# Financial Transmission and Auction Revenue Rights

In an LMP market, the lowest cost generation is dispatched to meet the load, subject to the ability of the transmission system to deliver that energy. When the lowest cost generation is remote from load centers, the physical transmission system permits that lowest cost generation to be delivered to load. This was true prior to the introduction of LMP markets and continues to be true in LMP markets. Prior to the introduction of LMP markets, contracts based on the physical rights associated with the transmission system were the mechanism used to provide for the delivery of low cost generation to load. Firm transmission customers who paid for the transmission system through rates received the low cost generation.

After the introduction of LMP markets, financial transmission rights (FTRs) were introduced to permit the loads which pay for the transmission system to continue to receive those benefits in the form of revenues which offset congestion to the extent permitted by the transmission system.<sup>1</sup> Financial transmission rights and the associated revenues were directly provided to loads in recognition of the facts that loads pay for the transmission system which permits low cost generation to be delivered to load. Another way of describing the result is that FTRs and the associated congestion revenues were directly provided to loads in recognition of the fact that load pays locational prices which result in load payments in excess of generation revenues which are the source of the funds available to offset congestion costs in an LMP market.<sup>2</sup> Congestion is defined to be load payments in excess of generation revenues. Congestion revenues are the source of the funds to pay FTRs. In an LMP system, the only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to use FTRs, or an equivalent mechanism, to pay back to load the difference between the total load payments and the total generation revenues. The only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to ensure that all congestion revenues are returned to load. Congestion revenues are defined to be equal to the sum

Effective April 1, 1999, FTRs were introduced with the LMP market, there was a real-time market but no day-ahead market, and FTRs returned real-time congestion revenue to load. Effective June 1, 2000, the day-ahead market was introduced and FTRs returned total congestion including day-ahead and balancing congestion to load. Effective June 1, 2003, PJM replaced the direct allocation of FTRs to load with an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs). The load still owns the rights to congestion collected under this system, but the ARR construct allows load to either claim the FTRs directly (through a process called self scheduling), or to sell the rights in the FTR auction in exchange for a revenue stream based on the prices of the FTRs. Under the ARR construct, all of the FTR auction revenues should belong to the load and all of the congestion revenues should belong to those that purchase or self schedule the FTRs.

The current ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient way to ensure that load receives all the congestion revenues or has the ability to receive the auction revenues associated with all the potential congestion revenues. Total ARR and self scheduled FTR revenue offset only 86.5 percent of total congestion costs including congestion in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the balancing energy market for the 2015 to 2016 planning period. One of the reasons for this inefficiency is the link, established by PJM member companies in their initial FTR filings, between congestion revenues and specific generation to load transmission paths. The original filings, made before PJM members had any experience with LMP markets, retained the view of congestion rooted in physical transmission rights. In an effort to protect themselves, the PJM utilities linked the payment of FTRs to specific, physical contract paths from specific generating units to specific load zones. That linkage was inconsistent with the appropriate functioning of FTRs in a nodal, network system with locational marginal pricing. The ARR allocation in 2015 continued to be based on those original physical generation to load paths, an illustration of the inadequacy of that approach and a source of the issues with the FTR model in 2015.

1 See 81 FERC ¶ 61,257, at 62,241 (1997).

On September 15, 2016, FERC ordered PJM to address the allocation of congestion credits in the FTR market,

of day ahead and balancing congestion. FTRs are one way to do that.

<sup>2</sup> See Id. at 62, 259-62,260 & n. 123.

portfolio netting within the FTR market and the use of historical resources for the Annual ARR allocation process.3 PJM made a compliance filing on November 14, 2016, outlining their plans to address these issues.<sup>4</sup> Under the order, PJM will allocate the costs of balancing congestion and market-to-market payments to load and exports. PJM will allocate all excess congestion revenue from the day-ahead market to FTR holders. PJM will allocate excess auction revenue, which is what FTR holders were willing to pay for FTRs in excess of what is provided to ARR holders, to FTR holders. FERC ordered the continued use of portfolio netting with the corresponding cross subsidies among participants in the FTR market. FERC directed PJM to replace generation to load paths based on retired generation with generation to load paths based on existing generation resources.

If the original PJM FTR design had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without use of the generation to load paths, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design would have been avoided. Now is a good time to address the issues of the FTR design and to return the design to its original purpose. This would eliminate much of the complexity associated with ARRs and FTRs and eliminate unnecessary controversy about the appropriate recipients of congestion revenues.

The 2016 State of the Market Report for PJM focuses on the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction and the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods, covering January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016.

## Table 13-1 The FTR Auction Markets results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Flawed

- Market structure was evaluated as competitive because the FTR auction is voluntary and the ownership positions resulted from the distribution of ARRs and voluntary participation.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because there was no evidence of anti-competitive behavior.

• Market design was evaluated as flawed because there are significant flaws with the basic ARR/FTR design. The market design is not an efficient way to ensure that all congestion revenues are returned to load.

## **Overview** Auction Revenue Rights

### **Market Structure**

• **Residual ARRs.** If ARR allocations are reduced as the result of a modeled transmission outage and the transmission outage ends during the relevant planning year, the result is that residual ARRs may be available. These residual ARRs are automatically assigned to eligible participants the month before the effective date. Residual ARRs are only available on paths prorated in Stage 1 of the annual ARR allocation, are only effective for single, whole months and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR clearing prices are based on monthly FTR auction clearing prices.

In the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 39,233.4 MW of residual ARRs, up from 26,845.4 MW in the first seven months of the 2015 to 2016 planning period, with a total target allocation of \$7.0 million for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, down from \$7.5 million for the first seven months of the 2015 to 2016 planning period.

• ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching. There were 43,089 MW of ARRs associated with \$504,600 of revenue that were reassigned in the first seven months of the 2015 to 2016 planning period. There were 27,920 MW of ARRs associated with \$315,900 of revenue that were reassigned for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period.

<sup>•</sup> Market performance was evaluated as competitive because it reflected the interaction between participant demand behavior and FTR supply, limited by PJM's analysis of system feasibility. But it is not clear, in a competitive market, why FTR purchases by financial entities remain persistently profitable.

<sup>3</sup> See 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016).

<sup>4</sup> See "Compliance Filing concerning Modifications to ARR and FTR Provisions," Docket No. EL16-6 (November 14, 2016).

### **Market Performance**

- Revenue Adequacy. For the 2016 to 2017 planning period, the ARR target allocations, which are based on the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction, were \$911.4 million, while PJM collected \$935.7 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions, making ARRs revenue adequate. For the 2015 to 2016 planning period, the ARR target allocations were \$931.6 million while PJM collected \$968.1 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. The year over year decrease in ARR target allocations and auction revenue is a result of decreased prices from the previous planning period resulting from continued reduced allocation of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs. ARR revenue adequacy is also affected by PJM's clearing of additional counter flow FTRs to alleviate infeasibilities from Stage 1A.
- ARRs as an Offset to Congestion. ARRs did not serve as an effective way to return congestion revenues to load. Total ARR and self scheduled FTR revenue offset only 63.8 percent of total congestion costs, which include congestion in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the balancing energy market, for the 2014 to 2015 planning period. In the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, total ARR and self scheduled FTR revenues offset 82.3 percent of total congestion costs. The total offset for the last six planning periods is 70.9 percent. The goal of the design should be to return 100 percent of the congestion revenues to the load.

### **Financial Transmission Rights**

### **Market Structure**

• **Supply.** The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction include the St. John's transformer in Dominion and the Elliott-Rosewood Line in AEP. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period include the Rockwell-Congress Line in AEP and the Graves Mills-Reusens Line in AEP.

Market participants can sell FTRs. In the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 208,405 MW, down from 327,980 in the 2016 to 2017 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction, total participant sell offers were 378, 431 MW, down from 378,744 MW in the 2015 to 2016 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 3,173,126 MW, up from 2,078,673 MW for the same period during the 2015 to 2016 planning period.

- Demand. In the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction, total FTR buy bids were 2,176,871 MW, down 11.5 percent from 2,459,946 MW the previous planning period. There were 2,592,183 MW of buy and self-scheduled bids in the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction, up 5.3 percent from 2,461,662 MW the previous planning period. The total FTR buy bids from the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period increased 51.9 percent from 1,081,644 MW for the same time period of the prior planning period, to 1,642,735 MW.
- Patterns of Ownership. For the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction, financial entities purchased 77.5 percent of prevailing flow FTRs and 84.9 percent of counter flow FTRs. For the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction, financial participants purchased 56.9 percent of all prevailing flow FTRs and 79.7 percent of all counter flow FTRs. For the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, financial entities purchased 71.3 percent of prevailing flow and 74.6 percent of counter flow FTRs for January through December of 2016. Financial entities owned 64.2 percent of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 55.8 percent of all prevailing flow FTRs and 76.0 percent of all counter flow FTRs during the period from January through December 2016.

### **Market Behavior**

• FTR Forfeitures. Total forfeitures for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period were \$0.4 million for Increment Offers, Decrement Bids and UTC Transactions using PJM's method. Using the proposed MMU approach, total FTR forfeitures would have been \$0.6 million.

• **Credit Issues.** There was one collateral default in 2016 which was promptly resolved.

### **Market Performance**

• Volume. The 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction cleared 297,083 MW (13.6 percent) of demand of FTR buy bids, up 7.1 percent from 277,397 MW (11.3 percent) in the 2016 to 2019 Long Term FTR Auction. The Long Term FTR Auction also cleared 36,782 MW (17.6 percent) of FTR sell offers, compared to 61,210 (18.7 percent), a 40.0 percent decrease.

In the Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period 420,198 MW (16.2 percent) of buy and self-schedule bids cleared, up 11.1 percent from 378,328 MW (15.4 percent) for the previous planning period. In the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions 1,642,735 MW (11.0 percent) of FTR buy bids and 707,646 MW (22.3 percent) of FTR sell offers cleared.

- Price. The weighted-average buy-bid FTR price in the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction was \$0.04 per MW, down from \$0.05 per MW for the 2016 to 2019 planning period. The weighted-average buy-bid FTR price in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period was \$0.49 per MW, up from \$0.31 per MW in the 2015 to 2016 planning period. The weighted average buy bid cleared FTR price in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period was \$0.13, down from \$0.25 per MW for the same period in the 2015 to 2016 planning period.
- **Revenue.** The 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction generated \$26.7 million of net revenue for all FTRs, up from \$23.2 million for the 2016 to 2019 Long Term FTR Auction. The 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction generated \$909.0 million in net revenue, down from \$936.3 million for the 2015 to 2016 Annual FTR Auction. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions generated \$26.7 million in net revenue for all FTRs for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, up

from \$17.3 million for the same time period in the 2015 to 2016 planning period.

- Revenue Adequacy. FTRs were paid at 100 percent of the target allocation level for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. This high level of revenue adequacy was primarily a result of actions taken by PJM to reduce the level of available ARRs and FTRs. PJM's actions included PJM's decision to include more outages and PJM's decision to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) in the model, both of which reduced system capability in the FTR auction model. PJM's actions led to a significant reduction in the allocation of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs.
- **Profitability.** FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received for an FTR and the cost of the FTR. In 2016, FTRs were profitable overall, with \$244.1 million in profits for physical entities, of which \$207.0 million was gross revenue from self-scheduled FTRs, and \$47.5 million for financial entities.

### **Markets Timeline**

Any PJM member can participate in the Long Term FTR Auction, the Annual FTR Auction and the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

Table 13-2 shows the date of first availability and final closing date for all annual ARR and FTR products.

#### Table 13-2 Annual FTR product dates

Auction	Initial Open Date	Final Close Date	
2017/2020 Long Term	6/1/2016	12/5/2016	
2016/2017 ARR	2/29/2016	3/29/2016	
2016/2017 Annual	4/5/2016	4/28/2016	

### Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that the ARR/FTR design be modified to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FTR auction revenues not be used to buy counter flow FTRs for the

purpose of improving FTR payout ratios.<sup>5</sup> (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all historical generation to load paths be eliminated as a basis for allocating ARRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that counter flow FTRs be eliminated. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR marketplace participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a seasonal ARR and FTR allocation system to better represent outages. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM apply the FTR forfeiture rule to up to congestion transactions consistent with the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to increment offers and decrement bids. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted. Pending before FERC.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Adopted partially, 14/15 planning period.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs including clear rules for what defines persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be

applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Adopted partially, 14/15 planning period.)

• The MMU recommends that PJM report correct monthly payout ratios to reduce understatement of payout ratios on a monthly basis. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Adopted 2016.)

### Conclusion

The annual ARR allocation should be designed to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to firm transmission service customers, without requiring contract path physical transmission rights that are impossible to define and enforce in LMP markets. The fixed charges paid for firm transmission services result in the transmission system which provides physically firm transmission service which results in load paying congestion revenues.

After the introduction of LMP markets, financial transmission rights (FTRs) permitted the loads which pay for the transmission system to continue to receive the benefits of firm low cost generation delivered using the transmission system in the form of revenues which offset congestion. Financial transmission rights and the associated revenues were directly provided to loads in recognition of the fact that loads pay for the transmission system which permits low cost generation to be delivered to load and loads pay congestion. Another way of describing the result is that FTRs and the associated revenues were directly provided to loads in recognition of the fact that load pays locational prices which result in load payments in excess of generation revenues which are the source congestion revenues in an LMP market. In other words, load payments in excess of generation revenues are the source of the funds to pay FTRs. In an LMP system, the only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to use FTRs to pay back to load the difference between the total load payments and the total generation revenues, which equals total congestion revenues.

With the creation of ARRs, FTRs no longer serve their original function of providing firm transmission customers the financial equivalent of physically firm transmission service. FTR holders, with the creation of ARRs, do not have the right to financially firm

<sup>5</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights" Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 55.

transmission service and FTR holders do not have the right to revenue adequacy.

As a result of the creation of ARRs and other changes to the design, the current ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient way to ensure that load receives the rights to all the congestion revenues and has the ability to receive the auction revenues associated with all the potential congestion revenues. Total ARR and self scheduled FTR revenue offset only 63.8 percent of total congestion costs including congestion in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the balancing energy market for the 2014 to 2015 planning period. For the 2015 to 2016 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 86.5 percent of total congestion costs. For the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 82.3 percent of total congestion costs.

Load should never be required to subsidize payments to FTR holders, regardless of the reason. Such subsidies have been suggested repeatedly.6 One form of recommended subsidies would ignore balancing congestion when calculating total congestion dollars available to fund FTRs. This approach would ignore the fact that loads must pay both day-ahead and balancing congestion and that congestion is defined, in an accounting sense, to equal the sum of day ahead and balancing congestion. To eliminate balancing congestion from the FTR revenue calculation would require load to pay twice for congestion. Load would have to continue paying for the physical transmission system, would have to continue paying in excess of generator revenues and not have balancing congestion included in the calculation of congestion in order to increase the payout to holders of FTRs who are not loads and who therefore did not receive an allocation of ARRs. In other words, load would have to continue providing all the funding of FTRs, while payments to FTR holders who did not receive ARRs exceed total congestion on their FTR paths and result in profits to FTR holders.

The Commission's order will shift substantial revenue from load to the holders of FTRs and reduce the ability of load to offset congestion. If these rules had been in place for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, and ARR/FTR allocations had remained constant, ARR holders would have gone from an offset of 82.3 percent under the current rule, to 77.4 percent under the new rule, a loss of \$43.8 million for the first seven months. FTR holders would have received a corresponding windfall and revenues to FTR holder would have exceeded target allocations by \$130.7 million.

If these rules had been in place beginning with the 2011/2012 planning period, ARR holders would have received \$996.7 million less in congestion offsets from the 2011/2012 through the 2016/2017 planning period. The total overpayment to FTR holders for the 2011/2012 through 2016/2017 planning period would have been \$896.1 million. The underpayment to load and the overpayment to FTR holders is a result of several factors in the new rules all of which mean the transfer of revenues to FTR holders and the shifting of costs to load. Load is now required to pay for balancing congestion, which significantly increases costs to load and significantly increases revenues paid to FTR holders. PJM will continue to clear counter flow FTRs using excess auction revenues in order to make it possible to sell more prevailing flow FTRs. FTR holders will receive excess day-ahead congestion revenues in excess of target allocations. FTR holders will receive excess auction revenue, which is what FTR holders were willing to pay for FTRs in excess of what is provided to ARR holders.

Revenue adequacy has received a lot of attention in the PJM FTR Market. There are several factors that can affect the reporting, distribution of and quantity of funding in the FTR market. Revenue adequacy is misunderstood. FTR holders, with the creation of ARRs, do not have the right to financially firm transmission service and FTR holders do not have the right to revenue adequacy even when defined correctly. Load does have those rights based on load's payment for the transmission system and load's payment of total congestion.

Reported FTR revenue adequacy uses target allocations as the relevant benchmark. But target allocations are not the relevant benchmark. Target allocations are based on day-ahead congestion only, ignoring balancing congestion which is the other part of total congestion. FTR holders appropriately receive revenues based on actual congestion in both day-ahead and balancing markets.

<sup>6</sup> See "FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC v PJM Interconnection, LLC," Docket No. EL13-47-000 (February 15, 2013).

When day-ahead congestion differs significantly from balancing congestion, as has occurred only in recent years, this is evidence that there are reporting issues, cross subsidization issues, issues with the level of FTRs sold, and issues with modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets. Such differences are not an indication that FTR holders are under paid.

PJM used a more conservative approach to modeling the transmission capability for the 2014 to 2015 through 2016 to 2017 planning periods compared to the 2013 to 2014 planning period. PJM simply used higher outage levels and included additional constraints, both of which reduced system capability in the FTR auction model. The result was a significant reduction in Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations, and a corresponding reduction in the available quantity of FTRs, an increase in FTR prices and an increase in ARR target allocations. The market response to the reduced supply of FTRs was increased bid prices, increased clearing prices and reduced clearing quantities.

Clearing prices fell and cleared quantities increased from the 2010 to 2011 planning period through the 2013 to 2014 planning period. The market response to lower revenue adequacy was to reduce bid prices and to increase bid volumes and offer volumes. In the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods, due to reduced ARR allocations, FTR volume decreased relative to the 2013 to 2014 planning period. The reduction in ARR allocations and resulting FTR volume caused, by definition, an improvement in revenue adequacy, and also resulted in an increase in the prices of FTRs. Increased FTR prices resulted in increased ARR target allocations, because ARR target allocations are based on the Annual FTR Auction nodal prices.

FTR target allocations are currently netted within each organization in each hour. This means that within an hour, positive and negative target allocations within an organization's portfolio are offset prior to the application of the payout ratio to the positive target allocation FTRs. The payout ratios are also calculated based on these net FTR positions. The current method requires those participants with fewer negative target allocation FTRs to subsidize those with more negative target allocation FTRs. The current method treats a positive target allocation FTR differently depending on the portfolio of which it is a part. The correct method would treat all FTRs with positive target allocations exactly the same, which would eliminate this form of cross subsidy. This should also be extended to include the end of planning period FTR uplift calculation. The net of a participant's portfolio should not determine their FTR uplift liability, rather their portion of total positive target allocations should be used to determine a participant's uplift charge. The FTR market cannot work efficiently if FTR buyers do not receive payments consistent with the performance of their FTRs. Eliminating the portfolio subsidy would be a good first step in that direction.

If netting within portfolios were eliminated and the payout ratio were calculated correctly, the payout ratio in the 2013 to 2014 planning period would have been 87.5 percent instead of the reported 72.8 percent. The MMU recommends that netting of positive and negative target allocations within portfolios be eliminated.

The current rules create an asymmetry between the treatment of counter flow and prevailing flow FTRs. Counter flow FTR holders make payments over the planning period, in the form of negative target allocations. These negative target allocations are paid at 100 percent regardless of whether positive target allocation FTRs are paid at less than 100 percent.

There is no reason to treat counter flow FTRs more favorably than prevailing flow FTRs. Counter flow FTRs should also be affected when the payout ratio is less than 100 percent. This would mean that counter flow FTRs would pay back an increased amount that mirrors the decreased payments to prevailing flow FTRs. The adjusted payout ratio would evenly divide the impact of lower payouts among counter flow FTR holders and prevailing flow FTR holders by increasing negative counter flow target allocations by the same amount it decreases positive target allocations. The FTR market cannot work efficiently if FTR buyers do not receive payments consistent with the performance of their FTRs. Eliminating the counter flow subsidy would be another good step in that direction.

The result of removing portfolio netting and applying a payout ratio to counter flow FTRs would have increased the calculated payout ratio in the 2013 to 2014 planning period from the reported 72.8 percent to 91.0 percent. For the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning period the payout ratio was 100 percent. The MMU

recommends that counter flow and prevailing flow FTRs be treated symmetrically with respect to the application of a payout ratio.

The overallocation of Stage 1A ARRs results in FTR overallocations on the same facilities. Stage 1A ARR overallocation is a source of revenue inadequacy and cross subsidy. The origin and basis for the requirement to assign Stage 1A ARRs needs further investigation. The issues associated with over allocation are based on the use of out of date generation to load ARR paths and on whether PJM has appropriately built transmission to meet the requirement.

The MMU recommends that the basis for the Stage 1A assignments be reviewed and made explicit, that the role of out of date generation to load paths be reviewed and that the building of the transmission capability required to provide all defined Stage 1A allocations be reviewed. There is a reason that transmission is not built to address the Stage 1A overallocation issue. PJM's transmission planning process (RTEP) does not identify a need for new transmission because there is, in fact, no need for new transmission associated with Stage 1A ARRs. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows.

The result of removing portfolio netting, applying a payout ratio to counter flow FTRs and eliminating Stage 1A ARR overallocation in the 2013 to 2014 planning period would have increased the payout ratio to 94.6 percent without reducing ARR allocations in Stage 1B and Stage 2.

