start service is required for the reliable restoration of the grid following a blackout. Black start service is the ability of a generating unit to start without an outside electrical supply, or is the demonstrated ability of a generating unit to automatically remain operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid (automatic load rejection or ALR).201

In 2023, total black start charges were $67.3 million, including $67.0 million in revenue requirement charges and $0.3 million in uplift charges. Black start revenue requirements consist of fixed black start service costs, variable black start service costs, training costs, fuel storage costs, and an incentive payment. Black start uplift charges are paid to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market or committed in real time to provide black start service under the ALR option or for black start testing. Black start zonal charges in 2023 ranged from $0 in the OVEC and REC Zones to $19.3 million in the AEP Zone.

CRF values are a key determinant of total payments to black start units. The CRF values in PJM tariff tables should have been changed for both black start and the capacity market when the tax laws changed in December 2017. As a result of the failure to change the CRF values, black start units have been and continue to be significantly overcompensated since the changes to the tax code.

**Reactive**

Reactive service, reactive supply and voltage control are provided by generation and other sources of reactive power (measured in MVar). Reactive power helps maintain appropriate voltage levels on the transmission system and is essential to the flow of real power (measured in MW). The same equipment provides both MVar and MW. Generation resources are required to meet defined reactive capability requirements as a condition to receive interconnection service in PJM.202 RTOs and their customers are not required to separately compensate generation resources for such reactive capability.203 In 2023, customers in PJM, nevertheless, paid $388.0 million for reactive capability based on archaic, nonmarket and unsupported assertions about cost allocation and a regulatory review process of filings by individual units that results in unsupported black box settlements. The current rules permit over recovery of reactive costs through reactive capability charges. All costs of generators should be incorporated in the market. The nonmarket approach to reactive capability payments should be eliminated.

Reactive service charges based on opportunity costs are appropriately paid to units that operate in real time outside of their normal range at the direction of PJM for the purpose of providing real-time reactive power.

Total reactive charges increased 0.56 percent from $386.5 million in 2022 to $388.7 million in 2023. Reactive capability charges increased 0.79 percent from $385.0 million in 2022 to $388.0 million in 2023. Total zonal reactive service charges ranged from $0 in the REC and OVEC Zones, to $58.7 million in the AEP Zone in 2023.

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201 OATT Schedule 1 § 1.3BB. There are no ALR units currently providing black start service.

202 OATT Attachment O.

Frequency Response
The PJM Tariff requires that all new generator interconnection customers, both synchronous and nonsynchronous, have hardware and/or software that provides primary frequency responsive real power control with the ability to sense changes in system frequency and autonomously adjust real power output to correct for frequency deviations. Primary frequency response begins within a few seconds and extends up to a minute. The purpose of primary frequency response is to arrest and stabilize the system until other measures (secondary and tertiary frequency response) become active. This includes a governor or equivalent controls capable of operating with a maximum five percent droop and a +/- 36 mHz deadband. In addition to resource capability, resource owners must comply by setting control systems to autonomously adjust real power output in a direction to correct for frequency deviations.

The response of generators within PJM to NERC identified frequency events remains under evaluation. A frequency event is declared whenever the system frequency goes outside of 60 Hz by +/- 40 mHz and stays there for 60 continuous seconds. The NERC BAL-003-2 requirement for balancing authorities (PJM is a balancing authority) uses a threshold value (\(L_{10}\)) equal to -259.3 MW/0.1 Hz and has selected 12 frequency events between December 1, 2020, and November 30, 2021, to evaluate.

As a balancing authority, PJM requires all generators to be capable of providing primary frequency response and to operate with primary frequency response controls enabled. PJM does monitor primary frequency response during NERC identified frequency events for all resources 50 MW or greater. Exclusions to PJM monitoring include nuclear plants, offline units, units with no available headroom, units assigned to regulation, and units with a current outage ticket in eDART.

Market Procurement of Real-Time Ancillary Services
PJM uses market mechanisms to varying degrees in the procurement of ancillary services, including primary reserves, secondary reserves, and regulation. Ideally, all ancillary services would be procured taking full account of the interactions with the energy market. When a resource is used for an ancillary service instead of providing energy in real time, the cost of removing the resource, either fully or partially, from the energy market should be included in the offer for the ancillary service. The degree to which PJM markets account for these interactions depends on the timing of the product clearing, software limitations, and the accuracy of unit parameters and offers.

The synchronized reserve market clearing is more integrated with the energy market clearing than the other ancillary services. Synchronized reserves are jointly cleared with energy in every real-time market solution. Given the joint clearing of energy and flexible synchronized reserves, the synchronized reserve market clearing price should always cover the opportunity cost of providing flexible synchronized reserves. Inflexible synchronized reserves, provided by resources that require longer notice to take actions to prepare for reserve deployment, are not cleared with energy in the real-time market solution. Inflexible synchronized reserves are cleared hourly by the Ancillary Service Optimizer (ASO) or the day-ahead energy market. The ASO uses energy market price forecasts, flexible synchronized reserves, and regulation to estimate the costs and benefits of using a resource for inflexible synchronized reserves.

Nonsynchronized reserves and offline secondary reserves are cleared with every real-time energy market solution. The energy commitment decisions to keep the resources offline have already been made when the RT SCED clears the five minute reserves markets. Therefore, offline reserves have no lost opportunity cost. They will not be called on for energy during the market interval for which they are assigned as offline resources.

Prices for the regulation and reserve markets are set by the pricing calculator (LPC), which uses the RT SCED solution as an input. RT SCED partially, but not fully, clears the reserve market.

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204 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulated facilities are exempt from this provision. Behind the meter generation that is sized to load is also exempt.
205 OATT Attachment G § 4.7.2 (Primary Frequency Response).
206 Id.; see also “PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations,” § 3.6 Primary Frequency Response, Rev. 48 (March 22, 2023).
207 See PJM “PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations,” § 4.4.3 Real-time The MMU recommends that the ability to make dual offers (to make offers as both a RegA and a RegD resource in the same market hour) be removed from the regulation market. (Priority: High; First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted) Reserve Market Clearing, Rev. 126 (May 31, 2023).
Section 10 Recommendations

Reserve Markets

- The MMU recommends that to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and respond to the notifications. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3, 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM replace the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone with a reserve zone structure consistent with the actual deliverability of reserves based on current transmission constraints. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted October 1, 2022.)

- The MMU recommends that the components of the cost-based offers for providing regulation and synchronous condensing be defined in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the unit repay all credits back to the last time that the unit successfully responded to an event 10 minutes or longer. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the synchronized reserve shortfall penalty should include LOC payments as well as SRMCP and MW of shortfall. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that aggregation not be permitted to offset unit specific penalties for failure to respond to a synchronized reserve event. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the ability to make dual offers (to make offers as both a RegA and a RegD resource in the same market hour) be removed from the regulation market. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the regulation market be modified to incorporate a consistent application of the marginal benefit factor (MBF) throughout the optimization, assignment and settlement process. The MBF should be defined as the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution (MRTS) between RegA and RegD. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.208)

- The MMU recommends that the current calculation of the performance score (based on precision, delay and correlation metrics) be replaced with the current calculation of the precision score. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the regulation market commitment period be reduced from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost in the ancillary services markets be calculated using the schedule on which the unit was scheduled to run in the energy market. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.209)

- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market be based on the resource’s dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.210)

- The MMU recommends that the $12.00 margin adder be eliminated from the definition of the cost based regulation offer because it is a markup and not a cost. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the ramp rate limited desired MW output be used in the regulation uplift calculation, to reflect the physical limits of the unit’s ability to ramp and to eliminate overpayment for opportunity costs when the payment uses an

208 162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018), rehe’g denied, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).
209 This recommendation was adopted by PJM for the energy market. Lost opportunity costs in the energy market are calculated using the schedule on which the unit was scheduled to run. In the regulation market, this recommendation has not been adopted, as the LOC continues to be calculated based on the lower of price or cost in the energy market offer.
210 162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018), rehe’g denied, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).
211 Id
unachievable MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends enhanced documentation of the implementation of the regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.\textsuperscript{214})

