2023 State of the Market Report for PJM

Press Briefing March 14, 2023 **IMM**



Market Monitoring Unit

- Monitoring Analytics, LLC
 - Independent company
 - Formed August 1, 2008
- Independent Market Monitor for PJM
 - Independent from Market Participants
 - Independent from RTO management
 - Independent from RTO board of managers
- MMU Accountability
 - To FERC (per FERC MMU Orders and MM Plan)
 - To PJM markets
 - To PJM Board for administration of the contract

Role of Market Monitoring

- Market monitoring is required by FERC Orders
- Role of competition under FERC regulation
 - Mechanism to regulate prices
 - Competitive outcome = just and reasonable
 - Competitive markets replace traditional regulation
- FERC has enforcement authority
- Relevant model of competition is not laissez faire
- Competitive outcomes are not automatic
- Competitive outcomes require effective market power mitigation rules.

Role of Market Monitoring

- Detailed rules required
- Detailed monitoring required:
 - Of participants
 - Of RTO
 - Of rules
- Market monitoring is primarily analytical
 - Adequacy of market rules
 - Compliance with market rules
 - Exercise of market power
 - Market manipulation

Role of Market Monitoring

- Market monitoring provides inputs to prospective mitigation
- Market monitoring provides retrospective mitigation
- Market monitoring provides information
 - To FERC
 - To state regulators
 - To market participants
 - To RTO





Market Monitoring Plan

- Monitor compliance with rules
 - Monitor the potential of market participants to exercise market power
 - Monitor for market manipulation
- Recommend changes to rules
 - Monitor actual or potential design flaws in rules
 - Monitor structural problems in the PJM market
- Report on market issues
 - State of the market reports
 - Other reports



PJM Footprint






PJM summary statistics

	2022	2023	Percent Change
Average Hourly Load Plus Exports (MWh)	94,301	92,455	(2.0%)
Average Hourly Generation Plus Imports (MWh)	96,147	94,165	(2.1%)
Peak Load Plus Export (MWh)	149,531	152,797	2.2%
Installed Capacity at December 31 (MW)	183,385	178,253	(2.8%)
Load Weighted Average Real Time LMP (\$/MWh)	\$80.14	\$31.08	(61.2%)
Total Congestion Costs (\$ Million)	\$2,501.3	\$1,068.6	(57.3%)
Total Uplift Credits (\$ Million)	\$284.5	\$158.7	(44.2%)
Total PJM Billing (\$ Billion)	\$86.24	\$48.61	(43.6%)

The energy market results were competitive


Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure: Aggregate Market	Partially Competitive	
Market Structure: Local Market	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Effective

RT load-weighted average LMP



Monitoring Analytics

RT monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP



RT load-weighted average LMP

	Real-Time Load	-Weighted Av	erage LMP		Year t	o Year Chan	ge
			Standard		Average		Standard
	Average	Median	Deviation	Average	Percent	Median	Deviation
1998	\$24.16	\$17.60	\$39.29	NA	NA	NA	NA
1999	\$34.07	\$19.02	\$91.49	\$9.91	41.0%	8.1%	132.8%
2000	\$30.72	\$20.51	\$28.38	(\$3.34)	(9.8%)	7.9%	(69.0%)
2001	\$36.65	\$25.08	\$57.26	\$5.93	19.3%	22.3%	101.8%
2002	\$31.60	\$23.40	\$26.75	(\$5.06)	(13.8%)	(6.7%)	(53.3%)
2003	\$41.23	\$34.96	\$25.40	\$9.64	30.5%	49.4%	(5.0%)
2004	\$44.34	\$40.16	\$21.25	\$3.10	7.5%	14.9%	(16.3%)
2005	\$63.46	\$52.93	\$38.10	\$19.12	43.1%	31.8%	79.3%
2006	\$53.35	\$44.40	\$37.81	(\$10.11)	(15.9%)	(16.1%)	(0.7%)
2007	\$61.66	\$54.66	\$36.94	\$8.31	15.6%	23.1%	(2.3%)
2008	\$71.13	\$59.54	\$40.97	\$9.47	15.4%	8.9%	10.9%
2009	\$39.05	\$34.23	\$18.21	(\$32.09)	(45.1%)	(42.5%)	(55.6%)
2010	\$48.35	\$39.13	\$28.90	\$9.30	23.8%	14.3%	58.7%
2011	\$45.94	\$36.54	\$33.47	(\$2.41)	(5.0%)	(6.6%)	15.8%
2012	\$35.23	\$30.43	\$23.66	(\$10.71)	(23.3%)	(16.7%)	(29.3%)
2013	\$38.66	\$33.25	\$23.78	\$3.43	9.7%	9.3%	0.5%
2014	\$53.14	\$36.20	\$76.20	\$14.47	37.4%	8.9%	220.4%
2015	\$36.16	\$27.66	\$31.06	(\$16.98)	(31.9%)	(23.6%)	(59.2%)
2016	\$29.23	\$25.01	\$16.12	(\$6.93)	(19.2%)	(9.6%)	(48.1%)
2017	\$30.99	\$26.35	\$19.32	\$1.76	6.0%	5.4%	19.9%
2018	\$38.24	\$29.55	\$32.89	\$7.25	23.4%	12.1%	70.2%
2019	\$27.32	\$23.63	\$23.12	(\$10.92)	(28.6%)	(20.0%)	(29.7%)
2020	\$21.77	\$19.07	\$12.50	(\$5.55)	(20.3%)	(19.3%)	(45.9%)
2021	\$39.78	\$32.11	\$27.72	\$18.02	82.8%	68.4%	121.8%
2022	\$80.14	\$60.09	\$135.55	\$40.36	101.4%	87.2%	389.1%
2023	\$31.08	\$26.83	\$19.77	(\$49.06)	(61.2%)	(55.3%)	(85.4%)

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Components of RT LMP (Unadjusted)

	2022		2023		Change in
Element	Contribution to LMP	Percent	Contribution to LMP	Percent	Percent
Gas	\$41.42	51.7%	\$13.60	43.7%	(7.9%)
Coal	\$5.66	7.1%	\$4.49	14.4%	7.4%
Positive Markup	\$7.29	9.1%	\$3.29	10.6%	1.5%
Variable Maintenance	\$2.40	3.0%	\$2.31	7.4%	4.4%
Ten Percent Adder	\$4.70	5.9%	\$1.95	6.3%	0.4%
CO ₂ Cost	\$1.74	2.2%	\$1.93	6.2%	4.0%
Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor	\$4.63	5.8%	\$1.62	5.2%	(0.6%)
Variable Operations	\$0.94	1.2%	\$1.10	3.5%	2.4%
Opportunity Cost Adder	\$1.58	2.0%	\$0.87	2.8%	0.8%
NO _x Cost	\$2.17	2.7%	\$0.51	1.6%	(1.1%)
Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost	\$1.45	1.8%	\$0.50	1.6%	(0.2%)
Market-to-Market	\$2.48	3.1%	\$0.41	1.3%	(1.8%)
LPA Rounding Difference	\$0.64	0.8%	\$0.40	1.3%	0.5%
Oil	\$1.42	1.8%	\$0.31	1.0%	(0.8%)
NA	\$0.25	0.3%	\$0.15	0.5%	0.2%
Increase Generation Differential	\$0.35	0.4%	\$0.13	0.4%	(0.0%)
Scarcity	\$5.05	6.3%	\$0.07	0.2%	(6.1%)
Landfill Gas	\$0.02	0.0%	\$0.06	0.2%	0.2%
Other	\$0.02	0.0%	\$0.02	0.1%	0.0%
SO ₂ Cost	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	0.0%
Emergency Demand Response	\$1.75	2.2%	\$0.00	0.0%	(2.2%)
PJM Administrative Cap	(\$1.39)	(1.7%)	\$0.00	0.0%	1.7%
LPA-SCED Differential	(\$0.03)	(0.0%)	(\$0.00)	(0.0%)	0.0%
Decrease Generation Differential	(\$0.04)	(0.1%)	(\$0.01)	(0.0%)	0.0%
Renewable Energy Credits	(\$0.39)	(0.5%)	(\$0.07)	(0.2%)	0.3%
Negative Markup	(\$3.96)	(4.9%)	(\$2.56)	(8.2%)	(3.3%)
Total	\$80.14	100.0%	\$31.08	100.0%	0.0%

Components of RT LMP (Adjusted)

