Q2

# State of the Market Report for PJM

January through June


## Monitoring Analytics, LLC

Independent
Market Monitor
for PJM


8.13.2026

2026

# Preface

The PJM Market Monitoring Plan provides:

The Market Monitoring Unit shall prepare and submit contemporaneously to the Commission, the State Commissions, the PJM Board, PJM Management and to the PJM Members Committee, annual state-of-the-market reports on the state of competition within, and the efficiency of, the PJM Markets, and quarterly reports that update selected portions of the annual report and which may focus on certain topics of particular interest to the Market Monitoring Unit. The quarterly reports shall not be as extensive as the annual reports. In its annual, quarterly and other reports, the Market Monitoring Unit may make recommendations regarding any matter within its purview. The annual reports shall, and the quarterly reports may, address, among other things, the extent to which prices in the PJM Markets reflect competitive outcomes, the structural competitiveness of the PJM Markets, the effectiveness of bid mitigation rules, and the effectiveness of the PJM Markets in signaling infrastructure investment. These annual reports shall, and the quarterly reports may include recommendations as to whether changes to the Market Monitoring Unit or the Plan are required.[1]

Accordingly, Monitoring Analytics, LLC, which serves as the Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) for PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), and is also known as the Independent Market Monitor for PJM (IMM), submits this *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June.*[2] [3]

1 PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) Attachment M (PJM Market Monitoring Plan) § VI.A. Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined have the meaning provided in the OATT, PJM Operating Agreement, PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA), the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement (CTOA) or other tariffs that PJM has on file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission).

2 OATT Attachment M.

3 All references to this report should refer to the source as Monitoring Analytics, LLC, and should include the complete name of the report: *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June.*

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# 1. Introduction

## Q2 2026 in Review

Reliability is a core goal of PJM. Reliability should remain a core goal of PJM. Reliability is a core responsibility of PJM. Reliability should remain a core responsibility of PJM. Maintaining and improving competitive markets should be a core goal of PJM. Maintaining and improving competitive markets is a core responsibility of PJM. The goal of competition in PJM is to provide customers reliable wholesale power at the lowest possible price, but no lower. FERC said exactly that in Order No. 2000.[1] The PJM energy markets have done that and have met that goal. The PJM markets work, even if not perfectly. The results of PJM markets were reliable in the first six months of 2026, although reliability is deteriorating. The results of the energy market were competitive in the first six months of 2026. The results of the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 capacity markets were not competitive. The PJM markets bring customers the benefits of competition when the market rules allow competition to work and prevent the exercise of market power.

The PJM energy and capacity markets are components of the PJM market; both are essential to providing reliable energy to customers at the lowest possible price. The energy market results incorporate immediate short term conditions including weather, the existing generation fleet, unit availability, actual load, transmission limitations, and fuel availability and costs. The capacity market results incorporate load forecasts and the response of investors in resources to expected market conditions. The energy market and the capacity market face interrelated challenges. There are interactive effects between the incentives in the energy market and the incentives in the capacity market. It would be a mistake to attempt to engineer the energy market to administratively shift some of the capacity market missing money to the energy market. No good reason has been provided for doing so. Current efforts to do that in the Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force (RCSTF) are not transparent or well defined. The recovery of the missing money in the capacity market is, by definition, administrative and will be no less administrative if somehow included in the energy market. Recovery of the missing money in the energy market is hard to do in any predictable or verifiable way and likely to undercut the goals of stability and predictability in the markets. It has proven to be a mistake to attempt to engineer the capacity market using the flawed ELCC approach or by making arbitrary changes to the VRR curve or undermining the net energy market revenue offset in individual offers and in the definition of the VRR curve, all of which PJM has done recently.

There are clear warning signs for the capacity market and for PJM reliability. The capacity market was short of meeting its reliability objective in the recent capacity auctions for the 2026/2027 BRA and the 2027/2028 BRA. PJM was also short of meeting its reliability target as of June 1, 2025, on an ICAP and a UCAP basis. The amount that PJM is short capacity grew from 208.7 MW in the 2026/2027 BRA, to 6,516.6 MW in the 2027/2028 BRA, and to 6,831.3 MW in the 2028/2029 BRA. The capacity market price impacts on customers have been very large and are not reversible. The price impacts will be even larger in the near term unless the issues associated with data center load are addressed in a timely manner, prior to the next BRA, scheduled for December 2026.

Data center load growth is the primary reason for recent and expected capacity market conditions, including total forecast load growth, the tight supply and demand balance, and high prices. But for data center growth, both actual and forecast, the capacity market would not have seen the same tight supply demand conditions, the same high prices observed in the 2025/2026 BRA, the 2026/2027 BRA, and the 2027/2028 BRA, and the currently expected tight supply conditions and high prices for subsequent capacity auctions. Forecast data center load growth has been the primary cause to date and the accuracy of those forecasts is highly questionable.

Holding aside all the other issues associated with the 2025/2026 BRA, 2026/2027 BRA, 2027/2028 BRA and 2028/2029 BRA, existing and forecast data center load by itself resulted in a significant increase in BRA revenues for each of the delivery years. Based on actual auction clearing prices and quantities and uplift MW, inclusion of existing and forecast data center load growth resulted in a combined total increase in capacity market revenues for

1 *Regional Transmission Organizations*, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, *mimeo* at 3 (1999), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2000-A, 90 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2000), *aff'd sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC*, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

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the 2025/2026 BRA, the 2026/2027 BRA, the 2027/2028 BRA, and 2028/2029 BRA of $29,368,774,465.[2] [3] This total will continue to grow until the issues associated with the addition of large data center loads are addressed.

The impact on the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 BRA revenues would have been higher had PJM not used the Agreement VRR curve.[4] If the 2026/2027 BRA had been run with PJM's proposed unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $19,294,286,100, an increase of $3,169,915,210, or 19.7 percent, compared to the actual auction results. If the 2027/2028 BRA had been run with PJM's proposed unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $26,324,850,846, an increase of $9,913,272,621, or 60.4 percent, compared to the actual auction results. If the 2028/2029 BRA had been run with PJM's proposed unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $29,722,226,243, an increase of $13,314,277,218, or 81.1 percent, compared to the actual auction results. In other words, the inclusion of data center load in the last three auctions increased customers' bills by $20,036,670,606, even with the maximum price from the Agreement in place. The market distorting effect of data center load would have been $46,434,135,655 but for the Agreement. The result of the Agreement was to reduce that impact by $26,397,465,049. Contrary to assertions that the Agreement was a typical regulatory response to high prices, the maximum price resulting from the Agreement is more consistent with a competitive outcome than would have occurred without the Agreement. The Agreement was a logical and reasonable response to the unmitigated market distortions created by unsubstantiated data center load forecasts that should not have been included in the market clearing in the first place.

The longstanding and recently revived assertion that the Agreement is evidence of a so called credibility trap is not correct. The assertion that PJM market prices are never allowed to reflect shortage is demonstrably false. The assertion that there should not be a regulatory response to extreme prices that do not reflect market fundamentals is wishful thinking on the part of some but not founded in the fact that FERC uses markets to create just and reasonable rates. That argument also relies on the paternalistic assertion that EDCs and LSEs should be required to hedge their obligations and the incorrect conclusion that if there had been hedges, load would not be paying the excess costs imposed by data center loads. Hedges can never beat the market over time because every hedge has a buyer and a seller.

There is nothing market based about the PJM VRR curve that would have been in place but for the maximum price in the Agreement. Any assertions that the PJM VRR curve represents a true market solution are unsupported and fail to recognize the distortionary effects of including unsubstantiated forecast data center load. The PJM VRR curve is based on a faulty calculation of Gross CONE and Net CONE.[5] The PJM VRR curve, proposed by PJM in the Quadrennial Review and effective for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction but for the Agreement, includes a maximum price equal to the greater of 1.15 times Gross CONE minus 0.75 times Net EAS (1.15*Gross CONE – 0.75*EAS), or 0.2 times Gross CONE. There is no reason to inflate the maximum price and PJM has provided no logical rationale for this overstatement.

Large data center load additions have already had a significant and irreversible impact on PJM customers that will be paid through May 31, 2029, and will have additional significant impacts on other customers as a result of higher transmission costs, higher energy market prices and higher capacity market prices.

Some participants contend that PJM markets are just facing an unexpected growth in demand and that the normal supply and demand dynamics should be allowed to play out without recognition of these unique circumstances. This position is that prices should be allowed to rise, incentives to build generation will result, and supply and demand will return to balance. This simplistic view ignores the fact that it is the unexpected addition of extraordinarily high levels of data center load (largely based on unsubstantiated forecasts) that have resulted in the supply-demand imbalance. This position also ignores related

2 See the *"Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A,"* (January 5, 2026). <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf>

3 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Market Monitor Report," (July 28, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_MC_Market_Monitor_Report_20260728.pdf>.

4 On December 30, 2024, in Docket No. EL25-46-000, Governor Josh Shapiro and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a complaint against PJM asserting that the maximum price for PJM's capacity auctions is unjust and unreasonable. The Governor and PJM reached an Agreement. On February 20, 2025, in Docket No. ER25-1357-000, pursuant to FPA section 205, PJM submitted proposed revisions to its Tariff to establish a specific maximum price and minimum price for all RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years, consistent with the Agreement. The resultant VRR curve is termed the restricted VRR curve, or the Agreement VRR curve.

5 See the Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER26-455, (January 20, 2026).



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underlying issues including the excessive maximum price in the capacity market, the uncertainty introduced by PJM's 2015 capacity market reforms and reliance on low probability high impact PAI penalties as a performance incentive, the uncertainty and understatement of available capacity that result from ELCC and the uncertainty hangover from the prior queue management issues. The unexpected role of data center load has created a policy issue that the Commission needs to address, consistent with the Commission's view on the role of competitive markets.

Other participants take the more radical view that the owners of existing capacity should be able to sell their resources to data centers directly and without limit. The proponents of that view have failed to explain why it is reasonable to create chaos for all the other PJM customers. Removal of significant levels of capacity from the PJM market that serves all other customers would create extreme price impacts in the energy and capacity markets, reliability shortfalls in the capacity market, and blackouts from inadequate energy. This is not speculation. This is simple math and logic.

Markets cannot automatically solve all problems and it is not enough to simply assert that the market will solve all the problems associated with data center load. The wholesale power markets created by FERC need rules and include rules based on the Commission's judgment about the appropriate rules required to meet the Commission's objectives. FERC relies on competitive markets to be a more effective substitute for traditional economic regulation. FERC's rules about market design and rules governing demand and supply are essential to creating the conditions under which markets can work, in significant part because there is endemic structural market power in the capacity market. The decisions about the interconnection of large new data center loads when there is not enough capacity to maintain system reliability are public, regulatory decisions because they are about competitive outcomes that are in the interests of all market participants. PJM markets are not laissez faire markets.

There is a path forward that does not use the current data center issues as a pretext for redefining fundamental elements of the PJM market design. That path starts with the recognition that the source of the current issues is data center load. The next step is to provide a mechanism for data center load to be served reliably while not distorting prices for all other customers. That step would remove data center load from the next BRAs and rely on bilateral contracts between data centers and generators, whether from negotiated bring your own new generation ("BYONG") contracts or from a reliability backstop auction. The rest is details. In contrast, PJM's proposal will ensure that other customers will continue to pay the price for the addition of data center load.

It is clear that continuing to simply accept the interconnection of large data center loads that cannot be served reliably because there is not adequate dispatchable capacity, is not a reasonable path forward and is not an efficient or competitive market solution and is not a solution of any kind. That path leads to continued shortfalls, increased reliability issues, continued maximum prices, and continued calls to abandon markets.

The current supply of capacity in PJM is not adequate to meet the demand from large data center loads and will not be adequate in the foreseeable future. This is a simple factual issue. There is not enough capacity currently to meet the data center load. The solution is not to create reliability issues and wealth transfer issues by clearing the capacity market at the maximum price and at a quantity less than the reliability requirement by allowing the ongoing interconnection of large data center loads without adequate generation to serve them and without a clear path to adding the required capacity or to defining full curtailability.

The market solution is to require data centers to bring their own new generation. This would include an expedited fast track load and generation interconnection process for large new data center loads that bring their own new generation with locational and temporal characteristics reasonably matched to their load profile. The preferred solution would include creating a queue for the addition of large new data center loads, which would not be interconnected until there is adequate capacity to serve them. This broad bring your own new generation solution to the issues created by the addition of unprecedented amounts of large data center load does not require a continued massive wealth transfer through ongoing shortage pricing. It is essential to have a pragmatic market solution that is consistent with and sustains efficient

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and competitive PJM markets rather than to create the conditions for a return to cost of service regulation or a variant of cost of service regulation.[6] [7] [8]

All loads should be served. All loads should be served reliably. The process for adding large data center loads should be transparent. All loads should benefit from competitive markets. All loads should have equal access to the transmission system. All loads should be treated as full transmission customers. All loads and generation are and should be on the grid and the grid is highly interconnected.

The temptation to create complex regulatory structures to shift data center costs and risks to other customers should be resisted. PJM's filing fails to resist that temptation.[9] The Market Monitor will file a detailed response at FERC to PJM's filing. A few of the basic issues are identified here. The PJM filing is fatally flawed for a number of reasons. The filing would explicitly remove protections against market power by eliminating the single clearing price competitive design, by eliminating the maximum price, by failing to define a competitive offer, and most importantly by undermining the longstanding must buy/must sell PJM capacity market design. The filing fails to recognize that the target shortfall MW are entirely comprised of forecast data center load. PJM would allocate the costs that result from the backstop auction to PJM LSEs and their customers on a nonmarket basis. PJM's proposal to allocate the costs of the reliability backstop auction to LSEs with data center load that are defined to be short is inconsistent with the basic design of the PJM Capacity Market. The reliability backstop auction should be solely for data center load rather than imposed on other customers. The costs and risks of data center load should be assigned to data center load and not to LSEs and to their other customers as a result. The PJM filing ignores the fundamental locational aspect of the PJM Capacity Market, creating the likelihood that all customers will have to pay for locational capacity market price differences, for increased energy costs from an inefficient dispatch, and for the transmission upgrades needed to move power from the resources to the load. The PJM filing fails to require that the output of the accepted supply offers reasonably matches the energy usage of data centers. The failure to match will result in data center load increasing energy prices for all customers.

PJM's proposal imposes costs and risks that result from data center load on PJM customers through LSEs and is therefore not consistent with the ratepayer protection pledge. The PJM filing is not consistent with either the Principles or the Pledge.

PJM's proposal explicitly shifts significant risk to other PJM customers. Other PJM customers, whether residential, commercial or industrial, should not be treated as a free source of insurance, or collateral, or financing for data centers. Yet that is what the PJM backstop auction would actually do. Although presented in superficially complex PJM tariff and legal terms, the proposals would shift risk to other PJM customers who would have no choice in the matter. Making LSEs the counterparty to transactions and requiring LSEs to bilaterally acquire capacity resources would shift risk to the other customers of each LSE in addition to radically changing the capacity market design and returning to the pre-markets period when generation owners exercised market power against competitive LSEs.

Running a backstop auction with the shortfall from the prior BRA based on forecast data center load, directly increases costs for all other customers and imposes the risks associated with uncertain data center forecasts on other customers. The issue of shifting risk is not a general concern to be put off to the uncertain future but must be a core element of any backstop proposal.

The most fundamental flaw in PJM's approach is PJM's mistaken narrative that the PJM capacity market is primarily a bilateral market. That assertion is not correct. That assertion is not supported by history. That assertion is not supported by the actual capacity market design and the actual functioning of the PJM capacity market. The capacity market was implemented in 1999 at the request of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in order to prevent existing generation owners from exercising market power against new entrant competitive LSEs. That market power could be exercised because the only

6 In response to the proposed use of a backstop auction to create a market mechanism to facilitate data center load bringing its own new generation, the MMU has made a proposal.

7 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal – V6, which can be found at <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%20 2026.06.19.pdf>.

8 See the *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*, Section 1: Introduction.

9 See *Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from Large Loads*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026).



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source of capacity for a new entrant LSE to meet its reliability obligation was a bilateral contract with existing generation owners. Then, as now, the ownership of capacity was highly concentrated and the generation owners had the ability to exercise market power in those bilateral negotiations. The solution was a competitive capacity market that required all generation owners to sell their capacity at a competitive price and all LSEs to buy the capacity needed to meet their reliability requirements at a competitive price. The result was access to competitively provided capacity that permitted competitive new entrant LSEs to compete with the incumbent utilities to meet load.

PJM's proposal would reverse the advantages of the competitive capacity market and restore market power through bilateral contracts and the requirement that each LSE meet its data center load through bilateral contracts for capacity. Data center loads are not the responsibility of the LSEs where the data centers choose to locate or of the other customers of the LSEs. Data center loads should pay their own costs and cover their own risks.

One of the benefits of competitive power markets is that changes in input prices and changes in the balance of supply and demand are reflected immediately in energy prices for both price decreases and price increases. Energy prices increased in the first six months of 2026 from the first six months of 2025. The real-time load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $20.79 per MWh, or 40.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $51.75 per MWh to $72.54 per MWh.

Of the $20.79 per MWh increase in the real-time load-weighted average LMP, $9.43 per MWh (45.3 percent) was the transmission constraint penalty factor component of LMP, $7.26 per MWh (34.9 percent) was the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP, $1.82 per MWh (8.8 percent) was the market power components of LMP, and $1.06 per MWh (5.1 percent) was the emissions cost components of LMP.

The total cost of wholesale power increased in the first six months of 2026 from the first six months of 2025. Energy costs (63.5 percent), capacity costs (17.1 percent) and transmission costs (17.4 percent) are the three largest components of the total cost of wholesale power, comprising 98.0 percent of the total cost per MWh in the first six months of 2026. The total cost of energy per MWh increased by $23.47 from $49.21 in the first six months of 2025 to $72.68 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 47.7 percent. The total cost of capacity per MWh increased by $13.23 from $6.39 in the first six months of 2025 to $19.61 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 207.1 percent. The total cost of transmission per MWh increased by $1.06 from $18.82 in the first six months of 2025 to $19.88 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 5.6 percent. The total cost per MWh of wholesale power increased by $38.34 from $76.16 in the first six months of 2025 to $114.50 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 50.3 percent.

The inclusion of data center load in the capacity market resulted in an increase in capacity costs and a corresponding increase in the total cost of wholesale power in PJM. In the first six months of 2026, the total cost per MWh of wholesale power increased by $11.11 (9.7 percent) from $103.40 to $114.50 as a result of the inclusion of data center load in the PJM Capacity Market. This cost increase does not include the impact on energy or transmission costs.

Generation from coal units decreased 3.2 percent, generation from natural gas units increased 2.6 percent, generation from oil units increased 29.7 percent, generation from wind units increased 2.1 percent, and generation from solar units increased 23.9 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

Energy market net revenue is a key measure of overall market performance as well as a measure of the incentive to invest in generation to serve PJM markets. Energy market net revenues are significantly affected by energy prices and fuel prices. Energy prices, gas prices and coal prices increased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The net effects were that in the first six months of 2026, average energy market theoretical net revenues increased by 108 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT), increased by 76 percent for a new combined cycle (CC), increased by 125 percent for a new coal plant (CP), increased by 40 percent for a new nuclear plant, increased by 198 percent for a new diesel (DS), increased by 25 percent for a new onshore wind installation, increased by 40 percent for

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a new offshore wind installation and increased by 13 percent for a new solar installation.

The real-time hourly average load in the first six months of 2026 increased by 2.5 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 90,914 MWh to 93,187 MWh.

While there are multiple centrifugal forces acting on PJM markets, there are still options available to maintain well functioning markets. Steps that can and should be taken immediately to offset those forces include: implement a bring your own new generation option for the interconnection of large new data center loads including a targeted backstop auction; improve the ELCC/CP capacity market design; enhance the PJM reserve products to address intermittent resource uncertainty; create rules for the competitive and transparent advanced commitment of generation for extreme weather; identify the availability of firm gas supply and gas transportation; require generators to procure natural gas transportation; ensure transparent information from pipelines; identify the need for dual fuel capacity; modify the RMR process; add comprehensive expedited queue options under PJM control to replace retiring resources and address immediate reliability issues; ensure integrated PJM transmission and reliability planning; ensure that large new loads are not subsidized or given preferential treatment; ensure that market power mitigation measures are strengthened and clarified, not eroded; facilitate more competition for transmission projects; and include direct comparisons between generation and transmission options to address reliability issues.

The assertion that yet another holistic review of PJM markets is required or is a panacea is, for many, merely a euphemism for raising prices. PJM has pursued a range of arbitrary mechanisms for raising prices, from extreme ORDCs, to fast start pricing, to unsupported increases in reserve requirements, to transmission constraint penalty factors, to PJM's version of ELCC, to modified capacity market demand curves that artificially reduce the net energy market revenue offset.

The goal of the ongoing review of PJM markets should be to continue to refine the PJM market design in order to permit supply and demand fundamentals to be reflected in prices in a transparent and predictable manner. The goal should be to avoid micromanaging market design features to achieve specific price outcomes or to continuously change the market rules in an effort to reach a desired result. Capacity market prices will be higher for organic load as the higher marginal costs of capacity are revealed in the capacity market. Energy market prices reflect input costs whether higher or lower.

PJM markets do not need a holistic review. The goal should be continuous improvement rather than continued crisis management. The focus should be on the fact that PJM markets and the underlying software need to be operated as efficiently as possible, relying on fully updated software. PJM's improved and approved market power mitigation process cannot work until PJM commitment and dispatch software is upgraded. These upgrades have been delayed by multiple years and have no firm expected implementation date. PJM's communications software and methods for providing information to generating units need to be fully updated. PJM operators need to have tools for advance scheduling and fuel inventory tracking that permit the efficient use of resources under extreme conditions.

The evolution of wholesale power markets is far from complete. The PJM markets need rules in order to provide reliable energy through competition. The foundational principle of using markets, with rules to prevent the exercise of market power and provide competitive results, is essential. Private investors, regardless of technology or subsidies, will put capital at risk and earn compensatory returns in markets that are not skewed in favor of any specific technology and in markets that are stable and that do not add risk and volatility. The core elements of the PJM market design remain robust. The use of locational marginal prices (LMP) in the energy market and partially locational prices in the capacity market continue to be essential to getting the price signals right. Technological and policy changes do not require that the core elements change. However, the market design can and must be improved and made more reliable and more efficient and more competitive. The current PJM ELCC capacity market design adds unnecessary risk and volatility that are not part of the market fundamentals. The ELCC approach needs to be applied on a unit specific basis, incorporate hourly supply and demand matching, and


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pay resources based on actual availability and performance rather than on assumed performance derived from a very limited data set of misinterpreted performance results based on unrepresentative extreme historical weather and specific PJM commitment and dispatch decisions. The capacity market also needs to eliminate artificial PAI risk that leads to uneconomic retirements and exits from PJM and establish effective performance incentives that apply every day. The basic logic of market power mitigation in both energy and capacity markets needs to be restored. The queue process should allow for a comprehensive, expedited process to resolve identified reliability issues. There should be an expedited interconnection process for large data center load additions that bring their own generation. Competition to build transmission, to implement dynamic line ratings (DLR) and to add grid enhancing technologies (GETs) should be expanded.

In the interests of all market participants, PJM, its current and potential market participants and stakeholders, PJM states, PJM customers, and the FERC will need to continue to work constructively to refine the competitive market design and to ensure the continued effectiveness of PJM markets in providing customers wholesale power at the lowest possible price, but no lower.

## PJM Market Summary Statistics

Table 1-1 shows selected summary statistics describing PJM markets.

### Table 1-1 PJM market summary statistics: January through June, 2025 and 2026[10]

| | Jan-Jun 2025 | Jan-Jun 2026 | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average Hourly Load Plus Exports (MWh) | 96,900 | 98,548 | 1.7% |
| Average Hourly Generation Plus Imports (MWh) | 98,789 | 100,666 | 1.9% |
| Peak Load Plus Net Export (MWh) | 158,889 | 151,547 | (4.6%) |
| Peak Load Excluding Export (MWh) | 156,256 | 146,175 | (6.5%) |
| Installed Capacity at June 30 (MW) | 181,290 | 183,874 | 1.4% |
| Load Weighted Average Real Time LMP ($/MWh) | $51.75 | $72.54 | 40.2% |
| Total Congestion Costs ($ Million) | $1,264.70 | $3,539.70 | 179.9% |
| Total Uplift Credits ($ Million) | $569.2 | $1,132.5 | 99.0% |
| Total PJM Billing ($ Billion) | $35.89 | $59.71 | 66.4% |

10 In Table 1-1, the MMU used the total PJM billing values provided by PJM through 2018. Starting in 2019, the total PJM billing values in Table 1-1 are modified by the MMU, to more accurately reflect PJM total billing. The total PJM billing shown in Table 1-1 is different from the total cost shown in Table 1-9. The total PJM billing in Table 1-1 represents the total dollars (charges) that pass through the PJM settlement process, while the total cost shown in Table 1-9 represents the portion of the total billing associated with the cost to load and includes additional costs to load accounted for outside the PJM settlement process.


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# PJM Market Background

The PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) operates a centrally dispatched, competitive wholesale electric power market that, as of June 30, 2026, had installed generating capacity of 184,191 megawatts (MW) and 1,144 members including market buyers, sellers and traders of electricity in a region including more than 67 million people in 21 control zones and all or parts of 13 states (Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia) and the District of Columbia (Figure 1-1).[11] [12]

As part of the market operator function, PJM coordinates and directs the operation of the transmission grid and plans transmission expansion improvements to maintain grid reliability in this region.

### Figure 1-1 PJM's footprint and its 21 control zones





11 See PJM. "Member List," which can be accessed at: <http://pjm.com/about-pjm/member-services/member-list.aspx>.
12 See PJM. "Who We Are," which can be accessed at: <http://pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx>.


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In the first six months of 2026, PJM had gross billings of $59.71 billion, an increase of 66.4 percent from $35.89 billion in the first six months of 2025. (Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2 Monthly PJM billings ($ Billion): 2008 through June 2026 [13]




PJM operates the day-ahead energy market, the real-time energy market, the capacity market, the regulation market, the synchronized reserve market, the secondary reserve market and the financial transmission rights (FTRs) markets.

