UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

NextEra Energy, Inc.	)	Docket No. EC26-131-000
Dominion Energy, Inc.	)	

ANSWER, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND COMMENTS OF THE INDEPENDENT MARKET MONITOR FOR PJM

Pursuant to Rule 211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations,[1] Monitoring Analytics, LLC, acting in its capacity as the Independent Market Monitor ("Market Monitor") for PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM"),[2] submits these comments on the response to a Commission deficiency letter filed by NextEra Energy, Inc. ("NextEra") and Dominion Energy, Inc. ("Dominion") ("Applicants") on October 15, 2026 ("October 15th Response"). The deficiency letter, issued September 23, 2026 ("Deficiency Letter"), directs the Applicants to respond to inquiries about their application filed July 15, 2026 ("July 15th Application"). Applicants seek approval under Section 203 of the Federal Power Act of a proposed transaction in which NextEra will acquire Dominion ("Transaction" or "Merger").

In addition, pursuant to Rules 212 and 213,[3] the Market Monitor also answers, and moves for leave to answer, Applicants' answer filed October 15, 2026 ("October 15th

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1 18 CFR §§ 385.211 (2026); 16 U.S.C. § 824b.

2 Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined have the meaning used in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("OATT"), the PJM Operating Agreement ("OA") or the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement ("RAA").

3 18 CFR §§ 385.212 & 385.213 (2026).

Answer"), to the Market Monitor's protest filed September 29, 2026 ("Market Monitor Protest"), to the July 15th Application.

Applicants fail to support their core assertion that monopoly is more beneficial to customers than competition. Both the October 15th Response and the October 15th Answer reveal Applicants' lack of transparency and diligence in providing the details of the proposed Merger to the Commission. The well documented, expansive future plans of NextEra to build new generation and transmission to meet the needs of data center load growth and become the largest utility in the nation are diminished as irrelevant and dismissed as speculative.[4] [5] Applicants' analysis of vertical market power due to pipeline ownership still requires correction due to an inaccurate market definition. Inconsistencies in the data filed in the Application are dismissed incorrectly as immaterial.[6] Applicants could easily provide sensitivities of their market power analyses without attributing NextEra's and Dominion's generation to power purchase agreement ("PPA") holders, but refuse to do so.[7] The existence of a PPA does not change the ownership of resources. The existence of a PPA does not preclude Applicants from using a resource to exercise market power. The proposed combined company's $249 billion market capitalization and geographic scope from New England to Florida and throughout the United States belie the Applicants' dismissiveness of

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4 *See* NextEra Energy presentation to investors, "NextEra Energy + Dominion Energy: Forming America's leading utility business and energy infrastructure company to reliably and affordably meet America's historic power demand," (May 18, 2026) <*https://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com/~/media/Files/N/NEE-IR/news-and-events/events-and-presentations/2026/2026-05-18%20NEED_Presentation_vF.pdf*> ("NextEra Merger Presentation") at 18, 19, 24.

5 *See* October 15th Answer at 24

6 *See* October 15th Answer at 23.

7 *See* October 15th Answer at 15–19.

the market power concerns raised by numerous protestors.[8] [9] Applicants should acknowledge the significance of the merger and provide the careful, detailed, accurate, and transparent market power analyses required.

Neither the October 15th Response nor the October 15th Answer demonstrate that the Merger is consistent with the public interest. On the contrary, the merger would harm the public interest in regulation through competition. The Merger should be rejected. If the Merger is, nevertheless, approved, the Applicants should be required to accept the identified behavioral conditions that would require competitive behavior in the PJM markets and thereby help protect the public interest.

I. ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' ANSWER

A. Monopoly Is Not Better Than Competition.

Competition must be considered in evaluating mergers. Applicants' filing is at its core based on the assertion that monopoly is more beneficial to customers than competition. Applicants' filing is a direct attack on the PJM competitive market construct established by the Commission in 1999. Applicants ignore the fact that the Commission introduced restructured markets and reliance on regulated competitive markets in place of monopoly

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[8] *See* NextEra Merger Presentation at 31.