	2022		2023		Change in
Element	Contribution to LMP	Percent	Contribution to LMP	Percent	Percen
Gas	\$41.42	51.7%	\$13.60	43.7%	(7.9%
Coal	\$5.66	7.1%	\$4.49	14.4%	7.49
Positive Markup	\$10.02	12.5%	\$4.28	13.8%	1.39
Variable Maintenance	\$2.40	3.0%	\$2.31	7.4%	4.49
CO ₂ Cost	\$1.74	2.2%	\$1.93	6.2%	4.09
Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor	\$4.63	5.8%	\$1.62	5.2%	(0.6%
Variable Operations	\$0.94	1.2%	\$1.10	3.5%	2.49
Opportunity Cost Adder	\$1.58	2.0%	\$0.87	2.8%	0.89
NO _x Cost	\$2.17	2.7%	\$0.51	1.6%	(1.1%
Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost	\$1.45	1.8%	\$0.50	1.6%	(0.2%
Market-to-Market	\$2.48	3.1%	\$0.41	1.3%	(1.8%
LPA Rounding Difference	\$0.64	0.8%	\$0.40	1.3%	0.59
Oil	\$1.42	1.8%	\$0.31	1.0%	(0.8%
VA	\$0.25	0.3%	\$0.15	0.5%	0.29
Increase Generation Differential	\$0.35	0.4%	\$0.13	0.4%	(0.0%
Scarcity	\$5.05	6.3%	\$0.07	0.2%	(6.1%
Landfill Gas	\$0.02	0.0%	\$0.06	0.2%	0.29
Other	\$0.02	0.0%	\$0.02	0.1%	0.09
Ten Percent Adder	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.01	0.0%	0.09
SO ₂ Cost	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	0.09
Emergency Demand Response	\$1.75	2.2%	\$0.00	0.0%	(2.2%
PJM Administrative Cap	(\$1.39)	(1.7%)	\$0.00	0.0%	1.79
LPA-SCED Differential	(\$0.03)	(0.0%)	(\$0.00)	(0.0%)	0.09
Decrease Generation Differential	(\$0.04)	(0.1%)	(\$0.01)	(0.0%)	0.0
Renewable Energy Credits	(\$0.39)	(0.5%)	(\$0.07)	(0.2%)	0.39
Negative Markup	(\$2.00)	(2.5%)	(\$1.61)	(5.2%)	(2.7%
Total	\$80.14	100.0%	\$31.08	100.0%	0.09

Components of change in real-time load-weighted average LMP

Component	2022	2023	Change in LMP	Percent
Fuel and Consumables	\$49.45	\$19.56	(\$29.89)	60.9%
Emission Related	\$5.11	\$3.24	(\$1.87)	3.8%
Market Power Related	\$10.42	\$4.99	(\$5.43)	11.1%
Scarcity	\$5.05	\$0.07	(\$4.99)	10.2%
Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor	\$4.63	\$1.62	(\$3.01)	6.1%
Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost	\$1.45	\$0.50	(\$0.95)	1.9%
Emergency Demand Response	\$1.75	\$0.00	(\$1.75)	3.6%
PJM Administrative Cap	(\$1.39)	\$0.00	\$1.39	(2.8%)
All Other	\$3.67	\$1.10	(\$2.56)	5.2%
Total	\$80.14	\$31.08	(\$49.06)	100.0%


Generation by fuel source

			_			
		2022		2023		Change i
		GWh	Percent	GWh	Percent	Outpu
Coal		167,603.8	20.0%	120,876.1	14.7%	(27.9%
	Bituminous	144,777.2	17.2%	108,651.3	13.2%	(25.0%
	Sub Bituminous	16,267.5	1.9%	6,428.1	0.8%	(60.5%
	Other Coal	6,559.0	0.8%	5,796.7	0.7%	(11.6%
Nuclear		271,522.1	32.3%	273,488.6	33.3%	0.79
Gas		335,707.2	40.0%	363,659.7	44.3%	8.3%
	Natural Gas CC	309,154.3	36.8%	331,766.8	40.4%	7.39
	Natural Gas CT	18,571.0	2.2%	21,077.7	2.6%	13.59
Nat	ural Gas Other Units	6,488.3	0.8%	9,571.2	1.2%	47.59
	Other Gas	1,493.5	0.2%	1,244.0	0.2%	(16.7%
Hydroelectric		15,662.5	1.9%	15,488.8	1.9%	(1.1%
	Pumped Storage	6,092.9	0.7%	6,096.5	0.7%	0.19
	Run of River	7,612.6	0.9%	7,644.6	0.9%	0.49
	Other Hydro	1,957.0	0.2%	1,747.6	0.2%	(10.7%
Wind		31,491.0	3.8%	28,937.2	3.5%	(8.1%
Waste		4,056.0	0.5%	3,992.6	0.5%	(1.6%
Oil		2,699.2	0.3%	2,676.7	0.3%	(0.8%
	Heavy Oil	76.4	0.0%	38.2	0.0%	(50.0%
	Light Oil	877.3	0.1%	918.5	0.1%	4.79
	Diesel	163.1	0.0%	40.4	0.0%	(75.2%
	Other Oil	1,582.4	0.2%	1,679.6	0.2%	6.19
Solar		9,242.4	1.1%	11,097.7	1.4%	20.19
Battery		25.4	0.0%	28.7	0.0%	12.79
Biofuel		1,371.1	0.2%	1,265.0	0.2%	(7.7%
Total		839,380.7	100.0%	821,511.0	100.0%	(2.1%

Generation by fuel source: 2008 through 2023

	Natural Gas	Coal	Nuclear	Other Fuel Type
2008	7.4%	54.9%	34.7%	3.0%
2009	10.0%	50.3%	35.9%	3.7%
2010	11.7%	49.3%	34.6%	4.4%
2011	14.1%	47.1%	34.5%	4.3%
2012	18.8%	42.1%	34.6%	4.5%
2013	16.7%	44.2%	34.8%	4.3%
2014	17.8%	43.3%	34.4%	4.5%
2015	23.0%	36.2%	35.5%	5.3%
2016	26.5%	33.9%	34.4%	5.3%
2017	26.8%	31.8%	35.6%	5.9%
2018	30.6%	28.6%	34.2%	6.6%
2019	36.2%	23.8%	33.6%	6.4%
2020	39.6%	19.3%	34.2%	6.9%
2021	37.7%	22.2%	32.8%	7.4%
2022	39.8%	20.0%	32.3%	7.9%
2023	44.1%	14.7%	33.3%	7.9%

Average short run marginal costs



Type of fuel used (by RT marginal units







Figure 8-14 Wind and solar output during the top 100 load hours: 2023



Map of RT generation less RT load by zone



RT daily load




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RT hourly average load and load plus exports

	PJM	Real-Time [Demand (M	Wh)		Year to Yea	ar Change	
	Lo	ad	Load Plus	s Exports	Lo	ad	Load Plus	s Exports
		Standard		Standard		Standard		Standard
	Load	Deviation	Demand	Deviation	Load	Deviation	Demand	Deviation
2001	30,297	5,873	32,165	5,564	NA	NA	NA	NA
2002	35,776	7,976	37,676	8,145	18.1%	35.8%	17.1%	46.4%
2003	37,395	6,834	39,380	6,716	4.5%	(14.3%)	4.5%	(17.5%)
2004	49,963	13,004	54,953	14,947	33.6%	90.3%	39.5%	122.6%
2005	78,150	16,296	85,301	16,546	56.4%	25.3%	55.2%	10.7%
2006	79,471	14,534	85,696	15,133	1.7%	(10.8%)	0.5%	(8.5%)
2007	81,681	14,618	87,897	15,199	2.8%	0.6%	2.6%	0.4%
2008	79,515	13,758	86,306	14,322	(2.7%)	(5.9%)	(1.8%)	(5.8%)
2009	76,034	13,260	81,227	13,792	(4.4%)	(3.6%)	(5.9%)	(3.7%)
2010	79,611	15,504	85,518	15,904	4.7%	16.9%	5.3%	15.3%
2011	82,541	16,156	88,466	16,313	3.7%	4.2%	3.4%	2.6%
2012	87,011	16,212	92,135	16,052	5.4%	0.3%	4.1%	(1.6%)
2013	88,332	15,489	92,879	15,418	1.5%	(4.5%)	0.8%	(3.9%)
2014	89,099	15,763	94,471	15,677	0.9%	1.8%	1.7%	1.7%
2015	88,594	16,663	92,665	16,784	(0.6%)	5.7%	(1.9%)	7.1%
2016	88,601	17,229	93,551	17,498	0.0%	3.4%	1.0%	4.3%
2017	86,618	15,170	91,015	15,083	(2.2%)	(11.9%)	(2.7%)	(13.8%)
2018	90,308	15,982	94,351	16,142	4.3%	5.4%	3.7%	7.0%
2019	88,120	15,867	92,920	16,085	(2.4%)	(0.7%)	(1.5%)	(0.4%)
2020	84,584	16,016	90,059	16,233	(4.0%)	0.9%	(3.1%)	0.9%
2021	87,606	15,725	92,774	16,485	3.6%	(1.8%)	3.0%	1.6%
2022	88,884	15,689	94,301	16,047	1.5%	(0.2%)	1.6%	(2.7%)
2023	86,193	13,926	92,455	14,324	(3.0%)	(11.2%)	(2.0%)	(10.7%)