PJM introduced energy pricing with cost-based offers and market-clearing nodal prices on April 1, 1998, and market-clearing nodal prices with market-based offers on April 1, 1999. PJM introduced the Daily Capacity Market on January 1, 1999, and the Monthly and Multimonthly Capacity Markets for the January through May 1999 period. PJM implemented FTRs on May 1, 1999. PJM implemented the day-ahead energy market and the regulation market on June 1, 2000. PJM modified the regulation market design and added a market in Synchronized Reserve on December 1, 2002. PJM introduced an Auction Revenue Rights (ARR) allocation process and an associated Annual FTR Auction effective June 1, 2003. PJM introduced the RPM capacity market effective June 1, 2007. PJM implemented the DASR market on June 1, 2008, and eliminated it on October 1, 2022. PJM introduced the Capacity Performance capacity market design effective on August 10, 2015, with the Base Residual Auction for 2018/2019. PJM replaced EFORd as the basis for derating ICAP to UCAP in the capacity market with ELCC effective with the Base Residual Auction run in July 2024 for 2025/2026. PJM replaced the two product, two signal regulation market with a single product, single signal regulation market effective October 1, 2025.

## Conclusions

This report assesses the competitiveness of the markets managed by PJM in the first six months of 2026, including market structure, participant behavior and market performance. This report was prepared by and represents the analysis of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, also referred to as the IMM, the Market Monitoring Unit or the MMU.

For each PJM market, the market structure is evaluated as competitive or not competitive, and participant behavior is evaluated as competitive or not competitive. Most important, the outcome of each market, market performance, is evaluated as competitive or not competitive.

The MMU also evaluates the market design for each market. The market design serves as the vehicle for translating participant behavior within the market structure into market performance. This report evaluates the effectiveness of the market design of each PJM market in providing market performance consistent with competitive results.

Market structure refers to the cost, demand, and ownership structure of the market. The three pivotal supplier (TPS) test is the most relevant measure

13 In Figure 1-2, the MMU used the total PJM billing values provided by PJM through 2018. Starting in 2019, the total PJM billing values in Figure 1-2 are modified by the MMU, to more accurately reflect PJM total billing. The total PJM billing shown in Figure 1-2 is different from the total cost shown in Table 1-9. The total PJM billing in Figure 1-2 represents the total dollars (charges) that pass through the PJM settlement process, while the total cost shown in Table 1-9 represents the portion of the total billing associated with the cost to load and includes additional costs to load accounted for outside the PJM settlement process.

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of market structure because it accounts for the ownership of assets and the relationship among the pattern of ownership, the resource costs, and the market demand using actual market conditions with both temporal and geographic granularity. Market shares and the related Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are also measures of market structure.

Participant behavior refers to the actions of individual market participants, also sometimes referred to as participant conduct.

Market performance refers to the outcomes of the market. Market performance results from the behavior of market participants within a market structure, mediated by market design.

Market design means the rules under which the entire relevant market operates, including the software that implements the market rules. Market rules include the definition of the product, the definition of short run marginal cost, rules governing offer behavior, market power mitigation rules, and the definition of demand. Market design is characterized as effective, mixed or flawed. An effective market design provides incentives for competitive behavior and permits competitive outcomes. A mixed market design has significant issues that constrain the potential for competitive behavior to result in competitive market outcomes, and does not have adequate rules to mitigate market power or incent competitive behavior. A flawed market design produces inefficient outcomes which cannot be corrected by competitive behavior.

## Energy Market Conclusion

The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of market structure, participant conduct and market performance, including market size, concentration, pivotal suppliers, offer behavior, markup, and price. The MMU concludes that the PJM energy market results were competitive in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 1-2 The energy market results were competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Partially Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Competitive** | **Effective** |

- The aggregate market structure was evaluated as partially competitive because the aggregate market power test based on pivotal suppliers indicates that the aggregate day-ahead market structure was not competitive on 93.5 percent of the days in the first six months of 2026. The hourly HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) results indicate that the PJM aggregate energy market in the first six months of 2026 was, on average, unconcentrated by FERC HHI standards. The average HHI was 783 with a minimum of 569 and a maximum of 1045. The baseload segment of the supply curve was unconcentrated. The intermediate segment of the supply curve was moderately concentrated. The peaking segment of the supply curve was highly concentrated. The fact that the average HHI is in the unconcentrated range does not mean that the aggregate market was competitive in all hours. As demonstrated for the day-ahead market, it is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. It is possible to have an exercise of market power even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power.
- The local market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to the highly concentrated ownership of supply in local markets created by


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transmission constraints and local reliability issues. The results of the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test, used to test local market structure, indicate the existence of market power in local markets created by transmission constraints. The local market performance is competitive as a result of the application of the TPS test. Transmission constraints create the potential for the exercise of local market power. The goal of PJM's application of the three pivotal supplier test is to identify local market power and offer cap to competitive offers, correcting for structural issues created by local transmission constraints. There are, however, identified issues with the definition of cost-based offers and the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that need to be addressed because unit owners can exercise market power even when they fail the TPS test.

- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the analysis of markup shows that marginal units generally make offers at, or close to, their marginal costs in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although the behavior of some participants both routinely and during periods of high demand represents noncompetitive economic withholding. The ownership of marginal units is concentrated. The markups of pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market and of many pivotal suppliers in local markets remain unmitigated due to the lack of aggregate market power mitigation and the flawed implementation of offer caps for resources that fail the TPS test. The markups of those participants affected LMP.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because market results in the energy market reflect the outcome of a competitive market, as PJM prices are set, on average, by marginal units operating at, or close to, their marginal costs in both day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although high markups for some marginal units did affect prices.
- Market design was evaluated as effective because the analysis shows that the PJM energy market resulted in competitive market outcomes. In general, PJM's energy market design provides incentives for competitive behavior and results in competitive outcomes. In local markets, where market power is an issue, the market design identifies market power and causes the market to provide competitive market outcomes in most cases although issues with the implementation of market power mitigation and development of cost-based offers remain. The role of UTCs in the day-ahead energy market continues to be an issue. Market design implementation issues, including inaccuracies in modeling of the transmission system and of generator capabilities as well as inefficiencies in price formation, undermine market efficiency in the energy market. The implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, undermined market efficiency by setting inefficient higher prices that are inconsistent with the dispatch signals. In the first six months of 2026, the estimated impact of fast start pricing, based on the difference between the real-time PLMP and DLMP times real-time load, was $2.2 billion.[14] The expanding use of transmission constraint penalty factors by PJM is inconsistent with competitive markets and added $6.0 billion to the cost of energy in the first six months of 2026.
- PJM markets are designed to promote competitive outcomes derived from the interaction of supply and demand in each of the PJM markets. Market design itself is the primary means of achieving and promoting competitive outcomes in PJM markets. One of the MMU's core functions is to identify actual or potential market design flaws.[15] The approach to market power mitigation in PJM has focused on market designs that promote competition (a structural basis for competitive outcomes) and on mitigating market power in instances where the market structure is not competitive and thus where market design alone cannot mitigate market power. FERC relies on effective market power mitigation when it approves market sellers to participate in the PJM market at market based rates.[16] In the PJM energy market, market power mitigation occurs primarily in the case of local market power. When a transmission constraint creates the potential for local market power, PJM applies a structural test to determine if the local market is competitive, applies a behavioral test to determine if generator offers exceed competitive levels and applies a market performance test to determine if such generator offers would affect the market price.[17]

14 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Market Monitor Report," (July 28, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_MC_Market_Monitor_Report_20260728.pdf> at 39.

15 OATT Attachment M (PJM Market Monitoring Plan).

16 See *Refinements to Horizontal Market Power Analysis for Sellers in Certain Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Markets*, Order No. 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040 (2019); *order on reh'g*, Order No. 861-A; 170 FERC ¶ 61,106 (2020).

17 The market performance test means that offer capping is not applied if the offer does not exceed the competitive level and therefore market power would not affect market performance.

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There are, however, identified issues with the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that can result in the exercise of local market power even when market power mitigation rules are applied. These issues need to be addressed, but, so far, PJM and FERC have failed to address them.[18] [19] [20] Some units with market power have positive markups and some have inflexible parameters, which means that the cost-based offer was not used and that the process for offer capping units that fail the TPS test does not consistently result in competitive market outcomes in the presence of market power. There are issues related to the definition of gas costs includable in energy offers that need to be addressed. There are issues related to the level of maintenance expense includable in energy offers that need to be addressed. There are currently no market power mitigation rules in place that limit the ability to exercise market power when aggregate market conditions are tight and there are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market. Aggregate market power needs to be addressed. Market design must reflect appropriate incentives for competitive behavior, the application of local market power mitigation needs to be fixed, the definition of a competitive offer needs to be fixed, and aggregate market power mitigation rules need to be developed. The importance of these issues is amplified by the rules permitting cost-based offers in excess of $1,000 per MWh.

18 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
19 185 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2023).
20 189 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2024).

## Capacity Market Conclusion

The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed market design, market structure, participant conduct and market performance in the PJM Capacity Market, including supply, demand, concentration ratios, pivotal suppliers, volumes, prices, outage rates and reliability.[21] The conclusions for 2025 and the first six months of 2026 are a result of the MMU's evaluation of the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 Base Residual Auctions.[22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33]

### Table 1-3 The capacity market results were not competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Not Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Not Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Mixed** |

- The aggregate market structure was evaluated as not competitive. For almost all auctions held from 2007 to the present, the PJM capacity market failed the three pivotal supplier test (TPS), which is conducted

21 The values stated in this report for the RTO and LDAs refer to the aggregate level including all nested LDAs unless otherwise specified. For example, RTO values include the entire PJM market and all LDAs. Rest of RTO values are RTO values net of nested LDA values.
22 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," (September 20, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20240920.pdf>.
23 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part B," (October 15, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20241015.pdf>.
24 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part C," (October 15, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_C_20241106.pdf>.
25 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part D," (December 6, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_D_20241206.pdf>.
26 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part E," (January 31, 2025). <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_E_20250131.pdf>.
27 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part F," (February 4, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_F_20250204.pdf>.
28 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part G Revised," (June 3, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_G_20250603_Revised.pdf>.
29 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part H," (July 31, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_H_20250731.pdf>.
30 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," (October 1, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20251001.pdf>.
31 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part B," (March 3, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20260303.pdf>.
32 See "Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A," (January 5, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf>.
33 See "Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part B," (July 9, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20260709.pdf>.


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at the time of the auction.[34] Structural market power is endemic to the capacity market.

- The local market structure was evaluated as not competitive. For almost every auction held, all LDAs have failed the TPS test, which is conducted at the time of the auction.[35]
- Participant behavior was evaluated as not competitive in the 2026/2027 and the 2027/2028 BRA. Effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the market seller offer cap definition was modified to include unit specific standalone Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk (CPQR) and segmented unit specific offer caps.[36] The offers in the 2026/2027 BRA included those based on standalone CPQR offer caps. The offers in the 2027/2028 BRA did not include those based on standalone CPQR offer caps. Market power mitigation measures were applied when the capacity market seller failed the market power test for the auction, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, would increase the market clearing price.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive based on the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Base Residual Auctions as a result of the flaws in the Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) design including the failure to correctly define the reliability contribution of thermal resources in the winter, and the failure to recognize and address the role of large data center loads is a direct cause of higher prices and will continue to result in even higher prices unless the related issues are addressed.
- Market design was evaluated as mixed because while there are many positive features of the capacity market design and some of the MMU's recommendations were implemented in the 2026/2027 BRA, there are several features of the RPM design which still threaten competitive outcomes. These include the lack of a queue for the addition of large new data center loads, details of PJM's ELCC implementation, the definition of market seller offer caps, the failure to apply the RPM must offer requirement to demand resources, the inclusion of performance assessment interval (PAI) penalties, the use of gross CONE as the maximum price on the VRR curve, the definition of DR which permits inferior products to substitute for capacity, the replacement capacity issue, the definition of unit offer parameters, and the inclusion of imports which are not substitutes for internal capacity resources.[37]

34 In the 2008/2009 RPM Third Incremental Auction, 18 participants in the RTO market passed the TPS test. In the 2018/2019 RPM Second Incremental Auction, 35 participants in the RTO market passed the test. In the 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction, 36 participants in the RTO passed the TPS test.

35 In the 2012/2013 RPM Base Residual Auction, six participants included in the incremental supply of EMAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction, seven participants in the incremental supply in MAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2021/2022 RPM First Incremental Auction, two participants in the incremental supply in EMAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2021/2022 RPM Second Incremental Auction, two participants in the incremental supply in EMAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction, eight participants in MAAC passed the TPS test.

36 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (2025).

## Synchronized Reserve Market Conclusion

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market for the first six months of 2026.

**Table 1-4 The synchronized reserve market results were not competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Regional Markets | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Flawed** |

- The synchronized reserve market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to supplier concentration. The RTO Reserve Zone was unconcentrated in the day-ahead market and unconcentrated in the real-time market. The MAD Reserve Subzone was moderately concentrated in the day-ahead market and highly concentrated in the real-time market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the market rules require all available reserves to offer at cost-based offers.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive because the interaction of participant behavior with the market design does not result in competitive prices as a result of PJM's changes to the operating reserve demand curve (ORDC). In an attempt to counter poor unit specific synchronized reserve performance, PJM unilaterally and inappropriately extended the first step of the ORDC for synchronized reserve, known as the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, in May 2023, raising prices for synchronized reserves, nonsynchronized reserves and energy.

37 While PJM filed for and FERC accepted the inclusion of RMR resources Brandon Shores and Wagner plants in the 2026/2027 through 2028/2029 BRAs, that does not require that RMR resources be included in capacity market auction clearing in future auctions for these or other RMR resources. See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-682-001 (April 29, 2025). See also 193 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2025).

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- Market design was evaluated as flawed based on PJM's modifications to the ORDC. PJM previously adopted reforms, including several based on MMU recommendations, removing both physical and economic withholding from the market.
- Significant communications technology issues when calling resources during synchronized reserve events have resulted in slow response from resources. On December 17, 2024, PJM implemented an electronic deployment of reserves via an augmented dispatch signal, but PJM does not require that resources be able to receive this signal.

## Nonsynchronized Reserve Market Conclusion

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Nonsynchronized Reserve Market for the first six months of 2026.

**Table 1-5 The nonsynchronized reserve market results were not competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Regional Markets | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Flawed** |

- The nonsynchronized reserve market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to supplier concentration for primary reserve. The RTO Reserve Zone was moderately concentrated in the day-ahead market and moderately concentrated in the real-time market. The MAD Reserve Subzone was highly concentrated in the day-ahead market and highly concentrated in the real-time market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because all available reserves are included by the PJM markets software, so withholding is not possible.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive because the interaction of participant behavior with the market design does not result in competitive prices as a result of PJM's changes to the operating reserve demand curve (ORDC). In an attempt to counter poor unit specific synchronized reserve performance, PJM unilaterally and inappropriately extended the first step of the ORDC for synchronized reserve, known as the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, in May 2023. Because the first step of the ORDC for primary reserve, known as the primary reserve reliability requirement, is based on the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, the primary reserve reliability requirement was consequently also extended, raising prices for synchronized reserves, nonsynchronized reserves, and energy.
- Market design was evaluated as flawed based on PJM's modifications to the first step of the ORDC.

## Secondary Reserve Market Conclusion

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Secondary Reserve Market for the first six months of 2026.

**Table 1-6 The secondary reserve market results were competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Competitive** | **Effective** |

- The secondary reserve market structure was evaluated as competitive due to the lack of supplier concentration for 30-minute reserve. The RTO Reserve Zone was unconcentrated in the day-ahead market and unconcentrated in the real-time market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because all available reserves are included by the PJM software, so withholding is not possible.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because the combination of a competitive market structure and competitive participation resulted in competitive market outcomes.
- The market design was evaluated as effective because the market rules ensure competitive market offers and require repayment of offline cleared secondary reserves that are not available when called on to provide energy in 30 minutes.


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## Regulation Market Conclusion

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, conduct and performance for the PJM Regulation Market for the first six months of 2026.

### Table 1-7 The regulation market results were not competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Flawed** |

- The regulation market structure was evaluated as not competitive because the PJM Regulation Market failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test in 91.8 percent of half hour market intervals in the first six months of 2026.
- Participant behavior in the PJM Regulation Market was evaluated as competitive in the first six months of 2026 because market power mitigation requires competitive offers when the three pivotal supplier test is failed, although the inclusion of a positive margin is not consistent with competitive offers.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive, because all units are not paid the same price on an equivalent MW basis.
- Market design was evaluated as flawed. The post-October 1, 2025, market results include an improved approach to opportunity cost but include an incorrect definition of opportunity cost that has significant effects on prices. The definition of performance is also incorrect. The post-October 1, 2025, design is a significant improvement over the pre-October 1, 2025, design although there are significant issues in the new design.

## FTR Auction Market Conclusion

The *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June* focuses on the 2025/2026 planning period as well as the 2025/2028 Long Term auction, the 2025/2026 Annual FTR auction and the 2025/2026 ARR allocation, specifically covering June 1, 2025, through June 30, 2026. The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of market structure, participant conduct and market performance, including market size, concentration, offer behavior, and price. The MMU concludes that the PJM FTR auction market results were partially competitive in the first six months of 2026. [38]

### Table 1-8 The FTR auction markets results were partially competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Partially Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Partially Competitive** | **Flawed** |

- Market structure was evaluated as competitive. The ownership of FTR obligations is unconcentrated for the individual years of the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction and each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for prevailing flow FTRs. The ownership of FTR obligations is unconcentrated or moderately concentrated for each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for counter flow FTRs. The ownership of FTR options is moderately or highly concentrated for every Monthly FTR Auction period and unconcentrated for the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. Ownership of current FTRs is disproportionately (89.2 percent) by financial participants. The ownership of ARRs is unconcentrated.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as partially competitive because ARR holders who are the sellers of FTRs have no option to set an acceptable sale price and are not permitted to participate in the market clearing in any way and are not assured they will receive 100 percent of auction revenues.
- Market performance was evaluated as partially competitive because of the significant and persistent flaws in the market design. Sellers, the ARR holders, cannot set a sale price. Buyers can reclaim some of their purchase price after the market clears if the product does not meet a profitability target. The market resulted in a substantial shortfall in congestion payments to load and significant and unsupportable disparities among

38 The MMU identified missing and erroneous distribution factors and shadow prices, primarily within the pricing run. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors requires accurate distribution factors and shadow prices. Where available, MMU used distribution factors from the dispatch run. MMU also calculated missing shadow prices for the relevant transmission constraints when feasible. This approach reduced the impact of the errors to 0.2 percent of all FTR target allocations within the affected month. Figures and Tables that are affected by this error are indicated with a footnote.

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zones in the share of congestion returned to load. FTR purchases by financial entities remain persistently profitable in part as a result of the flaws in the market design.

- Market design was evaluated as flawed because there are significant, fundamental and persistent flaws in the basic ARR/FTR design. The FTR auction market is not actually a market because the sellers have no independent role in the process. ARR holders cannot determine the price at which they are willing to sell rights to congestion revenue. Buyers have the ability to reclaim some of the price paid for FTRs after the market clears and, as a result, sellers are not assured they will receive 100 percent of auction revenues. The market design is not an efficient or effective way to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. The product sold to FTR buyers is incorrectly defined as target allocations rather than a share of congestion revenue. ARR holders' rights to congestion revenues are not correctly defined because the contract path based assignment of congestion rights is inadequate and incorrect. The ongoing PJM subjective intervention in the FTR market that affects market fundamentals is also an issue and a symptom of the fundamental flaws in the design. The product, the quantity of the product and the price of the product are all incorrectly defined.
- The fact that load is not able to define its willingness to sell FTRs or to set the prices at which it is willing to sell FTRs and the fact that load is required to return some of the cleared auction revenue to FTR buyers when FTR profits are deemed to be not adequate, means that the FTR design does not actually function as a market and is evidence of basic flaws in the market design.

## Role of MMU

FERC assigns three core functions to MMUs: reporting, monitoring and market design.[39] These functions are interrelated and overlap. The PJM Market Monitoring Plan establishes these functions, providing that the MMU is responsible for monitoring: compliance with the PJM Market Rules; actual or potential design flaws in the PJM Market Rules; structural problems in the PJM Markets that may inhibit a robust and competitive market; the actual or potential exercise of market power or violation of the market rules by a Market Participant; PJM's implementation of the PJM Market Rules or operation of the PJM Markets; and such matters as are necessary to prepare reports.[40]

### Reporting

The MMU performs its reporting function primarily by issuing and filing annual and quarterly state of the market reports; regular reports on market issues, such as RPM auction reports; reports responding to requests from regulators and other authorities; and ad hoc reports on specific topics. The state of the market reports provide a comprehensive analysis of market structure, participant conduct and market performance for the PJM markets. State of the market reports and other reports are intended to inform PJM, the PJM Board, FERC, other regulators, other authorities, market participants, stakeholders and the general public about how well PJM markets achieve the competitive outcomes necessary to realize the goals of regulation through competition, and how the markets can be improved.

The MMU presents reports directly to PJM stakeholders, PJM staff, FERC staff, state commission staff, state commissions, other regulatory agencies and the general public. Report presentations provide an opportunity for interested parties to ask questions, discuss issues, and provide feedback to the MMU.

### Monitoring

To perform its monitoring function, the MMU screens and monitors the conduct of Market Participants under the MMU's broad purview to monitor, investigate, evaluate and report on the PJM Markets.[41] The MMU has direct, confidential access to FERC.[42] The MMU may also refer matters to the attention of state commissions.[43]

The MMU monitors market behavior for violations of FERC Market Rules and PJM Market Rules, including the actual or potential exercise of market

39 18 CFR § 35.28(g)(3)(ii); see also *Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets*, Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶31,281 (2008) ("Order No. 719"), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 719-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶31,292 (2009), *reh'g denied*, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009).

40 OATT Attachment M § IV; 18 CFR § 1c.2.
41 OATT Attachment M § IV.
42 OATT Attachment M § IV.K.3.
43 OATT Attachment M § IV.H.


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power.[44] The MMU will investigate and refer "Market Violations," which refer to any of "a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies..."[45] [46] [47] The MMU also monitors PJM for compliance with the rules, in addition to market participants.[48]

An important component of the monitoring function is the review of inputs to mitigation. The actual or potential exercise of market power is addressed in part through *ex ante* mitigation rules incorporated in PJM's market clearing software for the energy market, the capacity market and the regulation market. If a market participant fails the TPS test in any of these markets its offer is set to the lower of its price-based or cost-based offer. This prevents the exercise of market power and ensures competitive pricing, provided that the cost-based offer accurately reflects short run marginal cost.

If cost-based offers do not accurately reflect short run marginal cost, the market power mitigation process does not ensure competitive pricing in PJM markets. The MMU evaluates the fuel cost policy for every unit as well as the other inputs to cost-based offers. PJM Manual 15 does not clearly or accurately describe the short run marginal cost of generation. Manual 15 should be replaced with a straightforward description of the components of cost offers based on short run marginal costs and the correct calculation of cost offers. The MMU evaluates every offer cap in each capacity market (RPM) auction using data submitted to the MMU through web-based data input systems developed by the MMU.[49]

The MMU also reviews operational parameter limits included with unit offers, evaluates compliance with the requirement to offer into the energy and capacity markets, evaluates the economic basis for unit retirement requests and evaluates and compares offers in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets.[50] [51] [52] [53]

The MMU reviews offers and inputs in order to evaluate whether those offers raise market power concerns. Market participants, not the MMU, determine and take responsibility for offers that they submit and the market conduct that those offers represent. If the MMU has a concern about an offer, the MMU may raise that concern with FERC or other regulatory authorities. FERC and other regulators have enforcement and regulatory authority that they may exercise with respect to offers submitted by market participants. PJM also reviews offers, but it does so in order to determine whether offers comply with the PJM tariff and manuals. PJM, in its role as the market operator, may reject an offer that fails to comply with the market rules. The respective reviews performed by the MMU and PJM are separate and non-sequential.

The PJM markets monitored by the MMU include market related procurement processes conducted by PJM, such as for Black Start resources included in the PJM system restoration plan.[54] [55]

The MMU also monitors transmission planning, interconnections and rules for vertical market power issues, and with the introduction of competitive transmission development policy in Order No. 1000, horizontal market power issues.[56]

44 OATT § I.1 ("FERC Market Rules" mean the market behavior rules and the prohibition against electric energy market manipulation codified by the Commission in its Rules and Regulations at 18 CFR §§ 1c.2 and 35.37, respectively; the Commission-approved PJM Market Rules and any related proscriptions or any successor rules that the Commission from time to time may issue, approve or otherwise establish... "PJM Market Rules" mean the rules, standards, procedures, and practices of the PJM Markets set forth in the PJM Tariff, the PJM Operating Agreement, the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement, the PJM Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, the PJM Manuals, the PJM Regional Practices Document, the PJM-Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator Joint Operating Agreement or any other document setting forth market rules.")

45 FERC defines manipulation as engaging "in any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity." 18 CFR § 1c.2(a)(3). Manipulation may involve behavior that is consistent with the letter of the rules, but violates their spirit. An example is market behavior that is economically meaningless, such as equal and opposite transactions, which may entitle the transacting party to a benefit associated with volume. Unlike market power or rule violations, manipulation must be intentional. The MMU must build its case, including an inference of intent, on the basis of market data.

46 OATT § I.1.

47 The MMU has no prosecutorial or enforcement authority. The MMU notifies FERC when it identifies a significant market problem or market violation. OATT Attachment M § IV.I.1. If the problem or violation involves a market participant, the MMU discusses the matter with the participant(s) involved and analyzes relevant market data. If that investigation produces sufficient credible evidence of a violation, the MMU prepares a formal referral and thereafter undertakes additional investigation of the specific matter only at the direction of FERC staff. *Id.* If the problem involves an existing or proposed law, rule or practice that exposes PJM markets to the risk that market power or market manipulation could compromise the integrity of the markets, the MMU explains the issue, as appropriate, to FERC, state regulators, stakeholders or other authorities. The MMU may also initiate, participate as a party or provide information or testimony in regulatory or other proceedings.

48 OATT Attachment M § IV.C.

49 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.E.

50 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.B.

51 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II.C.

52 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § IV.

53 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § IV.

54 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § II(p).

