

Interchange Transactions

PJM market participants import energy from, and export energy to, external regions continuously. The transactions involved may fulfill long-term or short-term bilateral contracts or respond to price differentials. The external regions include both market and non-market balancing authorities.

Overview

Interchange Transaction Activity

- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** During the first six months of 2015, PJM was a net importer of energy in the Real-Time Energy Market in all months.¹ In the first six months of 2015, the real-time net interchange of 10,817.3 GWh was higher than net interchange of 489.5 GWh in the first six months of 2014.
- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** During the first six months of 2015, PJM was a net exporter of energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in February, and a net importer in the remaining months. In the first six months of 2015, the total day-ahead net interchange of 2,864.9 GWh was higher than net interchange of -8,952.7 GWh in the first six months of 2014. The large difference in the day-ahead net interchange totals was a result of the reduction in up-to congestion transaction volumes.²
- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead and the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2015, gross imports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market were 78.2 percent of gross imports in the Real-Time Energy Market (123.6 percent in the first six months of 2014). In the first six months of 2015, gross exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market were 110.0 percent of the gross exports in the Real-Time Energy Market (162.8 percent in the first six months of 2014).

- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the Real-Time Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at nine of PJM's 20 interfaces.
- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the Real-Time Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at 10 of PJM's 18 interface pricing points eligible for real-time transactions.³
- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at nine of PJM's 20 interfaces.
- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at 10 of PJM's 19 interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions.
- **Up-to Congestion Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the Day-Ahead Market, in the first six months of 2015, up-to congestion transactions were net exports at four of PJM's 19 interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions.
- **Loop Flows.** In the first six months of 2015, net scheduled interchange was 10,817 GWh and net actual interchange was 10,424 GWh, a difference of 393 GWh. In the first six months of 2014, net scheduled interchange was 489 GWh and net actual interchange was 586 GWh, a difference of 96 GWh. This difference is inadvertent interchange.

Interactions with Bordering Areas

PJM Interface Pricing with Organized Markets

- **PJM and MISO Interface Prices.** In the first six months of 2015, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface in 55.5 percent of the hours.

¹ Calculated values shown in Section 9, "Interchange Transactions," are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

² On August 29, 2014, FERC issued an Order which created an obligation for UTCs to pay any uplift determined to be appropriate in the Commission review, effective September 8, 2014.

³ There is one interface pricing point eligible for day-ahead transaction scheduling only (NIPSCO).

- **PJM and New York ISO Interface Prices.** In the first six months of 2015, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/NYIS Interface and the NYISO/PJM proxy bus in 56.6 percent of the hours.
- **Neptune Underwater Transmission Line to Long Island, New York.** In the first six months of 2015, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Neptune Interface and the NYISO Neptune Bus in 56.0 percent of the hours.
- **Linden Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT) Facility.** In the first six months of 2015, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Linden Interface and the NYISO Linden Bus in 50.3 percent of the hours.
- **Hudson DC Line.** In the first six months of 2015, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Hudson Interface and the NYISO Hudson Bus in 39.1 percent of the hours.

Interchange Transaction Issues

- **PJM Transmission Loading Relief Procedures (TLRs).** PJM issued 20 TLRs of level 3a or higher in the first six months of 2015, compared to three such TLRs issued in the first six months of 2014.
- **Up-To Congestion.** On August 29, 2014, FERC issued an Order which created an obligation for UTCs to pay any uplift determined to be appropriate in the Commission review, effective September 8, 2014.⁴
The average number of up-to congestion bids decreased by 67.8 percent and the average cleared volume of up-to congestion bids decreased by 74.0 percent in the first six months of 2015, compared to the first six months in 2014 (Figure 9-13).

⁴ 148 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2014), Order Instituting Section 206 Proceeding and Establishing Procedures.

- **45 Minute Schedule Duration Rule.** Effective May 19, 2014, PJM removed the 45 minute scheduling duration rule in response to Order No. 764.^{5,6} PJM and the MMU issued a statement indicating ongoing concern about market participants' scheduling behavior, and a commitment to address any scheduling behavior that raises operational or market manipulation concerns.⁷

Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the MISO interface pricing point. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM monitor, and adjust as necessary, the weights applied to the components of the interfaces to ensure that the interface prices reflect ongoing changes in system conditions and that loop flows are accounted for on a dynamic basis. The MMU also recommends that PJM review the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual interface pricing points to reflect changes to the impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines as a result of system topology changes. The MMU recommends that this review occur at least annually. (Priority: Low. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1200 on the day prior, to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes. These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be utilized to meet load in the most economic manner. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that remove the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams.

⁵ *Integration of Variable Energy Resources*, Order No. 764, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246 (2012), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 764-A, 141 FERC ¶ 61231 (2012).

⁶ See Letter Order, Docket No. ER14-381-000 (June 30, 2014).

⁷ See joint statement of PJM and the MMU re Interchange Scheduling issued July 29, 2014, which can be accessed at: <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/reports/20140729-pjm-imm-joint-statement-on-interchange-scheduling.ashx>>.

Such a solution would include an optimized joint dispatch approach that treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to any other constraint within an LMP market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports as well as unlimited non-firm point-to-point willing to pay congestion imports and exports at all PJM interfaces in order to improve the efficiency of the market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule and receive higher prices (for imports) or lower prices (for exports) from PJM resulting from the inability to identify the true source or sink of the transaction. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the validation method also require market participants to submit transactions on market paths that reflect the expected actual power flow in order to reduce unscheduled loop flows. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU's proposed validation rules would address sham scheduling. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Stakeholder process.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the NIPSCO and Southeast interface pricing points from the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets and, with VACAR, assign the transactions created under the reserve sharing agreement to the SouthIMP/EXP pricing point. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM immediately provide the required 12-month notice to Duke Energy Progress (DEP) to unilaterally terminate the Joint Operating Agreement. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM and MISO work together to align interface pricing definitions, using the same number of external buses and selecting buses in close proximity on either side of the border with comparable bus weights. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Adopted partially, Q4 2013.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement additional business rules to remove the incentive to engage in sham scheduling activities using the PJM/IMO interface price. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted. Stakeholder process.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM file revisions to the marginal loss surplus allocation method to fully comply with the February 24, 2009, Order. The MMU recommends that marginal loss surplus allocations be capped such that the marginal loss surplus credits cannot exceed the contributions made to the fixed costs of the transmission system for any reason. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

Conclusion

Transactions between PJM and multiple balancing authorities in the Eastern Interconnection are part of a single energy market. While some of these balancing authorities are termed market areas and some are termed non-market areas, all electricity transactions are part of a single energy market. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between market and non-market areas. Market areas, like PJM, include essential features such as locational marginal pricing, financial congestion offsets (FTRs and ARRs in PJM) and transparent, least cost, security constrained economic dispatch for all available generation. Non-market areas do not include these features. The market areas are extremely transparent and the non-market areas are not transparent.

The MMU's recommendations related to transactions with external balancing authorities all share the goal of improving the economic efficiency of interchange transactions. The standard of comparison is an LMP market. In an LMP market, redispatch based on LMP and generator offers results in an efficient dispatch and efficient prices.

Interchange Transaction Activity

Aggregate Imports and Exports

In the first six months of 2015, PJM was a monthly net importer of energy in the Real-Time Energy Market in all months (Figure 9-1).⁸ In the first six months of 2015, the total real-time net interchange of 10,817.3 GWh was higher than the net interchange of 489.5 GWh in the first six months of 2014. In the first six months of 2015, the peak month for net importing interchange was April, 2,293.9 GWh; in the first six months of 2014 it was January, 1,556.0 GWh. Gross monthly export volumes in the first six months of 2015 averaged 2,923.4 GWh compared to 4,066.2 GWh in the first six months of 2014, while gross monthly imports in the first six months of 2015 averaged 4,726.3 GWh compared to 4,147.8 GWh in the first six months of 2014.

In the first six months of 2015, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in February, and a net importer in the remaining months (Figure 9-1). In the first six months of 2015, the total day-ahead net interchange of 2,864.9 GWh was higher than the net interchange of -8,952.7 GWh in the first six months of 2014. The large difference in the day-ahead net interchange totals was a result of the reduction in up-to congestion transaction volumes.⁹ In the first six months of 2015, the peak month for net exporting interchange was February, -122.7 GWh; in the first six months of 2014 it was April, -1,992.1 GWh. Gross monthly export volumes in the first six months of 2015 averaged 3,216.2 GWh compared to 6,619.5 GWh in the first six months of 2014, while gross monthly imports in the first six months of 2015 averaged 3,693.7 GWh compared to 5,127.3 GWh in the first six months of 2014.

Figure 9-1 shows the impact of net import and export up-to congestion transactions on the overall net day-ahead energy market interchange. The import, export and net interchange volumes include fixed, dispatchable and up-to congestion transaction totals. The up-to congestion net volume (as represented by the line on the chart) shows the net up-to congestion transaction

⁸ Calculated values shown in Section 9, "Interchange Transactions," are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

⁹ On August 29, 2014, FERC issued an Order which created an obligation for UTCs to pay any uplift determined to be appropriate in the Commission review, effective September 8, 2014.

volume. The net interchange volume under the line in Figure 9-1 represents the net interchange for fixed and dispatchable day-ahead transactions only.

In the first six months of 2015, gross imports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market were 78.2 percent of gross imports in the Real-Time Energy Market (123.6 percent in the first six months of 2014). In the first six months of 2015, gross exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market were 110.0 percent of gross exports in the Real-Time Energy Market (162.8 percent in the first six months of 2014). In the first six months of 2015, net interchange was 2,864.9 GWh in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and 10,817.3 GWh in the Real-Time Energy Market compared to -8,952.7 GWh in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and 489.5 GWh in the Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2014.

Transactions in the Day-Ahead Energy Market create financial obligations to deliver in the Real-Time Energy Market and to pay operating reserve charges based on differences between the transaction MW and price differences in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.¹⁰ In the first six months of 2015, the total day-ahead imports and exports were lower than the real-time imports and exports, the day-ahead imports net of up-to congestion transactions were less than the real-time imports, and the day-ahead exports net of up-to congestion transactions were less than real-time exports.

¹⁰ Up-to congestion transactions create financial obligations to deliver in real time, but do not pay operating reserve charges.

Figure 9-1 PJM real-time and day-ahead scheduled imports and exports: January through June 2015





Figure 9-2 shows the real-time and day-ahead import and export volume for PJM from 1999 through June, 2015. PJM became a consistent net exporter of energy in 2004 in both the Real-Time and Day-Ahead Energy Markets, coincident with the expansion of the PJM footprint that included the integrations of Commonwealth Edison, American Electric Power and Dayton Power and Light into PJM. In January 2012, the direction of real-time power flows began to fluctuate between net imports and exports. The net direction of power flows is generally a function of price differences net of transactions costs. Since the modification of the up-to congestion product in September 2010, up-to congestion transactions have played a significant role in power flows between PJM and external balancing authorities in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. On November 1, 2012, PJM eliminated the requirement that market participants specify an interface pricing point as either the source or sink of an up-to congestion transaction. As a result, the volume of import and

export up-to congestion transactions decreased, and the volume of internal up-to congestion transactions increased. While the gross import and export volumes in the Day-Ahead Energy Market have decreased, the net direction of power flows has remained predominantly in the export direction.

Figure 9-2 PJM real-time and day-ahead scheduled import and export transaction volume history: January 1999 through June 2015



Real-Time Interface Imports and Exports

In the Real-Time Energy Market, scheduled imports and exports are defined by the scheduled market path, which is the transmission path a market participant selects from the original source to the final sink. These scheduled flows are measured at each of PJM’s interfaces with neighboring balancing authorities. Table 9-16 includes a list of active interfaces in the first six months of 2015. Figure 9-3 shows the approximate geographic location of the interfaces. In the first six months of 2015, PJM had 20 interfaces with neighboring balancing

authorities. While the Linden (LIND) Interface, the Hudson (HUDS) Interface and the Neptune (NEPT) Interface are separate from the NYIS Interface, all four are interfaces between PJM and the NYISO. Similarly, there are ten separate interfaces that make up the MISO Interface between PJM and MISO. Table 9-1 through Table 9-3 show the Real-Time Energy Market interchange totals at the individual NYISO interfaces, as well as with the NYISO as a whole. Similarly, the interchange totals at the individual interfaces between PJM and MISO are shown, as well as with MISO as a whole. Net interchange in the Real-Time Energy Market is shown by interface for the first six months of 2015 in Table 9-1, while gross imports and exports are shown in Table 9-2 and Table 9-3.

In the Real-Time Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at nine of PJM's 20 interfaces. The top three net exporting interfaces in the Real-Time Energy Market accounted for 74.7 percent of the total net exports: PJM/MidAmerican Energy Company (MEC) with 31.7 percent, PJM/Neptune (NEPT) with 21.9 percent and PJM/New York Independent System Operator (NYIS) with 21.1 percent of the net export volume. The four separate interfaces that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPT, PJM/HUDS and PJM/Linden (LIND)) together represented 50.6 percent of the total net PJM exports in the Real-Time Energy Market. In the first six months of 2015, four of the ten separate interfaces that connect PJM to MISO were net exporters in the Real-Time Energy Market. Those four interfaces represented 47.9 percent of the total net PJM exports in the Real-Time Energy Market. Ten PJM interfaces had net scheduled imports, with three importing interfaces accounting for 57.5 percent of the total net imports: PJM/Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) with 22.4 percent, PJM/Ameren-Illinois (AMIL) with 18.6 percent and PJM/Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) with 16.6 percent of the net import volume.¹¹

Eleven shareholders own the generation located in the OVEC footprint and share OVEC's generation output. Approximately 80 percent of OVEC is owned by load serving entities or their affiliates located in the PJM footprint. The Inter-Company Power Agreement (ICPA), signed by OVEC's shareholders,

requires delivery of approximately 80 percent of the generation output into the PJM footprint.¹²

Table 9-1 Real-time scheduled net interchange volume by interface (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
CPLP	(19.8)	(27.2)	(34.2)	(18.3)	(0.4)	(28.4)	(128.3)
CPLW	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
DUK	423.3	377.0	443.5	528.0	367.9	110.9	2,250.6
LGEE	233.4	277.9	225.6	157.0	221.2	196.1	1,311.2
MISO	521.9	1,287.7	1,369.8	630.1	150.9	195.4	4,155.9
ALTE	(346.8)	(76.5)	279.7	(230.8)	(111.0)	(351.6)	(837.0)
ALTW	2.6	(0.1)	(0.7)	(2.9)	(38.3)	(0.8)	(40.1)
AMIL	778.3	863.7	394.9	518.6	445.9	577.6	3,579.0
CIN	281.9	355.4	336.2	399.5	71.6	25.7	1,470.4
CWLP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IPL	145.7	294.5	292.0	166.9	119.5	86.2	1,104.8
MEC	(483.8)	(422.6)	(348.3)	(465.5)	(500.2)	(460.5)	(2,680.9)
MECS	260.2	347.2	412.9	292.5	263.0	357.3	1,933.0
NIPS	1.4	18.9	31.1	23.9	34.9	3.3	113.6
WEC	(117.7)	(92.9)	(27.9)	(72.1)	(134.4)	(41.8)	(486.9)
NYISO	(1,571.6)	(1,341.2)	(1,109.3)	(129.3)	75.1	(198.7)	(4,275.2)
HUDS	(117.6)	(82.7)	(49.0)	(0.1)	(5.2)	(5.4)	(260.1)
LIND	(218.7)	(130.3)	(156.3)	7.4	76.9	38.0	(383.1)
NEPT	(326.4)	(318.6)	(437.9)	(289.5)	(167.5)	(309.1)	(1,849.0)
NYIS	(908.9)	(809.6)	(466.2)	152.9	170.9	77.8	(1,783.1)
OVEC	875.5	765.9	828.2	635.4	560.3	641.1	4,306.4
TVA	750.1	766.4	473.6	491.1	453.5	262.0	3,196.6
Total	1,212.7	2,106.6	2,197.2	2,293.9	1,828.4	1,178.6	10,817.3

¹¹ In the Real-Time Energy Market, one PJM interface had a net interchange of zero (PJM/City Water Light & Power (CWLP)).

¹² See "Ohio Valley Electric Corporation: Company Background," <<http://www.ovec.com/OVECHistory.pdf>>.

**Table 9-2 Real-time scheduled gross import volume by interface (GWh):
January through June 2015**

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
CPL	7.6	7.8	6.6	6.4	12.2	2.8	43.4
CPLW	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
DUK	586.1	510.0	485.3	563.1	460.9	271.0	2,876.4
LGEE	233.8	277.9	225.6	157.4	221.2	196.9	1,312.8
MISO	1,720.3	1,966.0	1,935.1	1,575.0	1,617.8	1,361.4	10,175.6
ALTE	3.1	16.9	379.5	6.8	326.1	1.6	734.0
ALTW	2.8	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	4.5
AMIL	794.4	866.7	405.6	526.3	451.5	587.4	3,631.9
CIN	360.4	369.6	378.8	461.8	175.3	159.1	1,905.0
CWLP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IPL	220.2	337.6	311.0	237.7	241.9	129.7	1,478.2
MEC	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	1.3
MECS	337.2	355.4	421.1	318.4	386.8	479.0	2,298.0
NIPS	1.4	18.9	31.1	23.9	35.8	3.3	114.4
WEC	0.0	0.4	7.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3
NYISO	959.9	1,196.4	1,020.1	1,013.1	1,000.7	992.1	6,182.4
HUDD	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
LIND	2.2	28.4	1.8	41.3	84.8	55.0	213.6
NEPT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2
NYIS	957.7	1,168.0	1,018.3	971.7	915.8	937.0	5,968.5
OVEC	901.8	790.7	849.6	651.8	576.6	655.7	4,426.2
TVA	769.8	794.5	486.4	496.7	476.7	316.7	3,340.8
Total	5,179.2	5,543.3	5,008.7	4,463.6	4,366.2	3,796.9	28,357.8

**Table 9-3 Real-time scheduled gross export volume by interface (GWh):
January through June 2015**

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
CPL	27.4	35.0	40.8	24.7	12.7	31.2	171.7
CPLW	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUK	162.8	132.9	41.8	35.1	93.0	160.1	625.8
LGEE	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.8	1.6
MISO	1,198.4	678.3	565.2	944.9	1,466.9	1,166.1	6,019.8
ALTE	350.0	93.4	99.8	237.6	437.1	353.2	1,571.1
ALTW	0.2	0.4	0.7	2.9	38.3	2.0	44.5
AMIL	16.1	3.0	10.7	7.7	5.6	9.8	53.0
CIN	78.5	14.1	42.7	62.3	103.7	133.3	434.6
CWLP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IPL	74.5	43.1	19.0	70.8	122.5	43.5	373.4
MEC	484.6	422.6	348.3	465.5	500.6	460.6	2,682.2
MECS	76.9	8.2	8.3	25.9	123.9	121.7	364.9
NIPS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.9
WEC	117.7	93.3	35.8	72.1	134.4	41.8	495.1
NYISO	2,531.5	2,537.7	2,129.5	1,142.4	925.6	1,190.9	10,457.6
HUDD	117.6	82.7	49.0	0.1	5.2	5.5	260.1
LIND	220.9	158.8	158.1	33.9	7.9	17.0	596.6
NEPT	326.4	318.6	437.9	289.5	167.6	309.1	1,849.2
NYIS	1,866.6	1,977.5	1,484.5	818.9	744.9	859.2	7,751.7
OVEC	26.3	24.7	21.4	16.5	16.4	14.6	119.8
TVA	19.7	28.1	12.8	5.7	23.2	54.7	144.2
Total	3,966.5	3,436.7	2,811.6	2,169.7	2,537.8	2,618.3	17,540.5

Real-Time Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports

Interfaces differ from interface pricing points. An interface is a point of interconnection between PJM and a neighboring balancing authority which market participants may designate as a market path on which scheduled imports or exports will flow.¹³ An interface pricing point defines the price at which transactions are priced, and is based on the path of the actual, physical transfer of energy. While a market participant designates a scheduled market path from a generation control area (GCA) to a load control area (LCA), this market path reflects the scheduled path as defined by the transmission reservations only, and may not reflect how the energy actually flows from the

¹³ A market path is the scheduled path rather than the actual path on which power flows. A market path contains the generation balancing authority, all required transmission segments and the load balancing authority. There are multiple market paths between any generation and load balancing authority. Market participants select the market path based on transmission service availability, the transmission costs for moving energy from generation to load and interface prices.

GCA to LCA. For example, the import transmission path from LG&E Energy, L.L.C. (LGEE), through MISO and into PJM would show the transfer of power into PJM at the PJM/MISO Interface based on the scheduled market path of the transaction. However, the physical flow of energy does not enter the PJM footprint at the PJM/MISO Interface, but enters PJM at the southern boundary. For this reason, PJM prices an import with the GCA of LGEE at the SouthIMP interface pricing point rather than the MISO pricing point.

Interfaces differ from interface pricing points. The challenge is to create interface prices, composed of external pricing points, which accurately represent flows between PJM and external sources of energy. The result is price signals that embody the underlying economic fundamentals across balancing authority borders.¹⁴

Transactions can be scheduled to an interface based on a contract transmission path, but pricing points are developed and applied based on the estimated electrical impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines, regardless of contract transmission path.¹⁵ PJM establishes prices for transactions with external balancing authorities by assigning interface pricing points to individual balancing authorities based on the generation control area and load control area as specified on the NERC Tag. According to the *PJM Interface Price Definition Methodology*, dynamic interface pricing calculations use actual system conditions to determine a set of weighting factors for each external pricing point in an interface price definition.¹⁶ The weighting factors are determined in such a manner that the interface reflects actual system conditions. However, this analysis is an approximation given the complexity of the transmission network outside PJM and the dynamic nature of power flows. Transactions between PJM and external balancing authorities need to be priced at the PJM border. Table 9-17 presents the interface pricing points used in the first six months of 2015. On September 16, 2014, PJM updated the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual pricing points. The MMU recommends that PJM review these mappings, at least annually, to

¹⁴ See the *2007 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Appendix D, "Interchange Transactions," for a more complete discussion of the development of pricing points.

¹⁵ See "Interface Pricing Point Assignment Methodology," (August 28, 2014) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/exschedule/interface-pricing-point-assignment-methodology.ashx>>. PJM periodically updates these definitions on its website.

¹⁶ See "PJM Interface Pricing Definition Methodology," (September 29, 2006) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/markets-ops/energy/lmp-model-info/20060929-interface-definition-methodology1.ashx>>.

reflect the fact that changes to the system topology can affect the impact of external power sources on PJM tie lines.