- The MMU recommends that PJM be required to save data elements necessary for verifying the performance of the regulation market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the regulation market three pivotal supplier test be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the generator primary frequency response evaluation be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the total regulation (TReg) signal sent on a fleet wide basis be eliminated and replaced with individual regulation signals for each unit. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, to prevent gaming, there be a penalty enforced in the regulation market as a reduction in performance score and/or a forfeiture of revenues when resource owners elect to deassign assigned regulation resources within the hour. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.\textsuperscript{215})

**Frequency Response, Reactive, and Black Start**

- The MMU recommends that all resources, new and existing, have a requirement to include and maintain equipment for primary frequency response capability as a condition of interconnection service. The PJM markets already compensate resources for frequency response capability and any marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that new CRF rates for black start units, incorporating current tax code changes, be implemented immediately. The new CRF rates should apply to all black start units. Black start units should be required to commit to providing black start service for the life of the unit. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that black start planning and coordination be on a regional basis and not on a zonal basis and that the costs of black start service be shared on an equal per MWh basis across the region. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that separate cost of service payments for reactive capability be eliminated and the cost of reactive capability be recovered in PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that payments for reactive capability, if continued, be based on the 0.95 power factor included in the voltage schedule in Interconnection Service Agreements. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, if payments for reactive are continued, fleet wide cost of service rates used to compensate resources for reactive capability be eliminated and replaced with compensation based on unit specific costs. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019.\textsuperscript{214} Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, if payments for reactive are continued, Schedule 2 to OATT be revised to state explicitly that only generators that provide reactive capability to the transmission system that PJM operates and has responsibility for are eligible for reactive capability compensation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

**Section 10 Conclusion**

The October 1, 2022, changes to the reserve markets included a synchronized reserve must offer requirement applicable to all generation capacity resources. This resulted in an increase in available supply. Combined with the removal of the $7.50 per MWh margin and the invalid variable operations and maintenance cost, supply and demand logic predicts lower prices, which occurred in 2022, except during Winter Storm Elliott. This is evidence of market efficiency. With the elimination of tier 1 reserves, the total reserve market clearing price

\textsuperscript{214} The MMU has discussed this recommendation in state of the market reports since 2016 but Q3, 2019 was the first time it was reported as a formal MMU recommendation.

\textsuperscript{215} Id.
credits, while based on lower prices, are paid to a larger MW quantity. However, prices have been higher since PJM extended the ORDCs in May.

The new reserve market design has been called into question by PJM based on a slower response during synchronized reserve events in October 2022 through December 2023 compared to prior months. In all cases, other than during Winter Storm Elliott, the ACE recovered within the required time frame and no reliability problems occurred. PJM responded to this poor performance by unilaterally and inappropriately increasing reserve requirements. This increase shifts the burden of poor resource performance from the resources themselves to customers, clearing more reserves instead of directly dealing with the causes of poor performance. These increases were the cause of higher reserve prices, including several intervals of shortage pricing, even while reserve markets cleared over 1,000 MW more than what was normally cleared in the months and years prior.

The data on synchronized reserve event recovery do not support the conclusion that there is an immediate need to change how reserves clear. If PJM insists on an immediate change, the focus should be on correcting the supply of reserves rather than increasing demand.

The MMU’s proposal is to buy the correct amount of reserves. No increase in demand is required. There has been no change in the need for/demand for reserves. PJM ignores the supply side. The issue is that resources have not provided the reserves that were offered and paid for. The solution is not to buy more MW of poorly performing reserves. The solution is to accurately recognize the actual supply of reserves. The solution is to buy the correct amount of reserves, accounting for the actual performance of supply.

The solution is also to improve the deployment of reserves in synchronized reserve events by requiring an electronic signal to resources with cleared reserves. This is not the same as PJM’s 2022 IRD proposal. IRD does not deploy cleared reserves. It is simply an RT SCED case with extra load bias that sends inaccurate price signals. IRD aims to recover from a disturbance by sending higher dispatch signals to resources deemed unreliable for reserves by the resource operator and by PJM.

The design of the PJM Regulation Market is significantly flawed.\(^{215}\) The market design does not correctly incorporate the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) in market clearing and settlement. The market design uses the marginal benefit factor (MBF) to incorrectly represent the MRTS and uses a mileage ratio instead of the MBF in settlement. The current market design allows regulation units that have the capability to provide both RegA and RegD MW to submit an offer for both signal types in the same market hour. However, the method of clearing the regulation market for an hour in which one or more units has a dual offer incorrectly accounts for the amount of RegD and the effective MW of the RegD that it clears. The result of the flaw is that the MBF in the clearing phase is incorrectly low compared to the MBF in the solution phase and the actual amount of effective MW procured is higher than the regulation requirement. This failure to correctly and consistently incorporate the MRTS into the regulation market design has resulted in both underpayment and overpayment of RegD resources and in the over procurement of RegD resources in all hours. The market results continue to include the incorrect definition of opportunity cost. These issues are the basis for the MMU’s conclusion that the regulation market design is flawed.

To address these flaws, the MMU and PJM developed a joint proposal which was approved by the PJM Members Committee on July 27, 2017, and filed with FERC on October 17, 2017.\(^{216}\) The PJM/MMU joint proposal addressed issues with the inconsistent application of the marginal benefit factor throughout the optimization and settlement process in the PJM Regulation Market. FERC rejected the joint proposal on March 30, 2018, as being noncompliant with Order No. 755.\(^{217}\) The MMU and PJM separately filed requests for rehearing, which were denied by order issued March 26, 2020.\(^{218}\)

The benefits of markets can be realized under the current approach to ancillary service markets. Even in the presence of structurally noncompetitive markets, there can be transparent, market clearing prices based on competitive offers that account explicitly and accurately for opportunity cost. This is consistent with the market design goal of ensuring competitive outcomes that provide appropriate incentives without reliance on
exercise of market power and with explicit mechanisms to prevent the exercise of market power. But there are significant issues with the PJM ancillary services markets.

The MMU concludes that the regulation market results were not competitive, and the market design is significantly flawed. The MMU concludes that the synchronized reserve market results were competitive. The MMU concludes that the nonsynchronized reserve market results were competitive. The MMU concludes that the secondary reserve market results were competitive.

**Overview: Section 11, Congestion and Marginal Losses**

**Congestion Cost**

- **Total Congestion.** Total congestion costs decreased by $1,432.7 million or 57.3 percent, from $2,501.3 million in 2022 to $1,068.6 million in 2023.

Table 13 Total congestion costs (Dollars (Millions)): 2008 through 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Congestion Cost</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
<th>Total PJM Billing</th>
<th>Percent of PJM Billing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$2,052</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$34,300</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$719</td>
<td>(65.0%)</td>
<td>$26,550</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$1,423</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>$34,770</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$999</td>
<td>(29.8%)</td>
<td>$35,890</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$529</td>
<td>(47.0%)</td>
<td>$29,180</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$677</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>$33,860</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$1,332</td>
<td>185.5%</td>
<td>$50,030</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$1,385</td>
<td>(28.3%)</td>
<td>$42,630</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$1,024</td>
<td>(26.1%)</td>
<td>$39,050</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$698</td>
<td>(21.2%)</td>
<td>$40,170</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$1,310</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>$49,790</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>$563</td>
<td>(55.5%)</td>
<td>$41,690</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$529</td>
<td>(9.4%)</td>
<td>$36,300</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>$995</td>
<td>(88.2%)</td>
<td>$54,100</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>$2,501</td>
<td>151.3%</td>
<td>$86,240</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>$1,069</td>
<td>(57.3%)</td>
<td>$48,610</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Day-Ahead Congestion.** Day-ahead congestion costs decreased by $1,660.7 million or 54.9 percent, from $3,025.2 million in 2022 to $1,364.5 million in 2023.

- **Balancing Congestion.** Negative balancing congestion costs decreased by $228.0 million, from -$523.9 million in 2022 to -$295.9 million in 2023. Negative balancing explicit charges decreased by $135.6 million, from -$355.4 million in 2022 to -$219.9 million in 2023.