55 OATT Attachment M–Appendix § III.

56 OA Schedule 6 § 1.5.

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## Market Design

In order to perform its role in PJM market design, the MMU evaluates existing and proposed PJM Market Rules and the design of the PJM Markets.[57] The MMU initiates and proposes changes to the design of such markets or the PJM Market Rules in stakeholder or regulatory proceedings.[58] In support of this function, the MMU engages in discussions with stakeholders, State Commissions, PJM Management, and the PJM Board; participates in PJM stakeholder meetings or working groups regarding market design matters; publishes proposals, reports or studies on such market design issues; and makes filings with the Commission on market design, market rules and market rule implementation issues, including complaints or petitions.[59] The MMU also recommends changes to the PJM Market Rules to the staff of the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation, State Commissions, and the PJM Board.[60] The MMU may provide in its annual, quarterly and other reports "recommendations regarding any matter within its purview."[61]

# New Recommendations

Consistent with its core function to "[e]valuate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes," the MMU recommends specific enhancements to existing market rules and implementation of new rules that are required for competitive results in PJM markets and for continued improvements in the functioning of PJM markets. [62]

In this *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, the MMU includes five new recommendations made for the second quarter of 2026.

## New Recommendation from Section 4, Energy Uplift

- The MMU recommends that PJM improve its advanced scheduling and commitment process in order to implement a transparent process in which units are scheduled and committed economically based on the known constraints prior to the day-ahead market. The multiday advance commitment process needs to address the communication process, the offers used for commitment evaluation, the operating parameters used for commitment evaluation, the financial consequences of commitment and the appropriate uplift rules. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## New Recommendation from Section 5, Capacity Market

- The MMU recommends that all forecast data center load be excluded from capacity market auctions if it is not on line on June 1, 2026. Only organic load and existing data center load as of June 1, 2026, would be included in the capacity market auctions. PJM would operate a reliability auction for forecast data center load that has not signed or committed to sign a bilateral contract for capacity.[63] (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## New Recommendation from Section 6, Demand Response

- The MMU recommends that CSPs be required to provide metered data to PJM within 24 hours following the dispatch of economic or emergency DR. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

57 OATT Attachment M § IV.D.
58 *Id.*
59 *Id.*; see also, e.g., 171 FERC ¶ 61,039; 167 FERC ¶ 61,084 at PP 70–76, *reh'g denied*, 168 FERC ¶ 61,141.
60 *Id.*
61 OATT Attachment M § VI.A.
62 18 CFR § 35.28(g)(3)(ii)(A); see also OATT Attachment M § IV.D.

63 The details of the MMU's proposed design are included in two executive summaries: See "IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf>. See also "IMM Curtailable Load Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Connect%20and%20Manage%20proposal%20-%20V2%202026.06.19.pdf>.


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## New Recommendation from Section 10, Ancillary Services

- The MMU recommends that, in cases where a unit is already committed for regulation, that the actual residual ramp (based on the current market interval's regulation assignment) be used when calculating the potential regulation set point and the LOC for purposes of clearing resources. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.).

## New Recommendation from Section 12, Generation and Transmission Planning

- The MMU recommends that PJM include only existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied, and queued generation with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, that has a high probability of completion, in the RTEP models. If a future study cannot achieve power balance with such generation, then the addition of load should be capped at the level that can be supplied by actual generation and not allowed to connect until expected generation can support it. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

# Total Cost of Wholesale Power

The total cost of wholesale power is the average total cost per MWh of wholesale electricity in PJM markets.[64] The costs of each component and subcomponent may vary by location and time period. The total costs are the sum of the total charges for the individual billing line items in each category divided by real time load, even when a specific category is not charged on that basis. The total cost of wholesale power and the components of that cost are presented for informational purposes and should not be used to calculate the costs of any specific market activity in PJM. The total cost includes the cost of energy, capacity, transmission service, ancillary services, and administrative fees billed through PJM systems. Table 1-9 shows the total cost, by component, for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

The total costs shown in Table 1-9 equal the total cost per MWh, by category, multiplied by the total real time load.[65] The total costs are different from the total billing values that PJM reports as shown in Figure 1-2. The total cost is the total costs to load, whereas PJM's reported total billing values are the total dollars (charges) that pass through the PJM settlement process.

The total cost of wholesale power increased in the first six months of 2026 from the first six months of 2025. Energy costs (63.5 percent), capacity costs (17.1 percent) and transmission costs (17.4 percent) are the three largest components of the total cost of wholesale power, comprising 98.0 percent of the total cost per MWh in the first six months of 2026 (Table 1-9). The total cost of energy per MWh increased by $23.47 from $49.21 in the first six months of 2025 to $72.68 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 47.7 percent. The total cost of capacity per MWh increased by $13.23 from $6.39 in the first six months of 2025 to $19.61 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 207.1 percent. The total cost of transmission per MWh increased by $1.06 from $18.82 in the first six months of 2025 to $19.88 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 5.6 percent. The total cost per MWh of wholesale power increased by $38.34 from $76.16 in the first six months of 2025 to $114.50 in the first six months of 2026, an increase of 50.3 percent.

The inclusion of data center load in the capacity market resulted in an increase in capacity costs and a corresponding increase in the total cost of wholesale power in PJM. In the first six months of 2026, the total cost per MWh of wholesale power increased by $11.11 (9.7 percent) from $103.40 to $114.50 as a result of the inclusion of data center load in the PJM Capacity Market. This cost increase does not include the impact on energy or transmission costs.

64 Accounting load is used in the calculation of total price because accounting load is the load customers pay for in PJM settlements. The use of accounting load with losses before June 1, 2007 and without losses after June 1, 2007, is consistent with PJM's calculation of LMP. Before June 1, 2007, transmission losses were included in accounting load. After June 1, 2007, transmission losses were excluded from accounting load and losses were addressed through the inclusion of marginal loss pricing in LMP.

65 For more information on the calculation of the total cost of wholesale power, see Monitoring Analytics, "*Total Cost of Wholesale Power Calculation Documentation,*" <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/data/docs/IMM_Total_Price_Calculation_Documentation_20241011.pdf>.

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## Table 1-9 Total cost per MWh by category: January through June, 2025 and 2026[66] [67] [68]

| Category | 2025 (Jan-Jun) $/MWh | 2025 (Jan-Jun) ($ Millions) | 2025 (Jan-Jun) Percent of Total | 2026 (Jan-Jun) $/MWh | 2026 (Jan-Jun) ($ Millions) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) Percent of Total | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | $49.21 | $19,431 | 64.6% | $72.68 | $29,415 | 63.5% | 47.7% |
| Day Ahead Energy | $49.09 | $19,382 | 64.5% | $73.65 | $29,808 | 64.3% | 50.0% |
| Balancing Energy | $1.17 | $461 | 1.5% | $2.11 | $854 | 1.8% | 80.6% |
| ARR Credits | ($1.44) | ($568) | (1.9%) | ($3.13) | ($1,268) | (2.7%) | 117.7% |
| Self Scheduled FTR Credits | ($1.26) | ($499) | (1.7%) | ($2.85) | ($1,153) | (2.5%) | 125.6% |
| Balancing Congestion | $0.76 | $302 | 1.0% | $0.96 | $388 | 0.8% | 25.5% |
| Emergency Energy | $0.01 | $6 | 0.0% | $0.05 | $20 | 0.0% | 244.8% |
| Inadvertent Energy | ($0.01) | ($6) | (0.0%) | $0.02 | $10 | 0.0% | (267.7%) |
| Load Response - Energy | $0.04 | $15 | 0.0% | $0.05 | $21 | 0.0% | 35.3% |
| Emergency Load Response | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.01 | $2 | 0.0% | 570.1% |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | $1.44 | $568 | 1.9% | $2.80 | $1,133 | 2.4% | 94.5% |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation | ($0.70) | ($278) | (0.9%) | ($1.28) | ($517) | (1.1%) | 81.6% |
| Market to Market Payments | $0.12 | $47 | 0.2% | $0.29 | $118 | 0.3% | 144.3% |
| Capacity | $6.39 | $2,522 | 8.4% | $19.61 | $7,938 | 17.1% | 207.1% |
| Capacity (Capacity Market and FRR) | $6.32 | $2,497 | 8.3% | $19.75 | $7,994 | 17.3% | 212.4% |
| Capacity Part V (RMR) | $0.06 | $25 | 0.1% | ($0.14) | ($57) | (0.1%) | (319.6%) |
| Load Response - Capacity | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission | $18.82 | $7,432 | 24.7% | $19.88 | $8,048 | 17.4% | 5.6% |
| Transmission Service Charges | $15.94 | $6,294 | 20.9% | $17.18 | $6,955 | 15.0% | 7.8% |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | $2.79 | $1,101 | 3.7% | $2.61 | $1,056 | 2.3% | (6.4%) |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | $0.09 | $37 | 0.1% | $0.09 | $37 | 0.1% | (4.0%) |
| Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA) | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission Facility Charges | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Ancillary | $1.06 | $419 | 1.4% | $1.63 | $660 | 1.4% | 53.7% |
| Reactive | $0.46 | $182 | 0.6% | $0.36 | $144 | 0.3% | (22.9%) |
| Regulation | $0.32 | $126 | 0.4% | $1.02 | $412 | 0.9% | 218.0% |
| Black Start | $0.07 | $29 | 0.1% | $0.06 | $22 | 0.0% | (24.4%) |
| Synchronized Reserves | $0.19 | $74 | 0.2% | $0.17 | $71 | 0.2% | (6.3%) |
| Secondary Reserves | $0.00 | $2 | 0.0% | $0.02 | $7 | 0.0% | 236.1% |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | $0.02 | $6 | 0.0% | $0.01 | $5 | 0.0% | (22.1%) |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Administration | $0.67 | $266 | 0.9% | $0.69 | $280 | 0.6% | 2.4% |
| PJM Administrative Fees | $0.63 | $248 | 0.8% | $0.64 | $259 | 0.6% | 2.0% |
| NERC/RFC | $0.04 | $17 | 0.1% | $0.05 | $18 | 0.0% | 6.2% |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Other | $0.00 | $2 | 0.0% | $0.01 | $2 | 0.0% | 13.6% |
| Total Cost ($/MWh) | $76.16 | $30,071 | 100.0% | $114.50 | $46,340 | 100.0% | 50.3% |
| Total Day Ahead Load (GWh) | 388,687 | | | 397,264 | | | 2.2% |
| Total Balancing Load (GWh) | (6,155) | | | (7,446) | | | 21.0% |
| Total Real Time Load (GWh) | 394,842 | | | 404,710 | | | 2.5% |
| Total Cost ($ Billions) | $30.07 | | | $46.34 | | | 54.1% |

66 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.

67 The total cost in this table does not match the PJM reported total billing due to differences in calculation methods. The total prices in this table are load-weighted average system prices per MWh by category, even if each category is not charged on a per MWh basis. The total cost is the total costs to load, whereas PJM's reported total billing are the total dollars (charges) that pass through the PJM settlement process.

68 The MMU publishes monthly detail of the total cost of wholesale power. See <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/data/pjm_cost.shtml>.



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Figure 1-3 shows the total cost of wholesale power by category in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Figure 1-3 Total cost per MWh by category: January through June, 2025 and 2026





Figure 1-4 shows the contributions of the energy, capacity and transmission service components of the total cost of wholesale power for each quarter since 2001. In the third quarter of 2019, the cost of transmission per MWh of wholesale power exceeded the cost of capacity for the first time. In the third quarter of 2025, significant increases in capacity market prices resulted in the cost of capacity per MWh of wholesale power increasing above the cost of transmission. In the first quarter of 2026, total transmission costs per MWh again exceeded the cost of capacity per MWh. In the second quarter of 2026, the total cost of capacity per MWh of wholesale power ($21.56) exceeded the cost of transmission ($21.08).

### Figure 1-4 Top three components of quarterly total cost ($/MWh): January 2001 through June 2026[69]





Table 1-11 shows the total cost, by component of the total wholesale power cost per MWh, for calendar years 2001 through 2025.

69 Note: The totals presented in this figure include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.

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## Table 1-10 Total cost per MWh by category: 2001 through 2025[70]

| Category | 2001 $/ MWh | 2002 $/ MWh | 2003 $/ MWh | 2004 $/ MWh | 2005 $/ MWh | 2006 $/ MWh | 2007 $/ MWh | 2008 $/ MWh | 2009 $/ MWh | 2010 $/ MWh | 2011 $/ MWh | 2012 $/ MWh | 2013 $/ MWh | 2014 $/ MWh | 2015 $/ MWh | 2016 $/ MWh | 2017 $/ MWh | 2018 $/ MWh | 2019 $/ MWh | 2020 $/ MWh | 2021 $/ MWh | 2022 $/ MWh | 2023 $/ MWh | 2024 $/ MWh | 2025 $/ MWh |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | $44.41 | $36.91 | $44.97 | $44.95 | $63.89 | $51.15 | $57.76 | $66.84 | $35.47 | $44.36 | $44.06 | $34.43 | $38.94 | $93.20 | $35.96 | $28.74 | $30.29 | $36.84 | $25.99 | $20.26 | $38.44 | $74.42 | $30.40 | $32.59 | $48.94 |
| Day Ahead Energy | $39.66 | $35.34 | $41.72 | $40.75 | $60.21 | $50.02 | $57.04 | $68.59 | $37.78 | $45.19 | $44.29 | $33.67 | $37.88 | $51.81 | $36.52 | $29.48 | $30.92 | $37.57 | $27.15 | $21.09 | $38.65 | $74.25 | $31.58 | $33.43 | $50.16 |
| Balancing Energy | $4.46 | $2.24 | $3.49 | $4.06 | $3.85 | $2.50 | $3.05 | $3.48 | $1.80 | $3.56 | $2.06 | $1.55 | $1.83 | $42.24 | $0.81 | $0.53 | $0.34 | $0.74 | $0.17 | $0.36 | $0.80 | $2.04 | $0.45 | $0.57 | $1.02 |
| ARR Credits | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.27) | ($0.40) | ($0.39) | ($0.59) | ($0.62) | ($0.72) | ($0.89) | ($0.52) | ($0.64) | ($0.55) | ($0.45) | ($0.54) | ($0.73) | ($0.82) | ($0.68) | ($0.70) | ($0.87) | ($0.69) | ($0.56) | ($1.15) | ($1.46) | ($1.24) | ($1.92) |
| Self Scheduled FTR Credits | ($0.93) | ($1.35) | ($0.83) | ($0.32) | ($0.80) | ($1.21) | ($1.58) | ($2.18) | ($0.69) | ($1.26) | ($0.57) | ($0.22) | ($0.23) | ($0.63) | ($0.46) | ($0.29) | ($0.20) | ($0.34) | ($0.14) | ($0.19) | ($0.33) | ($1.11) | ($0.42) | ($0.52) | ($1.33) |
| Balancing Congestion | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.03 | $0.09 | $0.17 | $0.18 | $0.30 | $0.67 | $0.39 | $0.39 | $0.59 |
| Emergency Energy | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 |
| Inadvertent Energy | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | ($0.01) | $0.00 | ($0.02) | $0.04 | $0.01 | ($0.01) | ($0.01) | $0.00 | ($0.01) | $0.01 | $0.01 | ($0.00) | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.03) | $0.01 | $0.01 | ($0.01) |
| Load Response - Energy | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.03 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.03 |
| Emergency Load Response | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.08 | $0.00 | $0.08 |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | $1.26 | $0.72 | $0.89 | $0.95 | $1.07 | $0.47 | $0.65 | $0.64 | $0.48 | $0.80 | $0.78 | $0.74 | $0.55 | $1.11 | $0.38 | $0.17 | $0.14 | $0.23 | $0.11 | $0.12 | $0.23 | $0.36 | $0.21 | $0.34 | $0.94 |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation | ($0.05) | ($0.04) | ($0.05) | ($0.09) | ($0.10) | ($0.07) | ($0.86) | ($3.07) | ($3.06) | ($3.47) | ($2.03) | ($0.86) | ($0.73) | ($0.93) | ($0.63) | ($0.37) | ($0.35) | ($0.88) | ($0.65) | ($0.68) | ($0.70) | ($0.87) | ($0.51) | ($0.45) | ($0.73) |
| Market to Market Payments | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.03 | ($0.00) | $0.02 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.10 | $0.06 | $0.03 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.07 | $0.12 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.23 | $0.07 | $0.05 | $0.11 |
| Capacity | $0.27 | $0.12 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.04 | $0.11 | $3.85 | $8.83 | $12.13 | $14.04 | $12.26 | $7.36 | $7.58 | $10.29 | $12.50 | $11.78 | $12.16 | $13.95 | $12.00 | $9.99 | $11.64 | $8.81 | $4.63 | $3.61 | $13.11 |
| Capacity (Capacity Market and FRR) | $0.27 | $0.12 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $3.80 | $8.79 | $12.12 | $14.01 | $12.12 | $7.27 | $7.52 | $10.25 | $12.50 | $11.78 | $12.12 | $13.90 | $11.98 | $9.99 | $11.64 | $8.74 | $4.53 | $3.56 | $12.94 |
| Capacity Part V (RMR) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.08 | $0.05 | $0.04 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.13 | $0.08 | $0.06 | $0.04 | ($0.00) | ($0.00) | $0.04 | $0.05 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.07 | $0.11 | $0.04 | $0.15 |
| Load Response - Capacity | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.02 |
| Transmission | $3.56 | $3.46 | $3.64 | $3.43 | $3.30 | $3.34 | $3.55 | $3.84 | $4.36 | $4.54 | $5.15 | $5.77 | $6.29 | $7.30 | $8.81 | $9.75 | $10.92 | $10.83 | $11.79 | $13.58 | $14.37 | $15.12 | $16.54 | $17.73 | $18.53 |
| Transmission Service Charges | $3.48 | $3.39 | $3.57 | $3.28 | $2.71 | $3.18 | $3.45 | $3.68 | $4.03 | $4.04 | $4.49 | $4.90 | $5.21 | $5.96 | $7.09 | $7.81 | $8.83 | $8.81 | $9.80 | $11.33 | $12.00 | $12.77 | $14.13 | $15.04 | $15.73 |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.07 | $0.25 | $0.40 | $0.56 | $0.78 | $0.99 | $1.25 | $1.62 | $1.86 | $2.02 | $1.92 | $1.91 | $2.15 | $2.29 | $2.28 | $2.32 | $2.59 | $2.71 |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | $0.08 | $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.10 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.08 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.10 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.08 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.09 |
| Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.05 | $0.50 | $0.07 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.03) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Transmission Facility Charges | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | ($0.01) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Ancillary | $0.75 | $0.63 | $0.91 | $0.91 | $1.19 | $0.92 | $1.00 | $1.15 | $0.78 | $0.90 | $0.90 | $0.84 | $1.24 | $0.99 | $0.91 | $0.71 | $0.76 | $0.79 | $0.71 | $0.72 | $0.86 | $1.07 | $0.88 | $0.91 | $1.10 |
| Reactive | $0.22 | $0.20 | $0.24 | $0.26 | $0.26 | $0.29 | $0.29 | $0.34 | $0.36 | $0.45 | $0.41 | $0.46 | $0.76 | $0.40 | $0.37 | $0.38 | $0.42 | $0.40 | $0.43 | $0.47 | $0.48 | $0.49 | $0.51 | $0.48 | $0.44 |
| Regulation | $0.53 | $0.42 | $0.50 | $0.51 | $0.80 | $0.53 | $0.63 | $0.70 | $0.34 | $0.36 | $0.32 | $0.26 | $0.25 | $0.33 | $0.23 | $0.11 | $0.14 | $0.18 | $0.12 | $0.10 | $0.19 | $0.38 | $0.17 | $0.23 | $0.38 |
| Black Start | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.14 | $0.08 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.08 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.09 | $0.06 |
| Synchronized Reserves | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.15 | $0.13 | $0.11 | $0.08 | $0.06 | $0.08 | $0.05 | $0.07 | $0.09 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.12 | $0.11 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.07 | $0.11 | $0.10 | $0.10 | $0.19 |
| Secondary Reserves | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.02 | ($0.01) | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.10 | $0.07 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Administration | $0.74 | $0.86 | $1.09 | $1.07 | $0.77 | $0.81 | $0.83 | $0.48 | $0.35 | $0.43 | $0.40 | $0.50 | $0.44 | $0.47 | $0.47 | $0.48 | $0.53 | $0.61 | $0.61 | $0.55 | $0.55 | $0.55 | $0.62 | $0.68 | $0.67 |
| PJM Administrative Fees | $0.73 | $0.86 | $1.05 | $0.93 | $0.72 | $0.74 | $0.76 | $0.43 | $0.31 | $0.36 | $0.37 | $0.46 | $0.40 | $0.43 | $0.43 | $0.44 | $0.49 | $0.57 | $0.57 | $0.50 | $0.50 | $0.50 | $0.57 | $0.63 | $0.62 |
| NERC/RFC | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.07 | $0.04 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.05 |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.06 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Other | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.03 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 |
| Total Cost ($/MWh) | $49.73 | $41.98 | $50.69 | $50.44 | $69.19 | $56.32 | $66.98 | $81.14 | $53.10 | $64.26 | $62.76 | $48.90 | $54.49 | $112.24 | $58.65 | $51.46 | $54.66 | $63.02 | $51.10 | $45.10 | $65.87 | $99.96 | $53.07 | $55.51 | $82.35 |
| Total Day Ahead Load (GWh) | 292,717 | 344,235 | 324,653 | 413,294 | 654,505 | 672,501 | 691,547 | 676,030 | 644,485 | 656,928 | 704,581 | 745,165 | 753,865 | 749,927 | 773,842 | 774,730 | 760,624 | 784,553 | 771,055 | 734,641 | 755,824 | 765,499 | 748,619 | 775,838 | 800,515 |
| Total Balancing Load (GWh) | 27,319 | 31,337 | (2,879) | (25,580) | (30,087) | (23,664) | (23,977) | (22,429) | (21,584) | (40,463) | (18,519) | (19,136) | (19,925) | (30,578) | (2,251) | (3,538) | 1,849 | (6,542) | (874) | (8,346) | (11,602) | (13,126) | (6,433) | (8,344) | (10,378) |
| Total Real Time Load (GWh) | 265,398 | 312,899 | 327,533 | 438,874 | 684,592 | 696,165 | 715,524 | 698,459 | 666,069 | 697,391 | 723,101 | 764,300 | 773,790 | 780,505 | 776,093 | 778,269 | 758,775 | 791,094 | 771,929 | 742,987 | 767,425 | 778,624 | 755,053 | 784,182 | 810,894 |
| Total Cost ($ Billions) | $13.20 | $13.14 | $16.60 | $22.14 | $47.37 | $39.21 | $47.93 | $56.67 | $35.37 | $44.81 | $45.38 | $37.37 | $42.17 | $87.60 | $45.52 | $40.05 | $41.47 | $49.86 | $39.45 | $33.51 | $50.55 | $77.83 | $40.07 | $43.53 | $66.78 |

70 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.



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Table 1-11 shows the percent of total cost, by component of the wholesale power cost per MWh, for calendar years 2001 through 2025.

## Table 1-11 Percent of total cost per MWh by category: 2001 through 2025[71]

| Category | Percent of Total Charges 2001 | Percent of Total Charges 2002 | Percent of Total Charges 2003 | Percent of Total Charges 2004 | Percent of Total Charges 2005 | Percent of Total Charges 2006 | Percent of Total Charges 2007 | Percent of Total Charges 2008 | Percent of Total Charges 2009 | Percent of Total Charges 2010 | Percent of Total Charges 2011 | Percent of Total Charges 2012 | Percent of Total Charges 2013 | Percent of Total Charges 2014 | Percent of Total Charges 2015 | Percent of Total Charges 2016 | Percent of Total Charges 2017 | Percent of Total Charges 2018 | Percent of Total Charges 2019 | Percent of Total Charges 2020 | Percent of Total Charges 2021 | Percent of Total Charges 2022 | Percent of Total Charges 2023 | Percent of Total Charges 2024 | Percent of Total Charges 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | 89.3% | 87.9% | 88.7% | 89.1% | 92.3% | 90.8% | 86.2% | 82.4% | 66.8% | 69.0% | 70.2% | 70.4% | 71.5% | 83.0% | 61.3% | 55.8% | 55.4% | 58.5% | 50.8% | 44.9% | 58.4% | 74.4% | 57.3% | 58.7% | 59.4% |
| Day Ahead Energy | 79.8% | 84.2% | 82.3% | 80.8% | 87.0% | 88.8% | 85.2% | 84.5% | 71.1% | 70.3% | 70.6% | 68.9% | 69.5% | 46.2% | 62.3% | 57.3% | 56.6% | 59.6% | 53.1% | 46.8% | 58.7% | 74.3% | 59.5% | 60.2% | 60.9% |
| Balancing Energy | 9.0% | 5.3% | 6.9% | 8.1% | 5.6% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.3% | 3.4% | 5.5% | 3.3% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 37.6% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 1.2% | 0.3% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.2% |
| ARR Credits | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.5%) | (0.8%) | (0.6%) | (1.0%) | (0.9%) | (0.9%) | (1.7%) | (0.8%) | (1.0%) | (1.1%) | (0.8%) | (0.5%) | (1.3%) | (1.6%) | (1.2%) | (1.1%) | (1.7%) | (1.5%) | (0.8%) | (1.2%) | (2.8%) | (2.2%) | (2.3%) |
| Self Scheduled FTR Credits | (1.9%) | (3.2%) | (1.6%) | (0.6%) | (1.2%) | (2.1%) | (2.4%) | (2.7%) | (1.3%) | (2.0%) | (0.9%) | (0.5%) | (0.4%) | (0.6%) | (0.8%) | (0.6%) | (0.4%) | (0.5%) | (0.3%) | (0.4%) | (0.5%) | (1.1%) | (0.8%) | (0.9%) | (1.6%) |
| Balancing Congestion | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| Emergency Energy | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Inadvertent Energy | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | (0.0%) | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | (0.0%) | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| Load Response - Energy | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Emergency Load Response | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | 2.5% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.5% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 1.1% |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation | (0.1%) | (0.1%) | (0.1%) | (0.2%) | (0.1%) | (0.1%) | (1.3%) | (3.8%) | (5.8%) | (5.4%) | (3.2%) | (1.7%) | (1.3%) | (0.8%) | (1.1%) | (0.7%) | (0.6%) | (1.4%) | (1.3%) | (1.5%) | (1.1%) | (0.9%) | (1.0%) | (0.8%) | (0.9%) |
| Market to Market Payments | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Capacity | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 5.8% | 10.9% | 22.8% | 21.8% | 19.5% | 15.1% | 13.9% | 9.2% | 21.3% | 22.9% | 22.2% | 22.1% | 23.5% | 22.1% | 17.7% | 8.8% | 8.7% | 6.5% | 15.9% |
| Capacity (Capacity Market and FRR) | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.7% | 10.8% | 22.8% | 21.8% | 19.3% | 14.9% | 13.8% | 9.1% | 21.3% | 22.9% | 22.2% | 22.1% | 23.4% | 22.1% | 17.7% | 8.7% | 8.5% | 6.4% | 15.7% |
| Capacity Part V (RMR) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% |
| Load Response - Capacity | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission | 7.2% | 8.2% | 7.2% | 6.8% | 4.8% | 5.9% | 5.3% | 4.7% | 8.2% | 7.1% | 8.2% | 11.8% | 11.5% | 6.5% | 15.0% | 18.9% | 20.0% | 17.2% | 23.1% | 30.1% | 21.8% | 15.1% | 31.2% | 31.9% | 22.5% |
| Transmission Service Charges | 7.0% | 8.1% | 7.0% | 6.5% | 3.9% | 5.7% | 5.2% | 4.5% | 7.6% | 6.3% | 7.2% | 10.0% | 9.6% | 5.3% | 12.1% | 15.2% | 16.2% | 14.0% | 19.2% | 25.1% | 18.2% | 12.8% | 26.6% | 27.1% | 19.1% |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 1.1% | 2.8% | 3.6% | 3.7% | 3.1% | 3.7% | 4.8% | 3.5% | 2.3% | 4.4% | 4.7% | 3.3% |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.7% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission Facility Charges | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Ancillary | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.8% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.7% | 2.3% | 0.9% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.3% |
| Reactive | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.5% |
| Regulation | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.5% |
| Black Start | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| Synchronized Reserves | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Secondary Reserves | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Administration | 1.5% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.8% |
| PJM Administrative Fees | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 1.8% | 1.0% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 0.8% |
| NERC/RFC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Other | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Price | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

71 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.