[9] *See* Protest of Public Interest Organizations, North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, and Maryland Office of People's Counsel (September 29, 2026), Protest and Request for Hearing of Attorneys General, State Energy and Environmental Protection Agencies (signed by attorney generals of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maine, by Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, by New Hampshire office of consumer advocate, by Maine office of the public advocate, by State of Connecticut office of consumer counsel, and by Rhode Island division of public utilities and carriers), and State Ratepayer Advocates and the Maine Public Utilities Commission (September 29, 2026), Comments of United States Senator Edward J. Markey (August 10, 2026), United States Senate Richard Blumenthal (September 2, 2026), the Virginia Office of the Attorney General, Division of Consumer Counsel, Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., Eversource Energy Service Company on behalf of the Connecticut Light and Power Company, et al., the Internal Market Monitor of ISO New England Inc. and the New England States Committee on Electricity (September 29, 2026).

cost of service regulation precisely because markets are more efficient and because monopoly cost of service regulation had been demonstrated to be high cost and inefficient.

The October 15th Answer (at 27) argues that benefits of lower cost financing and efficient construction due to the economies of scale achieved by the Merger will be "passed on to their customer base." Applicants have failed to provide any convincing evidence of economies of scale or of any increases in efficiency. Without competitive pressure, there is no guarantee that any asserted cost savings will be passed on to customers.

Applicants' arguments completely rely on these asserted cost savings. [10] Those cost savings are not supported. Applicants cannot predict the cost of capital after a merger and after the markets absorb the Applicants' aggressive construction program. The alleged evidence of lower maintenance costs does not pass even cursory review. Labor and materials costs and the regulatory environment are different in Florida than in Virginia. The assertion about lower operating and maintenance costs is an assertion that Dominion is operating inefficiently and charging too much for such costs. If that were true, a merger is not the solution. It is doubtful that the Virginia State Corporation Commission would agree. NextEra has provided no real evidence that such is true. Economies of scale are asserted but not supported.[11] There is nothing about having a larger monopoly utility that will make it more efficient. In fact, a larger monopoly utility is likely to be less efficient for Virginia than to continue to have a local utility that understands local conditions operate the utility unimpeded.

There is no plausible path on which the Merger will reduce the cost of building new generation and transmission. There is no plausible mechanism by which the Merger will reduce the cost of building new generation and transmission.

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[10] *See* NextEra Merger Presentation at 22-23.

[11] *See* NextEra Merger Presentation at 19-21.

Applicants propose to use regulated revenues, paid by the Virginia customers, to subsidize the construction of new generation, for example for data centers, that will be owned by the investors in the merged company. Applicants will also use regulated revenues to support the building of competitive generation, for the benefit of investors, in areas outside Virginia.

In a competitive market, investors bear the risks of investments and building new generation. Applicants' proposal imposes the costs and risks of investments on captive customers.

Applicants ignore the fact that competition is good for customers because it lowers costs and shifts risks to investors rather than captive customers. Unlike a merger, competition sustains long run pressure on costs and ensures that investors bear the long term and short term risks. The logical conclusion from Applicants' argument is that Applicants believe that monopoly is better than competition. The Applicants' proposal directly contradicts the Commission's reliance on competitive markets. [12]

The Applicants' view is that the Merger will benefit Virginia customers because it replaces one monopoly with a larger more powerful monopoly. [13] Applicants have not supported the central claim that lower costs will result. In addition, this view is simplistic. Applicants argue that monopoly is better for customers than competitive markets. This assertion is effectively an attack on the PJM competitive market construct and is at odds with the history of wholesale power markets under Commission regulation. This assertion is also at odds with basic economics, the history of markets and the history of monopolies.