The interface pricing method implies that the weighting factors reflect the actual system flows in a dynamic manner. In fact, the weightings are static, and are modified by PJM only occasionally.¹⁷ The MMU recommends that PJM monitor, and adjust as necessary, the weights applied to the components of the interfaces to ensure that the interface prices reflect ongoing changes in system conditions and that loop flows are accounted for on a dynamic basis.

While the OASIS has a path component, this path only reflects the path of energy into or out of PJM to one neighboring balancing authority. The NERC Tag requires the complete path to be specified from the generation control area (GCA) to the load control area (LCA), but participants do not always do so. This path is utilized by PJM to determine the interface pricing point that PJM will associate with the transaction. This approach will correctly identify the interface pricing point only if the market participant provides the complete path in the Tag. This approach will not correctly identify the interface pricing point if the market participant breaks the transaction into portions, each with a separate Tag. The result of such behavior can be incorrect pricing of transactions and the breaking of transactions into portions can be a way to manipulate markets.

There are several pricing points mapped to the region south of PJM. The SouthIMP and SouthEXP pricing points serve as the default pricing point for transactions at the southern border of PJM. The CPLEEXP, CPLEIMP, DUKEXP, DUKIMP, NCMPAEXP and NCMPAIMP were also established to account for various special agreements with neighboring balancing areas, and PJM continued to use the Southwest pricing point for certain grandfathered transactions.¹⁸

In the Real-Time Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at 10 of PJM's 18 interface pricing points eligible for

¹⁷ On June 1, 2015, PJM began using a dynamic weighting factor in the calculation for the Ontario Interface Pricing Point. For additional information, see "Elimination of Ontario Interface Pricing Point."

¹⁸ The MMU does not believe that it is appropriate to allow the use of the Southwest pricing point for the grandfathered transactions, and suggests that no further such agreements be entered into.

real-time transactions.¹⁹ The top three net exporting interface pricing points in the Real-Time Energy Market accounted for 84.0 percent of the total net exports: PJM/MISO with 48.7 percent, PJM/NEPTUNE with 18.4 percent and PJM/NYIS with 16.9 percent and of the net export volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) together represented 41.8 percent of the total net PJM exports in the Real-Time Energy Market. Six PJM interface pricing points had net imports, with two importing interface pricing points accounting for 76.2 percent of the total net imports: PJM/SouthIMP with 55.5 percent and PJM/Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) with 20.6 percent of the net import volume.²⁰

Table 9-4 Real-time scheduled net interchange volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	666.5	687.6	890.4	713.1	654.4	427.7	4,039.6
MISO	(1,028.3)	(396.8)	(312.1)	(801.1)	(1,323.3)	(1,027.7)	(4,889.3)
NORTHWEST	(1.0)	0.2	(3.7)	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(11.4)
NYISO	(1,568.5)	(1,262.5)	(1,090.7)	(129.7)	70.9	(213.3)	(4,193.9)
HUDSONTP	(117.6)	(82.7)	(49.0)	(0.1)	(5.2)	(5.4)	(260.1)
LINDENVFT	(218.7)	(130.3)	(156.3)	7.4	76.9	38.0	(383.1)
NEPTUNE	(326.4)	(318.6)	(437.9)	(289.5)	(167.5)	(309.1)	(1,849.0)
NYIS	(905.8)	(730.9)	(447.6)	152.5	166.7	63.2	(1,701.8)
OVEC	875.5	765.9	828.2	635.4	560.3	641.1	4,306.4
Southern Imports	2,482.1	2,508.5	1,980.8	1,944.4	1,997.4	1,600.3	12,513.4
CPLEIMP	7.6	7.3	5.2	6.3	11.8	2.4	40.6
DUKIMP	50.4	54.7	36.8	51.5	52.7	42.6	288.7
NCMPAIMP	105.6	47.1	28.9	170.1	164.8	86.4	603.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHIMP	2,318.5	2,399.4	1,909.8	1,716.5	1,768.1	1,468.8	11,581.1
Southern Exports	(213.5)	(196.2)	(95.6)	(66.1)	(129.0)	(247.1)	(947.6)
CPLEEXP	(19.7)	(31.2)	(36.4)	(24.7)	(10.8)	(31.0)	(153.8)
DUKEXP	(115.6)	(113.1)	(28.9)	(16.8)	(59.8)	(96.3)	(430.5)
NCMPAEXP	0.0	(0.2)	(0.1)	0.0	(0.0)	0.0	(0.3)
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEXP	(78.2)	(51.7)	(30.3)	(24.5)	(58.4)	(119.9)	(363.0)
Total	1,212.7	2,106.6	2,197.2	2,293.9	1,828.4	1,178.6	10,817.3

¹⁹ There is one interface pricing point eligible for day-ahead transaction scheduling only (NIPSCO).

²⁰ In the Real-Time Energy Market, two PJM interface pricing points had a net interchange of zero (Southeast and Southwest).

Table 9-5 Real-time scheduled gross import volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	672.1	766.7	909.0	713.7	654.7	428.0	4,144.2
MISO	165.2	280.9	249.0	141.2	141.2	135.8	1,113.3
NORTHWEST	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
NYISO	958.0	1,196.4	1,020.1	1,012.4	996.2	977.2	6,160.4
HUDSONTP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
LINDENVFT	2.2	28.4	1.8	41.3	84.8	55.0	213.6
NEPTUNE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2
NYIS	955.8	1,168.0	1,018.3	971.1	911.4	922.1	5,946.6
OVEC	901.8	790.7	849.6	651.8	576.6	655.7	4,426.2
Southern Imports	2,482.1	2,508.5	1,980.8	1,944.4	1,997.4	1,600.3	12,513.4
CPLEIMP	7.6	7.3	5.2	6.3	11.8	2.4	40.6
DUKIMP	50.4	54.7	36.8	51.5	52.7	42.6	288.7
NCMPAIMP	105.6	47.1	28.9	170.1	164.8	86.4	603.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHIMP	2,318.5	2,399.4	1,909.8	1,716.5	1,768.1	1,468.8	11,581.1
Southern Exports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CPLEEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	5,179.2	5,543.3	5,008.7	4,463.6	4,366.2	3,796.9	28,357.8

Table 9-6 Real-time scheduled gross export volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	5.6	79.1	18.6	0.6	0.3	0.3	104.5
MISO	1,193.5	677.7	561.2	942.3	1,464.4	1,163.4	6,002.5
NORTHWEST	1.0	0.0	3.9	2.2	2.3	2.3	11.7
NYISO	2,526.6	2,459.0	2,110.8	1,142.1	925.3	1,190.5	10,354.3
HUDSONTP	117.6	82.7	49.0	0.1	5.2	5.5	260.1
LINDENVFT	220.9	158.8	158.1	33.9	7.9	17.0	596.6
NEPTUNE	326.4	318.6	437.9	289.5	167.6	309.1	1,849.2
NYIS	1,861.6	1,898.8	1,465.8	818.5	744.7	858.9	7,648.4
OVEC	26.3	24.7	21.4	16.5	16.4	14.6	119.8
Southern Imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CPLEIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Exports	213.5	196.2	95.6	66.1	129.0	247.1	947.6
CPLEEXP	19.7	31.2	36.4	24.7	10.8	31.0	153.8
DUKEXP	115.6	113.1	28.9	16.8	59.8	96.3	430.5
NCMPAEXP	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEXP	78.2	51.7	30.3	24.5	58.4	119.9	363.0
Total	3,966.5	3,436.7	2,811.6	2,169.7	2,537.8	2,618.3	17,540.5

Day-Ahead Interface Imports and Exports

In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, as in the Real-Time Energy Market, scheduled imports and exports are determined by the scheduled market path, which is the transmission path a market participant selects from the original source to the final sink. Entering external energy transactions in the Day-Ahead Energy Market requires fewer steps than in the Real-Time Energy Market. Market participants need to acquire a valid, willing to pay congestion (WPC) OASIS reservation to prove that their day-ahead schedule could be supported in the Real-Time Energy Market.²¹ Day-Ahead Energy Market schedules need to be cleared through the Day-Ahead Energy Market process in order to become an approved schedule. The Day-Ahead Energy Market

²¹ Effective September 17, 2010, up-to congestion transactions no longer required a willing to pay congestion transmission reservation. Additional details can be found under the "Up-to Congestion" heading in this report.

transactions are financially binding, but will not physically flow unless they are also submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market. In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, a market participant is not required to acquire a ramp reservation, a NERC Tag, or to go through a neighboring balancing authority checkout process.

There are three types of day-ahead external energy transactions: fixed; up-to congestion; and dispatchable.²²

In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, transaction sources and sinks are determined solely by the market participants. In Table 9-7, Table 9-8, and Table 9-9, the interface designation is determined by the transmission reservation that was acquired and associated with the day-ahead market transaction, and does not bear any necessary relationship to the pricing point designation selected at the time the transaction is submitted to PJM in real time. For example, a market participant may have a transmission reservation with a point of receipt of MISO and a point of delivery of PJM. If the market participant knows that the source of the energy in the Real-Time Market will be associated with the SouthIMP interface pricing point, they may select SouthIMP as the import pricing point when submitting the transaction in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In the interface tables, the import transaction would appear as scheduled through the MISO Interface, and in the interface pricing point tables, the import transaction would appear as scheduled through the SouthIMP/EXP interface pricing point, which reflects the expected power flow.

Table 9-7 through Table 9-9 show the day-ahead interchange totals at the individual interfaces. Net interchange in the Day-Ahead Energy Market is shown by interface for the first six months of 2015 in Table 9-7, while gross imports and exports are shown in Table 9-8 and Table 9-9.

In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at nine of PJM's 20 interfaces. The top three net exporting interfaces in the Day-Ahead Energy Market accounted for 78.0 percent of the total net exports: PJM/New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYIS) with 32.5 percent, PJM/MidAmerican Energy Company (MEC) with

²² See the 2010 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 4, "Interchange Transactions," for details.

26.8 percent and PJM/Neptune (NEPT) with 18.7 percent of the net export volume. The four separate interfaces that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPT, PJM/HUDS and PJM/Linden (LIND)) together represented 53.7 percent of the total net PJM exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In the first six months of 2015, four of the ten separate interfaces that connect PJM to MISO were net exporters in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Those four interfaces represented 45.4 percent of the total net PJM exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Nine PJM interfaces had net scheduled imports, with two importing interfaces accounting for 77.4 percent of the total net imports: PJM/Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) with 51.2 percent and PJM/DUK with 26.2 percent of the net import volume.²³

Table 9-7 Day-Ahead scheduled net interchange volume by interface (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
CPLW	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUK	291.6	240.9	239.7	348.2	332.3	130.2	1,583.0
LGEE	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
MISO	(840.5)	(432.2)	(156.1)	(565.4)	(808.8)	(743.2)	(3,546.2)
ALTE	(346.7)	(87.6)	(70.8)	(204.1)	(318.8)	(300.5)	(1,328.5)
ALTW	0.0	0.5	0.0	(2.6)	(27.7)	(2.0)	(31.8)
AMIL	35.1	38.0	51.7	61.2	4.0	38.2	228.2
CIN	10.2	56.8	42.7	32.8	39.0	(0.6)	180.9
CWLP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IPL	0.0	6.3	1.0	11.9	35.9	(0.8)	54.3
MEC	(485.4)	(422.6)	(348.0)	(460.5)	(496.4)	(459.2)	(2,672.2)
MECS	65.2	61.4	161.4	64.8	81.8	21.5	456.1
NIPS	0.0	8.3	32.4	4.5	7.7	3.2	56.1
WEC	(118.9)	(93.3)	(26.4)	(73.4)	(134.3)	(43.0)	(489.3)
NYISO	(1,551.8)	(1,555.6)	(1,284.5)	(381.6)	(226.7)	(351.0)	(5,351.2)
HUDS	(105.4)	(76.4)	(41.6)	0.0	(1.5)	(1.9)	(226.7)
LIND	(13.1)	(8.4)	(10.7)	0.5	3.3	4.0	(24.5)
NEPT	(329.9)	(317.8)	(441.5)	(294.6)	(170.0)	(307.1)	(1,860.8)
NYIS	(1,103.3)	(1,153.1)	(790.7)	(87.6)	(58.5)	(46.1)	(3,239.3)
OVEC	645.3	515.5	579.0	444.5	414.5	499.1	3,097.9
TVA	60.1	38.1	56.1	105.7	93.1	41.3	394.3
Total without Up-To Congestion	(1,408.8)	(1,206.3)	(582.5)	(66.9)	(203.5)	(451.1)	(3,919.2)
Up-To Congestion	1,633.0	1,083.6	693.6	1,025.9	1,636.5	711.4	6,784.0
Total	224.1	(122.7)	111.1	959.0	1,433.0	260.3	2,864.9

²³ In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, two PJM interfaces had a net interchange of zero (PJM/Duke Energy Progress West (CPLW) and PJM/City Water Light & Power (CWLP)).

Table 9-8 Day-Ahead scheduled gross import volume by interface (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
CPLW	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUK	309.3	255.9	241.6	348.2	333.9	155.8	1,644.7
LGEE	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
MISO	187.7	193.2	320.9	199.5	225.2	158.7	1,285.2
ALTE	1.2	15.4	9.1	5.3	0.0	0.0	31.0
ALTW	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
AMIL	35.1	38.0	51.7	61.2	4.0	38.2	228.2
CIN	14.3	57.0	42.9	32.8	42.1	22.3	211.6
CWLP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IPL	0.0	6.3	1.0	11.9	35.9	0.0	55.1
MEC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MECS	137.0	67.7	174.5	83.8	135.5	94.9	693.4
NIPS	0.0	8.3	32.4	4.5	7.7	3.2	56.1
WEC	0.0	0.0	9.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.4
NYISO	677.5	679.3	617.1	707.4	645.0	742.4	4,068.7
HUDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
LIND	0.2	1.5	0.3	0.8	3.5	4.6	10.9
NEPT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NYIS	677.4	677.8	616.7	706.6	641.5	737.8	4,057.8
OVEC	672.2	540.2	600.4	459.3	430.9	499.1	3,202.1
TVA	69.8	68.1	63.6	105.7	102.9	75.4	485.5
Total without Up-To Congestion	1,918.8	1,739.0	1,845.7	1,822.4	1,740.0	1,633.4	10,699.3
Up-To Congestion	2,131.5	1,617.4	1,568.5	1,798.0	2,684.6	1,662.8	11,462.8
Total	4,050.2	3,356.4	3,414.3	3,620.4	4,424.6	3,296.2	22,162.1

Table 9-9 Day-Ahead scheduled gross export volume by interface (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
CPLE	15.9	15.2	18.9	20.5	10.0	29.6	110.0
CPLW	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUK	17.6	15.1	1.9	0.0	1.6	25.5	61.8
LGEE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MISO	1,028.2	625.4	477.0	764.9	1,033.9	901.9	4,831.3
ALTE	347.9	103.0	79.9	209.4	318.8	300.5	1,359.5
ALTW	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	27.7	2.0	32.3
AMIL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CIN	4.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	3.1	23.0	30.6
CWLP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IPL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8
MEC	485.4	422.6	348.0	460.5	496.4	459.2	2,672.2
MECS	71.9	6.3	13.1	19.0	53.7	73.4	237.3
NIPS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
WEC	118.9	93.3	35.8	73.4	134.3	43.0	498.7
NYISO	2,229.3	2,235.0	1,901.6	1,089.0	871.7	1,093.4	9,419.9
HUDS	105.4	76.4	41.6	0.0	1.5	1.9	226.7
LIND	13.3	9.9	11.1	0.3	0.2	0.6	35.3
NEPT	329.9	317.8	441.5	294.6	170.0	307.1	1,860.8
NYIS	1,780.7	1,830.9	1,407.5	794.2	700.0	783.8	7,297.1
OVEC	26.9	24.7	21.4	14.9	16.4	0.0	104.3
TVA	9.8	30.0	7.4	0.0	9.9	34.1	91.2
Total without Up-To Congestion	3,327.6	2,945.3	2,428.2	1,889.3	1,943.5	2,084.5	14,618.4
Up-To Congestion	498.5	533.8	875.0	772.1	1,048.1	951.3	4,678.8
Total	3,826.1	3,479.1	3,303.2	2,661.4	2,991.6	3,035.8	19,297.2

Day-Ahead Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports

Table 9-10 through Table 9-15 show the Day-Ahead Energy Market interchange totals at the individual interface pricing points. In the first six months of 2015, up-to congestion transactions accounted for 51.7 percent of all scheduled import MW transactions, 24.2 percent of all scheduled export MW transactions and 236.8 percent of the net interchange volume in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Net interchange in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, including up-to congestion transactions, is shown by interface pricing point in the first six months of 2015 in Table 9-10. Up-to congestion transactions by interface pricing point in the first six months of 2015 are shown in Table

9-11. Gross imports and exports, including up-to congestion transactions, for the Day-Ahead Energy Market are shown in Table 9-12 and Table 9-14, while gross import up-to congestion transactions are shown in Table 9-13 and gross export up-to congestion transactions are shown in Table 9-15. On August 29, 2014, FERC issued an Order which created an obligation for UTCs to pay any uplift determined to be appropriate in the Commission review, effective September 8, 2014.²⁴ As a result of the requirement to pay uplift charges and the uncertainty about the level of the required uplift charges, market participants reduced up-to congestion trading effective September 8, 2014.

There is one interface pricing point eligible for day-ahead transaction scheduling only (NIPSCO). The NIPSCO interface pricing point was created when the individual balancing authorities that integrated to form MISO operated independently. Transactions sourcing or sinking in the NIPSCO balancing authority were eligible to receive the real-time NIPSCO interface pricing point. After the formation of the MISO RTO, all real-time transactions sourcing or sinking in NIPSCO are represented on the NERC Tag as sourcing or sinking in MISO, and thus receive the MISO interface pricing point in the Real-Time Energy Market. For this reason, it was no longer possible to receive the NIPSCO interface pricing point in the Real-Time Energy Market after the integration of NIPSCO into MISO. The NIPSCO interface pricing point remains an eligible interface pricing point in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market for the stated purpose of facilitating the long term day-ahead positions created at the NIPSCO Interface prior to the integration. In the first six months of 2015, the day-ahead net scheduled interchange at the NIPSCO interface pricing point was -593.6 GWh (See Table 9-10) and the up-to congestion net scheduled interchange at the NIPSCO interface pricing point was -593.6 GWh (See Table 9-11). While there is no corresponding interface pricing point available for real-time transaction scheduling, a real-time LMP is still calculated. This real-time price is used for balancing the deviations between the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.

PJM consolidated the Southeast and Southwest interface pricing points to a single interface with separate import and export prices (SouthIMP

²⁴ 148 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2014), Order Instituting Section 206 Proceeding and Establishing Procedures.

and SouthEXP) on October 31, 2006. At that time, the real-time Southeast and Southwest interface pricing points remained only to support certain grandfathered agreements with specific generating units and to price energy under the reserve sharing agreement with VACAR. PJM also kept the day-ahead Southeast and Southwest interface pricing points to facilitate long-term day-ahead positions that were entered prior to the consolidation.

The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the NIPSCO and Southeast interface pricing points from the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets and, with VACAR, assign the transactions created under the reserve sharing agreement to the SouthIMP/EXP pricing point.

In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled exports at 10 of PJM's 19 interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions. The top three net exporting interface pricing points in the Day-Ahead Energy Market accounted for 75.9 percent of the total net exports: PJM/NYIS with 33.6 percent, PJM/NEPTUNE with 22.2 percent and PJM/Northwest with 20.0 percent of the net export volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) together represented 58.3 percent of the total net PJM exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Nine PJM interface pricing points had net imports, with three importing interface pricing points accounting for 84.7 percent of the total net imports: PJM/SouthImp with 35.3 percent, PJM/Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) with 34.8 percent and PJM/Southeast with 14.6 percent of the net import volume.

In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, in the first six months of 2015, up-to congestion transactions had net exports at four of PJM's 19 interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions. The top two net exporting interface pricing points eligible for up-to congestion transactions accounted for 73.2 percent of the total net up-to congestion exports: PJM/NIPSCO with 48.8 percent and PJM/SouthEXP with 24.4 percent of the net export up-to congestion volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/

LINDENVFT) together represented 14.7 percent of the net up-to congestion PJM exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All of the net exports were on PJM/NEPTUNE while the PJM/HUDSONTP, PJM/LINDENVFT and PJM/NYIS interface pricing points all had net import up-to congestion. Nine PJM interface pricing points had net up-to congestion imports, with three importing interface pricing points accounting for 66.5 percent of the total net up-to congestion imports: PJM/SouthIMP with 30.4 percent, PJM/Southeast with 21.9 percent and PJM/MISO with 14.1 percent of the net import volume.²⁵

Table 9-10 Day-ahead scheduled net interchange volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	249.6	154.7	182.3	22.2	(57.3)	65.0	616.5
MISO	(364.2)	(0.2)	198.3	(83.2)	(321.4)	(264.5)	(835.2)
NIPSCO	(52.8)	(42.7)	(146.5)	(132.0)	(155.5)	(64.1)	(593.6)
NORTHWEST	(449.3)	(418.3)	(279.5)	(299.4)	(171.0)	(223.2)	(1,840.7)
NYISO	(1,494.9)	(1,528.5)	(1,398.2)	(366.2)	(134.3)	(330.6)	(5,252.7)
HUDS	(62.2)	(43.7)	(138.3)	(3.8)	30.9	(8.4)	(225.5)
LINDENVFT	17.5	44.6	27.7	8.3	0.9	2.2	101.3
NEPTUNE	(421.7)	(341.7)	(443.8)	(299.5)	(179.5)	(353.1)	(2,039.2)
NYIS	(1,028.5)	(1,187.8)	(843.9)	(71.2)	13.4	28.7	(3,089.3)
OVEC	1,113.6	653.6	715.3	525.2	501.0	688.2	4,197.0
Southern Imports	1,395.3	1,230.8	971.5	1,469.8	2,065.7	829.0	7,962.2
CPLEIMP	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	12.8
DUKIMP	2.4	0.4	2.7	4.9	1.1	3.0	14.5
NCMPAIMP	109.5	51.0	30.5	165.1	158.6	83.8	598.6
SOUTHEAST	360.0	150.0	183.5	184.8	664.9	270.1	1,813.3
SOUTHWEST	179.4	135.9	172.3	291.4	315.0	171.7	1,265.8
SOUTHIMP	741.7	891.5	580.4	821.4	923.9	298.3	4,257.3
Southern Exports	(173.3)	(172.1)	(132.0)	(177.5)	(294.2)	(439.6)	(1,388.7)
CPLEEXP	(15.1)	(14.6)	(18.0)	(19.3)	(9.5)	(29.3)	(105.8)
DUKEXP	(8.3)	(13.1)	(1.9)	0.0	0.0	(18.2)	(41.4)
NCMPAEXP	(0.8)	(1.4)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(5.1)
SOUTHEAST	(2.3)	(17.7)	(9.5)	(5.3)	(0.6)	(22.5)	(57.8)
SOUTHWEST	(98.5)	(57.1)	(44.2)	(127.2)	(208.0)	(236.4)	(771.5)
SOUTHEXP	(48.3)	(68.2)	(57.6)	(24.5)	(75.6)	(133.0)	(407.1)
Total	224.1	(122.7)	111.1	959.0	1,433.0	260.3	2,864.9

²⁵ In the Day-Ahead Energy Market, six PJM interface pricing points (PJM/CPLEIMP, PJM/DUKIMP, PJM/NCMPAIMP, PJM/CPLEEXP, PJM/DUKEXP and PJM/NCMPAEXP) had up-to congestion net interchange of zero.