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Average number of pivotal suppliers in the dayahead energy market by load level




Average hourly capacity (MW) failing the energy market must offer requirement: 2023

Month	90th Percentile	Average	10th Percentile
Jan-23	2,218	1,257	265
Feb-23	1,252	676	295
Mar-23	1,440	808	364
Apr-23	5,299	3,781	1,878
May-23	5,151	4,449	3,832
Jun-23	4,158	3,323	2,603
Jul-23	2,750	2,030	1,232
Aug-23	2,196	1,540	982
Sep-23	2,650	1,918	1,099
Oct-23	3,396	2,568	1,884
Nov-23	2,771	2,102	1,562
Dec-23	3,324	2,549	1,877
2023	4,233	2,257	610



Frequency of reduction in control limit of line ratings (constraint intervals) in the real-time market: 2022 and 2023

	' '	Frequency (Constraint Intervals)		Constraints with Reduced Control Percent		eduction ent)
Description	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
Violated Transmission Constraints	24,016	10,252	20,063	7,213	5.9%	5.5%
Binding Transmission Constraints	104,562	105,392	101,046	103,491	6.3%	6.3%
Market to Market Transmission Constraints	74,259	52,204	17,702	14,355	5.6%	5.7%
All Transmission Constraints	202,837	167,848	138,811	125,059	6.2%	6.2%



Total congestion costs

	Congestion Cost	Percent Change	Total PJM Billing	Percent of PJM Billing
2008	\$2,052	NA	\$34,300	6.0%
2009	\$719	(65.0%)	\$26,550	2.7%
2010	\$1,423	98.0%	\$34,770	4.1%
2011	\$999	(29.8%)	\$35,890	2.8%
2012	\$529	(47.0%)	\$29,180	1.8%
2013	\$677	28.0%	\$33,860	2.0%
2014	\$1,932	185.5%	\$50,030	3.9%
2015	\$1,385	(28.3%)	\$42,630	3.2%
2016	\$1,024	(26.1%)	\$39,050	2.6%
2017	\$698	(31.9%)	\$40,170	1.7%
2018	\$1,310	87.8%	\$49,790	2.6%
2019	\$583	(55.5%)	\$41,680	1.4%
2020	\$529	(9.4%)	\$36,280	1.5%
2021	\$995	88.2%	\$54,130	1.8%
2022	\$2,501	151.3%	\$86,220	2.9%
2023	\$1,069	(57.3%)	\$48,600	2.2%
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Recommendations: Energy Market

- The MMU recommends that intermittent resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the energy market that reflects the limitations of these resources. (Adopted 2023)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the energy market that reflects the limitations of these resources.
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, PJM always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters for all cost-based and all price-based offers during high load conditions.

The capacity market results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure: Aggregate Market	Not Competitive	
Market Structure: Local Market	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Mixed

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Capacity market issues


- PJM ELCC issues
- Market power mitigation
- DR
- EE
- Reserve margin
- RMR issues



Installed capacity by fuel source

	01-Jan-23		31-May-23		01-Jun	01-Jun-23		31-Dec-23	
	MW	Percent	MW	Percent	MW	Percent	MW	Percent	
Battery	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	4.0	0.0%	21.9	0.0%	
Coal	42,937.0	23.4%	42,054.0	23.1%	39,903.2	22.5%	38,910.3	21.8%	
Gas	87,931.3	47.9%	89,790.3	49.2%	87,899.2	49.7%	87,818.9	49.3%	
Hydroelectric	8,491.7	4.6%	8,480.4	4.7%	7,507.2	4.2%	7,507.2	4.2%	
Nuclear	31,971.0	17.4%	31,823.8	17.5%	32,184.1	18.2%	32,183.0	18.1%	
Oil	5,196.2	2.8%	5,160.2	2.8%	4,194.0	2.4%	4,371.4	2.5%	
Solar	2,711.1	1.5%	2,806.5	1.5%	3,183.5	1.8%	3,513.3	2.0%	
Solid waste	649.4	0.4%	627.4	0.3%	627.4	0.4%	627.4	0.4%	
Wind	3,501.1	1.9%	1,609.8	0.9%	1,481.8	0.8%	3,321.4	1.9%	
Total	183,388.8	100.0%	182,352.4	100.0%	176,984.4	100.0%	178,252.9	100.0%	

Installed capacity by fuel source



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RPM reserve margin: 2019 to 2024

	01-Jun-19	01-Jun-20	01-Jun-21	01-Jun-22	01-Jun-23	01-Jun-24	
Forecast peak load ICAP (MW)	151,643.5	148,355.3	149,482.9	149,263.6	149,382.2	151,639.1	А
FRR peak load ICAP (MW)	12,284.2	11,488.3	11,717.7	28,292.8	29,554.6	30,431.0	В
PRD ICAP (MW)	0.0	558.0	510.0	230.0	235.0	305.0	С
Installed reserve margin (IRM)	16.0%	15.5%	14.7%	14.9%	14.9%	17.7%	D
Pool wide average EFORd	6.08%	5.78%	5.22%	5.08%	4.87%	5.10%	Е
Forecast pool requirement (FPR)	1.0895	1.0882	1.0871	1.0906	1.0930	1.1170	$F=(1+D)^*(1-E)$
RPM committed less deficiency UCAP (MW) (generation and D	OR) 162,276.1	159,560.4	156,633.6	137,944.8	136,408.5	139,810.2	G
RPM committed less deficiency ICAP (MW) (generation and DI	R) 172,781.2	169,348.8	165,260.2	145,327.4	143,391.7	147,323.7	H=G/(1-E)
RPM peak load ICAP (MW)	139,359.3	136,309.0	137,255.2	120,740.8	119,592.6	120,903.1	J=A-B-C
Reserve margin ICAP (MW)	33,421.9	33,039.8	28,005.0	24,586.6	23,799.1	26,420.6	K=H-J
Reserve margin (%)	24.0%	24.2%	20.4%	20.4%	19.9%	21.9%	L=K/J
Reserve margin in excess of IRM ICAP (MW)	11,124.4	11,911.9	7,828.5	6,596.3	5,979.8	5,020.8	$M=K-D^*J$
Reserve margin in excess of IRM (%)	8.0%	8.7%	5.7%	5.5%	5.0%	4.2%	N=M/J
RPM peak load UCAP (MW)	130,886.3	128,430.3	130,090.5	114,607.2	113,768.4	114,737.0	P=J*(1-E)
RPM reliability requirement UCAP (MW)	151,832.0	148,331.5	149,210.1	131,679.9	130,714.7	135,048.8	Q=J*F
Reserve margin UCAP (MW)	31,389.8	31,130.1	26,543.1	23,337.6	22,640.1	25,073.2	R=G-P
Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW)	10,444.1	11,228.9	7,423.5	6,264.9	5,693.8	4,761.4	S=G-Q
Projected replacement capacity UCAP (MW)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	Т
Projected reserve margin	24.0%	24.2%	20.4%	20.4%	19.9%	21.9%	U=(H-T/(1-E))/J-1
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Part V reliability service summary (RMR)

			1018 (1111) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	5 1 111 4	O	
Unit Names	Owner	Fuel Type	ICAP (MW) Cost Recovery Method	Docket Numbers	Start of Term	End of Term
Indian River 4	NRG Power Marketing LLC	Coal	410.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER22-1539	01-Jun-22	31-Dec-26
B.L. England 2	RC Cape May Holdings, LLC	Coal	150.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER17-1083	01-May-17	01-May-19
Yorktown 1	Dominion Virginia Power	Coal	159.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER17-750	06-Jan-17	13-Mar-18
Yorktown 2	Dominion Virginia Power	Coal	164.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER17-750	06-Jan-17	13-Mar-18
B.L. England 3	RC Cape May Holdings, LLC	Oil	148.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER17-1083	01-May-17	24-Jan-18
Ashtabula	FirstEnergy Service Company	Coal	210.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	11-Apr-15
Eastlake 1	FirstEnergy Service Company	Coal	109.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Eastlake 2	FirstEnergy Service Company	Coal	109.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Eastlake 3	FirstEnergy Service Company	Coal	109.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Lakeshore	FirstEnergy Service Company	Coal	190.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Elrama 4	GenOn Power Midwest, LP	Coal	171.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER12-1901	01-Jun-12	01-Oct-12
Niles 1	GenOn Power Midwest, LP	Coal	109.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER12-1901	01-Jun-12	01-Oct-12
Cromby 2 and Diesel	Exelon Generation Company, LLC	Natural gas/oil, Diesel	203.7 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER10-1418	01-Jun-11	01-Jan-12
Eddystone 2	Exelon Generation Company, LLC	Coal	309.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER10-1418	01-Jun-11	01-Jun-12
Brunot Island CT2A, CT2B, CT3 and CC4	Orion Power MidWest, L.P.	Natural gas	244.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER06-993	16-May-06	05-Jul-07
Hudson 1	PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC	Natural gas	355.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER05-644, ER11-2688	25-Feb-05	08-Dec-11
Sewaren 1-4	PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC	Natural gas	453.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER05-644	25-Feb-05	01-Sep-08

