

Financial Transmission and Auction Revenue Rights

In an LMP market, the lowest cost generation is dispatched to meet the load, but when there are transmission constraints, load pays the high local price for all generation, including the low cost generation serving part of that load. The low cost generation receives payment only for its low local price and does not receive the payment made by load for the output of the low cost generation at the high local price. The result is that load pays the correct local price but pays too much in total for energy because it is paying more for the low cost generation than the low cost generation receives. Load pays the difference between the high local price and the low local price of the low cost generation. That payment is appropriately not made to the low cost generation which is paid its LMP. In an LMP market, load pays more than generation receives. FTRs are the mechanism for returning those excess payments to load. But the current FTR mechanism in PJM does not and cannot return all the excess payments to load. The FTR mechanism in PJM needs a significant redesign in order to achieve that objective. The FTR mechanism has become unduly complicated and has deviated significantly from its original purpose. Return of all the excess payments to load would result in a perfect hedge against congestion. The current FTR mechanism has significantly attenuated the value of the FTR/ARR design as a hedge against congestion for load.

The FTR mechanism should be a simple accounting method for assigning congestion rights to load. But PJM has had to add increasingly complex rules and regularly intervene in the FTR mechanism because the PJM FTR design has moved further and further from these economic fundamentals. Some market participants have profited in various ways from these design flaws and those market participants now strongly defend the current design.

When the lowest cost generation is remote from load centers, the physical transmission system permits that lowest cost generation to be delivered to load, subject to transmission limits. This was true prior to the introduction of LMP markets and continues to be true in LMP markets.

After the introduction of LMP markets, financial transmission rights (FTRs) were introduced, effective April 1, 1999, for the real-time market and June 1, 2000, for the combined day-ahead and balancing (real-time) markets. FTRs permitted the loads, which pay for the transmission system, to continue to receive the benefits of access to either local or remote low cost generation by returning congestion to the load.¹ FTRs and the associated congestion revenues were directly provided to load in recognition of the fact that, as a result of LMP, load was required to pay more for low cost generation than is paid to low cost generation. But there was a flaw built in from the very beginning of the FTR design that had no significant impact initially but which was ultimately the source of all the issues with the FTR mechanism. That flaw was the idea that congestion was based on contract paths in a network system rather than a result of the actual operation of the complex network. Prior to the introduction of LMP markets, payment for the delivery of low cost generation to load was based both on intrazonal generation and intrazonal transmission, both under cost of service rates, and on contracts with specific remote generation outside the local zone and the associated point to point transmission contracts. But most load was served by intrazonal generation. In both cases, customers paid for the physical rights associated with the transmission system used to provide for the delivery of low cost generation to load. There was no congestion revenue because customers paid only the actual cost of the low cost generation. The flawed idea that congestion is based on contract paths was inconsistent with the most basic logic of LMP and the resultant fissure has continued to widen. The origin of FTRs was the recognition that the way to hold load harmless from making the excess payments created by the LMP system was to return the excess payments to load. The rights to congestion belong to load. If implemented correctly, FTRs would be the financial equivalent of firm transmission service for load. If implemented correctly, FTRs would be a perfect hedge against congestion for load. The result of the current FTR mechanism is a significant reduction in the value of FTRs as a hedge for load.

The notion that FTRs exist in order to provide a hedge for generation is a fallacy. In an LMP system, the basic incentive structure for generation derives from the fact

¹ See 81 FERC ¶ 61,257 at 62,241 (1997).

that generation is paid the LMP at the generator bus. If generation were to be guaranteed a price at a distant constrained load bus rather than at the generation bus, there would be no incentive for generation to locate where it is needed on the system. In addition, the payment of the price at the generator bus is fundamental to the logic of locational marginal pricing which produces local prices equal to the marginal value of generation at every point. There is no logical or theoretical basis in locational marginal pricing for the assertion that generation at low price nodes is underpaid and should be paid more from congestion dollars. Generation does not pay congestion. Some generation receives a price lower than the system marginal price (SMP) and some generation receives a price greater than SMP, but that does not mean that generation is paying congestion. It means that generation is being paid an LMP that is higher or lower than the system load-weighted average LMP. If a generating unit wants a hedge, it may enter into an arm's length transaction with a willing counterparty as a hedge. That is the way hedges work in markets. That is not the purpose of FTRs.

In an LMP system, the only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to use FTRs, or an equivalent mechanism, to pay back to load the difference between the total load payments and the total generation revenues. FTRs were the mechanism selected in PJM to offset the congestion costs that load pays in an LMP market. Congestion revenues are the source of the funds to pay FTRs. Congestion revenues are assigned to the load that paid them through FTRs.² The only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to ensure that all congestion revenues are returned to load or, more precisely, that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. In order to do that, congestion must be defined correctly based on the operation of the network and not on arbitrary contract paths.

Effective April 1, 1999, when FTRs were introduced with the LMP market, there was a real-time market but no day-ahead market, and FTRs returned real-time congestion revenue to load. Effective June 1, 2000, the day-ahead market was introduced and FTRs returned

total congestion including day-ahead and balancing (real-time) congestion to load. Congestion, in PJM's two settlement market, is the sum of day ahead and balancing congestion. Effective June 1, 2003, PJM replaced the direct allocation of FTRs to load with an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs). Under the ARR design, the load still owns the rights to congestion revenue, but the ARR design allows load to either claim the FTRs directly (through a process called self scheduling), or to sell the rights to congestion revenue in the FTR auction in exchange for a revenue stream based on the auction clearing prices of the FTRs. Under the ARR design, the right to all congestion revenues should belong to load. All congestion surplus should be assigned to load. But the actual implementation produces a very different result.

ARRs were an add on concept, defined based on a misunderstanding of FTRs, which had its roots in the assignment of congestion to load using contract paths (generation to load paths) rather than on the calculation of congestion actually paid. ARRs used assumed contract paths to assign congestion to load. The use of contract paths for ARRs was a more critical mistake than using contract paths for FTRs because contract paths did not and do not account for all congestion. The use of contract paths led to the mistaken conclusion that some congestion did not belong to load and could be sold to FTR buyers. The ARR concept, as it is currently implemented, does not allow the FTR sellers, load, to establish a price at which they are willing to sell, but forces load to accept whatever prices buyers are willing to pay. The revenue from the sale of congestion rights is not even paid in full to ARR holders. Sellers are required to return some of the cleared auction revenue to FTR buyers when FTR payments are less than target allocations. So called surplus revenue is paid to FTR holders to ensure payment, despite the fact that willing FTR buyers paid the revenues in the auction for the rights to an uncertain level of congestion.

The use of generation to load contract paths, rather than the direct calculation of congestion, led to an increased divergence between FTR target allocations on the generation to load contract paths and actual total congestion. This divergence between actual network use and historic contract paths was exacerbated as new zones were added with their own historic generation to load contract paths and as significant numbers of

² See *id.* at 62, 259–62, 260 & n. 123.

generating units retired and new units were added.³ Rather than understanding that the divergence resulted from the fact that a contract path based approach did not correctly calculate congestion in a network system, especially as the system grew significantly, the issue was characterized as the existence of excess capacity on the transmission system. But congestion was never about capacity on the transmission system. Prior to the introduction of ARRs, the so called excess congestion that exceeded the congestion on the defined contract paths was returned to load, regardless of its source. There is no such thing as excess congestion. The overlay of ARRs on the FTR concept did not change the fundamental logic of congestion, but permitted the introduction of a system in which the divergence was formally created between the amount of congestion paid by load and the amount of congestion returned to load. Congestion belongs to the load, by definition. The introduction of ARRs based on a contract path fiction undermined the assignment of all congestion rights to load.

The contract path fiction is also the source of the incorrect definition of the product that is bought and sold as FTRs, the available supply of the product and the price paid to the buyers of the product. The product is defined as the difference in congestion prices across specific transmission contract paths. The difference in congestion prices across contract paths is not congestion and is not equal to congestion revenues. The quantity of the product made available for sale in the FTR auctions is defined as system capability, meaning the capacity of the transmission system to deliver power. But system capability is not congestion and system capability is not the difference in congestion prices across transmission contract paths nor the potential for such difference. The definition of ARRs based on contract paths led to the mistaken idea that some transmission system capacity was used by ARRs but some was not and that both the ARR capability and the excess capacity was available for sale as FTRs. This fundamental confusion in the design of the market is the source of so called revenue shortfalls, of the redesign of the market to exclude balancing congestion, and of the need for PJM to intervene in the market. PJM has had to regularly intervene in the market because the market as designed

cannot reach equilibrium based on the economic fundamentals. The product, the quantity of the product, and the price of the product are all incorrectly defined.

The ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient mechanism for returning congestion to load, as a result of an FTR design that was flawed from its introduction and as a result of various distortions added to the design since its introduction. The distortions include the definition of target allocations based on day-ahead congestion only, the fact that ARR holders cannot set the sale price for congestion revenue rights, the return of market revenues to FTR buyers when profit targets are not met, the failure to assign all FTR auction revenues to ARR holders, the differences between modeled and actual system capability, the definition and allocation of surplus, and the numerous cross subsidies among participants. The fundamental distortion was the assignment of the rights to congestion revenue based on specific generation to load transmission contract paths. This approach retained the contract path based view of congestion rooted in physical transmission rights and inconsistent with the role of FTRs in a nodal, network system with locational marginal pricing.

The cumulative offset by ARRs for the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, using the rules effective for each planning period, was 72.2 percent. Load has been underpaid by \$2.7 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period.

The overall underassignment of congestion to load includes dramatically different results by zone. Load in some zones receives congestion revenues well in excess of the congestion they pay while the reverse is true for other zones.

If the original PJM FTR approach had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without use of the generation to load contract paths, and if the distortions subsequently introduced into the FTR design had not been added, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design and complex redesigns would have been avoided. PJM would not have had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy. The design should simply have provided

³ For a comprehensive report on capacity retirements and capacity additions in PJM, see: "2020 PJM Generation Capacity and Funding Sources: 2007/2008 through 2021/2022," (September 15, 2020) available at <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/Constraint_Based_Congestion_Calculations_20200722.pdf>.

for the return of all congestion revenues to load. The design should have also provided for the ability of load to sell the rights to congestion revenue. That sale could be organized as an FTR auction with the product and the price clearly defined. Now is a good time to address the issues of the FTR design and to return the design to its original purpose. This would eliminate much of the complexity associated with ARR and FTRs and eliminate unnecessary controversy about the appropriate recipients of congestion revenues.

The *2021 State of the Market Report for PJM* focuses on the 2020/2021 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions, specifically covering January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021.

Table 13-1 The FTR/ARR markets results were partially competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Partially Competitive	
Market Performance	Partially Competitive	Flawed

- Market structure was evaluated as competitive. The ownership of FTR obligations is unconcentrated for the individual years of the 2021/2024 Long Term FTR Auction, the 2021/2022 Annual FTR Auction and each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions. The ownership of FTR options is moderately or highly concentrated for every Monthly FTR Auction period and moderately concentrated for the 2020/2021 Annual FTR Auction. Ownership of FTRs is disproportionately (76.2 percent) by financial participants. The ownership of ARRs is unconcentrated.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as partially competitive because ARR holders who are the sellers of FTRs are not permitted to participate in the market clearing.
- Market performance was evaluated as partially competitive because of the flaws in the market design. Sellers, the ARR holders, cannot set a sale price. Buyers can reclaim some of their purchase price after the market clears if the product does not meet a profitability target. The market resulted in a substantial shortfall in congestion payments to load and significant and unsupportable disparities among zones in the share of congestion returned to load. FTR purchases by financial entities remain

persistently profitable in part as a result of the flaws in the market design.

- Market design was evaluated as flawed because there are significant and fundamental flaws with the basic ARR/FTR design. The FTR auction market is not actually a market because the sellers have no independent role in the process. ARR holders cannot determine the price at which they are willing to sell rights to congestion revenue. Buyers have the ability to reclaim some of the price paid for FTRs after the market clears. The market design is not an efficient or effective way to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. The product sold to FTR buyers is incorrectly defined as target allocations rather than a share of congestion revenue. ARR holders' rights to congestion revenues are not correctly defined because the contract path based assignment of congestion rights is inadequate and incorrect. Ongoing PJM subjective intervention in the FTR market that affects market fundamentals is also an issue and a symptom of the fundamental flaws in the design. The product, the quantity of the product and the price of the product are all incorrectly defined.
- The fact that load is not able to define its willingness to sell FTRs or the prices at which it is willing to sell FTRs and the fact that sellers are required to return some of the cleared auction revenue to FTR buyers when FTR profits are not adequate, means that the FTR design does not actually function as a market and is evidence of basic flaws in the market design.

Overview

Auction Revenue Rights

Market Structure

- **ARR Ownership.** In the 2021/2022 planning period ARRs were allocated to 1,459 individual participants, held by 131 parent companies. ARR ownership for the 2021/2022 planning period was unconcentrated with an HHI of 700.

Market Behavior

- **Self Scheduled FTRs.** For the 2021/2022 planning period, 26.1 percent of eligible ARRs were self scheduled as FTRs.

Market Performance

- **ARRs as an Offset to Congestion.** ARRs have not served as an effective mechanism to return all congestion revenues to load. For the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, ARRs offset only 44.8 percent of total congestion. Congestion payments by load in some zones were more than offset and congestion payments in some zones were less than offset. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by \$2.7 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was 72.2 percent of total congestion.
- **ARR Payments.** For the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, the ARR target allocations, which are based on the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction, were \$626.8 million, while PJM collected \$803.9 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions, making ARRs revenue adequate. For the 2020/2021 planning period, the ARR target allocations were \$517.1 million while PJM collected \$691.2 million from the combined Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.
- **Residual ARRs.** Residual ARRs are only available on contract paths prorated in Stage 1 of the annual ARR allocation, are only effective for single, whole months and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR clearing prices are based on monthly FTR auction clearing prices. Residual ARRs with negative target allocations are not allocated to participants. Instead they are removed and the model is rerun.

In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 18,624.9 MW of residual ARRs with a total target allocation of \$11.4 million, up from 13,601.8 MW, with a total target allocation of \$5.7 million, in the first seven months of the 2020/2021 planning period.

- **ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching.** There were 29,776 MW of ARRs associated with \$426,700 of revenue that were reassigned in the 2020/2021 planning period. There were 23,868 MW of ARRs associated with \$434,400 of revenue that were reassigned for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period.

Financial Transmission Rights

Market Design

- **Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.** The design of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions was changed effective with the 2020/2021 planning period. The new design includes auctions for each remaining month in the planning period. The prior design included auctions for the next three individual months plus remaining quarters.

Market Structure

- **Patterns of Ownership.** For the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, financial entities purchased 83.2 percent of prevailing flow and 92.7 percent of counter flow FTRs for January through December, 2021. Financial entities owned 76.4 percent of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 68.2 percent of all prevailing flow FTRs and 86.4 percent of all counter flow FTRs during the period from January through December 2021. Self scheduled FTRs account for 5.0 percent of all FTRs held.
- **Market Concentration.** For prevailing flow obligation FTRs in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, ownership of cleared prevailing flow bids was unconcentrated in all of the periods. Ownership of cleared counter flow bids was unconcentrated in 74.6 percent of periods and moderately concentrated in 25.4 percent of periods, in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period.

Market Behavior

- **Sell Offers.** In a given auction, market participants can sell FTRs acquired in preceding auctions or preceding rounds of auctions. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 12,374,729 MW.
- **Buy Bids.** The total FTR buy bids from the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning were 22,708,418 MW.

- **FTR Forfeitures.** Total FTR forfeitures were \$4.6 million for the 2020/2021 planning period. On May 20, 2021, FERC issued an order ruling the \$0.01 definition of an increase in the value of an FTR unjust and unreasonable, but upheld the other parts of PJM's forfeiture rule, and required PJM to modify the rule. FERC did not rule on PJM's compliance filing. As a result, there was no FTR forfeiture rule in place from May 20, 2021 through the end of 2021.
- **Credit.** There were 10 collateral defaults in 2021. There were 10 payment defaults not involving GreenHat Energy, LLC for a total of \$2.3 million. GreenHat Energy's default payments ended with the 2020/2021 planning period for a total of \$179.5 million. Of the 20 defaults, 15 were promptly cured, and the remainder are awaiting resolution.

Market Performance

- **Quantity.** In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions cleared 4,324,179 (19.0 percent) of FTR buy bids and 2,463,546 MW (19.9 percent) of FTR sell offers. For the 2020/2021 planning period, Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions cleared 2,720,662 (17.1 percent) of FTR buy bids and 2,770,301 MW (16.2 percent) of FTR sell offers.
- **Price.** The weighted average buy bid cleared FTR price in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for all periods of the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period was \$0.20 per MWh.
- **Revenue.** The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions resulted in net revenue of \$41.6 million in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, up from \$31.6 million for the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period.
- **Revenue Adequacy.** The first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period were revenue inadequate. FTRs were paid 91.1 percent of the target allocations for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, including distribution of the current surplus revenue.
- **Profitability.** FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received directly from holding an FTR plus any revenue from the sale of an FTR, and the cost of the FTR. In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, physical entities received \$118.6 million in profits on FTRs purchased

directly (not self scheduled), up from \$39.1 million profits in the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period and financial entities received \$252.6 million in profits, up from \$141.3 million profits in the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period.

Markets Timeline

Any PJM member can participate in the Long Term FTR Auction, the Annual FTR Auction and the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

Table 13-2 shows the date of first availability and final closing date for all annual ARR and FTR products.