- **Real-Time Congestion.** Real-time congestion costs decreased by $2,468.0 million, from $3,879.7 million in 2022 to $1,411.7 million in 2023.

- **Monthly Congestion.** Monthly total congestion costs in 2023 ranged from $26.8 million in March to $139.6 million in July.

- **Geographic Differences in CLMP.** Differences in CLMP between southern and eastern control zones in PJM were primarily a result of binding constraints on the Nottingham Series Reactor, the Conastone – Northwest Line, the Graceton – Safe Harbor Line, the Coolspring – Milford Line, and the Possum Point Transformer.

- **Congestion Frequency.** Congestion frequency continued to be significantly higher in the day-ahead energy market than in the real-time energy market in 2023. The number of congestion event hours in the day-ahead energy market was about three times the number of congestion event hours in the real-time energy market. Day-ahead congestion frequency increased by 0.6 percent from 73,106 congestion event hours in 2022 to 73,522 congestion event hours in 2023. Real-time congestion frequency decreased by 18.3 percent from 27,758 congestion event hours in 2022 to 22,687 congestion event hours in 2023.

- **Congested Facilities.** Day-ahead, congestion event hours decreased on the flowgates and interfaces and increased on lines and transformers.

The Nottingham Series Reactor was the largest contributor to congestion costs in 2023. With $222.8 million in total congestion costs, it accounted for 20.9 percent of the total PJM congestion costs in 2023.

- **CT Price Setting Logic and Closed Loop Interface Related Congestion.** PJM’s use of CT pricing logic officially ended with the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. While CT pricing logic was officially discontinued by PJM on September 1, 2021, PJM continues to use a related logic to force inflexible units and demand response to be on the margin in both real time and day ahead. None of the PJM defined closed loop interfaces were binding in 2022 or 2023.

- **Zonal Congestion.** AEP had the highest zonal congestion costs among all control zones in 2023.

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219 In Table 11-10, the MMU uses Total PJM Billing values provided by PJM. For 2019 and after, the MMU has modified the Total PJM Billing calculation to better reflect historical PJM total billing through the PJM settlement process.
AEP had $167.0 million in zonal congestion costs, comprised of $211.5 million in day-ahead congestion costs and -$44.5 million in balancing congestion costs.

Marginal Loss Cost

- **Total Marginal Loss Costs.** Total marginal loss costs decreased by $1,140.8 million or 59.5 percent, from $1,918.0 million in 2022 to $777.2 million in 2023. The loss MWh in PJM decreased by 1,362.1 GWh or 8.3 percent, from 16,419.0 GWh in 2022 to 15,056.8 GWh in 2023. The loss component of real-time LMP in 2023 was $0.02, compared to $0.06 in 2022.

- **Day-Ahead Marginal Loss Costs.** Day-ahead marginal loss costs decreased by $1,202.1 million or 58.6 percent, from $2,052.3 million in 2022 to $850.2 million in 2023.

- **Balancing Marginal Loss Costs.** Negative balancing marginal loss costs decreased by $61.2 million or 45.6 percent, from -$134.2 million in 2022 to -$73.0 million in 2023.

- **Total Marginal Loss Surplus.** The total marginal loss surplus decreased by $369.9 million or -58.4 percent, from $633.9 million in 2022, to $264.0 million in 2023.

- **Monthly Total Marginal Loss Costs.** Monthly total marginal loss costs in 2023 ranged from $47.0 million in April to $102.5 million in July.

System Energy Cost

- **Total System Energy Costs.** Total system energy costs increased by $774.6 million or 60.4 percent, from -$1,282.1 million in 2022 to -$507.5 million in 2023.

- **Day-Ahead System Energy Costs.** Day-ahead system energy costs increased by $820.1 million or 55.2 percent, from -$1,486.2 million in 2022 to -$666.0 million in 2023.

- **Balancing System Energy Costs.** Balancing system energy costs decreased by $70.8 million or 31.5 percent, from $225.0 million in 2022 to $154.2 million in 2023.

- **Monthly Total System Energy Costs.** Monthly total system energy costs in 2023 ranged from -$64.5 million in July to -$31.8 million in April.

Section 11 Conclusion

Congestion is defined as the total payments by load in excess of the total payments to generation, excluding marginal losses. The level and distribution of congestion reflects the underlying characteristics of the power system, including the nature and defined capability of transmission facilities, the offers and geographic distribution of generation facilities, the level and geographic distribution of incremental bids and offers and the geographic and temporal distribution of load.

Total congestion costs decreased by $1,432.7 million or 57.3 percent, from $2,501.3 million in 2022 to $1,068.6 million in 2023.

Monthly total congestion costs ranged from $26.8 million in March to $139.6 million in July in 2023.

The current ARR/FTR design does not ensure that load receives the rights to all congestion revenues. The congestion offset provided by ARRs and self scheduled FTRs in the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period was 78.6 percent. The cumulative offset of congestion by ARRs for the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, using the rules effective for each planning period, was 70.0 percent. Load has received $4.0 billion less than load should have received from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period.

Overview: Section 12, Planning

Generation Interconnection Planning

Existing Generation Mix

- As of December 31, 2023, PJM had a total installed capacity of 196,380.2 MW, of which 39,949.4 MW (20.3 percent) are coal fired steam units, 56,124.2 MW (28.6 percent) are combined cycle units and 33,452.6 MW (17.0 percent) are nuclear units. This measure of installed capacity differs from capacity market installed capacity because it includes energy only units, excludes all external units, and uses nameplate values for solar and wind resources.

- Of the 196,380.2 MW of installed capacity, 66,234.5 MW (33.7 percent) are from units older than 40 years, of which 30,262.3 MW (45.7 percent) are coal
fired steam units, 191.0 MW (0.3 percent) are combined cycle units and 20,840.6 MW (31.5 percent) are nuclear units.

**Generation Retirements**

- There are 58,282.2 MW of generation that have been, or are planned to be, retired between 2011 and 2026, of which 42,987.8 MW (73.8 percent) are coal fired steam units.
- In 2023, 6,727.8 MW of generation retired. The largest generator that retired in 2023 was the 800.0 MW Yorktown 3 oil fired steam unit located in the DOM Zone. Of the 6,727.8 MW of generation that retired in 2023, 1,884.0 MW (28.0 percent) were located in the PE Zone.
- As of December 31, 2023, there are 4,063.7 MW of generation that have requested retirement after December 31, 2023, of which 2,113.9 MW (52.0 percent) are located in the BGE Zone. Of the generation requesting retirement in the BGE Zone, 1,578.0 MW (74.6 percent) are coal fired steam units.

**Figure 16 Map of unit retirements: 2011 through 2026**

**Generation Queue**

- On November 29, 2022, the Commission issued an order accepting PJM’s tariff revisions to improve the queue process. The new queue process includes modifications to implement a cluster/cycle based processing method to replace the first in/first out processing method. This change will allow projects to move forward based on a first ready/first out analysis, where readiness is demonstrated through site control and financial milestones and there is an option to exit the study process early based on system impacts. The transition to the new queue process began on July 10, 2023.
- As of December 31, 2023, 268,472.8 MW were in generation request queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, a decrease of 19,019.9 MW (6.6 percent) from the 287,492.7 MW at the end of
2022. Based on historical completion rates, 37,057.9 MW (13.8 percent) of new generation in the queue are expected to go into service. In 2023, the AI2 queue window closed, and the AJ1 window opened and closed. As projects move through the queue process, projects can be removed from the queue due to incomplete or invalid data, withdrawn by the market participant or placed in service.

- As of December 31, 2023, 8,183 projects, representing 829,787.7 MW, have entered the queue process since its inception in 1998. Of those, 1,146 projects, representing 87,099.0 MW, went into service. Of the projects that entered the queue process, 3,805 projects, representing 474,215.9 MW (57.1 percent of the MW) withdrew prior to completion. Such projects may create barriers to entry for projects that would otherwise be completed, by taking up queue positions, increasing interconnection costs and creating uncertainty.