Table 9-11 Up-to congestion scheduled net interchange volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	113.6	93.9	1.4	(92.8)	(211.0)	(52.2)	(147.2)
MISO	164.3	126.4	247.7	211.4	225.0	152.8	1,127.6
NIPSCO	(52.8)	(42.7)	(146.5)	(132.0)	(155.5)	(64.1)	(593.6)
NORTHWEST	36.1	4.3	68.4	161.1	311.3	236.0	817.3
NYISO	56.5	22.6	(115.6)	15.4	92.4	20.5	91.9
HUDSONTP	43.2	32.7	(96.7)	(3.8)	32.4	(6.6)	1.3
LINDENVFT	30.7	53.0	38.4	7.8	(2.4)	(1.7)	125.7
NEPTUNE	(91.8)	(23.9)	(2.3)	(4.9)	(9.5)	(46.0)	(178.5)
NYIS	74.4	(39.1)	(54.9)	16.3	71.9	74.7	143.4
OVEC	468.3	138.2	136.3	84.9	86.5	186.4	1,100.5
Southern Imports	977.0	852.8	605.7	934.9	1,560.5	582.3	5,513.2
CPLEIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	360.0	150.0	183.5	184.8	664.9	270.1	1,813.3
SOUTHWEST	179.4	135.9	172.3	291.4	315.0	171.7	1,265.8
SOUTHIMP	437.6	566.9	249.9	458.7	580.6	140.5	2,434.2
Southern Exports	(130.0)	(111.9)	(103.9)	(157.0)	(272.7)	(350.3)	(1,125.8)
CPLEEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	(2.3)	(17.7)	(9.5)	(5.3)	(0.6)	(22.5)	(57.8)
SOUTHWEST	(98.5)	(57.1)	(44.2)	(127.2)	(208.0)	(236.4)	(771.5)
SOUTHEXP	(29.2)	(37.1)	(50.1)	(24.5)	(64.1)	(91.5)	(296.5)
Total Interfaces	1,633.0	1,083.6	693.6	1,025.9	1,636.5	711.4	6,784.0
INTERNAL	9,285.6	9,492.4	11,338.1	9,294.5	10,524.3	10,311.4	60,246.3
Total	10,918.6	10,575.9	12,031.7	10,320.5	12,160.8	11,022.9	67,030.4

Table 9-12 Day-ahead scheduled gross import volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	254.0	170.6	240.5	156.0	202.8	159.2	1,183.1
MISO	196.0	221.4	364.0	258.4	295.5	249.0	1,584.4
NIPSCO	16.3	12.7	4.1	44.4	43.3	117.5	238.2
NORTHWEST	115.3	80.7	179.0	223.3	379.2	319.4	1,297.0
NYISO	900.8	873.1	833.4	851.1	810.0	865.1	5,133.5
HUDS	70.9	61.4	29.2	59.6	49.5	16.2	286.8
LINDENVFT	32.4	58.4	59.4	23.3	15.5	20.2	209.1
NEPTUNE	14.1	24.1	33.1	7.6	0.8	6.6	86.3
NYIS	783.4	729.3	711.7	760.6	744.2	822.2	4,551.3
OVEC	1,172.5	767.0	821.7	617.4	628.1	757.0	4,763.7
Southern Imports	1,395.3	1,230.8	971.5	1,469.8	2,065.7	829.0	7,962.2
CPLEIMP	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	12.8
DUKIMP	2.4	0.4	2.7	4.9	1.1	3.0	14.5
NCMPAIMP	109.5	51.0	30.5	165.1	158.6	83.8	598.6
SOUTHEAST	360.0	150.0	183.5	184.8	664.9	270.1	1,813.3
SOUTHWEST	179.4	135.9	172.3	291.4	315.0	171.7	1,265.8
SOUTHIMP	741.7	891.5	580.4	821.4	923.9	298.3	4,257.3
Southern Exports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CPLEEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	4,050.2	3,356.4	3,414.3	3,620.4	4,424.6	3,296.2	22,162.1

Table 9-13 Up-to congestion scheduled gross import volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	117.7	105.3	57.8	40.9	49.1	42.0	412.8
MISO	181.7	145.2	284.3	248.6	290.3	223.7	1,373.9
NIPSCO	16.3	12.7	4.1	44.4	43.3	117.5	238.2
NORTHWEST	115.3	80.7	179.0	223.3	379.2	319.4	1,297.0
NYISO	223.3	193.8	216.3	143.7	165.0	122.8	1,064.9
HUDSONTP	70.9	61.4	29.2	59.6	49.5	16.2	286.8
LINDENVFT	32.2	56.8	59.1	22.5	12.0	15.6	198.2
NEPTUNE	14.1	24.1	33.1	7.6	0.8	6.6	86.3
NYIS	106.0	51.5	94.9	54.0	102.7	84.4	493.5
OVEC	500.2	226.8	221.3	162.2	197.3	255.1	1,562.9
Southern Imports	977.0	852.8	605.7	934.9	1,560.5	582.3	5,513.2
CPLEIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	360.0	150.0	183.5	184.8	664.9	270.1	1,813.3
SOUTHWEST	179.4	135.9	172.3	291.4	315.0	171.7	1,265.8
SOUTHIMP	437.6	566.9	249.9	458.7	580.6	140.5	2,434.2
Southern Exports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CPLEEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Interfaces	2,131.5	1,617.4	1,568.5	1,798.0	2,684.6	1,662.8	11,462.8

Table 9-14 Day-ahead scheduled gross export volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	4.4	15.9	58.2	133.7	260.1	94.2	566.6
MISO	560.2	221.6	165.8	341.6	617.0	513.5	2,419.6
NIPSCO	69.0	55.3	150.6	176.4	198.8	181.6	831.7
NORTHWEST	564.6	499.0	458.5	522.7	550.2	542.7	3,137.6
NYISO	2,395.7	2,401.7	2,231.6	1,217.3	944.3	1,195.7	10,386.3
HUDSONTP	133.1	105.1	167.5	63.3	18.5	24.6	512.2
LINDENVFT	14.8	13.8	31.7	15.0	14.6	17.9	107.8
NEPTUNE	435.8	365.7	476.9	307.1	180.3	359.7	2,125.6
NYIS	1,811.9	1,917.0	1,555.5	831.8	730.9	793.5	7,640.6
OVEC	58.9	113.4	106.4	92.2	127.1	68.7	566.7
Southern Imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CPLEIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Exports	173.3	172.1	132.0	177.5	294.2	439.6	1,388.7
CPLEEXP	15.1	14.6	18.0	19.3	9.5	29.3	105.8
DUKEXP	8.3	13.1	1.9	0.0	0.0	18.2	41.4
NCMPAEXP	0.8	1.4	0.9	1.1	0.5	0.4	5.1
SOUTHEAST	2.3	17.7	9.5	5.3	0.6	22.5	57.8
SOUTHWEST	98.5	57.1	44.2	127.2	208.0	236.4	771.5
SOUTHEXP	48.3	68.2	57.6	24.5	75.6	133.0	407.1
Total	3,826.1	3,479.1	3,303.2	2,661.4	2,991.6	3,035.8	19,297.2


Table 9-15 Up-to congestion scheduled gross export volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
IMO	4.1	11.5	56.4	133.7	260.1	94.2	559.9
MISO	17.4	18.8	36.7	37.2	65.3	70.8	246.2
NIPSCO	69.0	55.3	150.6	176.4	198.8	181.6	831.7
NORTHWEST	79.2	76.4	110.5	62.2	68.0	83.4	479.7
NYISO	166.8	171.2	331.8	128.3	72.6	102.3	973.0
HUDSONTP	27.7	28.7	125.9	63.3	17.0	22.7	285.5
LINDENVFT	1.5	3.9	20.6	14.7	14.4	17.3	72.5
NEPTUNE	105.9	48.0	35.4	12.6	10.4	52.6	264.8
NYIS	31.6	90.6	149.9	37.7	30.8	9.7	350.2
OVEC	32.0	88.7	85.0	77.3	110.7	68.7	462.4
Southern Imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CPLEIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHWEST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHIMP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Exports	130.0	111.9	103.9	157.0	272.7	350.3	1,125.8
CPLEEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DUKEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NCMPAEXP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOUTHEAST	2.3	17.7	9.5	5.3	0.6	22.5	57.8
SOUTHWEST	98.5	57.1	44.2	127.2	208.0	236.4	771.5
SOUTHEXP	29.2	37.1	50.1	24.5	64.1	91.5	296.5
Total Interfaces	498.5	533.8	875.0	772.1	1,048.1	951.3	4,678.8

Table 9-16 Active interfaces: January through June 2015²⁶

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
ALTE	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
ALTW	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
AMIL	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
CIN	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
CPLW	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
DUK	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
HUDS	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
IPL	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
LGEE	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
LIND	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
MEC	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
MECS	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NEPT	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NIPS	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NYIS	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
OVEC	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
TVA	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
WEC	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active

Figure 9-3 PJM's footprint and its external interfaces



²⁶ On July 2, 2012, Duke Energy Corp. (DUK) completed a merger with Progress Energy Inc. (CPL and CPLW). As of June 30, 2015, DUK, CPL and CPLW have continued to operate as separate balancing authorities, and are still considered distinct interfaces within the PJM energy market.

Table 9-17 Active pricing points: January through June 2015

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
CPLEEXP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
CPLEIMP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
DUKEXP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
DUKIMP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
HUDSONTP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
LINDENVFT	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
MISO	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NCMPAEXP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NCMPAIMP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NEPTUNE	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NIPSCO	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
Northwest	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
NYIS	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
Ontario IESO	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
OVEC	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
Southeast	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
SOUTHEXP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
SOUTHIMP	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active
Southwest	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active	Active

Loop Flows

Actual energy flows are the real-time metered power flows at an interface for a defined period. The comparable scheduled flows are the real-time power flows scheduled at an interface for a defined period. Inadvertent interchange is the difference between the total actual flows for the PJM system (net actual interchange) and the total scheduled flows for the PJM system (net scheduled interchange) for a defined period. Loop flows are the difference between actual and scheduled power flows at one or more specific interfaces. Loop flows can exist at the same time that inadvertent interchange is zero. For example, actual imports could exceed scheduled imports at one interface and actual exports could exceed scheduled exports at another interface by the same amount. The result is loop flow, despite the fact that system actual and scheduled power flow net to a zero difference.²⁷

²⁷ See the 2012 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

Loop flows result, in part, from a mismatch between incentives to use a particular scheduled transmission path and the market based price differentials that result from the actual physical flows on the transmission system.

PJM's approach to interface pricing attempts to match prices with physical power flows and their impacts on the transmission system. For example, if market participants want to import energy from the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) to PJM, they are likely to choose a scheduled path with the fewest transmission providers along the path and therefore the lowest transmission costs for the transaction, regardless of whether the resultant path is related to the physical flow of power. The lowest cost transmission path runs from SPP, through MISO, and into PJM, requiring only three transmission reservations, two of which are available at no cost (MISO transmission would be free based on the regional through and out rates, and the PJM transmission would be free, if using spot import transmission). Any other transmission path entering PJM, where the generating control area is to the south would require the market participant to acquire transmission through non-market balancing authorities, and thus incur additional transmission costs. PJM's interface pricing method recognizes that transactions sourcing in SPP and sinking in PJM will create flows across the southern border and prices those transactions at the SouthIMP interface price. As a result, the transaction is priced appropriately, but a difference between scheduled and actual flows is created at PJM's borders. For example, if a 100 MW transaction were submitted, there would be 100 MW of scheduled flow at the PJM/MISO interface border, but there would be no actual flows on the interface. Conversely, there would be no scheduled flows at the PJM/Southern interface border, but there would be 100 MW of actual flows on the interface. In the first six months of 2015, there were net scheduled flows of 4,936 GWh through MISO that received an interface pricing point associated with the southern interface. Conversely, in the first six months of 2015, there were no net scheduled flows across the southern interface that received the MISO interface pricing point.

In the first six months of 2015, net scheduled interchange was 10,817 GWh and net actual interchange was 10,424 GWh, a difference of 393 GWh. In the first six months of 2014, net scheduled interchange was 489 GWh and net

actual interchange was 586 GWh, a difference of 96 GWh. This difference is system inadvertent. PJM attempts to minimize the amount of accumulated inadvertent interchange by continually monitoring and correcting for inadvertent interchange.²⁸

Table 9-18 Net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface (GWh): January through June 2015

	Actual	Net Scheduled	Difference (GWh)
CPLE	4,747	(128)	4,876
CPLW	(708)	0	(708)
DUK	395	2,251	(1,855)
LGEE	1,531	1,311	220
MISO	(1,559)	4,156	(5,714)
ALTE	(3,101)	(837)	(2,264)
ALTW	(797)	(40)	(756)
AMIL	5,011	3,579	1,432
CIN	(4,002)	1,470	(5,473)
CWLP	(169)	0	(169)
IPL	(557)	1,105	(1,662)
MEC	(1,105)	(2,681)	1,576
MECS	2,260	1,933	327
NIPS	(3,861)	114	(3,974)
WEC	4,762	(487)	5,249
NYISO	(4,265)	(4,275)	10
HUDD	(260)	(260)	0
LIND	(383)	(383)	0
NEPT	(1,849)	(1,849)	0
NYIS	(1,773)	(1,783)	10
OVEC	5,596	4,306	1,290
TVA	4,685	3,197	1,488
Total	10,424	10,817	(393)

Every external balancing authority is mapped to an import and export interface pricing point. The mapping is designed to reflect the physical flow of energy between PJM and each balancing authority. The net scheduled values for interface pricing points are defined as the flows that will receive the specific interface price.²⁹ The actual flow on an interface pricing point is

²⁸ See PJM, "Manual 12: Balancing Operations," Revision 32 (April 6, 2015).

²⁹ The terms balancing authority and control area are used interchangeably in this section. The NERC tag applications maintained the terminology of generation control area (GCA) and load control area (LCA) after the implementation of the NERC functional model. The NERC functional model classifies the balancing authority as a reliability service function, with, among other things, the responsibility for balancing generation, demand and interchange balance. See "Reliability Functional Model," <http://www.nerc.com/files/Functional_Model_V4_CLEAN_2008Dec01.pdf>. (August 2008.)

defined as the metered flow across the transmission lines that are included in the interface pricing point.

The differences between the scheduled and actual power flows at the interface pricing points provide a better measure of loop flows than differences at the interfaces. Scheduled transactions are assigned interface pricing points based on the generation balancing authority and load balancing authority. Scheduled power flows are assigned to interfaces based on the OASIS path that reflects the path of energy into or out of PJM to one neighboring balancing authority. Power flows at the interface pricing points provide a more accurate reflection of where scheduled power flows actually enter or leave the PJM footprint based on the complete transaction path.

Table 9-19 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point. The CPLEEXP, CPLEIMP, DUKEXP, DUKIMP, NCMPAEXP, and NCMPAIMP interface pricing points were created as part of operating agreements with external balancing authorities, and do not reflect physical ties different from the SouthIMP and SouthEXP interface pricing points.

Because the SouthIMP and SouthEXP interface pricing points are the same physical point, if there are net actual exports from the PJM footprint to the southern region, by definition, there cannot be net actual imports into the PJM footprint from the southern region and therefore there will not be actual flows at the SouthIMP interface pricing point. Conversely, if there are net actual imports into the PJM footprint from the southern region, there cannot be net actual exports to the southern region and therefore there will not be actual flows on the SouthEXP interface pricing point. However, when analyzing the interface pricing points with the southern region, comparing the net scheduled and net actual flows as a sum of the pricing points, rather than the individual pricing points, provides some insight into how effective the interface pricing point mappings are. To accurately calculate the loop flows at the southern region, the net actual flows from the southern region are compared to the net scheduled flows from the southern region. The net actual flows from the southern region are determined by summing the total southern import actual flows and the total southern exports actual flows (10,651 GWh

of imports). The net scheduled flows from the southern region are determined by summing the total southern imports scheduled flows and the total southern exports scheduled flows (11,566 GWh of imports). In the first six months of 2015, the loop flows at the southern region were 915 GWh.

The IMO interface pricing point with the IESO was created to reflect the fact that transactions that originate or sink in the IMO balancing authority create physical flows that are split between the MISO and NYISO interface pricing points, so a mapping to a single interface pricing point does not reflect the actual flows. PJM created the IMO interface pricing point to reflect the actual power flows across both the MISO/PJM and NYISO/PJM Interfaces. The IMO does not have physical ties with PJM because it is not contiguous. Table 9-19 shows actual flows associated with the IMO interface pricing point as zero because there is no PJM/IMO Interface. The actual flows between IMO and PJM are included in the actual flows at the MISO and NYISO interface pricing points.

Table 9-19 Net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

	Actual	Net Scheduled	Difference (GWh)
IMO	0	4,040	(4,040)
MISO	(1,559)	(4,889)	3,331
NORTHWEST	0	(11)	11
NYISO	(4,265)	(4,194)	(71)
HUDSONTP	(260)	(260)	0
LINDENVFT	(383)	(383)	0
NEPTUNE	(1,849)	(1,849)	0
NYIS	(1,773)	(1,702)	(71)
OVEC	5,596	4,306	1,290
Southern Imports	16,403	12,513	3,889
CPLEIMP	0	41	(41)
DUKIMP	0	289	(289)
NCMPAIMP	0	603	(603)
SOUTHEAST	0	0	0
SOUTHWEST	0	0	0
SOUTHIMP	16,403	11,581	4,822
Southern Exports	(5,752)	(948)	(4,804)
CPLEEXP	0	(154)	154
DUKEXP	0	(431)	431
NCMPAEXP	0	(0)	0
SOUTHEAST	0	0	0
SOUTHWEST	0	0	0
SOUTHEXP	(5,752)	(363)	(5,389)
Total	10,424	10,817	(393)

Table 9-20 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point, with adjustments made to the MISO and NYISO scheduled interface pricing points based on the quantities of scheduled interchange where transactions from the Ontario Independent Electricity System Operator (IMO) entered the PJM energy market.

Table 9-20 Net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point (GWh) (Adjusted for IMO Scheduled Interfaces): January through June 2015

	Actual	Net Scheduled	Difference (GWh)
MISO	(1,559)	(768)	(790)
NORTHWEST	0	(11)	11
NYISO	(4,265)	(4,275)	10
HUDSONTP	(260)	(260)	0
LINDENVFT	(383)	(383)	0
NEPTUNE	(1,849)	(1,849)	0
NYIS	(1,773)	(1,783)	10
OVEC	5,596	4,306	1,290
Southern Imports	16,403	12,513	3,889
CPLEIMP	0	41	(41)
DUKIMP	0	289	(289)
NCMPAIMP	0	603	(603)
SOUTHEAST	0	0	0
SOUTHWEST	0	0	0
SOUTHIMP	16,403	11,581	4,822
Southern Exports	(5,752)	(948)	(4,804)
CPLEEXP	0	(154)	154
DUKEEXP	0	(431)	431
NCMPAEXP	0	(0)	0
SOUTHEAST	0	0	0
SOUTHWEST	0	0	0
SOUTHEXP	(5,752)	(363)	(5,389)
Total	10,424	10,817	(393)

PJM attempts to ensure that external energy transactions are priced appropriately through the assignment of interface prices based on the expected actual flow from the generation balancing authority (source) and load balancing authority (sink) as specified on the NERC eTag. Assigning prices in this manner is a reasonable approach to ensuring that transactions receive or pay the PJM market value of the transaction based on expected flows, but this method does not address loop flow issues.

Loop flows remain a significant concern for the efficiency of the PJM market. Loop flows can have negative impacts on the efficiency of markets with explicit locational pricing, including impacts on locational prices, on FTR revenue adequacy and on system operations, and can be evidence of attempts to game such markets.

The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule and receive higher prices (for imports) or lower prices (for exports) from PJM resulting from the inability to identify the true source or sink of the transaction. If all of the Northeast ISOs and RTOs implemented validation to prohibit the breaking of transactions into smaller segments, the level of Lake Erie loops flows would be reduced.

The MMU recommends that the validation also require market participants to submit transactions on market paths that reflect the expected actual flow in order to reduce unscheduled loop flows.

Table 9-21 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface and interface pricing point. This table shows the interface pricing points that were assigned to energy transactions that had market paths at each of PJM's interfaces. For example, Table 9-21 shows that in the first six months of 2015, the majority of imports to the PJM Energy Market for which a market participant specified Cinergy as the interface with PJM based on the scheduled transmission path, had a generation control area mapped to the IMO Interface, and thus actual flows were assigned the IMO interface pricing point (1,135 GWh). Conversely, the majority of exports from the PJM Energy Market for which a market participant specified Cinergy as the interface with PJM based on the scheduled transmission path had a load control area for which the actual flows would leave the PJM Energy Market at the MISO Interface, and thus were assigned the MISO interface pricing point (83 GWh).