In addition to addressing these issues, the approach to the question of FTR funding should also look at the fundamental reasons that there has been a significant and persistent difference between day-ahead and balancing congestion. These reasons include the inadequate transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction model which ignores all but long term outages known in advance; the different approach to transmission line ratings in the day-ahead and real-time markets, including reactive interfaces, which directly results in differences in congestion between day-ahead and realtime markets; differences in day-ahead and real-time modeling including different line ratings, the treatment of loop flows, the treatment of outages, the modeling of PARs and the nodal location of load, which directly results in differences in congestion between day-ahead and real-time markets; the overallocation of ARRs which directly results in a difference between congestion revenue and the payment obligation; the appropriateness of seasonal ARR allocations to better match actual market conditions with the FTR auction model; geographic subsidies from the holders of positively valued FTRs in some locations to the holders of consistently negatively valued FTRs in other locations; the contribution of up to congestion transactions to the differences between dayahead and balancing congestion and thus to FTR payout ratios; the payment of congestion revenues to UTCs; and the continued sale of FTR capability on pathways with a persistent difference between FTRs and total congestion revenue. The MMU recommends that these issues be reviewed and modifications implemented. Regardless of how these issues are addressed, funding issues that persist as a result of modeling differences and flaws in the design of the FTR market should be borne by FTR holders operating in the voluntary FTR market and not imposed on load through the mechanism of balancing congestion.

It is not clear, in a competitive market, why FTR purchases by financial entities remain persistently profitable. In a competitive market, it would be expected that profits would be competed away.

For the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods FTRs have been revenue adequate. This is not because the underlying problems have been fixed. Revenue adequacy has been accomplished by limiting the amount of available ARRs and FTRs by arbitrarily decreasing the ARR allocations for Stage 1B and Stage 2 which also results in a redistribution of ARRs based on differences in allocations between Stage 1A and Stage 1B ARRs.

### **Auction Revenue Rights**

ARRs are the financial instruments through which the proceeds from FTR Auctions are allocated to load based on load's payment for the transmission system and for load's payment of congestion. ARR values are based on nodal price differences between the ARR source and sink points.<sup>7</sup> These price differences are based on the bid prices of participants in the Annual FTR Auction. The auction clears the set of feasible FTR bids which produce the highest net revenue. ARR revenues are a function of FTR auction participants' expectations of locational congestion price differences and the associated level of revenue adequacy.

ARRs are available only as obligations (not options) and only as a 24-hour product. ARRs are available to the nearest 0.1 MW. The ARR target allocation is equal to the product of the ARR MW and the price difference between sink and source from the Annual FTR Auction. An ARR value can be positive or negative depending on the price difference between sink and source, with a negative difference resulting in a liability for the holder. The ARR target allocation represents the revenue that an ARR holder should receive. ARR credits can be positive or negative and can range from zero to the ARR target allocation. If the combined net revenues from the Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions are greater than the sum of all ARR target allocations, ARRs are fully funded. If these revenues are less than the sum of all ARR target allocations, available revenue is proportionally allocated among all ARR holders. If there are excess ARR revenues, the excess revenue is given pro rata to FTR holders.

The goal of the ARR/FTR design should be to provide an efficient mechanism to ensure that load receives the rights to all the congestion revenues, and has the ability to receive the auction revenues associated with all the potential congestion revenues. The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenues be allocated to ARR holders.

When a new control zone is integrated into PJM, firm transmission customers in that control zone may choose to receive either an FTR allocation or an ARR allocation before the start of the Annual FTR Auction for two consecutive planning periods following their integration date. After the transition period, such participants receive ARRs from the annual allocation process and are not eligible for directly allocated FTRs. Network service users and firm transmission customers cannot choose to receive both an FTR allocation and an ARR allocation. This selection applies to the participant's entire portfolio of ARRs that sink into the new control zone. During this transitional period, the directly allocated FTRs are reallocated, as load shifts between LSEs within the transmission zone.

Incremental ARRs (IARRs) are allocated to customers that have been assigned cost responsibility for certain upgrades included in the PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP). These customers as defined in Schedule 12 of the Tariff are network service customers and/or merchant transmission facility owners that are assigned the cost responsibility for upgrades included in the PJM RTEP. PJM calculates IARRs for each regionally assigned facility and allocates the IARRs, if any are created by the upgrade, to eligible customers based on their percentage of cost responsibility. The customers may choose to decline the IARR allocation during the annual ARR allocation process.8 Each network service customer within a zone is allocated a share of the IARRs in the zone based on their share of the network service peak load of the zone.

### Market Structure

ARRs have been available to network service and firm, point-to-point transmission service customers since June 1, 2003, when the annual ARR allocation was first implemented for the 2003 to 2004 planning period. The initial allocation covered the Mid-Atlantic Region and the AP Control Zone. For the 2006 to 2007 planning period, the choice of ARRs or direct allocation FTRs was available to eligible market participants in the AEP, DAY, DLCO and Dominion control zones. For the 2007 to 2008 and subsequent planning periods through the present, all eligible market participants were allocated ARRs.

### Supply and Demand

ARR supply is limited by the capability of the transmission system to simultaneously accommodate the set of requested ARRs and the numerous combinations of ARRs that are feasible. The top ten binding transmission constraints for the 2014 to 2015 planning period are shown in Table 13-3.

<sup>7</sup> These nodal prices are a function of the market participants' annual FIR bids and binding transmission constraints. An optimization algorithm selects the set of feasible FIR bids that produces the most net revenue.

<sup>8</sup> PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), pp. 31 and "IARRs for RTEP Upgrades Allocated for 2016/2017 Planning Period," <a href="http://www.pim.com/~/media/markets-ops/ttr/annual-arr-allocation/2016-2017/2016-2017-iarrs-for-rtep-upgrades-allocated">http://www.pim.com/~/media/ markets-ops/ttr/annual-arr-allocation/2016-2017/2016-2017-iarrs-for-rtep-upgrades-allocated. ashx>.

### **ARR Allocation**

For the 2007 to 2008 planning period, the annual ARR allocation process was revised to include Long Term ARRs that would be in effect for 10 consecutive planning periods.<sup>9</sup> Long Term ARRs can give LSEs the ability to offset their congestion costs on a long-term basis. Long Term ARR holders can self schedule their Long Term ARRs as FTRs for any planning period during the 10 planning period timeline.

Each March, PJM allocates ARRs to eligible customers in a three-stage process:

- Stage 1A. In the first stage of the allocation, network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs, up to their share of zonal base load, based on generation to load paths that reflect generation resources that had served load prior to markets in each control zone and up to 50 percent of their historical nonzone network load. Nonzone network load is load that is located outside of the PJM footprint. Firm, point-to-point transmission service customers can obtain Long Term ARRs, based on up to 50 percent of the MW of long-term, firm, pointto-point transmission service provided between the receipt and delivery points for the historical reference year. Stage 1A ARRs cannot be prorated. If Stage 1A ARRs are found to be infeasible, transmission system upgrades must be undertaken to maintain feasibility.<sup>10</sup> While transmission upgrades are being implemented, Stage 1A ARRs, and therefore FTRs, are overallocated.
- Stage 1B. ARRs unallocated in Stage 1A are available in the Stage 1B allocation for the following planning period. Network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs, up to their share of zonal peak load, based on generation to load paths that reflect generation resources that had served load prior to markets in each control zone and up to 100 percent of their transmission responsibility for nonzone network load. Firm, point-to-point transmission service customers can obtain ARRs based on the MW of long-term, firm, point-to-point service provided between the receipt and delivery points for the historical reference year. These long-term point-to-point service agreements must also

remain in effect for the planning period covered by the allocation.

• Stage 2. Stage 2 of the annual ARR allocation is a three-step procedure, with one-third of the remaining system capability allocated in each step of the process. Network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs from any hub, control zone, generator bus or interface pricing point to any part of their aggregate load in the control zone or load aggregation zone for which an ARR was not allocated in Stage 1A or Stage 1B. Firm, point-topoint transmission service customers can obtain ARRs consistent with their transmission service as in Stage 1A and Stage 1B.

Prior to the start of the Stage 2 annual ARR allocation process, ARR holders can relinquish any portion of their ARRs resulting from the Stage 1A or Stage 1B allocation process, provided that all remaining outstanding ARRs are simultaneously feasible following the return of such ARRs.<sup>11</sup> Participants may seek additional ARRs in the Stage 2 allocation.

Effective for the 2015 to 2016 planning period, when residual zone pricing was introduced, an ARR will default to sinking at the load settlement point, but the ARR holder may elect to sink their ARR at the physical zone instead.<sup>12</sup>

ARRs can also be traded between LSEs, but these trades must be made before the first round of the Annual FTR Auction. Traded ARRs are effective for the full 12-month planning period.

When ARRs are allocated, all ARRs must be simultaneously feasible to ensure that the physical transmission system can support the approved set of ARRs. In making simultaneous feasibility determinations, PJM utilizes a power flow model of security-constrained dispatch that takes into account generation and transmission facility outages and is based on assumptions about the configuration and availability of transmission capability during the planning period.<sup>13</sup> PJM may also adjust the outages modeled, adjust line limits and account for potential closed loop interfaces

<sup>9</sup> See the 2006 State of the Market Report (March 8, 2007) for the rules of the annual ARR allocation process for the 2006 to 2007 and prior planning periods.

<sup>10</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights" Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 22.

<sup>11</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), pp. 21.

<sup>12</sup> See "Residual Zone Pricing," PJM Presentation to the Members Committee (February 23, 2012) <a href="http://www.pim.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/20120223/20120223-item-03-residual-zone-pricing-presentation.ashx">http://www.pim.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/20120223/20120223-item-03-residual-zone-pricing-presentation.ashx</a>>.

<sup>13</sup> PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), pp. 55-56.

to address expected revenue issues. The simultaneous feasibility requirement is necessary to ensure that there are adequate revenues from congestion charges to satisfy all resulting ARR obligations. If the requested set of ARRs is not simultaneously feasible, customers are allocated prorated shares in direct proportion to their requested MW and in inverse proportion to their impact on binding constraints, except Stage 1A ARRs:

#### Equation 13- 1 Calculation of prorated ARRs

Individual prorated MW = (Constraint capability) X (Individual requested MW / Total requested MW) X (1 / MW effect on line).<sup>14</sup>

The effect of an ARR request on a binding constraint is measured using the ARR's power flow distribution factor. An ARR's distribution factor is the percent of each requested MW of ARR that would have a power flow on the binding constraint. The PJM methodology prorates ARR requests in proportion to their MW value and the impact on the binding constraint. PJM's method results in the prorating only of ARRs that cause the greatest flows on the binding constraint. Were all ARR requests prorated equally, regardless of their proportional impact on the binding constraints, the result would be a significant reduction in market participants' ARRs.

Table 13-3 shows the top 10 principal binding transmission constraints that limited the 2015 to 2016 ARR Stage 1A allocation. PJM was required to increase capability limits for several facilities in order to make the ARR allocation feasible.<sup>15</sup>

# Table 13-3 Top 10 principal binding transmissionconstraints limiting the Annual ARR Allocation:Planning period 2015 to 2016

Constraint	Туре	Control Zone
Breed - Wheatland	Flowgate	MISO
Wheatland - Petersburg	Flowgate	MISO
Wempletown	Transformer	ComEd
Nelson - Electric Junction	Flowgate	MISO
Cherry Valley - Silverlake	Flowgate	MISO
Pana North	Flowgate	MISO
Nelson - Cordova	Line	ComEd
Pana North	Flowgate	MISO
Cherry Valley	Transformer	ComEd
Pontiac Midpoint - Wilton Ctr.	Flowgate	ComEd

# FERC Order on EL16-121: Stage 1A ARR Allocation

FERC ordered PJM to more accurately represent system usage when allocating Stage 1A ARRs by removing retired resources from their allocation methodology.<sup>16</sup> PJM made a compliance filing, accepted by FERC, stating that retired units would be replaced with qualified replacement resources (QRRs).<sup>17</sup> PJM proposed to categorize QRRs as built under a rate base approach or a non-rate base (market) approach. PJM proposed to give priority to load delivery from their own rate based units in deciding between competing ARR claims.

Under the new allocation methodology, PJM will replace retired units or units whose ICAP is less than their historical capacity with QRRs. A QRR will be a unit, or combination of units, whose ICAP value can meet the historically allocated MW quantity that was allocated based on the retired resource. QRRs will be classified as rate base or non-rate base units and ranked by rate base/non-rate base and by economics within each category. Participants will have to provide evidence that a unit is a rate-base unit to qualify for the designation in the Stage 1A ARR allocation. PJM will assign the historical MW to rate base QRRs within the zone, and then intra zonally to all generation units to replace retired resource capacity. These reassignments must all pass the simultaneous feasibility test.

The method PJM has proposed continues to rely on a contract path based approach. PJM is not applying this method to all Stage 1A units, so over allocations may persist. Existing, non-retired, Stage 1A resources will still be given their current allocations, while ARR allocations to QRRs that replace retired Stage 1A resources will be prorated based on the feasibility of these of ARRs after existing resources are allocated. As a result of this proration, the new ARRs will have lower priority than the non-retired Stage 1A resources, which could affect the value of the newly assigned ARRs.

16 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016). 17 See FERC Docket No. EL16-6-003.

<sup>14</sup> See the MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets, at "Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights," for an illustration explaining this calculation in greater detail. <a href="http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical\_References/references/thml">http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical\_References/references/thml</a>.

<sup>15</sup> It is a requirement of Section 7.4.2 (i) in the OATT that any ARR request made in Stage 1A must be feasible and transmission capability must be raised if an ARR request is found to be infeasible.

# FTR Revenue Adequacy and Stage 1B/Stage 2 ARR Allocations

For the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods, FTR revenue adequacy was over 100 percent. Not every month was revenue adequate, but there was excess revenue from other months to ensure that the planning period was revenue adequate. The last time there were four months of consecutive funding of 100 percent or more was in the 2009 to 2010 planning period.

This high level of revenue adequacy was primarily due to actions taken by PJM to address prior low levels of revenue adequacy. PJM's actions included PJM's arbitrary use of higher outage levels and PJM's decision to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) both of which reduced system capability in the FTR auction model. PJM's actions led to a significant reduction in the allocation of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs.

While PJM's approach to outages in the Annual FTR Auction reduces revenue inadequacy, which was caused in part by Stage 1A ARR overallocations, it does not address the Stage 1A ARR overallocation issue directly, and has resulted in decreased Stage 1B ARR allocations through proration, decreased Stage 2 ARR allocations through proration and decreased FTR capability. Stage 1A ARRs were not affected by PJM's assumption of increased outages because they cannot be prorated.

Figure 13-1 shows the historic allocations for Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs from the 2011 to 2012 to 2016 to 2017 planning periods. There was an 84.9 percent decrease in Stage 1B ARRs allocated and an 88.1 percent decrease in total Stage 2 ARR allocations from the 2013 to 2014 planning period to the 2014 to 2015 planning period. Total Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations increased slightly in the 2015 to 2016 planning year over the 2014-2015 planning year allocations, from 3,497.6 MW to 5,219.6 MW. But the ARR allocations for the 2015-2016 planning year were still 78.8 percent below 2013 to 2014 planning period volumes of 34,444.0 MW. For the 2016 to 2017 planning period there was another relatively small increase in available Stage 1B and Stage 2 capacity from 5,319.6 MW to 12,821.6 MW, but available ARRs were still 48.9 percent below 2013 to 2014 planning period volumes.

#### Figure 13–1 Historic Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR Allocations from the 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017 planning periods




Table 13-4 shows the ARR allocations for the 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017 planning periods. Stage 1A allocations cannot be prorated and have been slowly increasing. Stage 1B and Stage 2 allocations can be prorated. Stage 1B and Stage 2 allocations were steadily declining over the 2011 to 2012 through 2013 to 2014 planning periods, but were very significantly reduced in the 2014 to 2015 planning period as a result of PJM's arbitrary increase in modeled outages designed to increase revenue adequacy. There was a small increase in Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR volume from the 2014 to 2015 planning period to the 2015 to 2016 planning period and a small increase for the 2016 to 2017 planning period. These incremental increases are the result of PJM making more ARRs available based on excess revenue in the previous planning period.

# Table 13-4 Historic Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRAllocations from the 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to2017 planning periods

	2011/2012	2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017
Stage	ARR	ARR	ARR	ARR	ARR	ARR
Stage 1A	64,159.9	67,299.6	67,861.4	68,837.7	71,874.0	68,729.1
Stage 1B	22,208.3	18,431.7	15,782.0	2,389.6	3,643.1	5,525.7
Stage 2-1	3,072.5	2,700.6	3,519.2	360.9	643.8	1,197.1
Stage 2-2	6,652.6	3,334.3	3,200.0	455.9	511.2	2,368.8
Stage 2-3	6,382.6	6,218.7	2,611.8	291.2	521.5	3,730.0
Total Stage 2	16,107.7	12,253.6	9,331.0	1,108.0	1,676.5	7,295.9

Table 13-5 shows the top 10 principal binding transmission constraints that limited the 2016 to 2017 ARR Stage 1A allocation. PJM was required to increase capability limits for several facilities in order to make the ARR allocation feasible.<sup>18</sup>

#### Table 13-5 Top 10 principal binding transmission constraints limiting the Annual ARR Allocation: Planning period 2016 to 2017

Constraint	Туре	Control Zone
Nucore - Whitestown	Flowgate	MISO
Monroe - Bayshore	Flowgate	MISO
Pana North	Flowgate	MISO
Nelson - Electric Junction	Flowgate	MISO
Cherry Valley - Silverlake	Flowgate	MISO
Nelson - Electric Junction	Flowgate	MISO
Churchtown	Transformer	AECO
Pierce - Foster	Flowgate	MISO
Byron - Cherry Valley	Flowgate	MISO
Pana North	Flowgate	MISO

### ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching

PJM rules provide that when load switches between LSEs during the planning period, a proportional share of associated ARRs that sink into a given control or load aggregation zone is automatically reassigned to follow that load.<sup>19</sup> ARR reassignment occurs daily only if the LSE losing load has ARRs with a net positive economic value to that control zone. An LSE gaining load in the same control zone is allocated a proportional share of positively valued ARRs within the control zone based on the shifted load. ARRs are reassigned to the nearest 0.001 MW and any MW of load may be reassigned multiple times over a planning period. Residual ARRs are also subject to the rules of ARR reassignment. This practice supports competition by ensuring that the offset to congestion follows load, thereby removing a barrier to competition among LSEs and, by ensuring that only

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ARRs with a positive value are reassigned, preventing an LSE from assigning poor ARR choices to other LSEs. However, when ARRs are self scheduled as FTRs, these underlying self-scheduled FTRs do not follow load that shifts while the ARRs do follow load that shifts, and this may result in lower value of the ARRs for the receiving LSE compared to the total value held by the original ARR holder.

There were 55,638 MW of ARRs associated with \$659,000 of revenue that were reassigned in the 2015 to 2016 planning period. There were 27,920 MW of ARRs associated with \$315,900 of revenue that were reassigned for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period.

Table 13-6 summarizes ARR MW and associated revenue automatically reassigned for network load in each control zone where changes occurred between June 2015 and December 2016.

# Table 13–6 ARRs and ARR revenue automatically reassigned for network load changes by control zone: June 1, 2015, through December 31, 2016

	ARRs Rea (MW-0	5	ARR Revenue Reassigned [Dollars (Thousands) per MW-day]			
	2015/2016	2016/2017	2015/2016	2016/2017		
Control Zone	(12 months)	(7 months)	(12 months)	(7 months)		
AECO	594	274	\$4.5	\$2.6		
AEP	7,145	1,381	\$72.0	\$8.4		
AP	2,171	936	\$51.8	\$19.5		
ATSI	7,077	3,773	\$66.7	\$20.6		
BGE	3,044	1,673	\$95.7	\$98.9		
ComEd	5,433	2,005	\$133.0	\$66.8		
DAY	624	473	\$1.3	\$1.4		
DEOK	6,489	1,428	\$31.5	\$8.4		
DLCO	6,179	4,117	\$13.1	\$10.0		
DPL	1,628	1,155	\$55.2	\$23.0		
Dominion	20	55	\$0.3	\$0.2		
EKPC	0	0	\$0.0	\$0.0		
JCPL	1,629	655	\$12.4	\$2.1		
Met-Ed	1,081	474	\$9.4	\$4.1		
PECO	4,189	2,735	\$23.8	\$6.2		
PENELEC	1,277	848	\$21.8	\$12.7		
PPL	3,341	3,320	\$18.6	\$3.7		
PSEG	1,569	965	\$37.5	\$13.4		
Рерсо	2,098	1,619	\$10.4	\$13.9		
RECO	52	35	\$0.0	\$0.0		
Total	55,638	27,920	\$659.0	\$315.9		

<sup>18</sup> It is a requirement of Section 7.4.2 (i) in the OATT that any ARR request made in Stage 1A must be feasible and transmission capability must be raised if an ARR request is found to be infeasible.

<sup>19</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 28.

### Incremental ARRs (IARRs) for RTEP Upgrades

Table 13-7 lists the IARR allocation MW for the planning periods from the 2008 to 2009 planning period through the 2016 to 2017 planning period. This table includes IARRs from RTEP projects and IARRs from other projects.

Table 13-7 IARR allocation volume: Planning period	S
2008 to 2009 through 2016 to 2017	

		Bid and				
Planning	Requested	Requested	Cleared	Cleared	Uncleared	Uncleared
Period	Count	Volume (MW)	Volume (MW)	Volume	Volume (MW)	Volume
2008/2009	15	890.5	890.5	100%	0	0%
2009/2010	14	530.5	530.5	100%	0	0%
2010/2011	14	530.5	530.5	100%	0	0%
2011/2012	15	595.0	595.0	100%	0	0%
2012/2013	15	687.4	687.4	100%	0	0%
2013/2014	17	1,087.4	1,087.4	100%	0	0%
2014/2015	18	1,447.4	1,447.4	100%	0	0%
2015/2016	17	1,290.5	1,290.5	100%	0	0%
2016/2017	18	1,447.4	1,447.4	100%	0	0%

Table 13-8 lists the three RTEP upgrade projects that were allocated a total of 678.2 MW of IARRs for the 2016 to 2017 planning period.