- In 2023, 4,400.2 MW from the queue went in service. Of the 4,400.2 MW that went in service, 2,644.0 MW (60.1 percent) were combined cycle units, 906.9 MW (20.6 percent) were solar units, 468.1 MW (11.0 percent) were combustion turbine natural gas units, 285.4 MW (6.5 percent) were wind units, 60.8 MW (1.4 percent) were battery units and 17.0 MW (0.4 percent) were solar + storage units.

- The number of queue entries increased during the past several years, primarily renewable projects. Of the 5,531 projects entered from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2023, 4,161 projects (75.2 percent) were renewable. Of the 461 projects entered in the queue in 2023, 410 projects (88.9 percent) were renewable. Renewable projects make up 77.7 percent of all projects in the queue and those projects account for 75.6 percent of the nameplate MW currently active, suspended or under construction in the queue as of December 31, 2023.

Of the 202,990.3 MW of renewable projects in the queue, only 11,162.9 MW (5.5 percent) of capacity resources are expected to go into service, based on both historical completion rates and ELCC derate factors for battery, wind and solar.

Figure 17 Map of unit additions (less than 20 MW): January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2023

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224 The queue totals in this report are the winter net MW energy for the interconnection requests ("MW Energy") as shown in the queue.

225 The 2026/2027 BRA ELCC factors are used for the ELCC derate adjusted MW. The adjusted MW are calculated using the four hour storage ELCC derate of 77.0 percent for battery resources, 13.0 percent ELCC derate for wind resources and 45.0 percent ELCC derate for solar resources.
Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP)

Market Efficiency Process

• There are significant issues with PJM’s benefit/cost analysis that should be addressed prior to approval of additional projects. PJM’s benefit/cost analysis does not correctly account for the costs of increased congestion associated with market efficiency projects.

• Through December 31, 2023, PJM has completed five market efficiency cycles under Order No. 1000.226 PJM delayed the opening of the 2022/2023 Long-Term Window until the reliability violations for the 2022 Window 3 are addressed. PJM is currently updating the market efficiency base case to include the solution selected from the 2022 Window 3.

PJM MISO Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP)

• PJM and MISO developed a process to facilitate the construction of interregional projects in response to the Commission’s concerns about interregional coordination along the PJM-MISO seam. This process, called the Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP), operates on a two year study schedule and is designed to address forward looking congestion.

But the use of an inaccurate benefit/cost method by PJM and the correct method by MISO results in an over allocation of the costs associated with joint PJM/MISO projects to PJM participants and in some cases approval of projects that do not pass an accurate cost-benefit test.

PJM MISO Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP)

• PJM and MISO developed the Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP) to facilitate the resolution of historic congestion issues that could be addressed through small, quick implementation projects.

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Supplemental Transmission Projects
• Supplemental projects are defined to be “transmission expansions or enhancements that are not required for compliance with PJM criteria and are not state public policy projects according to the PJM Operating Agreement. These projects are used as inputs to RTEP models, but are not required for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance criteria, as determined by PJM.” 227 Supplemental projects are exempt from competition.
• The average number of supplemental projects in each expected in service year increased by 925.0 percent, from 20 for years 1998 through 2007 (pre Order No. 890) to 205 for years 2008 through 2023 (post Order 890). 228

End of Life Transmission Projects
• An end of life transmission project is a project submitted for the purpose of replacing existing infrastructure that is at, or is approaching, the end of its useful life. End of life transmission projects should be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build the project. Under the current approach, end of life projects are excluded from the RTEP process and exempt from competition.

Board Authorized Transmission Upgrades
• The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) reviews proposals to improve transmission reliability in PJM and between PJM and neighboring regions. These proposals, which include reliability baseline, network, market efficiency and targeted market efficiency projects, as well as scope changes and project cancellations, but exclude supplemental and end of life projects, are periodically presented to the PJM Board of Managers for authorization. 229 In 2023, the PJM Board approved $6.71 billion in upgrades. As of December 31, 2023, the PJM Board has approved $48.3 billion in system enhancements since 1999.

Transmission Competition
• The MMU makes several recommendations related to the competitive transmission planning process. The recommendations include improved process transparency, incorporation of competition between transmission and generation alternatives, and the removal of barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission. These recommendations would help ensure that the process is an open and transparent process that results in the most competitive solutions.
• On May 24, 2018, the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) approved a motion that required PJM, with input from the MMU, to develop a comparative framework to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of competitive transmission proposals with binding cost containment proposals compared to proposals from incumbent and nonincumbent transmission companies without cost containment provisions.

Qualifying Transmission Upgrades (Q TU)
• A Qualifying Transmission Upgrade (Q TU) is an upgrade to the transmission system, financed and built by market participants, that increases the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL) into an LDA and can be offered into capacity auctions as capacity. Once a Q TU is in service, the upgrade is eligible to continue to offer the approved incremental import capability into future RPM Auctions. As of December 31, 2023, no QTUs have cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction.

Transmission Facility Outages
• PJM maintains a list of reportable transmission facilities. When a reportable transmission facility needs to be taken out of service, PJM transmission owners are required to report planned transmission facility outages as early as possible. PJM processes the transmission facility outage requests according to rules in PJM’s Manual 3 to decide if the outage is on time or late and whether or not they will allow the outage. 230
• There were 10,833 transmission outage requests submitted in the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period. Of the requested outages, 73.0 percent were planned for less than or equal to five days.
days and 15.7 percent were planned for greater than 30 days. Of the requested outages, 40.6 percent were late according to the rules in PJM’s Manual 3.

Section 12 Recommendations

Generation Retirements
- The MMU recommends that CIRs should end on the date of retirement in order to help ensure competitive markets and competitive access to the grid. The rules need to ensure that incumbents cannot exploit control of CIRs to block or postpone entry of competitors.231 (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2012.)

Generation Queue
- Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2023. Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that barriers to entry be addressed in a timely manner in order to help ensure that the capacity market will result in the entry of new capacity to meet the needs of PJM market participants. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends improvements in queue management including that PJM establish a review process to ensure that projects are removed from the queue if they are not viable, as well as a process to allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming.232 (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends continuing analysis of the study phase of PJM’s transmission planning to reduce the need for postponements of study results, to decrease study completion times, and to improve the likelihood that a project at a given phase in the study process will successfully go into service.233 (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends outsourcing interconnection studies to an independent party to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Currently, these studies are performed by incumbent transmission owners under PJM’s direction. This creates potential conflicts of interest, particularly when transmission owners are vertically integrated and the owner of transmission also owns generation. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

Market Efficiency Process
- The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated because it is not consistent with a competitive market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, PJM modify the rules governing benefit/cost analysis, the evaluation process for selecting among competing market efficiency projects and cost allocation for economic projects in order to ensure that all costs, including increased congestion costs and the risk of project cost increases, in all zones are included in order to ensure that the correct metrics are used for defining benefits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

Comparative Cost Framework
- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the project proposal templates to include data necessary to perform a detailed project lifetime financial analysis. The required data includes, but is not limited to: capital expenditure; capital structure; return on equity; cost of debt; tax assumptions; ongoing capital expenditures; ongoing maintenance; and expected life. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

Transmission Competition
- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of supplemental projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that the basis for all such exemptions be reviewed and modified to ensure that the supplemental project designation is not used to exempt transmission projects from a transparent,
robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects or to effectively replace the RTEP process. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)\textsuperscript{234}

- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of end of life projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that end of life transmission projects be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)\textsuperscript{235}

- The MMU recommends that PJM enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission providers. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM incorporate the principle that the goal of transmission planning should be the incorporation of transmission investment decisions into market driven processes as much as possible. (Priority: Low. First reported 2001. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends the creation of a mechanism to permit a direct comparison, or competition, between transmission and generation alternatives, including which alternative is less costly and who bears the risks associated with each alternative. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM establish fair terms of access to rights of way and property, such as at substations, in order to remove any barriers to entry and require competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers in the RTEP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that rules be implemented to require competition to provide financing for transmission projects. This competition could reduce the cost of capital for transmission projects and significantly reduce total costs to customers. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that storage resources not be includable as transmission assets for any reason. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

**Cost Allocation**

- The MMU recommends a comprehensive review of the ways in which the solution based dfax allocation method is implemented. The goal for such a process would be to ensure that the most rational and efficient approach to implementing the solution based dfax method is used in PJM. Such an approach should allocate costs consistent with benefits and appropriately calibrate the incentives for investment in new transmission capability. No replacement approach should be approved until all potential alternatives, including the status quo, are thoroughly reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends changing the minimum distribution factor in the allocation from 0.01 to 0.00 and adding a threshold minimum usage impact on the transmission facilities.\textsuperscript{236} (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

**Transmission Line Ratings**

- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners use the same methods to define line ratings and that all PJM transmission owners implement dynamic line ratings (DLR), subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted.)