Table 13-2 Annual FTR product dates

Auction	Initial Open Date	Final Close Date
2021/2025 Long Term	6/1/2021	3/3/2022
2021/2022 ARR	3/1/2021	3/30/2021
2021/2022 Annual	4/6/2021	4/29/2021

Recommendations

Market Design

- The MMU recommends that the current ARR/FTR design be replaced with defined congestion revenue rights (CRRs). A CRR is the right to actual congestion that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

ARR

- The MMU recommends that the ARR/FTR design be modified to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all historical generation to load paths be eliminated as a basis for assigning ARRs. The MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, the rights to all congestion revenue be allocated as ARRs prior to sale as FTRs. Reductions for outages and increased system capability should be reserved for ARRs rather than sold in the Long

Term FTR Auction. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from PJM's tariff, but that if IARRs are not eliminated, IARRs should be subject to the same proration rules that apply to all other ARR rights. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

FTR

- The MMU recommends that FTR funding be based on total congestion, including day-ahead and balancing congestion. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends a requirement that the details of all bilateral FTR transactions be reported to PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM continue to evaluate the bilateral indemnification rules and any asymmetries they may create. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs, including a clear definition of persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2014/2015 planning period.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate generation to generation paths and all other paths that do not represent the delivery of power to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Long Term FTR product be eliminated. If the Long Term FTR product is not eliminated, the Long Term FTR Market should be modified so that the supply of prevailing flow FTRs in the Long Term FTR Market is based solely on counter flow offers in the Long Term FTR Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models, including the use of probabilistic outage modeling. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

Surplus

- The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FTR auction revenues not be used by PJM to buy counter flow FTRs for the purpose of improving FTR payout ratios.⁴ (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

FTR Subsidies

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR market participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)

FTR Liquidation

- The MMU recommends that the FTR portfolio of a defaulted member be canceled rather than liquidated or allowed to settle as a default cost on the membership. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

Credit

- The MMU recommends the use of a 99 percent confidence interval when calculating initial margin requirements for FTR market participants, in order

⁴ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 27 (Aug. 25, 2021).

to assign the cost of managing risk to the FTR holders who benefit or lose from their FTR positions. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

Conclusion

Solutions

The annual ARR allocation should be designed to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load, without requiring contract path or point to point physical or financial transmission rights that are inconsistent with the network based delivery of power and the actual way congestion is generated in security constrained LMP markets. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. As a result, congestion belongs to load and should be returned to load.

The current contract path based design should be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right is to the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load can retain the right to the congestion revenues or sell the rights through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the sale by load of their congestion revenue rights.

Issues

If the original PJM FTR approach had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without use of the generation to load contract paths, and if the distortions subsequently introduced into the FTR design not been added, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design and complex redesigns would have been avoided. PJM would not have had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy.

PJM has persistently and subjectively intervened in the FTR market in order to affect the payments to FTR holders. These interventions are not appropriate. For example,

in the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 planning periods, PJM significantly reduced the allocation of ARR capacity, and FTRs, in order to guarantee full FTR funding. PJM reduced system capability in the FTR auction model by including more outages, reducing line limits and including additional constraints. PJM's modeling changes resulted in significant reductions in Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations, a corresponding reduction in the available quantity of FTRs, a reduction in congestion revenues assigned to ARRs, and an associated surplus of congestion revenue relative to FTR target allocations. This also resulted in a significant redistribution of ARRs among ARR holders based on differences in allocations between Stage 1A and Stage 1B ARRs. Starting in the 2017/2018 planning period, with the allocation of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load rather than FTRs, PJM increased system capability allocated to Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs, but continued to conservatively select outages to manage FTR funding levels.

PJM has intervened aggressively in the FTR market since its inception in order to meet various subjective objectives including so called revenue adequacy. PJM should not intervene in the FTR market to subjectively manage FTR funding. PJM should fix the FTR/ARR design and then should let the market work to return congestion to load and to let FTR values reflect actual congestion.

Load should never be required to subsidize payments to FTR holders, regardless of the reason.⁵ The FERC order of September 15, 2016, introduced a subsidy to FTR holders at the expense of ARR holders.⁶ The order requires PJM to ignore balancing congestion when calculating total congestion dollars available to fund FTRs. As a result, balancing congestion and M2M payments are assigned to load, rather than to FTR holders, as of the 2017/2018 planning period. When combined with the direct assignment of both surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenues to FTR holders, the Commission's order shifted substantial revenue from load to the holders of FTRs and further reduced the offset to congestion payments by load. This approach ignores the fact that load pays both day-ahead and balancing congestion, and that congestion is defined, in

⁵ Such subsidies have been suggested repeatedly. See FERC Dockets Nos. EL13-47-000 and EL12-19-000.

⁶ See 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016), *reh'g denied*, 156 FERC ¶ 61,093 (2017).

an accounting sense, to equal the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. Eliminating balancing congestion from the FTR revenue calculation requires load to pay twice for congestion. Load pays total congestion and pays negative balancing congestion again. The fundamental reasons that there has been a significant and persistent difference between day-ahead and balancing congestion include inadequate transmission modeling in the FTR auction and the role of UTCs in taking advantage of these modeling differences and creating negative balancing congestion. There is no reason to impose these costs on load.

These changes were made in order to increase the payout to holders of FTRs who are not loads. Increasing the payout to FTR holders at the expense of the load is not a supportable market objective. PJM should implement an FTR design that calculates and assigns congestion rights to load rather than continuing to modify the current, fundamentally flawed, design.

Load was made significantly worse off as a result of the changes made to the FTR/ARR process by PJM based on the FERC order of September 15, 2016. ARR revenues were significantly reduced for the 2017/2018 FTR Auction, the first auction under the new rules. ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 49.5 percent of total congestion costs for the 2017/2018 planning period rather than the 58.0 percent offset that would have occurred under the prior rules, a difference of \$101.4 million.

A subsequent rule change was implemented that modified the allocation of surplus auction revenue to load. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period, surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenue are assigned to FTR holders only up total target allocations, and then distributed to ARR holders.⁷ ARR holders will only be allocated this surplus after full funding of FTRs is accomplished. While this rule change increased the level of congestion revenues returned to load, the rules do not recognize ARR holders' rights to all congestion revenue. With this rule in effect for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, ARRs and FTRs offset 44.8 percent of total congestion. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by \$2.7 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the

first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was 72.2 percent of total congestion.

The complex process related to what is termed the overallocation of Stage 1A ARRs are entirely an artificial result of reliance on the contract path model in the assignment of FTRs. For example, there is a reason that transmission is not built to address the Stage 1A overallocation issue. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load contract paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows.

In response to a consultant's recommendations, PJM has proposed to increase Stage 1A ARR allocations to 60 percent of Network Service Peak Load (NSPL) ("Stage 1A Proposal").^{8, 9} While PJM's proposal will increase Stage 1A rights, this will come at the cost of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations. More importantly, PJM's proposal will not improve the alignment of congestion property rights to load, but will exacerbate the current misalignment.

Under the current rules, Stage 1A allocations are limited to 50 percent of Network Service Base Load. In the 2021/2022 planning period there were infeasibilities on 53 internal PJM constraints totaling 5,881 MW. These MW already result in revenue inadequacy because they are physically infeasible, but must be granted under the rules. In order to grant infeasible Stage 1A ARR allocations, PJM artificially increases the capacity of the constraint, which results in the over allocation issues of FTRs in the FTR auction. Increasing the amount of Stage 1 ARR allocations will exacerbate this issue and result in higher revenue inadequacy.

PJM's proposal is not internally consistent and does not follow its own logic. PJM's proposal does not extend the proposed changes beyond year one in the long term auction. The result is that buyers of long term FTRs can continue to purchase and hold capacity on the system before ARRs even have access to it. This increases over allocations and reduces load's access to ARRs.

7 163 FERC ¶61,165 (2018).

8 See "Review of PJM's Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) and Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)," London Economics, December 16, 2022.

9 See "Auction Revenue Rights and Financial Transmission Rights Tariff and Operating Agreement Revisions," Docket No. ER22-000, January 10, 2022.

PJM continues to fail to recognize the actual underlying issue. The only effective way to address the underlying issue identified by PJM's consultant, the fact that load does not actually get the rights to all congestion, is to modify the market design to assign congestion revenue rights to load.

Proposed Design

To address the issues with the current contract path based ARR/FTR market design, the MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right would be the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load could retain the right to the network congestion or sell the right through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the sale by ARR holders of their congestion revenue rights.

With a network assignment of actual congestion, there would be no cross subsidies among rights holders and no over or under allocation of rights relative to actual network market solutions. There would be no revenue shortfalls as congestion payments equal congestion collected. The risk of default would be isolated to the buyer and seller of the right, and any default would not be socialized to other right holders. In the case of a defaulting buyer, the rights to the congestion revenues would revert to the load. There would be no risk of a network right flipping in value from positive to negative, because congestion is always the positive difference between what load pays for energy, and generation is paid for energy as a result of transmission constraints.

The MMU proposal requires the calculation of constraint specific congestion and the calculation of that specific constraint's congestion related charges to each physical load bus downstream of that constraint. Under the MMU proposal, the constraint specific congestion calculated by hour, from both the day-ahead and balancing market would be paid directly to the physical load as a credit against the associated load serving entity's (LSE) energy bill. This right to the congestion is defined as the congestion revenue right (CRR) that belongs to the physical load at a defined bus, zone or aggregate. The

LSE could choose to sell all or a portion of the CRR through auctions.

A CRR is the right to actual, realized network related congestion that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. Under the MMU proposal a bus, zone or aggregate specific CRR could be sold as a defined share of the actual congestion. For example, an LSE could sell 50 percent of its congestion revenue right for the planning period to a third party. The third party buyer would then be entitled to 50 percent of the congestion that will be credited to that specific bus, zone or aggregate for the planning period. The remaining 50 percent of the congestion credit for the specified bus, zone or aggregate would be paid to the LSE along with auction clearing price for the 50 percent of CRR that was sold to the third party. Depending on actual congestion, an LSE selling its congestion revenue rights could be better or worse off than if it retained its rights.

Under the MMU proposal, the LSE would be able to set reservation prices in the auction for the sale of portions or all of its CRR. Third parties would have an opportunity to bid for the offered portions of the CRR, and the market for the congestion revenue associated with the specified bus, zone or aggregate would clear at a price. If the reservation price of an identified portion of the offered CRR was not met at the clearing price, that portion of the offered CRR would remain with the load. Auctions could be annual and/or monthly.

Under the MMU proposal, point to point rights (FTRs) could exist as a separate, self-funded hedging product based on simultaneously feasible prevailing and counter flows in a PJM managed network based auction. The only supply and the only source of revenues in the point to point market for prevailing flow FTRs would be counter flow offers and direct payments for specific rights.

Auction Revenue Rights

Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) are the mechanism used to assign congestion rights to load, using an archaic contract path based approach, and sell those rights to FTR buyers in various auctions. ARR values are based on nodal price differences established by cleared FTR bids in the Annual FTR Auction. ARR sellers have no opportunity to define a price at which they are willing to sell and must accept the prices as defined

by FTR buyers. ARR revenues are a function of FTR auction participants' expectations of congestion, risk, competition and available supply. But some auction revenues may be returned to FTR buyers, despite the fact that FTR buyers willingly paid a defined price for FTRs. PJM has significant discretion over the level of supply made available to FTR buyers. The appropriate goals of that discretion should be significantly limited and defined clearly in the tariff.

ARRs are available only as obligations (not options) and only as a 24 hour product. ARRs are available to the nearest 0.1 MW. The ARR target allocation is equal to the product of the ARR MW and the price difference between the ARR sink and source from the Annual FTR Auction.¹⁰ ARR target allocations are a set value at the time of the Annual FTR Auction. It is logically possible for ARRs to be revenue inadequate if the money collected from the FTR auction is not enough to pay the entirety of ARR target allocations for the planning period. This is extremely unlikely and can only happen if there is a modeling difference between the system model used for ARRs and the system model used for FTRs and the FTR MW are reduced. An ARR's target allocation, or value, which is established from the Annual FTR Auction, can be a benefit or liability depending on the price difference between sink and source.

The goal of the ARR/FTR design should be to provide an efficient mechanism to ensure that load receives the rights to all congestion revenues. In the current design, all auction revenues should be paid to ARR holders.

The quantity of the product made available as ARRs or for sale in the FTR auctions is defined as system capability, meaning the capacity of the transmission system to deliver power. But system capability is not congestion and system capability is not the difference in congestion prices across transmission contract paths nor the potential for such difference. The concept of system capability is not relevant to assigning the rights to congestion revenues to load. The use, or misuse, of the concept of system capability in assigning ARRs is derived entirely from the contract path approach used in the PJM design. The definition of ARRs based on contract paths led to the mistaken idea that some transmission

system capacity was used by ARRs but some was not and that both the ARR capability and the excess capability was available for sale as FTRs. In the current approach, system capability available to ARR holders is limited by the system capability made available in PJM's annual FTR transmission system market model. PJM's annual FTR transmission market model represents annual, expected system capability, modified by PJM to achieve PJM's goal of guaranteeing revenue equal to target allocations for FTRs, and subject to the requirement that all Stage 1A ARR requests must be allocated. Stage 1A ARR right requests are guaranteed and system capability necessary to accommodate the rights must be included in PJM's annual FTR transmission system market model.

Market Design

ARRs have been available to network service and firm, point to point transmission service customers since June 1, 2003, when the annual ARR allocation was first implemented for the 2003/2004 planning period. The initial allocation covered the Mid-Atlantic Region and the APS Control Zone. For the 2006/2007 planning period, the choice of ARRs or direct allocation FTRs was available to eligible market participants in the AEP, DAY, DUQ and DOM Control Zones. For the 2007/2008 and subsequent planning periods through the present, all eligible market participants were allocated ARRs.

Each March, PJM allocates annual ARRs to eligible customers in a three stage process: Stage 1A, Stage 1B and Stage 2B. Stage 1A ARRs are assigned based on historic contract paths and Stage 1A ARRs must be preserved for at least ten planning periods regardless of system or regulatory changes.¹¹

In Stage 1A, LSEs can obtain ARRs, based on their lowest daily peak load in the prior twelve month period, and based on generation to load contract paths that reflect generation resources that had historically served load, or their qualified replacements if the resource has retired and PJM has replaced it. The historical reference year is the year in which PJM markets were implemented, which is 1999 for the original zones, or the year in which a zone joined PJM. Firm, point to point transmission service customers can obtain Stage 1A ARRs, up to 50 percent of the MW of firm, point to point transmission service provided between the receipt and delivery points for the

¹⁰ These nodal prices are a function of the market participants' annual FTR bids and binding transmission constraints.

¹¹ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021) at 23.

historical reference year, subject to a cap of lowest daily peak load in the prior year. Network service customers can obtain Stage 1A ARR based on the MW of firm service provided during the reference year, subject to a cap of lowest daily peak load in the prior year. Stage 1A ARRs cannot be prorated. If Stage 1A ARRs are found to be infeasible, transmission system upgrades must be undertaken to maintain feasibility.¹²

In Stage 1B, network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs based on their share of zonal peak load, based on generation to load contract paths, up to the difference between their share of zonal peak load and Stage 1A allocations. Firm, point to point transmission service customers can obtain ARRs based on the MW of long-term, firm, point to point service provided between the receipt and delivery points for the historical reference year.

In Stage 2, network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs from any hub, control zone, generator bus or interface pricing point to any part of their aggregate load in the control zone or load aggregation zone up to their total peak network load in that zone. Firm, point to point transmission service customers can obtain ARRs consistent with their transmission service as in Stage 1A and Stage 1B.

When ARR holders self schedule FTRs, the ARR holders choose to be paid based on variable target allocations rather than the fixed ARR value determined in the annual FTR auction. ARR holders can self schedule ARRs as FTRs during the Annual FTR Auction.¹³ ARRs can be traded between LSEs prior to the first round of the Annual FTR Auction.

Effective for the 2015/2016 planning period, when residual zonal pricing was introduced, ARRs default to sinking at the load settlement point if different than the zone, but the ARR holder may elect to sink their ARR at the zone instead.¹⁴

In 2016, FERC ordered PJM to remove retired resources from the generation to load contract paths used to allocate Stage 1A ARRs.¹⁵ PJM replaced retired units with operating generators, termed qualified replacement

resources (QRRs).¹⁶ Existing Stage 1A resources retain their current allocations, while ARR allocations to QRRs that replace retired Stage 1A resources are prorated based on the feasibility of these ARRs after existing resources are allocated. As a result of this proration, ARRs for QRRs have lower priority than ARRs from generators that existed in 1998.

Generation to load paths, even from active generators, are based on a contract path model rather than a network model. Generation to load contract paths should not be used as a basis for assigning the rights to congestion revenue. Contract paths are not an accurate representation of the reasons that congestion revenues are paid or of how load is served in a network and will, by definition, not accurately measure the exposure of load to congestion.

Market Structure

ARRs are allocated on an annual basis. For the 2021/2022 planning period there were 1,459 individual participants, held by 131 parent companies.

The ownership of ARRs was unconcentrated, with an HHI of 851, for the 2020/2021 planning period.

Stage 1A Infeasibility

Stage 1A ARRs are allocated for a year, but guaranteed for 10 years, with the ability for a participant to opt out of any planning period within the 10 years. PJM conducts a simultaneous feasibility analysis to determine the transmission upgrades required to ensure that the long term ARRs can remain feasible. The rules provide that if a simultaneous feasibility test violation occurs in any year, PJM will identify or accelerate any transmission upgrades to resolve the violation and these upgrades will be recommended for inclusion in the PJM RTEP process. But such transmission upgrades must pass PJM's RTEP process.

PJM's transmission planning process (RTEP) does not identify a need for new transmission associated with Stage 1A overallocations because there is, in fact, no need for new transmission associated with Stage 1A ARRs. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load contract

¹² See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev 28 (Dec. 15, 2021).

¹³ OATT Attachment K 7.1.1.(b).

¹⁴ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021) at 35.

¹⁵ 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016).

¹⁶ See FERC Docket No. EL16-6-003.

paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows. This continues to be true even with the replacement of retired generating units.

ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching

PJM rules provide that when load switches between LSEs during the planning period, an LSE gaining load in the same control zone is allocated a proportional share of positively valued ARRs and residual ARRs within the control zone based on the shifted load.¹⁷ ARRs are reassigned to the nearest 0.001 MW and may be reassigned multiple times over a planning period. The reassignment of positively valued ARRs supports competition by ensuring that the offset to congestion follows load, thereby removing a barrier to competition among LSEs and, by ensuring that only ARRs with a positive value are reassigned, preventing an LSE from assigning poor ARR choices to other LSEs. However, when ARRs are self scheduled as FTRs, the self scheduled FTRs do not follow load that shifts while the ARRs do follow load that shifts, and this may result in lower value of the ARRs for the receiving LSE compared to the total value held by the original ARR holder.

There were 29,776 MW of ARRs associated with \$426,700 of revenue that were reassigned for the 2020/2021 planning period. There were 23,868 MW of ARRs associated with \$434,400 of revenue that were reassigned in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period.

Table 13-3 summarizes ARR MW and associated revenue reassigned for network load in each control zone where changes occurred between June 2020 and September 2021.