## Table 13-8 IARRs allocated for the 2015 to 2016 Annual ARR Allocation for RTEP upgrades

		IARR Parameters			
Project #	Project Description	Source	Sink	Total MW	
B0287	Install 600 MVAR Dynamic Reactive Device at Elroy 500kV	RTEP B0287 Source	DPL	190.6	
B0328	TrAIL Project: 502 JCT - Loudoun 500kV	RTEP B0328 Source	Рерсо	391.2	
B0329	Cason-Suffolk 500 kV	RTEP B0329 Source	Dominion	96.4	

### **Residual ARRs**

Residual ARRs are available if transmission system capability is added during the planning period after the annual ARR allocation. This additional transmission system capability would not have been accounted for in the initial annual ARR allocation, but it enables the creation of residual ARRs. Residual ARRs are effective on the first day of the month in which the additional transmission system capability is included in FTR auctions and exist until the end of the planning period. For the following planning period, any Residual ARRs are available as ARRs in the annual ARR allocation. Residual ARRs are a separate product from incremental ARRs.

Only ARR holders that had their Stage 1 ARRs prorated are eligible to receive Residual ARRs which cannot be declined, with positive or negative target allocations. Stage 1 ARR holders have a priority right to ARRs. Effective August 1, 2012, Residual ARRs are also available for eligible participants when a transmission outage was modeled in the Annual ARR Allocation, but the transmission facility becomes available during the modeled year. Residual ARRs awarded due to outages are effective for single, whole months and cannot be self scheduled. ARR target allocations are based on the clearing prices from FTR obligations in the effective

> monthly auction, may not exceed zonal network services peak load or firm transmission reservation levels and are only available up to the prorated ARR MW capacity as allocated in the Annual ARR Allocation.

Table 13-9 shows the Residual ARRs automatically allocated to eligible participants, along with the target allocations from the effective month. In the first seven months of the 2016 to

2017 planning period planning period, PJM allocated a total of 21,600.4 MW of residual ARRs, down from 34,537.6 MW for the first seven months of the 2015 to 2016 planning period. Residual ARRs had a total target

> allocation of \$4.2 million for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, down from \$5.9 million for the first seven months of the 2015 to 2016 planning period. Some ARRs that were previously

allocated in Stage 1B are now being allocated as Residual ARRs on a month to month basis without the option to self schedule.

Table 13-9 Residual ARR allocation volume and target	
allocation: 2016	

	Bid and			
	Requested	Cleared Volume		Target
Month	Volume (MW)	(MW)	Cleared Volume	Allocation
Jan-16	6,710.0	2,992.7	44.6%	\$1,732,883
Feb-16	4,317.0	3,781.0	87.6%	(\$669,918)
Mar-16	6,422.8	3,935.0	61.3%	\$746,442
Apr-16	5,490.3	3,769.5	68.7%	\$44,884
May-16	4,329.3	3,154.8	72.9%	\$897,905
Jun-16	4,596.8	2,978.5	64.8%	\$501,311
Jul-16	5,802.8	3,084.0	53.1%	\$394,249
Aug-16	6,355.5	3,658.1	57.6%	\$353,280
Sep-16	3,932.2	3,277.5	83.4%	\$780,618
Oct-16	8,784.6	3,643.7	41.5%	\$562,507
Nov-16	3,690.4	2,553.8	69.2%	\$651,587
Dec-16	4,748.3	2,404.8	50.6%	\$999,086
Total	65,180.0	39,233.4	60.2%	\$6,994,833

### **Market Performance**

### Volume

Table 13-10 shows the MW of ARR allocations for each round of the 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 planning periods. The percent cleared for the 2016 to 2017 planning period increased 2.7 percentage points from the previous planning period.

## Table 13–10 Annual ARR Allocation volume: planning periods 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017

				Requested	Cleared		Uncleared	
Planning			Requested	Volume	Volume	Cleared	Volume	Uncleared
Period	Stage	Round	Count	(MW)	(MW)	Volume	(MW)	Volume
2015/2016	1A	0	21,508	71,874	71,874	100.0%	0	0.0%
	1B	1	14,915	38,848	3,643	9.4%	35,205	90.6%
	2	2	5,849	26,710	644	2.4%	26,066	97.6%
		3	4,773	25,900	511	2.0%	25,389	98.0%
		4	4,326	25,986	522	2.0%	25,464	98.0%
		Total	14,948	78,596	1,677	2.1%	76,919	97.9%
	Total		51,371	189,318	77,194	40.8%	112,124	59.2%
2016/2017	1A	0	21,824	68,729	68,729	100.0%	0	0.0%
	1B	1	15,508	36,569	5,526	15.1%	31,043	84.9%
	2	2	5,784	27,942	1,197	4.3%	26,745	95.7%
		3	5,203	27,118	2,369	8.7%	24,749	91.3%
		4	5,070	27,080	3,730	13.8%	23,350	86.2%
		Total	16,057	82,140	7,296	8.9%	74,844	91.1%
	Total		53,389	187,438	81,551	43.5%	105,887	56.5%

Stage 1A Infeasibility

Stage 1A ARRs are allocated for a 10 year period, with the ability for a participant to opt out of any planning period. PJM conducts a simultaneous feasibility analysis to determine the transmission upgrades required to ensure that the long term ARRs can remain feasible. If a simultaneous feasibility test violation occurs in any year, PJM will identify or accelerate any transmission upgrades to resolve the violation and these upgrades will be recommended for inclusion in the PJM RTEP process.<sup>20</sup>

There is a reason that transmission is not actually built to address the Stage 1A overallocation issue. PJM's transmission planning process (RTEP) does not identify a need for new transmission because there is, in fact, no need for new transmission associated with Stage 1A ARRs. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows. For the 2016 to 2017 planning period, Stage 1A of the Annual ARR Allocation was infeasible. As a result, modeled system capability, in excess of actual system capability, was provided to the Stage 1A ARRs and added to the FTR auction. According to Section 7.4.2 (i) of the PJM OATT, the capability limits of the binding constraints rendering these ARRs infeasible must be increased in the model and these increased limits must be used in subsequent ARR and FTR allocations and auctions for the entire planning period, except in the

case of extraordinary circumstances.

The result of this required increased capability in the models is an overallocation of both ARRs and FTRs for the entire planning period and an associated reduction in ARR and FTR funding. Table 13-11 shows the MW quantity and count of overloaded facilities and the reasons for the modeled overload.

## Table 13-11 Overloaded facility type and reason:2016/2017 planning period

Reason	Туре	MW	Count
Network Load	M2M Flowgate	5,106	75
Network Load	Pseudo Tie Flowgate	2,238	64
Internal PJM	Transmission Outage	751	20

In order to eliminate the infeasibilities for the requested Stage 1A ARR allocations, PJM was required to raise the modeled capacity limits on 159 facilities, 20 of which were internal to PJM and the rest were in MISO, a total of 8,095 MW.<sup>21</sup>

Figure 13-2 shows the predicted and estimated impact of Stage 1A infeasibilities on funding for the 2012 to 2013 through 2015 to 2016 planning periods, as well as the predicted impact on funding for the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The predicted funding is based on the infeasible ARR MW and the nodal price of the source and sink in the Annual FTR Auction. The estimated funding is calculated assuming every infeasible ARR MW is self scheduled, and uses the hourly congestion

<sup>20</sup> PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p22.

<sup>21</sup> PJM 2016/2017 Stage 1A Over allocation notice, PJM FTRs, <http://www.pim.com/~/media/ markets-ops/ftr/annual-arr-allocation/2016-2017/2016-2017-stage-1a-over-allocation-notice ashx> (January 25, 2017).

LMP values. In the 2015 to 2016 planning period, Stage 1A ARR infeasibilities accounted for \$304.7 million in over allocation.





Figure 13-2 Stage 1A Infeasibility Funding Impact

Figure 13-3 shows a map of over allocated ARR source points in Stage 1A, regardless of reason, for the 2013 to 2014 through 2016 to 2017 planning periods. The year indicated for each source point is the latest year that source was announced as over allocated in the Stage 1A process. Generators retired as of the 2016 to 2017 planning period are indicated by a square marker to show Stage 1A source points that are no longer in service for the most recent Stage 1A allocation period.

#### Figure 13-3 Overallocated Stage 1A ARR source points



#### Revenue

ARRs are allocated to qualifying customers rather than sold, so there is no ARR revenue comparable to the revenue that results from the FTR auctions.

### **Revenue Adequacy**

As with FTRs, revenue adequacy for ARRs must be distinguished from the adequacy of ARRs as an offset to total congestion. Revenue adequacy is a narrower concept that compares the revenues available to ARR holders to the value of ARRs as determined in the Annual FTR Auction. ARRs have been revenue adequate for every auction to date. Customers that self schedule ARRs as FTRs have the same revenue adequacy characteristics as all other FTRs.

ARR holders received \$968.1 million in credits from the FTR auctions during the 2015 to 2016 planning period before accounting for self scheduling, load shifts or residual ARRs. The FTR auction revenue collected pays ARR holders' credits. During the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, ARR holders received \$935.7 million in ARR credits.

Table 13-12 lists projected ARR target allocations from the Annual ARR Allocation and net revenue sources from the Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2015 to 2016 planning period and the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning periods.

# Table 13-12 Projected ARR revenue adequacy (Dollars (Millions)): Planning periods 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017


	2015/	2016/
	2016	2017
Total FTR auction net revenue	\$968.1	\$935.7
Annual FTR Auction net revenue	\$936.3	\$909.0
Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction net revenue*	\$31.8	\$26.7
ARR target allocations	\$931.6	\$911.4
ARR credits	\$931.6	\$911.4
Surplus auction revenue	\$36.5	\$24.3
ARR payout ratio	100%	100%
FTR payout ratio*	100%	100%

\* Shows twelve months for 2015/2016 and seven months for 2016/2017.

Figure 13-4 shows the dollars per ARR MW held for each month of the 2010 to 2011 planning period through the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning periods. The ARR MW held do not include self-scheduled FTRs and do include Residual ARRs starting in August 2012. FTR prices increased in the 2014 to 2015 Annual FTR Auction as a result of reduced supply caused by PJM's assumption of more outages in the model used to allocate Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs. The increased FTR prices resulted in an increase in dollars paid per ARR MW. For

the 2014 to 2015 planning period, the total dollars per MW of ARR allocation was \$11,279, while the previous planning period resulted in a dollars per MW of \$6,692, a 68.5 percent increase in payment per allocated ARR MW. Some of the ARR MW lost from proration were provided in the Residual ARR process, but the residual allocations are not comparable to the ARRs awarded in the annual process because residual ARR allocations change each month and cannot be self scheduled as FTRs. For the 2015 to 2016 planning period, the dollars per MW of ARR allocation was \$10,641.54. For the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, the dollars per MW of ARR allocation were \$7,180.49 down from \$7,739.36 in the first seven months of the 2015 to 2016 planning period. Total dollars per MW were down slightly in the 2016 to 2017 planning period due to increased Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR volume.





### **Excess Auction Revenue**

Figure 13-5 shows the monthly excess auction revenue from the 2011 to 2012 through 2015 to 2016 planning periods. Excess auction revenue is the revenue collected each month from FTR auctions in excess of ARR target allocations.

Beginning with the 2014 to 2015 planning period, market rules allow PJM to decrease prevailing flow target allocations by clearing counter flow FTRs, without making the opposite prevailing flow FTR available, as long as ARRs remain revenue adequate.<sup>22</sup> This allows PJM to use the excess auction revenue to pay prevailing flow FTRs without increasing prevailing flow obligations. The result is to increase FTR funding. This action removes money from the ARR revenue stream and caused the decrease in excess ARR revenue beginning in June 2014. Excess auction revenue is allocated pro rata to FTR holders at the end of the planning period, instead of being distributed to ARR holders.

# Figure 13-5 Monthly excess ARR revenue: Planning periods 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017




Table 13-13 shows the excess auction revenue, by planning period, for planning periods 2010 to 2011 through 2016 to 2017.

Table 13-13 E	xcess Auction	Revenue:	Planning	periods
2010 to 2011	through 2016	to 2017		

Planning Period	Excess Auction Revenue
2010/2011	\$29,704,562
2011/2012	\$80,083,695
2012/2013	\$66,652,822
2013/2014	\$71,687,937
2014/2015*	\$29,045,590
2015/2016	\$29,612,591
2016/2017**	\$12,093,742
Total	\$318,880,939
*Start of counter flow "buy back"	

\*\*Through December 31, 2016

<sup>22</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights" Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 55.

### **Financial Transmission Rights**

FTRs are financial instruments that entitle their holders to receive revenue or require them to pay charges based on locational congestion price differences in the Day-Ahead Energy Market across specific FTR transmission paths, subject to total congestion revenue including day-ahead and balancing congestion. The value of the day-ahead congestion price differences, termed the FTR target allocation, defines the maximum, but not guaranteed, payout for FTRs. The target allocation of an FTR reflects the difference in day-ahead congestion prices rather than the difference in LMPs, which includes both congestion and marginal losses.

Auction market participants are free to request FTRs between any eligible pricing nodes on the system. For the Long Term FTR Auction a list of available hubs, control zones, aggregates, generator buses and interface pricing points is available. For the Annual FTR Auction and FTRs bought for a quarterly period in the monthly auction the available FTR source and sink points include hubs, control zones, aggregates, generator buses, load buses and interface pricing points. An FTR bought in the Monthly FTR Auction for the single calendar month following the auction may include any bus for which an LMP is calculated in the FTR model used. Effective August 5, 2011, PJM does not allow FTR buy bids to clear with a price of zero unless there is at least one constraint in the auction which affects the FTR path. FTRs are available to the nearest 0.1 MW. The FTR target allocation is calculated hourly and is equal to the product of the FTR MW and the congestion price difference between sink and source that occurs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. The target allocation of an FTR can be positive or negative depending on the sink minus source congestion price difference, with a negative difference resulting in a liability for the holder. FTR holders with a negatively valued FTR are required to pay charges equal to their target allocations. Revenues above that level on individual FTR paths are used to fund FTRs on paths which received less than their target allocations.

Available revenue to pay FTR holders is based on the amount of day-ahead and balancing congestion collected, payments by holders of negatively valued FTRs, Market to Market payments, excess ARR revenues available at the end of a month and any charges made to day-ahead operating reserves. Depending on the amount of revenues collected, FTR holders with a positively valued FTR may receive congestion credits between zero and their target allocations.

FTR funding is not on a path specific basis or on a time specific basis. There are widespread cross subsidies paid to equalize payments across paths and across time periods within a planning period. All paths receive the same proportional level of target revenue at the end of the planning period. FTR auction revenues and excess revenues are carried forward from prior months and distributed back from later months. At the end of a planning period, if some months remain not fully funded, an uplift charge is collected from any FTR market participants that hold FTRs for the planning period based on their pro rata share of total net positive FTR target allocations, excluding any charge to FTR holders with a net negative FTR position for the planning year.

FTRs can be bought, sold and self scheduled. Buy bids are bids to buy FTRs in the auctions; sell offers are offers to sell existing FTRs in the auctions; and self-scheduled bids are FTRs that have been directly converted from ARRs in the Annual FTR Auction.

There are two types of FTR products: obligations and options. An obligation provides a credit, positive or negative, equal to the product of the FTR MW and the congestion price difference between FTR sink (destination) and source (origin) that occurs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. An option provides only positive credits and options are available for only a subset of the possible FTR transmission paths.

There are three classes of FTR products: 24-hour, on peak and off peak. The 24-hour products are effective 24 hours a day, seven days a week, while the on peak products are effective during on peak periods defined as the hours ending 0800 through 2300, Eastern Prevailing Time (EPT) Mondays through Fridays, excluding North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) holidays. The off peak products are effective during hours ending 2400 through 0700, EPT, Mondays through Fridays, and during all hours on Saturdays, Sundays and NERC holidays.

PJM operates an Annual FTR Auction for all participants. In addition, PJM conducts Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the remaining months of the planning period. PJM also runs a Long Term FTR Auction for the following three consecutive planning years. FTR options are not available in the Long Term FTR Auction. A secondary bilateral market is also administered by PJM to allow participants to buy and sell existing FTRs. FTRs can also be exchanged bilaterally outside PJM markets.

The objective function of all FTR auctions is to maximize the bid-based value of FTRs awarded in each auction.

FTR buy bids and sell offers may be made as obligations or options and as any of the three classes. FTR selfscheduled bids by ARR holders are available only as obligations and 24-hour product class, consistent with the associated ARRs, and only in the Annual FTR Auction.

### **Market Structure**

### **Supply and Demand**

PJM oversees the process of selling and buying FTRs through ARR Allocations and FTR Auctions. Market participants purchase FTRs by participating in Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.<sup>23</sup> FTRs can also be traded between market participants through bilateral transactions. ARRs may be self scheduled as FTRs for participation only in the Annual FTR Auction.

Total FTR supply is limited by the capability of the transmission system, as modeled in the Annual ARR Allocation. Stage 1A ARR requests must be granted, which artificially increases the transmission capacity in the model on the affected facilities. The capacity modeled in the Annual ARR Allocation is used as the capacity for the Annual FTR Auction to simultaneously accommodate the various combinations of requested FTRs. Depending on assumptions used in the auction transmission model, the total FTR supply can be greater than or less than system capability in aggregate and/ or on an element by element basis. When FTR supply is greater than system capability, FTR target allocations will be greater than congestion revenues, contributing to FTR revenue inadequacy. Where FTR supply is less than system capability, FTR target allocations will be less than congestion revenues, contributing to FTR revenue surplus.

PJM can also make further adjustments to the auction model to address expected revenue inadequacies. PJM can assume higher outage levels and PJM can decide to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) both of which reduce system capability in the auction model. These PJM actions reduce the supply of available Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs, which in turn reduce the number of FTRs available for purchase. PJM made such adjustments starting in the 2014 to 2015 planning year auction model.

For the Annual FTR Auction, known transmission outages that are expected to last for two months or more may be included in the model, while known outages of five days or more may be included in the model for the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions as well as any outages of a shorter duration that PJM determines would cause FTR revenue inadequacy if not modeled.<sup>24</sup> The full list of outages selected is publicly posted, but the process by which these outages are selected is not fully explained and PJM exercises significant discretion in selecting outages to accomplish FTR revenue adequacy goals.

The auction process does not account for the fact that significant transmission outages, which have not been provided to PJM by transmission owners prior to the auction date, will occur during the periods covered by the auctions. Such transmission outages may or may not be planned in advance or may be emergency outages. In addition, it is difficult to model in an annual auction two outages of similar significance and similar duration in different areas which do not overlap in time. The choice of which to model may have significant distributional consequences. The fact that outages are modeled at significantly lower than historical levels results in selling too many FTRs which creates downward pressure on revenues paid to each FTR. To address this issue, the MMU has recommended that PJM use probabilistic outage modeling and seasonal ARR/FTR markets to better align the supply of ARRs and FTRs with actual system capabilities.

<sup>23</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 38.

<sup>24</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 55.

### Long Term FTR Auctions

PJM conducts a Long Term FTR Auction for the next three consecutive planning periods. The capacity offered for sale in Long Term FTR Auctions is the residual system capability assuming that all ARRs allocated in the prior annual ARR allocation process are self scheduled as FTRs. These ARRs are modeled as fixed injections and withdrawals in the Long Term FTR Auction. Future transmission upgrades are not included in the model. The 2009 to 2012 and 2010 to 2013 Long Term FTR Auctions consisted of two rounds.<sup>25</sup> Subsequent Long Term FTR Auctions consist of three rounds. FTRs purchased in prior rounds may be offered for sale in subsequent rounds. FTRs obtained in the Long Term Auctions may have terms of any one year or a single term of all three years. FTR products available in the Long Term Auction include 24-hour, on peak and off peak FTR obligations. FTR option products are not available in Long Term FTR Auctions.

- Round 1. The first round is conducted in the June prior to the start of the term covered by the Long Term FTR Auction. Market participants make offers for FTRs between any source and sink.
- Round 2. The second round is conducted approximately three months after the first round and follows the same rules as Round 1.
- Round 3. The third round is conducted approximately six months after the first round and follows the same rules as Round 1.

Table 13-14 shows the top 10 binding constraints for the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction and the 2015 to 2016 Annual FTR Auction based on the marginal value of on peak hours. The severity ranking is based on the marginal value of the constraint in the simultaneous feasibility test.

#### Table 13-14 Top 10 principal binding transmission constraints limiting the Long Term FTR Auction: Planning periods 2017 to 2020

			Severity Ranking by Auction Round		
Constraint	Туре	Control Zone	1	2	3
St. Johns	Transformer	Dominion	1	NA	5
Elliott - Rosewood	Line	AEP	NA	1	NA
Brown Jct Gates Hill	Line	AP	NA	NA	1
Mercer IP - Galesburg	Flowgate	MISO	2	NA	NA
Gore Jct Rolling Meadow	Line	Penelec	3	NA	6
Greenfield - Visteaon-Ford	Line	ATSI	NA	2	NA
Erie South - French Road	Line	Penelec	NA	3	NA
Worcester - Ocean Pines	Line	DPL	27	4	13
Gainesville	Transformer	Dominion	NA	5	NA

### Annual FTR Auctions

After the Long Term FTR Auction, residual capability on the PJM transmission system is auctioned in the Annual FTR Auction. Annual FTRs are effective beginning June 1 of the planning period through May 31. Outages expected to last two or more months are included in the determination of the simultaneous feasibility for the Annual FTR Auction. ARR holders who wish to self schedule must inform PJM prior to round one of this auction. Any self-scheduled ARR requests clear 25 percent of the requested volume in each round of the Annual FTR Auction as price takers. This auction consists of four rounds that allow any transmission service customers or PJM members to bid for any FTR or to offer for sale any FTR that they currently hold. FTRs in this auction can be obligations or options for peak, off peak or 24-hour periods. FTRs purchased in one round of the Annual FTR Auction can be sold in later rounds or in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

Table 13-15 shows the top 10 binding constraints for the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction based on the marginal value of on peak hours.