Part V reliability service cost summary (RMR)

			Initial Fili	ng	Actual		Weighted Average
				Cost per		Cost per	RPM Clearing Price
Unit Names	Owner		Total Cost	MW-day	Total Cost	MW-day	(\$ per MW-day)
Indian River 4	NRG Power Marketing LLC		\$357,065,662	\$520.25	\$133,249,790	\$561.31	\$51.68
B.L. England 2	RC Cape May Holdings, LLC		\$35,953,561	\$328.34	\$51,779,892	\$472.88	\$154.51
Yorktown 1	Dominion Virginia Power		\$9,739,434	\$142.12	\$8,427,011	\$122.97	\$134.64
Yorktown 2	Dominion Virginia Power		\$10,045,705	\$142.12	\$9,529,149	\$134.81	\$134.64
B.L. England 3	RC Cape May Holdings, LLC		\$28,710,481	\$723.84	\$10,058,665	\$253.60	\$138.95
Ashtabula	FirstEnergy Service Company		\$35,236,541	\$176.25	\$25,177,042	\$125.94	\$107.91
Eastlake 1	FirstEnergy Service Company		\$20,842,416	\$257.01	\$18,484,399	\$227.93	\$102.73
Eastlake 2	FirstEnergy Service Company		\$20,182,025	\$248.87	\$17,683,994	\$218.06	\$102.73
Eastlake 3	FirstEnergy Service Company		\$20,192,938	\$249.00	\$17,391,797	\$214.46	\$102.73
Lakeshore	FirstEnergy Service Company		\$33,993,468	\$240.47	\$20,532,969	\$145.25	\$102.73
Elrama 4	GenOn Power Midwest, LP		\$15,435,472	\$739.88	\$7,576,435	\$363.17	\$75.08
Niles 1	GenOn Power Midwest, LP		\$9,510,580	\$715.19	\$4,829,423	\$363.17	\$75.08
Cromby 2 and Diesel	Exelon Generation Company, LLC		\$20,213,406	\$463.70	\$17,776,658	\$407.80	\$108.63
Eddystone 2	Exelon Generation Company, LLC		\$165,993,135	\$1,467.74	\$85,364,570	\$754.81	\$108.63
Brunot Island CT2A, CT2B, CT3 and CC4	Orion Power MidWest, L.P.		\$60,933,986	\$601.76	\$23,507,795	\$232.15	\$89.78
Hudson 1	PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSE	G Fossil LLC	\$28,934,341	\$32.90	\$62,364,359	\$70.92	\$132.72
Sewaren 1-4	PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSE	EG Fossil LLC	\$47,633,115	\$81.89	\$79,580,435	\$136.82	\$97.39


2024/2025 RPM BRA: RPM revenue impacts

			Scenario Impact			
			RPM Revenue	Percent (Change	
		RPM Revenue	Change	Scenario	Actual to	
Scenario	Scenario Description	(\$ per Delivery Year)	(\$ per Delivery Year)	to Actual	Scenario	
0	Actual Results	\$2,192,828,251	NA	NA	NA	
1	Vertical VRR curve	\$1,377,668,211	\$815,160,040	59.2%	(37.2%)	
2	VRR curve half way to vertical	\$1,712,525,223	\$480,303,029	28.0%	(21.9%)	
3	Reduction in over forecasted peak load	\$1,800,931,369	\$391,896,882	21.8%	(17.9%)	
4	Correction to overstated intermittent capacity	\$2,272,074,858	(\$79,246,607)	(3.5%)	3.6%	
5	Zero demand resources	\$5,248,970,191	(\$3,056,141,939)	(58.2%)	139.4%	
6	Zero EE offers and EE add back	\$2,073,286,830	\$119,541,421	5.8%	(5.5%)	
7	Zero PRD offers	\$2,259,815,834	(\$66,987,582)	(3.0%)	3.1%	
8	Zero seasonal offers	\$2,296,212,168	(\$103,383,917)	(4.5%)	4.7%	
9	Matching seasonal offers only within LDAs	\$2,197,384,603	(\$4,556,351)	(0.2%)	0.2%	
10	Zero capacity imports	\$2,400,001,217	(\$207,172,966)	(8.6%)	9.4%	
11	Combined scenarios 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10	\$8,374,917,524	(\$6,182,089,273)	(73.8%)	281.9%	
12	Zero categorically exempt offers	\$5,200,707,712	(\$3,007,879,460)	(57.8%)	137.2%	
13	All categorically exempt offers	\$1,921,538,019	\$271,290,232	14.1%	(12.4%)	
14	All nuclear offers as price takers	\$2,121,788,593	\$71,039,658	3.3%	(3.2%)	
15	Combined scenarios 2, 4, 5 and 10	\$4,749,749,993	(\$2,556,921,742)	(53.8%)	116.6%	
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
2024/2025 RPM BRA: RPM cleared UCAP MW Impacts

			Scenario Impact			
				Percent (Change	
			Cleared UCAP	Scenario	Actual to	
Scenario	Scenario Description	Cleared UCAP (MW)	Change (MW)	to Actual	Scenario	
0	Actual Results	147,478.9	NA	NA	NA	
1	Vertical VRR curve	139,392.1	8,086.8	5.8%	(5.5%)	
2	VRR curve half way to vertical	143,011.6	4,467.3	3.1%	(3.0%)	
3	Reduction in over forecasted peak load	143,653.5	3,825.4	2.7%	(2.6%)	
4	Correction to overstated intermittent capacity	147,365.7	113.2	0.1%	(0.1%)	
5	Zero demand resources	145,808.2	1,670.7	1.1%	(1.1%)	
6	Zero EE offers and EE add back	139,810.6	7,668.3	5.5%	(5.2%)	
7	Zero PRD offers	147,798.6	(319.7)	(0.2%)	0.2%	
8	Zero seasonal offers	147, 147.6	331.3	0.2%	(0.2%)	
9	Matching seasonal offers only within LDAs	147,451.0	27.9	0.0%	(0.0%)	
10	Zero capacity imports	147,472.5	6.4	0.0%	(0.0%)	
11	Combined scenarios 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10	135,524.0	11,954.9	8.8%	(8.1%)	
12	Zero categorically exempt offers	145,773.2	1,705.7	1.2%	(1.2%)	
13	All categorically exempt offers	145, 162.6	2,316.3	1.6%	(1.6%)	
14	All nuclear offers as price takers	147,466.3	12.6	0.0%	(0.0%)	
15	Combined scenarios 2, 4, 5 and 10	142,653.2	4,825.7	3.4%	(3.3%)	

History of capacity prices




Map of RPM capacity prices



RPM reserve margin: June 1, 2019, to June 1, 2024

	01-Jun-19	01-Jun-20	01-Jun-21	01-Jun-22	01-Jun-23	01-Jun-24	
Forecast peak load ICAP (MW)	151,643.5	148,355.3	149,482.9	149,263.6	149,382.2	151,639.1	А
FRR peak load ICAP (MW)	12,284.2	11,488.3	11,717.7	28,292.8	29,554.6	30,431.0	В
PRD ICAP (MW)	0.0	558.0	510.0	230.0	235.0	305.0	С
Installed reserve margin (IRM)	16.0%	15.5%	14.7%	14.9%	14.9%	17.7%	D
Pool wide average EFORd	6.08%	5.78%	5.22%	5.08%	4.87%	5.10%	Е
Forecast pool requirement (FPR)	1.0895	1.0882	1.0871	1.0906	1.0930	1.1170	$F=(1+D)^*(1-E)$
RPM committed less deficiency UCAP (MW) (generation and DR)	162,276.1	159,560.4	156,633.6	137,944.8	136,408.5	139,810.2	G
RPM committed less deficiency ICAP (MW) (generation and DR)	172,781.2	169,348.8	165,260.2	145,327.4	143,391.7	147,323.7	H=G/(1-E)
RPM peak load ICAP (MW)	139,359.3	136,309.0	137,255.2	120,740.8	119,592.6	120,903.1	J=A-B-C
Reserve margin ICAP (MW)	33,421.9	33,039.8	28,005.0	24,586.6	23,799.1	26,420.6	K=H-J
Reserve margin (%)	24.0%	24.2%	20.4%	20.4%	19.9%	21.9%	L=K/J
Reserve margin in excess of IRM ICAP (MW)	11,124.4	11,911.9	7,828.5	6,596.3	5,979.8	5,020.8	$M=K-D^*J$
Reserve margin in excess of IRM (%)	8.0%	8.7%	5.7%	5.5%	5.0%	4.2%	N=M/J
RPM peak load UCAP (MW)	130,886.3	128,430.3	130,090.5	114,607.2	113,768.4	114,737.0	P=J*(1-E)
RPM reliability requirement UCAP (MW)	151,832.0	148,331.5	149,210.1	131,679.9	130,714.7	135,048.8	Q=J*F
Reserve margin UCAP (MW)	31,389.8	31,130.1	26,543.1	23,337.6	22,640.1	25,073.2	R=G-P
Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW)	10,444.1	11,228.9	7,423.5	6,264.9	5,693.8	4,761.4	S=G-Q
Projected replacement capacity UCAP (MW)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	T
Projected reserve margin	24.0%	24.2%	20.4%	20.4%	19.9%	21.9%	U=(H-T/(1-E))/J-1