Table 9-21 Net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface and interface pricing point (GWh): January through June 2015

Interface	Interface Pricing Point	Actual	Net Scheduled	Difference (GWh)	Interface	Interface Pricing Point	Actual	Net Scheduled	Difference (GWh)
ALTE		(3,101)	(837)	(2,264)	IPL		(557)	1,105	(1,662)
	IMO	0	0	(0)		IMO	0	1,359	(1,359)
	MISO	(3,101)	(1,511)	(1,591)		MISO	(557)	(318)	(239)
	SOUTHIMP	0	674	(674)		SOUTHEXP	0	(0)	0
ALTW		(797)	(40)	(756)		SOUTHIMP	0	64	(64)
	MISO	(797)	(42)	(754)	LGEE		1,531	1,311	220
	SOUTHIMP	0	2	(2)		SOUTHEXP	(3,131)	(2)	(3,129)
AMIL		5,011	3,579	1,432		SOUTHIMP	4,662	1,313	3,350
	IMO	0	1	(1)	LIND		(383)	(383)	0
	MISO	5,011	439	4,573		LINDENVFT	(383)	(383)	0
	SOUTHIMP	0	3,139	(3,139)	MEC		(1,105)	(2,681)	1,576
CIN		(4,002)	1,470	(5,473)		MISO	(1,105)	(2,682)	1,577
	IMO	0	1,135	(1,135)		SOUTHIMP	0	1	(1)
	MISO	(4,002)	(83)	(3,919)	MECS		2,260	1,933	327
	NORTHWEST	0	(11)	11		IMO	0	1,625	(1,625)
	SOUTHEXP	0	(4)	4		MISO	2,260	(311)	2,571
	SOUTHIMP	0	433	(433)		SOUTHEXP	0	(0)	0
CPLW		4,747	(128)	4,876		SOUTHIMP	0	620	(620)
	CPLEEXP	0	(154)	154	NEPT		(1,849)	(1,849)	0
	CPLEIMP	0	41	(41)		NEPTUNE	(1,849)	(1,849)	0
	SOUTHEXP	(577)	(18)	(559)	NIPS		(3,861)	114	(3,974)
	SOUTHIMP	5,324	3	5,322		IMO	0	0	(0)
CPLW		(708)	0	(708)		MISO	(3,861)	107	(3,968)
	SOUTHEXP	(752)	0	(752)		SOUTHIMP	0	6	(6)
	SOUTHIMP	44	0	44	NYIS		(1,773)	(1,783)	10
CWLP		(169)	0	(169)		IMO	0	(81)	81
	MISO	(169)	0	(169)		NORTHWEST	0	0	(0)
DUK		395	2,251	(1,855)		NYIS	(1,773)	(1,702)	(71)
	DUKEXP	0	(431)	431	OVEC		5,596	4,306	1,290
	DUKIMP	0	289	(289)		OVEC	5,596	4,306	1,290
	NCMPAEXP	0	(0)	0	TVA		4,685	3,197	1,488
	NCMPAIMP	0	603	(603)		DUKIMP	0	0	(0)
	SOUTHEXP	(334)	(195)	(139)		SOUTHEXP	(958)	(144)	(814)
	SOUTHIMP	729	1,985	(1,256)		SOUTHIMP	5,643	3,341	2,302
HUDS		(260)	(260)	0	WEC		4,762	(487)	5,249
	HUDSONTP	(260)	(260)	0		MISO	4,762	(487)	5,249
					Grand Total		10,424	10,817	(393)

Table 9-22 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point and interface. This table shows the interfaces where transactions were scheduled which received the individual interface pricing points. For example, Table 9-22 shows that in the first six months of 2015, the majority of imports to the PJM energy market for which a market participant specified a generation control area for which it was assigned the IMO interface pricing point, had market paths that entered the PJM energy market at the MECS Interface (1,625 GWh). Conversely, the majority of exports from the PJM energy market for which a market participant specified a load control area for which it was assigned the IMO interface pricing point, had market paths that exited the PJM Energy Market at the NYIS Interface (81 GWh).

Table 9-22 Net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point and interface (GWh): January through June 2015

Interface Pricing Point	Interface	Actual	Scheduled	Net Difference (GWh)	Interface Pricing Point	Interface	Actual	Scheduled	Net Difference (GWh)
CPLEEXP		0	(154)	154	NCMPAIMP		0	603	(603)
	CPLE	0	(154)	154		DUK	0	603	(603)
CPLEIMP		0	41	(41)	NEPTUNE		(1,849)	(1,849)	0
	CPLE	0	41	(41)		NEPT	(1,849)	(1,849)	0
DUKEXP		0	(431)	431	NORTHWEST		0	(11)	11
	DUK	0	(431)	431		CIN	0	(11)	11
DUKIMP		0	289	(289)		NYIS	0	0	(0)
	DUK	0	289	(289)		NYIS	(1,773)	(1,702)	(71)
	TVA	0	0	(0)		NYIS	(1,773)	(1,702)	(71)
HUDSONTP		(260)	(260)	0	OVEC		5,596	4,306	1,290
	HUDS	(260)	(260)	0		OVEC	5,596	4,306	1,290
IMO		0	4,040	(4,040)	SOUTHEXP		(5,752)	(363)	(5,389)
	ALTE	0	0	(0)		CIN	0	(4)	4
	AMIL	0	1	(1)		CPLE	(577)	(18)	(559)
	CIN	0	1,135	(1,135)		CPLW	(752)	0	(752)
	IPL	0	1,359	(1,359)		DUK	(334)	(195)	(139)
	MECS	0	1,625	(1,625)		IPL	0	(0)	0
	NIPS	0	0	(0)		LGEE	(3,131)	(2)	(3,129)
	NYIS	0	(81)	81		MECS	0	(0)	0
LINDENVFT		(383)	(383)	0		TVA	(958)	(144)	(814)
	LIND	(383)	(383)	0	SOUTHIMP		16,403	11,581	4,822
MISO		(1,559)	(4,889)	3,331		ALTE	0	674	(674)
	ALTE	(3,101)	(1,511)	(1,591)		ALTW	0	2	(2)
	ALTW	(797)	(42)	(754)		AMIL	0	3,139	(3,139)
	AMIL	5,011	439	4,573		CIN	0	433	(433)
	CIN	(4,002)	(83)	(3,919)		CPLE	5,324	3	5,322
	CWLP	(169)	0	(169)		CPLW	44	0	44
	IPL	(557)	(318)	(239)		DUK	729	1,985	(1,256)
	MEC	(1,105)	(2,682)	1,577		IPL	0	64	(64)
	MECS	2,260	(311)	2,571		LGEE	4,662	1,313	3,350
	NIPS	(3,861)	107	(3,968)		MEC	0	1	(1)
	WEC	4,762	(487)	5,249		MECS	0	620	(620)
NCMPAEXP		0	(0)	0		NIPS	0	6	(6)
	DUK	0	(0)	0		TVA	5,643	3,341	2,302
					Grand Total		10,424	10,817	(393)

PJM and MISO Interface Prices

If interface prices were defined in a comparable manner by PJM and MISO, and if time lags were not built into the rules governing interchange transactions, then prices at the interfaces would be expected to be very close and the level of transactions would be expected to be related to any price differentials. The fact that these conditions do not exist is important in explaining the observed relationship between interface prices and inter-RTO power flows, and those price differentials.

Both the PJM/MISO and MISO/PJM interface pricing points represent the value of power at the relevant border, as determined in each market. In both cases, the interface price is the price at which transactions are settled. For example, a transaction into PJM from MISO would receive the PJM/MISO interface price upon entering PJM, while a transaction into MISO from PJM would receive the MISO/PJM interface price. PJM and MISO use network models to determine these prices and to attempt to ensure that the prices are consistent with the underlying electrical flows.

Under the PJM/MISO Joint Operating Agreement, the two RTOs mutually determine a set of transmission facilities on which both RTOs have an impact, and therefore jointly operate to those constraints. These jointly controlled facilities are M2M (Market to Market) flowgates. When a M2M constraint binds, PJM's LMP calculations at the selected buses that make up PJM's MISO interface pricing point are based on the PJM model's distribution factors of the selected buses to the binding M2M constraint and PJM's shadow price of the binding M2M constraint. PJM's MISO interface pricing point is a weighted average price of the selected bus LMPs. Similarly, MISO's LMP calculations at the selected buses that make up MISO's PJM

interface pricing point are based on the MISO model's distribution factors of the selected buses to the binding M2M constraint and MISO's shadow price of the binding M2M constraint. MISO's PJM interface pricing point is the average of all of the PJM generator bus LMPs.^{30,31}

In 2013, questions were raised in the PJM/MISO Joint and Common Market (JCM) Initiative meetings about whether the interface definitions utilized by PJM and MISO were accurately capturing the congestion impact of transactions in the interface prices when a M2M constraint was binding in either footprint. A joint stakeholder group was formed to address the question.

Prior to June 1, 2014, the PJM interface definition for MISO consisted of nine buses located near the middle of the MISO system and not at the border between the RTOs. The MISO interface definition for PJM currently consists of all PJM generator buses which are spread across the entire PJM system. The interface definitions led to questions about the level of congestion included in interchange pricing.

Two solutions were proposed to resolve the issue, one by Potomac Economics (the MISO IMM) and one by PJM. The Potomac Economics proposal has two essential components: move the interface definition that each RTO uses to the center of the other RTO's load; and eliminate the congestion component for M2M constraints from the non-monitoring RTO's interface price. The PJM proposal is for PJM and MISO to establish a common interface price definition at the border between the RTOs and further incorporate an adjustment to the Market Flow calculations utilized in the market-to-market settlement process.³²

PJM modified the definition of the PJM/MISO Interface effective June 1, 2014, consistent with the PJM proposal. PJM's new MISO interface pricing point includes ten equally weighted buses that are close to the PJM/MISO border. The ten buses were selected based on PJM's analysis that showed that over 80 percent of the hourly tie line flows between PJM and MISO occurred on ten

ties composed of MISO and PJM monitored facilities. PJM selected generator buses electrically close to those ten tie lines. A PJM generator bus was selected for MISO monitored tie lines, and a MISO generator bus was selected for PJM monitored tie lines. MISO has not made any changes to their interface pricing point.

Real-Time and Day-Ahead PJM/MISO Interface Prices

In the first six months of 2015, the direction of the average hourly flow was inconsistent with the real-time average hourly price difference between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface. In the first six months of 2015, the PJM average hourly real-time LMP at the PJM/MISO border was \$30.04 while the MISO real-time LMP at the border was \$28.41, a difference of \$1.63. While the average hourly LMP difference at the PJM/MISO border was \$1.63, the average of the absolute values of the hourly differences was \$8.11. The average hourly flow in the first six months of 2015 was -359 MW (The negative sign means that the flow was an export from PJM to MISO, which is inconsistent with the fact that the average MISO/PJM price was lower than the average PJM/MISO price.) In the first six months of 2015, the direction of flow was consistent with price differentials in 55.5 percent of the hours. Table 9-23 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface based on LMP differences and flow direction.

³⁰ See "LMP Aggregate Definitions," (December 18, 2008) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/markets-ops/energy/lmp-model-info/20081218-aggregate-definitions.ashx>>. PJM periodically updates these definitions on its web site. See <<http://www.pjm.com>>.

³¹ Based on information obtained from MISO's extranet <<http://extranet.midwestiso.org>> (Accessed January 27, 2015).

³² See "Interface Pricing Issue - PJM Position Paper Draft," (February 17, 2015) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/pjm-miso-joint-common/20150219/20150219-item-04-interface-pricing-position-paper.ashx>>.


Table 9-23 PJM and MISO flow based hours and average hourly price differences: January through June 2015

LMP Difference	Flow Direction	Number of Hours	Average Hourly Price Difference
MISO/PJM LMP > PJM/MISO LMP	Any Flow	2,223	\$6.34
	Consistent Flow (PJM to MISO)	1,404	\$4.84
	Inconsistent Flow (MISO to PJM)	819	\$8.90
	No Flow	0	\$0.00
PJM/MISO LMP > MISO/PJM LMP	Any Flow	2,120	\$10.01
	Consistent Flow (MISO to PJM)	1,008	\$15.23
	Inconsistent Flow (PJM to MISO)	1,112	\$5.25
	No Flow	0	\$0.00

In the first six months of 2015, the day-ahead PJM average hourly LMP at the PJM/MISO border was \$30.56 while the MISO/PJM LMP at the border was \$29.70, a difference of \$0.86 per MWh.

The simple average interface price difference does not reflect the underlying hourly variability in prices (Figure 9-4). There are a number of relevant measures of variability, including the number of times the price differential fluctuates between positive and negative, the standard deviation of individual prices and of price differences and the absolute value of the price differences (Figure 9-6).

Figure 9-4 Real-time and day-ahead daily hourly average price difference (MISO/PJM Interface minus PJM/MISO Interface): January through June 2015



Distribution and Prices of Hourly Flows at the PJM/MISO Interface

In the first six months of 2015, the direction of hourly energy flows was consistent with PJM and MISO interface price differentials in 2,412 hours (55.5 percent of all hours), and was inconsistent with price differentials in 1,931 hours (44.5 percent of all hours). Table 9-24 shows the distribution of hourly energy flows between PJM and MISO based on the price differences between the PJM/MISO and MISO/PJM prices. Of the 1,931 hours where flows were in a direction inconsistent with price differences, 1,442 of those hours (74.7 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$1.00 and 577 of those hours (29.9 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was \$297.23. Of the 2,412 hours where flows were consistent with price differences, 1,889 of those hours

(78.3 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$1.00 and 872 of all such hours (36.2 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was \$278.65.

Table 9-24 Distribution of hourly flows that are consistent and inconsistent with price differences between PJM and MISO: January through June 2015

Price Difference Range (Greater Than or Equal To)	Inconsistent Hours	Percent of Total Hours	Consistent Hours	Percent of Total Hours
\$0.00	1,931	100.0%	2,412	100.0%
\$1.00	1,442	74.7%	1,889	78.3%
\$5.00	577	29.9%	872	36.2%
\$10.00	290	15.0%	488	20.2%
\$15.00	184	9.5%	327	13.6%
\$20.00	130	6.7%	251	10.4%
\$25.00	97	5.0%	195	8.1%
\$50.00	36	1.9%	81	3.4%
\$75.00	17	0.9%	48	2.0%
\$100.00	11	0.6%	33	1.4%
\$200.00	5	0.3%	7	0.3%
\$300.00	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
\$400.00	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
\$500.00	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

PJM/MISO Interface Prices Post June 1, 2014, Interface Pricing Point Modification

PJM modified the definition of the PJM/MISO Interface effective June 1, 2014. Interface prices under both definitions were calculated for the period from June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015, recognizing that the counterfactual prices could have been affected by the new definition. The average hourly PJM/MISO Interface price during this period was \$30.81, an increase of \$1.82 per MWh compared to the price of \$29.00 under the prior definition.

In 725 of the 8,760 hours analyzed (8.3 percent) the incentive to flow from the RTO with the lower price to the RTO with the higher price switched directions under the new definition. In 27 of the 725 hours (3.7 percent), the MISO/PJM interface price was lower than the PJM/MISO interface price under the old definition but higher under the new definition. Under the old definition the

incentive was to flow power from PJM to MISO while under the new definition the incentive was to flow power from MISO to PJM for these 27 hours.

In 698 of the 725 hours (96.3 percent), the MISO/PJM Interface price was higher than the PJM/MISO interface price under the old definition but lower under the new definition. Under the old definition the incentive was to flow power from MISO to PJM while under the new definition the incentive was to flow power from PJM to MISO for these 698 hours.

PJM and NYISO Interface Prices

If interface prices were defined in a comparable manner by PJM and the NYISO, if identical rules governed external transactions in PJM and the NYISO, if time lags were not built into the rules governing such transactions and if no risks were associated with such transactions, then prices at the interfaces would be expected to be very close and the level of transactions would be expected to be related to any price differentials. The fact that none of these conditions exists is important in explaining the observed relationship between interface prices and inter-RTO/ISO power flows, and those price differentials.³³

Real-Time and Day-Ahead PJM/NYISO Interface Prices

In the first six months of 2015, the relationship between prices at the PJM/NYIS Interface and at the NYISO/PJM proxy bus and the relationship between interface price differentials and power flows continued to be affected by differences in institutional and operating practices between PJM and the NYISO. In the first six months of 2015, the direction of the average hourly flow was inconsistent with the average price difference between PJM/NYIS Interface and at the NYISO/PJM proxy bus. In the first six months of 2015, the PJM average hourly LMP at the PJM/NYISO border was \$45.86 while the NYISO LMP at the border was \$42.09, a difference of \$3.77. While the average hourly LMP difference at the PJM/NYISO border was \$3.77, the average of the absolute value of the hourly difference was \$18.93. The average hourly flow in the first six months of 2015 was -408 MW. (The negative sign means that the flow was an export from PJM to NYISO, which is inconsistent with the

³³ See the 2012 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

fact that the average PJM price was higher than the average NYISO price.) The direction of flow was consistent with price differentials in 56.6 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2015. Table 9-25 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/NYIS Interface and the NYIS/PJM proxy bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.


Table 9-25 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and average hourly price differences: January through June 2015³⁴

LMP Difference	Flow Direction	Number of Hours	Average Hourly Price Difference
NYIS/PJM proxy bus LBMP > PJM/NYIS LMP	Any Flow	1,714	\$19.20
	Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	1,197	\$16.91
	Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	517	\$24.50
	No Flow	0	\$0.00
PJM/NYIS LMP > NYIS/PJM proxy bus LBMP	Any Flow	2,629	\$18.76
	Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	1,260	\$12.99
	Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	1,369	\$24.08
	No Flow	0	\$0.00

In the first six months of 2015, the day-ahead PJM average hourly LMP at the PJM/NYIS border was \$45.15 while the NYIS/PJM LMP at the border was \$42.49, a difference of \$2.66.

The simple average interface price difference does not reflect the underlying hourly variability in prices (Figure 9-5). There are a number of relevant measures of variability, including the number of times the price differential fluctuates between positive and negative, the standard deviation of individual prices and of price differences and the absolute value of the price differences (Figure 9-6).

Figure 9-5 Real-time and day-ahead daily hourly average price difference (NY/PJM proxy - PJM/NYIS Interface): January through June 2015



Distribution and Prices of Hourly Flows at the PJM/NYISO Interface

In the first six months of 2015, the direction of hourly energy flows was consistent with PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM price differences in 2,457 (56.6 percent of all hours), and was inconsistent with price differences in 1,886 hours (43.4 percent of all hours). Table 9-26 shows the distribution of hourly energy flows between PJM and NYISO based on the price differences between the PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM prices. Of the 1,886 hours where flows were in a direction inconsistent with price differences, 1,751 of those hours (92.8 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$1.00 and 1,256 of all those hours (66.6 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was \$988.45. Of the 2,457 hours where flows were consistent with price differences, 2,303 of

³⁴ The NYISO Locational Based Marginal Price (LBMP) is the equivalent term to PJM's Locational Marginal Price (LMP).

those hours (93.7 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$1.00 and 1,653 of all such hours (67.3 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to \$5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was \$347.23.


Table 9-26 Distribution of hourly flows that are consistent and inconsistent with price differences between PJM and NYISO: January through June 2015

Price Difference Range (Greater Than or Equal To)	Inconsistent Hours	Percent of Total Hours	Consistent Hours	Percent of Total Hours
\$0.00	1,886	100.0%	2,457	100.0%
\$1.00	1,751	92.8%	2,303	93.7%
\$5.00	1,256	66.6%	1,653	67.3%
\$10.00	897	47.6%	987	40.2%
\$15.00	686	36.4%	631	25.7%
\$20.00	562	29.8%	430	17.5%
\$25.00	474	25.1%	323	13.1%
\$50.00	248	13.1%	128	5.2%
\$75.00	128	6.8%	69	2.8%
\$100.00	81	4.3%	44	1.8%
\$200.00	13	0.7%	11	0.4%
\$300.00	7	0.4%	2	0.1%
\$400.00	6	0.3%	0	0.0%
\$500.00	3	0.2%	0	0.0%

Summary of Interface Prices between PJM and Organized Markets

Some measures of the real-time and day-ahead PJM interface pricing with MISO and with the NYISO are summarized and compared in Figure 9-6, including average prices and measures of variability.

Figure 9-6 PJM, NYISO and MISO real-time and day-ahead border price averages: January through June 2015



Neptune Underwater Transmission Line to Long Island, New York

The Neptune line is a 65 mile direct current (DC) merchant 230 kV transmission line, with a capacity of 660 MW, providing a direct connection between PJM (Sayreville, New Jersey), and NYISO (Nassau County on Long Island). Schedule 14 of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff provides that power flows will only be from PJM to New York. In the first six months of 2015, the average hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time average hourly price difference between the PJM Neptune Interface and the NYISO Neptune Bus. In the first six months of 2015, the PJM average hourly LMP at the Neptune Interface was \$44.27 while the NYISO LMP at the Neptune Bus was \$52.53, a difference of \$8.27. While the average hourly LMP difference at the PJM/Neptune border was \$8.27, the average of the absolute value of the

hourly difference was \$28.28. The average hourly flow in the first six months of 2015 was -426 MW. (The negative sign means that the flow was an export from PJM to NYISO, which is consistent with the fact that the average PJM price was lower than the average NYISO price.) The flows were consistent with price differentials in 56.0 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2015. Table 9-27 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/NEPT Interface and the NYIS/Neptune bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.

Table 9-27 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and average hourly price differences (Neptune): January through June 2015

LMP Difference	Flow Direction	Number of Hours	Average Hourly Price Difference
NYIS/Neptune Bus LBMP > PJM/NEPT LMP	Any Flow	2,502	\$31.72
	Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	2,430	\$32.27
	Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	0	\$0.00
	No Flow	72	\$13.23
PJM/NEPT LMP > NYIS/Neptune Bus LBMP	Any Flow	1,841	\$23.63
	Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	0	\$0.00
	Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	1,761	\$24.30
	No Flow	80	\$8.88

To move power from PJM to NYISO using the Neptune line, two PJM transmission service reservations are required. A transmission service reservation is required from the PJM Transmission System to the Neptune HVDC line (“Out Service”) and another transmission service reservation is required on the Neptune HVDC line (“Neptune Service”).³⁵ The PJM Out Service is covered by normal PJM OASIS business operations.³⁶ The Neptune Service falls under the provisions for controllable merchant facilities, Schedule 14 of the PJM Tariff. The Neptune Service is also acquired on the PJM OASIS.

Neptune Service is owned by a primary rights holder, and any service that is not used (as defined by a schedule on a NERC tag) may be released either voluntarily by the primary rights holder or by default by PJM. The primary rights holder may elect to voluntarily release monthly, weekly, daily or hourly

³⁵ See “PJM Business Practices for Neptune Transmission Service,” <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/merch-trans-facilities/neptune-oasis-business-practices-doc-clean.ashx>>.


³⁶ See “Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices,” <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean-doc.ashx>>.

firm or non-firm service. Voluntarily releasing the service allows for the primary rights holder to specify a rate to be charged for the released service. If the primary rights holder does not elect to voluntarily release non-firm service, and does not utilize the service, the available transmission will be released by default at 12:00, one business day before the start of service. Firm service is not subject to default release. On June 30, 2015, the rate for the non-firm service released by default was \$10 per MWh. The primary rights holder remains obligated to pay for the released service unless a second transmission customer acquires the released service. Table 9-28 shows the percentage of scheduled transmission usage across the Neptune line by the primary rights holder since commercial operations began in July, 2007.