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Table 1-12 shows the inflation adjusted average cost, by component, for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. To calculate the inflation adjusted average costs, the individual components' costs are deflated using the US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (with a base period of January 1998).[72]

## Table 1-12 Inflation adjusted total cost per MWh by category: January through June, 2025 and 2026[73] [74] [75]

| Category | 2025 (Jan-Jun) $/MWh | 2025 (Jan-Jun) ($ Millions) | 2025 (Jan-Jun) Percent of Total | 2026 (Jan-Jun) $/MWh | 2026 (Jan-Jun) ($ Millions) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) Percent of Total | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | $24.86 | $9,817 | 64.3% | $35.75 | $14,468 | 63.1% | 43.8% |
| Day Ahead Energy | $24.79 | $9,790 | 64.1% | $36.20 | $14,652 | 63.9% | 46.0% |
| Balancing Energy | $0.59 | $233 | 1.5% | $1.03 | $418 | 1.8% | 75.1% |
| ARR Credits | ($0.73) | ($286) | (1.9%) | ($1.53) | ($618) | (2.7%) | 110.5% |
| Self Scheduled FTR Credits | ($0.64) | ($251) | (1.6%) | ($1.39) | ($564) | (2.5%) | 119.0% |
| Balancing Congestion | $0.39 | $153 | 1.0% | $0.47 | $191 | 0.8% | 21.9% |
| Emergency Energy | $0.01 | $3 | 0.0% | $0.02 | $10 | 0.0% | 241.4% |
| Inadvertent Energy | ($0.01) | ($3) | (0.0%) | $0.01 | $5 | 0.0% | (264.2%) |
| Load Response - Energy | $0.02 | $8 | 0.0% | $0.03 | $10 | 0.0% | 32.2% |
| Emergency Load Response | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $1 | 0.0% | 546.8% |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | $0.73 | $288 | 1.9% | $1.38 | $560 | 2.4% | 89.6% |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation | ($0.36) | ($140) | (0.9%) | ($0.63) | ($255) | (1.1%) | 77.0% |
| Market to Market Payments | $0.06 | $24 | 0.2% | $0.14 | $58 | 0.3% | 136.6% |
| Capacity | $3.44 | $1,358 | 8.9% | $10.05 | $4,069 | 17.7% | 192.3% |
| Capacity (Capacity Market and FRR) | $3.41 | $1,345 | 8.8% | $10.12 | $4,097 | 17.9% | 197.1% |
| Capacity Part V (RMR) | $0.03 | $13 | 0.1% | ($0.07) | ($29) | (0.1%) | (319.6%) |
| Load Response - Capacity | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission | $9.50 | $3,751 | 24.6% | $9.72 | $3,932 | 17.2% | 2.3% |
| Transmission Service Charges | $8.04 | $3,176 | 20.8% | $8.40 | $3,398 | 14.8% | 4.4% |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | $1.41 | $556 | 3.6% | $1.28 | $516 | 2.3% | (9.3%) |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | $0.05 | $19 | 0.1% | $0.04 | $18 | 0.1% | (6.9%) |
| Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA) | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission Facility Charges | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Ancillary | $0.54 | $211 | 1.4% | $0.80 | $323 | 1.4% | 49.1% |
| Reactive | $0.23 | $92 | 0.6% | $0.17 | $70 | 0.3% | (25.2%) |
| Regulation | $0.16 | $64 | 0.4% | $0.50 | $201 | 0.9% | 208.2% |
| Black Start | $0.04 | $15 | 0.1% | $0.03 | $11 | 0.0% | (26.8%) |
| Synchronized Reserves | $0.09 | $37 | 0.2% | $0.09 | $35 | 0.2% | (8.8%) |
| Secondary Reserves | $0.00 | $1 | 0.0% | $0.01 | $3 | 0.0% | 227.9% |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | $0.01 | $3 | 0.0% | $0.01 | $3 | 0.0% | (24.8%) |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Administration | $0.34 | $134 | 0.9% | $0.34 | $137 | 0.6% | (0.9%) |
| PJM Administrative Fees | $0.32 | $125 | 0.8% | $0.31 | $127 | 0.6% | (1.2%) |
| NERC/RFC | $0.02 | $8 | 0.1% | $0.02 | $9 | 0.0% | 2.9% |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Other | $0.00 | $1 | 0.0% | $0.00 | $1 | 0.0% | 9.9% |
| Total Cost ($/MWh) | $38.68 | $15,272 | 100.0% | $56.65 | $22,928 | 100.0% | 46.5% |
| Total Day Ahead Load (GWh) | 388,687 | | | 397,264 | | | 2.2% |
| Total Balancing Load (GWh) | (6,155) | | | (7,446) | | | 21.0% |
| Total Real Time Load (GWh) | 394,842 | | | 404,710 | | | 2.5% |
| Total Cost ($ Billions) | $15.27 | | | $22.93 | | | 50.1% |

72 US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (base period: January 1998), published by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. <http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems> (July 14, 2026).

73 The totals in the Transmission section of this table include corrections to previously reported totals which did not include a full accounting of Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery costs.

74 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.


75 Note: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics did not publish CPI data for October 2025. October 2025 CPI data was approximated using the geometric mean of September and November 2025 index values. Further information on approximating BLS data for missing data points can be found at: <https://www.bls.gov/cpi/factsheets/approximating-missing-data.htm>.



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Figure 1-5 shows the total price of wholesale power and the inflation adjusted total price of wholesale power for each quarter since 2001.[76]

**Figure 1-5 Quarterly total cost and quarterly inflation adjusted total cost ($/MWh): January 2001 through June 2026[77]**




76 US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (base period: January 1998), published by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. <http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems> (July 14, 2026).

77 Note: The totals presented in this figure include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.

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Table 1-13 shows the inflation adjusted total cost, by component of the total wholesale power cost per MWh, for calendar years 2001 through 2025.[78]

## Table 1-13 Inflation adjusted total cost per MWh by category: 2001 through 2025[79]

| Category | 2001 $/ MWh | 2002 $/ MWh | 2003 $/ MWh | 2004 $/ MWh | 2005 $/ MWh | 2006 $/ MWh | 2007 $/ MWh | 2008 $/ MWh | 2009 $/ MWh | 2010 $/ MWh | 2011 $/ MWh | 2012 $/ MWh | 2013 $/ MWh | 2014 $/ MWh | 2015 $/ MWh | 2016 $/ MWh | 2017 $/ MWh | 2018 $/ MWh | 2019 $/ MWh | 2020 $/ MWh | 2021 $/ MWh | 2022 $/ MWh | 2023 $/ MWh | 2024 $/ MWh | 2025 $/ MWh |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | $40.54 | $33.10 | $39.54 | $38.43 | $52.73 | $40.97 | $45.02 | $50.06 | $26.76 | $32.88 | $31.66 | $24.24 | $27.01 | $63.81 | $24.56 | $19.35 | $19.97 | $23.74 | $16.44 | $12.64 | $22.84 | $41.00 | $16.12 | $16.79 | $22.83 |
| Day Ahead Energy | $36.20 | $31.70 | $36.68 | $34.84 | $49.69 | $40.06 | $44.46 | $51.37 | $28.50 | $33.50 | $31.83 | $23.71 | $26.27 | $35.47 | $24.94 | $19.85 | $20.39 | $24.21 | $17.17 | $13.16 | $22.97 | $40.90 | $16.75 | $17.23 | $23.31 |
| Balancing Energy | $4.07 | $2.01 | $3.07 | $3.47 | $3.18 | $2.00 | $2.37 | $2.61 | $1.36 | $2.64 | $1.48 | $1.09 | $1.27 | $28.93 | $0.55 | $0.36 | $0.23 | $0.47 | $0.11 | $0.22 | $0.48 | $1.12 | $0.24 | $0.29 | $0.48 |
| ARR Credits | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.24) | ($0.34) | ($0.32) | ($0.47) | ($0.49) | ($0.54) | ($0.67) | ($0.39) | ($0.46) | ($0.39) | ($0.31) | ($0.37) | ($0.50) | ($0.55) | ($0.45) | ($0.45) | ($0.55) | ($0.43) | ($0.33) | ($0.63) | ($0.78) | ($0.64) | ($0.86) |
| Self Scheduled FTR Credits | ($0.85) | ($1.21) | ($0.73) | ($0.28) | ($0.66) | ($0.97) | ($1.23) | ($1.63) | ($0.52) | ($0.93) | ($0.41) | ($0.16) | ($0.16) | ($0.43) | ($0.31) | ($0.20) | ($0.13) | ($0.22) | ($0.09) | ($0.12) | ($0.20) | ($0.61) | ($0.22) | ($0.27) | ($0.58) |
| Balancing Congestion | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.06 | $0.11 | $0.11 | $0.18 | $0.37 | $0.21 | $0.20 | $0.27 |
| Emergency Energy | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Inadvertent Energy | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | ($0.01) | $0.00 | ($0.01) | $0.03 | $0.01 | ($0.01) | ($0.00) | $0.00 | ($0.01) | $0.01 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.01) | $0.00 | $0.01 | ($0.01) |
| Load Response - Energy | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.05 | $0.03 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 |
| Emergency Load Response | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.04 | $0.00 | $0.02 |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | $1.15 | $0.65 | $0.78 | $0.81 | $0.88 | $0.38 | $0.51 | $0.48 | $0.36 | $0.59 | $0.56 | $0.52 | $0.38 | $0.77 | $0.26 | $0.12 | $0.09 | $0.15 | $0.07 | $0.08 | $0.14 | $0.20 | $0.11 | $0.18 | $0.46 |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation | ($0.04) | ($0.04) | ($0.05) | ($0.07) | ($0.09) | ($0.05) | ($0.66) | ($2.30) | ($2.31) | ($2.57) | ($1.46) | ($0.60) | ($0.51) | ($0.64) | ($0.43) | ($0.25) | ($0.23) | ($0.57) | ($0.41) | ($0.42) | ($0.42) | ($0.48) | ($0.27) | ($0.23) | ($0.34) |
| Market to Market Payments | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | ($0.00) | $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.07 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.08 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.13 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.04 |
| Capacity | $0.24 | $0.11 | $0.07 | $0.08 | $0.03 | $0.08 | $3.67 | $7.41 | $9.58 | $10.55 | $8.81 | $5.33 | $5.44 | $7.15 | $8.86 | $8.41 | $8.37 | $9.18 | $7.73 | $6.49 | $7.30 | $5.13 | $2.54 | $1.97 | $6.06 |
| Capacity (Capacity Market and FRR) | $0.24 | $0.11 | $0.07 | $0.08 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $3.63 | $7.38 | $9.57 | $10.54 | $8.72 | $5.27 | $5.40 | $7.13 | $8.86 | $8.41 | $8.34 | $9.15 | $7.71 | $6.49 | $7.30 | $5.09 | $2.48 | $1.95 | $5.99 |
| Capacity Part V (RMR) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.09 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.03 | ($0.00) | ($0.00) | $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.04 | $0.06 | $0.02 | $0.06 |
| Load Response - Capacity | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 |
| Transmission | $3.25 | $3.10 | $3.20 | $2.93 | $2.73 | $2.68 | $2.76 | $2.89 | $3.29 | $3.36 | $3.70 | $4.06 | $4.36 | $4.98 | $6.01 | $6.56 | $7.20 | $6.97 | $7.45 | $8.48 | $8.57 | $8.35 | $8.77 | $9.13 | $8.51 |
| Transmission Service Charges | $3.18 | $3.04 | $3.14 | $2.80 | $2.24 | $2.55 | $2.69 | $2.76 | $3.04 | $2.99 | $3.23 | $3.45 | $3.61 | $4.07 | $4.84 | $5.26 | $5.82 | $5.67 | $6.19 | $7.08 | $7.15 | $7.05 | $7.49 | $7.75 | $7.22 |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.05 | $0.18 | $0.30 | $0.40 | $0.55 | $0.69 | $0.85 | $1.10 | $1.25 | $1.33 | $1.24 | $1.20 | $1.35 | $1.36 | $1.26 | $1.23 | $1.33 | $1.25 |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.08 | $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.05 | $0.04 |
| Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.04 | $0.41 | $0.06 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.02) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Transmission Facility Charges | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | ($0.01) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Ancillary | $0.68 | $0.56 | $0.80 | $0.77 | $0.98 | $0.74 | $0.78 | $0.86 | $0.59 | $0.66 | $0.64 | $0.59 | $0.86 | $0.67 | $0.62 | $0.48 | $0.50 | $0.51 | $0.45 | $0.45 | $0.51 | $0.59 | $0.47 | $0.47 | $0.49 |
| Reactive | $0.20 | $0.18 | $0.21 | $0.22 | $0.21 | $0.23 | $0.23 | $0.25 | $0.27 | $0.33 | $0.29 | $0.32 | $0.53 | $0.27 | $0.25 | $0.26 | $0.28 | $0.26 | $0.27 | $0.29 | $0.28 | $0.27 | $0.27 | $0.25 | $0.20 |
| Regulation | $0.48 | $0.38 | $0.44 | $0.43 | $0.66 | $0.42 | $0.49 | $0.52 | $0.26 | $0.27 | $0.23 | $0.18 | $0.17 | $0.22 | $0.16 | $0.07 | $0.09 | $0.12 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.11 | $0.21 | $0.09 | $0.12 | $0.15 |
| Black Start | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.10 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.03 |
| Synchronized Reserves | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.13 | $0.11 | $0.09 | $0.07 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.05 | $0.07 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.08 | $0.08 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.09 |
| Secondary Reserves | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | ($0.01) | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.07 | $0.05 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Administration | $0.68 | $0.77 | $0.95 | $0.91 | $0.63 | $0.65 | $0.64 | $0.36 | $0.27 | $0.32 | $0.29 | $0.35 | $0.30 | $0.32 | $0.32 | $0.32 | $0.35 | $0.39 | $0.39 | $0.34 | $0.33 | $0.30 | $0.33 | $0.35 | $0.31 |
| PJM Administrative Fees | $0.67 | $0.77 | $0.92 | $0.80 | $0.60 | $0.60 | $0.59 | $0.32 | $0.24 | $0.27 | $0.27 | $0.33 | $0.28 | $0.29 | $0.29 | $0.30 | $0.32 | $0.37 | $0.36 | $0.31 | $0.30 | $0.28 | $0.30 | $0.32 | $0.29 |
| NERC/RFC | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.06 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.05 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Other | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Total Cost ($/MWh) | $45.40 | $37.66 | $44.57 | $43.12 | $57.11 | $45.12 | $52.87 | $61.57 | $40.48 | $47.78 | $45.10 | $34.57 | $37.98 | $76.95 | $40.36 | $35.12 | $36.38 | $40.80 | $32.45 | $28.40 | $39.56 | $55.36 | $28.23 | $28.72 | $38.20 |
| Total Day Ahead Load (GWh) | 292,717 | 344,235 | 324,653 | 413,294 | 654,505 | 672,501 | 691,547 | 676,030 | 644,485 | 656,928 | 704,581 | 745,165 | 753,865 | 749,927 | 773,842 | 774,730 | 760,624 | 784,553 | 771,055 | 734,641 | 755,824 | 765,499 | 748,619 | 775,838 | 800,515 |
| Total Balancing Load (GWh) | 27,319 | 31,337 | (2,879) | (25,580) | (30,087) | (23,664) | (23,977) | (22,429) | (21,584) | (40,463) | (18,519) | (19,136) | (19,925) | (30,578) | (2,251) | (3,538) | 1,849 | (6,542) | (874) | (8,346) | (11,602) | (13,126) | (6,433) | (8,344) | (10,378) |
| Total Real Time Load (GWh) | 265,398 | 312,899 | 327,533 | 438,874 | 684,592 | 696,165 | 715,524 | 698,459 | 666,069 | 697,391 | 723,101 | 764,300 | 773,790 | 780,505 | 776,093 | 778,269 | 758,775 | 791,094 | 771,929 | 742,987 | 767,425 | 778,624 | 755,053 | 784,182 | 810,894 |
| Total Cost ($ Billions) | $12.05 | $11.78 | $14.60 | $18.93 | $39.10 | $31.41 | $37.83 | $43.01 | $26.96 | $33.32 | $32.61 | $26.42 | $29.39 | $60.06 | $31.32 | $27.33 | $27.61 | $32.27 | $25.05 | $21.10 | $30.36 | $43.11 | $21.32 | $22.52 | $30.97 |

78 US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (base period: January 1998), published by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. <http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems> (July 14, 2026).
79 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.


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Table 1-14 shows the percent of the inflation adjusted total cost, by component of the wholesale power cost per MWh, for calendar years 2001 through 2025. [80]

## Table 1-14 Inflation adjusted percent of total cost per MWh by category: 2001 through 2025[81]

| Category | Percent of Total Charges 2001 | Percent of Total Charges 2002 | Percent of Total Charges 2003 | Percent of Total Charges 2004 | Percent of Total Charges 2005 | Percent of Total Charges 2006 | Percent of Total Charges 2007 | Percent of Total Charges 2008 | Percent of Total Charges 2009 | Percent of Total Charges 2010 | Percent of Total Charges 2011 | Percent of Total Charges 2012 | Percent of Total Charges 2013 | Percent of Total Charges 2014 | Percent of Total Charges 2015 | Percent of Total Charges 2016 | Percent of Total Charges 2017 | Percent of Total Charges 2018 | Percent of Total Charges 2019 | Percent of Total Charges 2020 | Percent of Total Charges 2021 | Percent of Total Charges 2022 | Percent of Total Charges 2023 | Percent of Total Charges 2024 | Percent of Total Charges 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | 89.3% | 87.9% | 88.7% | 89.1% | 92.3% | 90.8% | 85.1% | 81.3% | 66.1% | 68.8% | 70.2% | 70.1% | 71.1% | 82.9% | 60.8% | 55.1% | 54.9% | 58.2% | 50.6% | 44.5% | 57.7% | 74.1% | 57.1% | 58.5% | 59.8% |
| Day Ahead Energy | 79.7% | 84.2% | 82.3% | 80.8% | 87.0% | 88.8% | 84.1% | 83.4% | 70.4% | 70.1% | 70.6% | 68.6% | 69.2% | 46.1% | 61.8% | 56.5% | 56.0% | 59.3% | 52.9% | 46.3% | 58.1% | 73.9% | 59.3% | 60.0% | 61.0% |
| Balancing Energy | 9.0% | 5.3% | 6.9% | 8.1% | 5.6% | 4.4% | 4.5% | 4.2% | 3.4% | 5.5% | 3.3% | 3.1% | 3.3% | 37.6% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 1.2% | 0.3% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.3% |
| ARR Credits | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.5%) | (0.8%) | (0.6%) | (1.0%) | (0.9%) | (0.9%) | (1.7%) | (0.8%) | (1.0%) | (1.1%) | (0.8%) | (0.5%) | (1.2%) | (1.6%) | (1.2%) | (1.1%) | (1.7%) | (1.5%) | (0.8%) | (1.1%) | (2.7%) | (2.2%) | (2.3%) |
| Self Scheduled FTR Credits | (1.9%) | (3.2%) | (1.6%) | (0.6%) | (1.2%) | (2.1%) | (2.3%) | (2.6%) | (1.3%) | (1.9%) | (0.9%) | (0.5%) | (0.4%) | (0.6%) | (0.8%) | (0.6%) | (0.4%) | (0.5%) | (0.3%) | (0.4%) | (0.5%) | (1.1%) | (0.8%) | (0.9%) | (1.5%) |
| Balancing Congestion | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| Emergency Energy | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Inadvertent Energy | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | (0.0%) | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | (0.0%) | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| Load Response - Energy | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Emergency Load Response | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves) | 2.5% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 1.9% | 1.5% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 1.2% |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation | (0.1%) | (0.1%) | (0.1%) | (0.2%) | (0.2%) | (0.1%) | (1.3%) | (3.7%) | (5.7%) | (5.4%) | (3.2%) | (1.7%) | (1.3%) | (0.8%) | (1.1%) | (0.7%) | (0.6%) | (1.4%) | (1.3%) | (1.5%) | (1.1%) | (0.9%) | (1.0%) | (0.8%) | (0.9%) |
| Market to Market Payments | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Capacity | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 6.9% | 12.0% | 23.7% | 22.1% | 19.5% | 15.4% | 14.3% | 9.3% | 22.0% | 23.9% | 23.0% | 22.5% | 23.8% | 22.8% | 18.5% | 9.3% | 9.0% | 6.9% | 15.9% |
| Capacity (Capacity Market and FRR) | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 6.9% | 12.0% | 23.7% | 22.1% | 19.3% | 15.2% | 14.2% | 9.3% | 21.9% | 23.9% | 22.9% | 22.4% | 23.8% | 22.8% | 18.5% | 9.2% | 8.8% | 6.8% | 15.7% |
| Capacity Part V (RMR) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% |
| Load Response - Capacity | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission | 7.2% | 8.2% | 7.2% | 6.8% | 4.8% | 5.9% | 5.2% | 4.7% | 8.1% | 7.0% | 8.2% | 11.7% | 11.5% | 6.5% | 14.9% | 18.7% | 19.8% | 17.1% | 23.0% | 29.9% | 21.7% | 15.1% | 31.1% | 31.8% | 22.3% |
| Transmission Service Charges | 7.0% | 8.1% | 7.0% | 6.5% | 3.9% | 5.7% | 5.1% | 4.5% | 7.5% | 6.3% | 7.2% | 10.0% | 9.5% | 5.3% | 12.0% | 15.0% | 16.0% | 13.9% | 19.1% | 24.9% | 18.1% | 12.7% | 26.5% | 27.0% | 18.9% |
| Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 1.1% | 2.7% | 3.6% | 3.7% | 3.0% | 3.7% | 4.7% | 3.5% | 2.3% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 3.3% |
| Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A) | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| Transmission Seams Elimination Cost Assignment (SECA) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.7% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Transmission Facility Charges | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Ancillary | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.8% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.7% | 2.3% | 0.9% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.3% |
| Reactive | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.5% |
| Regulation | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% |
| Black Start | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| Synchronized Reserves | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Secondary Reserves | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Non-Synchronized Reserves | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | (0.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Administration | 1.5% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.8% |
| PJM Administrative Fees | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 1.8% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 0.8% |
| NERC/RFC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| RTO Startup and Expansion | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Other | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Price | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

80 US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (base period: January 1998), published by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. <http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems> (July 14, 2026).

81 Note: The totals in this table include after the fact billing adjustments and may not match totals presented in past reports.

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# Section Overviews

## Overview: Section 3, Energy Market

### Supply and Demand

#### Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, 1,241 MW of new resources were added in the energy market, and 669 MW of resources were retired.
- The real-time hourly on peak average offered supply in the first six months of 2026 decreased by 0.6 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from 139,347 MWh to 138,477 MWh.
- The day-ahead hourly on peak average offered supply in the first six months of 2026 decreased by 2.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from 149,354 MWh to 145,896 MWh.
- The real-time hourly average cleared generation in the first six months of 2026 increased by 1.3 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 96,763 MWh to 98,028 MWh.
- The day-ahead hourly average cleared supply in the first six months of 2026, including INCs and UTCs, decreased by 0.7 percent from the first six months of 2025 from 110,458 MWh to 109,740 MWh.
- **Demand.** The real-time hourly peak load without exports in the first six months of 2026 was 146,175 MWh (151,547 MWh with net exports) in the HE 1800 (EPT) on June 30, 2026, lower than the PJM peak load in the first six months of 2025, which was 156,256 MWh (158,889 MWh with net exports) in the HE 1800 (EPT) on June 23, 2025.
- The real-time hourly average load in the first six months of 2026 increased by 2.5 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 90,914 MWh to 93,187 MWh.
- The day-ahead hourly average cleared demand in the first six months of 2026, including DECs and UTCs, increased by 0.05 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 104,018 MWh to 104,069 MWh.