Table 13-3 ARRs and ARR revenue automatically reassigned for network load changes by control zone: June 2020 through December 2021

Control Zone	ARRs Reassigned (MW-day)		ARR Revenue Reassigned [Dollars (Thousands) per MW-day]	
	2020/2021 (12 months)	2021/2022 (7 months)	2020/2021 (12 months)	2021/2022 (7 months)
	ACEC	417	201	\$2.9
AEP	2,613	3,329	\$25.2	\$28.2
APS	1,386	824	\$20.8	\$8.2
ATSI	3,012	2,281	\$25.5	\$23.8
BGE	2,419	1,728	\$151.1	\$187.6
COMED	2,588	2,118	\$16.8	\$14.6
DAY	687	877	\$5.1	\$3.6
DUKE	827	885	\$26.2	\$34.3
DUQ	1,526	1,348	\$6.7	\$6.1
DOM	431	64	\$4.4	\$1.1
DPL	736	544	\$21.7	\$30.4
EKPC	0	0	\$0.0	\$0.0
JCPLC	927	734	\$4.3	\$1.5
MEC	608	755	\$2.9	\$3.8
OVEC	0	0	\$0.0	\$0.0
PECO	3,605	2,715	\$24.7	\$7.8
PE	603	544	\$7.3	\$5.3
PEPCO	2,176	1,349	\$27.3	\$23.5
PPL	3,358	2,870	\$38.5	\$44.4
PSEG	1,506	682	\$15.3	\$8.8
REC	352	20	\$0.1	\$0.0
Total	29,776	23,868	\$426.7	\$434.4

Residual ARRs

Introduced August 1, 2012, Residual ARRs are available for eligible ARR holders when a transmission outage was modeled in the Annual ARR Allocation, but the transmission facility returns to service during the planning period. Residual ARRs can only be allocated to participants whose ARRs were prorated in Stage 1B and only to a maximum of the prorated reduction, so not all available Residual ARRs are allocated. Residual ARRs are automatically assigned to eligible participants the month before the effective date, are effective for a single month and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR target allocations are based on the clearing prices from FTR obligations in the relevant monthly auction, may not exceed zonal network services peak load or firm transmission reservation levels and are only available up to the prorated ARR MW capacity as allocated in the Annual ARR Allocation. For the following planning period, these Residual ARRs are available as ARRs in the annual ARR allocation. Residual ARRs are a separate product from incremental ARRs. Beginning with the June 2017 monthly auction, Residual ARRs that would have cleared with a negative target allocation are not

¹⁷ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021).

assigned to participants.¹⁸ In prior planning periods, PJM's modeling of excess outages in order to manage FTR market outcomes resulted in the allocation of some ARR that would have been allocated in Stage 1B being allocated as Residual ARR on a month to month basis without the option to self schedule.

Table 13-4 shows the Residual ARR allocated to participants and the associated target allocations. The available volume is the total additional capacity available to be allocated as Residual ARR. The cleared volume is the residual ARR capacity actually allocated to participants with prorated ARR based on the level of prorated ARR in Stage 1B and the affected paths. In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 18,624.9 MW of Residual ARR with a target allocation of \$11.4 million. In the same time period for the 2020/2021 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 13,601.8 MW of residual ARR with a target allocation of \$5.7 million.

Table 13-4 Residual ARR allocation volume and target allocation: 2014/2015 planning period through 2021/2022 planning period

Planning Period	Available Volume (MW)	Cleared Volume (MW)	Cleared Volume	Target Allocation
2014/2015	65,095.3	22,532.9	34.6%	\$8,160,918.27
2015/2016	61,807.0	37,042.4	59.9%	\$8,620,353.27
2016/2017	71,000.7	35,034.9	49.3%	\$6,986,723.44
2017/2018	81,040.8	39,597.4	48.9%	\$17,497,625.78
2018/2019	49,646.9	27,335.6	55.1%	\$11,817,002.00
2019/2020	48,286.5	27,233.2	56.4%	\$12,369,580.58
2020/2021	43,484.2	25,028.0	57.6%	\$11,677,033.36
2021/2022	28,819.1	18,624.9	64.6%	\$11,420,537.73

* First seven months of 2021/2022 planning period

IARRs

In theory, Incremental Auction Revenue Rights (IARRs) are ARR made available by physical transmission system upgrades from customer funded transmission projects or from merchant transmission or generation interconnection requests. In order for a transmission project to result in IARRs, the project must create simultaneously feasible incremental market flow capability in PJM's ARR market model, over and above all system capability being used by existing allocated ARR and/or would be used by granting any prorated outstanding ARR requests, in the ARR market model.¹⁹

¹⁸ See FERC Letter Order, Docket No. ER17-1057 (April 5, 2017).

¹⁹ See PJM Incremental Auction Revenue Rights Model Development and Analysis, PJM June 12, 2017. <<https://www.pjm.com/~media/markets-ops/fttr/pjm-iarr-model-development-and-analysis.ashx>>.

There are three sources of IARRs: IARRs based on a specific transmission investment; IARRs based on merchant transmission or generation interconnection projects; and IARRs based on RTEP upgrades. In the case of a specific transmission investment, the participant elects desired IARR MW between a specified source and sink and PJM and the affected transmission owners determine the upgrades necessary to create incremental capability.²⁰ In the other two cases, the participants paying for the upgrades are assigned IARRs if any are created. There have been 13 successful IARR requests totaling 2,990.1 MW. One IARR path of 64.5 MW was terminated (June 1, 2012), leaving 12 unique source and sink combinations of 2,925.6 MW of IARRs. Of these 12 unique paths, three paths consisting of 1,200.0 MW were based on specific transmission investments requests, six paths consisting of 1,047.4 MW were based on merchant transmission requests and three paths consisting of 678.6 MW were based on customer funded (RTEP) transmission projects. The three paths based on specific transmission investments involved a generation company working with its affiliated transmission company. The other nine paths were based on projects that would have been built regardless of the addition of IARRs.

The MMU supports increased competition to provide transmission using market mechanisms. The IARR process is not a viable mechanism for facilitating competitive transmission investments. Maintaining the IARR process impedes the search for real solutions. PJM's process for creating and assigning IARRs is fundamentally flawed and cannot be made consistent with the requirements of Order No. 681 which established IARRs.²¹

Order No. 681 requires that long-term firm transmission rights made feasible by transmission upgrades or expansions be available upon request to the party that pays for such upgrades or expansions.²² Order No. 681 also requires that the rights granted by upgrades/expansions cannot come at the expense of transmission rights held by others. IARRs are treated as Stage 1A rights, which are given first and absolute priority in PJM's annual allocation process. Granting Stage

²⁰ See Attachment EE of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff <<https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/oatt.pdf>>.

²¹ See November 7, 2019 Comments on TranSource, LLC v. PJM, 168 FERC ¶ 61,119 (2019) ("Opinion No. 566").

²² *Long-Term Firm Transmission Rights in Organized Electricity Markets*, Order No. 681, 116 FERC ¶ 61,077 (2006) ("Order No. 681"), order on reh'g, Order No. 618-A, 117 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2006), order on reh'g, Order No. 681-A, 126 FERC ¶ 61,254 (2009).

1A status to IARRs is preferential treatment of IARR rights relative to the ARR rights belonging to load. If the annual market model used to assign existing ARR rights in a given year cannot simultaneously support all Stage 1A ARR requests, the system model is modified so as to make the Stage 1A ARR requests feasible. The result is an over allocation of congestion rights relative to expected congestion. To avoid having FTR target allocations exceed expected congestion, PJM reduces the annual supply (market model system capability) available to non-Stage 1A rights through selective line outages and line rating reductions. The resulting market model artificially supports all the Stage 1A ARR requests and artificially reduces the amount of remaining later tier ARRs from other rights holders. Stage 1A ARRs, including IARRs, are approved at the expense of other preexisting congestion rights. In the case of IARRs, this is in violation of Order No. 681.

The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from the PJM tariff. If IARRs are not eliminated, the MMU recommends that IARRs be subject to prorating like all other ARR rights rather than being exempt from prorating.

Financial Transmission Rights

FTRs are financial instruments that entitle their holders to receive revenue or require them to pay charges based on locational congestion price differences in the day-ahead energy market across specific FTR transmission paths. These day-ahead congestion price differences, multiplied by the FTR position in MW, are termed the FTR target allocations. The FTR target allocations define the maximum, but not guaranteed, payout for FTRs. The target allocation of an FTR reflects the difference in day-ahead congestion prices (CLMPs) rather than the difference in LMPs, which includes both congestion and marginal losses. Negative target allocations require the FTR holder to make payments rather than receive revenues in the FTR market. One of the fundamental flaws in the FTR design is the mismatch between congestion and the differences in day-ahead prices between nodes. The difference in day-ahead congestion prices is not congestion. Target allocations are not congestion.

Under the current rules, the revenue available to pay FTR holders' target allocations in a given month includes day-ahead congestion, payments by holders of

negatively valued FTRs, auction revenues greater than ARR target allocations, and any charges made to day-ahead operating reserves which occur where there are hours with net negative congestion. Any such revenue above FTR target allocations from prior months in a planning period are used to pay any current month shortfalls. Target allocations are a cap on payments to FTR holders for each planning period. At the end of each planning period, any surplus revenue above the target allocations is distributed to ARR holders.

FTR funding is not on a path specific basis or on an hour to hour basis and treats all FTRs the same. For example, if the payout ratio is less than 1.0 at the end of the planning period, the payments to all FTRs are reduced. Payments are made pro rata based on target allocations. The result is widespread cross subsidies because assignment of path specific FTRs may exceed system capability and affect the payments to FTRs on other paths. FTR auction revenues and excess revenues are carried forward from prior months and distributed back from later months within a planning period. At the end of a planning period, if some months remain not fully funded, an uplift charge is collected from any FTR market participants that hold FTRs for the planning period based on their pro rata share of total net positive FTR target allocations, excluding any charge to FTR holders with a net negative FTR position for the planning period.

Auction market participants may offer to buy FTRs between any eligible pricing nodes on the system, as defined by PJM for each auction. For the Annual FTR Auction and FTRs bought in the monthly auctions, the available FTR source and sink points include hubs, control zones, aggregates, generator buses, load buses and interface pricing points. For the Long Term FTR Auction there is a more restricted set of available hubs, control zones, aggregates, generator buses and interface pricing points available. PJM does not allow FTR buy bids to clear with a price of zero unless there is at least one constraint in the auction which affects the FTR path. FTRs are available to the nearest 0.1 MW.

FTRs are bought from supply defined by PJM. The fact that load is selling congestion revenue rights is not fully recognized in the FTR design, although FTR buyers can resell FTRs at a price they agree to accept. Load has no role in defining the price at which PJM sells FTRs

on their behalf. PJM's objective in the auctions is to maximize auction revenue, given the total set of bid prices and bid MW, but absent reservation prices from load. The failure to allow sellers the ability to decide at what price to sell FTRs is a fundamental flaw in the FTR market. The result is that PJM cannot actually maximize auction revenue and that the FTR market is not really a market.

Once bought from PJM, FTRs can be bought and sold. Buy bids are bids to buy FTRs in the auctions. Sell offers are offers to sell existing FTRs in the auctions.

Market participants can buy and sell existing FTRs, outside of the auction process, through a voluntary bulletin board, termed the PJM bilateral market. FTRs can also be exchanged bilaterally without using the bulletin board. There is no requirement to report bilateral transactions, or any information about them, to PJM.

Supply and Demand

Total FTR supply in each auction is limited by the definition of the transmission system capacity included in the PJM FTR market model as modified, for example, by PJM assumptions about transmission outages, for which there are no clear rules. PJM may also limit available transmission capacity through subjective judgment exercised without any clear guidelines.

The MMU recommends that the full transmission capacity of the system be allocated as ARR prior to sale as FTRs.

The FTR auction process does not account for the fact that significant transmission outages, which have not been provided to PJM by transmission owners prior to the auction date, will occur during the periods covered by the auctions. Such transmission outages may or may not be planned in advance or may be emergency outages.²³ In addition, it is difficult to model in an annual auction two outages of similar significance and similar duration in different areas which do not overlap in time. The choice of which to model will generally have significant distributional consequences; they will affect different areas very differently. The fact that outages are modeled at significantly lower than historical levels

results in selling too much FTR capacity, which creates downward pressure on ARR prices. To address this issue, the MMU recommends that PJM use probabilistic outage modeling to better align the supply of ARRs and FTRs with actual expected transmission capacity.

Long Term FTR Auctions

In July 2006, FERC approved Order No. 681 mandating the creation of long term firm transmission rights in transmission organizations with organized electricity markets. FERC's goal was that "load serving entities be able to request and obtain transmission rights up to a reasonable amount on a long-term firm basis, instead of being limited to obtaining exclusively annual rights."²⁴ Despite that order and inconsistent with the directive in that order, LSEs are not able to request ARRs nor are LSEs guaranteed rights to the revenue from Long Term FTR Auctions in PJM's long term FTR auction market design. Excess system capability in years two and three of the long term FTR auction is never made available to load in the form of ARRs and is only made available to FTR buyers.

PJM conducts the Long Term FTR Auction for the next three consecutive planning periods. The Long Term FTR Auction consists of five rounds beginning in June of the preceding planning period and continuing through March. FTRs purchased in prior rounds or Long Term Auctions may be offered for sale in subsequent rounds of the long term, annual or monthly FTR auctions. FTRs obtained in the Long Term FTR Auctions have terms of one year. FTR products available in the Long Term Auction include 24 hour, on peak and off peak FTR obligations, with FTR options unavailable in the Long Term FTR Auctions.

Beginning with Round 2 of the 2019/2022 Long Term FTR Auction, PJM implemented revisions to the determination of residual system capability made available in the Long Term FTR Auctions, and eliminated the YRALL product, consistent with the MMU's recommendation. The revisions affect the determination of ARR rights reserved for ARR holders. Rather than simply preserving the ARR cleared capacity from the previous annual allocation, PJM reruns the simultaneous feasibility test for the ARR/FTR market model, without outages, using the previous year's ARR requests, prorated when necessary, and uses

²³ See the 2019 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 12: Transmission Facility Outages: Transmission Facility Outages Analysis for the FTR Market.

²⁴ Order No. 681 at P 17.

the resulting ARRs as the basis for reserving capability for ARR holders in the Long Term FTR Auction. The ARR requests are greater than the previously cleared ARRs. The difference between the requested ARRs and the ARR/FTR market model's transmission system capacity, both without outages, determines the residual capability offered in the Long Term FTR Auction. The revisions provide ARR holders with more congestion rights in the Long Term FTR Auction that will carry into the Annual FTR Auction.

But the revisions do not address the congestion revenue rights sold in years two and three of the Long Term FTR Auction, which remain unavailable to ARRs. Capacity awarded in the Long Term FTR Auction is unavailable as ARRs in years two and three. As a result, the rights to significant congestion revenues are still assigned to the Long Term FTR Auction without ever having been made available to ARR holders. That outcome is inconsistent with the basic logic of ARRs and inconsistent with the stated intent of the market design which is to return all congestion revenues to load.

Long Term FTR Auction transmission capacity is determined by removing all outages and running an offline model of the previous Annual FTR Auction model with all ARR bids from the prior annual ARR allocation. Any ARR MW that clear in this offline model are reserved for ARR holders in the relevant planning periods, and are removed from the Long Term FTR Auction capability. Even this approach does not, and cannot, preserve all possible capacity for ARR holders in the first year of the Long Term Auction due to changes in system topology and outage selection between planning periods. PJM outage assumptions are a key factor in determining the supply of ARRs and the related supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction.

Annual FTR Auctions

Annual FTRs are effective for an entire planning period, June 1 through May 31. Outages expected to last two or more months, as well as any outages of a shorter duration that PJM decides would cause FTR revenue inadequacy if not modeled, are included in the determination of the simultaneous feasibility for the Annual FTR Auction.²⁵ While the full list of outages selected is publicly posted, PJM exercises significant

subjective judgment in selecting outages to accomplish FTR revenue adequacy goals and the process by which these outages are selected is not clear, is not defined and is not documented. ARR holders who wish to self schedule must inform PJM prior to round one of the annual auction. Any self scheduled ARR requests clear 25 percent of the requested volume in each round of the Annual FTR Auction as price takers. The Annual FTR Auction consists of four rounds that allow any PJM member to bid for any FTR or to offer for sale any FTR that they currently hold. FTRs in this auction can be obligations or options for peak, off peak or 24 hour periods. FTRs purchased in one round of the Annual FTR Auction can be sold in later rounds or in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions

Total Monthly FTR Auction capacity is based on the residual capacity available after the Long Term and Annual FTR auctions are conducted and adjustments are made to outages to reflect anticipated system conditions for the time periods auctioned. Outages expected to last five or more days are included in the determination of the simultaneous feasibility test for the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction. These are single-round monthly auctions that allow any transmission service customer or PJM member to bid for any FTR or to offer for sale any FTR that they currently hold. Before the 2020/2021 planning period, the first three individual months, and quarterly periods that had not yet begun, were available for bid or offer. Beginning with the 2020/2021 planning period, market participants can bid for or offer monthly FTRs for any of the remaining individual calendar months in the planning period. FTRs in the auctions include obligations and options and 24 hour, on peak and off peak products.²⁶

Bilateral Market

Market participants can buy and sell existing FTRs, outside of the auction process, through a voluntary bulletin board, termed the PJM bilateral market. FTRs can also be exchanged bilaterally without using the bulletin board. There is currently no requirement to report bilateral transactions, or any information about them, to PJM. Bilateral transactions that are not done through

²⁵ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021).

²⁶ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021).

PJM can involve parties that are not PJM members. PJM has no knowledge of bilateral transactions, or the terms and risks of bilateral transactions, that are done outside of PJM's bilateral market system. Bilateral transactions not reported to PJM are dependent on the contract established between the parties.

For bilateral trades reported to PJM, the FTR transmission path must remain the same, FTR obligations must remain obligations, and FTR options must remain options. However, an individual FTR may be split up into multiple, smaller FTRs, down to increments of 0.1 MW. Bilateral FTRs reported to PJM can also include more restrictive start and end times, meaning that the start time cannot be earlier than the original FTR start time and the end time cannot be later than the original FTR end time.