Table 9-28 Percentage of Neptune transmission usage by primary rights holder: July 2007 through June 2015

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
January	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
February	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
March	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
April	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.99%
May	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
June	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
July	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
August	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
September	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
October	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
November	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
December	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Figure 9-7 Neptune hourly average flow: January through June 2015



Linden Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT) facility

The Linden VFT facility is a controllable AC merchant transmission facility, with a capacity of 300 MW, providing a direct connection between PJM (Linden, New Jersey) and NYISO (Staten Island, New York). In the first six months of 2015, the average hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time average hourly price difference between the PJM Linden Interface and the NYISO LMP Linden Bus. In the first six months of 2015, the PJM average hourly LMP at the Linden Interface was \$43.33 while the NYISO LMP at the Linden Bus was \$46.82, a difference of \$3.49. While the average hourly LMP difference at the PJM/Linden border was \$3.49, the average of the absolute value of the hourly difference was \$19.36. The average hourly flow in the first six months of 2015 was -88 MW. (The negative sign means that the flow was an export from PJM to NYISO, which is consistent with the fact that the average PJM price was lower than the average NYISO price.) The flows

were consistent with price differentials in 50.3 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2015. Table 9-29 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/LIND Interface and the NYIS/Linden bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.

Table 9-29 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and average hourly price differences (Linden): January through June 2015

LMP Difference	Flow Direction	Number of Hours	Average Hourly Price Difference
NYIS/Linden Bus LBMP > PJM/LIND LMP	Any Flow	2,270	\$21.85
	Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	2,183	\$22.37
	Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	0	\$0.00
	No Flow	87	\$8.71
PJM/LIND LMP > NYIS/Linden Bus LBMP	Any Flow	2,073	\$16.63
	Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	0	\$0.00
	Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	2,017	\$16.92
	No Flow	56	\$6.44

To move power from PJM to NYISO on the Linden VFT line, two PJM transmission service reservations are required. A transmission service reservation is required from the PJM Transmission System to the Linden VFT (“Out Service”) and another transmission service reservation is required on the Linden VFT (“Linden VFT Service”).³⁷ The PJM Out Service is covered by normal PJM OASIS business operations.³⁸ The Linden VFT Service falls under the provisions for controllable merchant facilities, Schedule 16 and Schedule 16-A of the PJM Tariff. The Linden VFT Service is also acquired on the PJM OASIS.

Linden VFT Service is owned by a primary rights holder, and any service that is not used (as defined by a schedule on a NERC tag) may be released either voluntarily by the primary rights holder or by default by PJM. The primary rights holder may elect to voluntarily release monthly, weekly, daily or hourly firm or non-firm service. Voluntarily releasing the service allows for the primary rights holder to specify a rate to be charged for the released service. If the primary rights holder elects to not voluntarily release non-firm

³⁷ See “PJM Business Practices for Linden VFT Transmission Service,” <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/merch-trans-facilities/linden-vft-oasis-business-practices-doc-clean.ashx>>.


³⁸ See “Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices,” <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean-doc.ashx>>.

service, and does not utilize the service, the available transmission will be released by default at 12:00, one business day before the start of service. Firm service is not subject to default release. On June 30, 2015, the rate for the non-firm service released by default was \$6 per MWh. The primary rights holder remains obligated to pay for the released service unless a second transmission customer acquires the released service. Table 9-30 shows the percentage of scheduled transmission usage across the Linden VFT line by the primary rights holder since commercial operations began in November, 2009.

Table 9-30 Percentage of Linden transmission usage by primary rights holder: November 2009 through June 2015

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
January	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
February	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
March	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
April	NA	99.97%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.98%	100.00%
May	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
June	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	27.27%	100.00%
July	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	29.56%	
August	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	82.50%	
September	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	81.70%	
October	NA	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
November	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.86%	100.00%	
December	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	98.22%	100.00%	100.00%	

Figure 9-8 Linden hourly average flow: January through June 2015³⁹



Hudson Direct Current (DC) Merchant Transmission Line

The Hudson direct current (DC) line is a bidirectional merchant 230 kV transmission line, with a capacity of 673 MW, providing a direct connection between PJM (Public Service Electric and Gas Company’s (PSE&G) Bergen 230 kV Switching Station located in Ridgefield, New Jersey) and NYISO (Consolidated Edison’s (ConEd) W. 49th Street 345 kV Substation in New York City). The connection is a submarine cable system. While the Hudson DC line is a bidirectional line, power flows are only from PJM to New York because the Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC have only requested withdrawal rights (320 MW of firm withdrawal rights, and 353 MW of non-firm withdrawal rights). In the first six months of 2015, the average hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was inconsistent with the real-time average hourly price difference between the PJM Hudson Interface and the NYISO LMP Hudson Bus. In the

³⁹ The Linden VFT line is a bidirectional facility. The “Total Capacity” lines represent the maximum amount of interchange possible in either direction. These lines were included to maintain a consistent scale, for comparison purposes, with the Neptune DC Tie line.

first six months of 2015, the PJM average hourly LMP at the Hudson Interface was \$59.97 while the NYISO LMP at the Hudson Bus was \$47.42, a difference of \$12.55. While the average hourly LMP difference at the PJM/Hudson border was \$12.55, the average of the absolute value of the hourly difference was \$34.74. The average hourly flow in the first six months of 2015 was -60 MW. (The negative sign means that the flow was an export from PJM to NYISO, which is inconsistent with the fact that the average PJM price was higher than the average NYISO price.) The flows were consistent with price differentials in 39.1 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2015. Table 9-31 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/HUDS Interface and the NYIS/Hudson bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.

Table 9-31 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and average hourly price differences (Hudson): January through June 2015

LMP Difference	Flow Direction	Number of Hours	Average Hourly Price Difference
NYIS/Hudson Bus LBMP > PJM/HUDS LMP	Any Flow	1,911	\$25.21
	Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	1,697	\$26.67
	Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	0	\$0.00
	No Flow	214	\$13.63
PJM/HUDS LMP > NYIS/Hudson Bus LBMP	Any Flow	2,432	\$42.22
	Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM)	0	\$0.00
	Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS)	2,056	\$44.32
	No Flow	376	\$30.74

To move power from PJM to NYISO, on the Hudson line, two PJM transmission service reservations are required. A transmission service reservation is required from the PJM Transmission System to the Hudson line (“Out Service”) and another transmission service reservation is required on the Hudson line (“Hudson Service”).⁴⁰ The PJM Out Service is covered by normal PJM OASIS business operations.⁴¹ The Hudson Service falls under the provisions for controllable merchant facilities, Schedule 17 of the PJM Tariff. The Hudson Service is also acquired on the PJM OASIS.

⁴⁰ See “PJM Business Practices for Hudson Transmission Service,” <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/merch-trans-facilities/http-business-practices.ashx>>.


⁴¹ See “Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices,” <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean-doc.ashx>>.

Hudson Service is owned by a primary rights holder, and any service that is not used (as defined by scheduled on a NERC tag) may be released either voluntarily by the primary rights holder or by default by PJM. The primary rights holder may elect to voluntarily release monthly, weekly, daily or hourly firm or non-firm service. Voluntarily releasing the service allows for the primary rights holder to specify a rate to be charged for the released service. If the primary rights holder elects to not voluntarily release non-firm service, and does not utilize the service, the available transmission will be released by default at 12:00, one business day before the start of service. Firm service is not subject to default release. On June 30, 2015, the rate for the non-firm service released by default was \$10 per MWh. The primary rights holder remains obligated to pay for the released service unless a second transmission customer acquires the released service. Table 9-32 shows the percentage of scheduled transmission usage across the Hudson line by the primary rights holder since commercial operations began in May, 2013.

Table 9-32 Percentage of Hudson transmission usage by primary rights holder: May 2013 through June 2015

	2013	2014	2015
January	NA	51.22%	16.27%
February	NA	49.00%	14.67%
March	NA	40.40%	71.88%
April	NA	100.00%	100.00%
May	100.00%	26.87%	100.00%
June	100.00%	5.89%	59.72%
July	100.00%	18.51%	
August	100.00%	75.17%	
September	100.00%	75.31%	
October	100.00%	99.71%	
November	85.57%	99.60%	
December	28.32%	1.68%	

Figure 9-9 Hudson hourly average flow: January through June 2015



Operating Agreements with Bordering Areas

To improve reliability and reduce potential competitive seams issues, PJM and its neighbors have developed, and continue to work on, joint operating agreements. These agreements are in various stages of development and include implemented operating agreements with MISO and the NYISO, an implemented reliability agreement with TVA, an operating agreement with Duke Energy Progress, Inc., a reliability coordination agreement with VACAR South, a balancing authority operations agreement with the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEC) and a Northeastern planning coordination protocol with NYISO and ISO New England.

Table 9-33 shows a summary of the elements included in each of the operating agreements PJM has with its bordering areas. These elements include such items as whether PJM and its neighbor participate in the exchange of data, near-term system coordination, long-term system coordination, congestion management and joint checkout procedures.

Table 9-33 Summary of elements included in operating agreements with bordering areas

Agreement:	PJM-MISO	PJM-NYISO	PJM-TVA	PJM-DEP	PJM-VACAR	PJM-WEP	Northeastern Protocol
Date:	September 10, 2014	January 20, 2015	October 15, 2014	December 3, 2014	November 7, 2014	July 20, 2013	December 8, 2004
Data Exchange							
Real-Time Data	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Projected Data	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
SCADA Data	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
EMS Models	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Operations Planning Data	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Available Flowgate Capability Data	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Near-Term System Coordination							
Operating Limit Violation Assistance	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
Over/Under Voltage Assistance	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
Emergency Energy Assistance	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
Outage Coordination	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
Long-Term System Coordination	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Congestion Management Process							
ATC Coordination	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
Market Flow Calculations	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Firm Flow Entitlements	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Market to Market Redispatch	YES - Redispatch	YES - Redispatch	NO	YES - Dynamic Schedule	NO	NO	NO
Joint Checkout Procedures	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO

PJM-MISO = MISO/PJM Joint Operating Agreement

PJM-NYISO = New York ISO/PJM Joint Operating Agreement

PJM-TVA = Joint Reliability Coordination Agreement Between PJM - Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

PJM-DEP = Duke Energy Progress (DEP) - PJM Joint Operating Agreement

PJM-VACAR = PJM-VACAR South Reliability Coordination Agreement

PJM-WEP = Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement Between Wisconsin Electric Power Company and PJM Interconnection, LLC

Northeastern Protocol = Northeastern ISO-Regional Transmission Organization Planning Coordination Protocol

PJM and MISO Joint Operating Agreement⁴²

The Joint Operating Agreement between MISO and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. was executed on December 31, 2003. The PJM/MISO JOA includes provisions for market based congestion management that, for designated flowgates within MISO and PJM, allow for redispatch of units within the PJM and MISO regions to jointly manage congestion on these flowgates and to assign the costs of congestion management appropriately. In 2012, MISO and PJM initiated a joint stakeholder process to address issues associated with the operation of the markets at the seam.⁴³

Under the market to market rules, the organizations coordinate pricing at their borders. PJM and MISO each calculate an interface LMP using network models including distribution factor impacts. PJM uses ten buses within MISO to calculate the PJM/MISO interface pricing point LMP while MISO uses all of the PJM

⁴² See "Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (December 11, 2008) <<http://www.pjm.com/documents/agreements/~media/documents/agreements/joa-complete.ashx>>.

⁴³ See "2012 PJM/MISO Joint and Common Market Initiative," <<http://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/stakeholder-meetings/stakeholder-groups/pjm-miso-joint-common.aspx>>.

generator buses in its model of the PJM system in its computation of the MISO/PJM interface pricing point.⁴⁴

Coordinated flowgates (CF) are flowgates that are monitored or controlled by either PJM or MISO, in which only one has a significant impact (defined as a greater than 5 percent impact based on transmission distribution factors and generation to load distribution factors). A reciprocal coordinated flowgate (RCF) is a CF that is monitored and controlled by either PJM or MISO, on which both have significant impacts. Only RCFs are subject to the market to market congestion management process.


As of January 1, 2015, PJM had 102 flowgates eligible for M2M (Market to Market) coordination. In the first six months of 2015, PJM added 28 flowgates and deleted 20 flowgate, leaving 110 flowgates eligible for M2M coordination as of June 30, 2015. As of January 1, 2015, MISO had 275 flowgates eligible for M2M coordination. In the first six months of 2015, MISO added 37 and deleted 44 flowgates, leaving 268 flowgates eligible for M2M coordination as of June 30, 2015.

The timing of the addition of new M2M flowgates may contribute to FTR underfunding. MISO's ability to add flowgates dynamically throughout the planning period, which were not modeled in any PJM FTR auction, may result in oversold FTRs in PJM, and as a direct consequence, contribute to FTR underfunding. Effective June 1, 2014, PJM and MISO established a baseline set of flowgates to be modeled and procedures were developed to coordinate the exchange of FTR limits to be used in their annual FTR processes. A process was developed to ensure that temporary constraints represent known outages and other system conditions. Not allowing for M2M settlements on short-term outages that miss the monthly FTR model deadline could contribute to a solution to the FTR underfunding created by these short-term outages.

In the first six months of 2015, the market to market operations resulted in MISO and PJM redispatching units to control congestion on M2M flowgates and in the exchange of payments for this redispatch. Figure 9-10 shows credits for coordinated congestion management between PJM and MISO.

⁴⁴ See the 2012 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

Figure 9-10 Credits for coordinated congestion management: January 2013 through June 2015⁴⁵



PJM and New York Independent System Operator Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)⁴⁶

The Joint Operating Agreement between NYISO and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. became effective on January 15, 2013. Under the market to market rules, the organizations coordinate pricing at their borders. PJM and NYISO each calculate an interface LMP using network models including distribution factor impacts. PJM uses two buses within NYISO to calculate the PJM/NYIS interface pricing point LMP while The NYISO calculates the PJM interface price (represented by the Keystone proxy bus) based on the assumption that 40 percent of the scheduled energy will flow across the PJM/NYISO border on

⁴⁵ The totals represented in this figure represent the settlements as of the time of this report and may not include adjustments or resettlements.

⁴⁶ See "New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Joint Operating Agreement with PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (January 20, 2015) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/nyiso-pjm.ashx>>.


the Branchburg to Ramapo PAR controlled tie, and the remaining 60 percent will enter the NYISO on their free flowing A/C tie lines.

Coordinated flowgates (CF) are flowgates that are monitored or controlled by either PJM or NYISO, on which only one has a significant impact (defined as a greater than 5 percent impact based on transmission distribution factors and generation to load distribution factors). A reciprocal coordinated flowgate (RCF) is a CF that is monitored and controlled by either PJM or NYISO, on which both have significant impacts. Only RCFs are subject to the market to market congestion management process.

The firm flow entitlement (FFE) represents the amount of historic flow that each RTO had created on each RCF used in the market to market settlement process. The FFE establishes the amount of market flow that each RTO is permitted to create on the RCF before incurring redispatch costs during the market to market process. If the non-monitoring RTO's real-time market flow is greater than their FFE plus the approved MW adjustment from day-ahead coordination, then the non-monitoring RTO will pay the monitoring RTO based on the difference between their market flow and their FFE. If the non-monitoring RTO's real-time market flow is less than their FFE plus the approved MW adjustment from day-ahead coordination, then the monitoring RTO will pay the non-monitoring RTO for congestion relief provided by the non-monitoring RTO based on the difference between the non-monitoring RTO's market flow and their FFE.

In the first six months of 2015, market to market operations resulted in NYISO and PJM redispatching units to control congestion on M2M flowgates and in the exchange of payments for this redispatch. Figure 9-11 shows credits for coordinated congestion management between PJM and NYISO.

Figure 9-11 Credits for coordinated congestion management (flowgates): January 2013 through June 2015⁴⁷




The M2M coordination process focuses on real-time market coordination to manage transmission limitations that occur on the M2M Flowgates in a more cost effective manner. Coordination between NYISO and PJM includes not only joint redispatch, but also incorporates coordinated operation of the Ramapo PARs that are located at the PJM/NYIS border. This real-time coordination results in a more efficient economic dispatch solution across both markets to manage the real-time transmission constraints that impact both markets, focusing on the actual flows in real time to manage constraints.⁴⁸ For each M2M flowgate, a Ramapo PAR settlement will occur for each interval during coordinated operations. The Ramapo PAR settlements are determined based on whether the measured real-time flow on each of the Ramapo PARs is greater than or less than the calculated target value. If the actual flow is greater

⁴⁷ The totals represented in this figure represent the settlements as of the time of this report and may not include adjustments or resettlements.

⁴⁸ See "New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Joint Operating Agreement with PJM Interconnection, LLC," (November 4, 2014) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/nyiso-pjm.ashx>>.

than the target flow, NYISO will make a payment to PJM. This payment is calculated as the product of the M2M flowgate shadow price, the PAR shift factor and the difference between the actual and target PAR flow. If the actual flow is less than the target flow, PJM will make a payment to NYISO. This payment is calculated as the product of the M2M flowgate shadow price, the PAR shift factor and the difference between the target and actual PAR flow. In the first six months of 2015, PAR settlements resulted in monthly payments from PJM to NYISO. Figure 9-12 shows the Ramapo PAR credits for coordinated congestion management between PJM and NYISO.

Figure 9-12 Credits for coordinated congestion management (Ramapo PARs): January 2013 through June 2015⁴⁹



⁴⁹ The totals represented in this figure represent the settlements as of the time of this report and may not include adjustments or resettlements.

PJM and TVA Joint Reliability Coordination Agreement (JRCA)⁵⁰

The joint reliability coordination agreement (JRCA) executed on April 22, 2005, provides for the exchange of information and the implementation of reliability and efficiency protocols between TVA and PJM. The agreement also provides for the management of congestion and arrangements for both near-term and long-term system coordination. Under the JRCA, PJM and TVA honor constraints on each other’s flowgates in their Available Transmission Capability (ATC) calculations. Additionally, market flows are calculated on reciprocal flowgates. When a constraint occurs on a reciprocal flowgate within TVA, PJM has the option to redispatch generation to reduce market flow, and therefore alleviate the constraint. Unlike the M2M procedure between MISO and PJM, this redispatch does not result in M2M payments; however, electing to redispatch generation within PJM can avoid potential market disruption by curtailing a large number of transactions under the Transmission Line Loading Relief (TLR) procedure to achieve the same relief. The agreement continued to be in effect in the first six months of 2015.

PJM and Duke Energy Progress, Inc. Joint Operating Agreement⁵¹

On September 9, 2005, the FERC approved a JOA between PJM and Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC), with an effective date of July 30, 2005. As part of this agreement, both parties agreed to develop a formal congestion management protocol (CMP). On February 2, 2010, PJM and PEC filed a revision to the JOA to include a CMP.⁵² On January 20, 2011, the Commission conditionally accepted the compliance filing. On July 2, 2012, Duke Energy and Progress Energy Inc. completed a merger. At that time, Progress Energy Carolinas Inc. changed its name to Duke Energy Progress (DEP).

The PJM/DEP JOA states that the Marginal Cost Proxy Method (MCPM) will be used in the determination of the CPLEIMP and CPLEEXP interface

⁵⁰ See "Joint Reliability Coordination Agreement Among and Between PJM Interconnection, LLC, and Tennessee Valley Authority," (October 15, 2014) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/joint-reliability-coordination-agreement-miso-pjm-tva.ashx>>.

⁵¹ See "Amended and Restated Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between PJM Interconnection, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress Inc.," (December 3, 2014) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/progress-pjm-joint-operating-agreement.ashx>>.

⁵² See *PJM Interconnection, LLC and Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.* Docket No. ER10-713-000 (February 2, 2010).

price. Section 2.6A (2) of the PJM Tariff describes the process of calculating the interface price under the MCPM. Under the MCPM, PJM compares the individual bus LMP (as calculated by PJM) for each DEP generator in the PJM model with a telemetered output greater than zero MW to the marginal cost for that generator.

For the CPLEIMP price (imports to PJM), PJM uses the lowest LMP of any generator bus in the DEP balancing authority area, with an output greater than zero MW that has an LMP less than its marginal cost for each five minute interval. If no generator with an output greater than zero MW has an LMP less than its marginal cost, then the import price is the average of the bus LMPs for the set of generators in the DEP area with an output greater than zero MW that PJM determines to be the marginal units in the DEP area for that five minute interval. PJM determines the marginal units in the DEP area by summing the output of the units serving load in the DEP area in ascending order by the units' marginal costs until the sum equals the real time load in the DEP area. Units included in the sum shall be the marginal units for the DEP area for that interval.

PJM calculates the CPLEEXP price for exports from PJM to DEP as the highest LMP of any generator bus in the DEP area with an output greater than zero MW (excluding nuclear and hydro units) that has an LMP greater than its marginal cost in the 5 minute interval.⁵³ If no generator with an output greater than zero MW has an LMP greater than its marginal cost, then the export price will be the average of the bus LMPs for the set of generators with an output greater than zero MW that PJM determines to be marginal units in the same manner as described for the CPLEIMP interface price. The hourly integrated import and export prices are the average of all of the 5 minute intervals in each hour.

The MCPM bases its calculation on the DEP units modeled in the PJM market that have an output greater than zero, and only uses the units whose output exceeds the reported DEP real-time load. When new units are added to the

DEP footprint, and existing units in the DEP footprint retire, PJM does not have complete data to calculate the interface price. These new units can impact the interface price in several ways. By not having the additional units modeled, these units cannot be considered to be marginal units, and therefore cannot set price. For the import price, if the PJM calculated LMP of one of the new units were to be lower than any currently modeled unit, then PJM's CPLEIMP pricing point would be lower, and PJM would pay less for imports. Conversely, if the PJM calculated LMP of one of the new units were to be higher than any currently modeled unit, then PJM's CPLEEXP pricing point would be higher, and PJM would receive more for exports.

Not maintaining a current set of units in the DEP footprint in PJM's network model limits PJM's ability to recognize which units are marginal and it is often not possible to calculate the CPLEIMP and CPLEEXP interface prices using the MCPM. By not maintaining a complete set of units in the DEP footprint, the reported output of the modeled units are often insufficient to cover the reported real time load, and therefore no units are considered marginal. When this occurs, the MMU believes that the CPLEIMP and CPLEEXP pricing points should revert to the SOUTHIMP and SOUTHEXP interface prices; however, this has not been the case. When this occurs, PJM reverts the calculation using the high-low interface pricing method as described in Section 2.6A (1) of the PJM Tariff. The MMU does not believe that this is appropriate, and does not see the basis for this approach in either the PJM Tariff or the PJM/DEP JOA.