**Transmission Facility Outages**

- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate all transmission outage tickets as on time or late as if they were new requests when an outage is rescheduled, create options for late requests based

\textsuperscript{234} The FERC accepted tariff provisions that exclude supplemental projects from competition in the RTEP. 162 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2018), req’d denied, 164 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2018).

\textsuperscript{235} In recent decisions addressing competing proposals on end of life projects, the Commission accepted a transmission owner proposal excluding end of life projects from competition in the RTEP process, 172 FERC ¶ 61,225 (2020), aff’d, American Municipal Power, Inc. et al. v. FERC, Case No. 20-1448 (D.C. Cir. November 17, 2023), and rejected a proposal from PJM stakeholders that would have included end of life projects in competition in the RTEP process, 175 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020).

on the reasons, and apply the modified rules for late submissions to any such outages. The MMU recommends that PJM create options for treatment of late outages. The current rules apply more stringent rules, based on controlling actions, to late outages without distinguishing among reasons for late outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM draft a definition of the congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests and associated triggers, including both the extent of overloaded facilities and the level of economic congestion, to include in PJM manuals after appropriate review with appropriate rules for on time and late outage requests. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM create options for late requests based on the reasons, and modify the rules to reduce or eliminate the approval of late outage requests submitted or rescheduled after the FTR auction bidding opening date, based on those options. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM not permit transmission owners to divide long duration outages into smaller segments to avoid complying with the requirements for long duration outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

Section 12 Conclusion

The goal of the PJM market design should be to enhance competition and to ensure that competition is the core element of all PJM markets. But transmission investments have not been fully incorporated into competitive markets. The construction of new transmission facilities has significant impacts on the energy and capacity markets. But when generating units retire or load increases, there is no market mechanism in place that would require or even permit direct competition between transmission and generation to meet loads in the affected area. In addition, despite FERC Order No. 1000, there is not yet a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build transmission projects, to ensure that competitors provide a total project cost cap, or to obtain least cost financing through the capital markets.

The MMU recognizes that the Commission has issued orders that are inconsistent with the recommendations of the MMU and that PJM cannot unilaterally modify those directives. It remains the recommendation of the MMU that the PJM rules for competitive transmission development through the RTEP should build upon FERC Order No. 1000 to create real competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers. The ability of transmission owners to block competition for supplemental projects and end of life projects and the reasons for that policy should be reevaluated. PJM should enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission.

Order No. 1000 removed the right of first refusal (ROFR) for transmission projects for incumbent transmission owners except for the case of supplemental projects. This created an incentive for incumbent transmission owners to designate projects as supplemental projects to avoid the Order No. 1000 competitive provisions. In some cases, state laws related to ROFR have been proposed. In PJM, two states (Indiana and Michigan) have passed laws that provide ROFR to incumbent utilities/transmission owners.

Another element of opening competition would be to consider transmission owners’ ownership of property and rights of way at or around transmission substations. In many cases, the land acquired included property intended to support future expansion of the grid. Incumbents have included the costs of the property in their rate base, paid for by customers. PJM now has the responsibility for planning the development of the grid under its RTEP process. Property bought to facilitate future expansion should be a part of the RTEP process and be made available to all providers on equal terms.

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237 See “States unwind FERC plans for grid expansion,” EnergyWire, (January 19, 2023); <https://www.eenews.net/articles/states-unwind-ferc-plans-for-grid-expansion>
240 See IN Code § 8-1-38-9, effective 7/1/2023. Applies to transmission facilities approved for construction through an RTD planning process. Incumbent Transmission Owner must exercise within 90 days.
241 See M3, § 8460.503, effective 12/17/2021. Applies to regionally cost shared transmission lines included in a plan adopted by a recognized planning authority. Must be exercised by the incumbent(s) within 90 days after plan is adopted/approved.
The process for determining the reasonableness or purpose of supplemental transmission projects that are asserted to be not needed for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance as defined under the RTEP process needs additional oversight and transparency. If there is a need for a supplemental project, that need should be clearly defined and there should be a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build the project. If there is no defined need for a supplemental project for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance then the project should not be included in rates.

Managing the generation queues is a complex process. The PJM queue evaluation process will be significantly improved, based on the proposal submitted by PJM on June 14, 2022, and approved by FERC on November 29, 2022.

The new rules include significant modifications to the interconnection process designed to address some of the key underlying issues and significantly improve the efficiency of the process. These modifications include process efficiency enhancements, recognition of project clusters affecting the same transmission facilities, incentives to reduce the entry of speculative projects in the queue, and incentives to remove projects that are not expected to reach commercial operation. The new process should help to reduce backlogs and to remove projects that are not viable earlier to help improve the overall efficiency of the queue process.

While the changes in the queue process will clearly improve the process, the MMU’s recommendations related to the queue process will remain until the new process is in place and it can be evaluated. The impact of the modifications to the queue process will need to be evaluated to determine if they successfully remove projects from the queue if they are not viable, and allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress. The behavior of project developers also creates issues with queue management. When developers put multiple projects in the queue to maintain their own optionality while planning to build only one they also affect all the projects that follow them in the queue. Project developers may also enter speculative projects in the queue and then put the project in suspended status while they address financing. The impacts of such behavior and the incentives for such behavior are addressed in the new process which includes nonrefundable fees, credit requirements, enhanced site control, elimination of the ability to suspend a project and milestone requirements. The impact of these aspects of the revised interconnection process should continue to be evaluated to ensure that they are having the desired effect on project developer behavior. The PJM queue evaluation process should continue to be improved to help ensure that barriers to competition for new generation investments are not created. Issues that need to be addressed include the ownership rights to CIRs and whether transmission owners should perform interconnection studies.

The roles and efficiency of PJM, TOs and developers in the queue process all need to be examined and enhanced in order to help ensure that the queue process can function effectively and efficiently as the gateway to competition in the energy and capacity markets and not as a barrier to competition.

The Commission should require PJM, for example, to enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission.

The suggestion that generation owners should be permitted to avoid the queue process and directly transfer the generation CIRs to an affiliate or directly sell the CIRs to an unaffiliated entity should be rejected. In effect, this approach, if adopted by the large number of retiring units, would create a chaotic, bilateral private queue process that would replace the recently redesigned PJM queue process. The PJM queue process should continue to define available and needed CIRs for all capacity queue projects. CIRs from retiring units should be made available to the next resource in the queue that can use them, on the retirement date of the retiring resource. Generation owners do not have property rights in CIRs. The value of CIRs is a result of the entire transmission system which has been paid for by customers and other generators. The value of CIRs is a result of the existence of a network and is not a result solely or even primarily of the investment that may or may not have been required in order to get

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242 See PJM, Docket No. ER22-2110 (June 14, 2022).
243 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).
CIRs. The cost of CIRs is part of project costs included in generation owners’ investment decisions like any other project cost and subject to the same risk and reward structure. Open access to the transmission system by new resources should not be limited by claims to own the access rights by retiring units.

Rules should be developed to permit PJM to advance projects in the queue if they would resolve immediate reliability issues that result, for example, from unit retirements. The rules should be consistent with the flexibility included in the new queue process but add the option for PJM to expedite the interconnection and commercial operation of projects in the queue that would address identified reliability issues, consistent with the standing of the projects in the queue.