#### Market Behavior

- **Virtual Offers and Bids.** Any market participant in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market can use increment offers, decrement bids, up to congestion transactions, import transactions and export transactions as financial instruments that do not require physical generation or load. The hourly average submitted increment offer MW decreased by 2.6 percent and the cleared increment MW decreased by 9.0 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The hourly average submitted decrement bid MW increased by 10.0 percent and the cleared decrement MW increased by 6.8 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The hourly average submitted up to congestion bid MW decreased by 18.0 percent and the cleared up to congestion bid MW decreased by 23.5 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

#### Market Performance

- **Generation Fuel Mix.** In the first six months of 2026, generation from coal units decreased 3.2 percent, generation from natural gas units increased 2.6 percent, generation from oil units increased 29.7 percent, generation from wind units increased 2.1 percent, and generation from solar units increased 23.9 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.
- **Fuel Diversity.** The fuel diversity of energy generation in the first six months of 2026, measured by the fuel diversity index for energy ($FDI_e$), decreased 0.1 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.
- **Marginal Resources.** In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, coal units were 9.6 percent, natural gas units were 67.3 percent and wind units were 17.0 percent of marginal resources. In the first six months of 2025, coal units were 7.6 percent, natural gas units were 74.1 and wind units were 13.8 percent of marginal resources.
- **Prices.** The real-time load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $20.79 per MWh, or 40.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $51.75 per MWh to $72.54 per MWh.
- The day-ahead load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $24.52 per MWh, or 49.3 percent, from the first six months of


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2025, from $49.72 per MWh to $74.25 per MWh. This is the highest day-ahead load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of a year since the introduction of the PJM day-ahead energy market.

- **Fast Start Pricing.** The real-time load-weighted average PLMP was $72.54 per MWh for the first six months of 2026, which is 7.0 percent, $5.32 per MWh, higher than the real-time load-weighted average DLMP of $67.22 per MWh.
- **Components of Real-Time LMP.** In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, 39.5 percent of the real-time load-weighted LMP was the result of gas costs, 20.3 percent was the result of transmission constraint violation penalty factors, 8.3 percent was the result of coal costs, and 3.4 percent was the result of the cost of emission allowances.
- **Components of Day-Ahead LMP.** In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, 22.7 percent of the day-ahead load-weighted LMP was the result of decrement bids, 15.5 percent was the result of increment offers, 22.5 percent was the result of gas costs, and 6.2 percent was the result of coal costs.
- **Changes in Real-Time LMP.** Of the $20.79 per MWh increase in the real-time load-weighted average LMP, $9.43 per MWh (45.3 percent) was the transmission constraint penalty factor component of LMP, $7.26 per MWh (34.9 percent) was the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP, $1.82 per MWh (8.8 percent) was the sum of the markup, maintenance, and ten percent adder components of LMP, $1.06 per MWh (5.1 percent) was the emissions cost components of LMP, and -$1.24 per MWh (-6.0 percent) was the scarcity component of LMP. The pre-emergency demand response component decreased by $1.16 per MWh, -5.6 percent of the increase in LMP. The administrative cap component decreased LMP by less in the first six months of 2026 than the first six months of 2025, $0.16 per MWh increase in LMP, 0.7 percent of the increase in LMP.
- **Price Convergence.** Hourly and daily price differences between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets fluctuate continuously and substantially from positive to negative. The average difference between day-ahead and real-time average prices was -$1.22 per MWh in the first six months of 2026, and $1.17 per MWh in the first six months of 2025. The difference between day-ahead and real-time average prices, by itself, is not a measure of the competitiveness or effectiveness of the day-ahead energy market.

### Shortage

- **Shortage Intervals.** There were 102 intervals with five minute shortage pricing on 23 days in the first six months of 2026. Of the 102 intervals, 40 occurred during cold weather from late January into early February, including Winter Storm Fern, for which PJM issued several emergency warnings and actions. Three of the 102 intervals of shortage overlapped with synchronized reserve events.
- **SCED Shortage Intervals.** In the first six months of 2026, there were 2,330 five minute intervals, or 4.5 percent of all five minute intervals, for which at least one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves. In the first six months of 2026, there were 797 five minute intervals, or 1.5 percent of all five minute intervals, for which more than one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves. In the first six months of 2026, PJM triggered shortage pricing for 102 five minute intervals, or 4.4 percent of all five minute intervals.

## Competitive Assessment

### Market Structure

- **Aggregate Pivotal Suppliers.** The PJM energy market, at times, requires generation from pivotal suppliers to meet load, resulting in aggregate market power even when the HHI level indicates that the aggregate market is unconcentrated. Three suppliers were jointly pivotal in the day-ahead market on 169 days, 93.4 percent of the days, in the first six months of 2026 and 166 days, 91.7 percent of the days, in the first six months of 2025. The overall frequency of pivotal suppliers rose in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 due to an increase in the frequency of days with daily peak load above 130 GW.
- **Local Market Power.** In the first six months of 2026, in the real-time market, the 500 kV system, 13 zones, and the PJM/MISO interface experienced

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congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours. For seven out of the top 10 congested facilities (by real-time binding hours) in the first six months of 2026, the average number of suppliers providing constraint relief was three or fewer. There was a high level of concentration within the local markets for providing relief to the most congested facilities in the PJM Real-Time Energy Market. The local market structure was not competitive.

## Market Behavior

- **Offer Capping for Local Market Power.** PJM offer caps units when the local market structure is noncompetitive. Offer capping is an effective means of addressing local market power when the rules are designed and implemented properly. Offer capping levels have historically been low in PJM. In the day-ahead energy market, for units committed to provide energy for local constraint relief, offer-capped unit hours increased from 1.4 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 4.0 percent in the first six months of 2026. In the real-time energy market, for units committed to provide energy for local constraint relief, offer-capped unit hours decreased from 1.1 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 0.8 percent in the first six months of 2026. While overall offer capping levels have been low, there are a significant number of units with persistent structural local market power that would have had a significant impact on prices in the absence of local market power mitigation.

  The analysis of the application of the TPS test to local markets demonstrates that it is working to identify pivotal owners when the market structure is noncompetitive and to ensure that owners are not subject to offer capping when the market structure is competitive. There are, however, identified issues with the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that can result in the exercise of local market power. These issues need to be addressed promptly.

- **Offer Capping for Reliability.** PJM also offer caps units that are committed for reliability reasons, including for reactive support. In the day-ahead energy market, for units committed for reliability reasons, offer-capped unit hours decreased from 0.14 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 0.08 percent in the first six months of 2026. In the real-time energy market, for units committed for reliability reasons, offer-capped unit hours remained at 0.06 percent in the first six months of 2025 and 0.06 percent in the first six months of 2026. The low offer cap percentages for reliability commitments, relative to offer capping for transmission constraints, do not mean that units committed for reliability reasons do not have market power. All units manually committed for reliability have market power and all are committed on their least cost schedule as defined in the day-ahead and real-time markets.

- **Parameter Mitigation.** PJM applies operating parameter limits (PLS) to units that fail the TPS test and to all units during hot and cold weather alerts. In the first six months of 2026, 24.9 percent of unit hours for units that failed the TPS test in the day-ahead market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their cost-based schedules. On days when cold weather alerts and hot weather alerts were declared, 26.7 percent of unit hours in the day-ahead energy market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their price PLS schedules. These units should be committed on their parameter limited schedules to resolve the market power issue. If PJM promptly implemented the FERC approved solution to address the failure to correctly apply market power mitigation, this issue would no longer occur.

- **Frequently Mitigated Units (FMU) and Associated Units (AU).** In the first six months of 2026, no units qualified for an FMU adder. In 2025, 2024, 2023 and 2022, no units qualified for an FMU adder. In 2021, one unit qualified for an FMU adder.

- **Markup Index.** The markup index is a summary measure of participant offer behavior for individual marginal units. While the average markup index in the real-time market was -$0.03 when using unadjusted cost-based offers in the first six months of 2026, some marginal units did have substantial markups. The highest markup for any marginal unit in the real-time market in the first six months of 2026 was more than $900 per MWh and the highest markup in the first six months of 2025 was more than $800 per MWh, using unadjusted cost-based offers.


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- While the average markup index in the day-ahead market was $0.82 per MWh in the first six months of 2026, some marginal units did have substantial markups. The highest markup for any marginal unit in the day-ahead market in the first six months of 2026 was more than $600 per MWh.[82]
- **Markup.** The markup frequency distributions show that a significant proportion of units make price-based offers less than the cost-based offers permitted under the PJM market rules. This behavior means that competitive price-based offers reveal actual unit marginal costs and that PJM market rules permit the inclusion of costs in cost-based offers that are not short run marginal costs.

  The markup frequency distributions also show that a significant proportion of units were offered with high markups, consistent with the exercise of market power.

## Market Performance

- **Markup.** The markup conduct of individual owners and units has an identifiable impact on market prices. Markup is a key indicator of the competitiveness of the energy market.

  In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, the unadjusted markup component (net of positive and negative markup components) of LMP was $0.48 per MWh or 0.7 percent of the PJM load-weighted average LMP. February had the highest unadjusted peak markup component, $4.16 per MWh, or 5.2 percent of the real-time peak hour load-weighted average LMP for February.

  In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, the unadjusted markup component (net of positive and negative markup components) of LMP was $1.32 per MWh or 4.7 percent of the PJM load-weighted average LMP. January had the highest unadjusted peak markup component, $5.37 per MWh, or 3.30 percent of the day-ahead peak hour load-weighted average LMP for January.

  Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the analysis of markup shows that marginal units generally make offers at, or close to, their marginal costs in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although the behavior of some participants represents noncompetitive economic withholding.
- **Markup and Local Market Power.** Comparison of the markup behavior of marginal units with TPS test results shows that for 3.1 percent of all real-time marginal unit intervals in the first six months of 2026, the marginal unit had both local market power, as determined by the TPS test, and a positive markup. The marginal unit had local market power in 22.8 percent of all real-time marginal unit intervals in the first six months of 2026. For 13.6 percent of all marginal unit intervals with local market power, the unit had a positive markup. This occurred in 4,307 intervals, or 8.2 percent of all real-time market intervals in the first six months of 2026. The fact that units with market power had a positive markup means that the cost-based offer was not used, that a higher price-based offer was used, and that the process for offer capping units that fail the TPS test does not consistently result in competitive market outcomes in the presence of market power.
- **Markup and Aggregate Market Power.** In the first six months of 2026, pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market, committed in the day-ahead market and identified as one of three day-ahead aggregate pivotal suppliers, set real-time market prices with markups over $100 per MWh during 513 real-time market intervals (42.8 hours) and 64 day-ahead market hours. Some of the marginal units had local market power, but were not offer capped due to issues with the method that PJM uses to select offer schedules for units that fail the TPS test. Some of the marginal units had aggregate market power, for which there is no offer capping, and some had both local and aggregate market power.

82 The MMU identified an error in the PJM marginal resource identification algorithm within the day ahead clearing optimization. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors requires accurate identification of marginal resources. The error was fixed by the PJM software vendor in March 2025. The MMU was unable to calculate the component breakdown for 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 due to the inaccurate identification of marginal resources.

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## Section 3 Recommendations

### Market Power

- The MMU recommends that the market rules explicitly require that offers in the energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units, including parameter limited schedules. The short run marginal cost should reflect opportunity cost when appropriate. The MMU recommends that the level of incremental costs includable in cost-based offers per the PJM Operating Agreement not exceed the short run marginal cost of the unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

### Fuel Cost Policies

- The MMU recommends that PJM require that all fuel cost policies be algorithmic, verifiable, and systematic, and accurately reflect short run marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the temporary cost method be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to have an approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Low. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the penalty exemption provision be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to follow their approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

### Cost-Based Offers

- The MMU recommends removal of all use of FERC System of Accounts in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of all use of cyclic starting and peaking factors from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of all maintenance costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, given that maintenance costs are currently allowed in cost-based offers, that market participants be permitted to include only variable maintenance costs, linked to verifiable operational events and that can be supported by clear and unambiguous documentation of the operational data (e.g. run hours, MWh, MMBtu) that support the maintenance cycle of the equipment being serviced/replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Partially adopted 2023.)
- The MMU recommends explicitly accounting for soak costs and changing the definition of the start heat input for combined cycles to include only the amount of fuel used from first fire to the first breaker close in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that soak costs, soak time and the MWh produced during soaking be modeled separately. This will ensure that the time required for units to reach a dispatchable level is known and used in the unit commitment process instead of only being communicated verbally between dispatchers and generators. Separating soak costs from start costs and modeling the MWh produced during soaking allows for a better representation of the costs because it eliminates the need to simply assume the price paid for those MWh. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of nuclear fuel and nonfuel operations and maintenance costs that are not short run marginal costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends revising the pumped hydro fuel cost calculation to include day-ahead and real-time power purchases. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)


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## Market Power: TPS Test and Offer Capping

- The MMU recommends that the rules governing the application of the TPS test be clarified and documented. The TPS test application in the day-ahead energy market is not documented. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[83]
- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the process of applying the TPS test in the day-ahead energy market to ensure that all local markets created by binding constraints are tested for market power and to ensure that market sellers with market power are appropriately mitigated to their competitive offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that offer capping be applied to units that fail the TPS test in the real-time market that were not offer capped at the time of commitment in the day-ahead market or at a prior time in the real-time market. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation and to ensure that capacity resources meet their obligations to be flexible, that capacity resources be required to use flexible parameters in all offers at all times. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, PJM always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters for all cost-based and all price-based offers during high load conditions such as cold and hot weather alerts and emergency conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require every market participant to make available at least one cost schedule based on the same hourly fuel type(s) and parameters at least as flexible as their offered price schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that markup be consistently positive or negative across the full MWh range of price and cost-based offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, that PJM commit all resources that fail the TPS test on their cost-based offers, that the Market Seller designate the cost-based offer if there is more than one, and that PJM implement this solution as soon as possible. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM retain the $1,000 per MWh offer cap in the PJM energy market except when cost-based offers exceed $1,000 per MWh, and retain other existing rules that limit incentives to exercise market power. (Priority: High. First reported 1999. Status: Partially adopted, 1999, 2017.)
- The MMU recommends the elimination of FMU and AU adders. FMU and AU adders no longer serve the purpose for which they were created and interfere with the efficient operation of PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted, 2014.)[84]

## Offer Behavior

- The MMU recommends that resources not be allowed to violate the ICAP must offer requirement. The MMU recommends that PJM enforce the ICAP must offer requirement by assigning a forced outage to any unit that is derated in the energy market below its committed ICAP without an outage that reflects the derate. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets that reflects the limitations of these resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that capacity resources not be allowed to offer any portion of their capacity market obligation as maximum emergency energy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

83 The real-time market formula for determining the lowest cost schedule is documented. The day-ahead market formula for determining the lowest cost schedule is not documented.

84 The applicability of the FMU and AU adders is limited by the rule implemented in 2014 requiring that net revenues must fall below avoidable costs, but the possibility of FMU and AU adders is still part of the PJM Market Rules.

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- The MMU recommends that PJM integrate all the outage reporting tools in order to enforce the ICAP must offer requirement, ensure that outages are reported correctly and eliminate reporting inconsistencies. Generators currently submit availability in three different tools that are not integrated, Markets Gateway, eDART and eGADS. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that gas generators be required to check with pipelines throughout the operating day to confirm that nominations are accepted beyond the NAESB deadlines, that gas generators be required to inform PJM about whether they have gas, and that gas generators be required to place their units on forced outage until the time that pipelines allow nominations to consume gas at a unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Capacity Resources

- The MMU recommends that capacity resources be held to the OEM operating parameters of the capacity market CONE reference resource for performance assessment and energy uplift payments and that this standard be applied to all technologies on a uniform basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the parameters which determine nonperformance charges and the amounts of uplift payments should reflect the flexibility goals of the capacity market design. The operational parameters used by generation owners to indicate to PJM operators what a unit is capable of during the operating day should not determine capacity resource performance assessment or uplift payments. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[85]
- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly define the business rules that apply to the unit specific parameter adjustment process, including PJM's implementation of the tariff rules in the PJM manuals to ensure market sellers know the requirements for their resources. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM update the tariff to clarify that all generation resources are subject to unit specific parameter limits on their cost-based offers using the same standard and process as capacity resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that resources not be paid the daily capacity payment when unable to operate to their unit specific parameter limits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not approve temporary exceptions that are based on pipeline tariff terms that are not enforced at the time, or are based on inferior transportation service procured by the generator. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require generators that violate their approved turn down ratio (by either using the fixed gen option or increasing their economic minimum) to use the temporary parameter exception process that requires market sellers to demonstrate that the request is based on a physical and actual constraint. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends: that gas generators be required to confirm, regularly during the operating day, that they can obtain gas if requested to operate at their economic maximum level; that gas generators provide that information to PJM during the operating day; and that gas generators be required to be on forced outage if they cannot obtain gas during the operating day to meet their must offer requirement as a result of pipeline restrictions, and they do not have backup fuel. As part of this, the MMU recommends that PJM collect data on each individual generator's fuel supply arrangements at least annually or when such arrangements change, and analyze the associated locational and regional risks to reliability. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Accurate System Modeling

- The MMU recommends that PJM explicitly state its policy on the use of transmission constraint penalty factors including: the level of the penalty factors; the triggers for the use of the penalty factors; the appropriate line ratings to trigger the use of penalty factors; the allowed duration of

85 Flexible parameter standards are in place for combined cycle and combustion turbine resources when operating on a parameter limited schedule, but not for other schedules or generating technologies.


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the violation and when the transmission constraint penalty factors will be used to set the shadow price. The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) and included in LMP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted 2020.)[86]

- The MMU recommends that PJM routinely review all transmission facility ratings and any changes to those ratings to ensure that the normal, emergency and load dump ratings used in modeling the transmission system are accurate and reflect standard ratings practice. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not use closed loop interface or surrogate constraints to artificially override nodal prices based on fundamental LMP logic in order to: accommodate rather than resolve the inadequacies of the demand side resource capacity product; address the inability of the power flow model to incorporate the need for reactive power; accommodate rather than resolve the flaws in PJM's approach to shortage pricing; or for any other reason. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM update the outage impact studies, the reliability analyses used in RPM for capacity deliverability, and the reliability analyses used in RTEP for transmission upgrades to be consistent with the more conservative emergency operations (post contingency load dump limit exceedance analysis) in the energy market that were implemented in June 2013.[87] (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM include in the tariff or appropriate manual an explanation of the initial creation of hubs, the process for modifying hub definitions and a description of how hub definitions have changed.[88] [89] (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all buses with a net withdrawal be treated as load for purposes of calculating load and load-weighted LMP, even if the MW are settled to the generator. The MMU recommends that during hours when a load bus shows a net injection, the energy injection be treated as generation, not negative load, for purposes of calculating generation and load-weighted LMP, even if the injection MW are settled to the load serving entity. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM identify and collect data on available behind the meter generation resources, including nodal location information and relevant operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM document how LMPs are calculated when demand response is marginal. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not allow nuclear generators which do not respond to prices or which only respond to manual instructions from the operator to set the LMPs in the real-time market. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM increase the coordination of outage and operational restrictions data submitted by market participants via eDART/eGADs and offer data submitted via Markets Gateway. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM model generators' operating transitions, including soak time for units with a steam turbine, configuration transitions for combined cycles, and peak operating modes. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clarify, modify and document its process for dispatching reserves and energy when SCED indicates that supply is

86 PJM created a more transparent process for transmission constraint penalty factors and added it to the tariff in 2020. Policies on reductions in control limits and the duration of violations remain discretionary and undocumented in the PJM Market Rules.

87 This recommendation was the result of load shed events in September, 2013. For detailed discussion, please see *2013 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 3: Energy Market at 114 – 116.

88 According to minutes from the first meeting of the Energy Market Committee (EMC) on January 28, 1998, the EMC unanimously agreed to be responsible for approving additions, deletions and changes to the hub definitions to be published and modeled by PJM. Since the EMC has become the Market Implementation Committee (MIC), the MIC now appears to be responsible for such changes.

89 There is currently no PJM documentation in the tariff or manuals explaining how hubs are created and how their definitions are changed. The general definition of a hub can be found in the PJM.com Glossary <http://www.pjm.com/Glossary.aspx>.

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less than total demand including forecasted load and reserve requirements. The modifications should define: a SCED process to economically convert reserves to energy; a process for the recall of energy from capacity resources; and the minimum level of synchronized reserves that would trigger load shedding. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM stop capping the system marginal price in RT SCED and LPC and instead limit the sum of violated reserve constraint shadow prices that are included in the determination of LMP in LPC to $1,700 per MWh. While PJM no longer caps prices in RT SCED, PJM continues to apply a cap to the system marginal price in the pricing run (LPC) under fast start pricing. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM adjust the ORDCs during spin events to reduce the reserve requirement for synchronized and primary reserves by the amount of the reserves deployed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

### Transparency

- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly document the calculation of shortage prices and implementation of reserve price caps in the PJM manuals, including defining all the components of reserve prices, and all the constraints whose shadow prices are included in reserve prices. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM allow generators to report fuel type on an hourly basis in their offer schedules and to designate schedule availability on an hourly basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[90]
- The MMU recommends that PJM define clear criteria for operator approval of RT SCED cases, including shortage cases, that are used to send dispatch signals to resources, and for pricing, to minimize discretion. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)[91]

90 Fuel type is reported by offer schedule, but it can be inaccurate on an hourly basis.

91 The PJM Market Rules clarify that shortage case approval will be based on RT SCED, but does not address RT SCED case choice or load bias.

### Virtual Bids and Offers

- The MMU recommends eliminating up to congestion (UTC) bidding at pricing nodes that aggregate only small sections of transmission zones with few physical assets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends eliminating INC, DEC, and UTC bidding at pricing nodes that allow market participants to profit from modeling issues. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 3 Conclusion

The MMU analyzed key elements of PJM energy market structure, participant conduct and market performance in the first six months of 2026, including aggregate supply and demand, concentration ratios, aggregate pivotal supplier results, local three pivotal supplier test results, offer capping, markup, marginal units, participation in demand response programs, virtual bids and offers, loads and prices.

Prices are a key outcome of markets. Prices vary across hours, days and years for multiple reasons. Price is an indicator of the level of competition in a market. In a competitive market, prices are directly related to input prices, the marginal cost to serve load. In the first six months of 2026, LMP increased by $20.79 per MWh compared to the first six months of 2025, or 40.2 percent. The transmission constraint penalty factor component increased by $9.43 per MWh, 45.3 percent of the increase in LMP, as a result of PJM actions to reduce the line limits applied in SCED (control limits) below the actual line limits. The fuel cost components of LMP (the sum of gas, coal, oil, landfill gas, and consumables) increased by $7.26 per MWh, 34.9 percent of the increase in LMP. The pre-emergency demand response component decreased by $1.16 per MWh, -5.6 percent of the increase in LMP. The emissions cost components of LMP, including opportunity costs for emissions limited resources, increased by $1.06 per MWh, 5.1 percent of the increase in LMP. The administrative cap component decreased LMP by less in the first six months of 2026 than the first six months of 2025, $0.16 per MWh increase in LMP, 0.7 percent of the increase in LMP.



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The pattern of prices within days and across months and years illustrates how prices are directly related to supply and demand conditions and illustrates the potential significance of the impact of the price elasticity of demand on prices. Energy market results in the first six months of 2026 generally reflected supply-demand fundamentals, although the behavior of some participants both routinely and during high demand periods represents noncompetitive economic withholding. Economic withholding occurs when generator offers are greater than competitive levels, the short run marginal cost of generation. In the first six months of 2026, the sum of the markup, ten percent adder, and maintenance cost (not short run marginal cost) components increased by $1.82 per MWh or 8.8 percent of the increase in LMP. In the first six months of 2026, PJM actions, in the form of transmission constraint penalty factors, significantly increased prices. In the first six months of 2026, the transmission constraint penalty factor component increased by $9.43 per MWh, 45.3 percent of the increase in LMP.

Data center load growth affects energy market prices. Increased demand without matching energy supply puts upward pressure on prices, all else equal. It is difficult to shield customers from the costs caused by data center load growth in the energy market. The impact on the energy market is greater when data centers are added without adding corresponding generating capacity and its associated energy output, what has been termed connect and manage.

The potential for prolonged and excessively high administrative pricing in the energy market due to reserve penalty factors and transmission constraint penalty factors remains an issue that needs to be addressed.[92] The transmission constraint penalty factors are currently the second largest determinant of LMP after the marginal cost of gas. PJM has not experienced a prolonged load shedding event, but, if one were to occur, LMP could exceed $3,700 per MWh for the entire event.

With or without a capacity market, energy market design must permit shortage pricing when such pricing is consistent with market conditions and constrained by reasonable rules to ensure that market power is not exercised and to ensure no shortage pricing when such pricing is not consistent with market conditions. The point of shortage pricing is to ensure that the price of energy and reserves reflects the actual marginal cost of supply. The point of shortage pricing is not to set prices to arbitrarily high levels based on subjective assertions about the value of lost load. Shortage pricing implemented to increase generators' revenue is not consistent with a competitive market design. Changes in the market, like data center load growth and renewable energy growth, do not imply that PJM's current shortage pricing levels are too low. Artificially increasing energy market prices through market design changes is not a solution for managing either data center load growth or renewable energy growth. Load growth, largely driven by new data centers in the PJM region, increased the frequency of energy market shortages in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.[93] Arbitrarily increasing shortage pricing during shortage events by raising the administrative prices on the demand curve for reserves (Operating Reserves Demand Curve or ORDC), as PJM proposes in the Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force (RCSTF), would increase the costs imposed on all customers from data center load growth, counter to the Principles of the PJM governors and the White House, as well as the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.[94] [95] Data centers are already raising energy market costs to all customers by increasing load, specifically increasing the frequency of emergency high load alert events, and straining the transmission system, as evidenced by a $24.5 million single day of profits to UTCs during a transmission outage on May 26 in Data Center Alley. PJM's proposals would undermine the efforts of the Principles and the Pledge by changing the market design in a way that exacerbates the higher energy costs of data centers imposed on other customers.

Shortage pricing for price signals that reflect market conditions and actual short run marginal costs during periods of reserve or energy shortages is consistent with a competitive market design. Shortage pricing is part of an appropriate pricing structure facing both load and generation owners in a working wholesale electric power market design. Shortage pricing must

92 177 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2021).

93 See PJM, "PJM Load Forecast Accuracy Report," (May 29, 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/load-forecast/2026-load-forecast-accuracy-report.pdf>.

94 See Statement of Principles Regarding PJM, National Energy Dominance Council and PJM State Governors (February 15, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/statement-principles-regarding-pjm>.

95 See Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances Energy Affordability with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (March 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (March 4, 2026), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-advances-energy-affordability-with-the-ratepayer-protection-pledge/>.