While Dominion is a monopoly provider of power for the majority of its customers, it faces competition in the PJM energy and capacity markets, competition to supply large load

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12 *See* Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Electric Competition," <https://www.ferc.gov/electric-competition>, accessed November 5, 2026.

13 *See* October 15th Answer at 27.

customers, competition for the right to build some transmission projects, and has used competition in the procurement of new generation. The competitive environment for Dominion differs significantly from NextEra's environment in Florida, especially with respect to operating a utility that participates in an RTO market. Applicants argue that monopoly is better for customers than competition, directly counter to economics and to the actual use of competition by the Commission to reduce costs to customers and improve efficiency by ensuring that investors bear the risks and receive the rewards of markets, with Commission defined rules. Applicants simply assert that a monopoly supplier will achieve lower costs and pass them on to customers. The claims made by NextEra to the markets and to investors that this will increase the profitability of the merged companies and the claims that monopoly power is good for customers are inconsistent. Both cannot be true.

Potential competitors to the combined NextEra and Dominion include both past and potential future providers of energy storage and renewable resources to Dominion, merchant developers of gas-fired power plants, competitive load serving entities, and competitive transmission developers. The Merger would remove NextEra from the role of competitor. The October 15th Answer argues that all that matters is whether NextEra has directly competed with these companies in the past.[14] Applicants are incorrect. Whether NextEra has directly competed with these companies in the past is irrelevant, because NextEra's stated plans are to merge with Dominion which has directly competed with these companies and to take on the projects itself in the future in the place of competitors.[15]

Regardless of whether NextEra has built generation in the Dominion Zone, or any other part of PJM, in the past, the company makes it plain that they intend to do so in the

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[14] *See* October 15th Answer at 26, 29.

[15] *See* NextEra Merger Presentation at 29-40.

future.[16] The entire case made to investors for the Merger depends upon it, highlighting the Merger as the "largest regulated capital investment opportunity in the industry," an "unmatched large load opportunity," and that the companies "expect to double U.S.'s largest generation fleet by 2032."[17] Applicants' plan is apparently to leverage a large regulated rate base and captive customers in Virginia to fund investments in new generation and transmission to serve large load customers in the Dominion Zone and in the PJM market more broadly.

B. NextEra and Dominion are Direct Competitors for Competitive Transmission Projects.

The Merger would eliminate NextEra as a competitor in the market for competitive transmission projects and merchant generation both inside and outside the Dominion Zone. The number of projects built by NextEra in the past is not relevant. NextEra's stated ambitions and plans for future projects are relevant.[18] If NextEra succeeds in merging with Dominion, it would no longer be a competitor to Dominion. The October 15th Answer (at 30) calls it a "false presumption" that NextEra would no longer compete with Dominion for new transmission projects. The Market Monitor's statement is both correct and a fact not a presumption. The assertion that the Applicant competing with itself is competition fails the basic test of logic.

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[16] *See* NextEra Energy, Inc. and Dominion Energy, Inc. Merger Call (May 18, 2026) ("The combined company is targeting 9% plus long-term adjusted EPS growth, supported by 11% regulatory capital employed growth and high quality cash flows, growing in line with earnings. … A rate base of $138 billion would be the highest in the industry, reflecting smart capital investments to serve our customers with affordable and reliable power solutions. The opportunity set is enormous, and we believe we can deploy roughly $59 billion of smart CapEx on an average annual basis for the benefit of our customers to provide the energy solutions they need."), <*https://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com/~/media/Files/N/NEE-IR/news-and-events/events-and-presentations/2026/2026-05-18%20NEED_%20Transcript.pdf*>.

[17] *See* NextEra Merger Presentation at 30.

[18] NextEra Merger Presentation at 12.

The October 15th Answer states (at 30, fn.110) that Dominion and NextEra competed in two competitive RTEP clusters between 2018 and 2025. The October 15th Answer confuses the definition of competition in stating that NextEra is not competitively significant because NextEra has never won a competitive solicitation against Dominion. In competition, that happens. Dominion and NextEra competing in two competitive RTEP clusters proves that they were competitors and would be potential competitors for transmission projects but for the Merger.