FTR Bid Limits

PJM has the authority to limit participant's bids to 5,000 to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume.²⁷ PJM has had a cap of 10,000 bids and offers per auction round and per period at the corporate family level for more than a year, although the rule has not been enforced. On December 11, 2019, PJM made an informational announcement to urge participants to respect the rule.²⁸ Some participants continued to exceed the limit in 2020 through the use of multiple affiliates, although the number of such participants was significantly reduced. On October 26, 2020, the MMU informed stakeholders that it had notified companies that violated the limits persistently that the companies should comply, and recommended that PJM enforce the limit.²⁹ On November 5, 2020, PJM proposed to add a language in PJM Manual 6 regarding the bid limit.³⁰ The MMU recommends that PJM enforce the FTR auction bid limits at the corporate family level starting immediately.

²⁷ Operating Agreement Schedule 1 § 7.3.5(d) allows PJM to limit participant's bids to 5,000 to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume.

²⁸ See "Informational Update: FTR Auction Bid Limits," PJM Presentation to the Market Implementation Committee (December 11, 2019) <<https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/20191211/20191211-item-06-ftr-auction-bid-limits.ashx>>.

²⁹ See "Market Monitor Report," IMM Presentation to the Members Committee (October 26, 2020) <<https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2020/20201026-webinar/20201026-item-07-imm-report.ashx>>.

³⁰ See "Manual 6, Rev. 26: FTR Auction Bid Limits," PJM Presentation to the Market Implementation Committee (November 5, 2020) <<https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2020/20201105/20201105-item-05a-m6-updates-ftr-bid-limits.ashx>>.

Market Structure

In order to evaluate the ownership of FTRs, the MMU categorizes all participants owning FTRs in PJM as either physical or financial. Physical entities include utilities and customers which primarily take physical positions in PJM markets. Financial entities include banks, trading firms and hedge funds which primarily take financial positions in PJM markets. International market participants that primarily take financial positions in PJM markets are generally considered to be financial entities even if they are utilities in their own countries.

Table 13-5 presents the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction cleared FTRs for 2021 by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. Financial entities purchased 83.2 percent of prevailing flow FTRs, down 2.8 percentage points, and 92.7 percent of counter flow FTRs, up 3.8 percentage points, from 2020, with the result that financial entities purchased 87.7 percent, up 0.3 percentage points, of all prevailing and counter flow FTR buy bids in the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction for 2021.

Table 13-5 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction patterns of ownership by FTR direction: January through December, 2021

Trade Type	Organization Type	FTR Direction		
		Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	All
Buy Bids	Physical	16.8%	7.3%	12.3%
	Financial	83.2%	92.7%	87.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Sell Offers	Physical	5.3%	3.2%	4.7%
	Financial	94.7%	96.8%	95.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 13-6 shows the monthly cumulative HHI values for cleared obligation MW for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period monthly auctions for prevailing flow FTRs. Ownership of cleared prevailing flow bids was unconcentrated in all of the periods.³¹

³¹ See 2021 State of the Market Report for PJM, Section 3: Energy Market, Competitive Assessment for HHI definitions.

Table 13-6 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction HHIs by period for prevailing flow FTRs

Auction	Auction Period											
	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Jun-21	445	627	649	568	614	624	631	542	622	758	831	854
Jul-21		387	510	489	503	533	543	520	568	620	697	680
Aug-21			331	443	486	534	534	528	583	603	691	678
Sep-21				432	466	515	521	529	579	595	709	687
Oct-21					426	491	511	519	565	580	686	672
Nov-21						431	489	508	548	563	653	654
Dec-21							419	474	498	546	628	625

Table 13-7 shows the monthly cumulative HHI values for cleared obligation MW for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period monthly auctions by month for counter flow FTRs. Ownership of cleared counter flow bids was unconcentrated in 74.6 percent of periods and moderately concentrated in 25.4 percent of periods, in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period.

Table 13-7 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction HHIs by period for counter flow FTRs

Auction	Auction Period											
	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Jun-21	679	775	815	1086	1070	1153	1170	1155	1088	1263	1312	1357
Jul-21		609	617	754	821	899	911	892	857	934	1026	1028
Aug-21			554	685	738	853	886	869	863	948	1019	1018
Sep-21				935	693	796	851	830	830	964	1060	1025
Oct-21					649	713	800	772	776	908	1006	954
Nov-21						656	758	745	767	874	981	939
Dec-21							651	696	723	825	929	890

Table 13-8 shows the average daily FTR ownership for all FTRs for 2021 by organization type, by FTR direction and self scheduled FTRs.

Table 13-8 Daily FTR held position ownership by FTR direction: 2021

Organization Type	FTR Direction		All
	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	
Physical	22.9%	13.4%	18.7%
Physical Self Scheduled	8.9%	0.1%	5.0%
Financial	68.2%	86.4%	76.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Market Performance

Volume

PJM regularly intervenes in the FTR market based on subjective judgment which is not based on clear or documented guidelines. Such intervention in the FTR, or any market, is not appropriate and not consistent with the operation of competitive markets. In an apparent effort to manage FTR revenues, PJM may adjust normal transmission limits in the FTR auction model. If, in PJM's judgment, the normal transmission limit is not consistent with revenue

adequacy goals and simultaneous feasibility, then transmission limits are reduced pro rata based on the MW of Stage 1A infeasibility and the availability of auction bids for counter flow FTRs.³² PJM may also remove or reduce infeasibilities caused by transmission outages by clearing counter flow bids without being required to clear the corresponding prevailing flow bids.³³ The use of both of these procedures is contingent on the conditions that: PJM actions not affect the revenue adequacy of allocated ARRs; all requested self scheduled FTRs clear; and net FTR auction revenue is positive.

Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions

Table 13-9 provides the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction market volume for the entire 2020/2021 and the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning periods. There were 18,588,476 MW of FTR obligation buy bids and 10,445,193 MW of FTR obligation sell offers for all bidding periods in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The monthly balance of planning period FTR auction cleared 4,087,410 (22.0 percent) of FTR obligation buy bids and 2,048,561 MW (19.6 percent) of FTR obligation sell offers.

There were 4,119,942 MW of FTR option buy bids and 1,929,535 MW of FTR option sell offers for all bidding periods in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2021/2022 planning period. The ownership of options was highly concentrated in all periods. The monthly auctions cleared 236,769 MW (5.7 percent) of FTR option buy bids and 414,985 MW (21.5 percent) of FTR option sell offers.

³² See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021).

³³ See *id.*

Table 13-9 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction market volume: 2021

Monthly Auction	Type	Trade Type	Bid and Requested Count	Bid and Requested Volume (MW)	Cleared Volume (MW)	Cleared Volume	Uncleared Volume (MW)	Uncleared Volume
Jan-21	Obligations	Buy bids	381,342	1,836,655	322,062	17.5%	1,514,593	82.5%
		Sell offers	217,469	811,662	130,359	16.1%	681,304	83.9%
	Options	Buy bids	6,018	442,023	14,751	3.3%	427,272	96.7%
Sell offers		28,121	237,886	32,306	13.6%	205,581	86.4%	
Feb-21	Obligations	Buy bids	376,380	1,790,943	392,484	21.9%	1,398,459	78.1%
		Sell offers	202,939	761,827	137,133	18.0%	624,694	82.0%
	Options	Buy bids	2,117	200,050	8,830	4.4%	191,221	95.6%
Sell offers		20,855	207,239	30,062	14.5%	177,176	85.5%	
Mar-21	Obligations	Buy bids	294,408	1,424,569	327,035	23.0%	1,097,534	77.0%
		Sell offers	150,359	603,193	126,499	21.0%	476,694	79.0%
	Options	Buy bids	1,593	102,266	5,694	5.6%	96,572	94.4%
Sell offers		14,659	155,357	37,104	23.9%	118,253	76.1%	
Apr-21	Obligations	Buy bids	232,361	1,038,292	235,418	22.7%	802,874	77.3%
		Sell offers	103,242	396,155	88,706	22.4%	307,449	77.6%
	Options	Buy bids	952	95,317	4,750	5.0%	90,567	95.0%
Sell offers		8,212	100,079	33,112	33.1%	66,967	66.9%	
May-21	Obligations	Buy bids	143,525	726,081	172,760	23.8%	553,321	76.2%
		Sell offers	45,385	177,164	47,835	27.0%	129,329	73.0%
	Options	Buy bids	476	6,658	1,963	29.5%	4,695	70.5%
Sell offers		3,048	45,362	21,620	47.7%	23,742	52.3%	
Jun-21	Obligations	Buy bids	712,198	3,587,115	684,374	19.1%	2,902,741	80.9%
		Sell offers	511,008	1,831,087	418,763	22.9%	1,412,324	77.1%
	Options	Buy bids	22,795	474,246	44,199	9.3%	430,046	90.7%
Sell offers		58,595	409,723	86,979	21.2%	322,744	78.8%	
Jul-21	Obligations	Buy bids	710,795	3,302,256	707,723	21.4%	2,594,533	78.6%
		Sell offers	539,136	1,840,759	416,775	22.6%	1,423,984	77.4%
	Options	Buy bids	26,472	933,569	45,229	4.8%	888,340	95.2%
Sell offers		55,449	331,308	59,043	17.8%	272,266	82.2%	
Aug-21	Obligations	Buy bids	681,084	3,016,805	642,224	21.3%	2,374,581	78.7%
		Sell offers	484,901	1,630,064	324,703	19.9%	1,305,360	80.1%
	Options	Buy bids	31,238	982,824	42,841	4.4%	939,983	95.6%
Sell offers		45,509	285,096	54,253	19.0%	230,843	81.0%	
Sep-21	Obligations	Buy bids	597,853	2,667,831	629,359	23.6%	2,038,471	76.4%
		Sell offers	379,939	1,384,965	230,764	16.7%	1,154,201	83.3%
	Options	Buy bids	16,107	616,878	25,679	4.2%	591,199	95.8%
Sell offers		34,313	230,759	37,841	16.4%	192,918	83.6%	
Oct-21	Obligations	Buy bids	566,884	2,269,682	580,466	25.6%	1,689,216	74.4%
		Sell offers	388,073	1,322,781	239,199	18.1%	1,083,582	81.9%
	Options	Buy bids	27,001	505,049	22,842	4.5%	482,207	95.5%
Sell offers		40,572	263,125	59,517	22.6%	203,607	77.4%	
Nov-21	Obligations	Buy bids	451,818	1,937,011	452,751	23.4%	1,484,261	76.6%
		Sell offers	339,135	1,316,774	234,274	17.8%	1,082,500	82.2%
	Options	Buy bids	20,158	382,647	43,461	11.4%	339,186	88.6%
Sell offers		33,758	218,310	63,673	29.2%	154,637	70.8%	
Dec-21	Obligations	Buy bids	444,419	1,807,777	390,513	21.6%	1,417,263	78.4%
		Sell offers	297,782	1,118,763	184,083	16.5%	934,680	83.5%
	Options	Buy bids	12,374	224,729	12,518	5.6%	212,211	94.4%
Sell offers		29,110	191,215	53,679	28.1%	137,535	71.9%	
2020/2021*	Obligations	Buy bids	6,378,593	29,351,515	5,374,799	18.3%	23,976,716	81.7%
		Sell offers	3,827,330	12,711,366	2,216,261	17.4%	10,495,105	82.6%
	Options	Buy bids	89,167	5,672,240	311,288	5.5%	5,360,952	94.5%
Sell offers		516,603	3,515,054	554,040	15.8%	2,961,014	84.2%	
2021/2022**	Obligations	Buy bids	4,165,051	18,588,476	4,087,410	22.0%	14,501,066	78.0%
		Sell offers	2,939,974	10,445,193	2,048,561	19.6%	8,396,633	80.4%
	Options	Buy bids	156,145	4,119,942	236,769	5.7%	3,883,174	94.3%
Sell offers		297,306	1,929,535	414,985	21.5%	1,514,550	78.5%	

* Shows 12 months for 2020/2021 ** Shows 7 months for 2021/2022

Figure 13-1 shows the bid volume from each monthly auction for each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction. The prompt month is the final month for which FTRs for a specific month are sold. For example, June is the prompt month for June FTRs sold in the June auction, which occurs in May. The bid volume for the non-prompt months is significantly lower than for the prompt months. On average, the non-prompt month bid volume is 44.5 percent of the prompt month bid volume.

Figure 13-1 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction bid volume (MW per period): June 2021 through December 2021 Auction





Figure 13-2 shows the cleared volume from each monthly auction for each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction. The cleared volume for non-prompt months is also significantly lower than in prompt months. On average, the non-prompt month cleared volume is 25.2 percent of the prompt month cleared volume.

Figure 13-2 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared volume (MW per period): June 2021 through December 2021 Auction



Bilateral Market

Table 13-10 provides the PJM registered secondary bilateral FTR market volume for the 2020/2021 and the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning periods. Bilateral FTR transactions registered through PJM do not need to include an accurate price or the entire volume of the transaction. Bilateral FTR transactions are not required to be registered through PJM. As a result, the bilateral data are not a reliable basis for evaluating actual bilateral activity in PJM FTRs.

Table 13-10 Secondary bilateral FTR market volume: 2020/2021 and 2021/2022³⁴

Planning Period	Type	Class Type	Volume (MW)
2020/2021	Obligation	24-Hour	6,164.0
		On Peak	392.0
		Off Peak	96.0
		Total	6,652.0
	Option	24-Hour	0.0
		On Peak	0.0
Off Peak		0.0	
	Total	0.0	
2021/2022	Obligation	24-Hour	4,951.8
		On Peak	97,927.8
		Off Peak	67,980.8
		Total	170,860.4
	Option	24-Hour	0.0
		On Peak	16,009.0
Off Peak		20,846.6	
	Total	36,855.6	

³⁴ The 2020/2021 planning period covers bilateral FTRs that are effective for any time between June 1, 2020 through May 31, 2021, which originally had been purchased in a Long Term FTR Auction, Annual FTR Auction or Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction.

Figure 13-3 shows the FTR bid, net bid and cleared volume from June 2003 through December 2021 for Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions. Cleared volume includes FTR buy and sell offers that were accepted. The net bid volume includes the total buy, sell and self scheduled offers, counting sell offers as a negative volume. The bid volume is the total of all bid and self scheduled offers, excluding sell offers. The cleared volume in August 2018 was negative due to the liquidation of the GreenHat FTR portfolio, which resulted in a large quantity of FTRs selling in the monthly auction.

Figure 13-3 Long Term, Annual and Monthly FTR Auction bid and cleared volume: June 2003 through December 2021





Figure 13-4 shows cleared auction volumes by auction type as a percent of the total FTR cleared volume by calendar months for June 2004 through December 2021. FTR volumes are included in the calendar month they are effective, with long term and annual FTR auction volumes spread equally to each month in the relevant planning period. Over the course of each planning period an increasing number of Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTRs are purchased, resulting in a greater share of total FTRs. When the Annual FTR Auction occurs, FTRs purchased in previous Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, other than the current June auction, are no longer effective, resulting in a smaller share for monthly and a greater share for annual FTRs.


Figure 13-4 Cleared auction volume (MW) as a percent of total FTR cleared volume by calendar month: June 2004 through December 2021



Price

Figure 13-5 shows the weighted average cleared buy bid price of obligations in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions by bidding period for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period and the average price per MWh for each of the FTR periods.

Figure 13-5 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared, weighted-average, buy bid price per period (Dollars per MWh): 2021/2022 planning period



Profitability

FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received directly from holding an FTR plus any revenue from the sale of an FTR, and the cost of the FTR. FTR profitability is relevant only to participants

purchasing FTRs and is not relevant to self scheduled FTRs. For a prevailing flow FTR, the FTR revenue is the actual revenue that an FTR holder is paid as the target allocation plus the auction price from the sale of the FTR, if relevant, and the FTR cost is the auction price. For a counter flow FTR, the FTR revenue is the auction price that an FTR holder is paid to take the FTR plus the positive auction price from the sale of the FTR, if relevant, and the FTR cost is the target allocation that the FTR holder must pay plus the negative auction price from the sale of the FTR, if relevant. Profits include the payment of surplus to FTRs. Bilateral transactions are excluded from the profit calculations because there are inconsistent reporting requirements and no assurance that reported prices reflect the actual prices under the PJM rules. Bilateral profits and losses net to zero in market total profits and losses. ARR holders that self schedule FTRs receive congestion revenues but do not receive profits from those FTRs because ARR holders are assigned the rights to congestion revenues which they choose to take directly as the congestion payments associated with the corresponding FTRs.

Profits in the first seven months in the 2021/2022 planning period include the auction cost and revenue from both buying and selling FTRs that were effective between June 2021 and December 2021. This includes FTRs from the 2019/2022, 2020/2023 and 2021/2024 Long Term auctions, the 2021/2022 Annual auction, and the Monthly auctions from June 2021 through December 2021. The costs and revenues of the yearly FTR products are prorated based on the time period of the FTRs. Any revenues or costs related to bilateral transactions are not included in profits.

Hourly FTR profits are the sum of the hourly revenues minus the hourly costs for each FTR. The hourly revenues equal any positive hourly FTR target allocations, adjusted by the payout ratio plus any hourly auction revenues from the sale and/or the purchase of the FTR. The hourly auction costs equal any negative hourly FTR target allocations plus any hourly auction costs from the purchase and/or the sale of the FTR. The hourly auction costs and auction revenues are the product of the FTR MW and the auction price divided by the time period of the FTR in hours. The FTR revenues do not include after the fact adjustments which are very small and do not occur in every month.

The surplus includes surplus day-ahead congestion revenue and FTR auction surplus. The surplus is first allocated to FTR holders to cover any shortfall in paying FTR target allocations for the current month or prior months in the planning period. The end of planning period surplus or uplift was distributed to FTR holders prorata based on FTR positive target allocations through the 2017/2018 planning period. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period, after covering any shortfall in FTR target allocations within the planning period, the net surplus at the end of the planning period is distributed to ARR holders. Profits include any surplus distribution or uplift payments that was used to satisfy any shortfall in FTR target allocations.

The fact that FTR profits in each planning period have been positive for financial entities as a group, regardless of the payout ratio, raises questions about the competitiveness of the market. FTR profits for financial entities were not positive in the 2019/2020 planning period when accounting for GreenHat losses but were positive otherwise. FTR profits for financial entities without GreenHat losses were positive in every planning period from 2012/2013 through 2021/2022 except the 2016/2017 planning period, and were positive if summed over the entire period (Table 13-13). It is not clear, in a competitive market, why FTR profits for financial entities remain persistently profitable. In a competitive market, it would be expected that profits would be competed to zero.