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be designed to ensure that market prices reflect actual market conditions, that shortage pricing reflects actual short run marginal costs, that shortage pricing occurs with transparent triggers based on measured reserve levels and transparent prices, that shortage pricing only occurs when shortage exists, that shortage pricing not be excessive or punitive, that shortage pricing recognize that electric power serves a unique and critical role for customers, and that there are strong incentives for competitive behavior and strong disincentives to exercise market power. Such administrative shortage pricing is a key link between energy and capacity markets.

PJM defined inputs to the dispatch tools, particularly RT SCED, have substantial effects on energy market outcomes. Transmission line ratings in SCED, transmission constraint penalty factors, load forecast bias, hydro resource schedules, fast start pricing, and the treatment of demand resources change the dispatch of the system, affect prices, and can create significant price increases, particularly through transmission constraint penalty factors. PJM operator interventions to reduce the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings in RT SCED unnecessarily trigger transmission constraint penalty factors and significantly increase prices. The transmission constraint penalty factor contribution to the load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 was $14.75 per MWh or $6.0 billion of the total $29.3 billion cost of real-time load. In the first six months of 2026, the transmission constraint penalty factor contribution to the cost of real time load was more than five times higher than the $1.13 billion of energy uplift charges. Most of the LMP costs due to transmission constraint penalty factors occurred during Winter Storm Fern. During peak load conditions, there were significant power flows on several high voltage constraints, including Bedington – Black Oak and BC/PEPCO Doubles. This led to constraint violations in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets. A majority of the real-time violations were the result of PJM reducing the line rating in SCED. The high constraint shadow prices that result from the application of the transmission constraint penalty factor on high voltage constraints have a larger and broader effect on LMP throughout the market than lower voltage constraints. Differences between day-ahead and real-time unit commitments contributed to these issues, and differences between day-ahead and real-time market pricing also resulted from the different transmission constraint penalty factors used in the day-ahead dispatch run and pricing run.

There were also constraint violations for several hours on May 26, 2026, for multiple 230kV constraints in Data Center Alley during a transmission line outage. Pricing during this event contributed to a record day in UTC profits for the first six months of 2026, which must be paid for by customers through higher prices or balancing congestion charges. In the first six months of 2026, the control limit used in RT SCED for 89 percent of violated transmission constraint intervals was less than 100 percent of the actual line limit, with an average reduction of 5.2 percent. If the control limits had not been artificially reduced and everything else remained unchanged, the transmission constraint penalty factor's contribution to the load weighted average LMP in first six months of 2026 would have decreased by 99.6 percent from $14.75 to $0.06 per MWh.

The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) and included in LMP.

Fast start pricing, implemented on September 1, 2021, inappropriately disconnected pricing from dispatch instructions and despite the stated goal of reducing overall uplift, created a greater reliance on uplift rather than price as an incentive to follow PJM's instructions. In the first six months of 2026, the pricing run LMP (PLMP) exceeded the dispatch run LMP (DLMP) by $5.32 per MWh in the real-time market. The large difference resulted from the interaction between high fuel costs during Winter Storm Fern and PJM's fast start pricing rules. The fuel costs included in the no load offer for fast start CTs were added to the LMP in the pricing run, creating the majority of the difference. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to minimize system production costs, not to minimize uplift. Repricing the market to reflect commitment costs using fast start pricing prioritizes minimizing uplift over minimizing production costs.[96] The tradeoff exists because when commitment costs are included in prices, the price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient

96 See 173 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2020).



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behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. Units that start in one hour are not actually fast start units, and their commitment costs are not marginal in a five minute market. The differences between the actual LMP and the fast start LMP distort the incentive for market participants to behave competitively and to follow PJM's dispatch instructions. PJM pays uplift in an attempt to counter the distorted incentives inherent in fast start pricing. PJM also uses the pricing run to implement administrative pricing rules that are not related to fast start pricing. Specifically, PJM uses lower transmission constraint penalty factors in the day-ahead pricing run than in the dispatch run and implements system marginal price capping in the pricing run. Every difference between the dispatch run and the pricing run introduces another inefficiency in the market. In the four years since fast start pricing was introduced, the market has not responded with new entry of fast start units despite consistently higher LMPs when a fast start unit sets price.

The energy market requires more flexible operation of the dispatchable fleet as wind and solar resource penetration grows. Since 2018, PJM has argued that the way to incent investment in flexible units is to increase reserve requirements and to increase the administrative prices defined in the ORDCs. In fact, higher LMPs due to higher ORDCs would benefit inflexible units. Providing windfall gains to all generation through higher LMPs during more frequent reserve shortages is not an effective incentive for flexibility.

The question of how to provide market incentives for investment in flexibility, and for operating to the full capability of that flexibility should be addressed directly. Are units inflexible because they are old and inefficient, because they face gas pipeline constraints, because owners have not invested in increased flexibility or because they serve as a mechanism for the exercise of market power? Are units inflexible because the PJM software does not model combined cycle transitions?

A direct solution would include improved modelling of generator capabilities, so that PJM can send more targeted dispatch signals that generators are consistently capable of following. A direct solution would include targeted reforms to PJM software, like multi-interval dispatch and combined cycle modelling that would directly address PJM energy market performance. A direct solution would include stronger standards in the PJM Market Rules for performance of resources to their actual physical parameters. These reforms would be more efficient and effective than simply raising prices across the board.

The relationship between supply and demand is referred to as supply-demand fundamentals, or economic fundamentals, or market structure. The market structure of the PJM aggregate energy market is only partially competitive because aggregate market power does exist for a significant number of hours. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. It is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. Even a low HHI may be consistent with the exercise of market power with a low price elasticity of demand. The current market power mitigation rules for the PJM energy market rely on the assumption that the ownership structure of the aggregate market ensures competitive outcomes at all times. This assumption requires that the total demand for energy can be met without the supply from any individual supplier or from a small group of suppliers. This assumption is not correct. There are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate energy market with increasing frequency as daily peak loads increase. The frequency of days with aggregate pivotal suppliers was 93.4 percent in the first six months of 2026, compared to 91.7 percent in the first six months of 2025. High markups for some units demonstrate the potential to exercise market power both routinely and during high demand conditions. In the first six months of 2026, pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market, committed in the day-ahead market and identified as one of three day-ahead aggregate pivotal suppliers, set real-time market prices with markups over $100 per MWh for 553, or 0.4 percent of, marginal unit intervals. The existing market power mitigation measures do not address aggregate market power. The MMU is developing an aggregate market power test and will propose market power mitigation rules to address aggregate market power.

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The three pivotal supplier test is applied by PJM on an ongoing basis for local energy markets in order to determine whether offer capping is required for transmission constraints.[97] However, there are issues with the application of market power mitigation in the day-ahead energy market and the real-time energy market when market sellers fail the TPS test. The Commission recognized some of these issues in its order issued on June 17, 2021, but failed to address them in its November 30, 2023 order.[98] [99] Many of these issues can be resolved by simple rule changes. PJM filed and, on October 25, 2024, FERC accepted a proposal that requires that sellers that fail the TPS test be offer capped at their cost-based offers and that operating parameters will be mitigated.[100] That order has no current effect because FERC approved the PJM filing that linked, for no logical reason, implementing the improved rules to PJM's adoption of a software improvement, with no defined date. The flawed rules remain in place. There is no reason to delay implementation of the FERC approved rules until PJM addresses combined cycle modelling. The changes would decrease the solution time for the day-ahead market and enhance market efficiency. The approved approach should be implemented as soon as possible to help ensure effective market power mitigation.

The enforcement of market power mitigation rules is undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. A competitive offer is equal to short run marginal costs. The significance of competition metrics like markup is also undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. The definition of a competitive offer, under the PJM Market Rules, is not currently correct. The definition, that all costs that are related to electric production are short run marginal costs, is not clear or correct. All costs and investments for power generation are related to electric production. Under this definition, unit owners are allowed to include costs in cost-based energy offers that are not short run marginal costs in offers, especially maintenance costs. This issue can be resolved by simple rule changes to incorporate a clear and accurate definition of short run marginal costs. This rule also had unintended consequences for market seller offer caps in the capacity market. Maintenance costs includable in energy offers cannot be included in capacity market offer caps based on avoidable costs. As a result, capacity market offer caps based on net avoidable costs were lower than they would have been if maintenance costs had been correctly included in avoidable costs rather than incorrectly defined to be part of short marginal costs of producing energy and includable in energy offers.

A competitive power market will result in higher prices when fuel costs increase and in lower prices when fuel costs decrease. A competitive market will not result in higher prices when markups increase based on market power, or when PJM selects a price-based offer including a markup rather than a cost-based offer when there is local market power, or when PJM artificially triggers transmission constraint penalty factors. The overall energy market results support the conclusion that energy prices in PJM are set, generally, by marginal units operating at, or close to, their marginal costs, although this was not always the case in the first six months of 2026 or prior years. Given the design of the energy market which can permit the exercise of aggregate and local market power, some participants' offer behavior results in the exercise of market power in the energy market. This is a reason to use correctly defined short run marginal cost as the sole basis for cost-based offers, to correct the offer capping process for resources with local market power, and to implement an aggregate market power test. In addition, PJM's extensive administrative interventions in the energy market should be reduced or eliminated. The MMU concludes that the PJM energy market results were competitive in the first six months of 2026.

## Overview: Section 4, Energy Uplift

### Energy Uplift Credits

- **Energy uplift credits.** Total energy uplift credits increased by $563.3 million, or 99.0 percent, during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025, from $569.2 million to $1,132.5 million.
- **Types of energy uplift credits.** During the first six months of 2026, total energy uplift credits included $239.1 million in day-ahead generator credits, $746.1 million in balancing generator credits, $144.3 million in

97 The MMU reviews PJM's application of the TPS test and brings issues to the attention of PJM.
98 See 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
99 185 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2023).
100 189 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2024).


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lost opportunity cost credits, $0.9 million in dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits, and $2.1 million in reactive service credits.

- **Types of units.** During the first six months of 2026, non-coal steam units received 94.9 percent of the day-ahead generator credits. Combined cycle units and combustion turbines received 87.0 percent of balancing generator credits. Combustion turbines received 74.9 percent of lost opportunity credits and 48.8 percent of dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits. Hydro, wind, and solar received 35.7 percent of dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits.
- **Concentration of energy uplift credits.** In the first six months of 2026, the top 10 units receiving energy uplift credits received 36.0 percent of all credits and the top 10 organizations received 77.6 percent of all credits.
- **Lost opportunity cost credits.** Lost opportunity cost credits increased by $123.7 million, from $20.6 million to $144.3 million, or 601.4 percent, during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

  Some combustion turbines and diesels are scheduled day-ahead but not requested in real time, and receive day-ahead lost opportunity cost credits as a result. This was the source of 76.0 percent of the $144.3 million of lost opportunity costs.
- **Following dispatch.** Some units are incorrectly paid uplift despite not meeting uplift eligibility requirements, including not following dispatch, not having the correct commitment status, or not operating with PLS offer parameters. Since 2018, the MMU has made cumulative resettlement requests for the most extreme overpaid units of $17.9 million, of which PJM has resettled only $3.9 million, or 22.0 percent.

## Energy Uplift Charges

- **Energy Uplift Charges.** During the first six months of 2026, total energy uplift charges increased by $563.2 million, or 98.9 percent, compared to the first six months of 2025, from $569.2 million to $1,132.5 million.
- **Types of Energy Uplift Charges.** During the first six months of 2026, total uplift charges included $239.0 million in day-ahead operating reserve charges, $890.5 million in balancing generator charges, $2.2 million in reactive charges, and $0.3 million in black start services, and $0.5 million in local congestion charges.

## Section 4 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that uplift be paid only based on operating parameters that reflect the flexibility of the benchmark new entrant unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not pay uplift to units for energy produced because of not following dispatch. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)[101]
- The MMU recommends that PJM pay uplift based on the offer at the lower of the actual unit output or the desired MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)[102]
- The MMU recommends eliminating intraday segments from the calculation of uplift payments and returning to calculating the need for uplift based on the entire 24 hour operating day. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the elimination of day-ahead uplift to ensure that units receive an energy uplift payment based on their real-time output and not their day-ahead scheduled output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units not be paid lost opportunity cost uplift credits when PJM directs a unit to reduce output based on a transmission constraint or other reliability issue. There is no lost opportunity because the unit is required to reduce for the reliability of the unit and the system. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends reincorporating the use of net regulation revenues as an offset in the calculation of balancing generator credits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

101 PJM filed proposed changes to the uplift rules with the FERC on October 7, 2025 ("Reform to Energy Uplift Credit Rules," Docket No. ER26-59-000). The Commission Order on December 5, 2025, accepted the PJM Proposal as filed. PJM expects to implement the changes in 2027.

102 Id.

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- The MMU recommends that self scheduled units not be paid energy uplift credits for their startup cost when the units are scheduled by PJM to start before the self scheduled hours. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends three modifications to the energy lost opportunity cost calculations:
- The MMU recommends calculating LOC based on 24 hour daily periods for combustion turbines and diesels scheduled in the day-ahead energy market, but not committed in real time. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time should be compensated for LOC based on their real-time desired and achievable output, not their scheduled day-ahead output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that only flexible fast start units (startup plus notification times of 10 minutes or less) and units with short minimum run times (one hour or less) be eligible by default for the LOC compensation to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time. Other units should be eligible for LOC compensation only if PJM explicitly cancels their day-ahead commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that up to congestion (UTC) transactions be required to pay energy uplift charges for both the injection and the withdrawal sides of the UTC. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends allocating the energy uplift credits paid to units scheduled by PJM as must run in the day-ahead energy market for reasons other than voltage/reactive or black start services as a reliability charge to real-time load, real-time exports and real-time wheels. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the total cost of providing reactive support be categorized and allocated as reactive services. Reactive services credits should be calculated consistent with the balancing generator credit calculation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends including real-time exports and real-time wheels in the allocation of the cost of providing reactive support to the 500 kV system or above, in addition to real-time load. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends modifications to the calculation of lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units. The lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units should be based on the lesser of the desired output, the estimated output based on actual wind conditions and the capacity interconnection rights (CIRs). The MMU recommends that PJM require wind units to request CIRs based on the maximum output used in the ELCC calculation for wind units. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly identify and classify all reasons for incurring uplift in the day-ahead and the real-time energy markets and the associated uplift charges in order to make all market participants aware of the reasons for these costs and to help ensure a long term solution to the issue of how to allocate the costs of uplift. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the current uplift confidentiality rules in order to allow the disclosure of complete information about the level of uplift by unit and the detailed reasons for the level of uplift credits by unit in the PJM region. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.) [103]
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve its advanced scheduling and commitment process in order to implement a transparent process in which units are scheduled and committed economically based on the known constraints prior to the day-ahead market. The multiday advance commitment process needs to address the communication process, the offers used for commitment evaluation, the operating parameters used for commitment evaluation, the financial consequences of commitment and

103 On September 7, 2018, PJM made a compliance filing for FERC Order No. 844 to publish unit specific uplift credits. The compliance filing was accepted by FERC on June 21, 2019. 166 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2019). PJM began posting unit specific uplift reports on May 1, 2019. 167 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2019).


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the appropriate uplift rules. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 4 Conclusion

Competitive market outcomes result from energy offers equal to short run marginal costs that incorporate flexible operating parameters. When PJM permits a unit to include inflexible operating parameters in its offer and pays uplift based on those inflexible parameters, there is an incentive for the unit to remain inflexible. The rules regarding operating parameters should be implemented in a way that creates incentives for flexible operations rather than inflexible operations. The standard for paying uplift should be the maximum achievable flexibility, based on OEM standards for the benchmark new entrant unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market demand (VRR) curve. Applying a weaker standard effectively subsidizes inflexible units by paying them based on inflexible parameters that result from lack of investment and that could be made more flexible. The result inflates uplift costs, suppresses energy prices, and is an incentive for inflexibility.

It is not appropriate to accept that inflexible units should be paid uplift based on inflexible offers. The question of why units make inflexible offers should be addressed directly. Are units inflexible because they are old and inefficient, because owners have not invested in increased flexibility or because they serve as a mechanism for the exercise of market power? The question of why the inflexible unit was built, whether it was built under cost of service regulation and whether it is efficient to retain the unit should be answered directly. The question of how to provide market incentives for investment in flexible units and for investment in increased flexibility of existing units should be addressed directly. The question of whether inflexible units should be paid uplift at all should be addressed directly. Marginal cost pricing without paying uplift to inflexible units would create incentives for market participants to provide flexible solutions including replacing inefficient units with flexible, efficient units.

Implementing combined cycle modeling, to permit the energy market model optimization to take advantage of the versatility and flexibility of combined cycle technology in commitment and dispatch, would provide significant flexibility without requiring a distortion of the market rules. Such modeling should not be used as an excuse to eliminate market power mitigation or an excuse to permit inflexible offers to be paid uplift. There are defined steps that could and should be taken immediately to improve the modeling of combined cycle plants that do not require investment in combined cycle modeling software, including modeling soak time, and accurately accounting for transition times to power augmentation offer segments.

The reduction of uplift payments should not be a goal to be achieved at the expense of the fundamental logic of the LMP system. For example, the use of closed loop interfaces to reduce uplift should be eliminated because it is not consistent with LMP fundamentals and constitutes a form of subjective price setting. The same is true of fast start pricing. The same is true of PJM's proposals to modify the ORDC in order to increase energy prices and reduce uplift.

Accurate short run price signals, equal to the short run marginal cost of generating power, provide market incentives for cost minimizing production to all economically dispatched resources and provide market incentives to load based on the marginal cost of additional consumption. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to minimize system production costs, not to minimize uplift. Repricing the market to reflect commitment costs creates a tradeoff between minimizing production costs and reduction of uplift. The tradeoff exists because when commitment costs are included in prices, the price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. This tradeoff now exists based on fast start pricing.[104] Fast start pricing affects uplift calculations by introducing a new category of uplift in the balancing market, and changing the calculation of uplift in the day-ahead market.

When units routinely receive substantial revenues through energy uplift payments, these payments are not fully transparent to the market, in part

104 Fast start pricing was approved by FERC and implemented on September 1, 2021. See 173 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2020).

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because of the current confidentiality rules. As a result, other market participants, including generation and transmission developers, do not have the opportunity to compete to displace them. As a result, substantial energy uplift payments to a concentrated group of units and organizations have persisted. FERC Order No. 844 authorized the publication of unit specific uplift payments for credits incurred after July 1, 2019.[105] However, Order No. 844 failed to require the publication of unit specific uplift credits for the largest units receiving significant uplift payments, inflexible steam units committed for reliability by PJM in the day-ahead market.

Uplift payments could be significantly reduced by reversing many of the changes that have been made to the original basic uplift rules. The goal of uplift is to ensure that competitive energy and ancillary service market outcomes do not require efficient resources operating for the PJM system, at the direction of PJM, to operate at a loss. In the original PJM design, uplift was calculated on a daily basis, including all costs and net revenues. But that rule was changed to use only segments of the day. The result is to overstate uplift payments because units may be paid uplift for a day in which their net revenues exceed their costs. In the original PJM design, all net revenues from energy and ancillary services were an offset to uplift payments. That rule was changed to eliminate net revenue from the regulation market. The result is to overstate uplift payments, for no logical reason.

Uplift payments could also be significantly reduced to a more efficient level by eliminating all day-ahead operating reserve credits. It is illogical and unnecessary to pay units day-ahead operating reserve credits because units do not incur any costs to run and any revenue shortfalls are addressed by balancing generator credits.

The MMU has recommended that PJM pay substantially more attention to the details of uplift payments including accurately tracking whether units are following dispatch, identifying the actual need for units to be dispatched out of merit and determining whether better definitions of constraints would be a more market based approach. PJM has paid uplift to units even when they do not operate as requested by PJM, i.e. when units do not follow dispatch.

PJM and the MMU have defined and worked to implement systematic and verifiable rules for determining when units are following dispatch as a primary screen for eligibility for uplift payments. On October 7, 2025, PJM submitted those rules as tariff revisions. The rules address the fact that, under the status quo, resources receive make whole payments for energy produced while not following PJM's dispatch instructions. The rules were approved by FERC on December 5, 2025. PJM expects to implement the rules in the first half of 2027.

While energy uplift charges are an appropriate part of the cost of energy, market efficiency would be improved by ensuring that the level and variability of these charges are as low as possible consistent with the reliable operation of the system and consistent with pricing at short run marginal cost. The goal should be to minimize the total incurred energy uplift charges and to increase the transactions over which those charges are spread in order to reduce the impact of energy uplift charges on markets. The result would be to reduce the level of per MWh charges, to reduce the uncertainty associated with uplift charges and to reduce the impact of energy uplift charges on decisions about how and when to participate in PJM markets. The result would also be to increase incentives for flexible operation and to decrease incentives for the continued operation of inflexible and uneconomic resources. PJM does not need a new flexibility product. PJM needs to provide incentives to existing and new entrant resources to unlock the significant flexibility potential that already exists, to end incentives for inflexibility and to stop creating new incentives for inflexibility.

105 On June 21, 2019, FERC accepted PJM's Order No. 844 compliance filing. 166 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2019). The filing stated that PJM would begin posting unit specific uplift reports on May 1, 2019. On April 8, 2019, PJM filed for an extension on the implementation date of the zonal uplift reports and unit specific uplift reports to July 1, 2019. On June 28, 2019, FERC accepted PJM's request for extension of effective dates. 167 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2019).


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# Overview: Section 5, Capacity Market

## RPM Capacity Market

### Market Design

The Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) Capacity Market is a three year forward looking, annual, locational market, with a must offer requirement for Existing Generation Capacity Resources and a must buy requirement for load, with performance incentives, that includes clear market power mitigation rules and that permits the direct participation of demand side resources.[106] PJM introduced the Capacity Performance design for the 2017/2018 BRA. PJM introduced a new ELCC method for defining capacity MW offered in the 2025/2026 BRA.[107]

Under RPM, capacity obligations are annual.[108] By design, Base Residual Auctions (BRA) are held for delivery years that are three years in the future despite recent auction delays. First, Second and Third Incremental Auctions (IA) are held for each delivery year.[109] First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions are conducted 20, 10, and three months prior to the delivery year although some incremental auctions have not been held as a result of delays in holding BRAs.[110] A Conditional Incremental Auction may be held if there is a need to procure additional capacity resulting from a delay in a planned large transmission upgrade that was modeled in the BRA for the relevant delivery year.[111] A Reliability Backstop Auction may be conducted if tariff defined criteria are met to resolve reliability criteria violations caused by lack of sufficient capacity procured through RPM auctions.[112] If the installed reserve margin resulting from the total UCAP committed through self supply or BRAs for three consecutive years is more than one percentage point lower than the approved PJM installed reserve margin, PJM will make a filing with FERC to conduct a Reliability Backstop Auction. If the total UCAP committed for all base load generation resources in BRAs for three consecutive years is less than the forecasted minimum hourly load, PJM will make a filing with FERC to conduct a Reliability Backstop Auction. PJM has proposed significant changes to the tariff to create a new set of rules for a Reliability Backstop Auction.[113]

The 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted in the first six months of 2026.

### Market Structure

- **RPM Installed Capacity.** In the first six months of 2026, RPM installed capacity decreased 347.0 MW or 0.2 percent, from 184,220.8 MW on January 1, to 183,873.8 MW on June 30. Installed capacity includes net capacity imports and exports and can vary on a daily basis.
- **Reserves.** Total reserves on June 1, 2026, were 20,843.9 MW, which is 279.2 MW (UCAP) short of the required reserve level of 21,123.1 MW (UCAP). On June 1, 2026, the target installed reserve margin was 18.6 percent, and the actual reserve margin was only 18.4 percent.
- **RPM Installed Capacity by Fuel Type.** Of the total installed capacity on June 30, 2026, 48.0 percent was gas; 20.0 percent was coal; 17.6 percent was nuclear; 4.5 percent was hydroelectric; 2.3 percent was oil; 1.9 percent was wind; 0.3 percent was solid waste; and 5.4 percent was solar.
- **Market Concentration.** In the 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction, all participants in the total PJM market as well as the LDA RPM markets failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test.[114] Offer caps were applied to all sell offers for resources which were subject to mitigation when the capacity market seller did not pass the test, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, increased the market clearing price.[115] [116] [117]

106 The terms *PJM Region*, *RTO Region* and *RTO* are synonymous in this report and include all capacity within the PJM footprint.
107 See 186 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2024), *reh'g order*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2024).
108 Effective for the 2020/2021 and subsequent delivery years, the RPM market design incorporated seasonal capacity resources. Summer period and winter period capacity must be matched either through commercial aggregation or through the optimization in equal MW amounts in the LDA or the lowest common parent LDA.
109 See 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 at P 86 (2009).
110 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER10-366-000 (January 22, 2010).
111 See 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 at P 88 (2009). There have been no Conditional Incremental Auctions.
112 See OATT Attachment DD § 16.
113 See *Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from Large Loads*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026).
114 There are 27 Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) identified to recognize locational constraints as defined in "Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region," Schedule 10.1. PJM determines, in advance of each BRA, whether the defined LDAs will be modeled in the given delivery year using the rules defined in OATT Attachment DD § 5.10(a)(ii).
115 See OATT Attachment DD § 6.5.
116 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE resources were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 at P 30 (2009).
117 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource and creating a new definition for Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a generation capacity resource the same in terms of mitigation as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).

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- **Imports and Exports.** Of the 1,144.8 MW of imports offered in the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, 1,005.9 MW cleared. Of the cleared imports, 695.6 MW (69.2 percent) were from MISO.
- **Demand Resources.** Committed DR was 4,805.8 MW for June 1, 2026, as a result of cleared capacity for demand resources in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year (5,710.3 MW) less replacement capacity (904.5 MW).

### Market Conduct

- **2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction.** Of the 985 generation resources that submitted Capacity Performance offers, unit specific offer caps were calculated for four generation resources (0.4 percent).

### Market Performance

- The 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted in the first six months of 2026. The weighted average capacity price for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year is $324.88 per MW-day, including all RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The weighted average capacity price for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year is $333.44 per MW-day, including all RPM auctions for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year.
- For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, RPM annual charges to load are $14.9 billion.
- In the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, the market performance was determined to be not competitive.

## Part V Reliability Service (RMR)

- Of the nine companies (28 units) that have provided service following deactivation requests, two companies (seven units) filed to be paid under the deactivation avoidable cost rate (DACR), the formula rate. The other seven companies (21 units) filed to be paid under the cost of service recovery rate.

