MOPR Review (Minimum Offer Price Rule)

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Independent Market Monitor for PJM




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PJM Market Monitor

- MMU role is included in PJM tariff per FERC order.
- Since 1999, the PJM Market Monitoring Unit has been responsible for promoting a robust, competitive and nondiscriminatory electric power market in PJM by implementing the PJM Market Monitoring Plan.
- The MMU was internal to PJM until 2008. A dispute over independence led to the creation of a fully independent external MMU for PJM.
- Monitoring Analytics is the Independent Market Monitor for PJM.



PJM: 21 control zones



Monitoring Analytics

PJM markets

- Competitive wholesale power markets work.
 - The goal is power at the lowest possible cost.
- PJM energy market needs more effective market power mitigation.
- PJM capacity market needs to be improved.
- Markets are good for all unit types.
- Markets are good for renewables.
- Markets create incentives for creative responses.
- Markets preferred to planning.
- Market alternative to subsidies to address carbon:
 - Carbon price
 - 。 RGGI
- Markets only work with clear rules.

Minimum Offer Price Rule

- What is the issue?
 - Generating units with subsidies may suppress prices for competitive resources
 - Subsidies are contagious
- MOPR requires competitive offers for subsidized resources
 - Subsidized offer may be less than the competitive offer in the absence of a minimum offer price rule
 - MOPR may require a higher offer
- Sources of subsidies
 - Subsidies from states
 - Subsidies from cost of service utilities

Minimum Offer Price Rule

- What is a subsidy?
 - An out of market payment that covers all or part of the costs of a capacity resource
 - Subsidized resources do not depend on markets for all revenues
- Why subsidies?
 - NJ/MD: gas fired combined cycle units (2009)
 - Reliability
 - Renewable resources: Renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
 - Carbon reduction
 - Off shore wind
 - Nuclear
 - Regulated utilities
 - All costs covered by out of market customer payments



December 2019 MOPR Order

- FERC Order defined boundary between federal and state jurisdiction for PJM wholesale power market.
- States have authority over generation.
- MOPR is not about market power.
- MOPR is about defining competitive markets.
- FERC Order defined subsidies comprehensively:
 RPS/RECs
 - Cost of service regulation (self supply)
 - Technology specific: offshore wind; nuclear (ZECs)

- Wide exceptions for existing resources
 - Did not provide competitive exemption for gas resources



Impacts of 2019 MOPR Order

- No identified impact on capacity prices or cleared resources in 2022/2023 capacity auction
- Capacity market auctions for 2023/2024; 2024/2025
 - Existing nuclear units with subsidies are expected to clear
 - Existing renewable resources are exempt
 - Existing resources with RPS qualifications are exempt

- Existing self supply resources are exempt
- Existing demand resources are exempt
- Estimates of price increases are incorrect
- Some states considered leaving the PJM capacity market as a result of the MOPR Order.
 - **FRR (fixed resource requirement) option**
 - Higher cost and nonmarket solution
 - Market power is an issue

PJM MOPR proposal

- Eliminate MOPR for the identified sources of subsidies:
 - All state subsidies are exempt
 - All regulated utility subsidies are exempt
- Create an incorrect and unworkable definition of buyer side market power
 - **Output** Unnecessary with the effective elimination of MOPR
 - **Barriers to IMM data gathering and analysis**
 - **Barriers to enforcement**
- Confusing and inefficient administrative process
- Conclusion: PJM markets better off with no MOPR than with PJM's approach to MOPR.



IMM MOPR proposal

- Maintain MOPR for key sources of subsidies:
 - State subsidies
 - Regulated utility subsidies
- Define competitive offer correctly (MOPR floor)
 - Net avoidable costs (ACR)
- Create exemption for uneconomic, emerging technologies
 - Off shore wind
 - Carbon capture
- Conclusion:
 - Well defined MOPR respects both FERC and state authority

- Renewables are competitive
- Nuclear is competitive

PJM vs IMM MOPR proposals

- PJM eliminates MOPR for known subsidies:
 - State subsidies
 - Regulated utility subsidies
- IMM retains a clear definition of subsidies that trigger MOPR
- PJM retains incorrect definition of competitive offer (MOPR floor): Net cost of new entry (CONE)
- IMM defines competitive offer correctly: Net avoidable costs (ACR)
- IMM: Intent to affect markets is not relevant
- Under IMM definition
 - Renewables' offers are expected to be competitive, excluding impact of subsidies
 - Nuclear offers are expected to be competitive, excluding impact of subsidies



Long term impacts of next MOPR Order

- Will subsidies spread further?
- Will renewable supply be competitive?
- Renewables contribution to capacity/reliability.
- Will states implement carbon pricing?
- Least cost approach to low carbon power market:
 - Option 1: Markets with modified MOPR
 - Option 2: Markets with carbon price
 - Option 3: Combine Option 1 and Option 2
 - Option 4: Markets plus targeted RECs/subsidies
 - Option 5: FRR instead of markets



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