On July 2, 2012, Duke Energy and Progress Energy Inc. completed a merger. While the individual companies planned to operate separately for a period of time, they have a joint dispatch agreement, and a joint open access transmission tariff.⁵⁴ On October 3, 2014, Duke Energy Progress (DEP) and PJM submitted revisions to the JOA to include a new Appendix B, update references to DEP's current legal name, and incorporate other revisions.⁵⁵ The MMU submitted a protest to this filing noting that the existing JOA depends on the specific characteristics of PEC as a standalone company, and the assumptions reflected in the current JOA no longer apply under the DEP joint

⁵³ The MMU has objected to the omission of nuclear and hydro units from the calculation. This omission is not included in the definition of the MCPM interface pricing method in the PJM Tariff, but is included as a special condition in the PJM/DEP JOA. The MMU does not believe it is appropriate to exclude these units from the calculation as these units could be considered marginal and impact the prices.

⁵⁴ See "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Carolina Power & Light tariff filing," Docket No. ER12-1338-000 (July 12, 2012) and "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Carolina Power & Light Joint Dispatch Agreement filing," Docket No. ER12-1343-000 (July 11, 2012).

⁵⁵ See *Duke Energy Progress, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, LLC*, Docket No. ER15-29-000 (October 3, 2014).

dispatch agreement.⁵⁶ As noted in the 2010 filing, “the terms and conditions of the bilateral agreement among PEC and PJM are grounded in an appreciation of their systems as they exist at the time of the effective date of the JOA, but they fully expect that evolving circumstances, protocols and requirements will require that they negotiate, in good faith, a response to such changes.”⁵⁷ The joint dispatch agreement changed the unique operational relationship that existed when the congestion management protocol was established. However, the merged company has not engaged in discussions with PJM as to whether the congestion management protocol that was “tailored to their [PJM and PEC] unique operational relationship” is still appropriate, or whether the congestion management protocol needs to be revised. The existing JOA does not apply to the merged company and should be terminated. The MMU recommends that PJM immediately provide the required 12-month notice to DEP to unilaterally terminate the Joint Operating Agreement.

PJM and VACAR South Reliability Coordination Agreement⁵⁸

On May 23, 2007, PJM and VACAR South (comprised of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DUK), PEC, South Carolina Public Service Authority (SCPSA), Southeast Power Administration (SEPA), South Carolina Energy and Gas Company (SCE&G) and Yadkin Inc. (a part of Alcoa)) entered into a reliability coordination agreement. It provides for system and outage coordination, emergency procedures and the exchange of data. The parties meet on a yearly basis. The agreement continued to be in effect in the first six months of 2015.

Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement between Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEC) and PJM Interconnection, LLC⁵⁹

The Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement executed on July 20, 2013, provides for the exchange of information between WEC and PJM.

⁵⁶ See Protest and Motion for Rehearing of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM in Docket No. ER15-29-000 (October 24, 2014).

⁵⁷ Joint Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of PJM Interconnection, L.C.C. and Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., Docket No. ER10-713-000 (March 10, 2010) at 2. Section 3.3 of the PJM-Progress JOA.

⁵⁸ See “PJM-VACAR South RC Agreement,” (November 7, 2014) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/executed-pjm-vacar-rc-agreement.ashx>>.

⁵⁹ See “Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement between Wisconsin Electric Power Company and PJM Interconnection, LLC,” (July 20, 2013) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/balancing-authority-operations-coordination-agreement.ashx>>.

The purpose of the data exchange is to allow for the coordination of balancing authority actions to ensure the reliable operation of the systems. The agreement continued to be in effect in the first six months of 2015.

Northeastern ISO-Regional Transmission Organization Planning Coordination Protocol⁶⁰

The Northeastern ISO-RTO Planning Coordination Protocol executed on December 8, 2004, provides for the exchange of information between PJM, NYISO and ISO New England. The purpose of the data exchange is to allow for the long-term planning coordination among and between the ISOs and RTOs in the Northeast. The agreement continued to be in effect in the first six months of 2015.

Interface Pricing Agreements with Individual Balancing Authorities

PJM consolidated the Southeast and Southwest interface pricing points to a single interface with separate import and export prices (SouthIMP and SouthEXP) on October 31, 2006.

The PJM/DEP JOA allows for the PECIMP and PECEXP interface pricing points to be calculated using the Marginal Cost Proxy Pricing method.⁶¹ The DUKIMP, DUKEXP, NCMPAIMP and NCMPAEXP interface pricing points are calculated based on the high-low pricing method as defined in Section 2.6A (1) of the PJM Tariff.

Table 9-34 Real-time average hourly LMP comparison for Duke, PEC and NCMPA: January through June 2015

	Import LMP	Export LMP	SOUTHIMP	SOUTHEXP	Difference - IMP LMP - SOUTHIMP	Difference - EXP LMP - SOUTHEXP
Duke	\$32.34	\$33.80	\$32.41	\$32.41	(\$0.08)	\$1.38
PEC	\$30.92	\$34.62	\$32.41	\$32.41	(\$1.50)	\$2.21
NCMPA	\$33.06	\$33.28	\$32.41	\$32.41	\$0.65	\$0.87

⁶⁰ See “Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol,” (December 8, 2004) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/agreements/northeastern-iso-rto-planning-coordination-protocol.ashx>>.

⁶¹ See *PJM Interconnection, LLC*, Docket No. ER10-2710-000 (September 17, 2010).

Table 9-35 Day-ahead average hourly LMP comparison for Duke, PEC and NCMPA: January through June 2015

	Import LMP	Export LMP	SOUTHIMP	SOUTHEXP	Difference IMP - SOUTHIMP	Difference EXP - SOUTHEXP
Duke	\$34.07	\$35.22	\$33.90	\$33.88	\$0.17	\$1.35
PEC	\$34.44	\$35.48	\$33.90	\$33.88	\$0.54	\$1.60
NCMPA	\$34.77	\$34.95	\$33.90	\$33.88	\$0.87	\$1.07

It is not clear that agreements between PJM and neighboring external entities, in which those entities receive some of the benefits of the PJM LMP market without either integrating into an LMP market or applying LMP internally, are in the best interest of PJM's market participants. In the case of the DEP JOA for example, the merger between Progress and Duke has resulted in a single, combined entity where one part of that entity is engaged in congestion management with PJM and thereby receiving special pricing from PJM for the dynamic energy schedule, while the other part of the entity is not.

Other Agreements with Bordering Areas

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) Wheeling Contracts

To help meet the demand for power in New York City, Con Edison uses electricity generated in upstate New York and wheeled through New York and New Jersey including lines controlled by PJM.⁶² This wheeled power creates loop flow across the PJM system. The Con Edison contracts governing the New Jersey path evolved during the 1970s and were the subject of a Con Edison complaint to the FERC in 2001.⁶³

After years of litigation concerning whether or on what terms Con Edison's protocol would be renewed, on February 23, 2009, PJM filed a settlement on behalf of the parties to resolve remaining issues with these contracts and their proposed rollover of the agreements under the PJM OATT.⁶⁴ By order

⁶² See the *2015 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 4 – "Energy Market Uplift" of this report for the operating reserve credits paid to maintain the power flow established in the Con Edison wheeling contracts.

⁶³ See the *2012 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

⁶⁴ See FERC Docket Nos. ER08-858-000, et al. The settling parties are the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO), Con Ed, PSE&G, PSE&G Energy Resources & Trading LLC and the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities.

issued September 16, 2010, the Commission approved this settlement,⁶⁵ which extends Con Edison's special protocol indefinitely. The Commission approved transmission service agreements that provide for Con Edison to take firm point-to-point service going forward under the PJM OATT. The Commission rejected objections raised first by NRG and FERC trial staff, and later by the MMU, that this arrangement is discriminatory and inconsistent with the Commission's open access transmission policy.⁶⁶ The settlement defined Con Edison's cost responsibility for upgrades included in the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. Con Edison is responsible for required transmission enhancements, and must pay the associated charges during the term of its service, and any subsequent roll over of the service.⁶⁷ Con Edison's rolled over service became effective on May 1, 2012. At that time, Con Edison became responsible for the entire 1,000 MW of transmission service and all associated charges and credits.

Interchange Transaction Issues

PJM Transmission Loading Relief Procedures (TLRs)

TLRs are called to control flows on electrical facilities when economic redispatch cannot solve overloads on those facilities. TLRs are called to control flows related to external balancing authorities, as redispatch within an LMP market can generally resolve overloads on internal transmission facilities.

PJM issued 20 TLRs of level 3a or higher in the first six months of 2015, compared to three such TLRs issued in the first six months of 2014.⁶⁸ The number of different flowgates for which PJM declared a TLR 3a or higher increased from seven in the first six months of 2014 to eight in the first six months of 2015. The total MWh of transaction curtailments increased by 3,316.3 percent from 1,852 MWh in the first six months of 2014 to 61,418 MWh in the first six months of 2015.

⁶⁵ 132 FERC ¶ 61,221 (2010).

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Motion to Intervene Out-of-Time and Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM in Docket No. ER08-858-000, et al. (May 11, 2010).

⁶⁷ The terms of the settlement state that Con Edison shall have no liability for transmission enhancement charges prior to the commencement of, or after the termination of, the term of the rolled over service.

⁶⁸ TLR Level 3a is the first level of TLR that results in the curtailment of transactions. See the *2014 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Appendix E, "Interchange Transactions," for a more complete discussion of TLR levels.

MISO issued 53 TLRs of level 3a or higher in the first six months of 2015, compared to 93 such TLRs issued in the first six months of 2014. The number of different flowgates for which MISO declared a TLR 3a or higher decreased from 26 in the first six months of 2014 to 15 in the first six months of 2015. The total MWh of transaction curtailments decreased by 63.0 percent from 138,714 MWh in the first six months of 2014 to 87,428 MWh in the first six months of 2015.

NYISO issued four TLRs of level 3a or higher in the first six months of 2015, compared to one such TLRs issued in the first six months of 2014. The number of different flowgates for which NYISO declared a TLR 3a or higher was one in the first six months of 2014 and was also one in the first six months of 2015. The total MWh of transaction curtailments increased by 305.4 percent from 991 MWh in the first six months of 2014 to 3,027 MWh in the first six months of 2015.

Table 9-36 PJM MISO, and NYISO TLR procedures: January, 2012 through June 2015

Month	Number of TLRs Level 3 and Higher			Number of Unique Flowgates That Experienced TLRs			Curtailment Volume (MWh)		
	PJM	MISO	NYISO	PJM	MISO	NYISO	PJM	MISO	NYISO
Jan-12	1	9	5	1	6	2	4,920	6,274	8,058
Feb-12	4	6	16	2	6	2	0	5,177	35,451
Mar-12	1	11	10	1	6	2	398	31,891	26,761
Apr-12	0	14	11	0	7	1	0	8,408	29,911
May-12	2	17	12	1	10	5	3,539	30,759	21,445
Jun-12	0	24	0	0	7	0	0	31,502	0
Jul-12	11	19	1	5	4	1	34,197	46,512	292
Aug-12	8	13	0	1	6	0	61,151	13,403	0
Sep-12	2	5	0	1	4	0	21,134	12,494	0
Oct-12	3	9	0	2	6	0	0	12,317	0
Nov-12	4	10	5	2	6	2	444	24,351	6,250
Dec-12	1	22	0	1	12	0	0	17,761	0
Jan-13	4	42	2	3	17	1	13,453	103,463	1,045
Feb-13	4	26	0	3	10	0	14,609	66,086	0
Mar-13	0	39	0	0	13	0	0	53,122	0
Apr-13	1	45	0	1	20	0	84	64,938	0
May-13	10	29	0	7	14	0	879	20,778	0
Jun-13	4	25	1	1	11	1	5,036	76,240	4,102
Jul-13	12	28	0	2	9	0	88,623	80,328	0
Aug-13	4	19	0	4	8	0	3,469	38,608	0
Sep-13	6	33	0	5	14	0	7,716	90,188	0
Oct-13	2	42	0	1	20	0	534	72,121	0
Nov-13	2	27	0	2	8	0	11,561	52,508	0
Dec-13	0	16	0	0	5	0	0	20,257	0
Jan-14	3	19	0	3	10	0	1,852	11,683	0
Feb-14	0	29	1	0	10	1	0	33,189	991
Mar-14	0	11	0	0	7	0	0	14,842	0
Apr-14	0	6	0	0	3	0	0	1,233	0
May-14	0	9	0	0	4	0	0	53,153	0
Jun-14	0	19	0	0	7	0	0	24,614	0
Jul-14	1	13	1	1	6	1	317	26,616	0
Aug-14	0	7	0	0	3	0	0	6,319	0
Sep-14	1	11	0	1	4	0	935	87,296	0
Oct-14	1	5	0	1	5	0	1,386	20,581	0
Nov-14	0	10	0	0	6	0	0	23,736	0
Dec-14	2	2	0	2	2	0	1,792	1,264	0
Jan-15	2	8	1	1	4	1	7,293	626	2,261
Feb-15	6	11	2	2	6	1	37,222	9,173	331
Mar-15	8	0	1	3	0	1	14,704	0	435
Apr-15	2	6	0	2	3	0	1,033	23,518	0
May-15	1	8	0	1	2	0	961	12,048	0
Jun-15	1	20	0	1	4	0	205	42,063	0

Table 9-37 Number of TLRs by TLR level by reliability coordinator: January through June, 2015⁶⁹

Year	Reliability Coordinator	3a	3b	4	5a	5b	6	Total
2015	MISO	15	23	0	10	5	0	53
	NYIS	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
	ONT	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	PJM	11	7	0	1	1	0	20
	SOCO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SWPP	68	36	0	21	9	0	134
	TVA	26	40	0	14	26	0	106
	VACS	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
Total		125	108	0	46	42	0	321

Up-To Congestion

The original purpose of up-to congestion transactions was to allow market participants to submit a maximum congestion charge, up to \$25 per MWh, they were willing to pay on an import, export or wheel through transaction in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. This product was offered as a tool for market participants to limit their congestion exposure on scheduled transactions in the Real-Time Energy Market.⁷⁰

Following elimination of the requirement to procure and pay for transmission for up-to congestion transactions, the volume of transactions increased significantly.

Up-to congestion transactions impact the day-ahead dispatch and unit commitment. Despite that, up-to congestion transactions do not pay operating reserves charges. Up-to congestion transactions also affect FTR funding.⁷¹

On August 29, 2014, FERC issued an Order which created an obligation for UTCs to pay any uplift determined to be appropriate in the Commission review, effective September 8, 2014.⁷²

⁶⁹ Southern Company Services, Inc. (SOCO) is the reliability coordinator covering a portion of Mississippi, Alabama, Florida and Georgia. Southwest Power Pool (SWPP) is the reliability coordinator for SPP. VACAR-South (VACS) is the reliability coordinator covering a portion of North Carolina and South Carolina.

⁷⁰ See the *2012 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

⁷¹ For more information on up-to congestion transaction impacts on FTRs, see the *2014 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through September*, Section 13: FTRs and ARRs, "FTR Forfeitures."

⁷² 148 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2014) *Order Instituting Section 206 Proceeding and Establishing Procedures*.

As a result of the requirement to pay uplift charges and the uncertainty about the level of the required uplift charges, market participants reduced up-to congestion trading effective September 8, 2014. The average number of up-to congestion bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market decreased by 67.8 percent, from 209,819 bids per day in the first six months of 2014 to 67,641 bids per day in the first six months of 2015. The average cleared volume of up-to congestion bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market decreased by 74.0 percent, from 1,609,507 MWh per day in the first six months of 2014, to 418,102 MWh per day in the first six months of 2015 (Figure 9-13).

Figure 9-13 Monthly up-to congestion cleared bids in MWh: January 2005 through June 2015




Table 9-38 Monthly volume of cleared and submitted up-to congestion bids: January 2010 through June 2015

Month	Bid MW					Bid Volume					Cleared MW					Cleared Volume				
	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total
Jan-10	3,794,946	3,097,524	212,010	-	7,104,480	81,604	55,921	3,371	-	140,896	2,250,689	1,789,018	161,977	-	4,201,684	49,064	33,640	2,318	-	85,022
Feb-10	3,841,573	3,937,880	316,150	-	8,095,603	80,876	80,685	2,269	-	163,830	2,627,101	2,435,650	287,162	-	5,349,913	50,958	48,008	1,812	-	100,778
Mar-10	4,877,732	4,454,865	277,180	-	9,609,777	97,149	74,568	2,239	-	173,956	3,209,064	3,071,712	263,516	-	6,544,292	60,277	48,596	2,064	-	110,937
Apr-10	3,877,306	5,558,718	210,545	-	9,646,569	67,632	85,358	1,573	-	154,563	2,622,113	3,690,889	170,020	-	6,483,022	42,635	54,510	1,154	-	98,299
May-10	3,800,870	5,062,272	149,589	-	9,012,731	74,996	78,426	1,620	-	155,042	2,366,149	3,049,405	112,700	-	5,528,253	47,505	48,996	1,112	-	97,613
Jun-10	9,126,963	9,568,549	1,159,407	-	19,854,919	95,155	89,222	6,960	-	191,337	6,863,803	6,850,098	1,072,759	-	14,786,660	59,733	55,574	5,831	-	121,138
Jul-10	12,818,141	11,526,089	5,420,410	-	29,764,640	124,929	106,145	18,948	-	250,022	8,971,914	8,237,557	5,241,264	-	22,450,734	73,232	60,822	16,526	-	150,580
Aug-10	8,231,393	6,767,617	888,591	-	15,887,601	115,043	87,876	10,664	-	213,583	4,430,832	2,894,314	785,726	-	8,110,871	62,526	40,485	8,884	-	111,895
Sep-10	7,768,878	7,561,624	349,147	-	15,679,649	184,697	161,929	4,653	-	351,279	3,915,814	3,110,580	256,039	-	7,282,433	63,405	45,264	3,393	-	112,062
Oct-10	8,732,546	9,795,666	476,665	-	19,004,877	189,748	154,741	7,384	-	351,873	4,150,104	4,564,039	246,594	-	8,960,736	76,042	65,223	3,670	-	144,935
Nov-10	11,636,949	9,272,885	537,369	-	21,447,203	253,594	170,470	9,366	-	433,430	5,765,905	4,312,645	275,111	-	10,353,661	112,250	71,378	4,045	-	187,673
Dec-10	17,769,014	12,863,875	923,160	-	31,556,049	307,716	215,897	15,074	-	538,687	7,851,235	5,150,286	337,157	-	13,338,678	136,582	93,299	7,380	-	237,261
Jan-11	20,275,932	11,807,379	921,120	-	33,004,431	351,193	210,703	17,632	-	579,528	7,917,986	4,925,310	315,936	-	13,159,232	151,753	91,557	8,417	-	251,727
Feb-11	18,418,511	13,071,483	800,630	-	32,290,624	345,227	226,292	17,634	-	589,153	6,806,039	4,879,207	248,573	-	11,933,818	151,003	99,302	8,851	-	259,156
Mar-11	17,330,353	12,919,960	749,276	-	30,999,589	408,628	274,709	15,714	-	699,051	7,104,642	5,603,583	275,682	-	12,983,906	178,620	124,990	7,760	-	311,370
Apr-11	17,215,352	9,321,117	954,283	-	27,490,752	513,881	265,334	17,459	-	796,674	7,452,366	3,797,819	351,984	-	11,602,168	229,707	113,610	8,118	-	351,435
May-11	21,058,071	11,204,038	2,937,898	-	35,200,007	562,819	304,589	24,834	-	892,242	8,294,422	4,701,077	1,031,519	-	14,027,018	261,355	143,956	11,116	-	416,427
Jun-11	20,455,508	12,125,806	395,833	-	32,977,147	524,072	285,031	12,273	-	821,376	7,632,235	5,361,825	198,482	-	13,192,543	226,747	132,744	6,363	-	365,854
Jul-11	24,273,892	16,837,875	409,863	-	41,521,630	603,519	338,810	13,781	-	956,110	9,585,027	8,617,284	205,599	-	18,407,910	283,287	186,866	7,008	-	477,161
Aug-11	23,790,091	21,014,941	229,895	-	45,034,927	591,170	403,269	8,278	-	1,002,717	10,594,771	10,875,384	103,141	-	21,573,297	274,398	208,593	3,648	-	486,639
Sep-11	21,740,208	18,135,378	232,626	-	40,108,212	526,945	377,158	7,886	-	911,989	10,219,806	9,270,121	82,200	-	19,572,127	270,088	185,585	3,444	-	459,117
Oct-11	20,240,161	19,476,556	333,672	-	40,049,794	540,877	451,507	8,609	-	1,000,993	8,376,208	7,853,947	126,718	-	16,356,873	255,206	198,778	4,236	-	458,220
Nov-11	27,007,141	28,994,789	507,788	-	56,509,718	594,397	603,029	13,379	-	1,210,805	9,064,570	9,692,312	131,670	-	18,888,552	254,851	256,270	5,686	-	516,807
Dec-11	34,990,790	34,648,433	531,616	-	70,170,839	697,524	655,222	14,187	-	1,366,933	11,738,910	10,049,685	137,689	-	21,926,284	281,304	248,008	6,309	-	535,621
Jan-12	38,906,228	36,928,145	620,448	-	76,454,821	745,424	689,174	16,053	-	1,450,651	13,610,725	14,120,791	145,773	-	27,877,288	289,524	304,072	5,078	-	598,674
Feb-12	37,231,115	36,736,507	323,958	-	74,291,580	739,200	724,477	8,572	-	1,472,249	12,883,355	12,905,553	54,724	-	25,843,632	299,055	276,563	2,175	-	577,793
Mar-12	38,824,528	39,163,001	297,895	-	78,285,424	802,983	842,857	8,971	-	1,654,811	13,328,968	13,306,689	89,262	-	26,724,918	320,210	320,252	3,031	-	643,493
Apr-12	42,085,326	44,565,341	436,632	-	87,087,299	884,004	917,430	12,354	-	1,813,788	15,050,798	16,297,303	171,252	-	31,519,354	369,273	355,669	4,655	-	729,597
May-12	44,436,245	43,888,405	489,938	-	88,814,588	994,735	885,319	10,294	-	1,890,348	17,416,386	14,733,838	189,667	-	32,339,891	434,919	343,872	4,114	-	782,905
Jun-12	38,962,548	32,828,393	975,776	-	72,766,718	872,764	684,382	21,781	-	1,578,927	12,675,852	12,311,609	250,024	-	25,237,485	355,731	295,911	6,891	-	658,533
Jul-12	45,565,682	41,589,191	855,676	-	88,010,549	1,077,721	911,300	27,173	-	2,016,194	13,001,225	12,823,361	348,946	-	26,173,532	399,135	321,062	9,958	-	730,155
Aug-12	44,972,628	45,204,886	931,161	-	91,108,675	1,054,472	987,293	31,580	-	2,073,345	12,768,023	13,354,850	300,038	-	26,422,911	377,146	343,717	12,738	-	733,601
Sep-12	40,796,522	39,411,713	957,800	-	81,166,035	1,037,179	949,941	29,246	-	2,016,366	12,089,136	12,961,955	292,095	-	25,343,186	341,925	329,217	9,620	-	680,762
Oct-12	35,567,607	42,489,970	1,415,992	-	79,473,570	908,200	1,048,029	46,802	-	2,003,031	11,969,576	13,949,871	392,286	-	26,311,733	345,788	376,513	14,089	-	736,390
Nov-12	24,795,325	25,498,103	1,258,755	52,022,007	103,574,190	542,992	614,349	43,829	1,631,255	2,832,425	6,517,798	7,872,496	286,535	14,482,701	29,159,529	186,492	245,943	15,042	509,436	956,913
Dec-12	22,597,985	22,560,837	1,727,510	84,548,868	131,435,199	489,208	515,873	55,376	2,767,292	3,827,749	5,116,607	6,350,080	454,289	21,958,089	33,879,065	180,592	224,830	24,459	820,991	1,250,872
Jan-13	16,718,393	21,312,321	2,010,317	76,937,535	116,978,566	422,501	527,037	63,227	2,115,649	3,128,414	4,115,418	5,820,177	522,459	22,906,008	33,364,063	149,282	199,123	23,926	657,602	1,029,933
Feb-13	12,567,004	15,509,978	1,477,275	67,258,116	96,812,373	352,963	400,563	43,133	1,798,434	2,595,093	3,019,380	4,356,113	461,615	23,311,066	31,148,173	110,397	158,085	15,892	669,364	953,738
Mar-13	14,510,721	17,019,755	1,601,487	88,109,152	121,241,114	372,402	402,711	48,112	1,959,294	2,782,519	3,868,303	4,743,283	358,180	27,439,606	36,409,373	131,506	166,295	17,884	774,020	1,089,705
Apr-13	14,538,907	17,419,505	1,337,680	105,927,107	139,223,200	358,245	364,008	47,048	2,275,846	3,045,147	4,413,047	4,834,302	315,867	32,152,243	41,715,459	145,860	157,031	16,315	892,562	1,211,768
May-13	16,565,868	17,640,682	1,640,097	115,572,648	151,419,296	431,892	389,254	54,873	2,660,793	3,536,812	4,556,277	4,747,887	333,677	34,778,962	44,416,803	144,444	144,482	16,317	944,116	1,249,359
Jun-13	16,698,203	18,904,971	1,337,373	128,595,957	165,536,504	452,145	433,010	48,007	3,384,811	4,317,973	3,823,166	4,280,538	312,158	34,935,141	43,351,002	143,223	151,603	17,518	1,116,318	1,428,662
Jul-13	15,436,914	16,428,662	1,473,144	116,673,912	150,012,631	430,120	387,969	49,712	3,075,624	3,943,425	3,250,706	3,502,990	320,374	29,883,430	36,957,500	131,535	127,032	17,948	957,260	1,233,775
Aug-13	12,332,984	14,354,140	1,370,624	89,306,595	117,364,344	328,835	326,637	40,325	2,223,269	2,919,066	2,862,764	3,232,565	309,069	26,900,995	33,305,393	111,715	122,061	16,299	848,490	1,098,565
Sep-13	10,767,257	11,322,974	729,332	75,686,010	98,505,573	264,095	262,486	21,968	1,976,741	2,525,290	2,962,619	3,467,611	221,329	26,044,742	32,696,300	102,984	107,604	10,233	792,766	1,013,587
Oct-13	9,081,257	11,106,943	853,397	86,857,535	107,899,131	280,821	338,374	31,031	2,524,127	3,174,353	2,201,219	3,532,253	186,113	28,243,584	34,163,168	108,189	145,667	11,551	1,002,832	1,268,239
Nov-13	9,219,216	15,052,563	1,307,989	98,027,480	123,607,248	267,704	394,031	39,095	3,167,638	3,868,468	2,640,001	3,986,788	332,814	32,437,908	39,397,511	112,850	154,379	13,958	1,238,589	1,519,776
Dec-13	9,934,234	16,089,101	1,696,981	118,916,149	146,636,465	286,295	404,788	42,367	3,691,770	4,425,220	3,189,261	3,234,196	503,666	38,150,077	45,077,200					