Table 13-11 lists FTR profits, and the congestion returned through self scheduled FTRs, by organization type and FTR direction of the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. All participants who were assigned ARRs are classified as physical ARR. Some participants that are not eligible for ARRs are classified as physical because they are physical participants, for example companies that own only generation.

In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, physical entities, including physical FTR and physical ARR participants, received \$118.6 million in profits on FTRs purchased directly (not self scheduled), up from \$39.1 million in the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period. Financial participants received \$252.6 million in profits, up from \$141.3 million in the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period. Self scheduled FTRs have zero cost.

ARR holders who self scheduled FTRs received \$145.6 million in congestion revenues. Revenues from self scheduled FTRs are a return of congestion to the load that paid the congestion and are not profits.

Table 13-11 FTR profits and revenues by organization type and FTR direction: 2021/2022: June through December

Organization Type	Purchased FTRs Profit			Self Scheduled FTRs Revenue Returned		
	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	Total	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	Total
Financial	\$368,193,387	(\$115,621,164)	\$252,572,223			
Physical	\$140,109,205	(\$48,149,591)	\$91,959,614			
Physical ARR	\$47,118,705	(\$20,482,001)	\$26,636,704	\$147,661,864	(\$2,045,201)	\$145,616,663
Total	\$555,421,297	(\$184,252,755)	\$371,168,541	\$147,661,864	(\$2,045,201)	\$145,616,663

Table 13-12 lists the monthly FTR profits for the 2020/2021 planning period and the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period by organization type. In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, profits for all participants were \$371.2 million, up from \$180.4 million in profits for the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period. The largest month to month increase in profits was in November, \$155.2 million. Among organization types, financial organizations had the largest increase in profits in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, \$110.5 million, while physical ARR organizations' profits increased by \$16.0 million.

Table 13-12 Monthly FTR profits by organization type: 2020/2021 and 2021/2022³⁵

Month	Organization Type				Total
	Financial	Financial without GreenHat	Physical	Physical ARR	
Jun-20	\$13,553,728	\$14,169,535	\$2,968,368	(\$105,462)	\$16,416,634
Jul-20	\$35,758,125	\$35,699,812	\$9,137,003	\$3,750,023	\$48,645,151
Aug-20	\$26,341,215	\$26,180,692	\$6,690,519	\$3,240,451	\$36,272,185
Sep-20	\$23,243,038	\$22,978,996	\$7,356,627	\$4,494,466	\$35,094,131
Oct-20	\$9,270,440	\$8,813,003	\$5,358,560	(\$843,912)	\$13,785,088
Nov-20	\$7,462,052	\$7,789,762	(\$3,735,384)	(\$2,396,979)	\$1,329,689
Dec-20	\$26,204,312	\$26,414,749	\$160,949	\$2,536,264	\$28,901,524
Jan-21	\$14,413,025	\$14,543,616	(\$606,901)	\$1,014,141	\$14,820,265
Feb-21	\$26,325,929	\$27,249,807	\$14,548,075	\$3,170,577	\$44,044,582
Mar-21	\$31,624,116	\$31,679,111	\$5,276,933	\$5,960,090	\$42,861,139
Apr-21	\$33,914,216	\$32,426,080	\$6,217,364	\$3,418,465	\$43,550,045
May-21	\$32,476,383	\$32,960,851	\$7,569,383	(\$5,256,074)	\$34,789,692
Summary for Planning Period 2020/2021					
Total	\$280,586,579	\$280,906,014	\$60,941,495	\$18,982,052	\$360,510,126
Jun-21	\$15,067,557	\$15,067,557	\$7,186,702	(\$2,606,859)	\$19,647,400
Jul-21	\$5,372,702	\$5,372,702	(\$609,812)	(\$3,039,244)	\$1,723,646
Aug-21	\$36,172,528	\$36,172,528	\$4,111,145	(\$2,200,327)	\$38,083,347
Sep-21	\$28,123,046	\$28,123,046	\$11,576,806	\$728,730	\$40,428,582
Oct-21	\$23,827,339	\$23,827,339	\$20,344,006	\$9,299,537	\$53,470,882
Nov-21	\$100,345,821	\$100,345,821	\$35,354,907	\$20,803,798	\$156,504,526
Dec-21	\$43,663,229	\$43,663,229	\$13,995,860	\$3,651,069	\$61,310,159
Summary for Planning Period 2021/2022					
Total	\$252,572,223	\$252,572,223	\$91,959,614	\$26,636,704	\$371,168,541

³⁵ The GreenHat Default Allocation Assessment by PJM was finished by the 2020/2021 planning period and GreenHat had no remaining position starting in the 2021/2022 planning period.

Table 13-13 lists the historical profits by planning period by organization type beginning in the 2012/2013 planning period for purchased FTRs. (Profits do not include congestion revenue to self-scheduled FTRs.) Surplus allocated to ARR holders in the 2018/2019 planning period was \$112.3 million, \$140.7 million in the 2019/2020 planning period, and \$137.1 million in the 2020/2021 planning period.

Table 13-13 FTR profits by organization type: 2012/2013 through 2021/2022

		2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/2019	2019/2020	2020/2021	2021/2022
Financial	Profit	\$201,825,234	\$913,502,323	\$250,551,943	\$68,895,867	(\$12,525,947)	\$239,981,474	\$113,086,231	(\$21,139,644)	\$280,586,579	\$252,572,223
	Surplus	(\$50,304,408)	(\$145,080,521)	\$19,453,837	\$4,921,078	\$8,810,267	\$90,361,918				
	Total	\$151,520,826	\$768,421,802	\$270,005,781	\$73,816,945	(\$3,715,680)	\$330,343,392	\$113,086,231	(\$21,139,644)	\$280,586,579	\$252,572,223
Financial without GreenHat	Profit	\$201,825,234	\$913,502,323	\$250,551,785	\$70,094,918	(\$11,821,248)	\$240,111,850	\$223,376,757	\$25,150,852	\$280,906,014	\$252,572,223
	Surplus	(\$50,304,408)	(\$145,080,521)	\$19,453,837	\$4,921,078	\$8,810,267	\$90,361,918				
	Total	\$151,520,826	\$768,421,802	\$270,005,623	\$75,015,995	(\$3,010,981)	\$330,473,768	\$223,376,757	\$25,150,852	\$280,906,014	\$252,572,223
Physical	Profit	\$68,537,800	\$297,456,284	\$82,853,390	\$10,007,327	(\$4,010,669)	\$57,532,872	(\$5,945,233)	(\$42,860,656)	\$60,941,495	\$91,959,614
	Surplus	(\$41,626,011)	(\$53,642,077)	\$5,395,706	\$1,865,146	\$4,181,855	\$34,296,618				
	Total	\$26,911,789	\$243,814,207	\$88,249,096	\$11,872,473	\$171,186	\$91,829,490	(\$5,945,233)	(\$42,860,656)	\$60,941,495	\$91,959,614
Physical ARR	Profit	\$26,572,818	\$366,128,947	\$112,609,140	\$82,181,795	(\$2,468,152)	\$66,458,939	(\$6,248,557)	(\$49,614,191)	\$18,982,052	\$26,636,704
	Surplus	(\$25,873,836)	(\$81,279,067)	\$18,515,990	\$7,110,576	\$12,040,688	\$47,753,635				
	Surplus from										
	Self-scheduled FTRs	(\$45,978,766)	(\$81,765,964)	\$15,530,158	\$3,073,711	\$6,469,297	\$42,513,186				
	Total	\$698,982	\$284,849,881	\$131,125,130	\$89,292,371	\$9,572,536	\$114,212,574	(\$6,248,557)	(\$49,614,191)	\$18,982,052	\$26,636,704
Total		\$179,131,597	\$1,297,085,890	\$489,380,007	\$174,981,788	\$6,028,043	\$536,385,456	\$100,892,442	(\$113,614,490)	\$360,510,126	\$371,168,541

* The first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period

Table 13-14 shows the profits and losses of the five most and the five least profitable participants by patterns of ownership. Total MWh is the sum of all MWh by ownership type regardless of profitability. The Top 5 Profit is the sum of the profits of the five most profitable participants by ownership type. The Top 5 Profit/MWh is the Top 5 Profit divided by the sum of the MWh of the top 5 participants by ownership type. The Top 5 Market Share of MWh is the sum of the MWh of the top 5 participants by ownership type divided by Total MWh. The Top 5 Profit Share Among Profitable Participants is the Top 5 Profit divided by the sum of the profits of all profitable participants by ownership type. The same logic applies for the statistics related to the Bottom 5 participants. The All row includes all participants including all ownership types when calculating the share of the profits and losses of the Top 5 and Bottom 5 participants. When all participants across ownership types are considered, three of the Top 5 participants and three of the Bottom 5 participants were financial participants. Of all the ownership types, the Top 5 physical ARR participants' share of profits was the highest, 96.1 percent, although the total profits of that group was the lowest. There are only a small number of physical ARR participants who directly purchase FTRs. The Bottom 5 physical participants' share of losses was the highest, 76.1 percent, although the difference with the other organization types' bottom 5 loss share is less than the difference in the top 5's profit share. When compared to the same time period in the 2020/2021 planning period, the sum of top 5 participants' profits increased by more than 100 percent for all ownership types. For the bottom 5 participants' losses, the sum of the financial and physical ARR participants' losses was similar to losses in the 2020/2021 planning period but the losses of the physical bottom 5 participants increased by more than 100 percent. There are participants who have had persistent losses for multiple years. It is possible for PJM FTR participants to have complementary positions in other trading platforms such as the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) or Nodal Exchange.

Table 13-14 Top 5 and bottom 5 FTR profits by ownership type: 2021/2022: June through December

Organization Type	Total MWh	Top 5				Bottom 5		Bottom 5 Loss Share Among Unprofitable Participants	
		Top 5 Profit	Top 5 Profit/MWh	Top 5 Market Share in MWh	Top 5 Profit Share Among Profitable Participants	Bottom 5 Loss	Bottom 5 Loss/MWh		
Financial	2,023,876,497	\$166,688,845	\$0.31	26.5%	54.5%	(\$38,432,047)	(\$0.14)	13.2%	71.8%
Physical	277,870,811	\$70,295,479	\$1.31	19.3%	56.5%	(\$24,658,055)	(\$0.59)	15.1%	76.1%
Physical ARR	209,793,031	\$43,234,567	\$0.48	42.7%	96.1%	(\$11,675,595)	(\$2.51)	2.2%	63.6%
All	2,511,540,339	\$182,549,589	\$0.34	21.1%	38.4%	(\$51,220,890)	(\$0.36)	5.7%	49.1%

Table 13-15 shows the shares of the number of profitable and unprofitable participants by ownership type weighted by FTR MWh in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. There were more profitable participants than unprofitable participants. By ownership type, financial and physical entities had more profitable participants than unprofitable participants but physical ARR entities had more unprofitable participants than profitable participants. Compared to the same period in the 2020/2021 planning period, the share of the unprofitable participants increased from 20.2 percent to 32.7 percent. The increase in the unprofitable physical ARR participants' share was the largest, from 35.3 percent to 55.1 percent. One of the reasons for the increased number of unprofitable participants is that those who bought counter flow FTRs had significant negative FTR target allocation relative to revenue from the auction (the price of the counterflow FTRs). The total profits and the profits by ownership type increased (Table 13-11), and top 5 profitable participants' profits more than doubled for all ownership types (Table 13-14). In other words, FTRs were more profitable in the 2021/2022 planning period to date, but for fewer participants. Profits were more concentrated in the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period than in the same period in the 2020/2021 planning period.

Table 13-15 Share of participants by profitability by ownership type: 2021/2022: June through December

Organization Type	Unprofitable	Profitable
Financial	29.7%	70.3%
Physical	37.2%	62.8%
Physical ARR	55.1%	44.9%
Total	32.7%	67.3%

Revenue

Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-16 shows monthly balance of planning period FTR auction revenue by trade type, type and class type for 2021. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period netted \$41.6 million in revenue, the difference between buyers paying \$204.9 million and sellers receiving \$263.3 million. For the entire 2020/2021 planning period, the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions netted \$37.0 million in revenue with buyers paying \$142.0 million and sellers receiving \$105.0 million.

Table 13-16 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction revenue: 2021

Monthly Auction	Type	Trade Type	Class Type			
			24-Hour	On Peak	Off Peak	All
Jan-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$1,941,358	\$3,115,732	\$6,036,272	\$11,093,362
		Sell offers	\$118,732	\$1,962,676	\$4,515,876	\$6,597,284
	Options	Buy bids	\$7,201	\$295,920	\$368,044	\$671,165
		Sell offers	\$52,076	\$1,307,888	\$1,874,030	\$3,233,994
Feb-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$1,488,611	\$4,102,215	\$8,421,228	\$14,012,054
		Sell offers	\$151,204	\$3,430,637	\$6,788,020	\$10,369,861
	Options	Buy bids	\$6,780	\$178,510	\$273,701	\$458,991
		Sell offers	\$66,074	\$845,917	\$1,324,871	\$2,236,862
Mar-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$875,232	\$4,248,129	\$8,919,313	\$14,042,674
		Sell offers	(\$370,674)	\$2,359,553	\$6,212,710	\$8,201,589
	Options	Buy bids	\$19,057	\$213,699	\$311,568	\$544,324
		Sell offers	\$52,023	\$1,084,212	\$1,726,196	\$2,862,432
Apr-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$298,333	\$3,124,790	\$5,647,597	\$9,070,720
		Sell offers	(\$41,738)	\$1,795,035	\$3,766,861	\$5,520,159
	Options	Buy bids	\$7,925	\$94,663	\$181,157	\$283,745
		Sell offers	\$28,839	\$841,377	\$1,210,681	\$2,080,897
May-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$752,007	\$1,524,128	\$3,194,089	\$5,470,225
		Sell offers	(\$71,677)	\$1,089,999	\$2,696,146	\$3,714,468
	Options	Buy bids	\$0	\$139,731	\$217,126	\$356,857
		Sell offers	\$593	\$555,263	\$831,306	\$1,387,162
Jun-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$23,340,717	\$9,404,124	\$25,460,202	\$58,205,042
		Sell offers	\$945,610	\$11,155,487	\$25,557,332	\$37,658,430
	Options	Buy bids	\$497,178	\$1,326,642	\$1,779,074	\$3,602,894
		Sell offers	\$1,481,777	\$2,870,409	\$5,390,340	\$9,742,526
Jul-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$15,661,148	\$8,980,313	\$20,009,562	\$44,651,023
		Sell offers	\$924,780	\$9,727,764	\$19,609,993	\$30,262,536
	Options	Buy bids	\$515,331	\$1,087,379	\$1,677,645	\$3,280,356
		Sell offers	\$1,335,702	\$2,424,771	\$4,041,930	\$7,802,403
Aug-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$17,539,272	\$5,131,710	\$15,224,864	\$37,895,846
		Sell offers	\$1,340,545	\$8,336,462	\$17,598,418	\$27,275,424
	Options	Buy bids	\$344,696	\$1,518,623	\$2,265,025	\$4,128,344
		Sell offers	\$1,651,285	\$2,217,229	\$3,850,400	\$7,718,915
Sep-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$13,948,629	\$5,039,838	\$14,673,250	\$33,661,717
		Sell offers	\$768,971	\$6,378,411	\$16,027,116	\$23,174,497
	Options	Buy bids	\$223,181	\$847,307	\$1,140,014	\$2,210,502
		Sell offers	\$1,444,340	\$2,134,005	\$3,803,811	\$7,382,156
Oct-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$27,933,654	\$2,832,919	\$9,206,791	\$39,973,364
		Sell offers	\$1,810,365	\$10,271,351	\$18,503,339	\$30,585,055
	Options	Buy bids	\$281,517	\$1,153,761	\$2,139,020	\$3,574,298
		Sell offers	\$1,507,562	\$4,232,969	\$5,347,872	\$11,088,403
Nov-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$10,501,911	\$5,552,785	\$14,278,621	\$30,333,317
		Sell offers	\$877,283	\$7,193,512	\$15,486,227	\$23,557,022
	Options	Buy bids	\$109,608	\$2,539,925	\$4,392,466	\$7,042,000
		Sell offers	\$2,523,463	\$3,987,244	\$5,982,489	\$12,493,197
Dec-21	Obligations	Buy bids	\$9,253,556	\$6,866,991	\$16,133,967	\$32,254,514
		Sell offers	\$2,075,232	\$6,873,963	\$13,802,932	\$22,752,127
	Options	Buy bids	\$293,333	\$2,145,567	\$1,609,095	\$4,047,995
		Sell offers	\$2,017,647	\$4,116,563	\$5,634,822	\$11,769,032
2020/2021*	Obligations	Buy bids	\$76,746,367	\$23,793,302	\$35,265,115	\$135,804,784
		Sell offers	\$2,204,711	\$32,008,489	\$44,772,400	\$78,985,599
	Options	Buy bids	\$105,703	\$2,668,216	\$3,395,976	\$6,169,895
		Sell offers	\$556,743	\$11,393,636	\$14,017,286	\$25,967,665
	Net Total		\$74,090,616	(\$16,940,607)	(\$20,128,594)	\$37,021,415
2021/2022**	Obligations	Buy bids	\$118,178,886	\$43,808,681	\$114,987,256	\$276,974,824
		Sell offers	\$8,742,786	\$59,936,949	\$126,585,356	\$195,265,091
	Options	Buy bids	\$2,264,845	\$10,619,205	\$15,002,338	\$27,886,388
		Sell offers	\$11,961,776	\$21,983,190	\$34,051,664	\$67,996,631
	Net Total		\$99,739,169	(\$27,492,253)	(\$30,647,426)	\$41,599,490

* Shows twelve months for 2020/2021 **Shows seven months for 2021/2022

FTR Target Allocations

FTR target allocations were examined separately by source and sink contribution. Hourly FTR target allocations were divided into those that were benefits and liabilities and summed by sink and by source. Figure 13-6 shows the 10 largest positive and negative FTR target allocations, summed by sink, for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The top 10 sinks that produced financial benefit accounted for 37.3 percent of total positive target allocations with the Western Hub accounting for 12.0 percent of all positive target allocations. The top 10 sinks that created liability accounted for 25.7 percent of total negative target allocations with PSEG accounting for 8.5 percent of all negative target allocations.