C. NextEra's Analysis of Vertical Market Power Due to the Mountain Valley Pipeline is Incorrect.

The Market Monitor's Protest provided evidence from Platts showing that the prices in Transco Zone 5 South and Zone 5 North separate at Station 165 in Virginia, the connection point of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, which NextEra partially owns, to the Transcontinental Pipeline.[19] This is an established fact about the gas markets and it is surprising that Applicants would claim otherwise. Applicants' assertion (at 29) that the Market Monitor did not provide evidence is false. Specifically, the Market Monitor provided an example where on August 20, 2026, the Zone 5 South price was 135 percent higher than the Zone 5 North price.[20] This day was typical of summer 2026 conditions. It is the responsibility of Applicants to provide gas market data and accurate analysis for the Commission required market power screens. The July 15th Application does not provide an accurate analysis of the vertical market power created by NextEra's ownership interests in a natural gas pipeline in the Dominion Zone, because it does not account for pipeline constraints within Transco Zone 5. Transco Zone 5 as a whole is not the correct market definition for natural gas generators in the

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[19] *See* Market Monitor Protest at 19–20.

[20] *See*, *e.g.*, Platts Gas Daily, Vol. 43, Issue 158 (August 20, 2026), <https://spglobal.scene7.com/is/content/spglobalcom/Platts_Gas_Daily_20_August_2026pdf>, accessed September 27, 2026. The weekly average price for Transco Zone 5 North was $2.155 per MMBtu, while the price for Transco Zone 5 South was $4.089 per MMBtu. The Market Monitor is unable to reproduce further data from Platts.

Dominion Zone of PJM. The Applicants' filing is deficient on this matter. Further analysis is required of Applicants.

D. Future Plans are Relevant.

The October 15th Answer (at 22–24) argues that it would be entirely theoretical to consider interconnection requests for future generation resources that are in various PJM cycles or in long term planning models. The queue is not theoretical. PJM transmission planners who base their analysis on the queue would be surprised to hear that the queue is theoretical. Companies that have invested significant capital and time in queue project development would be surprised to hear that the queue is theoretical. Other market participants would be surprised to hear that Applicants' entries in the queue are theoretical. Contrary to Applicants' claims, the Commission's merger policy expressly contemplates a forward looking assessment of competitive conditions. In Order No. 592, the Commission stated that "the focus of [merger analysis] may have to be adjusted to encompass those products, markets, and factors that are relevant to analyzing the exercise of market power in the future business environment."[21] In Order No. 642, the Commission stated that "merger analysis should be as forward-looking as practicable" and explained that historical sales data may fail to identify generation suppliers whose capacity could discipline future price increases.[22] NextEra's future plans to build new generation and transmission in PJM are clearly relevant to the Merger. Applicants rely on the specific 2027 analysis date to avoid including in the Application their plans to build over 15 GW of new generation. [23] They should be fully transparent in their analysis and be clear about their plans and the impact of those plans on market structure.

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21 *See* Order No. 592, 77 FERC ¶ 61,263 (1996), Docket No. RM96-6-000 at 8 n.7.

22 *See* Order No. 642, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,111, at PP 37–38 (2000).

23 *See* Market Monitor Protest at Table 1.

The Applicants' future plans are not "highly speculative." NextEra and Dominion may not know other companies' plans, but they know their own. In fact, in the recent earnings call presentation, both NextEra and Dominion stated that the companies are on track in developing planned generation. Dominion's Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind installation is "happening now."[24] NextEra has "achieved greater than two-thirds of the midpoint of [its] 2026 through 2029 development expectations, and [NextEra] added approximately 15 GW to the backlog in the last 12 months."[25] As the Market Monitor Protest pointed out (at 15–16), the Applicants have procured enough turbines, a critical input to generation development, for planned gas power plant projects. With this critical input secured, Applicants cannot logically assert that their generation interconnection requests are highly speculative.