New entrant CT net revenue and total cost by LDA




New entrant CC net revenue and total cost by LDA



New entrant CP net revenue and total cost by



New entrant nuclear plant net revenue and total



Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall)


	ICAP							Surplus	(Shortfal	II) (\$/MWł	n)		_				
	(MW)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Beaver Valley	1,808	\$26.3	\$6.3	\$10.5	\$8.8	(\$3.3)	\$1.4	\$11.7	\$3.2	(\$0.4)	\$2.6	\$13.9	\$3.7	(\$2.7)	\$15.0	\$42.4	\$3.0
Braidwood	2,337	\$24.9	\$2.5	\$6.4	\$3.4	(\$6.1)	(\$2.6)	\$7.2	(\$1.2)	(\$3.2)	(\$1.6)	\$5.9	\$3.9	(\$0.0)	\$15.1	\$35.0	(\$0.6)
Byron	2,300	\$24.5	(\$1.3)	\$3.4	(\$0.6)	(\$9.4)	(\$3.6)	\$4.9	(\$6.1)	(\$9.6)	(\$2.8)	\$5.8	\$3.2	(\$0.6)	\$14.1	\$34.5	(\$1.0)
Calvert Cliffs	1,726	\$60.6	\$20.9	\$28.6	\$17.9	\$4.5	\$14.6	\$31.6	\$14.1	\$7.2	\$6.1	\$16.3	\$5.4	(\$0.9)	\$19.4	\$54.6	\$10.0
Cook	2,177	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Davis Besse	894	NA	NA	NA	NA	(\$13.2)	(\$7.0)	\$6.6	(\$1.2)	(\$4.0)	(\$8.4)	(\$0.9)	(\$6.3)	(\$15.1)	\$5.9	\$31.6	(\$9.5)
Dresden	1,797	\$25.6	\$3.0	\$7.6	\$4.4	(\$5.2)	(\$1.0)	\$9.1	\$0.3	(\$1.6)	(\$0.1)	\$7.1	\$4.5	\$0.5	\$15.7	\$36.2	(\$1.2)
Hope Creek	1,172	\$54.0	\$17.0	\$24.5	\$16.9	\$2.6	\$12.4	\$26.0	\$6.3	(\$1.9)	\$1.6	\$12.3	\$1.8	(\$2.2)	\$11.0	\$38.0	(\$2.2)
LaSalle	2,265	\$24.8	\$2.5	\$6.4	\$3.3	(\$6.1)	(\$1.9)	\$7.7	(\$0.9)	(\$3.6)	(\$1.9)	\$6.0	\$3.7	(\$0.2)	\$14.8	\$34.7	(\$0.9)
Limerick	2,242	\$54.1	\$17.1	\$24.7	\$16.6	\$2.6	\$12.2	\$25.7	\$6.5	(\$2.1)	\$1.5	\$12.1	\$1.6	(\$2.6)	\$11.6	\$38.2	(\$2.4)
North Anna	1,892	\$52.0	\$14.6	\$25.5	\$16.8	\$0.2	\$5.7	\$23.2	\$10.9	\$3.0	\$4.7	\$16.0	\$4.8	(\$2.0)	\$17.9	NA	NA
Oyster Creek	608	\$47.5	\$8.4	\$15.9	\$7.2	(\$8.2)	\$3.3	\$16.4	(\$4.7)	(\$11.6)	(\$9.9)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Peach Bottom	2,550	\$53.7	\$16.9	\$24.2	\$16.1	\$2.3	\$12.3	\$25.5	\$5.8	(\$2.2)	\$1.4	\$11.8	\$0.7	(\$2.7)	\$11.5	\$38.4	(\$2.3)
Perry	1,240	NA	NA	NA	NA	(\$13.2)	(\$6.4)	\$5.5	(\$0.3)	(\$4.0)	(\$7.4)	\$1.9	(\$5.8)	(\$15.1)	\$6.3	\$32.1	(\$8.7)
Quad Cities	1,819	\$24.1	(\$0.4)	\$2.4	(\$1.8)	(\$13.2)	(\$6.9)	\$0.6	(\$7.7)	(\$9.5)	(\$3.5)	\$4.3	\$2.1	(\$2.4)	\$12.7	\$34.6	(\$1.4)
Salem	2,285	\$54.0	\$17.1	\$24.5	\$16.9	\$2.6	\$12.4	\$26.0	\$6.2	(\$2.1)	\$1.5	\$12.1	\$1.6	(\$2.3)	\$10.9	\$37.8	(\$2.3)
Surry	1,676	\$48.8	\$13.8	\$24.2	\$16.4	(\$0.0)	\$5.1	\$21.6	\$10.8	\$2.6	\$4.5	\$16.0	\$4.0	(\$2.6)	\$17.2	NA	NA
Susquehanna	2,494	\$46.8	\$15.2	\$22.4	\$16.1	\$1.4	\$11.1	\$24.6	\$6.3	(\$1.6)	\$1.8	\$10.1	(\$1.4)	(\$6.6)	\$8.6	\$36.3	(\$1.6)
Three Mile Island	803	\$40.7	\$6.5	\$13.3	\$4.6	(\$9.6)	\$0.9	\$13.7	(\$6.8)	(\$12.4)	(\$10.3)	(\$3.8)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Nuclear unit forward annual surplus (shortfall) for 2024

	ICAP Sur (MW)	plus (Shortfall) (\$/MWh)	Subsidy (\$/MWh)	Surplus (Shortfall) Excluding Subsidy (\$ in millions)	Surplus (Shortfall) Including Subsidy (\$ in millions)
Beaver Valley	1,808	\$11.15	\$3.15	\$169.5	\$217.4
Braidwood	2,337	\$6.19	\$7.15	\$121.6	\$262.1
Byron	2,300	\$5.43	\$7.75	\$105.0	\$254.9
Calvert Cliffs	1,726	\$17.10	\$0.00	\$248.0	\$248.0
Cook	2,177	NA	\$4.90	NA	NA
Davis Besse	894	(\$2.04)	\$3.75	(\$15.4)	\$12.8
Dresden	1,797	\$5.72	\$7.50	\$86.4	\$199.7
Hope Creek	1,172	\$4.73	\$10.00	\$46.6	\$145.1
LaSalle	2,265	\$6.00	\$7.30	\$114.3	\$253.3
Limerick	2,242	\$4.44	\$8.55	\$83.8	\$244.9
North Anna	1,892	NA	\$1.15	NA	NA
Peach Bottom	2,550	\$4.49	\$8.50	\$96.3	\$278.5
Perry	1,240	(\$0.41)	\$2.45	(\$4.3)	\$21.2
Quad Cities	1,819	\$4.56	\$16.50	\$69.7	\$322.0
Salem	2,285	\$4.59	\$10.00	\$88.2	\$280.3
Surry	1,676	NA	\$2.00	NA	NA
Susquehanna	2,494	\$4.73	\$8.30	\$99.2	\$273.2
wv	w.monitoringanaly	rtics.com	49	Monito	ring Analytics

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Map of unit retirements: 2011 through 2026