Figure 13-6 Ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations summed by sink: 2021/2022





Figure 13-7 shows the 10 largest positive and negative FTR target allocations, summed by source, for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The top 10 sources with a positive target allocation accounted for 29.7 percent of total positive target allocations with the PECO Zone accounting for 7.9 percent of total positive target allocations. The top 10 sources with a negative target allocation accounted for 29.0 percent of all negative target allocations, with the Western Hub accounting for 13.8 percent of total negative target allocations.

Figure 13-7 Ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations summed by source: 2021/2022



The Effect of Fast Start Pricing on FTR Target Allocations

PJM implemented fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. As a result of these changes, PJM produces two separate dispatch and pricing solutions. The dispatch run results in dispatch instructions and matching prices, termed dispatch run locational marginal price, or DLMP. The DLMP prices are the prices that would have been the LMPs prior to fast start pricing. The pricing run results in the final prices used in settlements, termed pricing run locational marginal price, or PLMP. The two runs result in different sets of target allocations for the same FTR paths. Table 13-17 compares the target allocations that result from the pricing and dispatch runs for both self scheduled and all other FTRs for September 2021 through December 2021. The difference indicates whether the target allocations were increased or decreased as a result of fast start pricing.

Table 13-17 Pricing run and dispatch run FTR Target Allocations: September 2021 through December 2021

	Pricing Run	Dispatch Run	Difference	% Difference
Non-Self Scheduled	\$374,963,133.5	\$374,109,200.7	\$853,932.8	0.2%
Self Scheduled	\$68,875,580.1	\$68,737,575.7	\$138,004.4	0.2%

Surplus Congestion Revenue

Surplus congestion revenue is a misnomer. In fact, there is no such thing as surplus congestion revenue. The rights to all congestion revenue belong to load. Surplus congestion revenue, as defined in PJM rules, is an artifact of the flawed design of the current approach to FTR/ARRs.

In the current design, surplus congestion revenue should be allocated to ARR holders because such revenue is part of total congestion revenues. In addition, FTR Auction revenue results from the prices paid by willing FTR buyers and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason and should be settled monthly.

Surplus day-ahead congestion is defined as the difference between the day-ahead congestion collected and FTR target allocations. Surplus FTR auction revenue is defined as the difference between the sum of monthly FTR auction revenue from the Long Term, Annual and monthly auctions, and ARR target allocations. Surplus FTR auction revenue can result from high prices in the FTR auctions, and from FTR capacity sold in excess of assigned ARR capacity on specific paths, and FTR capacity sold on paths not available to ARR holders.

Surplus congestion revenue is defined as the sum of the surplus day-ahead congestion revenue and the surplus FTR auction revenue at the end of each month.³⁶ Beginning with the 2014/2015 planning period, PJM may use surplus FTR auction revenue to pay for the clearing of counter flow FTRs as part of the auction clearing process.³⁷ The remaining surplus is first used to ensure that ARR target allocations in the month are fully funded. Any remaining surplus is used to pay any shortfall in FTR target allocations for the current month or prior months in the planning period. Any remaining surplus is used to pay any shortfall in FTR target allocations for the entire planning period at the end of the planning period. Any remaining surplus is distributed to ARR holders.³⁸

If, at the end of the planning period, all the surplus congestion revenue has been provided to FTR holders and target allocations for the year are not covered, an uplift charge is assigned to FTR holders to cover the net planning period deficiency. An individual participant's uplift charge allocation is the ratio of their share of net positive target allocations to the total net positive target allocations.

Figure 13-8 shows the distribution of the monthly surplus congestion revenue distributed to FTR holders as if it were settled monthly. The figure shows the portions of total monthly surplus, represented by the total height of the bar, that are from day-ahead congestion surplus, represented by the blue portion of the bar, and from auction surplus, represented by the orange portion of the bar. The horizontal green lines represent the amount of revenue that FTRs were paid from the surplus to be made whole for that month. The height of the bar below the green line is the portion of auction surplus that went to FTR holders, and the height of the bar above the green line is the portion that would have gone to ARR holders at the end of the planning period, if nothing changed and this surplus was not provided to FTRs. If a green line is above the bar that means there was not enough surplus congestion in that month to make FTRs whole. For example, September 2020 did not have enough surplus congestion to make FTRs whole. Those FTRs were made whole using surplus revenue from previous months. Six of the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period did not have enough revenue to pay FTR target allocations, represented by lines that are entirely above the surplus bars, resulting in a payout ratio under 100 percent for the planning period.

The market rules should recognize that ARR holders have the right to all surplus congestion revenue, not just the remainder after funding FTRs. The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. In Figure 13-8 the amount represented by each bar would be assigned to ARR holders in every month. In the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, \$84.0 million of surplus congestion revenue was paid to FTR holders that would have been paid to ARR holders under the MMU recommendation.

³⁶ Prior to the 2017/2018 planning period, the surplus congestion revenue was not the simple sum of the surplus FTR auction revenue and surplus day-ahead congestion because there were various cross market charges subtracted from FTR revenue, including M2M and competing use charges, which reduced available surplus congestion revenue.

³⁷ See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 28 (Dec. 15, 2021).

³⁸ On May 31, 2018, a rule change was implemented. Effective for the 2018/2019 planning period, surplus day-ahead congestion charges and surplus FTR auction revenue that remain at the end of the Planning Period allocated to ARR holders, rather than to FTR holders. 163 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2018).

Figure 13-8 Monthly surplus congestion and auction revenue distributed to FTR holders: June 2017 through December 2021³⁹




Figure 13-9 shows the surplus FTR auction revenue from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. Each new planning period introduces a new FTR model, including outages and PJM’s discretionary adjustments for revenue adequacy. The differences in the assumptions in the market model can result in large differences in FTR auction surplus and ARR revenue from one planning period to another.

FTR auction revenue is the value that FTR buyers assign to congestion rights that belong to ARR holders. There is no logical or market based reason to assign any part of that auction revenue back to the FTR buyers. It is inconsistent with the operation of a market that sellers are required to return some of the purchase price to buyers if the purchase is less profitable for buyers than expected. Auction revenue from the sale of FTRs should be distributed directly and completely to ARR holders. The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis.

Figure 13-9 Monthly FTR auction surplus: 2011/2012 through 2021/2022




Table 13-18 shows the surplus FTR auction revenue, surplus day-ahead congestion revenue and surplus congestion revenue for planning periods 2010/2011 through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period.

Table 13-18 Surplus FTR Auction Revenue: 2010/2011 through 2021/2022⁴⁰

Planning Period	Surplus FTR Auction Revenue (Millions)	Surplus Day-Ahead Congestion (Millions)	Surplus Congestion Revenue (Millions)
2010/2011	\$29.7	(\$1,218.7)	(\$449.3)
2011/2012	\$108.9	(\$460.3)	(\$192.5)
2012/2013	\$66.7	(\$328.5)	(\$292.3)
2013/2014	\$71.7	(\$715.3)	(\$678.7)
2014/2015*	\$29.0	\$139.8	\$139.6
2015/2016	\$29.6	\$56.4	\$42.5
2016/2017	\$27.9	\$97.1	\$72.6
2017/2018	\$27.4	\$344.0	\$371.2
2018/2019	\$180.8	(\$68.5)	\$112.3
2019/2020	\$217.8	(\$87.9)	\$140.7
2020/2021	\$166.1	(\$185.1)	(\$14.5)
2021/2022**	\$91.4	\$215.0	(\$123.6)
Total	\$1,047.0	(\$2,211.9)	(\$872.1)

*Start of counter flow “buy back”

**First seven months

³⁹ The bars for December 2018 and January 2019 are truncated.

⁴⁰ Total congestion surplus not equal to the sum of the columns in years prior to the 2017/2018 planning period because other charges were subtracted from the congestion surplus.

Revenue Adequacy

FTR revenue adequacy, like surplus congestion revenue, is a misnomer. FTR revenue adequacy, as defined in PJM rules, is an artifact of the flawed design of the current approach to FTR/ARRs.

As defined, FTR revenue adequacy simply compares congestion revenues to FTR target allocations. (Target allocations are the CLMP differences between the source and sink of the FTR times the MW of the FTR.) There is no reason to expect congestion revenues to equal FTR target allocations under the path based approach. Revenue adequacy is not a benchmark for how well the FTR process is working. Target allocations define the maximum payments to FTRs but target allocations are not congestion. FTR revenue adequacy is not equivalent to the adequacy of ARRs as an offset for load against total congestion. A path specific target allocation is not a guarantee of payment.

Actual congestion revenues are not a result of PJM's decisions about the FTR auction model. As a result, the fewer FTRs sold, the higher the probability that congestion will exceed the sum of the FTR target allocations. For example, PJM's subjective decision to reduce available system capability in the ARR/FTR market model through outage selection for the 2014/2015 through 2016/2017 planning periods resulted in a high level of revenue adequacy at the expense of a reduction in available ARRs and associated FTRs. PJM's decisions have included the arbitrary use of higher outage levels and the decision to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) both of which reduced the FTRs made available for sale in FTR auctions. PJM's actions have led to a significant reduction in the allocation of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs and therefore a reduction in available FTRs.

While PJM's arbitrary decision to increase outages in the ARR allocation and in the Annual FTR Auction reduced FTR revenue inadequacy, it did not address the Stage 1A ARR over allocation issue directly because Stage 1A ARR allocations cannot be prorated. Instead, PJM's actions for the 2014/2015 through 2016/2017 planning periods resulted in decreased Stage 1B ARR allocations, decreased Stage 2 ARR allocations and decreased FTR capability. The direct assignment of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load beginning in

the 2017/2018 planning period increased the congestion revenue available to pay FTR holders. In response, PJM reduced the number of outages taken in the ARR allocation and in the Annual FTR Auction, increasing ARR allocations and FTR availability. The current ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient way to ensure that load receives all the congestion revenues or has the ability to receive the auction revenues associated with all the potential congestion revenues. There are several reasons for the disconnect between congestion revenues and ARR/FTR revenues in the current design. The reasons include: the use of generation to load paths rather than a measure of total congestion to assign congestion revenue rights; the failure to provide to ARR holders the full system capability that is provided to FTR purchasers in the Long Term FTR Auction; unavoidable modeling differences such as emergency outages; avoidable modeling differences such as outage modeling decisions; and cross subsidies among and between FTR participants and ARR holders.

Revenue adequacy for ARRs is, for practical purposes, a meaningless concept. Revenue adequacy for ARRs means that FTR buyers collectively pay more than zero for FTRs in FTR auctions, and that those payments were received by ARR holders. Unsurprisingly, ARRs have been revenue adequate for every auction to date. ARR revenue adequacy has nothing to do with the adequacy of ARRs as an offset to total congestion. ARRs can be revenue adequate at the same time that ARRs return only half of congestion to load, or even much less.

Total net FTR auction revenue for the 2020/2021 planning period, before accounting for self scheduling, load shifts or residual ARRs, was \$691.2 million. The FTR auction revenue pays ARR holders' credits. For the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period, total net FTR auction revenue was \$803.9 million.

Table 13-19 presents the PJM FTR revenue detail for the 2020/2021 planning period and the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. This includes ARR target allocations from the Annual ARR Allocation and net revenue sources from the Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.⁴¹ In this table, under the new balancing congestion and M2M payment rules, any negative congestion is from

⁴¹ The final ARR values may change if load shifts.

day-ahead congestion and does not include balancing congestion. A negative deficiency is a surplus, which will be distributed to ARR holders at the end of the planning period, while a positive deficiency is a shortfall, which will be charged as FTR uplift at the end of the planning period.

Table 13-19 Total annual ARR and FTR revenue detail (Dollars (Millions)): 2020/2021 and 2021/2022

Accounting Element	2020/2021	2021/2022*
ARR information		
ARR target allocations	\$517.1	\$626.8
ARR credits	\$517.1	\$626.8
FTR auction revenue	\$691.2	\$803.9
Annual FTR Auction net revenue	\$577.0	\$692.4
Long Term FTR Auction net revenue	\$72.7	\$69.9
Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction net revenue	\$41.4	\$41.6
Surplus auction revenue		
ARR Surplus	\$166.1	\$91.4
ARR payout ratio	100%	100%
FTR targets		
Positive target allocations	\$1,397.7	\$1,312.5
Negative target allocations	(\$313.0)	(\$298.7)
FTR target allocations	\$1,084.7	\$1,013.8
Adjustments:		
Adjustments to FTR target allocations	(\$4.5)	\$0.0
Total FTR targets	\$1,080.3	\$1,013.8
FTR payout ratio	98.7%	91.1%
FTR revenues		
ARR excess	\$166.1	\$91.4
Congestion		
Net Negative Congestion (enter as negative)	\$0.0	\$0.0
Hourly congestion revenue	\$899.6	\$798.8
M2M Payments(credit to PJM minus credit to M2M entity)	\$0.0	\$0.0
Adjustments:		
Surplus revenues carried forward into future months	\$9.0	\$3.6
Surplus revenues distributed back to previous months	\$20.2	\$3.7
Other adjustments to FTR revenues	\$0.0	\$0.0
Total FTR revenues		
Surplus revenues distributed to other months	\$29.2	\$7.4
Net Negative Congestion charged to DA Operating Reserves	\$0.0	\$0.0
Total FTR congestion credits	\$1,094.9	\$897.6
Total congestion credits(includes end of year distribution)	\$1,094.9	\$897.6
Remaining deficiency	\$14.5	\$123.6

* First seven months of 2021/2022 planning period

FTR target allocations are defined based on hourly CLMP differences in the day-ahead energy market for FTR paths. FTR credits are paid to FTR holders and, depending on market conditions, can be less than the target allocations but are capped at target allocations. Table 13-20 lists the FTR revenues, target allocations, credits, payout ratios, congestion credit deficiencies and excess congestion charges by month.

The total row in Table 13-20 is not the sum of each of the monthly rows because the monthly rows may include excess revenues carried forward from prior months and excess revenues distributed back from later months. September 2020 had revenue shortfalls totaling \$4.2 million, but September FTR target allocations were fully funded using surplus revenue from previous months. March and April 2021 had revenue shortfalls that could not be made whole using surplus revenues from previous months, resulting in a revenue shortfall for the planning period.

Table 13-20 Monthly FTR accounting summary (Dollars (Millions)): 2020/2021 and 2021/2022

Period	FTR Revenues (with adjustments)	FTR Target Allocations	FTR Payout Ratio (original)	FTR Credits (with adjustments)	FTR Payout Ratio (with adjustments)	Monthly Credits Surplus/Deficiency (with adjustments)
Jun-20	\$74.4	\$73.3	100.0%	\$74.7	100.0%	(\$1.1)
Jul-20	\$118.3	\$112.3	100.0%	\$118.3	100.0%	(\$6.0)
Aug-20	\$95.2	\$94.4	100.0%	\$95.2	100.0%	(\$0.8)
Sep-20	\$90.9	\$95.2	94.9%	\$95.2	100.0%	\$0.0
Oct-20	\$67.5	\$72.2	93.1%	\$72.2	100.0%	\$0.0
Nov-20	\$55.1	\$53.4	100.0%	\$55.1	100.0%	(\$1.7)
Dec-20	\$79.6	\$90.5	87.5%	\$90.5	100.0%	\$0.0
Jan-21	\$69.0	\$67.6	100.0%	\$69.0	100.0%	(\$1.4)
Feb-21	\$104.9	\$95.4	100.0%	\$104.9	100.0%	(\$9.6)
Mar-21	\$96.3	\$107.5	89.6%	\$105.5	98.2%	\$1.1
Apr-21	\$95.6	\$109.4	87.4%	\$95.6	87.4%	\$13.4
May-21	\$118.9	\$110.3	100.0%	\$118.9	100.0%	(\$8.6)
Summary for Planning Period 2020/2021						
Total	\$1,065.7	\$1,081.5		\$1,095.3		\$14.5
Jun-21	\$97.7	\$101.5	96.3%	\$101.5	100.0%	\$0.0
Jul-21	\$86.5	\$79.1	100.0%	\$86.5	109.3%	(\$7.4)
Aug-21	\$121.5	\$141.1	86.1%	\$125.1	88.7%	\$16.0
Sep-21	\$110.7	\$133.5	82.9%	\$110.7	82.9%	\$22.8
Oct-21	\$126.7	\$142.1	89.2%	\$126.7	89.2%	\$15.4
Nov-21	\$220.9	\$270.1	81.8%	\$220.9	81.8%	\$49.1
Dec-21	\$126.1	\$146.4	86.1%	\$126.1	86.1%	\$20.3
Summary for Planning Period 2021/2022*						
Total	\$890.2	\$1,013.8		\$423.8		\$123.6

* First seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period

Figure 13-10 shows the original PJM reported FTR payout ratio by month, excluding excess revenue distribution, for January 2004 through December 2021. The months with payout ratios above 100 percent have congestion revenue greater than the target allocations and the months with payout ratios under 100 percent have congestion revenue that is less than the target allocations. Figure 13-10 also shows the payout ratio after distributing surplus congestion revenue across months within the planning period. The payout ratio for revenue inadequate months in the current planning period may change if surplus congestion revenue is collected in the remainder of the planning period.

Figure 13-10 FTR payout ratio by month, excluding and including excess revenue distribution: January 2004 through December 2021




Table 13-21 shows the FTR payout ratio by planning period from the 2003/2004 planning period forward. The 2013/2014 planning period includes the additional revenue from unallocated congestion charges from Balancing Operating Reserves. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period payments to FTRs are limited to 100 percent of the target allocations.

The first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period were revenue inadequate, with a payout ratio of 91.1 percent. Revenue inadequacy means that actual congestion revenue, excluding balancing congestion, is not enough to pay the target allocations for FTRs. Revenue inadequacy is generally a result of selling too many FTRs on a path compared to the actual capacity of the path. As revenue is the price difference on the path times the FTR MW, selling more MW of FTRs than can physically flow on the path will result in revenue inadequacy, unless excess revenue from other paths offsets the path with revenue shortfalls.


Table 13-21 Reported FTR payout ratio by planning period⁴²

Planning Period	FTR Payout Ratio
2003/2004	97.7%
2004/2005	100.0%
2005/2006	90.7%
2006/2007	100.0%
2007/2008	100.0%
2008/2009	100.0%
2009/2010	96.9%
2010/2011	85.0%
2011/2012	80.6%
2012/2013	67.8%
2013/2014	72.8%
2014/2015	116.2%
2015/2016	106.8%
2016/2017	112.6%
2017/2018	138.5%
2018/2019	100.0%
2019/2020	100.0%
2020/2021	98.7%
2021/2022	91.1%

* First seven months of 2021/2022

Figure 13-11 shows the day-ahead, balancing and total congestion payments from January 2005 through December 2021.