It would be willfully short sighted and inconsistent with a rational market analysis to limit the Commission's market power analysis to existing generation capacity or supply conditions during the first year following the transaction. The analysis should include generation additions, including projects in PJM's interconnection queue and also recognize the Applicants plans to build much more than the already explicitly recognized queue projects. NextEra has asserted that it plans to build 20 GW of generation and energy storage in Dominion. [26] That should be included in the analysis. The PJM market and the Dominion submarket will be more concentrated as a result. The Commission should require analyses incorporating such expected future supply rather than excluding it solely because the relevant facilities are not yet operational. The size and scope of the Merger requires a forward

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[24] *Dominion Energy, Inc.* Q3 FY2026 earnings call transcript (October 30, 2026) <https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/DOD.DU/earnings/DOD.DU-Q3-2026-earnings_call-721450.html>.

[25] *NextEra Energy, Inc.* Q3 FY2026 earnings call transcript (October 21, 2026) <https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/NEE/earnings/NEE-Q3-2026-earnings_call-715214.html>.

[26] *See* NextEra Merger Presentation at 24. The 20 GW is the sum of 11 GW from IRPs, 4 GW from the Virginia storage mandate, and 5 GW from incremental data center opportunities show on the slide.

looking and transparent market power analysis, which requires the inclusion of Applicants' actual planned generation additions and the ability to profitably add more generation.

E. The Market Monitor's Conditions Have a Direct Nexus.

The simple answer is that the Merger should not be approved because the Applicants have not demonstrated that monopoly is better than competition. If the Merger is nonetheless approved, behavioral conditions are required as part of attempting to ensure that customers are harmed less than they would be absent behavioral conditions, as a result of a less competitive market structure.

The October 15th Answer (at 32) contends that the Market Monitor "does not posit any direct nexus" to its recommended behavioral conditions. Applicants are incorrect. The behavioral conditions recommended by the Market Monitor have a direct nexus to the harms the Merger would create if allowed to proceed without the recommended behavioral conditions. Dominion currently has market power in PJM as the largest generation owner.[27] The existing market power of Dominion and the well established flaws in the PJM rules, especially in market power mitigation rules, are the direct nexus with the Market Monitor's behavioral conditions one through six, listed in the Market Monitor Protest.[28]

The October 15th Answer points out the Market Monitor's statement that all suppliers are pivotal in PJM's Capacity Market. Applicants fail to note that the Market Monitor has made this point since the introduction of a capacity market in PJM and supported this point with extensive analysis over that period.[29] As Applicants state (at 30), "With that logic, the Commission could never approve a merger in PJM without implementing mitigating

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[27] *See* Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 5: Capacity Market at p. 400, Table 5-4 Installed capacity by parent company: January 1, May 31, June 1, and June 30, 2026.

[28] *See* Market Monitor Protest at 39-41.

[29] *See* Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., *2026 State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 5: Capacity Market at 383.

conditions." Applicants are correct. Applicants are especially correct in the case of this proposed Merger. NextEra says that imposing such conditions is not consistent with Commission precedent. Applicants are not correct. The Commission has accepted conditions in PJM's largest mergers and can accept them in this one.[30]

As an electric distribution company serving the largest concentration of data centers in the U.S., the seventh condition is particularly relevant to Dominion. Applicants should commit to not removing capacity from the PJM market to serve data center load. A failure to commit to this condition would underscore the Market Monitor's point about the use of regulated revenue from captive customers to fund generation for the benefit of investors.