<sup>25</sup> FERC approved, on December 7, 2009, the addition of a third round to the Long Term FTR Auction. FERC letter order accepting PJM Interconnection, LLCS: revisions to Long-Term Financial Transmission Rights Auctions to its Amended and Restated Operating Agreement and Open Access Transmission Tariff, Docket No. ER10-82-000 (December 7, 2009).

### Table 13–15 Top 10 principal binding transmission constraints limiting the Annual FTR Auction: Planning period 2016 to 2017

		Severity Ranking by Auction				
				Round		
Constraint	Туре	Control Zone	1 2 3			
Rockwell - Congress	Line	AEP	2	1	1	1
Graves Mills - Reusens	Line	AEP	1	3	28	NA
Mercer IP - Galesburg	Flowgate	MISO	5	2	2	2
Rantoul Jct - Paxton East	Flowgate	MISO	7	7 4 3		3
Davenport - East Calamus	Flowgate	MISO	3	18	41	37
St. Johns	Transformer	Dominion	4	27	24	111
Waterman - Sandwich	Line	ComEd	10	7	4	4
New Hope - Ocean Pines	Line	DPL	6	NA	NA	NA
Wempletown	Transformer	ComEd	8	88	17	122
Electric Junction - Waterman	Line	ComEd	9	8	7	8

# Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions

The residual capability of the PJM transmission system, after the Long Term and Annual FTR Auctions are concluded, is offered in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. Existing FTRs are modeled as fixed injections and withdrawals. Outages expected to last five or more days are included in the determination of the simultaneous feasibility test for the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction. These are single-round monthly auctions that allow any transmission service customer or PJM member to bid for any FTR or to offer for sale any FTR that they currently hold. Market participants can bid for or offer monthly FTRs for any of the next three months remaining in the planning period, or quarterly FTRs for any of the quarters remaining in the planning period. FTRs in the auctions include obligations and options and 24-hour, on peak and off peak products.<sup>26</sup>

### Secondary Bilateral Market

Market participants can buy and sell existing FTRs through the PJM administered, bilateral market, or market participants can trade FTRs among themselves without PJM involvement. Bilateral transactions that are not done through PJM can involve parties that are not PJM members. PJM has no knowledge of bilateral transactions that are done outside of PJM's bilateral market system.

For bilateral trades done through PJM, the FTR transmission path must remain the same, FTR obligations must remain obligations, and FTR options must remain

options. However, an individual FTR may be split up into multiple, smaller FTRs, down to increments of 0.1 MW. FTRs can also be given different start and end times, but the start time cannot be earlier than the original FTR start time and the end time cannot be later than the original FTR end time.

### **Buy Bids**

The total FTR buy bids in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the entire 2015 to 2016 planning period and the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period were 9,386,860 MW and 10,167,078 MW.

### Patterns of Ownership

The overall ownership structure of FTRs and the ownership of prevailing flow and counter flow FTRs is descriptive and is not necessarily a measure of actual or potential FTR market structure issues, as the ownership positions result from competitive auctions.

In order to evaluate the ownership of prevailing flow and counter flow FTRs, the MMU categorized all participants owning FTRs in PJM as either physical or financial. Physical entities include utilities and customers which primarily take physical positions in PJM markets. Financial entities include banks and hedge funds which primarily take financial positions in PJM markets. International market participants that primarily take financial positions in PJM markets are generally considered to be financial entities even if they are utilities in their own countries.

Table 13-16 presents the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction market cleared FTRs by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. The results show that financial entities purchased 77.5 percent of prevailing flow buy bid FTRs and 84.9 percent of counter flow buy bid FTRs with the result that financial entities purchased 80.8 percent of all Long Term FTR Auction cleared buy bids for the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction.

<sup>26</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), p. 39.

Table 13–16 Long Term FTR Auction patterns of ownership by FTR direction: Planning periods 2017 to 2020

			FTR Direction				
	Organization	Prevailing					
Trade Type	Туре	Flow	Counter Flow	All			
Buy Bids	Physical	22.5%	15.1%	19.2%			
	Financial	77.5%	84.9%	80.8%			
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			
Sell Offers	Physical	36.9%	26.6%	33.3%			
	Financial	63.1%	73.4%	66.7%			
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			

Table 13-17 presents the Annual FTR Auction cleared FTRs for the 2016 to 2017 planning period by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. In the Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period, financial entities purchased 56.9 percent of prevailing flow FTRs, up 0.6 percentage points, and 79.7 percent of counter flow FTRs, up 4.7 percentage points, with the results that financial entities purchased 65.6 percent, up 3.3 percentage points, of all Annual FTR Auction cleared buy bids for the 2016 to 2017 planning period.

Table 13-17 Annual FTR Auction patterns of ownershipby FTR direction: Planning period 2016 to 2017

			FTR Direction			
	Organization	Self-Scheduled	Prevailing	Counter		
Trade Type	Туре	FTRs	Flow	Flow	All	
Buy Bids	Physical	Yes	10.0%	0.4%	6.4%	
		No	33.0%	19.9%	28.0%	
		Total	43.1%	20.3%	34.4%	
	Financial	No	56.9%	79.7%	65.6%	
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Sell Offers	Physical		26.6%	24.7%	25.9%	
	Financial		73.4%	75.3%	74.1%	
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 13-18 presents the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared FTRs for 2016 by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. Financial entities purchased 71.3 percent of prevailing flow FTRs, down 3.6 percent, and 74.6 percent of counter flow FTRs, down 2.2 percent, for the year, with the result that financial entities purchased 72.8 percent, down 2.9 percent, of all prevailing and counter flow FTR buy bids in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared FTRs for 2016.

Table 13-18 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR
Auction patterns of ownership by FTR direction: 2016

TD D

		FIR Direction	
Organization	Prevailing		
Туре	Flow	<b>Counter Flow</b>	All
Physical	28.7%	25.4%	27.2%
Financial	71.3%	74.6%	72.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Physical	30.7%	35.1%	32.1%
Financial	69.3%	64.9%	67.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Type Physical Financial Total Physical Financial	Type         Flow           Physical         28.7%           Financial         71.3%           Total         100.0%           Physical         30.7%           Financial         69.3%	Type         Flow         Counter Flow           Physical         28.7%         25.4%           Financial         71.3%         74.6%           Total         100.0%         100.0%           Physical         30.7%         35.1%           Financial         69.3%         64.9%

Table 13-19 presents the average daily net position ownership for all FTRs for 2016, by FTR direction.

Table 13–19 Daily FTR net position ownership by FTR direction: 2016

	FTR Direction				
Organization Type	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	All		
Physical	44.2%	24.0%	35.8%		
Financial	55.8%	76.0%	64.2%		
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		

### Market Performance

### Volume

In an effort to address reduced FTR payout ratios, PJM may use normal transmission limits in the FTR auction model. These capability limits may be reduced if ARR funding is not impacted, all requested self-scheduled FTRs clear and net FTR Auction revenue is positive. If the normal capability limit cannot be reached due to infeasibilities then FTR Auction capability reductions are undertaken pro rata based on the MW of Stage 1A infeasibility and the availability of appropriate auction bids for counter flow FTRs.<sup>27</sup>

In another effort to reduce FTR funding issues, PJM implemented a new rule stating that PJM may model normal capability limits on facilities which are infeasible due to modeled transmission outages in Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. The capability of these facilities may be reduced if ARR target allocations are fully funded and net auction revenues are greater than zero. This reduction may only take place when there are counter flow auction bids available to reduce the infeasibilities.<sup>28</sup>

In the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction 133,153 MW (26.8 percent of demand; 44.8 percent of total FTR

<sup>27</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016) p. 56.

<sup>28</sup> See PJM. "Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Revision 17 (June 1, 2016) p. 56.

volume) of counter flow FTR buy bids cleared, an increase from 120,650 MW and 43.5 percent of total FTR volume. In the same auction, prevailing flow FTR buy bids cleared 163,931 MW (9.8 percent of demand; 55.2 percent of total FTR volume) an increase from 156,746 MW and 55.2 percent of total FTR volume. In the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction, there were 12,853 MW (13.5 percent) of counter flow sell offers and 23,929 MW (21.1 percent) of prevailing flow sell offers cleared.

				Bid and				
			Bid and	Requested	Cleared		Uncleared	
		Period	Requested	Volume	Volume	Cleared	Volume	Uncleared
Trade Type	FTR Direction	Туре	Count	(MW)	(MW)	Volume	(MW)	Volume
Buy bids	Counter Flow	Year 1	71,013	188,872	48,984	25.9%	139,887	74.1%
		Year 2	55,813	167,917	47,150	28.1%	120,767	71.9%
		Year 3	49,332	137,540	36,330	26.4%	101,210	73.6%
		Year All	266	1,627	688	42.3%	938	57.7%
		Total	176,424	495,955	133,153	26.8%	362,802	73.2%
	Prevailing Flow	Year 1	167,750	646,060	58,233	9.0%	587,826	91.0%
		Year 2	129,840	510,387	61,768	12.1%	448,618	87.9%
		Year 3	127,220	508,133	43,709	8.6%	464,425	91.4%
		Year All	2,760	16,336	220	1.3%	16,116	98.7%
		Total	427,570	1,680,916	163,931	9.8%	1,516,986	90.2%
	Total		603,994	2,176,871	297,083	13.6%	1,879,788	86.4%
Sell offers	Counter Flow	Year 1	26,109	59,201	8,744	14.8%	50,457	85.2%
		Year 2	12,347	28,722	3,582	12.5%	25,140	87.5%
		Year 3	3,192	7,167	527	7.3%	6,640	92.7%
		Year All	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Total	41,648	95,089	12,853	13.5%	82,237	86.5%
	Prevailing Flow	Year 1	29,991	62,737	14,093	22.5%	48,644	77.5%
		Year 2	17,866	40,390	8,575	21.2%	31,814	78.8%
		Year 3	4,555	10,189	1,261	12.4%	8,928	87.6%
		Year All	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Total	52,412	113,316	23,929	21.1%	89,386	78.9%
	Total		94,060	208,405	36,782	17.6%	171,623	82.4%

Table 13-20 Long Term FTR Auction market volume: Planning period 2017 to	o 2020
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Table 13-21 provides the Annual FTR Auction market volume for the 2016 to 2017 planning period. Total FTR buy bids were 2,592,183 MW, up 5.3 percent from 2,461,662 MW for the previous planning period. For the 2016 to 2017 planning period 393,509 MW (15.3 percent) of buy bids cleared, up 11.0 percent from 354,630 MW for the previous planning period. There were 378,431 MW of sell offers with 69,451 MW (18.4 percent) clearing for the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The total volume of cleared buy and self-scheduled bids was 420,198 MW, up 11.1 percent from 378,328 in the previous Annual FTR Auction.

#### Table 13–21 Annual FTR Auction market volume: Planning period 2016 to 2017

				Bid and				
Turda Tura	Tura		Bid and Requested	Requested Volume	Cleared Volume	Cleared	Uncleared Volume	Uncleared
Trade Type	Туре	FTR Direction	Count	(MW)	(MW)	Volume	(MW)	Volume
Buy bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	169,985	651,973	159,684	24.5%	492,289	75.5%
		Prevailing Flow	318,673	1,397,127	210,885	15.1%	1,186,243	84.9%
		Total	488,658	2,049,100	370,569	18.1%	1,678,532	81.9%
	Options	Counter Flow	1,150	25,255	33	0.1%	25,222	99.9%
		Prevailing Flow	50,862	491,138	22,908	4.7%	468,231	95.3%
		Total	52,012	516,393	22,940	4.4%	493,453	95.6%
	Total	Counter Flow	171,135	677,228	159,717	23.6%	517,511	76.4%
		Prevailing Flow	369,535	1,888,266	233,792	12.4%	1,654,474	87.6%
		Total	540,670	2,565,494	393,509	15.3%	2,171,985	84.7%
Self-scheduled bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	75	591	591	100.0%	0	0.0%
		Prevailing Flow	3,585	26,099	26,099	100.0%	0	0.0%
		Total	3,660	26,689	26,689	100.0%	0	0.0%
Buy and self-scheduled bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	170,060	652,564	160,275	24.6%	492,289	75.4%
		Prevailing Flow	322,258	1,423,226	236,983	16.7%	1,186,243	83.3%
		Total	492,318	2,075,790	397,258	19.1%	1,678,532	80.9%
	Options	Counter Flow	1,150	25,255	33	0.1%	25,222	99.9%
		Prevailing Flow	50,862	491,138	22,908	4.7%	468,231	95.3%
		Total	52,012	516,393	22,940	4.4%	493,453	95.6%
	Total	Counter Flow	171,210	677,818	160,307	23.7%	517,511	76.3%
		Prevailing Flow	373,120	1,914,365	259,891	13.6%	1,654,474	86.4%
		Total	544,330	2,592,183	420,198	16.2%	2,171,985	83.8%
Sell offers	Obligations	Counter Flow	74,701	176,389	28,577	16.2%	147,811	83.8%
	5	Prevailing Flow	86,565	186,695	39,895	21.4%	146,801	78.6%
		Total	161,266	363,084	68,472	18.9%	294,612	81.1%
	Options	Counter Flow	24	120	0	0.0%	120	100.0%
	r · · · ·	Prevailing Flow	2,889	15,227	979	6.4%	14,248	93.6%
		Total	2,913	15,347	979	6.4%	14,368	93.6%
	Total	Counter Flow	74,725	176,509	28,577	16.2%	147,931	83.8%
		Prevailing Flow	89,454	201,922	40,874	20.2%	161,049	79.8%
		Total	164,179	378,431	69,451	18.4%	308,980	81.6%
		iotai	104,173	570,451	03,431	10.4%	200,200	01.0%

# Figure 13-6 Annual Bid FTR Auction volume: Planning period 2009 to 2010 through 2016 to 2017




Figure 13-6 shows the bid volumes of the Annual FTR Auctions from the 2009 to 2010 planning period through the 2016 to 2017 planning period and the associated

payout ratios, represented by the background bars. The payout ratio for the current planning period is shown as dotted background because it is not yet final. Bid volume has not changed significantly with payout ratio, with the exception of on and off peak prevailing flow products. For on and off peak prevailing flow products, the 2012 to 2013 planning period the bid volume decreased 24.3 percent from the 2011 to 2012 planning period, but then

planning

period

increased 30.5 percent for the 2013 to 2014 planning period despite an only slightly improved payout ratio. Bid volume for the 2016 to 2017 planning period was down 15.4 percent from the 2015 to 2016 planning period.

Figure 13-7 shows the cleared volumes of the Annual FTR Auctions from planning period 2009 to 2010 through the 2016 to 2017 planning period and the associated planning period payout ratios, represented by the background bars. The payout ratio for the current planning period is shown as dotted background because it is not yet final. The cleared MW increased from the 2009 to 2010 planning period through the 2013 to the 2014 planning period, as a market response to lower payout ratios compared to target allocations. The 2014 to 2015, 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 planning period volumes were 19.1 percent, 16.3 percent and 7.0 percent lower than the 2013 to 2014 volume, as a result of PJM's more restrictive modeling of Stage 1B and Stage

2 ARRs starting in the 2014 to 2015 planning period and leading to fewer available FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction and higher prices. In the planning periods since the inception of this policy, PJM has been allowing more Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs to clear resulting in higher slightly higher cleared volume, but increasing prices in the Annual FTR Auction.




Figure 13–7 Annual Cleared FTR Auction volume: Planning period 2009 to 2010 through 2016 to 2017

Table 13-22 shows the proportion of ARRs selfscheduled as FTRs for the last seven planning periods. The maximum possible level of self-scheduled FTRs includes all ARRs. Eligible participants self-scheduled 26,689 MW (32.5 percent) of ARRs as FTRs for the 2016 to 2017 planning period, up from 26,689 MW (30.4 percent) in the previous planning period.

## Table 13-22 Comparison of self-scheduled FTRs:Planning periods 2009 to 2010 through 2016 to 2017

		Maximum Possible	Percent of ARRs
	Self-Scheduled	Self-Scheduled	Self-Scheduled
Planning Period	FTRs (MW)	FTRs (MW)	as FTRs
2009/2010	68,589	109,613	62.6%
2010/2011	55,669	102,046	54.6%
2011/2012	46,017	103,660	44.4%
2012/2013	41,351	99,115	41.7%
2013/2014	29,289	94,097	31.1%
2014/2015	26,964	73,504	36.7%
2015/2016	23,699	77,872	30.4%
2016/2017	26,689	82,229	32.5%

Table 13-23 provides the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction market volume for the entire 2015 to 2016 planning period and the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. There were 11,947,294 MW of FTR obligation buy bids and 2,802,202 MW of FTR obligation sell offers for all bidding periods in the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared 1,595,935 MW (13.4 percent) of FTR obligation buy bids and 593,901 MW (21.2 percent) of FTR obligation sell offers.

There were 3,023,974 MW of FTR option buy bids and 370,924 MW of FTR option sell offers for all bidding periods in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The monthly auctions cleared 46,800 MW (1.5 percent) of FTR option buy bids, and 113,745 MW (30.7 percent) of FTR option sell offers.

Table 13-23 Monthly	y Balance of Planning	p Period FTR Auction	market volume: 2016

			Bid and	Bid and	Cleared		Uncleared	
Monthly	T	Tue de T	Requested	Requested	Volume	Cleared	Volume	Uncleared
Auction	Туре	Trade Type	Count	Volume (MW)	(MW)	Volume	(MW)	Volume
Jan-16	Obligations	Buy bids	341,467	2,106,004	235,561	11.2%	1,870,443	88.8%
	0.11	Sell offers	120,657	303,271	81,934	27.0%	221,338	73.0%
	Options	Buy bids	9,175	268,381	7,783	2.9%	260,598	97.1%
5 1 40	0.11	Sell offers	8,075	37,712	10,212	27.1%	27,500	72.9%
Feb-16	Obligations	Buy bids	310,044	2,122,942	168,574	7.9%	1,954,368	92.1%
	<b>A</b>	Sell offers	99,043	267,534	79,992	29.9%	187,543	70.1%
	Options	Buy bids	24,657	487,736	9,869	2.0%	477,867	98.0%
14 40	0.11	Sell offers	7,835	37,179	9,297	25.0%	27,881	75.0%
Mar-16	Obligations	Buy bids	328,233	2,040,401	256,731	12.6%	1,783,670	87.4%
		Sell offers	120,625	314,628	102,897	32.7%	211,731	67.3%
	Options	Buy bids	19,431	404,511	9,082	2.2%	395,429	97.8%
		Sell offers	9,806	44,757	11,080	24.8%	33,677	75.2%
Apr-16	Obligations	Buy bids	247,410	1,484,893	191,218	12.9%	1,293,674	87.1%
	0.11	Sell offers	87,100	233,733	69,280	29.6%	164,453	70.4%
	Options	Buy bids	8,938	178,209	5,291	3.0%	172,918	97.0%
M. 10	01.11	Sell offers	6,820	35,740	9,938	27.8%	25,802	72.2%
May-16	Obligations	Buy bids	149,322	689,190	106,669	15.5%	582,521	84.5%
	0	Sell offers	42,621	103,346	40,823	39.5%	62,522	60.5%
	Options	Buy bids	2,882	91,075	2,055	2.3%	89,020	97.7%
1 10	0.11	Sell offers	3,654	18,069	7,924	43.9%	10,145	56.1%
Jun-16	Obligations	Buy bids	492,145	1,988,712	261,393	13.1%	1,727,319	86.9%
	0	Sell offers	262,228	487,524	116,314	23.9%	371,210	76.1%
	Options	Buy bids	15,453	435,374	11,296	2.6%	424,078	97.4%
1 1 10	01.11.11.11.11.11	Sell offers	21,679	74,214	22,222	29.9%	51,992	70.1%
Jul-16	Obligations	Buy bids	509,577	2,131,823	284,246	13.3%	1,847,577	86.7%
	Ontinus	Sell offers	271,006	466,772	112,440	24.1%	354,332	75.9%
	Options	Buy bids	16,677	619,864	8,552	1.4%	611,312	98.6%
1. 10	01.11.11.11.11.11	Sell offers	14,562	65,749	19,229	29.2%	46,520	70.8%
Aug-16	Obligations	Buy bids	456,681	2,224,197	257,093	11.6%	1,967,104	88.4%
	0	Sell offers	232,423	422,754	83,265	19.7%	339,489	80.3%
	Options	Buy bids	13,398	387,403	6,451	1.7%	380,953	98.39
Con 10	Obligations	Sell offers	14,808	58,654	13,962	23.8%	44,692	76.29
Sep-16	Obligations	Buy bids	402,909	1,772,262	244,301	13.8%	1,527,961	86.29
	Ontinus	Sell offers	240,198	441,114	83,618	19.0%	357,497	81.0%
	Options	Buy bids	9,461	607,443	8,313	1.4%	599,130	98.6%
0 at 10	Obligations	Sell offers	14,471	61,891	17,458	28.2%	44,433	71.8%
Oct-16	Obligations	Buy bids	355,949	1,486,644	222,742	15.0%	1,263,902	85.0%
	Ontinus	Sell offers Buy bids	148,613	352,652	62,772	17.8%	289,880	82.2%
	Options	,	6,254	433,810 45,230	4,378	1.0%	429,432	99.0%
N= 10	Obligations	Sell offers			•	33.7%	29,988	66.3%
Nov-16	Obligations	Buy bids	304,708	1,231,314	176,846	14.4%	1,054,468	85.6%
	Ontions	Sell offers	126,001	318,875	62,972	19.7%	255,902	80.3%
	Options	Buy bids	6,759	311,130	4,848	1.6%	306,282	98.4%
Dec 16	Obligations	Sell offers	7,529	32,355	12,373	38.2%	19,983	61.8%
Dec-16	Obligations	Buy bids	267,390	1,112,342	149,314	13.4%	963,028	86.6%
	Options	Sell offers Buy bids	131,826	312,511	72,521	23.2% 1.3%	239,989	76.8% 98.7%
	options	Sell offers	3,496	228,950	2,963	40.4%	225,987	98.7% 59.6%
2015/2016*	Obligations	Buy bids	8,435	32,831	13,259 2,366,860	10.8%	19,571 19,469,480	89.2%
2013/2010	oungations	Sell offers		21,836,340				
	Ontions		1,582,528	4,385,972	1,088,967	24.8%	3,297,005	75.2%
	Options	Buy bids	157,638	3,850,526	92,957	2.4%	3,757,569	97.6%
2010/2017**	Obliggt	Sell offers	112,395	505,471	137,873	27.3%	367,598	72.7%
2016/2017**	Obligations	Buy bids	2,789,359	11,947,294	1,595,935	13.4%	10,351,359	86.6%
		Sell offers Buy bids	1,412,295 71,498	2,802,202 3,023,974	593,901 46,800	21.2% 1.5%	2,208,300	78.8%
	Options							


\* Shows twelve months for 2015/2016; \*\* Shows seven months ended December 31 for 2016/2017

Table 13-24 presents the buy-bid, bid and cleared volume of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction, and the effective periods for the volume. The average monthly cleared volume for 2016 was 219,630.6 MW. The average monthly cleared volume for 2015 was180,531.0 MW.