Figure 13-11 FTR surplus and day-ahead, balancing and total congestion: 2005 through December 2021



ARRs as an Offset to Congestion for Load

Load pays for the transmission system and pays congestion revenues. FTRs, and later ARR, were intended to return congestion revenues to load to offset an unintended consequence of locational marginal pricing. With the implementation of the current, path based FTR/ARR design, the purpose of FTRs has been subverted. The inconsistencies between actual network solutions used to serve load and path based rights available to load cause a misalignment of congestion paid by load and the congestion paid to load, in aggregate and on a specific load basis. These inconsistencies between actual network use and path based rights cause cross subsidies between ARR holders and FTR holders and among ARR holders. One result of this misalignment is that individual zones have very different offsets due to the location of their path based ARRs compared to their actual congestion costs from actual network use.

Table 13-22 shows the ARR and FTR revenue paid to load, the congestion offset available to load with and without allocating balancing congestion to load and the congestion offset when surplus congestion revenue is allocated to load. The highlighted offsets are the actual offsets based on the rules that were effective in that planning period. The pre 2017/2018 offset is calculated as the ARR credits and the FTR credits excluding balancing congestion and M2M payments, divided by the total day-ahead congestion and the load share of balancing and M2M payments.

⁴² The actual payout ratios for planning periods 2006/2007, 2007/2008, and 2008/2009 may have exceeded 100 percent.

The allocation of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load went into effect for the 2017/2018 planning period. If these rules had been in place beginning with the 2011/2012 planning period, ARR holders would have received a total of \$1,351.4 million less in congestion offsets from the 2011/2012 through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The total overpayment to FTR holders for the 2011/2012 through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period would have been \$1,585.1 million.

Total ARR and self scheduled FTR revenue offset 44.8 percent of total congestion costs for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. For the 2019/2020 planning period, FTR bidders paid more in the auctions than the actual day-ahead target allocations for the same paths. The unexpected reduction in energy prices in 2020 led to a corresponding unexpected reduction in target allocations and in actual congestion. This resulted in an offset over 100 percent because the resulting total ARR value for the 2019/2020 planning period was greater than actual congestion costs. FTR prices were lower in the Annual FTR Auction for 2020/2021, reducing the offset for the 2020/2021 planning period.

Table 13–22 ARR and FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders: 2011/2012 through 2021/2022

Planning Period	Revenue					Pre 2017/2018 (Without Balancing)		2017/2018 (With Balancing)		Post 2017/2018 (With Balancing and Surplus)		Effective Offset				
	ARR Credits	Unadjusted FTR Credits	Day Ahead Congestion	Balancing + M2M Congestion	Total Congestion	Surplus Revenue Pre 2017/2018	Surplus Revenue Post 2017/2018	Total ARR/FTR Offsets	Current Revenue Received	Current Revenue Offset	New Revenue Received	New Revenue Offset	Cumulative Revenue	Cumulative Offset		
2011/2012	\$515.6	\$310.0	\$1,025.4	(\$275.7)	\$749.7	(\$50.6)	\$35.6	\$113.9	\$775.0	103.4%	\$585.5	78.1%	\$663.8	88.5%	\$775.0	103.4%
2012/2013	\$356.4	\$268.4	\$904.7	(\$379.9)	\$524.8	(\$94.0)	\$18.4	\$62.1	\$530.7	101.1%	\$263.2	50.2%	\$306.9	58.5%	\$530.7	101.1%
2013/2014	\$339.4	\$626.6	\$2,231.3	(\$360.6)	\$1,870.6	(\$139.4)	(\$49.0)	(\$49.0)	\$826.5	44.2%	\$556.3	29.7%	\$556.3	29.7%	\$826.5	44.2%
2014/2015	\$487.4	\$348.1	\$1,625.9	(\$268.3)	\$1,357.6	\$36.7	\$111.2	\$400.6	\$872.2	64.2%	\$678.4	50.0%	\$967.8	71.3%	\$872.2	64.2%
2015/2016	\$641.8	\$209.2	\$1,098.7	(\$147.6)	\$951.1	\$9.2	\$42.1	\$188.9	\$860.2	90.4%	\$745.5	78.4%	\$892.3	93.8%	\$860.2	90.4%
2016/2017	\$648.1	\$149.9	\$885.7	(\$104.8)	\$780.8	\$15.1	\$36.5	\$179.0	\$813.1	104.1%	\$729.6	93.4%	\$872.1	111.7%	\$813.1	104.1%
2017/2018	\$429.6	\$212.3	\$1,322.1	(\$129.5)	\$1,192.6	\$52.3	\$80.4	\$370.7	\$694.2	58.2%	\$592.8	49.7%	\$883.1	74.1%	\$592.8	49.7%
2018/2019	\$531.6	\$130.1	\$832.7	(\$152.6)	\$680.0	(\$5.8)	\$16.2	\$112.2	\$655.87	96.4%	\$525.3	77.2%	\$621.3	91.4%	\$621.3	91.4%
2019/2020	\$547.6	\$91.9	\$612.1	(\$169.4)	\$442.7	(\$1.6)	\$21.6	\$157.8	\$637.9	144.1%	\$491.7	111.1%	\$627.9	141.8%	\$627.9	141.8%
2020/2021	\$392.7	\$179.9	\$899.6	(\$256.2)	\$643.4	(\$43.2)	(\$0.0)	(\$0.0)	\$529.31	82.3%	\$316.4	49.2%	\$316.4	49.2%	\$316.4	49.2%
2021/2022*	\$275.0	\$166.3	\$815.5	(\$105.4)	\$710.0	(\$34.9)	(\$17.6)	(\$17.6)	\$406.5	57.2%	\$318.3	44.8%	\$318.3	44.8%	\$318.3	44.8%
Total	\$5,165.1	\$2,692.7	\$12,253.5	(\$2,350.1)	\$9,903.4	(\$256.2)	\$295.4	\$1,518.6	\$7,601.6	76.8%	\$5,803.1	58.6%	\$7,026.3	70.9%	\$7,154.4	72.2%

* seven months of 2021/2022 planning period

Table 13–22 illustrates the inadequacies of the ARR/FTR design. The goal of the design should be to give the rights to 100 percent of the congestion revenues to the load.

The cumulative offset, beginning in the 2011/2012 planning period, is the sum of the revenue received for that planning period and all previous planning periods divided by the total congestion for that planning period and all previous planning periods. The cumulative shortfall is the cumulative difference between the ARR holders' revenue and the congestion they paid, for the planning period and prior planning periods.

Table 13–23 also shows the cumulative offset and shortfall, assuming the rules implemented in the 2017/2018 planning period. The cumulative offset percentage has increased since the 2014/2015 planning period except for the 2019/2020 planning period. The cumulative offset would have been 70.9 percent if the 2017/2018 surplus allocation rules had been in place for the entire period.

Table 13-23 ARR and FTR cumulative offset for ARR holders using 2017/2018 surplus allocation: 2011/2012 through 2021/2022

Planning Period	Cumulative Offset	Cumulative Shortfall (Millions)
2011/2012	88.5%	(\$85.9)
2012/2013	76.2%	(\$303.8)
2013/2014	48.6%	(\$1,618.1)
2014/2015	55.4%	(\$2,007.9)
2015/2016	62.1%	(\$2,066.6)
2016/2017	68.3%	(\$1,975.4)
2017/2018	69.2%	(\$2,284.8)
2018/2019	71.1%	(\$2,343.6)
2019/2020	74.8%	(\$2,158.3)
2020/2021	73.0%	(\$2,485.4)
2021/2022*	70.9%	(\$2,877.1)

* seven months of 2021/2022 Planning Period

Table 13-24 shows the cumulative offset and shortfall using the rules that were effective in the given planning period to calculate the ARR/FTR revenue. The cumulative offset was 72.2 percent based on the rules that were in place for each planning period. Load has been underpaid by \$2.7 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The amount of underpayment would have been even greater, \$4.1 billion, if the 2017/2018 surplus allocation rules had been in place for the entire period.

Table 13-24 ARR and FTR cumulative offset for ARR holders using effective surplus allocation rules: 2011/2012 through 2021/2022

Planning Period	Cumulative Offset	Cumulative Shortfall (Millions)
2011/2012	103.4%	\$25.3
2012/2013	102.4%	\$31.2
2013/2014	67.8%	(\$1,012.9)
2014/2015	66.7%	(\$1,498.3)
2015/2016	70.9%	(\$1,589.2)
2016/2017	75.0%	(\$1,556.9)
2017/2018	71.0%	(\$2,156.7)
2018/2019	72.7%	(\$2,215.4)
2019/2020	76.3%	(\$2,030.2)
2020/2021	74.4%	(\$2,357.2)
2021/2022*	72.2%	(\$2,748.9)

* seven months of 2021/2022 Planning Period

Zonal ARR Congestion Offset

Zonal ARR congestion offsets vary significantly across zones. There is no reason that this should be the result. This outcome is a direct result of the flawed definition of congestion and of the method for assigning rights to congestion to ARR holders. The results show that path based ARR assignments in the current path based ARR/FTR design are not aligned with actual network use by load, and are therefore not aligned with how

congestion is actually paid by load on actual network usage. Due to this misalignment of ARR rights relative to actual network usage, individual loads cannot claim the congestion they paid through assigned ARRs. The misalignment of path based ARR rights produces cross subsidies among ARR holders.

ARRs are allocated to zonal load based on historical generation to load transmission contract paths, in many cases based on 1999 contract paths. ARRs are allocated within zones based on zonal base load (Stage 1A) and zonal peak loads (other stages). ARR revenue is the result of the prices that result from the sale of FTRs through the FTR auctions. ARR revenue for each zone is the revenue for the ARRs that sink in each zone.

Congestion paid by load in a zone is the total difference between what the zonal load pays in congestion charges net of payments to the generation that serves the zonal load, including generation in the zone and outside the zone.⁴³

Table 13-25 shows the day-ahead congestion and balancing congestion and M2M charges paid by load in each zone along with the congestion offsets paid to load: FTR auction revenue; self scheduled FTR revenue adjusted by the payout ratio for FTRs if below 100 percent; and the allocation of end of planning period surplus.⁴⁴ The offset for the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period assigns the current surplus revenue at the end of the quarter to ARR holders. Table 13-25 also shows payments by load for balancing congestion and M2M payments. The total congestion offset paid to load is the sum of all of those credits and charges.

The zonal offset percentage shown in Table 13-25 is the sum of the congestion related revenues (offset) paid to load in each zone divided by the total congestion payment made by load in each zone.

43 See "Constraint Based Congestion Calculations," PJM ARR FTR Market Task Force (July 17, 2020) <<https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/afmtf/2020/20200722/20200722-item-03a-constraint-based-congestion-calculations.ashx>>.

44 See 2020 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 11: Congestion and Marginal Losses

Table 13-25 Zonal ARR and FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders: 2021/2022 planning period

Zone	ARR Credits	Adjusted FTR Credits	Balancing+ M2M Charge	Surplus Allocation	Total Offset	Day Ahead Congestion	Balancing Congestion	M2M Payments	Total Congestion	Offset
ACEC	\$2.2	(\$0.0)	(\$1.1)	\$0.0	\$1.0	\$7.2	(\$1.0)	(\$0.1)	\$6.1	17.1%
AEP	\$25.1	\$25.5	(\$16.1)	\$0.0	\$34.5	\$132.8	(\$15.1)	(\$1.0)	\$116.7	29.6%
APS	\$17.6	\$12.9	(\$6.1)	\$0.0	\$24.5	\$57.2	(\$5.7)	(\$0.4)	\$51.1	47.8%
ATSI	\$12.2	\$0.5	(\$7.6)	\$0.0	\$5.2	\$62.6	(\$7.0)	(\$0.5)	\$55.1	9.4%
BGE	\$52.8	\$2.4	(\$3.8)	\$0.0	\$51.4	\$30.8	(\$3.6)	(\$0.3)	\$26.9	190.7%
COMED	\$24.6	\$4.3	(\$11.1)	\$0.0	\$17.8	\$95.7	(\$10.3)	(\$0.8)	\$84.6	21.1%
DAY	\$3.0	\$0.5	(\$2.1)	\$0.0	\$1.5	\$15.3	(\$1.9)	(\$0.1)	\$13.3	11.3%
DOM	\$18.5	\$76.8	(\$18.7)	\$0.0	\$76.6	\$125.8	(\$17.8)	(\$0.1)	\$107.9	71.0%
DPL	\$21.8	\$8.4	(\$2.3)	\$0.0	\$28.0	\$34.7	(\$2.1)	(\$0.9)	\$31.7	88.2%
DUKE	\$14.6	\$1.0	(\$3.1)	\$0.0	\$12.5	\$22.9	(\$2.9)	(\$0.2)	\$19.8	63.0%
DUQ	\$3.3	\$0.2	(\$1.5)	\$0.0	\$2.0	\$9.9	(\$1.4)	(\$0.2)	\$8.4	23.3%
EKPC	\$2.3	\$0.0	(\$1.5)	\$0.0	\$0.7	\$12.3	(\$1.4)	(\$0.1)	\$10.8	6.8%
EXT	\$0.4	\$0.0	(\$2.9)	\$0.0	(\$2.5)	\$13.2	(\$2.9)	\$0.0	\$10.3	(23.9%)
JCPLC	\$1.2	\$0.0	(\$2.7)	\$0.0	(\$1.5)	\$17.9	(\$2.5)	(\$0.2)	\$15.2	(9.8%)
MEC	\$4.6	\$1.4	(\$5.1)	\$0.0	\$0.9	\$19.7	(\$5.0)	(\$0.1)	\$14.6	5.8%
OVEC	\$0.0	\$0.0	(\$0.1)	\$0.0	(\$0.1)	\$0.5	(\$0.1)	\$0.0	\$0.4	(21.0%)
PE	\$6.0	\$5.9	(\$2.5)	\$0.0	\$9.4	\$19.9	(\$2.4)	(\$0.1)	\$17.3	54.4%
PECO	\$12.0	\$0.3	(\$4.2)	\$0.0	\$8.1	\$34.2	(\$3.8)	(\$0.3)	\$30.1	26.8%
PEPCO	\$13.5	\$3.3	(\$3.5)	\$0.0	\$13.3	\$27.0	(\$3.3)	(\$0.2)	\$23.5	56.8%
PPL	\$19.5	\$7.1	(\$4.6)	\$0.0	\$22.0	\$38.7	(\$4.2)	(\$0.3)	\$34.2	64.5%
PSEG	\$19.6	\$1.3	(\$4.8)	\$0.0	\$16.1	\$34.1	(\$4.4)	(\$0.4)	\$29.3	55.0%
REC	\$0.2	\$0.0	(\$0.2)	\$0.0	(\$0.0)	\$3.0	(\$0.2)	(\$0.0)	\$2.8	(0.3%)
Total	\$275.0	\$151.8	(\$105.4)	\$0.0	\$321.3	\$815.5	(\$99.1)	(\$6.4)	\$710.0	45.3%

The total congestion offset paid to loads in the first seven months of the 2021/2021 planning period was 45.3 percent of congestion costs. The results vary significantly by zone. Loads in some zones, like BGE, receive substantially more in offsets than their total congestion payments. Loads in other zones, like ATSI, receive substantially less in offsets than their total congestion payments. The offsets are a function of the assignment of ARRs and the valuation of ARRs in the FTR auctions.

The amount and proportion of the offset that can be realized by load serving entities via their ARR allocations varies by planning period. The offsets are a function of the assignment of ARRs relative actual network sources of congestion paid, the valuation of ARRs in the FTR auctions and the congestion revenue from self scheduled ARRs. If the prices for FTRs are high relative to realized congestion, the offset provided by ARR is increased relative to cases where the prices for FTRs are low relative to realized congestion. While the amount of congestion that is returned to the load varies by planning period, PJM's ARR/FTR design has consistently failed to return the congestion revenues to the load that paid it. It is not possible for load to recover all of the congestion that they pay under the current design in which the rights to congestion revenues are assigned based on fictitious contract paths.

Offset if all ARRs are Held as ARRs

Table 13-26 shows the total congestion offset that would be available to ARR holders via allocated ARRs, by zone, if the ARRs holders held all their allocated ARRs in the 2019/2020, 2020/2021, and the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period and did not self schedule any.