Profile of units at risk of retirement

		MW ex	pected t	o retire			Total MW
2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2024-2030
180	1,578	410	0	0	0	0	2,168
149	886	0	0	0	0	0	1,035
503	579	0	0	0	0	0	1,082
833	3,043	410	0	0	0	0	4,285
0	1,493	116	1,760	3,605	0	3,550	10,524
0	0	0	2,314	0	0	6,247	8,561
103	0	0	0	189	0	259	550
103	1,493	116	4,074	3,794	0	10,056	19,635
							17,725
							14,611
							1,438
							33,774
180	3,071	526	1,760	3,605	0	3,550	30,417
149	886	0	2,314	0	0	6,247	24,207
606	579	0	0	189	0	259	3,071
935	4,536	526	4,074	3,794	0	10,056	57,694
	180 149 503 833 0 0 103 103 180 149 606	180 1,578 149 886 503 579 833 3,043 0 1,493 0 0 103 0 103 1,493 180 3,071 149 886 606 579	2024 2025 2026 180 1,578 410 149 886 0 503 579 0 833 3,043 410 0 1,493 116 0 0 0 103 0 0 103 1,493 116	2024 2025 2026 2027 180 1,578 410 0 149 886 0 0 503 579 0 0 833 3,043 410 0 0 1,493 116 1,760 0 0 0 2,314 103 0 0 0 103 1,493 116 4,074 180 3,071 526 1,760 149 886 0 2,314 606 579 0 0	180 1,578 410 0 0 149 886 0 0 0 503 579 0 0 0 833 3,043 410 0 0 0 1,493 116 1,760 3,605 0 0 0 2,314 0 103 0 0 0 189 103 1,493 116 4,074 3,794 180 3,071 526 1,760 3,605 149 886 0 2,314 0 606 579 0 0 189 935 4,536 526 4,074 3,794	2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 180 1,578 410 0 0 0 149 886 0 0 0 0 503 579 0 0 0 0 833 3,043 410 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,314 0 0 103 0 0 0 189 0 103 1,493 116 4,074 3,794 0 180 3,071 526 1,760 3,605 0 149 886 0 2,314 0 0 606 579 0 0 189 0 935 4,536 526 4,074 3,794 0	2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 180 1,578 410 0 0 0 0 0 149 886 0

Retirements and expected retirements

							MW	Retired							MW at Risk
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2011-2023	2024-2030
Coal	543	5,908	2,590	2,239	7,065	243	2,038	3,167	4,111	2,132	1,020	5,385	4,380	40,820	27,087
Natural Gas	523	250	82	294	1,319	74	34	1,441	447	233	220	340	1,493	6,748	26,048
Other	131	804	187	437	879	83	41	935	899	891	70	439	855	6,651	3,487
Total MW	1,197	6,962	2,859	2,970	9,263	400	2,113	5,543	5,456	3,255	1,310	6,163	6,728	54,219	56,622


Units at risk of retirement if revenues doubled

MW expected to retire 2024-2030	
MW requested deactivation	4,285
MW expected to retire for regulatory reasons	19,635
MW uneconomic 2024-2026 if total revenues are dou	bled
Coal	10,627
Natural Gas	7,428
Other	902
Total MW uneconomic	18,957
Total MW At Risk of Retirement	42,877

Gas pipeline capacity to replace units at risk of retirement

		MW A	t Risk
Gas pipeline capacity need to replace units at	risk of retirement	57,694	42,877
ICAP			
Coal		30,417	23,319
Natural Gas		24,207	17,024
Other		3,071	2,534
Total		57,694	42,877
New CC unit ICAP (MW)		1,100	1,100
New CC unit heat rate (mmbtu/MWh)		6.543	6.543
Number of new CC units needed to replace coal	at risk	28	22
Dth needed to replace all coal at risk (Dth/day)		4,836,586	3,800,174
Bcf needed to replace all coal at risk (Bcf/day)		4.8	3.8
Dth needed to replace half of coal at risk (Dth/day	y)	2,418,293	1,900,087
Bcf needed to replace half of coal at risk (Bcf/day	<i>'</i>)	2.4	1.9
	F.4	Monitoring A	nalytics

Demand response revenue by market



Energy efficiency resources (MW)

Delivery Year	EE RPM Cleared (UCAP MW)	Total RPM Cleared (UCAP MW)	EE Percent Cleared	EE RPM Revenue
2011/2012	76.4	134,139.6	0.1%	\$139,812
2012/2013	666.1	141,061.8	0.5%	\$11,408,552
2013/2014	904.2	159,830.5	0.6%	\$21,598,174
2014/2015	1,077.7	161,092.4	0.7%	\$42,308,549
2015/2016	1,189.6	173,487.4	0.7%	\$66,652,986
2016/2017	1,723.2	179,749.0	1.0%	\$68,709,670
2017/2018	1,922.3	180,590.3	1.1%	\$86,147,605
2018/2019	2,296.3	175,957.4	1.3%	\$103,105,796
2019/2020	2,528.5	177,040.6	1.4%	\$92,569,666
2020/2021	3,569.5	173,688.5	2.1%	\$101,348,169
2021/2022	4,806.2	174,713.0	2.8%	\$185,755,803
2022/2023	5,734.8	150,465.2	3.8%	\$135,265,303
2023/2024	5,896.4	150,143.9	3.9%	\$93,603,058
2024/2025	7,668.7	147,505.6	5.2%	\$117,133,991

Recommendations: Demand Response

- The MMU recommends that PJM report the response of demand capacity resources to dispatch by PJM as the actual change in load rather than simply the difference between the amount of capacity purchased by the customer and the actual metered load. The current approach significantly overstates the response to PJM dispatch.
- The MMU recommends that demand resources offering as supply in the capacity market be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called.

Recommendations: Demand Response

 The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI.

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Total energy uplift charges by category

Category	2022 Charges (Millions)	2023 Charges (Millions)	Change (Millions)	Percent Change
Day-Ahead Operating Reserves	\$58.8	\$49.7	(\$9.1)	(15.4%)
Balancing Operating Reserves	\$223.7	\$108.1	(\$115.6)	(51.7%)
Reactive Services	\$1.5	\$0.6	(\$0.9)	(59.7%)
Synchronous Condensing	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	0.0%
Black Start Services	\$0.5	\$0.3	(\$0.2)	(34.3%)
Total	\$284.5	\$158.7	(\$125.7)	(44.2%)
Energy Uplift as a Percent of Total PJM Billing	0.3%	0.3%	(0.0%)	(1.0%)

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Total energy uplift charges by unit type

Unit Type	2022 Credits (Millions)	2023 Credits (Millions)	Change	Percent Change	2022 Sha re	2023 Sha re
Combined Cycle	\$29.8	\$5.3	(\$24.5)	(82.2%)	10.5%	3.3%
Combustion Turbine	\$172.7	\$92.8	(\$79.9)	(46.3%)	60.7%	58.4%
Diesel	\$3.1	\$2.9	(\$0.2)	(7.4%)	1.1%	1.8%
Hydro	\$8.3	\$0.2	(\$8.1)	(97.6%)	2.9%	0.1%
Nuclear	\$0.0	\$0.0	(\$0.0)	(51.6%)	0.0%	0.0%
Solar	\$0.1	\$0.1	(\$0.0)	(17.6%)	0.0%	0.0%
Steam - Coal	\$35.1	\$36.1	\$0.9	2.7%	12.3%	22.7%
Steam - Other	\$32.6	\$19.8	(\$12.8)	(39.2%)	11.5%	12.5%
Wind	\$2.7	\$1.6	(\$1.1)	(40.5%)	1.0%	1.0%
Total	\$284.5	\$158.7	(\$125.7)	(44.2%)	100.0%	100.0%



Recommendations: Energy Market Uplift

- PJM should ensure that units not following dispatch are not paid uplift.
- CTs should not be defined to be always following dispatch. (Adopted 2022)
- Flexible operating parameters should be required as a condition for receiving uplift.
- Uplift should not be paid to units backed down for reliability because there is no lost opportunity.
- Uplift should not be paid to units based on a fuel they are not burning.

The regulation market results were not competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Not Competitive	Flawed


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The synchronized reserve market results were competitive


Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure: Regional Markets	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Effective

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Daily average real-time reserves




Daily Average Reserve Prices



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Example: old, intermediate, and new ORDCs



Reserve Markets

- The MMU recommends that to minimize lag, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and respond to the notifications.
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the unit repay all credits back to the last time that the unit successfully responded to an event 10 minutes or longer.