Monthly		Prompt	Second	Third					
Auction	MW Type	Month	Month	Month	Q1	02	Q3	Q4	Total
Jan-16	Bid	1,330,456	389,271	264,547				390,110	2,374,385
	Cleared	126,983	33,997	17,849				64,514	243,344
Feb-16	Bid	1,612,886	305,237	352,140				340,415	2,610,677
	Cleared	114,428	24,775	21,204				18,035	178,442
Mar-16	Bid	1,476,838	381,466	372,548				214,060	2,444,912
	Cleared	155,020	44,575	37,508				28,710	265,813
Apr-16	Bid	1,244,258	418,843						1,663,101
	Cleared	131,099	65,411						196,509
May-16	Bid	780,265							780,265
	Cleared	108,724							108,724
Jun-16	Bid	681,521	288,949	273,138	204,684	335,252	331,270	309,273	2,424,086
	Cleared	101,097	28,610	26,583	24,752	35,094	31,969	24,584	272,688
Jul-16	Bid	998,701	420,705	308,767		341,395	358,352	323,766	2,751,687
	Cleared	119,303	47,520	24,596		35,155	36,548	29,676	292,798
Aug-16	Bid	1,180,580	289,291	241,822		266,319	316,435	317,152	2,611,600
	Cleared	128,158	32,177	19,141		26,069	29,079	28,921	263,544
Sep-16	Bid	838,551	343,803	323,119		198,258	351,139	324,834	2,379,704
	Cleared	106,735	39,188	30,410		12,664	36,463	27,154	252,614
Oct-16	Bid	791,635	322,827	244,616			280,907	280,468	1,920,453
	Cleared	112,738	33,781	19,665			33,161	27,775	227,120
Nov-16	Bid	682,928	228,572	185,778			205,536	239,630	1,542,444
	Cleared	97,144	24,934	13,547			22,869	23,199	181,694
Dec-16	Bid	590,623	208,416	203,619			117,437	221,197	1,341,292
	Cleared	80,302	20,754	18,552			10,493	22,177	152,277

Table 13-24 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction buy-bid, bid and cleared volume (MW per period): 2016

Figure 13-8 shows cleared auction volumes as a percent of the total FTR cleared volume by calendar months for June 2004 through December 2016, by type of auction. FTR volumes are included in the calendar month they are effective, with Long Term and Annual FTR auction volume spread equally to each month in the relevant planning period. This figure shows the share of FTRs purchased in each auction type by month. Over the course of the planning period an increasing number of Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTRs are purchased, making them a greater portion of active FTRs. When the Annual FTR Auction occurs, FTRs purchased in any previous Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auction, other than the current June auction, are no longer in effect, so there is a reduction in their share of total FTRs with a corresponding increase in the share of Annual FTRs.








Table 13-25 provides the secondary bilateral FTR market volume for the entire 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 planning periods.

Table 13-25 Secondary bilateral FTR market volume:
Planning periods 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 <sup>29</sup>

Planning Period	Туре	Class Type	Volume (MW)
2015/2016	Obligation	24-Hour	667.6
		On Peak	40,207.5
		Off Peak	27,652.4
		Total	68,527.5
	Option	24-Hour	0.0
		On Peak	8,765.5
		Off Peak	6,157.1
		Total	14,922.6
2016/2017	Obligation	24-Hour	538.5
		On Peak	11,699.0
		Off Peak	6,384.5
		Total	18,622.0
	Option	24-Hour	0.0
		On Peak	678.0
		Off Peak	104.5
		Total	782.5

Figure 13-9 shows the FTR bid, cleared and net bid volume from June 2003 through December 2016 for Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions.<sup>30</sup> Cleared volume is the volume of FTR buy and sell offers that were accepted. The net bid volume includes the total buy, sell and self-scheduled offers, counting sell offers as a negative volume. The bid volume is the total of all bid and self-scheduled offers, excluding sell offers. Bid volumes and net bid volumes have increased since 2003. Cleared volume was relatively steady until 2010, with an increase in 2011 followed by a slight decrease in 2012. In 2013, cleared volume increased, and there was a larger increase in 2014. The demand for FTRs has increased.





### Price

Table 13-26 shows the cleared, weighted-average prices by trade type, FTR direction, period type and class type for the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction. Only FTR obligation products are available in the Long Term FTR Auctions. In this auction, weighted-average buy bid counter flow and prevailing flow FTR prices were -\$0.42 and \$0.41, compared to -\$0.47 and \$0.45 from the 2016 to 2019 Long Term FTR Auction. Weighted-average sell bid counter flow and prevailing flow FTR prices were -\$0.43 and \$0.44, compared to -\$0.37 for counter flow FTRs and \$0.43 for prevailing flow FTRs.

<sup>29</sup> The 2014 to 2015 planning period covers bilateral FIRs that are effective for any time between June 1, 2014 through June 1, 2015, which originally had been purchased in a Long Term FIR Auction, Annual FIR Auction or Monthly Balance of Planning Period FIR Auction.

<sup>30</sup> The data for this table are available in 2016 State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume 2, Appendix H.

# Table 13-26 Long Term FTR Auction weighted-average cleared prices (Dollars per MW): Planning periods 2017 to 2020

			Class Type					
		Period						
Trade Type	FTR Direction	Туре	24-Hour	On Peak	Off Peak	All		
Buy bids	Counter Flow	Year 1	(\$1.55)	(\$0.33)	(\$0.55)	(\$0.47)		
		Year 2	(\$1.19)	(\$0.31)	(\$0.52)	(\$0.42)		
		Year 3	(\$0.71)	(\$0.27)	(\$0.44)	(\$0.36)		
		Year All	NA	(\$0.03)	(\$0.09)	(\$0.05)		
		Total	(\$1.18)	(\$0.30)	(\$0.50)	(\$0.42)		
	Prevailing Flow	Year 1	\$0.81	\$0.35	\$0.55	\$0.46		
		Year 2	\$0.78	\$0.32	\$0.50	\$0.41		
		Year 3	\$0.61	\$0.27	\$0.44	\$0.35		
		Year All	NA	\$0.01	\$0.01	\$0.01		
		Total	\$0.75	\$0.32	\$0.50	\$0.41		
	Total		(\$0.26)	\$0.03	\$0.06	\$0.04		
Sell offers	Counter Flow	Year 1	(\$1.46)	(\$0.35)	(\$0.50)	(\$0.46)		
		Year 2	NA	(\$0.32)	(\$0.45)	(\$0.40)		
		Year 3	NA	(\$0.10)	(\$0.18)	(\$0.13)		
		Year All	NA	NA	NA	NA		
		Total	(\$1.17)	(\$0.33)	(\$0.48)	(\$0.43)		
	Prevailing Flow	Year 1	\$0.55	\$0.27	\$0.48	\$0.38		
		Year 2	\$0.62	\$0.47	\$0.65	\$0.55		
		Year 3	NA	\$0.26	\$0.49	\$0.36		
		Year All	NA	NA	NA	NA		
		Total	\$0.57	\$0.34	\$0.54	\$0.44		
	Total		(\$0.26)	\$0.11	\$0.19	\$0.13		

Figure 13-10 shows the volume-weighted average buy bid price for the Annual FTR Auctions from the 2009 to 2010 through the 2016 to 2017 planning periods and the associated planning period payout ratios, represented by the background bars. The payout ratio for the 2016 to 2017 planning period is shown as dotted background because it is not yet final. From the 2010 to 2011 planning period to the 2013 to 2014 planning period FTR prices decreased. The 2014 to 2015, 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 planning periods 24 hour obligation prices increased 142.5 percent, 210.8 and 260.8 percent from the 2013 to 2014 planning period. This large price increase was driven by the significant decrease in FTR supply volume during the Annual FTR Auction which was a result of PJM's decisions to use a more constrained model and its impact on Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations. The increased price due to decreased volume has led to an increase in ARR target allocations for the planning period.

Figure 13–10 Annual FTR Auction volume-weighted average buy bid price: Planning period 2009 to 2010 through 2016 to 2017




Table 13-27 shows the weighted-average cleared buybid prices by trade type, FTR product, FTR direction and class type for the Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The weighted-average cleared buy bid price in the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction was \$0.35 per MW, up from \$0.31 per MW in the 2015 to 2016 planning period.

# Table 13–27 Annual FTR Auction weighted-average cleared prices (Dollars per MW): Planning period 2016 to 2017

	Class Type					
Trade Type	Туре	FTR Direction	24-Hour	On Peak	Off Peak	All
Buy bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$0.95)	(\$0.54)	(\$0.33)	(\$0.45)
		Prevailing Flow	\$1.79	\$1.03	\$0.73	\$0.94
		Total	\$0.72	\$0.39	\$0.25	\$0.34
	Options	Counter Flow	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
		Prevailing Flow	\$0.05	\$0.64	\$0.38	\$0.49
		Total	\$0.05	\$0.64	\$0.38	\$0.49
Self-scheduled bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$0.11)	NA	NA	(\$0.11)
		Prevailing Flow	\$1.32	NA	NA	\$1.32
		Total	\$1.29	NA	NA	\$1.29
Buy and self-scheduled bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$0.84)	(\$0.54)	(\$0.33)	(\$0.45)
		Prevailing Flow	\$1.41	\$1.03	\$0.73	\$1.01
		Total	\$1.13	\$0.39	\$0.25	\$0.46
	Options	Counter Flow	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
		Prevailing Flow	\$0.05	\$0.64	\$0.38	\$0.49
		Total	\$0.05	\$0.64	\$0.38	\$0.49
Sell offers	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$2.07)	(\$0.58)	(\$0.40)	(\$0.59)
		Prevailing Flow	\$0.68	\$0.50	\$0.30	\$0.41
		Total	(\$0.47)	\$0.10	\$0.02	\$0.02
	Options	Counter Flow	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Prevailing Flow	\$0.00	\$0.47	\$0.30	\$0.35
		Total	\$0.00	\$0.47	\$0.30	\$0.35

Table 13-28 shows the weighted-average cleared buybid price in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions by bidding period for January 2016 through December 2016. For example, for the January 2016 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction, the current month column is January, the second month column is February and the third month column is March. Quarters 1 through 4 are represented in the Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 columns. The total column represents all of the activity within the January 2016 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction.

#### Table 13–28 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared, weighted-average, buy-bid price per period (Dollars per MW): January through December, 2016

Monthly	Prompt	Second	Third					
Auction	Month	Month	Month	Q1	02	03	04	Total
Jan-16	\$0.13	\$0.29	(\$0.00)				\$0.07	\$0.11
Feb-16	\$0.13	\$0.20	\$0.12				\$0.20	\$0.16
Mar-16	\$0.15	\$0.11	\$0.07				\$0.07	\$0.12
Apr-16	\$0.11	\$0.11					\$0.00	\$0.11
May-16	\$0.11						\$0.00	\$0.11
Jun-16	\$0.09	\$0.07	\$0.03	\$0.20	\$0.19	\$0.30	\$0.16	\$0.17
Jul-16	\$0.11	\$0.15	\$0.04		\$0.12	\$0.23	\$0.12	\$0.14
Aug-16	\$0.08	\$0.10	\$0.12		\$0.07	\$0.19	\$0.09	\$0.10
Sep-16	\$0.11	\$0.09	\$0.09		\$0.12	\$0.14	\$0.09	\$0.11
Oct-16	\$0.13	\$0.11	\$0.02			\$0.12	\$0.10	\$0.11
Nov-16	\$0.10	\$0.14	\$0.13			\$0.18	\$0.11	\$0.13
Dec-16	\$0.15	\$0.19	\$0.27			\$0.24	\$0.14	\$0.17

The cleared weighted-average price paid in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for January through December 2016 was \$0.13 per MW, down from \$0.24 per MW in the same time last year, a 45.8 percent decrease in FTR prices. The cleared weighted-average price for the current planning period was \$0.13, down 48.0 percent from \$0.25 for the same time period during the previous planning period.

### Profitability

FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received for an FTR and the cost of the FTR. For a prevailing flow FTR, the FTR credits are the actual revenue that an FTR holder receives and the auction price is the cost. For a counter flow FTR, the

auction price is the revenue that an FTR holder is paid and the FTR credits are the cost to the FTR holder, which the FTR holder must pay. The cost of self-scheduled FTRs is zero. ARR holders that self schedule FTRs purchase the FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction, but the ARR holders receive offsetting ARR credits that equal the purchase price of the FTRs.

The fact that FTRs have been consistently profitable regardless of the payout ratio raises questions about the competitiveness of the market. It is not clear, in a competitive market, why FTR purchases by financial entities remain persistently profitable. In a competitive market, it would be expected that profits would be competed to zero or a de mimimis level.

Table 13-29 lists FTR profits by organization type and FTR direction for the period from January through December, 2016. Some participants classified as physical, such as a company that holds one generator, are not eligible for ARRs but do have a physical presence on the PJM system. Such entities would be under the Physical category, while any entity that holds an ARR will be under the Physical ARR Holder category. Separating physical into those participants with and without FTRs allows a better view into the profits ARR holders are making through the FTR market. FTR profits are the sum of the daily FTR target allocations, including for self-scheduled FTRs, adjusted by the payout ratio minus the daily FTR auction costs for each FTR held by an organization. The FTR target allocation is equal to the product of the FTR MW and congestion price differences between sink and source in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. The FTR credits do not include after the fact adjustments which are very small and do not occur in every month. The FTR credits also do not include any excess congestion revenue distributions made at the end of the planning period. The daily FTR auction costs are the product of the FTR MW and the auction price divided by the time period of the FTR in days. Self-scheduled FTRs have zero cost. FTRs were profitable overall, with \$244.2 million in profits for all physical entities, of which \$207.4 million was from self-scheduled FTRs, and \$47.5 million for financial entities.

## Table 13–29 FTR profits by organization type and FTR direction: 2016

	FTR Direction								
		Self Scheduled		Self Scheduled					
Organization Type	Prevailing Flow	Prevailing Flow	<b>Counter Flow</b>	Counter Flow	All				
Financial	(\$108,757,022.37)	NA	\$156,294,514	NA	\$47,537,492				
Physical	(\$26,934,571.67)	NA	\$26,856,705	NA	(\$77,867)				
Physical ARR Holder	\$29,022,758.28	\$206,994,377	\$7,822,186	\$378,265	\$244,217,586				
Total	(\$106,668,835.76)	\$206,994,377	\$190,973,404	\$378,265	\$291,677,210				

Table 13-30 lists the monthly FTR profits in 2016 by organization type.

# Table 13-30 Monthly FTR profits by organization type:2016

	Organization Type						
		Physical ARR					
Month	Physical	Holders	Financial	Total			
Jan	\$68,003	\$18,722,463	\$25,562,897	\$44,353,362			
Feb	\$539,063	\$30,173,609	\$19,619,306	\$50,331,977			
Mar	(\$2,765,117)	\$22,529,897	\$1,230,244	\$20,995,025			
Apr	(\$2,156,157)	\$22,549,475	\$7,422,799	\$27,816,117			
May	(\$7,016,575)	\$8,108,304	(\$5,728,428)	(\$4,636,700)			
Jun	(\$2,369,364)	\$10,987,038	(\$6,163,265)	\$2,454,408			
Jul	\$666,260	\$31,092,695	\$570,363	\$32,329,318			
Aug	\$3,423,455	\$14,534,611	\$9,898,169	\$27,856,234			
Sep	\$6,634,340	\$47,173,377	\$12,909,228	\$66,716,944			
Oct	\$5,640,273	\$52,627,609	(\$3,486,077)	\$54,781,805			
Nov	(\$1,876,298)	(\$4,683,570)	(\$8,477,147)	(\$15,037,015)			
Dec	(\$865,749)	(\$9,597,922)	(\$5,820,596)	(\$16,284,267)			
Total	(\$77,867)	\$244,217,586	\$47,537,492	\$291,677,210			

Table 13-31 lists the historical profits by calendar year by organization type beginning January 2011.

# Table 13–31 Yearly FTR profits by organization type: 2011 through 2016

Calendar Year	Physical	Financial	Total
2011	\$340,260,261	\$125,697,493	\$465,957,753
2012	(\$7,634,041)	\$78,762,923	\$71,128,882
2013	\$170,180,569	\$177,494,506	\$347,675,076
2014	\$873,909,275	\$543,642,102	\$1,417,551,377
2015	\$453,547,398	\$182,282,134	\$635,829,532
2016	\$244,139,718	\$47,537,492	\$291,677,210

#### Revenue

#### Long Term FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-32 shows the Long Term FTR Auction revenue data by trade type, FTR direction, period type and class type. The 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction netted \$26.7 million in revenue, \$3.5 million more than the previous Long Term FTR Auction. Buyers paid \$48.4

> million and sellers received \$21.7 million, down \$12.0 million and \$15.4 million over the previous Long Term FTR Auction. In general, revenue increased \$3.5 million over the previous Long Term FTR Auction, with counter flow buy bid revenue decreasing

3.9 percent and prevailing flow buy bid revenue decreasing 6.9 percent.

				Class	Туре			
Trade Type	FTR Direction	Period Type	24-Hour	On Peak	Off Peak	All		
Buy bids	Counter Flow	Year 1	(\$13,865,196)	(\$52,361,573)	(\$37,364,286)	(\$103,591,055)		
		Year 2	(\$7,761,389)	(\$43,553,743)	(\$37,548,472)	(\$88,863,605)		
		Year 3	(\$5,005,407)	(\$28,000,602)	(\$25,397,031)	(\$58,403,039)		
		Year All	\$0	(\$319,141)	(\$176,332)	(\$495,473)		
		Total	(\$26,631,992)	(\$124,235,058)	(\$100,486,121)	(\$251,353,171)		
	Prevailing Flow	Year 1	\$6,795,665	\$67,652,677	\$44,562,449	\$119,010,791		
		Year 2	\$5,662,333	\$57,741,990	\$49,101,454	\$112,505,777		
		Year 3	\$2,860,593	\$35,206,352	\$30,170,444	\$68,237,390		
		Year All	\$6,961	\$10,816	\$15,524	\$33,301		
		Total	\$15,325,553	\$160,611,835	\$123,849,872	\$299,787,259		
	Total		(\$11,306,439)	\$36,376,777	\$23,363,751	\$48,434,088		
Sell offers	Counter Flow	Year 1	(\$2,553,051)	(\$8,658,617)	(\$7,007,072)	(\$18,218,739)		
		Year 2	(\$666,560)	(\$3,101,121)	(\$2,656,749)	(\$6,424,429)		
		Year 3	0	(\$158,053)	(\$142,046)	(\$300,099)		
		Year All	NA	NA	NA	NA		
		Total	(\$3,219,610)	(\$11,917,790)	(\$9,805,868)	(\$24,943,268)		
	Prevailing Flow	Year 1	\$1,026,067	\$14,286,980	\$8,408,061	\$23,721,107		
		Year 2	\$699,642	\$10,531,252	\$9,695,363	\$20,926,257		
		Year 3	11,648	\$1,206,188	\$792,342	\$2,010,177		
		Year All	NA	NA	NA	NA		
		Total	\$1,737,356	\$26,024,420	\$18,895,765	\$46,657,541		
	Total		(\$1,482,254)	\$14,106,630	\$9,089,897	\$21,714,273		
Total			(\$9,824,185)	\$22,270,147	\$14,273,853	\$26,719,815		

Table 13-32 Long Term FTR Auction Revenue: Planning periods 2017 to 2020

### Annual FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-33 shows the Annual FTR Auction revenue by trade type, type, FTR direction and class type. The Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period generated \$909.0 million, down 2.9 percent from \$936.3 million in the 2015 to 2016 planning period, and up 21.4 percent from \$748.6 in the 2014 to 2015 planning period. Counter flow FTR holders received \$255.7 million, up 62.8 percent from the previous planning period and prevailing flow FTR holders paid \$1,164.7 million, up 6.5 percent from the previous planning period.