The proposed condition to remain in PJM is directly related to the fact that Dominion is one of the largest transmission owners in PJM. Contrary to the claims in the October 15th Answer (at 41-43), Dominion, as a large transmission owner, has fundamental influential power in PJM's rule making process, because it has the ability to threaten withdrawal from the PJM footprint.[31] For Dominion to remain in PJM is a critical condition to limit the harms to competition from the Merger and to maintain the integrity of the PJM market, a condition to which Old Dominion Electric Cooperative concurs in its comments.[32]

In addition, the Commission has accepted the proposed condition on RTO participation in previous orders. For example, the Commission conditioned the approval of the merger between American Electric Power Service Corp and Central & South West Corp

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30 *See Exelon Corp.*, 136 FERC ¶ 61,161 (2011).

31 *See Duquesne Light Co.*, 122 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2008); *UtilityDive*, AEP eyes exit from PJM, SPP over slow generation interconnection (May 6, 2026) <*https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-pjm-spp-data-centers-earnings/819419/*>.

32 *See* Comments of Old Dominion Electric Cooperative re the application filed by NextEra Energy, Inc., et al. under EC26-131 (September 29, 2026) at 4-5.

on the merged company's commitment to participate in RTOs.[33] The Commission has also accepted the behavioral conditions that the Market Monitor has recommended.[34]

The purpose of competition in the wholesale electricity markets is to provide customers with reliable wholesale power at the lowest possible price.[35] Competitive outcomes are meant to replace traditional regulation when paired with market rules including effective market power mitigation rules.

The Market Monitor reiterates that no behavioral remedies are sufficient to mitigate the threats to market competition created by the Merger. The July 15th Application should be rejected. Market power mitigation rules in PJM are not sufficient to address the increases in structural market power and the potential exercises of market power that the Merger would produce.

If the Merger is nevertheless approved, the Market Monitor's proposed conditions would mitigate some, but not all, of the ability to exercise the enhanced structural market power of the merged company.

If the Applicants believe their own assertions, Applicants should willingly agree to the proposed conditions.

II. COMMENTS ON DEFICIENCY LETTER RESPONSE: MISTAKES, INCONSISTENCIES, AND OMISSIONS UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE MERGER APPLICATION

The mistakes, inconsistencies, omissions, and general lack of transparency in the July 15th Application and the October 15th Response undermine confidence in the overall

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33 *See American Electric Power Service Corp & Central & South West Corp,* 90 FERC ¶61,242, *mimeo* at 19–20 (2000).

34 *See*, *e.g.*, *Exelon Corp.*, 138 FERC ¶ 61,167 (March 9, 2012); *Constellation et al.,* 192 FERC ¶ 61,074 (July 23, 2025).

35 *Regional Transmission Organizations*, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, *mimeo* at 3 (1999), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2000-A, 90 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2000), *aff'd sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC*, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

application. The July 15th Application failed to supply sufficient details about the generation resources owned by NextEra and Dominion. In response to Question 4 of the Deficiency Letter, Applicants provide a list of generation resources that NextEra and Dominion own, but on a confidential basis. Information about Applicants' generation portfolio should be provided publicly and transparently so that all parties can evaluate the Merger. Requiring submission of the key details is essential to maintain the incentive for future applicants to submit complete applications and to ensuring that the burden of submitting a complete filing is not shifted from applicants to the Commission and intervenors.

Applicants are required to provide a list of all energy subsidiaries and affiliates, a description of their ownership share and business, and a description of all jurisdictional facilities that they own, operate, or control.[36] These descriptions are commonly provided together in Section 203 applications, but may be included as Exhibit B and Exhibit G. Based on information provided in Section II of the July 15th Application, Applicants requested a waiver to the requirement to file a separate Exhibit G and a waiver to the requirement to provide the additional information required for Exhibit B. However, the complete details required of Exhibit B and Exhibit G were not provided in the July 15th Application as a whole.

In Section II the July 15th Application provides a description of NextEra's transmission owning subsidiaries and affiliates, but Applicants leave NextEra's generation owning subsidiaries and affiliates to Exhibit B-1 where they provide only the generation name, capacity rating, market, geographic region, MBR docket number, and immediate parent. Applicants provide no further details for NextEra's generators, including fuel type, technology type, and location. Section II of the July 15th Application provides a list of Dominion's transmission owning subsidiaries and affiliates and a description of Virginia Electric Power Company ("VEPCO"), including only the total generating capacity of VEPCO's subsidiaries. Applicants state further information is described in Exhibit B-2. In

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[36] *See* 18 CFR 33.2(c)(2) and 18 CFR 33.2(d).