The fundamental purpose of the queue process is to provide open access to the grid for supply resources. More specifically, the fundamental purpose of the queue process for capacity resources is to provide open access to the grid and to ensure that the energy from capacity resources is deliverable so that capacity resources can meet their must offer obligations in the energy market and provide reliable energy supply during all conditions. In order to ensure that open access, all capacity resources should be required to have a must offer obligation in the capacity market. If they do not, such resources are effectively withholding access to the grid from capacity resources that would take on a must offer obligation in the capacity market. The result creates market power for the resources with no must offer obligation, noncompetitively limits access to the grid, increases capacity market prices above the competitive level, and creates uncertainty and unpredictable volatility in the capacity market.

The addition of a planned transmission project changes the parameters of the capacity auction for the area, changes the amount of capacity needed in the area, changes the capacity market supply and demand fundamentals in the area and may effectively forestall the ability of generation to compete. But there is no mechanism to permit a direct comparison, let alone competition, between transmission and generation alternatives. There is no mechanism to evaluate whether the generation or transmission alternative is less costly, whether there is more risk associated with the generation or transmission alternatives, or who bears the risks associated with each alternative. Creating such a mechanism should be an explicit goal of PJM market design.

The current market efficiency process does exactly the opposite by permitting transmission projects to be approved without competition from generation. The broader issue is that the market efficiency project approach explicitly allows transmission projects to compete against future generation projects, but without allowing the generation projects to compete. Projecting speculative transmission related benefits for 15 years based on the existing generation fleet and existing patterns of congestion eliminates the potential for new generation to respond to market signals. The market efficiency process allows assets built under the cost of service regulatory paradigm to displace generation assets built under the competitive market paradigm. In addition, there are significant issues with PJM’s current cost/benefit analysis which cause it to consistently overstate the potential benefits of market efficiency projects. The market efficiency process is misnamed. The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated.

In addition, the use of an inaccurate cost-benefit method by PJM and the correct method by MISO results in an over allocation of the costs associated with joint PJM/MISO projects to PJM participants and in some cases approval of projects that do not pass an accurate cost-benefit test.

If it is retained, there are significant issues with PJM’s cost/benefit analysis that should be addressed prior to approval of additional projects. The current cost/benefit analysis for a regional project, for example, explicitly and incorrectly ignores the increased congestion in zones that results from an RTEP project when calculating the energy market benefits. All costs should be included in all zones and LDAs. The definition of benefits should also be reevaluated.

The cost/benefit analysis should also account for the fact that the transmission project costs are not subject to cost caps and may exceed the estimated costs by a wide margin. When actual costs exceed estimated costs, the benefit/cost analysis is effectively meaningless and low estimated costs may result in inappropriately favoring transmission projects over market generation projects.
The risk of cost increases for transmission projects should be incorporated in the cost/benefit analysis.

There are currently no market incentives for transmission owners to plan, submit and complete transmission outages in a timely and efficient manner. Requiring transmission owners to pay does not create an effective incentive when those payments are passed through to transmission customers. The process for the submission of planned transmission outages needs to be carefully reviewed and redesigned to limit the ability of transmission owners to submit transmission outages that are late for FTR auction bid submission dates and are late for the day-ahead energy market and that have large and unnecessary impacts on the PJM energy market. The submission of late transmission outages can inappropriately affect market outcomes when market participants do not have the ability to modify market bids and offers. The PJM process for evaluating the congestion impact of transmission outages needs to be clearly defined and upgraded to provide for management of transmission outages to minimize market impacts. The MMU continues to recommend that PJM draft a clear and expanded definition of the congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests that is incorporated in the PJM Market Rules. PJM Manual 38 currently defines congestion resulting from a transmission outage as an overload on transmission facilities rather than using the general economic definition of congestion resulting from out of merit generation to control constraints. PJM does not currently evaluate the economic impact of congestion when reviewing proposed transmission outages.245

The treatment by PJM and Dominion Virginia Power of the outage for the Lanexa – Dunnsville Line illustrates some of the issues with the current process. The outage was submitted and delayed more than once. PJM’s analysis of expected congestion did not highlight the magnitude of the issue. Dominion Virginia Power did not stage the outage so as to minimize market disruption and congestion until after there were significant disruptions and congestion.

As an example of the complexities of defining the benefits of transmission investments, the reduction in congestion is frequently and incorrectly cited as a metric of benefits. Congestion is frequently misunderstood. Congestion is not static. Congestion exhibits dynamic intertemporal variability and dynamic locational variability. More importantly, congestion is not the correct metric for evaluating the potential benefits of enhancing the transmission grid.

There is not a secular trend towards increasing congestion in PJM. Congestion is volatile on a monthly basis. Congestion is also volatile on an hourly and daily basis. For example, higher congestion can result from changes in seasonal and daily/hourly fuel costs.

The level and distribution of congestion at a point in time is a function of the location and size of generating units, the relative costs of the fuels burned and the associated marginal costs of generating units, the location and size of load and the locational capability of the transmission grid. Each of these factors changes over time.

The geographic distribution of congestion is dynamic. The nature and location of congestion in the PJM system has changed significantly over the last 10 years and continues to change. The nature and location of congestion in PJM can also change from one day to the next as a result of changes in relative fuel costs. As a result, building transmission to address a specific pattern of congestion does not make sense, unless the technology can be easily moved to new locations as conditions change. The transmission system is only one of many reasons that congestion exists. The dynamic nature of congestion and the multiple, interactive causes of congestion make it virtually impossible to identify the standalone impacts of an individual transmission investment on future congestion. It is possible, for example, that congestion occurring during a period of a few days in the winter as a result of very high fuel prices, significantly increases the reported level of congestion for the entire year. This has occurred in PJM. It would be a mistake to consider that level of congestion to be a signal to build transmission.

At a more fundamental level, congestion is not the correct metric for evaluating the potential benefits of enhancing the transmission grid. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. Congestion is neither good nor bad, but is a direct measure of the extent to which there are multiple marginal generating units with different offers dispatched to serve load as a result of transmission

Constraints. Congestion occurs when available, least-cost energy cannot be delivered to all load because transmission facilities are not adequate to deliver that energy to one or more areas, and higher cost units in the constrained area(s) must be dispatched to meet the load. The result is that the price of energy in the constrained area(s) is higher than in the unconstrained area. Load in the constrained area pays the higher price for all energy including energy from low cost generation and energy from high cost generation, while only high cost generators are paid the high price at their bus and low cost generators are paid only the low price at their bus.

If FTRs worked perfectly and were assigned directly to load, FTRs would return all congestion to the load that paid the congestion. Congestion is not a cost, it is an accounting result of a market based on locational energy prices in which all load in a constrained area pays the higher single market clearing locational price, resulting in excess payments by load that are not paid to generation, which should be returned to load.

Counterintuitively, congestion actually increases when the transmission capacity between areas with lower cost generation and areas with higher cost generation increases but does not fully eliminate the need for some higher cost local generation. The smaller the amount of higher cost local generation needed to meet load, the more of the local load is met via low cost generation delivered over the transmission system and therefore the higher is the difference between what load pays and generation receives, congestion.

The PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) successfully addresses the need for transmission investment to reliably meet load. Together with the requirement that new generation pay interconnection costs, the RTEP process has resulted in the appropriate level of new transmission investment in PJM. There is no evidence that the PJM planning process is not adequate to meet the requirements of the PJM markets. Additional transmission investment is not a panacea. Transmission investment is expensive and long lived and it is essential that transmission investments be carefully planned for clearly identified needs in order to ensure that power markets can continue to provide reliable service at a competitive price.

PJM must make out of market payments to units that want to retire (deactivate) but that PJM requires to remain in service, for limited operation, for a defined period because the unit is needed for reliability.\textsuperscript{246} This provision has been known as Reliability Must Run (RMR) service but RMR is not defined in the PJM tariff. The correct term is Part V reliability service. The need to retain uneconomic units in service reflects a flawed market design and/or planning process problems. If a unit is needed for reliability, the market should reflect a locational value consistent with that need which would result in the unit remaining in service or being replaced by a competitor unit. The planning process should evaluate the impact of the loss of units at risk and determine in advance whether transmission upgrades are required in order to limit the duration of Part V service for individual units. It is essential that the deactivation provisions of the tariff be evaluated and modified. It is also essential that PJM look forward and attempt to plan for foreseeable unit retirements, whether for economic or regulatory reasons. PJM should consider an expedited queue process for projects that could replace the retiring capacity including the immediate transfer of the retiring unit’s CIRs to units in the queue in order to permit generation to compete as an alternative to the current transmission only approach.