			Туре			
Trade Type	Туре	FTR Direction	24-Hour	On Peak	Off Peak	All
Buy bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$33,376,334)	(\$171,543,694)	(\$120,897,348)	(\$325,817,376)
		Prevailing Flow	\$98,648,009	\$473,996,780	\$319,439,439	\$892,084,228
		Total	\$65,271,675	\$302,453,086	\$198,542,091	\$566,266,853
	Options	Counter Flow	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
		Prevailing Flow	\$122,422	\$29,281,256	\$20,105,845	\$49,509,523
		Total	\$122,422	\$29,281,256	\$20,105,845	\$49,509,523
	Total	Counter Flow	(\$33,376,334)	(\$171,543,694)	(\$120,897,348)	(\$325,817,376)
		Prevailing Flow	\$98,770,431	\$503,278,036	\$339,545,284	\$941,593,751
		Total	\$65,394,098	\$331,734,342	\$218,647,936	\$615,776,376
Self-scheduled bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$554,976)	NA	NA	(\$554,976)
		Prevailing Flow	\$302,732,687	NA	NA	\$302,732,687
		Total	\$302,177,711	NA	NA	\$302,177,711
Buy and self-scheduled bids	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$33,931,309)	(\$171,543,694)	(\$120,897,348)	(\$326,372,351)
		Prevailing Flow	\$401,380,696	\$473,996,780	\$319,439,439	\$1,194,816,915
		Total	\$367,449,387	\$302,453,086	\$198,542,091	\$868,444,564
	Options	Counter Flow	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
		Prevailing Flow	\$122,422	\$29,281,256	\$20,105,845	\$49,509,523
		Total	\$122,422	\$29,281,256	\$20,105,845	\$49,509,523
	Total	Counter Flow	(\$33,931,309)	(\$171,543,694)	(\$120,897,348)	(\$326,372,351)
		Prevailing Flow	\$401,503,118	\$503,278,036	\$339,545,284	\$1,244,326,438
		Total	\$367,571,809	\$331,734,342	\$218,647,936	\$917,954,087
Sell offers	Obligations	Counter Flow	(\$16,305,297)	(\$29,281,811)	(\$25,092,182)	(\$70,679,290)
		Prevailing Flow	\$7,442,064	\$42,620,672	\$28,029,936	\$78,092,673
		Total	(\$8,863,233)	\$13,338,861	\$2,937,754	\$7,413,382
	Options	Counter Flow	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
		Prevailing Flow	\$0	\$691,623	\$847,523	\$1,539,146
		Total	\$0	\$691,623	\$847,523	\$1,539,146
	Total	Counter Flow	(\$16,305,297)	(\$29,281,811)	(\$25,092,182)	(\$70,679,290)
		Prevailing Flow	\$7,442,064	\$43,312,295	\$28,877,459	\$79,631,819
		Total	(\$8,863,233)	\$14,030,484	\$3,785,277	\$8,952,528
Total			\$376,435,042	\$317,703,858	\$214,862,658	\$909,001,559

Table 13-33 Annual FTR Auction revenue: Planning period 2015 to 20	16
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### Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-34 shows Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction revenue by trade type, type and class type for January through December 2016. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2016 to 2017 planning period netted \$26.7 million in revenue, the difference between buyers paying \$133.0 million and sellers receiving \$106.3 million for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. For the entire 2015 to 2016 planning period, the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions netted \$31.8 million in revenue with buyers paying \$263.5 million and sellers receiving \$231.7 million.

	-				Class Type	
Monthly Auction	Туре	Trade Type	24-Hour	On Peak	Off Peak	Al
Jan-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$2,767,129	\$6,642,066	\$5,322,646	\$14,731,841
		Sell offers	(\$1,527,329)	\$6,009,617	\$4,867,971	\$9,350,259
	Options	Buy bids	\$7,749	\$433,485	\$222,655	\$663,889
		Sell offers	\$4,548	\$2,013,776	\$1,952,220	\$3,970,544
Feb-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$2,484,838	\$5,046,424	\$3,565,515	\$11,096,777
		Sell offers	(\$566,504)	\$4,516,965	\$3,621,103	\$7,571,565
	Options	Buy bids	\$4,254	\$586,461	\$407,158	\$997,873
		Sell offers	\$8,038	\$1,653,043	\$1,337,798	\$2,998,879
Mar-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$3,613,801	\$5,764,687	\$3,975,010	\$13,353,498
		Sell offers	\$316,238	\$5,416,263	\$3,820,100	\$9,552,601
	Options	Buy bids	\$16,807	\$431,121	\$223,272	\$671,200
		, Sell offers	\$5,536	\$1,528,874	\$1,167,147	\$2,701,557
Apr-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$2,617,134	\$2,986,782	\$1,654,425	\$7,258,340
, ipi 10	oongutions	Sell offers	\$115,458	\$3,448,354	\$2,223,777	\$5,787,589
	Options	Buy bids	\$47	\$407,910	\$179,795	\$587,752
	options	Sell offers	\$7,609	\$1,089,056	\$777,074	\$1,873,738
May-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$95,103	\$2,444,319	\$1,923,140	\$4,462,562
way=10	Jungations	Sell offers	\$95,103	\$2,444,319 \$1,316,756		
	Ontions				\$1,072,812	\$2,429,838
	Options	Buy bids	\$206	\$144,053	\$79,575	\$223,834
1 . 10	011	Sell offers	\$3,556	\$983,572	\$781,069	\$1,768,197
Jun-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$16,456,472	\$10,330,600	\$2,578,829	\$29,365,901
		Sell offers	\$1,081,144	\$13,005,246	\$6,209,015	\$20,295,405
	Options	Buy bids	\$14,434	\$2,077,626	\$1,341,275	\$3,433,336
		Sell offers	\$42,161	\$5,547,550	\$3,732,866	\$9,322,577
Jul-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$3,291,958	\$12,811,711	\$6,309,992	\$22,413,662
		Sell offers	\$708,924	\$9,454,234	\$3,919,893	\$14,083,051
	Options	Buy bids	\$4,188	\$2,108,948	\$1,148,228	\$3,261,364
		Sell offers	\$17,838	\$3,859,285	\$2,239,573	\$6,116,695
Aug-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$3,203,792	\$7,741,721	\$2,321,385	\$13,266,898
		Sell offers	\$136,920	\$5,656,728	\$1,783,234	\$7,576,882
	Options	Buy bids	\$211,177	\$1,772,385	\$1,093,625	\$3,077,187
		Sell offers	\$11,798	\$3,019,930	\$1,524,192	\$4,555,920
Sep-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$558,863	\$9,639,403	\$4,685,818	\$14,884,083
		Sell offers	\$295,989	\$5,168,545	\$1,776,746	\$7,241,280
	Options	Buy bids	\$111,025	\$887,738	\$559,749	\$1,558,512
		Sell offers	\$35,188	\$2,965,495	\$1,747,988	\$4,748,671
Oct-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$2,451,829	\$7,507,347	\$3,747,301	\$13,706,477
	J	Sell offers	\$200,638	\$4,545,291	\$2,182,012	\$6,927,941
	Options	Buy bids	\$164	\$473,752	\$346,490	\$820,406
	options	Sell offers	\$201,432	\$2,563,593	\$1,496,728	\$4,261,752
Nov-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$2,213,524	\$6,285,598	\$3,465,184	\$11,964,306
100-10	oongations	Sell offers	\$56,338	\$4,230,107	\$1,970,692	\$6,257,137
	Options	Buy bids	\$27,276			
	options			\$613,392	\$388,626	\$1,029,294
D. 10	01.11	Sell offers	\$211,502	\$2,076,710	\$1,337,854	\$3,626,066
Dec-16	Obligations	Buy bids	\$4,064,286	\$6,207,922	\$3,281,636	\$13,553,844
		Sell offers	\$284,607	\$4,211,838	\$1,844,002	\$6,340,448
	Options	Buy bids	\$1,927	\$437,616	\$259,429	\$698,971
		Sell offers	\$30,617	\$3,114,447	\$1,833,947	\$4,979,011
2015/2016*	Obligations	Buy bids	\$19,822,319	\$132,789,349	\$90,651,090	\$243,262,758
		Sell offers	(\$3,279,132)	\$105,708,110	\$76,816,631	\$179,245,609
	Options	Buy bids	\$34,213	\$12,353,013	\$7,822,858	\$20,210,083
		Sell offers	\$237,496	\$30,375,844	\$21,799,523	\$52,412,863
	Net Total		\$22,898,168	\$9,058,407	(\$142,207)	\$31,814,368
2016/2017**	Obligations	Buy bids	\$32,240,723	\$60,524,301	\$26,390,146	\$119,155,170
		Sell offers	\$2,764,559	\$46,271,990	\$19,685,595	\$68,722,145
	Options	Buy bids	\$370,191	\$8,371,455	\$5,137,423	\$13,879,070
	· ·	Sell offers	\$550,536	\$23,147,010	\$13,913,146	\$37,610,692

### Table 13-34 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction revenue: 2016

\* Shows Twelve Months; \*\* Shows Seven Months

#### FTR Target Allocations

FTR target allocations were examined separately by source and sink contribution. Hourly FTR target allocations were divided into those that were benefits and liabilities and summed by sink and by source for the first four months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. Figure 13-11 shows the ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations, summed by sink, for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The top 10 sinks that produced financial benefit accounted for 50.6 percent of total positive target allocations during the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period with the Northern Illinois Hub accounting for 16.1 percent of all positive target allocations. The top 10 sinks that created liability accounted for 17.8 percent of total negative target allocations with the PSEG Zone accounting for 3.2 percent of all negative target allocations.

Figure 13–11 Ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations summed by sink: 2016 to 2017 planning period





Figure 13-12 shows the ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations, summed by source, for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The top 10 sources with a positive target allocation accounted for 33.6 percent of total positive target allocations with Byron accounting for 6.9 percent of total positive target allocations. The top 10 sources with a negative target allocation accounted for 24.1 percent of all negative target allocations, with the Western Hub accounting for 13.8 percent.

Figure 13-12 Ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations summed by source: 2016 to 2017 planning period



### **Revenue Adequacy**

Congestion revenue is created in an LMP system when all loads pay and all generators receive their respective LMPs. When load in a constrained area pays more than the amount that generators receive, excluding losses, positive congestion revenue exists. The load MW exceed the generation MW in constrained areas because part of the load is served by imports using transmission capability into the constrained areas. That is why load, which pays for the transmission capability, is assigned ARRs to offset congestion in the constrained areas. Generating units that are the source of such imports are paid the price at their own bus, which does not reflect congestion in constrained areas. Generation in constrained areas receives the congestion price and all load in constrained areas pays the congestion price. As a result, load congestion payments are greater than the congestion-related payments to generation.<sup>31</sup> That is the source of the congestion revenue to pay holders of ARRs and FTRs. If PJM allocated FTRs equal to the transmission capability into constrained areas, FTR payouts would equal the sum of congestion.

Revenue adequacy must be distinguished from the adequacy of ARRs/FTRs as an offset against total congestion. Revenue adequacy is a narrower concept that compares total congestion revenues, including

<sup>31</sup> For an illustration of how total congestion revenue is generated and how FTR target allocations and congestion receipts are determined, see Table G-1, "Congestion revenue, FTR target allocations and FTR congestion credits: Illustration," *MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, at "Financial Transmission and Auction Revenue Rights."

day-ahead and balancing congestion, to the total target allocations, based only on day-ahead congestion, across the specific paths for which FTRs were available and purchased. A path specific target allocation is not a guarantee of payment. The adequacy of ARRs/FTRs as an offset for load against congestion compares ARR and self-scheduled FTR revenues to total congestion on the system.

FTRs are paid each month from congestion revenues, both day-ahead and balancing. FTR auction revenues and excess revenues are carried forward from prior months and distributed back from later months. For example, in June 2014, there was \$2.9 million in excess congestion revenue, to be used to fund months later in the planning period that may have a revenue shortfall. At the end of a planning period, if some months remain not fully funded, an uplift charge is collected from any FTR market participants that hold FTRs during the planning period based on their pro rata share of total net positive FTR target allocations, excluding any charge to FTR holders with a net negative FTR position for the planning year. For example, the 2013 to 2014 planning period was not revenue adequate, and thus this uplift charge was collected from FTR participants. There was excess congestion revenue at the end of the 2014 to 2015 planning period, which was distributed to FTR participants in the same manner that the FTR uplift is applied.

FTR revenues are primarily comprised of hourly congestion revenue, from the day-ahead and balancing markets.32 FTR revenues also include ARR excess revenues, which equal the difference between ARR target allocations and FTR auction revenues, and negative FTR target allocations, which are a source of revenue from FTRs with a negative target allocation. Competing use revenues are based on the Unscheduled Transmission Service Agreement between the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and PJM. This agreement sets forth the terms and conditions under which compensation is provided for transmission service in connection with transactions not scheduled directly or otherwise prearranged between NYISO and PJM. Congestion revenues appearing in Table 13-35 include both congestion charges associated with PJM facilities and those associated with reciprocal, coordinated

flowgates (M2M flowgates) in MISO and NYISO whose operating limits are respected by PJM.<sup>33</sup>

Market to market operations resulted in NYISO, MISO and PJM redispatching units to control congestion on flowgates located in the other's area and in the exchange of payments for this redispatch. The Firm Flow Entitlement (FFE) represents the amount of historic flow that each RTO had created on each reciprocally coordinated flowgate (RCF) used in the market to market settlement process. The FFE establishes the amount of market flow that each RTO is permitted to create on the RCF before incurring redispatch costs during the market to market process. If the nonmonitoring RTO's real-time market flow is greater than their FFE plus the approved MW adjustment from day-ahead coordination, then the nonmonitoring RTO will pay the monitoring RTO based on the difference between their market flow and their FFE. If the nonmonitoring RTO's real-time market flow is less than their FFE plus the approved MW adjustment from day-ahead coordination, then the monitoring RTO will pay the nonmonitoring RTO for congestion relief provided by the non-monitoring RTO based on the difference between the nonmonitoring RTO's market flow and their FFE.

For the 2014 to 2015, 2015 to 2016 and the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning periods, PJM paid MISO and NYISO a combined \$33.2 million, \$41.5 million and \$13.6 million for redispatch on the designated M2M flowgates. The timing of the addition of new M2M flowgates may reduce FTR funding levels. MISO's ability to add flowgates dynamically throughout the planning period, which were not modeled in any previous PJM FTR auction, may result in oversold FTRs in PJM, and as a direct consequence, reduce FTR funding.

FTRs were paid at 100 percent of the target allocation level for the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods. Congestion revenues are allocated to FTR holders based on FTR target allocations. PJM collected \$1,457.1 million, \$1,003.3 million and \$613.2 million of FTR revenues during the 2014 to 2015, 2015 to 2016 and first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning periods. Congestion in January 2014 was extremely high due to

<sup>32</sup> When hourly congestion revenues are negative, it is defined as a net negative congestion hour.

<sup>33</sup> See "Joint Operating Agreement between the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, LLC." (December 11, 2008), Section 6.1 <<a href="http://pim.com/media/documents/merged-tariffs/miso-joa.pdf">http://pim.com/media/documents/ merged-tariffs/miso-joa.pdf</a>. (Accessed February 23, 2016)

cold weather events, resulting in target allocations and congestion revenues that were unusually high for 2014. For the 2015 to 2016 planning period, the top sink and top source with the highest positive FTR target allocations were the Northern Illinois Hub and Western Hub. The top sink and top source with the largest negative FTR target allocation was the Western Hub.

This high level of revenue adequacy was primarily due to actions taken by PJM to address prior low levels of revenue adequacy. PJM's actions included PJM's assumption of higher outage levels and PJM's decision to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) both of which reduced system capability in the FTR auction model. PJM's actions led to a significant reduction in the allocation of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs. For the 2014 to 2015 planning period, Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations were reduced by 84.9 percent and 88.1 percent from the 2013 to 2014 planning period. For the 2015 to 2016 planning period, Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations were reduced by 76.9 percent and 82.0 percent from the 2013 to 2014 planning period. The result of this change in modeling was also that available FTR capacity decreased for the planning period. This decrease resulted in an increase in FTR nodal prices for the Annual FTR Auction. The result was fewer available ARRs, but an increased dollar per MW value for those ARRs. The impact on total ARR target allocations is shown in Table 13-35 and on dollars per MW in Figure 13-4.

Table 13-35 presents the PJM FTR revenue detail for the 2015 to 2016 planning period and the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period.

Accounting Element	2015/2016	2016/2017
ARR information		
ARR target allocations	\$963.5	\$547.9
FTR auction revenue	\$993.1	\$560.0
ARR excess	\$29.6	\$12.1
FTR targets		
Positive target allocations	\$1,148.8	\$669.5
Negative target allocations	(\$209.1)	(\$133.0)
FTR target allocations	\$939.7	\$536.5
Adjustments:		
Adjustments to FTR target allocations	(\$0.3)	(\$0.4)
Total FTR targets	\$939.4	\$536.1
FTR revenues		
ARR excess	\$29.6	\$12.1
Congestion		
Net Negative Congestion (enter as negative)	(\$25.2)	(\$7.7)
Hourly congestion revenue	\$1,021.0	\$613.9
Midwest ISO M2M (credit to PJM minus credit to Midwest ISO)	(\$41.5)	(\$13.6)
Adjustments:		
Excess revenues carried forward into future months	\$21.5	\$8.7
Excess revenues distributed back to previous months	\$0.0	\$0.0
Other adjustments to FTR revenues	\$0.0	\$0.0
Total FTR revenues		
Excess revenues distributed to other months	\$21.5	\$8.7
Net Negative Congestion charged to DA Operating Reserves	\$0.0	\$0.0
Total FTR congestion credits	\$1,003.3	\$613.2
Total congestion credits on bill (includes CEPSW and end-of-year distribution)	\$1,003.3	\$613.2
Remaining deficiency	(\$39.2)	(\$68.4)

Table 13-35 Total annual PJM FTR revenue detail (Dollars (Millions)): Planning periods 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017

FTR target allocations are based on hourly prices in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for FTR paths and are defined to be the revenue required to compensate FTR holders for day-ahead congestion on those paths. FTR credits are paid to FTR holders and, depending on market conditions, can be less than the target allocations. Table 13-36 lists the FTR revenues, target allocations, credits, payout ratios, congestion credit deficiencies and excess congestion charges by month. At the end of the 12-month planning period, excess congestion charges are used to offset any monthly congestion credit deficiencies.

The total row in Table 13-36 is not the sum of each of the monthly rows because the monthly rows may include excess revenues carried forward from prior months and excess revenues distributed back from later months. September 2016 and October 2016 had revenue shortfalls totaling \$2.6 million and \$6.1 million, but were fully funded using excess revenue from previous months.

	FTR		FTR	FTR	FTR	Monthly Credits
	Revenues	FTR Target	Payout Ratio	Credits	Payout Ratio	Excess/Deficiency
Period	(with adjustments)	Allocations	(original)	(with adjustments)	(with adjustments)	(with adjustments)
Jun-15	\$103.8	\$83.8	100.0%	\$103.8	100.0%	\$20.0
Jul-15	\$88.0	\$67.5	100.0%	\$88.0	100.0%	\$20.5
Aug-15	\$57.3	\$47.6	100.0%	\$57.3	100.0%	\$9.7
Sep-15	\$77.5	\$76.6	100.0%	\$77.5	100.0%	\$0.9
Oct-15	\$84.8	\$82.6	100.0%	\$82.6	100.0%	\$2.2
Nov-15	\$91.9	\$92.3	99.5%	\$92.3	100.0%	(\$0.4)
Dec-15	\$66.1	\$69.1	95.6%	\$69.1	100.0%	(\$3.0)
Jan-16	\$105.7	\$102.1	100.0%	\$102.1	100.0%	(\$3.7)
Feb-16	\$110.5	\$103.7	100.0%	\$103.7	100.0%	(\$6.8)
Mar-16	\$75.4	\$80.2	94.1%	\$80.2	100.0%	\$4.7
Apr-16	\$71.4	\$82.6	86.4%	\$82.6	100.0%	\$11.3
May-16	\$49.2	\$51.6	95.4%	\$51.6	100.0%	\$2.4
		Summ	ary for Planning	g Period 2015 to 2016	;	
Total	\$981.6	\$939.6		\$990.8	100.0%	\$57.7
Jun-16	\$60.5	\$55.1	100.0%	\$60.5	100.0%	(\$5.4)
Jul-16	\$112.1	\$87.1	100.0%	\$112.1	100.0%	(\$24.9)
Aug-16	\$110.9	\$82.2	100.0%	\$110.9	100.0%	(\$28.7)
Sep-16	\$117.7	\$120.4	97.7%	\$120.4	100.0%	\$2.6
Oct-16	\$104.9	\$110.9	94.5%	\$110.9	100.0%	\$6.1
Nov-16	\$45.7	\$38.2	100.0%	\$45.7	100.0%	(\$7.4)
Dec-16	\$52.9	\$42.3	100.0%	\$52.9	100.0%	(\$10.7)
		Summ	ary for Planning	g Period 2016 to 2017		
Total	\$604.7	\$536.1		\$613.3		(\$68.4)

Table 13-36 Monthly FTR acc	ounting summary (Dollars	(Millions)): Planning period	2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017
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Figure 13-13 shows the original PJM reported FTR payout ratio by month, excluding excess revenue distribution, for January 2004 through December 2015. The months with payout ratios above 100 percent have excess congestion revenue and the months with payout ratios under 100 percent are revenue inadequate. Figure 13-13 also shows the payout ratio after distributing excess revenue across months within the planning period. If there are excess revenues in a given month, the excess is distributed to other months within the planning period that were revenue deficient. The payout ratio for revenue inadequate months in the current planning period may change if excess revenue is collected in the remainder of the planning period. March 2015 had high levels of negative balancing congestion that resulted in a payout ratio of 64.6 percent. However, there was enough excess from previous months to bring the payout ratio to 100 percent.

# Figure 13-13 FTR payout ratio by month, excluding and including excess revenue distribution: January 2004 through December 2016




Table 13-37 shows the FTR payout ratio by planning period from the 2003 to 2004 planning period forward. Planning period 2013 to 2014 includes the additional revenue from unallocated congestion charges from Balancing Operating Reserves. For the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods, there was excess congestion revenue to pay target allocations resulting in a payout ratio of 116.2 percent and 106.8 percent for the planning periods. This excess will be distributed to all FTR participants, pro rata, based on their net positive target allocations.