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Excess black start capital recovery payments

	Capital Recovery	
	Payments	
	2018 - 2040	Overpayment
	(\$ millions)	(\$ millions)
Had CRFs been updated on January 1, 2018	\$428.7	
Current CRFs remain in place	\$518.4	\$89.7
Updated CRFs beginning July 1, 2024	\$433.6	\$4.9
Updated CRFs beginning January 1, 2025	\$452.3	\$23.6
Updated CRFs beginning January 1, 2026	\$468.6	\$39.9

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Black start revenue requirement charges

	Revenue		
	Requirement	Uplift	
Year	Charges	Charges	Total
2010	\$11,490,379	\$0	\$11,490,379
2011	\$13,695,331	\$0	\$13,695,331
2012	\$18,749,617	\$8,384,651	\$27,134,269
2013	\$20,874,535	\$86,701,561	\$107,576,097
2014	\$26,945,112	\$32,906,733	\$59,851,845
2015	\$56,425,648	\$5,175,644	\$61,601,292
2016	\$69,376,257	\$279,017	\$69,655,275
2017	\$69,258,169	\$257,174	\$69,515,342
2018	\$64,439,926	\$294,753	\$64,734,679
2019	\$64,327,918	\$226,014	\$64,553,932
2020	\$64,643,080	\$230,754	\$64,873,834
2021	\$67,694,868	\$316,437	\$68,011,305
2022	\$68,110,179	\$476,876	\$68,587,055
2023	\$66,946,135	\$313,527	\$67,259,662

Reactive charges

	Reactive	Reactive	
	Service	Capability	
Year	Charges	Charges	Total
2010	\$69,314,376	\$241,994,431	\$311,308,807
2011	\$44,568,672	\$255,910,059	\$300,478,731
2012	\$76,100,839	\$272,864,535	\$348,965,374
2013	\$312,640,950	\$276,918,698	\$589,559,649
2014	\$29,560,453	\$280,840,576	\$310,401,029
2015	\$10,543,187	\$276,567,702	\$287,110,889
2016	\$2,498,279	\$294,389,603	\$296,887,882
2017	\$20,379,379	\$302,704,116	\$323,083,495
2018	\$13,183,120	\$303,465,206	\$316,648,326
2019	\$570,589	\$329,215,657	\$329,786,246
2020	\$428,629	\$345,647,272	\$346,075,901
2021	\$909,343	\$364,007,391	\$364,916,734
2022	\$1,513,558	\$384,991,729	\$386,505,287
2023	\$609,938	\$388,044,837	\$388,654,774

Recommendations: Ancillary Services

- The regulation market should be modified to incorporate a consistent application of the marginal benefit factor (MBF) throughout the optimization, assignment and settlement process.
- LOC should be based on actual unit ramp rates. Current LOC overstated significantly.
- Separate cost of service payments for reactive capability should be eliminated and the cost of reactive capability recovered in the capacity market.
- New CRF rates for black start units, incorporating current tax code changes, should be implemented immediately for all black start units.

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The FTR/ARR markets results were partially competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Partially Competitive	
Market Performance	Partially Competitive	Flawed

Recommendations: FTR/ARR

 Rights to all congestion revenues should be assigned to load.

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ARR and self scheduled FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders

					Revenue				Pre 201 (Without B		2017/201 Baland		Post 201 (With Ba and Su	lancing	Effective (Offset
		Unadjusted		Balancing +		Surplus Revenue	Surplus	Post	Total		Current	<u> </u>	New			
Planning	ARR	SS FTR	Day Ahead	M2M	Total	Pre 2017/2018	Revenue	2017/2018	ARR/FTR	Percent	Revenue	Percent	Revenue	New	Cumulative	
Period	Credits	Credits	Congestion	Congestion	Congestion	Rules	2017/2018 Rules	Rules	Offset	Offset	Received	Offset	Received	Offset	Revenue	Offset
2011/2012	\$515.6	\$310.0	\$1,025.4	(\$275.7)	\$749.7	(\$50.6)	\$35.6	\$113.9	\$775.0	103.4%	\$585.5	78.1%	\$663.8	88.5%	\$775.0	103.4%
2012/2013	\$356.4	\$268.4	\$904.7	(\$379.9)	\$524.8	(\$94.0)	\$18.4	\$62.1	\$530.7	101.1%	\$263.2	50.2%	\$306.9	58.5%	\$530.7	101.1%
2013/2014	\$339.4	\$626.6	\$2,231.3	(\$360.6)	\$1,870.6	(\$139.4)	(\$49.0)	(\$49.0)	\$826.5	44.2%	\$556.3	29.7%	\$556.3	29.7%	\$826.5	44.2%
2014/2015	\$487.4	\$348.1	\$1,625.9	(\$268.3)	\$1,357.6	\$36.7	\$111.2	\$400.6	\$872.2	64.2%	\$678.4	50.0%	\$967.8	71.3%	\$872.2	64.2%
2015/2016	\$641.8	\$209.2	\$1,098.7	(\$147.6)	\$951.1	\$9.2	\$42.1	\$188.9	\$860.2	90.4%	\$745.5	78.4%	\$892.3	93.8%	\$860.2	90.4%
2016/2017	\$648.1	\$149.9	\$885.7	(\$104.8)	\$780.8	\$15.1	\$36.5	\$179.0	\$813.1	104.1%	\$729.6	93.4%	\$872.1	111.7%	\$813.1	104.1%
2017/2018	\$429.6	\$212.3	\$1,322.1	(\$129.5)	\$1,192.6	\$52.3	\$80.4	\$370.7	\$694.2	58.2%	\$592.8	49.7%	\$883.1	74.1%	\$592.8	49.7%
2018/2019	\$531.6	\$130.1	\$832.7	(\$152.6)	\$680.0	(\$5.8)	\$16.2	\$112.2	\$655.87	96.4%	\$525.3	77.2%	\$621.3	91.4%	\$621.3	91.4%
2019/2020	\$547.6	\$91.9	\$612.1	(\$169.4)	\$442.7	(\$1.6)	\$21.6	\$157.8	\$637.9	144.1%	\$491.7	111.1%	\$627.9	141.8%	\$627.9	141.8%
2020/2021	\$392.7	\$179.9	\$899.6	(\$256.2)	\$643.4	(\$43.2)	(\$0.0)	(\$0.0)	\$529.31	82.3%	\$316.4	49.2%	\$316.4	49.2%	\$316.4	49.2%
2021/2022	\$469.7	\$500.5	\$2,069.2	(\$457.4)	\$1,611.8	(\$104.6)	(\$2.9)	(\$2.9)	\$865.6	53.7%	\$509.9	31.6%	\$509.9	31.6%	\$509.9	31.6%
2022/2023	\$998.7	\$630.0	\$2,223.5	(\$526.5)	\$1,697.1	(\$80.6)	\$65.1	\$235.2	\$1,548.2	91.2%	\$1,167.4	68.8%	\$1,337.5	78.8%	\$1,337.5	78.8%
2023/2024*	\$527.4	\$202.0	\$913.0	(\$183.2)	\$729.9	(\$30.7)	\$5.5	\$27.7	\$698.7	95.7%	\$551.7	75.6%	\$573.9	78.6%	\$573.9	78.6%
Total	\$6,885.8	\$3,858.9	\$16,643.8	(\$3,411.7)	\$13,232.1	(\$437.2)	\$380.6	\$1,796.2	\$10,307.6	77.9%	\$7,713.7	58.3%	\$9,129.3	69.0%	\$9,257.4	70.0%

^{*}First seven months of 2023/2024



Zonal ARR/FTR total congestion offset

									_	
		Adjusted	Balancing+	Surplus		Day Ahead	Balancing		Total	
Zone	ARR Credits	FTR Credits	M2M Charge	Allocation	Total Offset	Congestion	Congestion	M2M Payments	Congestion	Offset
ACEC	\$2.8	\$0.0	(\$2.27)	\$0.08	\$0.7	\$8.5	(\$2.0)	(\$0.2)	\$6.3	10.5%
AEP	\$55.4	\$16.6	(\$27.6)	\$3.1	\$47.5	\$137.6	(\$24.9)	(\$2.8)	\$110.0	43.1%
APS	\$33.3	\$14.5	(\$12.2)	\$1.5	\$37.1	\$59.0	(\$11.2)	(\$1.0)	\$46.8	79.3%
ATSI	\$29.0	\$0.4	(\$14.2)	\$0.9	\$16.1	\$66.6	(\$12.8)	(\$1.4)	\$52.4	30.7%
BGE	\$72.6	\$22.5	(\$7.1)	\$2.5	\$90.5	\$34.4	(\$6.4)	(\$0.7)	\$27.3	331.2%
COMED	\$26.3	(\$0.0)	(\$18.3)	\$0.8	\$8.7	\$142.7	(\$16.3)	(\$2.0)	\$124.4	7.0%
DAY	\$7.0	\$0.4	(\$3.7)	\$0.2	\$3.9	\$17.1	(\$3.4)	(\$0.4)	\$13.4	29.2%
DOM	\$67.9	\$112.9	(\$29.2)	\$0.9	\$152.6	\$134.1	(\$26.5)	(\$2.6)	\$104.9	145.4%
DPL	\$33.4	\$15.0	(\$5.0)	\$0.1	\$43.6	\$41.8	(\$4.6)	(\$0.4)	\$36.8	118.5%
DUKE	\$26.7	\$0.9	(\$5.8)	\$11.1	\$32.9	\$28.0	(\$5.2)	(\$0.6)	\$22.3	147.8%
DUQ	\$5.0	\$0.2	(\$3.0)	\$1.2	\$3.4	\$12.4	(\$2.7)	(\$0.3)	\$9.4	36.2%
EKPC	\$3.8	\$0.0	(\$3.0)	\$0.1	\$0.9	\$14.6	(\$2.7)	(\$0.3)	\$11.6	7.5%
EXT	\$0.9	\$0.0	(\$5.2)	\$0.0	(\$4.3)	\$17.6	(\$5.2)	\$0.0	\$12.4	(34.8%)
JCPLC	\$2.7	\$0.0	(\$6.0)	\$0.1	(\$3.2)	\$24.3	(\$5.5)	(\$0.5)	\$18.3	(17.5%)
MEC	\$18.9	\$0.4	(\$3.7)	\$0.6	\$16.3	\$15.5	(\$3.4)	(\$0.3)	\$11.8	137.4%
OVEC	(\$0.0)	\$0.0	(\$0.2)	\$0.0	(\$0.2)	\$1.5	(\$0.2)	(\$0.0)	\$1.3	(18.0%)
PE	\$9.8	\$7.3	(\$3.5)	\$0.4	\$14.0	\$18.7	(\$3.1)	(\$0.4)	\$15.2	91.6%
PECO	\$9.3	\$6.1	(\$8.3)	\$0.4	\$7.5	\$31.8	(\$7.5)	(\$0.8)	\$23.5	32.1%
PEPCO	\$34.6	\$4.2	(\$6.5)	\$1.1	\$33.3	\$30.0	(\$5.9)	(\$0.6)	\$23.4	142.4%
PPL	\$45.6	\$0.4	(\$8.5)	\$1.4	\$38.9	\$39.0	(\$7.6)	(\$0.9)	\$30.5	127.8%
PSEG	\$40.5	\$0.0	(\$9.4)	\$1.2	\$32.3	\$35.9	(\$8.4)	(\$1.0)	\$26.5	121.8%
REC	\$1.6	\$0.0	(\$0.3)	\$0.0	\$1.3	\$1.5	(\$0.3)	(\$0.0)	\$1.2	110.4%
Total	\$527.2	\$202.0	(\$183.2)	\$27.7	\$573.7	\$912.7	(\$165.9)	(\$17.3)	\$729.5	78.6%