## Generator Performance

- **Forced Outage Rates.** The average PJM EFORd in the first six months of 2026 was 8.4 percent, an increase from 6.2 percent in the first six months of 2025.[118]
- **Generator Performance Factors.** The PJM aggregate equivalent availability factor in the first six months of 2026 was 79.9 percent, a decrease from 81.6 percent in the first six months of 2025.

## Section 5 Recommendations[119]

### Definition of Capacity

- The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the enforcement of a consistent definition of capacity resources. The MMU recommends that the tariff requirement to be a physical resource be enforced and enhanced. The requirement to be a physical resource should apply at the time of auctions and should also constitute a commitment to be physical in the relevant delivery year. The requirement to be a physical resource should be applied to all resource types, including planned generation, demand resources, and imports.[120] [121] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that DR providers be required to have a signed contract with specific customers for specific facilities for specific levels of DR at least six months prior to any capacity auction in which the DR is offered. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

118 The generator performance analysis includes all PJM capacity resources for which there are data in the PJM generator availability data systems (GADS) database. Data was downloaded from the PJM GADS database on July 22, 2026. EFORd data presented in state of the market reports may be revised based on data submitted after the publication of the reports as generation owners may submit corrections at any time with permission from PJM GADS administrators.

119 The MMU has identified serious market design issues with RPM and the MMU has made specific recommendations to address those issues. These recommendations have been made in public reports. See Table 5-2.

120 See also Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER14-503-000 (December 20, 2013).

121 See "Analysis of Replacement Capacity for RPM Commitments: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2019," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2019/IMM_Analysis_of_Replacement_Capacity_for_RPM_Commitments_June_1_2007_to_June_1_2019_20190913.pdf> (September 13, 2019).



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- The MMU recommends that Energy Efficiency Resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market construct because PJM's load forecasts have accounted for EE since the 2016 load forecast for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year. EE is not a capacity resource as defined in the tariff, and there is no reason to continue to pay large subsidies to EE providers.[122] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Adopted 2024.)[123]
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market participants to meet their deliverability requirements under the same rules. PJM should end the practice of giving away winter CIRs to intermittent resources that appear to exist because other resources paid for the supporting network upgrades. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)[124]
- The MMU recommends that the must offer rule in the capacity market apply to all capacity resources. There is no reason to exempt intermittent and capacity storage resources, including hydro, and demand resources from the must offer requirement. The same rules should apply to all capacity resources in order to ensure open access to the transmission system and prevent the exercise of market power through withholding. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market sellers of proposed generation capacity resources, including thermal and intermittent, to submit a binding notice of intent to offer at least six months prior to the base residual auction. This is consistent with the overall MMU recommendation that all capacity resources have a must offer obligation in the capacity market auctions. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM's application of the ELCC approach be replaced with an ELCC approach that is based on the actual hourly availability of all individual generators for accreditation and for payment. The MMU recommends short term modifications to PJM's approach to include hourly data that would permit unit specific ELCC ratings, to weight summer and winter risk in a more balanced manner, to eliminate PAI risks, and to pay for actual hourly performance rather than based on inflexible class capacity accreditation ratings derived from a small number of nonrepresentative hours of poor performance from PV1 and WSE. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

## Market Design and Parameters

- The MMU recommends that PJM establish a load queue for large new data center loads to ensure that such loads are not added until there is adequate generation capacity to serve them. The MMU recommends that an expedited queue option that would permit both the load and the generation to be added without delays be available to large data centers if they bring their own new generation with locational and temporal characteristics reasonably matched to their load profile. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all forecast data center load be excluded from capacity market auctions if it is not on line on June 1, 2026. Only organic load and existing data center load as of June 1, 2026, would be included in the capacity market auctions. PJM would operate a reliability auction for forecast data center load that has not signed or committed to sign a bilateral contract for capacity.[125] (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate the shape of the VRR curve. The shape of the VRR curve directly results in load paying substantially more for capacity than load would pay with a vertical demand curve. More specifically, the MMU recommended that the VRR curve be rotated halfway towards the vertical demand curve at the reliability requirement in the 2022 Quadrennial Review. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum price on the VRR curve be defined as 1.5 times Net CONE, capped at Gross CONE. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

122 "PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis," § 3.2 Development of the Forecast, Rev. 39 (June 30, 2026).
123 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2024).
124 This recommendation was first made in the 2020/2021 BRA report in 2017. See the "Analysis of the 2020/2021 RPM Base Residual Auction," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2017/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20202021_RPM_BRA_20171117.pdf> (November 11, 2017).
125 The details of the MMU's proposed design are included in two executive summaries: See "IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf>. See also "IMM Curtailable Load Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Connect%20and%20Manage%20proposal%20-%20V2%202026.06.19.pdf>.

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- The MMU recommends that the reference resource be a CT rather than a CC. The MMU recommends that the ELCC value used to convert the gross CONE in ICAP terms for a CT to the gross CONE in UCAP terms be the ELCC based on winter ratings. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Adopted 2025.)
- The MMU recommends that the test for determining modeled Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) in RPM be redefined. A detailed reliability analysis of all at risk units should be included in the redefined model including transmission constraints inside LDAs. The market design should clear and pay units that are needed for reliability per PJM's transmission reliability analysis in order to forestall RMRs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clear the capacity market based on nodal capacity resource locations and the characteristics of the transmission system inside and outside LDAs consistent with the actual electrical facts of the grid. Absent a fully nodal capacity market clearing process, the MMU recommends that PJM use a non-nested model with all LDAs modeled including VRR curves for all LDAs. Each LDA requirement should be met with the capacity resources located within the LDA and exchanges from neighboring LDAs up to the transmission limit. LDAs should be allowed to price separate if that is the result of the LDA supply curves and the transmission constraints between LDAs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the net revenue offset calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical net revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)[126]
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce the number of incremental auctions to a single incremental auction held three months prior to the start of the delivery year and reevaluate the triggers for holding conditional incremental auctions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not sell back any capacity in any IA procured in a BRA. If PJM continues to sell back capacity, the MMU recommends that PJM offer to sell back capacity in incremental auctions only at the BRA clearing price for the relevant delivery year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not buy any capacity in any IA if PJM has already procured excess reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends changing the RPM solution method to explicitly incorporate the cost of uplift (make whole) payments in the objective function. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) rules, including obligations and performance requirements, be revised and updated to ensure that the rules reflect current market realities and that FRR entities do not unfairly take advantage of those customers paying for capacity in the PJM capacity market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the value of CTRs be defined by the total MW cleared in the capacity market, the internal MW cleared and the imported MW cleared, and not redefined later prior to the delivery year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the market clearing results be used in settlements rather than the reallocation process currently used, or that the process of modifying the obligations to pay for capacity be reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.) [127]
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve the clarity and transparency of its CETL calculations. The MMU also recommends that CETL for capacity imports into PJM be based on the ability to import capacity only where PJM capacity exists and where that capacity has a must offer requirement

126 This recommendation was first made during the Quadrennial Review in 2014, including the PJM Capacity Senior Task Force (CSTF), the MRC and the MC. <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/closed-groups/cstf>.

127 This recommendation was first made in the 2023/2024 BRA report in 2022. See "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction Revised," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).



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in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)

## Offer Caps, Offer Floors, and Must Offer

- The MMU recommends using the lower of the cost or price-based energy market offer to calculate energy costs in the calculation of the historical net revenues which are an offset to gross ACR in the calculation of unit specific capacity resource offer caps based on net ACR. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that modifications to existing resources, including relatively small proposed increases in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource be treated as an existing resource and subject to the corresponding market power mitigation rules and no longer be treated as planned and exempt from offer capping. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)[128]
- The MMU recommends that the RPM market power mitigation rules be modified to apply offer caps in all cases when the three pivotal supplier test is failed and the sell offer is greater than the offer cap. This will ensure that market power does not result in an increase in uplift (make whole) payments for seasonal products. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that any combined seasonal resources be required to be in the same LDA and at the same location, in order for the energy market and capacity market to remain synchronized and reliability metrics correctly calculated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the definition of avoidable costs in the tariff be corrected to be consistent with the economic definition. Avoidable costs are costs that are neither short run marginal costs, like fuel or consumables, nor fixed costs like depreciation and rate of return. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity and therefore the competitive offer level for capacity resources and therefore the market seller offer cap. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity for both new resources and existing resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)[129]
- The MMU recommends that major maintenance costs be included in the definition of avoidable costs and removed from energy offers because such costs are avoidable costs and not short run marginal costs. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that capacity market sellers be required to explicitly request and support the use of minimum MW quantities (inflexible sell offer segments) and that the requests only be permitted for defined physical reasons. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, as part of the MOPR unit specific standard of review, all projects be required to use the same basic modeling assumptions. That is the only way to ensure that projects compete on the basis of actual costs rather than on the basis of modeling assumptions.[130] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The only function the current MOPR is serving now is to create unnecessary administrative work in the application and compliance screening and to create barriers to entry for generation resources. Absent a meaningful change to MOPR, the MMU recommends eliminating the MOPR. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Performance Incentive Requirements of RPM

- The MMU recommends that any unit not capable of supplying energy equal to its day-ahead must offer requirement (ICAP) be required to reflect

128 This recommendation was first made in the 2014/2015 BRA report in 2012. See "Analysis of the 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2012/Analysis_of_2014_2015_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20120409.pdf> (April 9, 2012).

129 This recommendation was first made in the 2023/2024 BRA report in 2022. See "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction Revised," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).

130 See 143 FERC ¶ 61,090 (2013) ("We encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider, for example, whether the unit-specific review process would be more effective if PJM requires the use of common modeling assumptions for establishing unit-specific offer floors while, at the same time, allowing sellers to provide support for objective, individual cost advantages. Moreover, we encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider these modifications to the unit-specific review process together with possible enhancements to the calculation of Net CONE."); see also, Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER13-535-001 (March 25, 2013); Complaint of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. Unnamed Participant, Docket No. EL12-63-000 (May 1, 2012); Motion for Clarification of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER11-2875-000, et al. (February 17, 2012); Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER11-2875-002 (June 2, 2011); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket Nos. EL11-20 and ER11-2875 (March 4, 2011).

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an appropriate outage and associated performance penalty. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that retroactive replacement transactions associated with a failure to perform during a PAI not be allowed and that, more generally, retroactive replacement capacity transactions not be permitted. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that there be an explicit requirement that capacity resource offers in the day-ahead energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units, including flexible operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that Capacity Performance resources be required to perform without excuses. Resources that do not perform should not be paid regardless of the reason for nonperformance. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require actual seasonal tests as part of the Summer/Winter Capability Testing rules, that the number of tests be limited, and that the ambient conditions under which the tests are performed be defined to reflect seasonal extreme conditions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM select the time and day that a unit undergoes Net Capability Verification Testing, not the unit owner, and that this information not be communicated in advance to the unit owner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Capacity Imports and Exports

- The MMU recommends that all capacity imports be required to be deliverable to PJM load in an identified LDA, zonal or subzonal, or defined combinations of specific zones, e.g. MAAC, prior to the relevant delivery year to ensure that they are full substitutes for internal, physical capacity resources. Pseudo ties alone are not adequate to ensure deliverability to PJM load. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all costs incurred as a result of a pseudo tied unit be borne by the unit itself and included as appropriate in unit offers in the capacity market. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the PJM Tariff be modified to explicitly state that in order to qualify, a Capacity Market Seller requesting a must offer exception based on a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity must provide a confirmed firm transmission reservation, covering the entire path from source to sink, for the full requested ICAP MW of the external sale that covers the entire delivery year, by the tariff defined deadline. The MMU recommends that this language apply to all external sales of Generation Capacity Resources, including those where an external balancing authority does not require this level of transmission service in order to consider a PJM resource as a network resource. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Deactivations/Retirements

- The MMU recommends that the notification requirement for deactivations be extended from the current one quarter prior (See Table 5-31) to 12 months prior to an auction in which the unit will not be offered due to deactivation; and no less than 12 months prior to the date of deactivation (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the same reliability standard be used in capacity auctions as is used by PJM transmission planning. One result of the current design is that a unit may fail to clear in a BRA, decide to retire as a result, but then be found to be needed for reliability by PJM planning and paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) to remain in service while transmission upgrades are made. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends elimination of both the cost of service recovery rate option and the deactivation avoidable cost rate option for providing Part V reliability service (RMR), and their replacement with clear language that provides for the recovery of 100 percent of the actual incremental


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costs required to operate to provide the service plus a defined incentive. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that units recover all and only the incremental costs, including incremental investment costs without a cap, required to provide Part V reliability service (RMR service) that the unit owner would not have incurred if the unit owner had deactivated its unit as it proposed, plus a defined incentive payment. Customers should bear no responsibility for paying previously incurred (sunk) costs, including a return on or of prior investments. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that if units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) are included in the calculation of CETO and/or reliability in the relevant LDA, the capacity of the RMR resources should also be included in capacity market supply at zero cost, but without all the obligations of a capacity resource, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) not be included in the calculation of CETO or reliability in the relevant LDA, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions, until a decision is made to build transmission as a replacement, and then should be included. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all CIRs be returned to the pool of available interconnection capability on the retirement date of generation resources in order to facilitate timely and competitive entry into the PJM markets, open access to the transmission system and maintain the priority order defined by the queue process. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 5 Conclusion

The analysis of the PJM Capacity Market begins with market design and market structure, which provide the framework for the actual behavior or conduct of market participants. The analysis examines participant behavior within that market design and market structure. Regardless of the ownership structure of a market, the market design can result in noncompetitive outcomes or in competitive outcomes. In a good market design and a competitive market structure, market participants are constrained to behave competitively. In a market with endemic structural market power like the PJM Capacity Market, effective market power mitigation rules are required in order to constrain market participants to behave competitively. The analysis examines market performance, measured by price and the relationship between price and marginal cost, that results from the interaction of market structure and participant behavior. The analysis also examines the impact of market design choices on market performance.

The MMU concludes that the results of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction were significantly affected by flawed market design elements including the inclusion of large new data center loads in the load forecast, the lack of a queue for the addition of large new data center loads, by the performance assessment interval (PAI) penalties that are part of the CP design, by PJM's ELCC approach, by the definition of market seller offer caps, by the failure to extend the RPM must offer requirement to demand resources, and by the product definition and lack of market power mitigation for demand resources. The BRA prices do not reflect supply and demand fundamentals but reflect, in significant part, PJM decisions about the definition of supply and demand. PJM filed changes that were approved by FERC to adopt two of the MMU's recommendations, the inclusion of specific RMR resources as supply in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year and the elimination of the categorical exemption to the RPM must offer requirement effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, although PJM failed to include elimination of the categorical exemption for demand resources.[131] [132]

The capacity market is, by design, always tight in the sense that total supply is generally only slightly larger than demand. While the market may be long at times, that is not the equilibrium state. Market power is and will

131 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-682-001 (April 29, 2025). See also 193 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2025).
132 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (2025).

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remain endemic to the structure of the PJM Capacity Market. Nonetheless, a competitive outcome can be assured by appropriate market power mitigation rules within an effective market design. Detailed market power mitigation rules are included in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT or Tariff). Reliance on the RPM design for competitive outcomes means reliance on the market power mitigation rules.

The basic conclusion of Part A of the MMU's analysis of the 2027/2028 BRA is that data center load growth is the primary reason for recent and expected capacity market conditions, including total forecast load growth, the tight supply and demand balance, and high prices. But for data center growth, both actual and forecast, the PJM Capacity Market would not have seen the same tight supply demand conditions, the same high prices observed in the 2025/2026 BRA, the 2026/2027 BRA and the 2027/2028 BRA or the currently expected tight supply conditions and high prices for subsequent capacity auctions. The combined total increase in capacity market revenues resulting from data center load, both actual and forecast, for the 2025/2026 BRA, the 2026/2027 BRA and the 2027/2028 BRA was $23,100,955,341.[133] [134] [135] This total will continue to grow until the issues associated with the additions of large data center loads are addressed.

It is misleading to assert that the capacity market results are simply just a reflection of supply and demand. The current conditions are not the result of organic load growth. The current conditions in the capacity market are almost entirely the result of large load additions from data centers, both actual historical and forecast. The growth in data center load and the expected future growth in data center load are unique and unprecedented and uncertain and require a different approach than simply asserting that it is just supply and demand.

It is equally misleading to assert that the PJM Capacity Market does not work as a result of the impact of existing and forecast large data center load additions. Despite all the issues with PJM's changes to the capacity market design, the PJM Capacity Market would have provided for reliability at prices consistent with organic load growth and the cost of new capacity were it not for the paradigm shift represented by the almost inexhaustible demand for power from data centers.

Data center load growth is the core reliability issue facing PJM markets at present. There is still time to address the issue but failure to do so effectively will result in very high costs for other PJM customers and could also result in a switch from competitive markets to cost of service regulation or other distortions of the market design. Customers are already bearing billions of dollars in higher costs as a direct result of existing and forecast data center load as the Market Monitor demonstrated in the Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part G, the Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A, and the Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A.[136] [137] With the completion of the 2028/2029 BRA, the inclusion of data center load in the capacity market auctions has resulted in an irreversible total increase in costs of $29.4 billion.[138]

PJM should not continue to interconnect large new data center load if that load cannot be served reliably. The goal should be to serve all load that can be served reliably. The MMU recommends that PJM establish a load queue for large new data center loads to ensure that such loads are not added until there is adequate generation capacity to serve them. The MMU recommends that an expedited queue option that would permit both the load and the generation to be added without delays be available to large data centers if they bring their own new generation with locational and temporal characteristics reasonably matched to their load profile.

For the first time since the introduction of the RPM capacity market design, the 2026/2027 BRA used a VRR curve with both a defined maximum price and a defined minimum price. The maximum and minimum prices were based on

133 See, "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part G Revised," <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_2025 2026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_G_20250603_Revised.pdf> (June 3, 2025).

134 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," ("Part A") <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20251001.pdf> (October 1, 2025).

135 See "Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," ("Part A") <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf> (January 5, 2026).

136 Post Technical Conference Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM (July 7, 2025) *Resource Adequacy Meeting the Challenge of Resource Adequacy in Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Regions*, Docket No. AD25-7.

137 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," (October 1, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20251001.pdf>.

138 See "Market Monitor Report," (July 28, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/presentations/2026/IMM_MC_Market_Monitor_Report_20260728.pdf>.



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the Agreement between Governor Shapiro of Pennsylvania and PJM that was incorporated in a PJM filing with FERC.[139] That VRR curve with the defined maximum and minimum price is referred to in this report as the actual (or restricted) VRR curve. The VRR curve that would have been used absent the Agreement is referred in this report as the unrestricted VRR curve.

The Agreement resulted in a reduction of 2026/2027 BRA revenues of $3,169,915,210, or 16.4 percent, compared to the revenues that would have resulted from the unrestricted VRR curve, holding everything else constant. If the 2026/2027 BRA had been run with an unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $19,294,286,100, an increase of $3,169,915,210, or 19.7 percent, compared to the actual auction revenues of $16,124,370,889. The Agreement resulted in a reduction of 2027/2028 BRA revenues of $9,913,272,621, or 37.7 percent, compared to the revenues that would have resulted from the unrestricted VRR curve, holding everything else constant. If the 2027/2028 BRA had been run with an unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $26,324,850,846, an increase of $9,913,272,621, or 60.4 percent, compared to the actual auction revenues of $16,411,578,225. The Agreement resulted in a reduction of combined 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 BRA revenues of $13,083,187,831, or 28.7 percent, compared to the revenues that would have resulted from the unrestricted VRR curve, holding everything else constant.

The demand for capacity includes expected peak load plus a reserve margin, and points on the demand curve, called the Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve, exceed peak load plus the reserve margin. The maximum price on the VRR curve has a significant impact on market prices particularly when the market is tight. The shape of the VRR curve results in the purchase of excess capacity and higher payments by customers. The VRR curves used in the 2025/2026 BRA included a maximum price equal to gross CONE for most LDAs that resulted in a significant increase in customer payments for load as a result of paying a price above the competitive level. Demand for capacity is almost entirely inelastic because the market rules require loads to purchase their share of the system capacity requirement. The VRR demand curve is everywhere inelastic. The result is that any supplier that owns more capacity than the typically small difference between total supply and the defined demand is individually pivotal and therefore has structural market power.

For the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, total reserves were 16,977.4 MW, which is 6,516.6 MW (UCAP) short of the required reserve level of 23,494.0 MW (UCAP). The level of committed demand resources in the 2027/2028 BRA was 7,298.6 MW, meaning the PJM markets will rely on demand resources as part of the required reserve margin, rather than as excess above the required reserve margin. This is not consistent with the defined obligations of DR compared to other capacity resources. DR capacity resources do not have a must offer obligation in the energy market. DR capacity resources do not have a must offer obligation in the capacity market. The definition of performance for DR is not to provide a defined incremental level of MW when called but is only to be at a defined level of demand. DR capacity resources have significantly under performed during recent cold weather and hot weather events. DR capacity resources do not have a defined market seller offer cap. PJM markets for the first time in the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 Delivery Years will rely on demand response resources as part of the required reserve margin, rather than as excess above the required reserve margin. PJM markets for the first time in the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 Delivery Years will experience the implications of the definition of demand resources as a purely emergency capacity resource, when demand resources are a significant share of required reserves. Nonetheless, as another significant flaw in the market design, PJM does not include DR in its definition of primary or secondary reserves in the energy market. DR, for all these reasons, is an inferior resource in the capacity market. PJM does not have clear rules defining when the operators must call on DR.

There are currently two important gaps in the market power rules for the PJM Capacity Market related to demand resources. The RPM must offer requirement is not applied to demand resources. There are no market power mitigation rules that apply to demand resources.

139 On December 30, 2024, in Docket No. EL25-46-000, Governor Josh Shapiro and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a complaint against PJM asserting that the maximum price for PJM's capacity auctions is unjust and unreasonable. The Governor and PJM reached an Agreement. On February 20, 2025, in Docket No. ER25-1357-000, pursuant to FPA section 205, PJM submitted proposed revisions to its Tariff to establish a specific maximum price and minimum price for all RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years, consistent with the Agreement.

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For the 2027/2028 BRA, all participants to which the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test was applied (in the RTO RPM market) failed the three pivotal supplier test. The result was that offer caps were applied to all sell offers for Existing Generation Capacity Resources when the capacity market seller did not pass the test, the submitted sell offer exceeded the tariff defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, would have resulted in a higher market clearing price.[140] [141]

The correct definition of a competitive offer in the capacity market is the marginal cost of capacity, net ACR, where gross ACR includes an explicit accounting for the costs of mitigating risk, including the risk associated with mitigating rational capacity market nonperformance penalties, and the relevant costs of acquiring fuel, including natural gas, and net ACR includes all energy and ancillary services net revenues as an offset against every element of gross ACR.

The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. The use of Net CONE as the basis for the PAI penalty rate is unsupported by economic logic. The use of Net CONE to establish penalties is a form of arbitrary administrative pricing that creates arbitrarily high risk for generators, creates complexity in the calculation of CPQR and increases CPQR above rational levels, and ultimately raises the price of capacity above the competitive level. Given PJM's recent decision to rely on conservative operations during tight market conditions as evidenced during Polar Vortex 2025 in January 2025, the probability of a PAI is extremely small. In addition, PJM tightened the definition of a PAI and capped the total annual penalty at 1.5 times the resource's capacity market BRA clearing price. There is no effective performance incentive remaining in the capacity market. In the absence of the EFORd design and with the absence of actual or expected regular PAI events, there is no capacity market consequence for failing to perform.

Rather than penalizing capacity resources at extremely high levels for nonperformance only during PAI events, capacity resources should be paid the daily price of capacity only to the extent that they are available to produce energy or provide reserves, as required by PJM on a daily/hourly basis, based on their cleared capacity (ICAP). This is a positive performance incentive based on the market price of capacity rather than a penalty based on an arbitrary assumption. This would mean that capacity resources are paid to provide energy and reserves based on their full ICAP and are not paid a bonus for doing so. The reduced payments for capacity would directly reduce customers' bills for capacity. This would also end the pretense that there will be penalty payments to fund bonus payments. This would also end the need for complex CPQR calculations based on the penalty rate and assumptions about the number and timing of PAI events. CP has not worked as the theory suggested. PAI events are high impact, low probability events. The failure of the PAI incentives to prevent a very high level of outages during Winter Storm Elliott illustrates the weakness of incentives based on this type of event. In addition, the actual performance standards were unacceptably weakened in the CP model. The standard of performance in the CP model is (B) * (ELCC accredited UCAP factor for a unit), where B is the balancing ratio and the ELCC accredited UCAP factor is the derating factor. For example, if B were 80 percent, the actual required performance for a unit with an 80 percent ELCC accredited UCAP factor would be only 64 percent of ICAP (.80 * .80). For units with low ELCC accredited UCAP factors, the required performance is even lower. The obligation to perform should equal the full ICAP value of a unit, consistent with the associated must offer obligation in the energy market for capacity resources.

The MMU is required to identify market issues and to report them to the Commission and to market participants. The Commission decides on any action related to the MMU's findings.

The MMU has identified serious market design issues with RPM and the MMU has made specific recommendations to address those issues.[142] In 2025 and the first six months of 2026, the MMU prepared a number of RPM related reports and testimony, shown in Table 5-2.

140 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 (2009) at P 30.

141 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource and creating a new definition for Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must-offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource the same in terms of mitigation as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).

142 For the complete list of RPM reports, see the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 5: Capacity Market.



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The PJM markets have worked to provide incentives to entry and to retain capacity. A majority of capacity investments in PJM were financed by market sources. Of the 62,666.3 MW of additional capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2007/2008 through 2025/2026 Delivery Years, 46,876.7 MW (74.8 percent) were based on market funding. Of the 3,294.6 MW of additional capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2027/2028 Delivery Years, 2,725.1 MW (82.7 percent) were based on market funding. Those investments were made based on the assumption that markets would be allowed to work and that inefficient units would exit.

It is essential that any approach to the PJM markets incorporate a consistent view of how the preferred market design is expected to provide competitive results in a sustainable market design over the long run. A sustainable market design means a market design that results in appropriate incentives to competitive market participants to retire units and to invest in new units over time such that reliability is ensured as a result of the functioning of the market.

In order to attract and retain adequate resources for the reliable operation of the energy market, revenues from PJM energy, ancillary services and capacity markets must be adequate for those resources. That adequacy requires a capacity market. The capacity market plays the essential role of equilibrating the revenues necessary to incent competitive entry and exit of the resources needed for reliability, with the revenues from the energy market that are directly affected by nonmarket sources.