## Table 13–37 PJM reported FTR payout ratio by planning period

Planning Period	FTR Payout Ratio
2003/2004	97.7%
2004/2005	100.0%
2005/2006	90.7%
2006/2007	100.0%
2007/2008	100.0%
2008/2009	100.0%
2009/2010	96.9%
2010/2011	85.0%
2011/2012	80.6%
2012/2013	67.8%
2013/2014	72.8%
2014/2015	100.0%
2015/2016	100.0%
2016/2017	100.0%

## FTR Uplift Charge

At the end of the planning period, an uplift charge is applied to FTR holders. This charge is to cover the net of the monthly deficiencies in the target allocations calculated for individual participants. An individual participant's uplift charge is a pro rata charge, to cover this deficiency, based on their net target allocation with respect to the total net target allocation of all participants with net positive target allocations for the planning period. Participants pay an uplift charge that is a ratio of their share of net positive target allocations to the total net positive target allocations.

The uplift charge is only applied to, and calculated from, members with a net positive target allocation at the end of the planning period. Members with a net negative target allocation have their year-end target allocation set to zero for all uplift calculations. Since participants in the FTR Market with net positive target allocations are paying the uplift charge to fully fund FTRs, their payout ratio cannot be 100 percent. The end of planning period payout ratio is calculated as the participant's target allocations minus the uplift charge applied to them divided by their target allocations. The calculations of uplift are structured so that, at the end of the planning period, every participant in the FTR Market with a positive net target allocation receives payments based on the same payout ratio. At the end of the planning period and the end of a given month no payout ratio is actually applied to a participant's target allocations. The payout ratio is simply used as a reporting mechanism to demonstrate the amount of revenue available to pay target allocations and represent the percentage of target allocations a participant with a net positive portfolio has been paid for the planning period. However, this same calculation is not accurate when calculating a single month's payout ratio as currently reported, where the calculation of available revenue is not the same.

The total planning period target allocation deficiency is the sum of the monthly deficiencies throughout the planning period. The monthly deficiency is the difference in the net target allocation of all participants and the total revenue collected for that month. The total revenue paid to FTR holders is based on the hourly congestion revenue collected, which includes hourly M2M, wheel payments and unallocated congestion credits.

Table 13-38 provides a demonstration of how the FTR uplift charge is calculated. In this example it is important to note that the sum of the net positive target allocations is \$32 and the total monthly deficiency is \$10. The uplift charge is structured so that those with higher target

allocations pay more of the deficit, which ultimately impacts their net payout. Also, in this example, and in the PJM settlement process, the monthly payout ratio varies for all participants, but the uplift charge is structured so that once the uplift charge is applied the end of planning period payout ratio is the same for all participants.

For the 2012 to 2013 planning period, the total deficiency was \$291.8 million. The top ten participants with the highest target allocations paid 53.6 percent of the total deficiency for the planning period. All of the uplift money is collected from individual participants, and distributed so that every participant experiences the same payout ratio. This means that some participants subsidize others and receive less payout from their FTRs after the uplift is applied, while others receive a subsidy and get a higher payout after the uplift is applied. In this example, participants 1 and 5 are paid less after the uplift charge is applied, while participants 3 and 4 are paid more.

## Table 13–38 End of planning period FTR uplift charge example

	Net Target	Total Monthly	Monthly	Uplift	Net	Payout	Monthly	EOPP Payout
Participant	Allocation	Payment	Deficiency	Charge	Payout	Change	Payout Ratio	Ratio
1	\$10.00	\$8.00	\$2.00	\$3.13	\$6.88	(\$1.13)	80.0%	68.8%
2	(\$4.00)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	(\$4.00)	\$0.00	100.0%	100.0%
3	\$15.00	\$10.00	\$5.00	\$4.69	\$10.31	\$0.31	66.7%	68.8%
4	\$3.00	\$1.00	\$2.00	\$0.94	\$2.06	\$1.06	33.3%	68.8%
5	\$4.00	\$3.00	\$1.00	\$1.25	\$2.75	(\$0.25)	75.0%	68.8%
Total	\$28.00	\$22.00	\$10.00	\$10.00	\$18.00	\$0.00		

## **Revenue Adequacy Issues and Solutions**

The current ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient way to ensure that load receives all the congestion revenues or has the ability to receive the auction revenues associated with all the potential congestion revenues. There are several reasons for the disconnect between congestion revenues and ARR/FTR revenues. The reasons include unavoidable modeling differences, avoidable modeling differences, such as outage modeling decisions, cross subsidies among and between FTR participants ARR holders and the construction of the Stage 1A ARR system which is based on historical, rather than physical, pathways.

The issuance of the September 15, 2016 FERC order increases the gap between congestion revenue and ARR/ FTR revenue collected. Allocating balancing congestion and M2M payments, along with allocating excess

congestion revenue to FTR holders solely, increases revenue adequacy for FTRs, but reduces payments to load and increases costs to load, undermining the ability of load to offset their congestion costs. Supporting FTR portfolio netting leads to cross subsidies among FTR participants. Restructuring Stage 1A allocations using ORRs for retired resources is an attempt to fix a flawed system, but retains the core problem which is reliance on contract path congestion revenue rights. The accepted rule change does not address the problem with using contract paths, does not address the deficiencies for active units and gives priority to units based on financial, not physical, determinations. The purpose of the FTR/ARR system is to return congestion revenue to load. The current and newly accepted rules do not meet this goal.

## Netting Target Allocations within Portfolios

Currently, FTR target allocations are netted within each organization in each hour. This means that within an hour, positive and negative target allocations within an organization's portfolio are offset prior to the application

> of the payout ratio to the positive target allocation FTRs. The payout ratios are also calculated based on these net FTR positions. Elimination of portfolio netting would correctly account for negative target allocations as a source of

revenue to pay positive target allocations. It would also apply the payout ratio directly to a participant's positive target allocations before subtracting negative target allocations, rather than applying the payout ratio to a participant's net portfolio. Applying the payout ratio to a participant's net portfolio, results in unequal payout ratios depending on a participant's portfolio construction.

The current method requires those with fewer negative target allocation FTRs to subsidize those with more negative target allocation FTRs. The current method treats a positive target allocation FTR differently depending on the portfolio of which it is a part. But all FTRs with positive target allocations should be treated in exactly the same way, which would eliminate this form of cross subsidy. For example, a participant has \$200 of positive target allocation FTRs and \$100 of negative target allocation FTRs and the payout ratio is 80 percent. Under the current method, the positive and negative positions are first netted to \$100 and then the payout ratio is applied. In this example, the holder of the portfolio would receive 80 percent of \$100, or \$80.

The correct method would first apply the payout ratio to FTRs with positive target allocations and then net FTRs with negative target allocations. In the example, the 80 percent payout ratio would first be applied to the positive target allocation FTRs, 80 percent of \$200 is \$160. Then the negative target allocation FTRs would be netted against the positive target allocation FTRs, \$160 minus \$100, so that the holder of the portfolio would receive \$60.

If done correctly, the payout ratio would also change, although the total net payments made to or from participants would not change. The sum of all positive and negative target allocations is the same in both methods. The net result of this change would be that holders of portfolios with smaller shares of negative target allocation FTRs would no longer subsidize holders of portfolios with larger shares of negative target allocation FTRs.

Under the current method all participants with a net positive target allocation in a month are paid a payout ratio based on each participant's net portfolio position. The correct approach would calculate payouts to FTRs with positive target allocations, without netting in an hour. This would treat all FTRs the same, regardless of a participant's portfolio. This approach would also eliminate the requirement that participants with larger shares of positive target allocation FTRs subsidize participants with larger shares of negative target allocation FTRs.

Elimination of portfolio netting should also be applied to the end of planning period FTR uplift calculation. With this approach, negative target allocations would not offset positive target allocations at the end of the planning period when allocating uplift. The FTR uplift charge would be based on participants' share of the total positive target allocations paid for the planning period. Table 13-39 shows an example of the effects of calculating FTR payouts on a per FTR basis rather than the current method of portfolio netting for four hypothetical organizations for an example hour. In this example, there was \$45 in congestion revenue collected, which results in a payout ratio of 39.1 percent for positive target allocations when ignoring any contribution by negative or net negative target allocations. With portfolio netting, the total revenue available to pay positive target allocations is \$50, which is the \$45 in congestion collected plus the \$5 generated by the net negative target allocation of Participant 4, which results in a payout ratio of 41.7 percent for net positive target allocations. Without portfolio netting there is \$110 in total revenue available, which is the \$45 in congestion collected plus the \$65 in negative target allocations from all participants, which results in a payout ratio of 61.1 percent for positive target allocations.

The positive and negative TA columns show the total positive and negative target allocations, calculated separately, for each organization. The percent negative target allocations is the share of the portfolio which is negative target allocation FTRs. The net target allocation is the net of the positive and negative target allocations for the given hour. The FTR netting payout column shows what a participant would see on their bill, including payout ratio adjustments, under the current method. The per FTR payout column shows what a participant would see on their bill, including payout ratio adjustments, if FTR target allocations were done correctly. In this example, the actual monthly payout ratio is 41.7 percent. If portfolio netting were eliminated, the actual monthly payout ratio would rise to 61.1 percent.

This table shows the effects of a per FTR target allocation calculation on individual participants. The total payout does not change, but the allocation across individual participants does.

The largest change in payout is for participants 1 and 2. Participant 1, who has a large proportion of FTRs with negative target allocations, receives less payment. Participant 2, who has no negative target allocations, receives more payment.

	Positive	Negative	Percent		FTR Netting	No Netting	
	Target	Target	Negative Target		Payout	Payout	Percent
Participant	Allocation	Allocation	Allocation	Net TA	(Current)	(Proposed)	Change
1	\$60.00	(\$40.00)	66.7%	\$20.00	\$8.33	(\$3.33)	(140.0%)
2	\$30.00	\$0.00	0.0%	\$30.00	\$12.50	\$18.33	46.7%
3	\$90.00	(\$20.00)	22.2%	\$70.00	\$29.17	\$35.00	20.0%
4	\$0.00	(\$5.00)	100.0%	(\$5.00)	(\$5.00)	(\$5.00)	0.0%
Total	\$180.00	(\$65.00)	-	\$115.00	\$45.00	\$45.00	-

#### Table 13-39 Example of FTR payouts from portfolio netting and without portfolio netting

Table 13-40 shows the total value for the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods of FTRs with positive and negative target allocations. The Net Positive Target Allocation column shows the value of all portfolios with an hourly net positive target allocation FTRs are netted against positive target allocation FTRs. The Net Negative Target Allocation column shows the value of all portfolios with an hourly net negative value after negative target allocation FTRs are netted against positive target allocation column shows the value of all portfolios with an hourly net negative value after negative target allocation FTRs. The Net Negative Target Allocation column shows the value of all portfolios with an hourly net negative value after negative target allocation FTRs. The Per FTR Positive Allocation column shows the total value of the hourly positive target allocation FTRs without netting. The Per Negative Allocation column shows the total value of the hourly negative target allocation FTRs without netting.

The Reported Payout Ratio column is the monthly payout ratio as currently reported by PJM, calculated as total revenue divided by the sum of the net positive and net negative target allocations. The No Netting FTR Payout Ratio column is the payout ratio that participants with positive target allocations would receive if FTR payouts were calculated without portfolio netting, calculated by dividing the total revenue minus the per FTR negative target allocation by the per FTR positive target allocations. The total revenue available to fund the holders of positive target allocation FTRs is calculated by adding any negative target allocations to the congestion credits for that month.

If netting within portfolios were eliminated and the payout ratio were calculated correctly, the payout ratio for the 2013 to 2014 planning period would have been 87.5 percent instead of the reported 72.8. For the 2014 to 2015 and 2015 to 2016 planning periods there was no revenue inadequacy, so eliminating portfolio netting would have no effect. September 2016 experienced revenue inadequacy, but excess revenue was distributed from previous months to ensure full funding. For months with no revenue inadequacies there is no change in payout ratio.

	Net Positive Target	Net Negative	Per FTR Positive	Per FTR Negative	Total Congestion	Reported Payout	No Netting Payout
	Allocations	Target Allocations	Target Allocations	Target Allocations	Revenue	Ratio (Current)	Ratio (Proposed)
Jun-16	\$66,890,503	(\$11,761,810)	\$145,725,072	(\$90,578,663)	\$60,547,574	100.0%	100.0%
Jul-16	\$103,067,704	(\$15,947,225)	\$234,908,328	(\$147,750,891)	\$112,060,353	100.0%	100.0%
Aug-16	\$106,463,071	(\$24,309,023)	\$270,738,798	(\$188,528,046)	\$110,872,528	100.0%	100.0%
Sep-16	\$143,711,526	(\$23,349,848)	\$334,869,805	(\$214,320,300)	\$120,361,723	100.0%	100.0%
Oct-16	\$140,704,976	(\$29,766,159)	\$322,466,349	(\$211,484,113)	\$110,938,816	100.0%	100.0%
Nov-16	\$50,418,317	(\$12,156,919)	\$124,242,433	(\$85,964,032)	\$45,658,421	100.0%	100.0%
Dec-16	\$58,101,556	(\$15,818,469)	\$164,917,652	(\$122,634,566)	\$52,937,720	100.0%	100.0%
2015/2016 Total	\$1,148,845,079	(\$206,167,602)	\$2,970,405,028	(\$2,030,832,071)	\$1,003,307,668	100.0%	100.0%
2016/2017* Total	\$669,357,653	(\$133,109,453)	\$1,597,868,436	(\$1,061,260,610)	\$613,377,135	100.0%	100.0%

Table 13-40 Monthly positive and negative target allocations and payout ratios with and without hourly netting: Planning period 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017

\*First seven months of 2016 to 2017 planning period

### Portfolio Dependent Payout Ratio

Under the current portfolio netting rules, negative target allocations are first netted against positive, and then the payout ratio is applied. This results in two significant problems with the current method. First is that a participant can shield itself from both monthly revenue inadequacy and the end of planning period uplift charge by shrinking the size of their positive target allocations. This is advantageous because the participant can still be profiting from their negative target allocations if they are paid to take counter flow positions and pay back less than they received. Additionally, it results in positive target allocations receiving different payout ratios depending on the composition of the portfolio they are in. All positive target allocation FTR should be treated equally, regardless of the

portfolio they are in, and this can only be accomplished by eliminating portfolio netting. Not treating all FTRs equally results in participants with more negative target allocations receiving a subsidy by reducing the effective payout ratio to participants with fewer negative target allocations. The reduced payouts to participants with fewer negative target allocations subsidize increased payout ratios to participants with larger negative target allocations, and is an unbalanced distribution of available congestion revenue collected.

Table 13-41 demonstrates the impact on the payout ratio to positive target allocation FTRs with and without portfolio netting. In the example the total congestion collected is \$4,750 and the total net target allocation is \$9,500, resulting in a reported payout ratio of 50.0 percent. With portfolio netting, the net target allocation is simply multiplied by the payout ratio to calculate the congestion revenue a participant receives. For Participant 1, this is \$250 multiplied by 0.5 for a total revenue received of \$125. The revenue to positive TA column is an indication of how much revenue the positive target allocations, which are the only part of a portfolio receiving available revenue, of a participant need to be paid in order to reach the congestion revenue received. For participant 1, they are effectively being paid \$875 of their \$1,000 so that the congestion revenue received can be \$125. Another way to state this is the participant is effectively paying themselves their negative target allocations first, and then receiving revenue based on their net target allocation. The result of this is that Participant 1's positive target allocations are effectively granted a payout ratio of 87.5 percent simply because they hold negative target allocations, while Participant 3, who holds no negative target allocations, is only paid at a 50.0 percent payout ratio.

## Table 13-41 Change in positive target allocation payout ratio given portfolio construction

Without portfolio netting all participants are paid at the same effective payout ratio for their positive target allocations. Counting negative target allocations as a source of revenue raises the payout ratio to 54.5 percent. Without portfolio netting, the payout ratio is first applied to positive target allocations, then the participant's negative target allocations are added. The result of this calculation is that each participant is paid an equal 54.5 percent regardless of their portfolio's negative target allocations. In this example Participant 1 pays ends up paying \$204.55 into the congestion pot, in net, while Participant 3 is paid 54.5 percent of the positive target allocations, resulting in a payment of \$4,745.45. Eliminating portfolio netting is the only way to treat positive target allocations equally across all portfolios, and eliminates the subsidy positive target allocations holders are paying to negative target allocation holders.

## Mathematically Equivalent FTRs

A single FTR can be broken into multiple FTRs. The newly formed set of multiple FTRs can have the same net target allocation as long as the start and end points of the constituent end points are, in net, the same as the original. Opponents of the elimination of FTR netting have claimed that without netting this would no longer be true. However, this assertion does not account for revenues from negative target allocation FTR paths in the mathematically equivalent set of FTRs. Appropriately including these revenues results in mathematical equivalence between the single FTR and that same FTR broken into a constituent set of FTRs with the same start and end point.

Table 13-43 shows the effects on a participant with and without portfolio netting under three distinct scenarios. Table 13-42 provides the day-ahead CLMP values for each node used in the example. In this example, a participant can either buy an FTR position directly from

	Congestion	= \$4.750 Net	TA = \$9.500			With Netting		V	Vithout Nettin	a
	Positive						Calculated	Congestion		Calculated
	Target	Target	Net Target	Reported	Revenue	Revenue to	Positive TA	Revenue	Revenue to	Positive TA
Participant	Allocations	Allocations	Allocations	Payout Ratio	Received	Positive TA	Payout Ratio	Received	Positive TA	Payout Ratio
1	\$1,000.00	(\$750.00)	\$250.00	50.0%	\$125.00	\$875.00	87.5%	(\$204.55)	\$545.45	54.5%
2	\$750.00	(\$200.00)	\$550.00	50.0%	\$275.00	\$475.00	63.3%	\$209.09	\$409.09	54.5%
3	\$8,700.00	\$0.00	\$8,700.00	50.0%	\$4,350.00	\$4,350.00	50.0%	\$4,745.45	\$4,745.45	54.5%
Total	\$10,450.00	(\$950.00)	\$9,500.00	-	\$4,750.00	\$5,700.00	-	\$4,750.00	\$5,700.00	-

A to B or can break it into individual pieces with the net effect of an FTR from A to B with a net target allocation of \$5. In this example, there was \$3.60 in congestion collected, due to a payout ratio of 72.0 percent and a total payout in each of the three scenarios of \$3.60. This payout amount is simply the payout ratio of 72.0 percent multiplied by the net target allocations of \$5 in each scenario.

With the elimination of netting, if the additional revenue created by considering positive and negative target allocations separately is disregarded, it appears as if the payout for the same net FTR is drastically different depending on the composition of the FTR. The results of this mistake are payouts of \$3.60, -\$0.60 and -\$25.80 for the same net FTR in each distinct scenario. However, if the negative target allocations are properly accounted for as a source of revenue when considering congestion collected, the total revenue available increases thereby increasing the payout ratio for each scenario's positive target allocations. The total revenue available is the \$3.60 in congestion collected plus the negative target allocations, resulting in revenue available to pay positive target allocations of \$3.60, \$18.60 and \$108.60 with payout ratios to positive target allocations of 72.0 percent (unchanged due to no negative target allocations), 93.0 percent and 98.7 percent. Multiplying these correct payout ratios by the scenario's positive target allocations, and then adding the scenario's negative target allocations results in a net payout of \$3.60 for each scenario.

#### Table 13-42 Nodal day-ahead CLMPs

Node	DA CLMP
A	\$20
В	\$25
С	\$40
D	\$100
E	\$10

Table 13-43 Mathematically equivalent FTR payments with and without portfolio netting

The results of this example demonstrate the mathematical fact that no matter how an FTR path is constructed, as a single FTR or a mathematically equivalent set of FTRs, the total payment the FTR path will be the same. Attempts to disprove this ignore the revenues from the constituent FTR counter flow positions and the resulting change in payout ratio that is experienced by positive target allocations. A net FTR may be constructed in any manner and the resultant total payout will be equivalent with and without portfolio netting.

### FERC Order on FTRs: Portfolio Netting

On September 15, 2016, FERC decided that PJM's current practice of portfolio netting was just and reasonable.<sup>34</sup> FERC did not agree that portfolio netting led to subsidization of portfolios with counterflow positions. The Market Monitor and PJM demonstrated that eliminating portfolio netting would eliminate a cross subsidy among FTR portfolios without changing the amount of total revenue available revenue to pay to portfolios.

## **Counter Flow FTRs and Revenues**

The current rules create an asymmetry between the treatment of counter flow and prevailing flow FTRs. The payout to the holders of counter flow FTRs is not affected when the payout ratio is less than 100 percent. There is no reason for that asymmetric treatment.

For a prevailing flow FTR, the target allocation would be subject to a reduced payout ratio, while a counter flow FTR holder would not be subject to the reduced payout ratio. The profitability of the prevailing flow FTRs is affected by the payout ratio while the profitability of the counter flow FTRs is not affected by the payout ratio.

				Available	Netting	No Netting	Available		Correct No
	Positive	Negative		Revenue	Revenue	Revenue Received	Revenue No	Payout Ratio	Netting Revenue
FTR Path(s)	TA	TA	Net TA	Netting	Received	(Incorrect)	Netting	No Netting	Received
A-B	\$5.00	\$0.00	\$5.00	\$3.60	\$3.60	\$3.60	\$3.60	72.0%	\$3.60
А-С, С-В	\$20.00	(\$15.00)	\$5.00	\$3.60	\$3.60	(\$0.60)	\$18.60	93.0%	\$3.60
A-C, C-E, E-D, D-B	\$110.00	(\$105.00)	\$5.00	\$3.60	\$3.60	(\$25.80)	\$108.60	98.7%	\$3.60

34 See 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016).

Counter flow FTR holders make payments over the planning period, in the form of negative target allocations. These negative target allocation FTRs are paid at 100 percent regardless of whether positive target allocation FTRs are paid at less than 100 percent.

A counter flow FTR is profitable if the hourly negative target allocation is smaller than the hourly auction payment they received. A prevailing flow FTR is profitable if the hourly positive target allocation is larger than the auction payment they made.