Overview: Section 13, FTRs and ARRs

Auction Revenue Rights

Market Structure

\begin{itemize}
  \item ARR Ownership. In the 2023/2024 planning period ARRs were allocated to 1,504 individual participants, held by 123 parent companies, down from 1,566 individual parents, held by 133 parent companies in the 2022/2023 planning period. ARR ownership for the 2023/2024 planning period was unconcentrated with an HHI of 617, up from 584 for the 2022/2023 planning period.
\end{itemize}

Market Behavior

\begin{itemize}
  \item Self Scheduled FTRs. For the 2023/2024 planning period, 24.1 percent of eligible ARRs were self scheduled as FTRs.
\end{itemize}

Market Performance

\begin{itemize}
  \item ARRs as an Offset to Congestion. ARRs have not served as an effective mechanism to return all congestion revenues to load. For the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, ARRs
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{246} OATT Part V §114.
and self scheduled FTRs offset 78.6 percent of total congestion. Congestion payments by load in some zones were more than offset and congestion payments in some zones were less than offset. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by $4.0 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was 70.0 percent of total congestion.

- **ARR Payments.** For the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, the ARR target allocations, which are based on the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction, were $1,588.5 million, while PJM collected $1,841.0 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. For the 2022/2023 planning period, the ARR target allocations were $1,350.4 million while PJM collected $1,664.2 million from the combined Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

- **Residual ARRs.** Residual ARRs are only available on contract paths prorated in Stage 1 of the annual ARR allocation, are only effective for single, whole months and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR clearing prices are based on monthly FTR auction clearing prices. Residual ARRs with negative target allocations are not allocated to participants. Instead they are removed and the model is rerun.

  In the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 15,045.3 MW of residual ARRs with a total target allocation of $5.0 million, down from 17,822.70 MW, with a total target allocation of $13.9 million, in the first seven months of the 2022/2023 planning period.

- **ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching.** There were 26,290 MW of ARRs associated with $474,000 of revenue that were reassigned for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period. There were 38,774 MW of ARRs associated with $2,100,400 of revenue that were reassigned in the 2022/2023 planning period.

### Financial Transmission Rights

#### Market Design

- **Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.** The design of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions includes auctions for each remaining month in the planning period.

#### Market Structure

- **Patterns of Ownership.** For the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, financial entities purchased 86.2 of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 81.3 percent of prevailing flow and 91.6 percent of counter flow FTRs for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period. Financial entities owned 78.3 percent of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 70.1 percent of all prevailing flow FTRs and 88.2 percent of all counter flow FTRs during the first four seven of the 2023/2024 planning period. Self scheduled FTRs account for 4.3 percent of all FTRs held.

- **Market Concentration.** In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, ownership of cleared prevailing flow bids was unconcentrated in all periods. Ownership of cleared counter flow bids was unconcentrated in 31.7 percent of periods and moderately concentrated in 68.3 percent of periods.

#### Market Behavior

- **Sell Offers.** In a given auction, market participants can sell FTRs acquired in preceding auctions or preceding rounds of auctions. In the 2023/2026 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 865,052 MW. In the 2023/2024 Annual FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 898,579 MW. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 28,349,032 MW.

- **Buy Bids.** In the 2023/2026 Long Term FTR auction, total FTR buy bids were 1,388,159 MW, down 41.9 percent from 2,387,443 MW the previous long term auction. There were 3,773,919 MW of buy and self scheduled bids in the 2023/2024 Annual FTR Auction, up 87.8 percent from 2,010,076 MW the previous planning period. The total FTR buy bids from the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR
Auctions for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning were 52,674,605 MW.

- **FTR Forfeitures.** Total FTR forfeitures were $1.6 million for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period.
- **Credit.** There have been three collateral defaults and one payment default in 2023.

### Market Performance

- **Quantity.** In the 2023/2026 Long Term FTR Auction 282,258 MW (20.3 percent) of buy bids cleared and 346,357 MW (12.3 percent) of sell offers cleared. In the Annual FTR Auction for the 2023/2024 planning period 878,232 MW (23.3 percent) of buy and self scheduled bids cleared, up 72.5 percent from 509,687 (25.4 percent) for the previous planning period. In the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions cleared 7,121,766 MW (13.5 percent) of FTR buy bids and 4,578,278 MW (16.1 percent) of FTR sell offers. For the 2022/2023 planning period, Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions cleared 7,303,241 MW (17.8 percent) of FTR buy bids and 3,483,021 MW (17.8 percent) of FTR sell offers.
- **Price.** The weighted average buy bid FTR price in the 2023/2026 Long Term FTR Auction was $0.13 per MW, up from $0.05 from the 2022/2025 Long Term FTR Auction. The weighted average bid FTR price in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2023/2024 planning period was $3.37 per MW, up from $1.72 per MW in the 2022/2023 planning period. The weighted average buy bid cleared FTR price in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for all periods in the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period was $0.50 per MWh, up from $0.49 per MWh in the same period of the 2022/2023 planning period.
- **Revenue.** The 2023/2026 Long Term FTR Auction generated $184.5 million of net revenue for all FTRs, up 153.7 percent from $72.8 million from the 2022/2025 Long Term FTR Auction. The 2023/2024 Annual FTR Auction generated $1,694.3 million in net revenue, up 12.8 percent from $1,501.5 million for the 2022/2023 Annual FTR Auction. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions resulted in net revenue of $68.1 million in the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, down 23.8 percent from $89.4 million in the same period in the 2022/2023 planning period.
- **Revenue Adequacy.** FTRs were paid 100.0 percent of the target allocations for the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period, including distribution of the current surplus revenue.

### Section 13 Recommendations

#### Market Design

- **Profitability.** FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received directly from holding an FTR plus any revenue from the sale of an FTR, and the cost of buying the FTR. In the first seven months in the 2023/2024 planning period, profits for all participants were $167.8 million. In the first seven months in the 2023/2024 planning period, physical entities received $54.3 million in profits on FTRs purchased directly (not self scheduled), down from $127.5 million in profits in the same time period in the 2022/2023 planning period. Financial entities received $113.4 million in profits, down from $413.2 million profits in the same time period in the 2022/2023 planning period.
or aggregate. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

ARR

- The MMU recommends that the ARR/FTR design be modified to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all historical generation to load paths be eliminated as a basis for assigning ARRs. The MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, the rights to all congestion revenue be allocated as ARRs prior to sale as FTRs. Reductions for outages and increased system capability should be reserved for ARRs rather than sold in the Long Term FTR Auction. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from PJM’s tariff, but that if IARRs are not eliminated, IARRs should be subject to the same proration rules that apply to all other ARR rights. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

FTR

- The MMU recommends that FTR funding be based on total congestion, including both day-ahead and balancing congestion. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that bilateral transactions be eliminated and that all FTR transactions occur in the PJM market. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends a requirement that the details of all bilateral FTR transactions be reported to PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM continue to evaluate the bilateral indemnification rules and any asymmetries they may create. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs, including a clear definition of persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2014/2015 planning period.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate generation to generation paths and all other paths that do not represent the delivery of power to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Long Term FTR product be eliminated. If the Long Term FTR product is not eliminated, the Long Term FTR Market should be modified so that the supply of prevailing flow FTRs in the Long Term FTR Market is based solely on counter flow offers in the Long Term FTR Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models, including the use of probabilistic outage modeling. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

Surplus

- The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FTR auction revenues not be used by PJM to buy counter flow FTRs for the purpose of improving FTR payout ratios. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

FTR Subsidies

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR market participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)
• The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)

FTR Liquidation
• The MMU recommends that the FTR portfolio of a defaulted member be canceled rather than liquidated or allowed to settle as a default cost on the membership. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

Credit
• The MMU recommends the use of at least a 99 percent confidence interval when calculating initial margin requirements for FTR market participants, in order to assign the cost of managing risk to the FTR holders who benefit or lose from their FTR positions. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Adopted 2023.)

