# Overview of Three Pivotal Supplier Test

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# **TPS Background**

- The three pivotal supplier test is a reasonable application of the Commission's delivered price test
  - Tests for whether the level of excess supply results in an adequately competitive market structure.
  - Need at least four suppliers to pass test.
  - Permits targeted mitigation in the relevant market.





#### **TPS: Relevant Market**

 The three pivotal supplier test measures the degree to which the supply from three suppliers is required in order to meet the demand in the relevant market.



# **TPS: Formula**

$$\operatorname{RSI3}_{j} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( S_{i} \right) - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \left( S_{i} \right) - S_{j}}{D}$$

#### where,

- D = Total demand for the product
- $\sum_{i=1}^{n} (S_i)$  = total available supply in relevant market
- $\sum_{i=1}^{2} (S_i)$  = supply from two largest suppliers
- $S_i$  = supply from the supplier being tested





## **TPS:** Applications

#### • Applied in:

- Real-Time Energy Market
- Day-Ahead Energy Market
- Regulation Market
- Capacity Market



#### **Energy Market: Relevant Market**

- The three pivotal supplier test measures the degree to which the supply from three suppliers is required in order to meet the demand for relief of a constraint, which defines the relevant market.
- Relevant supply tested in the energy market is constraint relief MW for a particular constraint.





# **Relevant Market**

- Two key variables in the analysis are the demand for and the supply of constraint relief MW
  - Demand consists of the incremental, effective MW required to relieve the constraint.
  - Supply consists of effective MW of supply incrementally available to relieve the constraint at a distribution factor (DFAX) greater than or equal to the DFAX used by PJM in operations





### **Relevant Market**





### **TPS: Real Time Energy**

- Objective, ex ante test of market structure, behavior and impact for localized markets for incremental relief
- TPS replaced approach that capped local energy markets all the time
  - Pass the test, taken on current offer, price or cost
  - Fail the test, taken on the lesser of price or cost
- TPS only results in a cost offer dispatch (capping):
  - When there is a determination of structural market power
  - When unit price offer > unit cost offer
  - When the unit is actually dispatched for the constraint and would therefore affect the price





# **TPS and Type I vs. Type II Error**

- Type 1 error is detecting market power when none exists
  - Mitigation results in setting offer equal to MC
  - Mitigation results in a competitive outcome
  - Cost of type 1 error is zero
- Type 2 error is a failure to detect market power when it exists
  - Failure to mitigate results in market power and prices above competitive level
  - Cost of type 2 error is large





- TPS applied to aggregate market
- General:
  - Eliminate crossed price and cost curves: constant markup
  - Physical based parameters (most flexible) in both price and cost
  - MW segments need to be the same in both price and cost offers
  - Changing offers within day requires a cost basis
  - Changing offers within day requires approved fuel policy





## TPS: Application to Aggregate Energy Markets

- Objective, ex ante test of market structure, behavior and impact for aggregate energy market
- Recognize the development of market power in the aggregate market during relative high load conditions
- Change in aggregate mitigation (\$1,000 cap may be going away)
- TPS would be applied to test jointly pivotal suppliers for aggregate energy
  - Pass the test, taken on current offer, price or cost
  - Fail the test, taken on the lesser of price or cost





#### TPS: Application to Aggregate Energy Markets

- TPS would only result in a cost offer dispatch (capping):
  - When there is a determination of structural market power
  - When unit price offer > unit cost offer
  - When the unit is actually dispatched for energy



#### PJM hourly energy market HHI: January through September 2014 and 2015

	Hourly Market HHI (Jan - Sep, 2014)	Hourly Market HHI (Jan - Sep, 2015)
Average	1154	1095
Minimum	930	879
Maximum	1468	1468
Highest market share (One hour)	29%	30%
Average of the highest hourly market		
share	21%	20%
# Hours	6,551	6,551
# Hours HHI > 1800	0	0
% Hours HHI > 1800	0%	0%

# PJM hourly energy market HHI (By supply segment): January through September 2014 and 2015

	Jan - Sep, 2014			Jan - Sep, 2015			
	Minimum	Average	Maximum	Minimum	Average	Maximum	
Base	1038	1181	1484	991	1124	1474	
Intermediate	771	1914	6533	605	2014	6809	
Peak	702	5940	10000	741	6111	10000	



# PJM hourly Energy Market HHI (By supply segment): January through June 2014 and 2015

	Jan - Jun, 2014			Jan - Jun, 2015			
	Minimum	Average	Maximum	Minimum	Average	Maximum	
Base	1029	1174	1454	1021	1148	1489	
Intermediate	727	1719	5693	693	2016	8147	
Peak	713	6119	10000	802	6080	10000	



#### Marginal unit contribution to PJM real-time, loadweighted LMP (By parent company): January through September 2014 and 2015

	2014 (Jan-Sep)		2015 (Jan-Sep)	
Company	Percent of P	rice Company	Per	cent of Price
1	17	.8% 1		18.6%
2	16	.2% 2		15.4%
3	12	.2% 3		11.3%
4	9	9.1% 4		9.4%
5	7	.6% 5		8.1%
6	6	.2% 6		8.0%
7	5	5% 7		5.0%
8	5	.3% 8		4.5%
9	3	.7% 9		2.9%
Other (60 com	npanies) 16	.4% Other (58 c	companies)	16.8%



#### Marginal resource contribution to PJM day-ahead, load-weighted LMP (By parent company): January through September of 2014 and 2015

	2014 (Ja	an - Sep)			2015 (Jan	- Sep)
Com	pany	Perc	ent of Price (	Company		Percent of Price
1			10.5%	1		16.7%
2			8.1%	2		10.0%
3			6.6%	3		8.8%
4			5.6%	4		5.5%
5			5.6%	5		4.9%
6			5.4%	6		4.8%
7			4.7%	7		4.1%
8			3.6%	8		4.0%
9			3.0%	9		3.2%
Other	r (144 companies)		46.9% (	Other (149 o	companies)	38.0%



- General:
  - Eliminate crossed price and cost curves: constant markup
  - Physical based parameters (most flexible) in both price and cost
  - MW segments need to be the same in both price and cost offers
  - Changing offers within day requires a cost basis
  - Changing offers within day requires approved fuel policy





- Which is the lower?
- Eliminate crossed price and cost curves: constant markup





- Constant markup
- MW segments need to be the same in both price and cost offers



Physical parameters (most flexible) applied to all schedules



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