Table 13-26 Offset available to load if all ARRs are held: 2019/2020 through 2021/2022 planning periods

	19/20 Planning Period				20/21 Planning Period				21/22 Planning Period*			
	ARR Held TA	Bal+M2M Charges	Congestion+ M2M	Offset	ARR Held TA	Bal+M2M Charges	Congestion+ M2M	Offset	ARR Held TA	Bal+M2M Charges	Congestion+ M2M	Offset
ACEC	\$7.8	(\$2.1)	\$3.7	155.9%	\$4.4	(\$2.7)	\$5.5	31.2%	\$2.2	(\$1.1)	\$6.1	17.8%
AEP	\$169.0	(\$28.2)	\$81.9	172.0%	\$85.3	(\$38.1)	\$110.9	42.6%	\$53.7	(\$16.1)	\$116.7	32.2%
APS	\$63.8	(\$10.4)	\$31.9	167.3%	\$50.5	(\$14.8)	\$45.2	79.0%	\$26.8	(\$6.1)	\$51.1	40.6%
ATSI	\$35.4	(\$13.9)	\$36.8	58.3%	\$20.5	(\$19.5)	\$50.6	2.1%	\$12.5	(\$7.6)	\$55.1	9.0%
BGE	\$67.1	(\$6.7)	\$15.3	396.2%	\$61.1	(\$9.1)	\$24.8	209.2%	\$54.8	(\$3.8)	\$26.9	189.0%
COMED	\$64.2	(\$19.8)	\$65.2	68.1%	\$43.2	(\$28.5)	\$78.3	18.8%	\$27.9	(\$11.1)	\$84.6	19.9%
DAY	\$11.4	(\$3.9)	\$9.7	77.2%	\$6.4	(\$5.3)	\$11.0	9.8%	\$3.4	(\$2.1)	\$13.3	9.8%
DOM	\$67.4	(\$16.9)	\$59.2	85.2%	\$67.5	(\$37.9)	\$87.9	33.7%	\$61.6	(\$3.1)	\$107.9	54.2%
DPL	\$50.9	(\$8.7)	\$17.4	242.4%	\$32.8	(\$6.7)	\$36.2	72.0%	\$28.2	(\$1.5)	\$31.7	84.1%
DUKE	\$44.2	(\$6.0)	\$14.9	256.9%	\$28.8	(\$8.4)	\$17.4	117.5%	\$16.5	(\$18.7)	\$19.8	(10.8%)
DUQ	\$5.4	(\$3.2)	\$5.1	43.0%	\$5.8	(\$4.0)	\$6.2	28.7%	\$3.4	(\$2.3)	\$8.4	13.6%
EKPC	\$2.4	(\$2.9)	\$7.4	(7.2%)	\$3.0	(\$4.2)	\$8.4	(13.3%)	\$2.3	(\$1.5)	\$10.8	6.9%
EXT	\$2.0	(\$2.2)	(\$1.7)	10.6%	\$0.5	(\$13.8)	\$11.0	(120.7%)	\$0.4	(\$2.9)	\$10.3	(23.9%)
JCPLC	\$6.0	(\$4.6)	\$9.2	14.5%	\$6.1	(\$6.1)	\$12.9	(0.1%)	\$1.2	(\$2.7)	\$15.2	(10.0%)
MEC	\$7.7	(\$4.2)	\$8.7	40.2%	\$3.9	(\$5.3)	\$16.5	(8.4%)	\$5.1	(\$5.1)	\$14.6	(0.3%)
OVEC	NA	\$0.1	\$0.5	14.6%	NA	(\$0.3)	\$0.9	(28.8%)	NA	(\$0.1)	\$0.4	(21.0%)
PE	\$18.1	(\$3.8)	\$10.8	132.3%	\$9.3	(\$6.5)	\$16.4	16.7%	\$8.7	(\$4.2)	\$17.3	25.9%
PECO	\$24.0	(\$8.2)	\$13.4	118.3%	\$15.1	(\$10.9)	\$24.9	17.0%	\$12.2	(\$2.5)	\$30.1	32.0%
PEPCO	\$30.6	(\$6.1)	\$13.7	178.3%	\$29.1	(\$8.3)	\$20.5	101.6%	\$15.5	(\$3.5)	\$23.5	51.0%
PPL	\$37.6	(\$8.5)	\$20.5	142.2%	\$26.1	(\$11.5)	\$30.8	47.4%	\$21.4	(\$4.6)	\$34.2	49.4%
PSEG	\$46.2	(\$8.9)	\$18.4	202.5%	\$24.7	(\$13.9)	\$25.0	43.2%	\$20.2	(\$4.8)	\$29.3	52.7%
REC	\$0.6	(\$0.3)	\$0.6	46.2%	\$0.2	(\$0.6)	\$2.1	(17.0%)	\$0.2	(\$0.2)	\$2.8	(0.3%)
Total	\$761.8	(\$169.4)	\$442.7	133.8%	\$524.3	(\$256.2)	\$643.4	41.7%	\$378.0	(\$105.4)	\$710.0	38.4%

* First seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period

Offset if all ARRs are Self Scheduled

Table 13-27 shows the total congestion offset that would be available to ARR holders via allocated ARRs, by zone, if the ARR holders self scheduled all their allocated ARRs as FTRs in the 2019/2020, 2020/2021, and the first seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period. The calculated self scheduled FTR target allocations assume a 100 percent payout ratio. The results show that the recovery of congestion varies significantly by zone and that the load in some zones recovers more than the congestion paid and the load in other zones recovers less. This result is not consistent with a rational FTR/ARR design under which all load would be returned their congestion, but no more and no less.

Table 13-27 Offset available to load if all ARRs self scheduled: 2019/2020 through 2021/2022 planning periods

	19/20 Planning Period				20/21 Planning Period				21/22 Planning Period*			
	SS FTR	Bal+M2M Charges	Congestion+ M2M	Offset	SS FTR	Bal+M2M Charges	Congestion+ M2M	Offset	SS FTR	Bal+M2M Charges	Congestion+ M2M	Offset
ACEC	\$2.6	(\$2.1)	\$3.7	15.6%	\$1.8	(\$2.7)	\$5.5	(16.4%)	\$0.3	(\$1.1)	\$6.1	(12.9%)
AEP	\$62.7	(\$28.2)	\$81.9	42.1%	\$77.3	(\$38.1)	\$110.9	35.3%	\$67.3	(\$16.1)	\$116.7	43.9%
APS	\$31.2	(\$10.4)	\$31.9	65.1%	\$42.0	(\$14.8)	\$45.2	60.3%	\$39.5	(\$6.1)	\$51.1	65.4%
ATSI	\$27.9	(\$13.9)	\$36.8	38.1%	\$30.7	(\$19.5)	\$50.6	22.1%	\$34.4	(\$7.6)	\$55.1	48.8%
BGE	\$53.7	(\$6.7)	\$15.3	308.0%	\$79.7	(\$9.1)	\$24.8	284.2%	\$80.3	(\$3.8)	\$26.9	283.8%
COMED	\$40.6	(\$19.8)	\$65.2	31.9%	\$69.6	(\$28.5)	\$78.3	52.4%	\$40.4	(\$11.1)	\$84.6	34.6%
DAY	\$5.6	(\$3.9)	\$9.7	17.4%	\$8.0	(\$5.3)	\$11.0	24.9%	\$5.4	(\$2.1)	\$13.3	25.2%
DOM	\$32.8	(\$16.9)	\$59.2	26.9%	\$117.0	(\$37.9)	\$87.9	90.0%	\$121.9	(\$3.1)	\$107.9	110.1%
DPL	\$27.3	(\$8.7)	\$17.4	107.3%	\$56.4	(\$6.7)	\$36.2	137.4%	\$44.1	(\$1.5)	\$31.7	134.5%
DUKE	\$30.5	(\$6.0)	\$14.9	164.2%	\$40.9	(\$8.4)	\$17.4	187.2%	\$31.8	(\$18.7)	\$19.8	66.1%
DUQ	\$8.1	(\$3.2)	\$5.1	95.2%	\$8.9	(\$4.0)	\$6.2	79.7%	\$6.8	(\$2.3)	\$8.4	54.0%
EKPC	\$4.1	(\$2.9)	\$7.4	16.8%	\$6.6	(\$4.2)	\$8.4	29.3%	\$5.8	(\$1.5)	\$10.8	39.4%
EXT	\$0.9	(\$2.2)	(\$1.7)	74.3%	\$0.3	(\$13.8)	\$11.0	(122.3%)	\$0.7	(\$2.9)	\$10.3	(21.2%)
JCPLC	\$2.3	(\$4.6)	\$9.2	(25.5%)	\$0.9	(\$6.1)	\$12.9	(40.2%)	\$2.8	(\$2.7)	\$15.2	0.4%
MEC	\$0.8	(\$4.2)	\$8.7	(38.5%)	\$8.0	(\$5.3)	\$16.5	16.5%	\$18.1	(\$5.1)	\$14.6	89.0%
OVEC	NA	\$0.1	\$0.5	NA	NA	(\$0.3)	\$0.9	NA	NA	(\$0.1)	\$0.4	(21.0%)
PE	\$11.2	(\$3.8)	\$10.8	69.1%	\$13.5	(\$6.5)	\$16.4	42.8%	\$13.3	(\$4.2)	\$17.3	52.9%
PECO	\$16.8	(\$8.2)	\$13.4	63.8%	\$14.0	(\$10.9)	\$24.9	12.4%	\$16.0	(\$2.5)	\$30.1	44.7%
PEPCO	\$23.2	(\$6.1)	\$13.7	124.3%	\$37.3	(\$8.3)	\$20.5	141.7%	\$30.7	(\$3.5)	\$23.5	116.1%
PPL	\$39.2	(\$8.5)	\$20.5	149.9%	\$43.7	(\$11.5)	\$30.8	104.5%	\$80.9	(\$4.6)	\$34.2	223.6%
PSEG	\$21.3	(\$8.9)	\$18.4	67.2%	\$43.2	(\$13.9)	\$25.0	117.0%	\$34.2	(\$4.8)	\$29.3	100.3%
REC	\$0.2	(\$0.3)	\$0.6	(22.6%)	\$1.0	(\$0.6)	\$2.1	21.0%	\$0.6	(\$0.2)	\$2.8	16.0%
Total	\$443.0	(\$169.4)	\$442.7	61.8%	\$700.9	(\$256.2)	\$643.4	69.1%	\$675.3	(\$105.4)	\$710.0	80.3%

* First seven months of the 2021/2022 planning period

ARR Allocation and Congestion In and Out of Zone

Table 13-28 shows the share of ARR MW for the 2021/2022 planning period with paths that source inside and outside the zone where the ARR load is located, and the proportion of congestion that results from constraints that are inside and outside the zone. Table 13-28 allows a comparison of externally sourced ARRs with the congestion that results from external constraints. For example, 93.5 percent of ACEC congestion results from constraints that are outside of the zone, but only 27.8 percent of ACEC ARRs originate outside the zone.

Table 13-28 illustrates one of the fundamental issues with the path based approach to ARR/FTR design. In the PJM market, which operates as an integrated network, a significant proportion of congestion results from constraints that are not in the same zone as load, but the assignment of ARRs is inconsistent with that fact. This inconsistency makes it impossible for load to match ARRs with the actual sources of congestion.

Table 13-28 ARR Allocation and Congestion from inside and outside zone: 2021/2022

	ARRs		Congestion	
	Out of Zone	In Zone	Out of Zone	In Zone
ACEC	27.8%	72.2%	93.5%	6.5%
AEP	10.4%	89.6%	78.5%	21.5%
APS	10.5%	89.5%	96.7%	3.3%
ATSI	21.2%	78.8%	98.0%	2.0%
BGE	44.8%	55.2%	83.9%	16.1%
COMED	0.0%	100.0%	79.9%	20.1%
DAY	72.2%	27.8%	96.1%	3.9%
DOM	0.4%	99.6%	73.3%	26.7%
DPL	31.7%	68.3%	34.2%	65.8%
DUKE	29.6%	70.4%	91.2%	8.8%
DUQ	82.6%	17.4%	97.9%	2.1%
EKPC	49.5%	50.5%	99.9%	0.1%
EXT	100.0%	0.0%	92.3%	7.7%
JCPL	18.9%	81.1%	100.0%	0.0%
OVEC	NA	NA	49.7%	50.3%
MEC	30.3%	69.7%	94.7%	5.3%
PE	16.9%	83.1%	85.1%	14.9%
PECO	10.3%	89.7%	75.7%	24.3%
PEPCO	22.3%	77.7%	96.7%	3.3%
PPL	1.3%	98.7%	70.6%	29.4%
PSEG	34.8%	65.2%	99.5%	0.5%
REC	100.0%	0.0%	33.9%	66.1%
Average	34.1%	65.9%	82.8%	17.2%

Credit

There were 10 collateral defaults in 2021. There were 10 payment defaults not involving GreenHat Energy, LLC for a total of \$2.3 million. GreenHat Energy's default payments ended with the 2020/2021 planning period for a total of \$179.5 million. Of the 20 defaults, 15 were promptly cured, and the remainder are awaiting resolution.

On December 21, 2021, PJM submitted a change to the credit rules to FERC.⁴⁵ Under the proposed rules PJM would replace the current credit calculation, which is largely based on a weighted average historical FTR value, with an initial margin based on a risk confidence interval from an historical simulation analysis model. PJM's proposal included the use of a 97 percent confidence interval, which indicates a 97 percent probability that the initial margin collected would cover potential default costs. The MMU recommends the use of a 99 percent confidence interval when calculating the initial margin requirements for FTR market participants, in order to assign the cost of managing risk to the FTR holders who benefit or lose from their FTR positions.

Default Portfolio Considerations

Under the method applied to the GreenHat default, when an FTR participant defaults on their positions, their portfolio remains in the FTR market and will continue to accrue revenues and/or charges and must be reconciled. Under this method, PJM leaves the participant's positions unchanged, lets the positions settle at day-ahead prices, and charges any net losses to the default allocation assessment. This method exposes all members in PJM to an uncertain charge for the default allocation assessment that will not be known until those FTRs settle.

The MMU recommends a method under which defaulted FTRs would be canceled rather than holding or liquidating them. Canceling the FTRs would release the FTRs to the FTR market. The market would then decide the value of the capacity released and the timing of its release. There would be no discretion necessary to settle the defaulted position and the losses would be contained within the ARR/FTR market.

⁴⁵ See "Revisions to PJM's FTR Credit Requirement and Request for 28-Day Comment Period," Docket No. ER22-000 (December 21, 2021).

Cancellation of a defaulting portfolio does not change congestion. But cancellation of a defaulting portfolio can affect ARR/FTR funding as a result of changes in auction revenue, changes in the net target allocations, and potential simultaneous feasibility violations, while any collateral collected from the defaulted participant is available to offset losses from the cancelled FTRs. However, PJM can and does address similar issues routinely. PJM has tools available, such as the counter flow buyback and Stage 1A over allocation rules, and uses them regularly in the Annual FTR Auction, to improve funding as well as address feasibility concerns. Cancellation of FTRs would isolate the costs of the default to those participating in and benefitting from the FTR market.

FTR Forfeitures

By order issued January 19, 2017, the Commission determined that the FTR forfeiture rule is just and reasonable and “...serves to deter such manipulation” related to virtual transaction crossproduct manipulation.⁴⁶ The Commission identified four main tenets with which the Forfeiture Rule must comply, including that it: deter manipulation, provide transparency allowing participants to modify their behavior, base forfeitures on an individual participant’s actions and is not punitive.⁴⁷

The point of the FTR forfeiture rule is to avoid an inefficient and costly market power mitigation process and to establish an objective rule that prevents manipulation of the FTR market. The FTR forfeiture rule is designed to remove the incentive to engage in manipulation. The rule does not result in findings of manipulation.⁴⁸

The FTR forfeiture rule considers the impact of a participant’s net virtual transaction portfolio on all constraints.⁴⁹ If a participant’s net virtual portfolio impacts a constraint by the greater of 0.1 MW or 10 percent or more of the constraint line limit, and that constraint affects an individual FTR’s target allocation by \$0.01 or more, the participant’s net virtual portfolio increased the value of the FTR, and the FTR is subject

to FTR forfeiture. The FTR forfeiture also requires that congestion on the FTR path in the day ahead market be greater than congestion on that path in the real time market.

The FTR forfeiture rule does not require FTR holders to pay penalties. The FTR forfeiture rule does not affect the profits or losses of virtual activity. The FTR forfeiture rule, if triggered by a participant’s virtual portfolio, results in forfeiting only FTR profits and only in the specific hours for which the rule is violated. The profit is calculated as the hourly FTR target allocation minus the FTR’s hourly cost. Even when FTR profits are forfeited, the value that the buyer assigned to congestion in the FTR auction (the price paid) is not affected. For example, if a buyer paid \$5.00/MWh for congestion and congestion was \$5.00/MWh, the forfeiture would be zero. If congestion were \$7.00/MWh, the forfeiture would be \$2.00/MWh. Market participants understand the relationship between FTR and virtual positions in detail and can avoid violating the FTR forfeiture rule if they choose to do so.

The FTR forfeiture rule is less effective than initially intended as a result of the element of the rule requiring that day ahead congestion on the FTR path be greater than real time congestion the same path. As a result of model differences, there is a significant opportunity for virtual participants to profit from differences between day ahead and real time prices without driving the prices together, termed false arbitrage. As a result, FTR holders can use virtual positions to make their FTR positions more valuable without violating the rule.

The FTR forfeiture rule has not reduced participation in the PJM FTR market or participation in virtual activity. There has been an increase in the number of participants in the FTR market since the implementation of the new FTR forfeiture rule, and a decrease in the number of participants with forfeitures.

On June 24, 2019, PJM implemented a new method to calculate the hourly cost of an FTR only for hours in which it is effective.⁵⁰ Beginning with the September 2019 bill, PJM began billing using the correct hourly cost calculation. For the 2020/2021 planning period, total FTR forfeitures were \$4.6 million.

⁴⁶ See 158 FERC ¶ 61,038 at P 33 (2017).

⁴⁷ See *id.* at P 62.

⁴⁸ See “Protest and Motion for Rejection of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM,” Docket No. EL20-41 (June 1, 2020).

⁴⁹ A modified FTR forfeiture rule was implemented effective January 19, 2017. See 2019 *State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Section 13: Financial Transmission Rights for the full history.


⁵⁰ See “Minor modification to Tariff Language for FTR Forfeiture Rule,” Docket No. ER19-2240 (June 24, 2019).

On May 20, 2021, FERC issued an order ruling the \$0.01 definition of an increase in the value of an FTR unjust and unreasonable, but upheld the other parts of PJM's forfeiture rule.⁵¹ In this order, FERC required PJM to modify the FTR forfeiture rule and submit a compliance filing. As a result, there was no FTR forfeiture rule in place from May 20, 2021 through the end of 2021.

On June 21, 2021, PJM filed a request for clarification, or alternatively rehearing.⁵² PJM asked that FERC clarify the status of the forfeitures that were assessed over the four years between the initial FERC order for a compliance filing, and their order rejecting PJM's compliance filing. On July 19, 2021, PJM made a compliance filing to address FERC's concerns with the \$.01 element of the FTR forfeiture rule.⁵³ PJM's compliance filing eliminated that element and replaced it with a constraint based FTR forfeiture. The forfeiture is based on the increased value of each constraint that violates the rule, determined by the shadow price multiplied by the net dfax on that constraint. This change meets FERC's previously established criteria established under the initial FERC order and creates a more precise FTR forfeiture value, to meet the criteria established under the new FERC order.

Figure 13-12 shows the monthly FTR forfeitures under the modified FTR forfeiture rule from January 19, 2017, through December 31, 2021. As required by the FERC order, PJM began retroactively billing FTR forfeitures with the September 2017 bill. In the period from January 2017 through September 2017, participants did not have good information about the level of their FTR forfeitures, so they could not accurately modify their bidding behavior to avoid FTR forfeitures. After September 2017, FTR forfeitures decreased significantly, and stabilized, as participants received information on their FTR forfeitures.

Figure 13-12 Monthly FTR forfeitures for physical and financial participants



⁵¹ See 175 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021).

⁵² See "Request for Clarification or, in the Alternative, Rehearing of PJM Interconnection, LLC," FERC Docket No. ER17-1433-00 (June 21, 2021).

⁵³ See "FTR Forfeiture Rule Compliance Filing," FERC Docket No. ER17-1433 (July 19, 2021).