Exhibit B-2, applicants provide the standard description of only 11 generation owning subsidiaries and affiliates. Applicants only report VEPCO's total generating capacity in Exhibit B-2, without providing any details of the generation assets owned or under long term contract by VEPCO.

In the October 15th Response to the Deficiency Letter, Applicants provide a list of generators owned by NextEra and Dominion, the fuel type, technology type, zone, submarket, summer capacity, winter capacity, and PPA details. Applicants also provide a list of generators in which NextEra and Dominion are the purchaser pursuant to a PPA. These details are only provided in the confidential workpapers.

Applicants should provide a narrative description of all relevant energy affiliates, including the generation resources that they own or operate, on a public basis, as is standard practice for Section 203 applications. Applicants should provide this description in the same manner that they did for some of Dominion's subsidiaries and affiliates: Buckeye Plains Solar Project, LLC, Eastern Shore Solar, LLC, Foxhound Solar, LLC, Greensville County Solar Project, LLC, Hardin Solar Energy LLC, OSW Project, LLC, Pickaway County Solar Project, LLC, Scott-II Solar LLC, Southampton Solar LLC, Summit Farms Solar, LLC, and Wilkinson Solar LLC. This data is necessary for all interested parties to understand and evaluate the Merger.

III. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER

The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR § 385.213(a)(2), do not permit answers to protests, answers, or requests for rehearing unless otherwise ordered by the decisional authority. The Commission has made exceptions, however, where an answer clarifies the issues or assists in creating a complete record.[37] In this answer, the Market

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
[37] *See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 119 FERC ¶61,318 at P 36 (2007) (accepted answer to answer that "provided information that assisted … decision-making process"); *California Independent System Operator Corporation*, 110 FERC ¶ 61,007 (2005) (answer to answer permitted to assist Commission in

Monitor provides the Commission with information useful to the Commission's decision making process and which provides a more complete record. Accordingly, the Market Monitor respectfully requests that this answer be permitted.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Market Monitor respectfully requests that the Commission afford due consideration to this pleading as the Commission resolves the issues raised in this proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,



Jeffrey W. Mayes

General Counsel
Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue, Suite 160
Eagleville, Pennsylvania 19403
(610) 271-8053
jeffrey.mayes@monitoringanalytics.com

Joseph E. Bowring
Independent Market Monitor for PJM
President
Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue, Suite 160
Eagleville, Pennsylvania 19403
(610) 271-8051
joseph.bowring@monitoringanalytics.com

Catherine A. Tyler
Deputy Market Monitor
Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue, Suite 160
Eagleville, Pennsylvania 19403
(610) 271-8050
catherine.tyler@monitoringanalytics.com

Nicholas O'Brien
Market Analyst
Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue, Suite 160
Eagleville, Pennsylvania 19403
(610) 271-8050
Nicholas.OBrien@monitoringanalytics.com

decision-making process); *New Power Company v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 98 FERC ¶ 61,208 (2002) (answer accepted to provide new factual and legal material to assist the Commission in decision-making process); *N.Y. Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 121 FERC ¶61,112 at P 4 (2007) (answer to protest accepted because it provided information that assisted the Commission in its decision-making process).

Kyungjin Yoo
Analyst
Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue, Suite 160
Eagleville, Pennsylvania 19403

November 5, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding.

Dated at Eagleville, Pennsylvania,
this 5th day of November, 2026.



Jeffrey W. Mayes
General Counsel
Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue, Suite 160
Eagleville, Pennsylvania 19403
(610)271-8053
jeffrey.mayes@monitoringanalytics.com