75

Offset available to load if all ARRs self scheduled

		21/22	Planning Pe	eriod		22/23 Planning Period				23/24 Planning Period					
		Residual	Bal+M2M	Congestion			Residual	Bal+M2M	Congestion			Residual	Bal+M2M	Congestion	
	SS FTR	ARR Credits	Charges	+M2M	Offset	SS FTR	ARR Credits	Charges	+M2M	Offset	SS FTR	ARR Credits	Charges	+M2M	Offset
ACEC	\$0.4	\$0.1	(\$5.2)	\$14.8	(31.4%)	\$3.0	\$0.0	(\$6.2)	\$16.3	(19.6%)	\$3.5	\$0.0	(\$2.3)	\$6.3	19.2%
AEP	\$132.5	\$0.5	(\$65.7)	\$240.4	28.0%	\$208.7	\$1.0	(\$79.3)	\$274.1	47.6%	\$33.8	\$0.4	(\$27.6)	\$110.0	6.0%
APS	\$93.3	\$1.6	(\$29.7)	\$122.8	53.1%	\$70.4	\$7.9	(\$31.4)	\$105.8	44.3%	\$45.8	\$0.0	(\$12.2)	\$46.8	71.8%
ATSI	\$47.3	\$0.0	(\$32.3)	\$117.9	12.7%	\$84.8	\$0.7	(\$40.7)	\$133.1	33.7%	\$55.2	\$0.0	(\$14.2)	\$52.4	78.3%
BGE	\$147.0	\$0.1	(\$17.0)	\$59.9	217.3%	\$194.0	\$0.0	(\$19.4)	\$68.4	255.2%	\$140.5	\$0.0	(\$7.1)	\$27.3	487.8%
COMED	\$51.9	\$0.2	(\$44.7)	\$159.9	4.6%	\$31.1	\$0.5	(\$56.2)	\$182.5	(13.5%)	\$33.9	\$0.0	(\$18.3)	\$124.4	12.5%
DAY	\$7.1	\$0.2	(\$8.6)	\$26.2	(4.7%)	\$11.4	\$0.0	(\$10.8)	\$32.4	1.8%	\$3.5	\$0.0	(\$3.7)	\$13.4	(1.7%)
DOM	\$556.6	\$11.5	(\$22.0)	\$370.9	147.3%	\$663.2	\$19.2	(\$85.5)	\$270.1	221.0%	\$154.2	\$0.3	(\$29.2)	\$104.9	119.5%
DPL	\$52.3	\$2.9	(\$80.3)	(\$21.1)	119.3%	\$56.2	\$1.0	(\$13.7)	\$64.6	67.3%	\$83.7	\$0.0	(\$5.0)	\$36.8	213.9%
DUKE	\$50.8	\$0.7	(\$12.3)	\$23.7	165.4%	\$81.4	\$0.0	(\$16.9)	\$51.7	124.7%	\$37.0	\$0.0	(\$5.8)	\$22.3	140.6%
DUQ	\$7.0	\$0.0	(\$6.4)	\$45.3	1.2%	\$15.0	\$0.0	(\$8.3)	\$18.5	36.5%	\$15.1	\$0.0	(\$3.0)	\$9.4	128.9%
EKPC	\$10.1	\$0.0	(\$7.0)	\$21.9	14.2%	\$13.0	\$0.0	(\$8.4)	\$27.2	17.3%	\$6.1	\$0.0	(\$3.0)	\$11.6	26.8%
EXT	\$1.9	\$0.0	(\$9.9)	\$19.9	(40.0%)	NA	\$0.0	(\$12.7)	\$28.9	(43.8%)	\$0.7	\$0.0	(\$5.2)	\$12.4	(36.7%)
JCPLC	\$4.4	\$0.0	(\$12.8)	\$39.0	(21.7%)	\$5.3	\$0.0	(\$16.3)	\$53.0	(20.8%)	\$4.5	\$0.0	(\$6.0)	\$18.3	(8.1%)
MEC	\$31.3	\$0.0	(\$11.6)	\$33.2	59.5%	\$46.5	\$0.0	(\$11.2)	\$32.4	108.7%	(\$2.1)	\$0.0	(\$3.7)	\$11.8	(49.1%)
OVEC	NA	\$0.0	(\$0.4)	\$1.5	(29.4%)	NA	\$0.0	(\$0.5)	\$3.3	(15.4%)	(\$0.0)	\$0.0	(\$0.2)	\$1.3	(16.8%)
PE	\$29.7	\$0.1	(\$18.5)	\$31.8	35.5%	\$20.5	\$0.2	(\$10.8)	\$35.3	28.3%	\$26.2	\$0.0	(\$3.5)	\$15.2	149.1%
PECO	\$6.2	\$0.8	(\$12.0)	\$78.0	(6.5%)	\$6.8	\$0.0	(\$24.0)	\$74.9	(22.8%)	\$20.0	\$0.0	(\$8.3)	\$23.5	49.5%
PEPCO	\$59.2	\$0.0	(\$15.5)	\$53.8	81.2%	\$95.2	\$0.0	(\$17.9)	\$61.0	126.7%	\$47.7	\$0.0	(\$6.5)	\$23.4	175.6%
PPL	\$160.3	\$0.0	(\$21.5)	\$103.3	134.4%	\$117.4	\$0.0	(\$28.2)	\$83.7	106.4%	\$17.2	\$0.0	(\$8.5)	\$30.5	28.6%
PSEG	\$94.0	\$0.2	(\$23.1)	\$76.0	93.4%	\$48.7	\$0.4	(\$27.1)	\$75.4	29.1%	\$31.2	\$0.0	(\$9.4)	\$26.5	82.2%
REC	\$1.1	\$0.0	(\$0.8)	\$5.3	6.2%	\$0.8	\$0.0	(\$0.9)	\$4.5	(4.2%)	\$1.6	\$0.0	(\$0.3)	\$1.2	109.2%
Total	\$1,544.3	\$18.8	(\$457.4)	\$1,624.6	68.1%	\$1,773.4	\$31.0	(\$526.4)	\$1,697.1	75.3%	\$759.2	\$0.8	(\$183.2)	\$729.5	79.1%

^{*} First seven months of the 2023/2024 planning period



FTR profits and revenues by organization type and FTR direction: June through December, 2023/2024

	Puro	hased FTRs Profit	Self Schedul	ed FTRs Revenue I	Returned	
Organization Type	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	Total	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	Total
Financial	\$116,811,316	(\$3,389,083)	\$113,422,233			
Physical	\$42,639,245	(\$19,143,736)	\$23,495,509			
Physical ARR	\$87,786,938	(\$56,945,358)	\$30,841,580	\$201,999,285	(\$7,893)	\$201,991,393
Total	\$247,237,500	(\$79,478,177)	\$167,759,323	\$201,999,285	(\$7,893)	\$201,991,393



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