Energy Price Formation IMM Package

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Energy Price Formation

- Prices should reflect supply and demand fundamentals.
- Prices are not too low.
- Reserve markets should provide incentives for resources to provide reserves and respond to reserve events.
- Scarcity pricing is intended for periods when the market is tight, not all the time.
- The reserve markets are not in place to provide revenues for uneconomic capacity.



IMM Proposal

- Synchronized reserve T1/T2 consolidation
 - Must offer details as proposed by PJM and IMM
 - Offer margin = 0 as proposed by IMM
 - Penalty structure as proposed by IMM
- Operating Reserve Demand Curves
 - Shape of curves
 - IMM proposed ORDC conservatively targets operator actions and stressed market conditions
 - Extend method to 30 minute reserves and day ahead
 The same issues require development for PJM or IMM package



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Synchronized Reserve Offer Margin

- Synchronized reserve prices, including opportunity costs, fall well below \$7.50 per MWh most of the time.
- There are no explicit costs of providing synchronized reserves, only energy opportunity cot.
- The margin is intended to reflect a margin consistent with a competitive market. The margin should be zero.
- PJM proposes tying the margin to performance penalties, imposing a higher price for a lower quality product.
- PJM approach to penalties will increase margin.





Reserve Must Offer Requirement

- PJM will calculate the capability for online generating units capable of following the dispatch signal.
- All resources should have a defined and enforceable obligation to provide accurate ramp rates for all relevant points on the offer curve.
- Hourly ramp rates
- Resource types that can provide synchronized reserves, but cannot follow the dispatch signal, must submit their true physical capability to PJM.
- PJM and IMM packages have the same structure of offers and method for clearing reserves.



Smaller Reserve Subzones

- RTO wide reserves support loss of a generator that is not behind a constraint.
- MAD Subzone, or other large area subzones, support loss of a generator that is constrained by a wide area IROL.
- Smaller constrained areas in PJM also require provision of reserves inside that area
 - BGE/PEPCO, Delmarva South
 - PSEG, ATSI
- PJM proposes only one subzone.





PJM's ORDC Proposal

- PJM proposes high prices for reserves beyond the reserve requirement
- Based on PJM's calculations of high probability of shortage under normal levels of forecast error and forced outages.
- Historic data does not support PJM's probability of shortage calculations.
- The PJM market has seen 21 five minute intervals, less than 2 hours, of shortage since five minute shortage pricing began in 2017.
 - Only 10 minutes of synchronized reserve shortage.



IMM ORDC Proposal

- Goal: construct a demand curve that provides an appropriate price signal for additional reserves when needed.
- The IMM proposes an ORDC based on analysis of actual operator demand for additional reserves.
- The resulting ORDC provides sufficient, but not excessive, prices for market procurement of additional reserves when needed.



EPFSTF Goals

- Board proposed changes (April letter)
 - Synch reserve market implementation
 - 30 minute reserve product
 - Dynamic reserve requirements to reflect operator actions
 - Enhance ORDCs
 - "These enhancements would result in more transparent energy and reserve price signals that better reflect operator actions."
- PJM's ORDC proposal is not targeted to addressing operator actions.



EPFSTF Issues Per 12.05.18 Letter

- Impacts
 - With fast start; maintenance costs; fuel security
- Same reserve price for all reserve products
- Day-ahead/real-time interactions
- New uplift payments without offsets
- Allocation of reserve costs
- Matching of price impacts and demand conditions
- Details of interaction among synchronized reserves, primary reserves, 30 minute reserves and multiple locational reserve requirements

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EPFSTF Issues Per 12.05.18 Letter

- Incentives for flexibility; inflexibility
- Congestion impact on:
 - price dynamics;
 - balancing congestion;
 - role of virtuals;
 - FTRs
- Impact on cleared RPM auctions





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