There is no reason to treat counter flow FTRs more favorably than prevailing flow FTRs. Counter flow FTRs should also be affected when the payout ratio is less than 100 percent. This would mean that counter flow FTRs would pay back an increased amount, parallel to the decreased payments to prevailing flow FTRs. The adjusted payout ratio would evenly divide funding between counter flow FTR holders and prevailing flow FTR holders by increasing negative counter flow target allocations by the same amount it decreases positive target allocations.

Table 13-44 provides an example of how the counter flow adjustment method would impact a two FTR system. In this example, there is \$15 of total congestion revenue available, corresponding to a reported payout ratio of 75 percent and an actual payout ratio of 87.5 percent. In the example, the profit is shown with and without the counter flow adjustment. As the example shows, the profit of a counter flow FTR does not change when there is a payout ratio less than 100 percent, while the profit of a prevailing flow FTR is reduced. Applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs distributes the funding penalty evenly to both prevailing and counter flow FTR holders.

Table 13-44 Example implementation of counter flowadjustment method

	Prevailing A-B 10MW	Counter C-D 10MW
Auction Cost	\$50.00	(\$30.00)
Target Allocation	\$40.00	(\$20.00)
Payout	\$30.00	(\$20.00)
Profit without revenue inadequacy	(\$10.00)	\$10.00
Profit after revenue inadequacy	(\$20.00)	\$10.00
Payout for Positive TA	\$35.00	(\$20.00)
Profit for Positive TA	(\$15.00)	\$10.00
Payout after CF Adjustment	\$36.67	(\$21.67)
Profit after CF Adjustment	(\$13.33)	\$8.33
Profit Difference	\$1.67	(\$1.67)

Table 13-45 shows the monthly positive, negative and total target allocations.<sup>35</sup> Table 13-45 also shows the total congestion revenue available to fund FTRs, as well as the total revenue available to fund positive target allocation FTR holders on a per FTR basis and on a per FTR basis with counter flow payout adjustments. Implementing this change to the payout ratio for counter flow FTRs would result in an additional \$188.4 million (27.8 percent of difference between revenues and total target allocations) in revenue available to fund positive target allocations for the 2013 to 2014 planning period. If this change were implemented after excess planning period revenue was distributed, it would not result in additional revenue for the 2014 to 2015, 2015 to 2016 or 2016 to 2017 planning periods. However, if this change were implemented before excess planning period revenues were distributed, there would be an increase in the revenue available each month to pay prevailing flow FTRs, resulting in a decrease in the amount of excess from previous months that needs to be used to achieve revenue adequacy. This can be seen as a slight difference in the total revenue and adjusted counter flow total revenue columns for March, April, May and September 2016 that were not revenue adequate. The result of this would be \$4.3 million in additional revenue generated for the 2015 to 2016 planning period.

The result of removing portfolio netting and applying a payout ratio to counter flow FTRs would increase the calculated payout ratio for the 2013 to 2014 planning period from the reported 72.8 percent to 91.0 percent. For months with no revenue inadequacies there is no change in payout ratio.

<sup>35</sup> Reported payout ratio may differ between Table 13-40 and Table 13-45 due to rounding differences when netting target allocations and considering each FTR individually.

Table 13-45 Counter flow FTR payout ratio adjustment impacts: Planning period 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017

							Adjusted	Adjusted	Adjusted	
				Total	Reported		Prevailing	Counter	Counter Flow	Additional
	Positive Target	Negative Target	Total Target	Congestion	Payout	Total Revenue	Flow Payout	Flow Payout	Revenue	Revenue
	Allocations	Allocations	Allocations	Revenue	Ratio*	Available	Ratio	Ratio	Available	Generated
Jan-16	\$321,877,316	(\$219,805,629)	\$102,071,687	\$111,640,380	100.0%	\$331,446,009	100.0%	100.0%	\$331,446,009	\$0
Feb-16	\$315,314,260	(\$211,591,605)	\$103,722,655	\$116,388,192	100.0%	\$327,979,798	100.0%	100.0%	\$327,979,798	\$0
Mar-16	\$309,689,295	(\$229,412,325)	\$80,276,969	\$75,303,718	100.0%	\$304,716,044	100.0%	100.0%	\$306,379,919	\$1,663,876
Apr-16	\$286,739,441	(\$204,102,945)	\$82,636,496	\$79,920,761	100.0%	\$284,023,706	100.0%	100.0%	\$284,895,369	\$871,662
May-16	\$192,044,982	(\$140,414,905)	\$51,630,077	\$49,689,877	100.0%	\$190,104,782	100.0%	100.0%	\$190,780,714	\$675,932
Jun-16	\$145,725,072	(\$90,578,663)	\$55,146,409	\$60,547,574	100.0%	\$151,126,237	100.0%	100.0%	\$151,126,237	\$0
Jul-16	\$234,908,328	(\$147,750,891)	\$87,157,436	\$112,060,353	100.0%	\$259,811,244	100.0%	100.0%	\$259,811,244	\$0
Aug-16	\$270,738,798	(\$188,528,046)	\$82,210,752	\$110,872,528	100.0%	\$299,400,574	100.0%	100.0%	\$299,400,574	\$0
Sep-16	\$334,869,805	(\$214,320,300)	\$120,549,505	\$120,361,678	100.0%	\$334,681,978	100.0%	100.0%	\$334,742,412	\$60,435
Oct-16	\$322,466,349	(\$211,484,113)	\$110,982,236	\$110,938,816	100.0%	\$322,422,929	100.0%	100.0%	\$322,437,170	\$14,241
Nov-16	\$124,242,433	(\$85,964,032)	\$38,278,401	\$45,658,421	100.0%	\$131,622,453	100.0%	100.0%	\$131,622,453	\$0
Dec-16	\$164,917,652	(\$122,634,565)	\$42,283,086	\$52,937,720	100.0%	\$175,572,286	100.0%	100.0%	\$175,572,286	\$0
Total 2015/2016	\$2,970,404,365	(\$2,030,831,660)	\$939,572,706	\$1,002,235,633	100.0%	\$3,033,067,292	100.0%	100.0%	\$3,037,387,376	\$4,320,084
Total 2016/2017	\$1,597,868,436	(\$1,061,260,610)	\$536,607,826	\$613,377,090	100.0%	\$1,674,637,700	100.0%	100.0%	\$1,597,711,865	\$74,676
* Damastad maria	4	duo to rounding diff		at a s						

\* Reported payout ratios may vary due to rounding differences when netting

Figure 13-14 shows the FTR surplus, collected dayahead, balancing and total congestion payments from January 2005 through December 2016. May 2016 had positive total balancing congestion of \$7.5 million. March 2015 had balancing congestion of -\$70.0 million.

# Figure 13-14 FTR surplus and the collected day-ahead, balancing and total congestion: January 2005 through December 2016





Figure 13-15 shows the relationship among monthly target allocations, balancing congestion, M2M payments and day-ahead congestion. The left column is the target allocations for all FTRs for the month. The total height of the right column is day-ahead congestion revenues and the stripes are reductions to total congestion revenues. When the total height of the solid segments in the right

column exceeds the height of the left column, the month is revenue adequate. For example, February 2016 was revenue adequate by \$6.8 million. March was revenue inadequate by \$4.9 million, but there was enough excess revenue in other months in the planning period to fully fund the month.

### Figure 13–15 FTR target allocation compared to sources of positive and negative congestion revenue



# ARRs as an Offset to Congestion for Load

Load pays for the transmission system and contributes congestion revenues. FTRs and later ARRs were intended to return congestion revenues to load. With the implementation of the current FTR/ARR design, other participants are allowed to receive a portion of the congestion revenues.

Table 13-46 compares the revenue received by ARR holders and total congestion for the 2011 to 2012 through the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period. This compares the total offset provided to all ARR holders including all ARRs converted to self scheduled FTRs to the total congestion revenues. ARR credits are calculated as the product of the ARR MW and the cleared price of the ARR path from the Annual FTR Auction. The FTR credits represent the total self scheduled FTR target allocations for FTRs held by ARR holders, adjusted by the FTR payout ratio. ARR holders that elect to self schedule FTRs are paid the daily ARR credits for the ARR, and then pay the daily auction price of the self scheduled FTRs, netting the cost of the FTRs to zero. This is accounted for in the ARR credits column by subtracting the cost of the FTR from the ARR credits.

The total ARR/FTR offset is the sum of the ARR and self scheduled FTR credits. The congestion column shows the total amount of congestion collected in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the balancing energy market. The percent offset is the percent of total, system wide, congestion offset by ARR and self scheduled FTR credits that ARR holders receive.

Table 13-46 shows the offset provided by ARRs and self scheduled FTRs for the entire 2011 to 2012 through the 2016 to 2017 planning period. This offset reflects the share of congestion revenues returned to loads. ARR and FTR revenues offset 44.7 percent of Day-Ahead Energy Market and the balancing energy market for the 2013 to 2014 planning period and 63.8 percent for the 2014 to 2015 planning period. For the 2015 to 2016 planning period ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 86.5 percent of total congestion costs. For the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 82.3 percent of total congestion costs. Over the last six planning periods 70.9 percent of total congestion costs have been offset through ARRs and FTRs.

This demonstrates the inadequacies of the current ARR/ FTR design. The goal of the design should be to return 100 percent of the congestion revenues to the load. But the actual results fall well short of that goal. The current allocation of congestion revenue resulted in a total of \$1,780.6 million in unreturned congestion revenue to ARR holders, and a 70.9 percent congestion offset, over the last six planning periods.

# Table 13-46 ARR and FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders: Planning periods 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017

Planning Period	ARR Credits	FTR Credits	Total Congestion	Total ARR/ FTR Offset	Percent Offset	Unreturned Revenue
2011/2012	\$512.2	\$249.8	\$770.6	\$762.0	98.9%	\$8.5
2012/2013	\$349.5	\$181.9	\$575.8	\$531.4	92.3%	\$44.4
2013/2014	\$337.7	\$456.4	\$1,777.1	\$794.0	44.7%	\$983.1
2014/2015	\$482.4	\$404.4	\$1,390.9	\$886.8	63.8%	\$504.1
2015/2016	\$635.3	\$223.4	\$992.6	\$858.8	86.5%	\$133.8
2016/2017	\$375.2	\$122.2	\$604.1	\$497.5	82.3%	\$106.7
Total	\$2,692.4	\$1,638.1	\$6,111.0	\$4,330.5	70.9%	\$1,780.6

## FERC Order on FTRs: Balancing Congestion and M2M Payment Allocation

On September 15, 2016, FERC issued an order removing balancing congestion and market to market (M2M) payments from the FTR funding equation and assigned them, on a load ratio basis, to load and exports.<sup>36</sup>

This order will go into effect on June 1, 2017, for the 2017 to 2018 planning period.

In its compliance filing PJM redefined balancing congestion as balancing congestion plus market to market (M2M) payments between MISO and NYISO. Under the order, load and exports will pay balancing congestion and M2M payments proportionally. On average from the 2011 to 2012 planning period on, load comprises 94.8 percent of all demand. From the 2011 to 2012 planning period onward, total balancing congestion and M2M payments were \$1,496.3 million, so load would have been responsible for 94.8 percent, or an additional \$1,418.4 million in charges to subsidize FTR holders.

<sup>36</sup> See 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016).

In addition, FERC ordered that all excess congestion revenue, which includes day-ahead congestion in excess of FTR target allocations and excess FTR auction revenue, belongs to FTR holders. PJM initially proposed returning excess day-ahead and excess FTR auction revenue to ARR holders, but that proposal was rejected by FERC. Under this new rule, for the 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017 planning period FTR holders would have receive an additional \$896.1 million over their target allocations.

The Market Monitor continues to propose that excess FTR auction revenue should be allocated to ARR holders and all congestion rents, including balancing congestion, should be allocated to FTRs.

The reallocation of balancing congestion and M2M payments from FTR holders to load, and the allocation of excess auction revenues to FTR holders subsidizes FTR holders at the expense of ARR holders. It is inconsistent with the logic that FTRs are a day-ahead only product because excess auction revenues are not day-ahead revenues.

Table 13-47 shows the share of total congestion that is offset by ARRs and FTRs for load for the 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017 planning periods. Table 13-47 shows the congestion offset available to load under the current rules. Table 13-47 also shows what the congestion offset available to load would be under the new rules, the change in the congestion offset available to load and the overpayment to FTRs under the new rules. The new congestion offset is calculated as the ARR credits and the FTR credits excluding balancing congestion and M2M payments, divided by the total congestion and the load share of balancing and M2M payments. The proposed new revenue is the sum of the ARR credits, adjusted FTR credits and the load share of balancing congestion and M2M payments. The FTR over payment is the excess day-ahead congestion revenue and excess auction revenue FTR holders received over their FTR target allocations.

If these rules had been in place beginning with the 2011/2012 planning period, ARR holders would have received \$996.7 million less in congestion offsets from the 2011/2012 through the 2016/2017 planning period. The total overpayment to FTR holders for the 2011/2012 through 2016/2017 planning period would

have been \$896.1 million. The underpayment to load and the overpayment to FTR holders is a result of several factors in the new rules all of which mean the transfer of revenues to FTR holders and the shifting of costs to load. Load is now required to pay for balancing congestion, which significantly increases costs to load and significantly increases revenues paid to FTR holders. PJM will continue to clear counter flow FTRs using excess auction revenues in order to make it possible to sell more prevailing flow FTRs. FTR holders will receive excess day-ahead congestion revenues in excess of target allocations. FTR holders will receive excess auction revenue, which is what FTR holders were willing to pay for FTRs in excess of what is provided to ARR holders.

Old					Proposed					
Planning	ARR	FTR	Total	Total ARR/	Percent	New	Old Revenue	New Revenue	ARR Holder	FTR Over
Period	Credits	Credits	Congestion	FTR Offset	Offset	Offset	Received	Received	Change	Payment
2011/2012	\$512.2	\$249.8	\$770.6	\$762.0	98.9%	83.3%	\$762.0	\$598.6	(\$163.4)	\$113.9
2012/2013	\$349.5	\$181.9	\$575.8	\$531.4	92.3%	68.0%	\$531.4	\$275.9	(\$255.5)	\$62.1
2013/2014	\$337.7	\$456.4	\$1,777.1	\$794.0	44.7%	43.2%	\$794.0	\$574.1	(\$219.9)	\$0.0
2014/2015	\$482.4	\$404.4	\$1,390.9	\$886.8	63.8%	57.2%	\$886.8	\$686.6	(\$200.2)	\$400.6
2015/2016	\$635.3	\$223.4	\$992.6	\$858.8	86.5%	78.2%	\$858.8	\$744.8	(\$113.9)	\$188.9
2016/2017	\$375.2	\$122.2	\$604.1	\$497.5	82.3%	77.4%	\$497.5	\$453.7	(\$43.8)	\$130.7
Total	\$2,692.4	\$1,638.1	\$6,111.0	\$4,330.5	70.9%	63.1%	\$4,330.5	\$3,333.8	(\$996.7)	\$896.1

Table 13-47 ARR and FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders under PJM's proposed FTR funding: Planning periods 2011 to 2012 through 2016 to 2017

## **Credit Issues**

There was one collateral default in 2016 which was promptly resolved.

## **FTR Forfeitures**

An FTR holder may be subject to forfeiture of any profits from an FTR if it meets the criteria defined in Section 5.2.1 (b) of Schedule 1 of the PJM Operating Agreement. If a participant has a cleared increment offer or decrement bid for an applicable hour at or near the source or sink of any FTR they own and the day-ahead congestion LMP difference is greater than the real-time congestion LMP difference the profits from that FTR may be subject to forfeiture for that hour. An increment offer or decrement bid is considered near the source or sink point if 75 percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn, and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus, is reflected on the constrained path between the FTR source or sink. This rule only applies to increment offers and decrement bids that would increase the price separation between the FTR source and sink points.

Figure 13-16 demonstrates the FTR forfeiture rule for INCs and DECs. The INC or DEC distribution factor (dfax) is compared to the largest impact withdrawal or injection dfax. If the absolute difference between the virtual bid and its counterpart is greater than or equal to 75 percent, the virtual bid is considered for forfeiture. This is the metric in the rule which defines the impact of the virtual bid on the constraint.

In the first part of the example in Figure 13-16, the INC has a dfax of 0.25 and the maximum withdrawal dfax on the constraint is -0.5. The difference between the two dfax values is -0.75 (0.25 minus -0.5). The absolute

value is 0.75. In the second part of the example in, the DEC has dfax of 0.5 and the maximum injection dfax on the constraint is -0.25. The difference between the two dfax values is 0.75 (-0.25 minus 0.5). The absolute value is also 0.75.

### Figure 13-16 Illustration of INC/DEC FTR forfeiture rule




Figure 13-17 shows the FTR forfeiture values for both physical and financial participants for each month of June 2010 through December 2016. Currently, counter flow FTRs are not subject to forfeiture regardless of INC or DEC positions. Total forfeitures for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period were \$0.4 million (0.07 percent of total FTR target allocations).

Figure 13–17 Monthly FTR forfeitures for physical and financial participants: June 2010 through December 2016





Figure 13-18 shows the FTR forfeitures on just INCs and DECs, FTR forfeitures on INCs, DECs and UTCs using the method proposed by PJM and FTR forfeitures on INCs, DECs and UTCs using the method proposed by the MMU from January 2013 through December 2016. The method proposed by PJM for calculating forfeitures associated with UTCs was implemented on September 1, 2013, and for each month thereafter. UTC forfeitures before September 2013 were not billed, but are included to illustrate the impact of the different methods of calculating forfeitures. The UTC curves include all forfeitures for the month associated with INCs, DECs and UTCs. The dotted line indicates the percentage of forfeitures caused by UTC transactions using PJM's method, excluding INCs and DECs.

### Figure 13–18 FTR forfeitures for INCs/DECs and INCs/ DECs/UTCs for both the PJM and MMU methods: January 2013 through December 2016



## Up-to-Congestion Transaction FTR Forfeitures

The current implementation of the FTR forfeiture rule submitted by PJM is not consistent with the application of the forfeiture rule for INCs and DECs. Under PJM's method the simple net dfax of the UTC transaction is the only consideration for forfeiture, representing the contract path of the UTC transaction. Under this method, the net dfax is the sink dfax of the UTC minus the source dfax of the UTC. The net dfax alone cannot be used as an indication of helping or hurting a constraint, rather, the direction of the constraint must also be considered. In addition, the PJM method only considers UTC transactions whose net dfax is positive. This logic not only passes transactions that should fail the forfeiture test, but fails transactions that should pass the forfeiture test.

PJM's logic also does not hold when one of the points of the UTC is far from the constraint. In this case, one side of the UTC would have a dfax of zero, indicating no connection to the constraint being considered. If a point of the UTC transaction has no connection to the constraint, there can be no power flow directly between the two UTC points, so the simple net dfax, cannot logically be used in this case to indicate whether a UTC is eligible for forfeiture. Under the MMU method this UTC would be treated as an INC or DEC and follow the same rules as the current INC/DEC FTR forfeiture rule. Figure 13-19 shows an example of the two proposed FTR forfeiture rules for UTC transactions. In both cases, the net dfax of the UTC is taken. Under the PJM method the net dfax of the UTC is calculated by subtracting the dfax of the sink bus A (0.2) from the dfax of the source bus B (0.5) to get a net dfax of -0.3. If this net dfax value is greater than 0.75 the UTC is subject to forfeiture. Under the MMU method, the net dfax is calculated by subtracting the dfax of sink A (0.2) from the dfax of source bus B (0.5) to get a net dfax of 0.3. This net dfax is then compared to the withdrawal point with the largest impact on the constraint. The MMU method compares the net UTC dfax to a withdrawal because the UTC is a net injection on this constraint. In this example, the net dfax is 0.3 and it is compared to the largest withdrawal dfax at C (-0.5). The absolute value of the difference is calculated from these two points to determine if the UTC fails the FTR forfeiture rule. In this case, the absolute value of the difference is the dfax of bus C (-0.5) minus the net UTC dfax (0.3) for a total impact of 0.8, which is over the 0.75 threshold for the FTR forfeiture rule. The result is that this UTC fails the FTR forfeiture rule. The MMU proposes to apply the same rules to UTC transactions as is applied to INCs and DECs, treat the UTC as equivalent to an INC or a DEC depending on its net impact on a given constraint. A UTC transaction is essentially a paired INC/DEC, it has a net impact on the flow across a constraint, as an INC or DEC does. While total system power balance is maintained by a UTC, local flows may change based on the UTC's net impact on a constraint. The MMU method captures this impact.

#### Figure 13-19 Illustration of UTC FTR forfeiture rule





Figure 13-20 demonstrates where the assumption of contract path for UTCs in PJM's method does not hold with actual system conditions when either the source or sink of the UTC does not have any impact on the constraint being considered. In this case, the UTC is effectively an INC or a DEC relative to the constraint, as the other end of the UTC has no impact on the constraint.

However, the PJM approach would not treat the UTC as an INC or DEC, despite the effective absence of the other end of the UTC. This is a flawed result.

As demonstrated in Figure 13-20, the UTC is no different than an INC on the constraint being considered. Using the PJM method this UTC would pass the FTR forfeiture rule. The net dfax would be calculated as the dfax of bus B (0) minus the dfax of bus A (0.25) for a net dfax of -0.25, with no comparison to any withdrawal bus. Since the dfax is negative, it would pass the PJM FTR forfeiture rule. Under the MMU's method, the net dfax is calculated as an injection with a dfax of 0.25, and then the absolute value of the difference is calculated between that injection and the dfax of the largest withdrawal on the constraint. In this example that is bus C, with a dfax of -0.5. The result is an absolute value of the dfax difference of 0.75, meaning that this UTC fails the FTR forfeiture test.

## Figure 13–20 Illustration of UTC FTR Forfeiture rule with one point far from constraint



The MMU recommends that the FTR forfeiture rule be applied to UTCs in the same way it is applied to INCs and DECs.