Table 9-38 Monthly volume of cleared and submitted up-to congestion bids: January 2010 through June 2015 (continued)

Month	Bid MW					Bid Volume					Cleared MW					Cleared Volume				
	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total	Import	Export	Wheel	Internal	Total
Jan-14	10,359,891	16,047,391	2,326,490	119,848,848	148,582,620	350,248	469,176	47,801	4,382,482	5,249,707	2,594,374	3,172,914	460,495	35,413,440	41,641,223	116,316	143,021	15,323	1,537,418	1,812,078
Feb-14	11,351,094	14,846,332	1,854,617	126,008,272	154,060,316	382,148	480,055	47,526	5,151,647	6,061,376	2,764,565	3,247,481	362,670	36,715,916	43,090,631	132,870	147,766	14,045	1,897,337	2,192,018
Mar-14	14,669,735	17,135,117	1,949,978	147,142,336	180,897,166	515,877	516,871	54,575	7,026,221	8,113,544	3,442,624	3,293,865	341,620	41,962,312	49,040,421	165,663	148,671	15,214	2,290,716	2,620,264
Apr-14	12,056,167	15,453,126	1,744,523	132,691,464	161,945,280	408,540	404,498	48,279	5,179,680	6,040,997	3,037,393	3,483,465	347,165	46,018,100	52,886,123	136,314	129,838	12,743	2,036,904	2,315,799
May-14	14,145,892	17,305,057	2,132,591	153,504,853	187,088,393	456,708	452,060	54,954	5,628,483	6,592,205	3,077,932	4,477,545	319,825	47,071,415	54,946,717	136,627	162,321	14,724	1,960,618	2,274,290
Jun-14	13,404,498	13,716,736	1,499,317	141,004,417	169,624,968	407,769	372,275	44,035	5,095,316	5,919,395	3,598,712	3,000,215	349,700	42,767,010	49,715,637	137,256	115,610	16,994	1,732,262	2,002,122
Jul-14	11,820,001	11,811,311	1,278,719	133,179,154	158,089,185	396,433	388,463	38,402	5,021,819	5,845,117	3,541,889	3,118,746	336,003	42,702,334	49,698,971	143,527	131,968	13,699	1,834,684	2,123,878
Aug-14	10,808,911	12,150,513	874,609	135,912,394	159,746,426	375,703	385,705	32,368	5,108,340	5,902,116	3,054,727	3,315,313	140,171	42,796,063	49,306,273	146,179	139,431	11,706	1,937,025	2,234,341
Sep-14	5,105,355	5,291,842	467,670	51,226,017	62,090,885	174,241	156,046	18,095	1,796,453	2,144,835	1,500,083	1,232,520	103,304	15,430,477	18,266,384	73,100	56,651	5,915	735,658	871,324
Oct-14	2,556,049	2,633,382	202,516	17,301,235	22,693,183	91,922	83,113	8,743	775,152	958,930	778,085	527,692	73,370	5,538,329	6,917,477	36,303	27,787	3,557	313,084	380,731
Nov-14	2,907,118	3,090,553	233,597	20,157,436	26,388,704	99,298	98,695	14,611	964,684	1,177,288	802,153	732,365	106,754	6,931,319	8,572,590	38,126	33,342	7,584	397,534	476,586
Dec-14	3,294,133	3,074,993	120,694	21,170,152	27,659,972	128,753	113,591	11,020	1,063,697	1,317,061	1,090,084	683,527	43,036	7,819,905	9,636,553	51,293	39,262	4,747	477,788	573,090
Jan-15	5,546,341	2,401,938	184,935	26,556,180	34,689,394	198,934	97,676	9,072	1,280,378	1,586,060	2,047,961	414,985	83,498	9,285,631	11,832,075	85,916	23,956	3,520	486,044	599,436
Feb-15	5,375,057	2,198,495	235,687	30,708,158	38,517,397	199,947	97,499	8,555	1,504,921	1,810,922	1,569,220	485,647	48,134	9,492,364	11,595,365	66,858	27,559	2,228	502,766	599,411
Mar-15	6,104,575	3,878,773	590,547	43,668,068	54,241,963	219,079	120,017	18,573	1,806,387	2,164,056	1,463,247	769,655	105,300	11,338,070	13,676,272	69,309	36,927	6,028	615,310	727,574
Apr-15	7,172,015	3,787,440	656,913	41,264,789	52,881,157	268,196	112,440	19,215	1,568,301	1,968,152	1,669,627	643,703	128,394	9,294,533	11,736,258	79,809	26,693	5,148	472,254	583,904
May-15	9,104,665	4,738,308	866,026	45,821,190	60,530,188	352,787	142,643	29,817	1,870,020	2,395,267	2,510,355	873,849	174,280	10,524,318	14,082,802	114,601	34,456	6,437	544,781	700,275
Jun-15	7,686,270	3,678,135	717,311	46,563,639	58,645,356	273,749	107,444	18,962	1,918,405	2,318,560	1,490,960	779,517	171,815	10,311,431	12,753,722	68,977	27,114	4,044	544,756	644,891
TOTAL	1,167,930,865	1,148,499,652	67,268,073	2,738,167,674	5,121,866,263	28,315,616	25,535,966	1,661,529	92,394,929	147,908,040	411,439,204	398,507,448	24,749,862	825,037,517	1,659,734,031	11,303,605	10,061,648	634,105	32,924,021	54,923,379

In the first six months of 2015, the cleared MW volume of up-to congestion transactions was comprised of 14.2 percent imports, 5.2 percent exports, 0.9 percent wheeling transactions and 79.6 percent internal transactions. Less than 0.1 percent of the up-to congestion transactions had matching real-time energy market transactions.

Sham Scheduling

Sham scheduling refers to a scheduling method under which a market participant breaks a single transaction, from generation balancing authority (source) to load balancing authority (sink), into multiple segments. Sham scheduling hides the actual source of generation from the load balancing authority. When unable to identify the source of the energy, the load balancing authority lacks a complete picture of how the power will flow to the load which can create loop flows and inaccurate pricing for transactions.

For example, if the generation balancing authority (source) is NYISO, and the load balancing authority (sink) is PJM, the transaction would be priced, in the PJM Energy Market, at the PJM/NYIS Interface regardless of the submitted market path. However, if a market participant were to break the transaction into multiple segments, one on the NYIS-ONT market path, and a second segment on the ONT-MISO-PJM market path, the market participant would conceal the true source (NYISO) from PJM, and PJM would price the transaction as if its source is Ontario (the ONT Interface price).

The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU's proposed validation rules would address sham scheduling.

Elimination of Ontario Interface Pricing Point

An interface pricing point defines the price at which transactions are priced, and is based on the path of the actual, physical transfer of energy. While a market participant designates a scheduled market path from a generation control area (GCA) to a load control area (LCA), this market path reflects the scheduled path as defined by the transmission reservations only, and may not reflect how the energy actually flows from the GCA to LCA. The challenge is to create interface prices, composed of external pricing points, which accurately represent flows between PJM and external sources of energy.

Transactions can be scheduled to an interface based on a contract transmission path, but pricing points are developed and applied based on the estimated electrical impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines, regardless of contract transmission path.⁷³ PJM establishes prices for transactions with external balancing authorities by assigning interface pricing points to individual balancing authorities based on the generation control area and load control area as specified on the NERC Tag. Transactions between PJM and external balancing authorities need to be priced at the PJM border.

The PJM/IMO interface pricing point (Ontario) was created to reflect the fact that transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority create actual energy flows that are split between the MISO and NYISO interface pricing points. PJM created the PJM/IMO interface pricing point to reflect the actual power flows across both the MISO/PJM and NYISO/PJM interfaces. The IMO does not have physical ties with PJM because it is not contiguous.

The PJM/IMO interface pricing point is defined as the LMP at the Bruce bus, which is located in the IESO. In the same manner as the PJM/MISO interface price, when a M2M constraint binds, PJM's LMP calculation at the Bruce bus (as well as all buses in the PJM network model) is based on the PJM model's distribution factors of the Bruce bus to the binding M2M constraint and PJM's shadow price of the binding M2M constraint. The LMP at the Bruce bus includes a congestion and loss component across the MISO and NYISO balancing authorities.

⁷³ See "Interface Pricing Point Assignment Methodology," (August 28, 2014) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/exschedule/interface-pricing-point-assignment-methodology.ashx>>. PJM periodically updates these definitions on its website. See <<http://www.pjm.com>>.

The non-contiguous nature of the PJM/IMO interface pricing point creates opportunities for market participants to engage in sham scheduling activities. For example, a market participant can use two separate transactions to create a flow from Ontario to MISO. In this example, the market participant uses the PJM Energy Market as a temporary generation and load point by first submitting a wheeling transaction from Ontario, through MISO and into PJM, then by submitting a second transaction from PJM to MISO. These two transactions, combined, create an actual flow along the Ontario/MISO interface. Through sham scheduling, the market participant receives settlements from PJM when no changes in generation occur. This activity is similar to that observed when PJM had a Southwest and Southeast Interface pricing point. During that time, market participants would utilize the PJM spot market as a temporary load and generation point to wheel transactions through the PJM Energy Market. This was done to take advantage of the price differences between the interfaces without providing the market benefits of congestion relief.

At the February 11, 2015, meeting of the PJM Markets Implementation Committee, PJM introduced a new PJM/IMO interface price method.⁷⁴ The new method utilizes a dynamic weighting of the PJM/MISO interface price and the PJM/NYIS interface price, based on the performance of the Michigan-Ontario PARs. When the absolute value of the actual flows on the PARs are greater than or equal to the absolute value of the scheduled flows on the PARs, and the scheduled and actual flows are in the same direction, the PJM/IMO interface price will be equal to the PJM/MISO interface price (i.e. 100 percent weighting on the PJM/MISO interface). When actual flows on the PARs are in the opposite direction of the scheduled flows on the PARs, the PJM/IMO interface price will be equal to the PJM/NYIS interface price (i.e. 100 percent weighting on the PJM/NYIS interface). When the absolute value of the actual flows on the PARs are less than or equal to the absolute value of the scheduled flows on the PARs, and the scheduled and actual flows are in the same direction, the PJM/IMO interface price will be a combination to the PJM/MISO interface price and the PJM/NYIS interface price. In this case the weightings of the PJM/MISO and PJM/NYIS interface prices are determined

⁷⁴ See "IMO Interface Definition Methodology Report," (February 11, 2015) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/committees-groups/committees/mic/20150211/20150211-item-08b-imo-interface-definition-methodology-report.ashx>>.

based on the scheduled and actual flows. For example, in a given interval, the scheduled flow on the Michigan-Ontario PARs is 1,000 MW, and the actual flow is 800 MW. If in that same interval, the PJM/MISO interface price is \$45.00 and the PJM/NYIS interface price \$30.00, the PJM/IMO interface price would be calculated with a weighting of 80 percent of the PJM/MISO interface price ($\$45.00 * 0.8$, or $\$36.00$) and 20 percent of the PJM/NYIS interface price ($\$30.00 * 0.2$, or $\$6.00$), for a PJM/IMO interface price of \$42.00. The new PJM/IMO interface price method was implemented on June 1, 2015.

The MMU believes that the new PJM/IMO interface price method is a step in the right direction towards pricing energy that sources or sinks in Ontario based on the path of the actual, physical transfer of energy. The MMU remains concerned about the assumption of PAR operations, and will continue to evaluate the impact of PARs on the scheduled and actual flows and the impacts on the PJM/IMO interface price. The MMU remains concerned about the potential for market participants to continue to engage in sham scheduling activities after the new method is implemented.

The MMU recommends that if the PJM/IMO interface price remains and with PJM's new method in place, that PJM implement additional business rules to remove the incentive to engage in sham scheduling activities using the PJM/IMO interface price. Such rules would prohibit the same market participant from scheduling an export transaction from PJM to any balancing authority while at the same time an import transaction is scheduled to PJM that receives the PJM/IMO interface price. PJM should also prohibit the same market participant from scheduling an import transaction to PJM from any balancing authority while at the same time an export transaction is scheduled from PJM that receives the PJM/IMO interface price.

Of the 4,202 GWh of the net scheduled transactions between PJM and IESO, 4,121 GWh wheeled through MISO in the first six months of 2015 (see Table 9-22). The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the PJM/IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the PJM/MISO interface pricing point.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ On October 1, 2013, a sub-group of PJM's Market Implementation Committee started stakeholder discussions to address this inconsistency in market pricing.

PJM and NYISO Coordinated Interchange Transactions

Coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS) provides the option for market participants to submit intra-hour transactions between the NYISO and PJM that include an interface spread bid on which transactions are evaluated. The evaluation is based on the forward-looking prices as determined by PJM's intermediate term security constrained economic dispatch tool (ITSCED) and the NYISO's real-time commitment (RTC) tool. PJM shares its PJM/NYISO interface price ITSCED results with the NYISO. The NYISO compares the PJM/NYISO interface price with its RTC calculated NYISO/PJM interface price. If the PJM and NYISO interface price spread is greater than the market participant's CTS bid, the transaction is approved. If the PJM and NYISO interface price spread is less than the CTS bid, the transaction is denied.

On December 13, 2013, PJM submitted proposed revisions to the PJM Operating Agreement, and parallel provisions of the PJM Tariff, to implement CTS.⁷⁶ This filing requested that the Commission issue an order accepting the proposed revisions by no later than February 13, 2014 to allow for adequate time to develop the infrastructure necessary to implement CTS in November, 2014. The Commission issued an order conditionally accepting the tariff revisions on February 20, 2014, for implementation on the later of November 4, 2014, or the date that CTS becomes operational, subject to the submission of an informational filing informing the Commission of the acceptance of ITSCED forecasting accuracy standards, and an additional revised tariff no later than fourteen days prior to the official implementation date of CTS.⁷⁷ On November 4, 2014, PJM and the NYISO implemented CTS.

The ITSCED application runs approximately every five minutes and each run produces forecast LMPs for the intervals approximately 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 90 minutes and 135 minutes ahead. Therefore, for each 15 minute interval, the various ITSCED solutions will produce 12 forecasted PJM/NYIS interface prices. To evaluate the accuracy of ITSCED forecasts, the forecasted PJM/NYIS interface price for each 15 minute interval from ITSCED was compared to the actual real-time interface LMP for the first six months of 2015. Table 9-39

⁷⁶ See PJM Interconnection, LLC, OA Schedule 1 and Attachment K Revisions, Docket No. ER14-623-000 (December 13, 2013).

⁷⁷ 146 FERC ¶ 61,096 (2014).

shows that over all 12 forecast ranges, ITSCED predicted the real-time PJM/NYIS interface LMP within the range of \$0.00 to \$5.00 in 32.1 percent of the intervals. In those intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time LMP was \$1.90. In 9.9 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than \$20.00, with an average price difference of \$81.25, and in 9.6 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time LMP was greater than -\$20.00, with an average price difference of \$98.34.

Table 9-39 ITSCED real-time LMP - PJM/NYIS interface price comparison (all intervals): January through June 2015

Range	Percent of All Intervals	Average Price Difference
> \$20	9.9%	\$81.25
\$10 to \$20	5.7%	\$14.04
\$5 to \$10	8.9%	\$7.04
\$0 to \$5	32.1%	\$1.90
-\$5 to \$0	24.5%	\$1.72
-\$10 to -\$5	5.2%	\$7.11
-\$20 to -\$10	4.0%	\$14.24
< -\$20	9.6%	\$98.34

Table 9-40 shows how the accuracy of the ITSCED forecasted LMPs changes as the cases approach real-time.

Table 9-40 ITSCED real-time LMP - PJM/NYIS interface price comparison (by interval): January through June 2015

Range	~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time		~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time		~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time		~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time	
	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference
> \$20	9.5%	\$64.40	9.1%	\$61.69	10.6%	\$70.93	7.7%	\$63.37
\$10 to \$20	6.0%	\$14.04	5.7%	\$14.14	6.2%	\$13.91	5.3%	\$13.92
\$5 to \$10	9.1%	\$7.04	9.3%	\$7.06	10.2%	\$7.00	8.3%	\$7.01
\$0 to \$5	30.6%	\$1.99	31.3%	\$1.98	32.8%	\$2.00	34.2%	\$1.79
-\$5 to \$0	23.6%	\$1.90	23.6%	\$1.88	22.9%	\$1.68	25.7%	\$1.63
-\$10 to -\$5	6.2%	\$7.04	6.0%	\$7.08	4.7%	\$7.18	5.0%	\$7.10
-\$20 to -\$10	4.4%	\$14.35	4.4%	\$14.05	3.5%	\$14.30	4.1%	\$14.25
< -\$20	10.6%	\$121.58	10.5%	\$109.20	9.1%	\$87.32	9.7%	\$87.68

Table 9-40 shows that while there is some improvement as the forecast gets closer to real time, a substantial range of forecast errors remain even in the thirty-minute ahead forecast. In the final ITSCED results prior to real time, in 60.0 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP fell within +/- \$5.00 of the actual PJM/NYIS interface real-time LMP, compared to 54.2 percent in the 135 minute ahead ITSCED results.

In 17.4 percent of all intervals, the absolute value of the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than \$20.00 in the thirty-minute ahead cases, the average price differences were \$63.37 when the price difference was greater than \$20.00, and \$87.68 when the price difference was greater than -\$20.00.

The NYISO utilizes PJM's ITSCED forecasted LMPs to compare against the NYISO Real-Time Commitment (RTC) results in its evaluation of CTS transactions. The NYISO approves CTS (spread bid) transactions when the offered spread is less than or equal to the spread between the ITSCED forecast PJM/NYIS interface LMP and the NYISO RTC forecast NYIS/PJM interface LMP. The large differences between forecast and actual LMPs in the intervals closest to real-time could cause CTS transactions to be approved that would contribute to transactions being scheduled counter to real-time economic signals, and contribute to inefficient scheduling across the PJM/NYIS border.