Section 13 Conclusion
Solutions
The annual ARR allocation should be designed to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load, without requiring contract path or point to point physical or financial transmission rights that are inconsistent with the network based delivery of power and the actual way congestion is generated in PJM’s security constrained LMP market. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. As a result, congestion belongs to load and should be returned to load.

The current contract path based design should be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right is to the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load can retain the right to the congestion revenues or sell the rights through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the voluntary sale by load of their congestion revenue rights at terms defined by load.

Issues
If the original PJM FTR approach had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without use of the generation to load contract paths, and if the distortions subsequently introduced into the FTR design not been added, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design and complex redesigns would have been avoided. PJM would not have had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy.

PJM has persistently and subjectively intervened in the FTR market in order to affect the payments to FTR holders. These interventions are not appropriate. For example, in the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 planning periods, PJM significantly reduced the allocation of ARR capacity, and FTRs, in order to guarantee full FTR funding. PJM reduced system capability in the FTR auction model by including more outages, reducing line limits and including additional constraints. PJM’s modeling changes resulted in significant reductions in Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations, a corresponding reduction in the available quantity of FTRs, a reduction in congestion revenues assigned to ARRs, and an associated surplus of congestion revenue relative to FTR target allocations. This also resulted in a significant redistribution of ARRs among ARR holders based on differences in allocations between Stage 1A and Stage 1B ARRs. Starting in the 2017/2018 planning period, with the allocation of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load rather than FTRs, PJM increased system capability allocated to Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs, but continued to conservatively select outages to manage FTR funding levels.

PJM has intervened aggressively in the FTR market since its inception in order to meet various subjective objectives including so called revenue adequacy. PJM
should not intervene in the FTR market to subjectively manage FTR funding. PJM should fix the FTR/ARR design and then let the market work to return congestion to load and to let FTR values reflect actual congestion.

Load should never be required to subsidize payments to FTR holders, regardless of the reason.249 The FERC order of September 15, 2016, introduced a subsidy to FTR holders at the expense of ARR holders.250 The order requires PJM to ignore balancing congestion when calculating total congestion dollars available to fund FTRs. As a result, balancing congestion and M2M payments are assigned to load, rather than to FTR holders, as of the 2017/2018 planning period. When combined with the direct assignment of both surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenues to FTR holders, the Commission’s order shifted substantial revenue from load to the holders of FTRs and further reduced the offset to congestion payments by load. This approach ignores the fact that load pays both day-ahead and balancing congestion, and that actual congestion is the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. Eliminating balancing congestion from the FTR revenue calculation requires load to pay twice for congestion. Load pays total congestion and pays negative balancing congestion again. The fundamental reasons that there has been a significant and persistent difference between day-ahead and balancing congestion include inadequate modeling in the FTR auction and the role of UTCs in taking advantage of these modeling differences and creating negative balancing congestion. There is no reason to impose these costs on load.

These changes were made in order to increase the payout to holders of FTRs who are not loads. Increasing the payout to FTR holders at the expense of the load is not a supportable market objective. PJM should implement an FTR design that calculates and assigns congestion rights to load rather than continuing to modify the current, fundamentally flawed, design.

Load was made significantly worse off as a result of the changes made to the FTR/ARR process by PJM based on the FERC order of September 15, 2016. ARR revenues were significantly reduced for the 2017/2018 FTR Auction, the first auction under the new rules. ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 49.5 percent of total congestion costs for the 2017/2018 planning period rather than the 58.0 percent offset that would have occurred under the prior rules, a difference of $101.4 million.

A subsequent rule change was implemented that modified the allocation of surplus auction revenue to load. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period, surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenue are assigned to FTR holders only up to total target allocations, and then distributed to ARR holders.251 ARR holders will only be allocated this surplus after full funding of FTRs is accomplished. While this rule change increased the level of congestion revenues returned to load, the rules do not recognize ARR holders’ rights to all congestion revenue, and only improves congestion payouts to load when there is a surplus. There was no surplus for the 2020/2021 or 2021/2022 planning years. With this rule in effect for the 2021/2022 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 31.6 percent of total congestion. There was surplus for the 2022/2023 and the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning periods. But even with a surplus, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 78.8 and 78.6 percent of total congestion paid by ARR holders. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by $4.0 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was 70.0 percent of total congestion.

The complex process related to what is termed the overallocation of Stage 1A ARRs is entirely an artificial result of reliance on the contract path model in the assignment of FTRs. For example, there is a reason that transmission is not actually built to address the Stage 1A overallocation issue. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load contract paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows.

PJM proposed, and on March 11, 2022, FERC accepted, to increase Stage 1A ARR allocations from 50 percent of Network Service Base Load (NSBL) to 60 percent of Network Service Peak Load (NSPL).252 NSBL is a network service customer’s contribution to the lowest daily zonal peak load in the prior 12 month period, and NSPL is a network service customer’s contribution to

249 Such subsidies have been suggested repeatedly. See FERC Dockets Nos. EL13-47-000 and EL12-19-000.
252 See 178 FERC ¶ 61,170.
the highest daily zonal peak load in the prior twelve month period. PJM’s new ARR allocation rules have increased Stage 1A rights at the cost of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations. More importantly, PJM’s new ARR allocation rules have exacerbated the current misalignment between congestion property rights and the congestion paid by load.

**Proposed Design**

To address the issues with the current contract path based ARR/FTR market design, the MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right would be the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load could retain the right to the congestion or sell the right through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the voluntary sale by load of their congestion revenue rights at terms defined by load.

With a network assignment of actual congestion, there would be no cross subsidies among rights holders and no over or under allocation of rights relative to actual network market solutions. There would be no revenue shortfalls as congestion payments equal congestion collected. The risk of default would be isolated to the buyer and seller of the right, and any default would not be socialized to other right holders. In the case of a defaulting buyer, the rights to the congestion revenues would revert to the load. There would be no risk of a network right flipping in value from positive to negative, because congestion is always the positive difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy as a result of transmission constraints.

The MMU proposal requires the calculation of constraint specific congestion and the calculation of that specific constraint’s congestion related charges to each physical load bus downstream of that constraint. Under the MMU proposal, the constraint specific congestion calculated by hour, from both the day-ahead and balancing market would be paid directly to the physical load as a credit against the associated load serving entity’s (LSE) energy bill. This right to the congestion is defined as the congestion revenue right (CRR) that belongs to the physical load at a defined bus, zone or aggregate. The LSE could choose to sell all or a portion of the CRR through auctions.

A CRR is the right to actual, realized network related congestion that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. Under the MMU proposal a bus, zone or aggregate specific CRR could be sold as a defined share of the actual congestion. For example, an LSE could sell 50 percent of its congestion revenue right for the planning period to a third party. The third party buyer would then be entitled to 50 percent of the congestion that is credited to that specific bus, zone or aggregate for the planning period. The remaining 50 percent of the congestion credit for the specified bus, zone or aggregate would be paid to the LSE along with the auction clearing price for the 50 percent of the CRR that was sold to the third party. Depending on actual congestion and the price paid for a CRR, an LSE selling its congestion revenue rights could be better or worse off than if it retained its rights.

Under the MMU proposal, the LSE would be able to set reservation prices in the auction for the sale of portions or all of its CRR. Third parties would have an opportunity to bid for the offered portions of the CRR, and the market for the congestion revenue associated with the specified bus, zone or aggregate would clear at a price. If the reservation price of an identified portion of the offered CRR was not met at the clearing price, that portion of the offered CRR would remain with the load. Auctions could be annual and/or monthly and/or more frequent.

Under the MMU proposal, point to point rights (FTRs) could exist as a separate, self-funded hedging product based on simultaneously feasible prevailing and counter flows in a PJM managed network based auction. The only supply and the only source of revenues in the point to point market for prevailing flow FTRs would be counter flow offers and direct payments for specific rights.