CTS transactions are evaluated based on the spread bid, which limits the amount of price convergence that can occur. As long as balancing operating reserve payments are applied and CTS transactions are optional, the CTS proposal represents an incremental step towards better interface pricing. The 75 minute time lag associated with scheduling energy transactions in the NYISO should be addressed to improve the efficiency of interchange transaction pricing at the PJM/NYISO seam. Minimizing this time lag could play a significant role in improving pricing efficiency at the PJM/NYISO border on a standalone basis or in combination with the CTS transaction approach. CTS transactions are evaluated for each 15 minute interval. From November 4, 2014, through June 30, 2015, the first eight months of CTS operations, 23,565 15 minute

transaction intervals were approved through the CTS process based on the forecast LMPs. When the forecast LMPs for the approved intervals were compared to the hourly integrated real-time LMPs, the direction of the flow in 7,694 (32.7 percent) of the intervals was inconsistent with the differences in real-time PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM prices. For example, if a market participant submits a CTS transaction from NYISO to PJM with a spread bid of \$5.00, and NYISO's forecasted PJM interface price was at least \$5.00 lower than PJM's forecasted NYISO interface price, the transaction would be approved. For 32.7 percent of the approved transactions, the actual, real-time price differentials were in the opposite direction of the forecast differential. The actual, real-time price differentials meant that the transactions would have been economic in the opposite direction. For 67.3 percent of the intervals, the forecast price differentials were consistent with real-time PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM price differences.

The MMU does not believe that conclusions should be reached on the effectiveness of the CTS process in improving the scheduling efficiency on the PJM/NYISO interface based on data for eight months. The data for eight months show that ITSCED is not a highly accurate predictor of the real-time PJM/NYISO interface prices. If this remains true, it will limit the effectiveness of CTS in improving the effectiveness of interface pricing.

Reserving Ramp on the PJM/NYISO Interface

Prior to the implementation of CTS, PJM held ramp space for all transactions submitted between PJM and the NYISO as soon as the NERC Tag was approved. At that time, once transactions were evaluated by the NYISO through their real-time market clearing process, any adjustments made to the submitted transactions would be reflected on the NERC Tags and the PJM ramp was adjusted accordingly.

As part of this process, PJM was often required to make further adjustments to transactions on its other interfaces in order to bring total system ramp back to within its limit. For example, if the ramp limit were +/- 1,000 MW, and there were 2,000 MW of imports scheduled from the NYISO to PJM at a given interval, this would allow for 3,000 MW to be exported from PJM

on its other interfaces in the same interval (2,000 MW of imports and 3,000 MW of exports net to -1,000 MW of interchange, which is within the +/- 1,000 MW ramp limit in that interval). If, through the NYISO real-time market clearing process, the NYISO only approves 1,000 MW of exports to PJM, the other 1,000 MW of transactions would be curtailed, and PJM would see a ramp of -2,000 MW in that interval (1,000 MW of imports and 3,000 MW of exports net to -2,000 MW of interchange) which violates the +/- 1,000 MW ramp limit. PJM would then be required to curtail an additional 1,000 MW of exports at its other interface to bring the limit back to within the 1,000 MW limit. These curtailments were made on a last-in first-out basis as determined by the timestamp on the NERC Tag.

With the implementation of the CTS product with the NYISO, PJM modified how ramp is handled at the PJM/NYISO interface. Effective November 4, 2014, PJM no longer holds ramp room for any transactions submitted between PJM and the NYISO at the time of submission. Only after the NYISO completes its real-time market clearing process, and communicates the results to PJM, will PJM perform a ramp evaluation on transactions scheduled with the NYISO. If, in the event the NYISO market clearing process violates ramp, PJM would make additional adjustments based on a last-in first-out basis as determined by the timestamp on the NERC Tag. This process prevents the transactions scheduled at the PJM/NYISO interface from holding (or creating) ramp until they have completed their economic evaluation and are approved through the NYISO market clearing process. The MMU has not observed any adverse effects of the new process. The MMU will continue to monitor and evaluate the process moving forward.

PJM and MISO Coordinated Interchange Transaction Proposal

PJM and MISO have proposed the implementation of coordinated interchange transactions, similar to the PJM/NYISO approach, through the Joint and Common Market initiative. While the mechanics of transaction evaluation have yet to be determined, the coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS) proposal would provide the option for market participants to submit intra-

hour transactions between the MISO and PJM that include an interface spread bid on which transactions are evaluated. Similar to the PJM/NYISO approach, the evaluation would be based, in part, on the forward-looking prices as determined by PJM's intermediate term security constrained economic dispatch tool (ITSCED).

The ITSCED application runs approximately every five minutes and each run produces forecast LMPs for the intervals approximately 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 90 minutes and 135 minutes ahead. Therefore, for each 15 minute interval, the various ITSCED solutions will produce 12 forecasted PJM/MISO interface prices. To evaluate the accuracy of ITSCED forecasts, the forecasted PJM/MISO interface price for each 15 minute interval from ITSCED was compared to the actual real-time interface LMP for the first six months of 2015. Table 9-41 shows that over all 12 forecast ranges, ITSCED predicted the real-time PJM/MISO interface LMP within the range of \$0.00 to \$5.00 in 39.8 percent of all intervals. In those intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time LMP was \$1.72. In 5.8 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than \$20.00, with an average price difference of \$77.31, and in 4.7 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time LMP was greater than -\$20.00, with an average price difference of \$98.59.

Table 9-41 ITSCED real-time LMP - PJM/MISO interface price comparison (all intervals): January through June 2015

Range	Percent of All Intervals	Average Price Difference
> \$20	5.8%	\$77.31
\$10 to \$20	6.1%	\$14.21
\$5 to \$10	8.1%	\$7.06
\$0 to \$5	39.8%	\$1.72
-\$5 to \$0	27.7%	\$1.52
-\$10 to -\$5	4.6%	\$7.09
-\$20 to -\$10	3.3%	\$14.10
< -\$20	4.7%	\$98.59

Table 9-42 shows how the accuracy of the ITSCED forecasted LMPs change as the cases approach real-time.

Table 9-42 ITSCED real-time LMP - PJM/MISO interface price comparison (by interval): January through June 2015

Range	~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time		~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time		~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time		~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time	
	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference	Percent of Intervals	Average Price Difference
> \$20	7.5%	\$53.95	7.1%	\$49.13	3.8%	\$48.55	3.4%	\$57.88
\$10 to \$20	6.9%	\$14.36	7.1%	\$14.35	5.7%	\$14.07	5.1%	\$14.13
\$5 to \$10	9.0%	\$7.07	8.6%	\$7.02	8.3%	\$7.08	7.3%	\$7.04
\$0 to \$5	39.3%	\$1.83	40.6%	\$1.82	40.7%	\$1.75	41.3%	\$1.65
-\$5 to \$0	25.2%	\$1.59	25.0%	\$1.56	28.4%	\$1.50	29.4%	\$1.45
-\$10 to -\$5	4.3%	\$7.06	4.1%	\$7.08	4.7%	\$7.14	4.9%	\$7.11
-\$20 to -\$10	3.1%	\$14.14	3.0%	\$14.01	3.3%	\$14.22	3.5%	\$14.13
< -\$20	4.7%	\$154.48	4.6%	\$126.54	5.0%	\$74.48	5.0%	\$73.69

Table 9-42 shows that while there is some improvement as the forecast gets closer to real time, a substantial range of forecast errors remain even in the thirty-minute ahead forecast. In the final ITSCED results prior to real time, in 70.7 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP fell within +/- \$5.00 of the actual PJM/MISO interface real-time LMP, compared to 64.5 percent in the 135 minute ahead ITSCED results.

The absolute value of the average price difference between the ITSCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than \$20.00 in the thirty-minute ahead cases in 8.4 percent of all intervals, the average price difference was \$57.88 when the price difference was greater than \$20.00, and the average price difference was \$73.69 when the price difference was greater than -\$20.00.

The data reviewed show that ITSCED is not a highly accurate predictor of the real-time PJM/MISO interface prices. If this remains true, it will limit the effectiveness of CTS in improving the effectiveness of interface pricing between PJM and MISO.

Willing to Pay Congestion and Not Willing to Pay Congestion

When reserving non-firm transmission, market participants have the option to choose whether or not they are willing to pay congestion. When the market participant elects to pay congestion, PJM operators redispatch the system if necessary to allow the energy transaction to continue to flow. The system redispatch often creates price separation across buses on the PJM system. The difference in LMPs between two buses in PJM is the congestion cost (and losses) that the market participants pay in order for their transaction to continue to flow.

The MMU recommended that PJM modify the not willing to pay congestion product to address the issues of uncollected congestion charges. The MMU recommended charging market participants for any congestion incurred while the transaction is loaded, regardless of their election of transmission service, and restricting the use of not willing to pay congestion transactions (as well as all other real-time external energy transactions) to transactions at interfaces.

On April 12, 2011, the PJM Market Implementation Committee (MIC) endorsed the changes recommended by the MMU. The elimination of internal sources and sinks on transmission reservations mostly addresses these concerns, as there can no longer be uncollected congestion charges for imports to PJM or exports from PJM (Table 9-43 shows that there have been no uncollected congestion charges since the inception of the business rule change on April 12, 2013.) There is still potential exposure to uncollected congestion charges in wheel through transactions, and the MMU will continue to evaluate if additional mitigation measures would be necessary in the future to address this exposure.

Table 9-43 Monthly uncollected congestion charges: January 2010 through June 2015

Month	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Jan	\$148,764	\$3,102	\$0	\$5	\$0	\$0
Feb	\$542,575	\$1,567	(\$15)	\$249	\$0	\$0
Mar	\$287,417	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Apr	\$31,255	\$4,767	(\$68)	(\$3,114)	\$0	\$0
May	\$41,025	\$0	(\$27)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Jun	\$169,197	\$1,354	\$78	\$0	\$0	\$0
Jul	\$827,617	\$1,115	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Aug	\$731,539	\$37	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Sep	\$119,162	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Oct	\$257,448	(\$31,443)	(\$6,870)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Nov	\$30,843	(\$795)	(\$4,678)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Dec	\$127,176	(\$659)	(\$209)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Total	\$3,314,018	(\$20,955)	(\$11,789)	(\$2,860)	\$0	\$0

Spot Imports

Prior to April 1, 2007, PJM did not limit non-firm service imports that were willing to pay congestion, including spot imports, secondary network service imports and bilateral imports using non-firm point-to-point service. Spot market imports, non-firm point-to-point and network services that are willing to pay congestion, collectively willing to pay congestion (WPC), were part of the PJM LMP energy market design implemented on April 1, 1998. Under this approach, market participants could offer energy into or bid to buy from the PJM spot market at the border/interface as price takers without restrictions based on estimated available transmission capability (ATC). Price and PJM system conditions, rather than ATC, were the only limits on interchange. PJM interpreted its JOA with MISO to require restrictions on spot imports and exports although MISO has not implemented a corresponding restriction.⁷⁸ The result was that the availability of spot import service was limited by ATC and not all spot transactions were approved. Spot import service (a network service) is provided at no charge to the market participant offering into the PJM spot market.

⁷⁸ See "Modifications to the Practices of Non-Firm and Spot Market Import Service," (April 20, 2007) <<http://www.pjm.com/~media/etools/oasis/wpc-white-paper.ashx>>.


In response to market participant complaints regarding the inability to acquire spot import service after this rule change on April 1, 2007, changes were made to the spot import service effective May 1, 2008.⁷⁹ These changes limited spot imports to only hourly reservations and caused spot import service to expire if not associated with a valid NERC Tag within 2 hours when reserved the day prior to the scheduled flow or within 30 minutes when reserved on the day of the scheduled flow.

The new spot import rules provided incentives to hoard spot import capability. In the *2008 State of the Market Report for PJM*, the MMU recommended that PJM reconsider whether a new approach to limiting spot import service is required or whether a return to the prior policy with an explicit system of managing related congestion is preferable. PJM and the MMU jointly addressed this issue through the stakeholder process, recommending that all unused spot import service be retracted if not tagged within 30 minutes from the reservations queued time intraday, and two hours when queued the day prior. On June 23, 2009 PJM implemented the new business rules.

Figure 9-14 shows the spot import service utilization for the NYISO interface, and for all other interfaces, from January 2013, through June 2015. The yellow line shows the total monthly MWh of spot import service reserved and the orange line shows the total monthly MWh of tagged spot import service. The grey shaded area between the yellow and orange lines represents the MWh of retracted spot import service. The blue shaded area between the orange line and green shaded area represents the MWh of curtailed transactions using spot import service, and the green shaded area represents the total settled MWh of spot import service. Figure 9-14 shows that while there are proportionally fewer retracted MWh on the NYISO interface than on all other interfaces, the NYISO has proportionally more curtailed MWh. This is a result of the NYISO market clearing process.

⁷⁹ See "Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices" (May 1, 2008) <<http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/~media/etools/oasis/regional-practices-redline-doc.ashx>>. (Accessed March 1, 2012)

Figure 9-14 Spot import service utilization: January 2013 through June, 2015



The MMU continues to recommend that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports (as well as all non-firm point-to-point willing to pay congestion imports and exports) at all PJM Interfaces.

Interchange Optimization

When PJM prices are higher than prices in surrounding balancing authorities, imports will flow into PJM until the prices are approximately equal, given all the identified limitations on the effectiveness of the interchange pricing and transaction process. This is an appropriate market response to price differentials. Given the nature of interface pricing and the treatment of interface transactions, it is not possible to reliably predict the quantity or sustainability of such imports. The inability to predict interchange volumes creates additional challenges for PJM dispatch in trying to meet loads, especially on high-load days. If all external transactions were submitted as

real-time dispatchable transactions during emergency conditions, PJM would be able to include interchange transactions in its supply stack, and dispatch only enough interchange to meet the demand.

The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1200 on the prior day to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes. These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be utilized to meet load based on economic dispatch rather than guessing the sensitivity of the transactions to price changes.

In addition to changing prices, transmission line loading relief procedures (TLRs), market participants' curtailments for economic reasons, and external balancing authority curtailments all affect the duration of interchange transactions. The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that remove the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams. Such a solution would include an optimized, but limited joint dispatch approach that treats seams between balancing authorities as a constraint, similar to other constraints within an LMP market.

45 Minute Schedule Duration Rule

PJM limits the change in interchange volumes on 15 minute intervals. These changes are referred to as ramp. The purpose of imposing a ramp limit is to help ensure the reliable operation of the PJM system. The 1,000 MW ramp limit per 15 minute interval was based on the availability of ramping capability by generators in the PJM system. The limit is consistent with the view that the available generation in the PJM system can only move 1,000 MW over any 15 minute period. The PJM ramp limit is designed to limit the change in the amount of imports or exports in each 15 minute interval to account for the physical characteristics of the generation to respond to changes in the level of imports and exports. For example, if at 0800 the sum of all external transactions were -3,000 MW (negative sign indicates net exporting), the limit for 0815 would be -2,000 MW to -4,000 MW. In other words, the starting or

ending of transactions would be limited so that the overall change from the previous 15 minute period would not exceed 1,000 MW in either direction.

In 2008, there was an increase in 15 minute external energy transactions that caused swings in imports and exports submitted in response to intra-hour LMP changes. This activity was due to market participants' ability to observe price differences between RTOs in the first third of the hour, and predict the direction of the price difference on an hourly integrated basis. Large quantities of MW would then be scheduled between the RTOs for the last 15 minute interval to capture those hourly integrated price differences with relatively little risk of prices changing. This increase in interchange on 15 minute intervals created operational control issues, and in some cases led to an increase in uplift charges due to calling on resources with minimum run times greater than 15 minutes needed to support the interchange transactions. As a result, a new business rule was proposed and approved that required all transactions to be at least 45 minutes in duration.

On June 22, 2012, FERC issued Order No. 764.⁸⁰ This order proposed to give transmission customers the ability to adjust their transmission schedules to reflect more accurate power production forecasts, load and system conditions, by requiring each public utility transmission provider to offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling. Order No. 764 required transmission providers to provide transmission customers the option to schedule transmission service at 15 minute intervals.⁸¹

On November 12, 2013, PJM submitted its compliance filing to Order 764.⁸² PJM noted that its current business practices already comply with the 15 minute scheduling interval mandate, but pointed out the 45 minute minimum duration rule that was put in place to protect against the previously observed market abuses.⁸³ PJM concluded that a return to a 15 minute duration rule would cause an increase in imbalance charges/Balancing Operating Reserve

⁸⁰ *Integration of Variable Energy Resources*, Order No. 764, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246 (2012), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 764-A, 141 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2012).

⁸¹ Order No. 764 at P 51.

⁸² See PJM Interconnection LLC filing, Docket No. ER14-383-000 (November 12, 2013).

⁸³ See *Id.* at 5-7.

costs if market participants engaged in the behaviors that the 45 minute requirement eliminated.

On April 17, 2014, FERC issued its order accepting in part and rejecting in part PJM's proposed tariff revisions.⁸⁴ The Commission found that PJM's 45 minute duration rule was inconsistent with Order 764.⁸⁵

Effective May 19, 2014, PJM removed the 45 minute scheduling duration rule to become compliant with Order No. 764.^{86,87,88}

PJM and the MMU issued a statement indicating ongoing concern about market participants' scheduling behavior, and a commitment to address any scheduling behavior that raises operational or market manipulation concerns.⁸⁹

Interchange Transaction Credit Screening Process

On November 3, 2014, PJM implemented a credit screening process for export interchange transactions submitted to PJM which requires participants to set aside sufficient credit in the eCredit application to cover their transactions. The amount of credit participants are required to set aside is equal to the MWh of each transaction times a price for each transaction on a rolling two day basis. The price used in the calculation is defined as the export nodal reference price factor for the interface point where the export is scheduled, or the real-time price calculated by PJM's ITSCED model, if higher. The export nodal reference price factor is updated every two months, and is based on nodal prices in the same two months the prior year. For example, if a market participant submits a 100 MW export from PJM to MISO between 0700 and 2300 (16 on-peak hours) in January 2015, and if the ITSCED price does not exceed the export nodal reference price factor, then the credit requirement would be calculated as $100\text{MW} * 16 \text{ hours/day} * 2 \text{ days} * \318.84 (the MISO on-peak nodal reference price factor for Jan-Feb 2015) or \$1,020,288. If this

⁸⁴ 147 FERC ¶ 61,045 (2014).

⁸⁵ See *Id.* at P 12.

⁸⁶ *Integration of Variable Energy Resources*, Order No. 764, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246 (2012), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 764-A, 141 FERC ¶ 61231 (2012).

⁸⁷ See Letter Order, Docket No. ER14-381-000 (June 30, 2014).

⁸⁸ See Letter Order, Docket No. ER14-381-000 (June 30, 2014).

⁸⁹ See joint statement of PJM and the MMU re Interchange Scheduling issued July 29, 2014, which can be accessed at: <http://www.pjm.com/~media/documents/reports/20140729-pjm-imm-joint-statement-on-interchange-scheduling.ashx>.

full amount of credit is not set aside for the full two days, the transaction will be curtailed at the next screening.

Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation

The sum of marginal losses is greater than average losses, resulting in a marginal loss surplus. The marginal loss surplus is paid by load and should be returned to load. The allocation of the marginal loss surplus is defined by PJM's marginal loss surplus allocation method.

On February 24, 2009, the Commission issued an Order directing that PJM's marginal loss surplus allocations should be allocated "equitably among all parties that support the fixed cost of the transmission system, without regard to whether such parties serve load, or show cause why such a credit should not be provided to all those who pay transmission charges."⁹⁰ On August 18, 2010, PJM filed revisions to the marginal loss surplus allocation.⁹¹ The Commission approved PJM's filing on September 17, 2010.⁹² However, the approved allocation method still does not accurately implement the Commission's February 24, 2009, directive. The current marginal loss surplus allocation states:

The total Transmission Loss Charges accumulated by PJM Settlement in any hour shall be distributed pro-rata to each Network Service User and Transmission Customer in proportion to its ratio shares of the total MWhs of energy delivered to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, or the total exports of MWh of energy from the PJM Region (that paid for transmission service during such hour). Exports of energy for which Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service was utilized and for which the Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service rate was paid will receive an allocation of the total Transmission Loss Charges based on a percentage of the MWh of energy exported on such service, determined by the ratio of Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service rate to Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service rate.⁹³

⁹⁰ 126 FERC ¶ 61,164 (2009).

⁹¹ See PJM Interconnection L.L.C. filing, Docket No. ER10-2280-000 (August 18, 2010).

⁹² 132 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2010).

⁹³ See OATT Attachment K § 5.5.

The current marginal loss surplus allocation method does not allocate the surplus based on contributions to the fixed costs of the transmission system, but based on the MWh of transmission used instead. For example, if a market participant acquires 100 MWh of transmission, but only schedules 25 MWh, the marginal loss allocation would be based on the 25 MWh of scheduled transmission, ignoring the contribution of the remaining 75 MWh to the fixed costs of the transmission system that were paid for, but not utilized. The use of scheduled energy rather than the contribution to the costs of the grid results in an under allocation of surplus to firm transmission customers. Firm transmission is purchased on an annual, monthly, weekly or daily basis. The load factor, or utilization rate, for firm transmission service is much lower than for non-firm transmission service. The result, in turn, is that an allocation method based on usage rather than the contribution to the fixed costs of the grid under allocates surplus to firm transmission customers and over allocates surplus to non-firm transmission customers. For example, if a market participant wants to schedule energy on daily firm transmission during the on-peak hours, they would be required to acquire, at a minimum, a 24 hour daily firm block. Only the sixteen on-peak hours during which the transmission was used would be eligible for marginal loss surplus allocations. The result is that one third of the total cost of the firm transmission, which the market participant contributes to the fixed costs of the transmission system, is not eligible for any allocation of the marginal loss surplus. This effect is exacerbated for weekly, monthly and annual purchases of firm transmission service.

The current method also inappropriately excludes some transmission service types that contribute to the fixed costs of the transmission system. The method does not allocate any surplus to the purchasers of non-firm or firm point-to-point transmission service that is required to import power to PJM in the PJM Real-Time Market, or to the purchasers of non-firm or firm transmission service required to import or export fixed or dispatchable transactions in the PJM Day-Ahead Market.

The MMU recommends that PJM file revisions to the marginal loss surplus allocation method to fully comply with the February 24, 2009, Order. The

MMU recommends that the revised allocation method distribute the marginal loss surplus to each network service user and transmission customer in proportion to its ratio share of the total dollars contributed to the fixed costs of the transmission system, regardless of whether such service is utilized in the PJM Day-Ahead or Real-Time Energy Markets. The MMU recommends that marginal loss surplus allocations be capped such that the marginal loss surplus credits cannot exceed the contributions made to the fixed costs of the transmission system for any reason.