## Overview: Section 6, Demand Response

- **Demand Response Activity.** Demand response resources include economic demand response (energy market demand resources), emergency demand response, pre-emergency demand response and price responsive demand (PRD) (capacity market demand resources), synchronized reserves and regulation.[143]

  Total demand response revenue increased by $232.2 million, 149.3 percent, from $155.6 million in the first six months of 2025 to $387.8 million in the first six months of 2026, primarily due to increases in capacity market revenue. Emergency demand response revenue accounted for 85.0 percent of all demand response revenue, economic demand response for 4.8 percent, demand response in the synchronized reserve market for 2.5 percent and demand response in the regulation market for 7.7 percent.

  Total emergency demand response revenue increased by $208.6 million, 172.3 percent, from $121.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $329.7 million in the first six months of 2026.[144] This increase was primarily a result of higher capacity market prices and capacity market revenue.

  Economic demand response revenue increased by $2.2 million, 13.7 percent, from $16.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $18.4 million in the first six months of 2026.[145] Demand response revenue in the synchronized reserve market increased by $0.6 million, 5.7 percent, from $9.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $9.7 million in the first six months of 2026. Demand response revenue in the regulation market increased by $20.9 million, 228.4 percent, from $9.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $30.0 million in the first six months of 2026.

- **Demand Response Energy Payments are Uplift.** Energy payments to emergency and economic demand response resources are uplift. LMP does not cover energy payments to demand response resources although emergency demand response and economic demand response can and do set LMP. Energy payments to emergency demand resources are paid by PJM market participants in proportion to their net purchases in the real-time energy market. Energy payments to economic demand resources are paid by real-time exports from PJM and real-time loads in each zone for which the load-weighted, average real-time LMP for the hour during which the reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the net benefits test price for that month.[146]

- **Demand Response Market Concentration.** The ownership of economic demand response resources was highly concentrated in the first six

143 Emergency demand response refers to both emergency and pre-emergency demand response.

144 The total credits and MWh numbers for demand resources were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.

145 Economic credits are synonymous with revenue received for reductions under the economic load response program.

146 "PJM Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting," § 11.2.2, Rev. 104 (March 1, 2026).

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months of 2025 and 2026. The HHI for economic demand response resource reductions increased by 148 points from 8631 in the first six months of 2025 to 8779 in the first six months of 2026.

The ownership of emergency demand response resources is highly concentrated. The HHI for emergency demand response resources committed MW was 2517 for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. In the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, the four largest CSPs owned 86.7 percent of all committed emergency demand response UCAP MW. The HHI for emergency demand response committed MW is 3131 for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. In the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the four largest CSPs own 89.2 percent of all committed demand response UCAP MW.

- **Limited Locational Dispatch of Demand Resources.** PJM should be able to individually dispatch any capacity performance resource, including demand resources. PJM cannot dispatch demand resources by node with the current rules because demand resources are not registered to a node. In addition, aggregation rules allow a demand resource that incorporates many small End Use Customers to span an entire zone, which is inconsistent with nodal dispatch.
- **Energy Efficiency.** Energy efficiency payments were eliminated from PJM markets effective June 1, 2026.

## Section 6 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that PJM report the response of emergency demand response resources to dispatch by PJM as the actual change in load rather than simply the difference between the amount of capacity purchased by the customer and the actual metered load. The performance metric should be (CBL – Metered load)/(CBL – FSL). The current approach significantly overstates the expected response to PJM dispatch. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FSL registrations be required to reduce to their FSL and GLD registrations be required to reduce by their committed amount in every event hour. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources offering as supply in the capacity market be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) below their PLC to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, as an alternative to including emergency demand response resources as supply in the capacity market, that demand resources have the option to be on the demand side of the markets, that customers be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion, that customer payments be determined only by metered load, and that PJM forecasts immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the option to specify a minimum dispatch price (strike price) for emergency demand response resources be eliminated and that participating resources receive the hourly real-time LMP less any generation component of their retail rate.[147] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum offer for emergency demand response resources and price response demand resources be the same as the maximum offer for generation resources and that the same cost verification rules applied to generation resources apply to demand resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the emergency demand response resources be treated as economic resources, responding to economic price signals like other capacity resources. The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources not be treated as emergency resources. The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources be available for every hour of the year. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Emergency Program Energy Only option be eliminated because the opportunity to receive the appropriate energy

147 See "Complaint and Motion to Consolidate of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL14-20-000 (January 28, 2014), "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. ER15-852-000 (February 13, 2015).


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market prices is already provided in the economic program. (Priority: Low. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, if emergency demand response resources remain in the capacity market, a daily energy market must offer requirement apply to emergency demand response resources, comparable to the rule applicable to generation capacity resources.[148] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources be required to provide their nodal location, comparable to generation resources. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require nodal dispatch of emergency demand response resources with no advance notice required or, if nodal location is not required, subzonal dispatch of demand resources with no advance notice required. The MMU recommends that, if PJM continues to use subzones for any purpose, PJM clearly define the role of subzones in the dispatch of demand response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not remove any defined subzones and maintain a public record of all created and removed subzones. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the measurement of compliance across zones within a compliance aggregation area (CAA). The multiple zone approach is less locational than the zonal and subzonal approach and creates larger mismatches between the locational need for the resources and the actual response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that measurement and verification methods for all demand resources be modified to reflect compliance more accurately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that compliance rules be revised to include submittal of all necessary hourly load data, and that negative values be included when calculating event compliance across hours and registrations. Compliance by demand resources with PJM dispatch instructions should include both increases and decreases in load. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM adopt the ISO-NE five-minute metering requirements in order to ensure that operators have the necessary information for reliability and that market payments to demand resources be calculated based on interval meter data at the site of the demand reductions.[149] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends demand response event compliance be calculated on a five minute basis for all emergency demand response resources and that the penalty structure reflect five minute compliance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that demand response testing be initiated by PJM with advance notice to CSPs identical to the actual lead time required in an emergency in order to accurately represent the conditions of an emergency event. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that shutdown cost be defined as the cost to curtail load for a given period that does not vary with the measured reduction or, for behind the meter generators, be the start cost defined in Manual 15 for generators. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Net Benefits Test be eliminated and that economic demand response resources be paid LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the tariff rules for emergency demand response resources clarify that a resource and its CSP, if any, must notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and must terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at defined levels because load has been reduced or eliminated, as in the case of

148 See "Complaint and Motion to Consolidate of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL14-20-000 (January 27, 2014) at 1.

149 See ISO-NE Tariff, Section III, Market Rule 1, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2, "Demand Response," <https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/rules-procedures/tariff/market-rule-1>. (Accessed October 17, 2017) ISO-NE requires that DR have an interval meter with five-minute data reported to the ISO and each behind the meter generator is required to have a separate interval meter. After June 1, 2017, demand response resources in ISO-NE must also be registered at a single node.

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bankrupt and/or out of service facilities. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that there be only one demand response product in the capacity market, with an obligation to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.[150])
- The MMU recommends that all demand resources register as Pre-Emergency and that the Emergency Program be eliminated. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the lead times for emergency demand response resources be shortened to 30 minutes with a one hour minimum dispatch for all resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends setting the baseline for measuring capacity compliance under winter compliance at the customers' PLC, similar to GLD, to avoid double counting. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the Relative Root Mean Squared Test be required for all demand resources with a CBL. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that 30 minute pre-emergency and emergency demand response be considered to be 30 minute reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that energy efficiency resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market mechanism and that PJM should ensure that the impact of EE measures on the load forecast is incorporated immediately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Adopted 2024.)[151] [152]
- The MMU recommends that demand reductions based entirely on behind the meter generation be capped at the lower of economic maximum or actual generation output. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that DER aggregations that clear in a capacity auction not be permitted to change status from homogeneous demand response to any other status for any additional auctions for the same delivery year, or for the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported Q3, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that EDCs not be allowed to participate in markets as DER aggregators in addition to their EDC role. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM include a 5.0 MW maximum size cap on DER aggregations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM use a nodal approach for DER participation in PJM markets that excludes multinodal aggregation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Commission require PJM to include in OATT Attachment M the explicit statement that the Market Monitor's role includes the right to collect information from EDCs and DERA related to actions taken on the distribution system related to DERs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that net metering resources be prohibited from participating in wholesale ancillary services markets if they are compensated for the service at the retail level. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the requirements for reporting expected real time energy load reductions by CSPs to PJM to improve the accuracy and usefulness to PJM's system operators. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI. The MMU recommends that PJM revise the

150 PJM's Capacity Performance design requires resources to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year, but demand resources still have a limited mandatory compliance window.
151 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095.
152 Originally incorporated with auctions conducted in 2016 for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and forward. The mechanics of the EE addback mechanism were modified beginning with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.


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performance requirements for demand resources to include an event specific measurement for dispatch occurring outside of Performance Assessment Events and penalties for nonperformance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PRD be required to respond during a PAI, regardless of whether the real-time LMP at the applicable location meet or exceeds the PRD strike price, to be consistent with all CP resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that CSPs be required to provide metered data to PJM within 24 hours following the dispatch of economic or emergency DR. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 6 Conclusion

A fully functional demand side of the electricity market means that End Use Customers or their designated intermediaries will have the ability to see real-time energy price signals in real time, will have the ability to react to real-time prices in real time and will have the ability to receive the direct benefits or costs of changes in real-time energy use. In addition, customers or their designated intermediaries will have the ability to see current capacity prices, will have the ability to react to capacity prices and will have the ability to receive the direct benefits or costs of changes in the demand for capacity in the same year in which demand for capacity changes. A functional demand side of these markets means that customers will have the ability to make decisions about levels of power consumption based both on how customers value the power and on the actual cost of that power.

In the energy market, if there is to be a demand side program, demand resources should be paid the value of energy, which is LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. There is no reason to have the net benefits test. The necessity for the net benefits test is an illustration of the illogical approach to demand side compensation embodied in paying full LMP to demand resources. The benefit of demand side resources is not that they suppress market prices, but that customers can choose not to consume at the current price of power, that individual customers benefit from their choices and that the choices of all customers are reflected in market prices. If customers face the market price, customers should have the ability to not purchase power and the market impact of that choice does not require a test for appropriateness.

If demand resources are to continue competing directly with generation capacity resources in the PJM Capacity Market, the product must be defined such that it can actually serve as a substitute for generation. This is a prerequisite to a functional market design. Demand resources do not have a must offer requirement in the day-ahead energy market, are able to offer above $1,000 per MWh without providing a fuel cost policy or any rationale for the offer. Demand resources do not have telemetry requirements similar to other Capacity Performance resources.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources offering as supply in the capacity market should be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) below their PLC to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called.

In order to be a substitute for generation, the ELCC for demand resources should be based on data about actual reductions in demand during high expected loss of load hours, like other capacity resources. The current DR ELCC is significantly overstated because the DR ELCC value is based on the unsupported assumption that the full amount of capacity sold will respond when called rather than on actual response data. In other words, the actual response is assumed to be perfect. The amount of capacity sold equals the PLC minus the FSL for the resource. PJM has proposed to make this problem worse rather than to correct it, by increasing the ELCC of demand resources based on assumptions rather than actual performance data.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should be defined in PJM rules as an economic resource, as generation is defined. Demand resources should be required to offer in the day-ahead energy market and should be called when the resources are required and prior to the declaration of an emergency. Demand resources should be available for every hour of the year. The fact that demand resources are only obligated to respond for defined

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time periods meant that PJM could not fully use demand resources during Winter Storm Elliott (Elliott). Demand resources should be treated as economic resources like any other capacity resource. Demand resources should be called whenever economic and paid the LMP rather than an inflated strike price up to $1,849 per MWh that is set by the seller.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should be subject to robust measurement and verification techniques to ensure that transitional DR programs incent the desired behavior. The methods used in PJM programs today are not adequate to determine and quantify deliberate actions taken to reduce consumption.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should provide a nodal location and should be dispatched nodally to enhance the effectiveness of demand resources and to permit the efficient functioning of the energy market. Both subzonal and multi-zone compliance should be eliminated because they are inconsistent with an efficient nodal market.

In order to be a substitute for generation, compliance by demand resources with PJM dispatch instructions should include both increases and decreases in load. Compliance of demand resources for capacity purposes is measured relative to either Peak Load Contribution (PLC) or Winter Peak Load (WPL), which are static values. If a demand resource's metered load increases above these reference values during a PAI, the current method applied by PJM simply ignores increases in load and thus artificially overstates compliance.[153]

In order to be a substitute for generation, Actual Performance of demand resources during a Performance Assessment Event should be determined consistent with that of generation and should not be netted across the Emergency Action Area (EAA). The Capacity Market Seller's Performance Shortfalls for Demand Resources in the EAA are netted to determine a net EAA Performance Shortfall for the Performance Assessment Interval. Any net positive EAA Performance Shortfall is allocated to the Capacity Market Seller's demand resources that under complied within the EAA on a prorata basis based on the under compliance MW, and such seller's demand resources will be assessed a Performance Shortfall for the Performance Assessment Interval. Any net negative EAA Performance Shortfall is allocated to the Market Seller's Demand Resources that over complied within the EAA on a prorata basis based on over compliance MW, and such Market Seller's Demand Resources will be assessed Bonus Performance. Netting of performance of Demand Resources across the EAA is inconsistent with the performance measurement of other Capacity Performance resources.

In order to be a substitute for generation, any demand resource and its Curtailment Service Provider (CSP), should be required to notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and to terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at the specified level, such as in the case of bankrupt and out of service facilities. Generation resources are required to inform PJM of any change in availability status, including outages and shutdown status.

As an alternative to being a substitute for generation in the capacity market, demand response resources should have the option to be on the demand side of the capacity market rather than on the supply side. Rather than detailed demand response programs with their attendant complex and difficult to administer rules, customers would be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion and the level of usage paid for would be defined by metered usage rather than a complex and inaccurate measurement protocol, and PJM forecasts would immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior.

Under the MMU's recommended approach, participating load would inform PJM prior to an RPM auction of the MW participating, the months and hours of participation and the temperature humidity index (THI) threshold at which load would be reduced.[154] [155] [156] PJM would reduce the load forecast used

153 See PJM. MC Webinar, Market Monitor Report <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2023/20230620-webinar/item-04---imm-report.ashx> (June 20, 2023).

154 The MMU peak shaving proposal at the Summer-Only Demand Response Senior Task Force (SODRSTF) is an example of how to create a demand side product that is on the demand side of the market and not on the supply side. See the MMU package within the *SODRSTF Matrix*, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/task-forces/sodrstf/20180815/20180815-item-04-sodrstf-matrix.xls> .

155 The MMU proposal was based on the concepts defined in the BGE load forecasting program and the Pennsylvania Act 129 Utility Program. *Advance signals that can be used to foresee demand response days*, BGE, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/sodrstf/20180309/20180309-item-05-bge-load-curtailment-programs.ashx> (March 9, 2018).

156 *Pennsylvania ACT 129 Utility Program*, CPower, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/sodrstf/20180413/20180413-item-03-pa-act-129-program.ashx> (April 13, 2018).



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in the RPM auction based on the designated reductions. Load would agree to curtail demand to at or below a defined FSL, less than the customer PLC, when the THI exceeds a defined level or load exceeds a specified threshold. By relying on metered load and the PLC, load can reduce its demand for capacity and that reduction can be verified without complicated and inaccurate metrics to estimate load reductions. Under PJM's weakened version of the program, performance is measured under the current economic demand response CBL rules which means relying on load estimates rather than actual metered load.[157] PJM's proposal includes only a THI curtailment trigger and not an overall load curtailment trigger.

The long term appropriate end state for demand resources in the PJM markets should be comparable to the demand side of any market. Customers should use energy as they wish, accounting for market prices in any way they like, and that usage will determine the amount of capacity and energy for which each customer pays. There would be no counterfactual measurement and verification.

Under this approach, customers that wish to avoid capacity payments would reduce their load during expected high load hours, not limited to a small number of peak hours. Capacity costs would be assigned to LSEs and by LSEs to customers, based on actual load on the system during these hours. Customers wishing to avoid high energy prices would reduce their load during high price hours. Customers would pay for what they actually use, as measured by meters, rather than relying on flawed measurement and verification methods. No measurement and verification estimates are required. No promises of future reductions which can only be verified by inaccurate and biased measurement and verification methods are required. To the extent that customers enter into contracts with CSPs or LSEs to manage their payments, measurement and verification can be negotiated as part of a bilateral commercial contract between a customer and its CSP or LSE. But the system would be paid for actual, metered usage, regardless of which contractual party takes that obligation.

This approach provides more flexibility to customers to limit usage at their discretion. There is no requirement to be available year round or every hour of every day. There is no 30 minute notice requirement. There is no requirement to offer energy into the day-ahead market. All decisions about interrupting are up to the customers only and they may enter into bilateral commercial arrangements with CSPs at their sole discretion. Customers would pay for capacity and energy depending solely on metered load.

A transition to this end state should be defined in order to ensure that appropriate levels of demand side response are incorporated in PJM's load forecasts and thus in the demand curve in the capacity market. That transition should be defined by the rules proposed by the MMU.

This approach would work under the CP design in the capacity market. This approach is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court decision in *EPSA* as it does not depend on whether FERC has jurisdiction over the demand side.[158] This approach would allow FERC to more fully realize its overriding policy objective to create competitive and efficient wholesale energy markets. The decision of the Supreme Court addressed jurisdictional issues and did not address the merits of FERC's approach. The Supreme Court's decision has removed the uncertainty surrounding the jurisdictional issues and created the opportunity for FERC to revisit its approach to demand side.

Any discussion of demand resource performance during a PAI, or at any time demand resources are called on, must recognize the significant problems with the definition of performance for demand resources. As defined by PJM rules, performance, contrary to intuition, does not mean actually reducing load in response to a PJM request for demand resources. Performance means only that, on a net portfolio basis, the amount of capacity paid for in the capacity market (PLC) minus actual metered load is equal to the amount of demand side capacity sold in the capacity market (ICAP). If a demand resource location was already at a reduced load level when PJM called a PAI, the demand resource would be deemed to have performed at a level equal to the PLC minus the metered load even though it took no action. If the load at a demand resource location actually increased above the PLC when called to reduce

157 The PJM proposal from the SODRSTF weakened the proposal but was approved at the October 25, 2018 Members Committee meeting and PJM filed Tariff changes on December 7, 2018. See "Peak Shaving Adjustment Proposal," Docket No. ER19-511-000 (December 7, 2018).

158 577 U.S. 260 (2016).

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its demand, that increase would be set to zero and ignored. If the load at a demand resource location increased when called to reduce but remained below the PLC, the resources would be credited with a reduction from the PLC to that increased MWh level. The standard reporting of demand side response is therefore misleading because it includes loads that were already lower for any reason as a response, because it credits increases in load as a response, and because it ignores and zeros out increases in load above the PLC. That is exactly what happened during Elliott. In addition, PRD is not required to respond if the LMP is less than the PRD strike price. This flawed rule meant that PRD did not fully respond during Winter Storm Elliott because PRD offered at the maximum price of $1,849 per MWh.

## Overview: Section 7, Net Revenue

### Net Revenue

- Energy market net revenues are significantly affected by energy prices and fuel prices. Energy prices, gas prices and coal prices increased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The net effects were that in the first six months of 2026, average energy market theoretical net revenues increased by 108 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT), increased by 76 percent for a new combined cycle (CC), increased by 125 percent for a new coal plant (CP), increased by 40 percent for a new nuclear plant, increased by 198 percent for a new diesel (DS), increased by 25 percent for a new onshore wind installation, increased by 40 percent for a new offshore wind installation and increased by 13 percent for a new solar installation.
- The price of natural gas and coal increased in the first six months of 2026. The marginal costs of a new CT and CC were greater than the marginal costs of a new CP in January and February, and lower in March through June 2026.
- In the first six months of 2026, spark spreads in BGE, PSEG and Western Hub increased and spark spreads in COMED decreased compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, dark and quark spreads increased in BGE, PSEG and Western Hub and dark and quark spreads decreased in COMED compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, the volatility of spark, dark and quark spreads increased in BGE, and Western Hub, decreased in PSEG, and were mixed in COMED compared to the first six months of 2025.
- Of the 16 PJM nuclear plants analyzed, all are expected to cover their avoidable costs from energy and capacity market revenues in 2026, 2027 and 2028, without any subsidies.

### Section 7 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that the net revenue calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

### Section 7 Conclusion

Wholesale electric power markets are affected by externally imposed reliability requirements. A regulatory authority external to the market makes a determination as to the acceptable level of reliability which is enforced through a requirement to maintain a target level of installed or unforced capacity. The requirement to maintain a target level of installed capacity can be enforced via a variety of mechanisms, including government construction of generation, full requirement contracts with developers to construct and operate generation, state utility commission mandates to construct capacity, or capacity markets of various types. Regardless of the enforcement mechanism, the exogenous requirement to construct capacity in excess of what is constructed in response to energy market signals alone has an impact on energy markets. The reliability requirement results in maintaining a level of capacity in excess of the level that would result from the operation of an energy market alone. The result of that additional capacity is to reduce the level and volatility of energy market prices and to reduce the duration of high energy market prices. This, in turn, reduces net revenue to generation owners which reduces the incentive to invest. The exact level of both aggregate and


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locational excess capacity is a function of the calculation methods used by RTOs and ISOs. A basic purpose of the capacity market is to allow all cleared capacity resources the opportunity to cover their net avoidable costs on an annual basis to ensure the economic sustainability of the reliable energy market. PJM's recent change to the definition of the VRR curve in the capacity market weakens the connection between the energy and capacity markets by discounting the net revenue offset, overstating net CONE and creating an arbitrary floor price and, as a result, undermines an important part of the fundamental PJM market design.[159]

PJM's introduction of a flawed form of ELCC for defining available unforced capacity has made the definition of reliability less clear. The ELCC derate factors are volatile and subject to changes for reasons that are not clear to generation owners or other market participants. There are significant issues with PJM's implementation of its approach to ELCC that result, among other things, in the undervaluing of gas fired generation capacity and overvaluing DR and battery storage.

## Overview: Section 8, Environmental and Renewables

### Federal Environmental Regulation

- **MATS.** The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule (MATS) applies the Clean Air Act (CAA) maximum achievable control technology (MACT) requirement to new or modified sources of emissions of mercury and arsenic, acid gas, nickel, selenium and cyanide.[160] On February 19, 2026, the EPA finalized repeal of the core changes of the 2024 amendments to the rule, including the revised filterable particulate matter (fPM) emission standard, restoring the 0.030 lbs/MMBtu standard that became effective in 2012, and eliminating the requirement to use PM Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS).[161]
- **Air Quality Standards ($NO_X$ and $SO_2$ Emissions).** The CAA requires each state to attain and maintain compliance with fine particulate matter (PM) and ozone national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). The CAA also requires that each state prohibit emissions that significantly interfere with the ability of another state to meet NAAQS.[162] (Transport Rule) On March 15, 2021, the EPA finalized decreases to allowable emissions under the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and the 2008 ozone NAAQS for 10 PJM states.[163] On February 28, 2022, the EPA issued a federal implementation plan for implementation of CSAPR (also known as the Good Neighbor Plan),[164] which applies when no state implementation plan has been approved. On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a stay of the federal implementation plan pending judicial review.[165] The effect of the stay is to eliminate the ozone season $NO_X$ emissions budgets for electric generating units in the PJM states. Unless and until the stay is lifted, no federal implementation plan is effective in PJM states and the state emissions budgets are not effective. On January 27, 2026, the EPA proposed approving state implementation plan submissions from eight states, including PJM states Kentucky and Tennessee, for the 2015 ozone NAAQS.[166] Upon becoming final, these states' interstate transport obligations would be resolved without the federal Good Neighbor Plan requirements.
- **NSR/NSPS.** The CAA's NSR program is a preconstruction permitting program that requires certain stationary sources of air pollution to obtain permits prior to beginning construction. Parts C and D of Title I of the CAA provide for New Source Review (NSR) in order to prevent new projects and projects receiving major modifications from increasing emissions in areas currently meeting NAAQS or from inhibiting progress in areas that do not.[167] NSR requires permits before construction commences. NSR review applies a two part analysis to projects at facilities such as power

159 See Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER26-455-000 (December 8, 2025); 194 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2026).
160 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil Fuel Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units*, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012).
161 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units: Final Repeal*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794; FRL-6716.4-02-OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 9088 (February 24, 2026).
162 CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
163 *Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0272; FRL-10013-42-OAR, 85 Fed. Reg. 23054 (Apr. 30, 2021).
164 See *Federal Implementation Plan Addressing Regional Ozone Transport for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0668; FRL 8670-01-OAR, 87 Fed. Reg. 20036 (April 6, 2022).
165 Ohio v. EPA, Slip Op. No. 23A349. (S. Ct. June 27, 2024); Utah v. EPA, D.C. Cir. Case No. Case No. 23-1157, et al.
166 See *Interstate Transport Plan Review for the 2015 Ozone NAAQS*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-0192; FRL-12716-01-OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 4026 (January 30, 2026).
167 42 U.S.C § 7470 et seq.

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plants, some of which involve multiple units and combinations of new and existing units.[168]

New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) set uniform, technology-based emission limits for specific source categories nationwide, pursuant to Section 111 of the CAA. Numeric emission limits based on the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER). On January 9, 2026, the EPA finalized amendments to NSPS for stationary combustion turbines and stationary gas turbines establishing subcategories for new, modified, or reconstructed stationary combustion turbines based on size, rates of utilization, design efficiency, and fuel type. The EPA determined that combustion controls are BSER for NOX emissions for most new, modified, or reconstructed stationary combustion turbines. For one subcategory, new large turbines with high capacity factors, the BSER for NOX is combustion controls with the addition of selective catalytic reduction (SCR).

- **RICE.** Stationary reciprocating internal combustion engines (RICE) are electrical generation facilities like diesel engines typically used for backup, emergency or supplemental power. RICE must be tested annually.[169] Environmental regulations allow stationary emergency RICE that do not meet the emissions limits and are participating in demand response programs to operate for up to 100 hours per calendar year when providing emergency demand response when there is a PJM declared NERC Energy Emergency Alert Level 2 or there are five percent voltage/frequency deviations.

  PJM should but does not prevent stationary emergency RICE that cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of EPA emissions standards from participating in PJM markets as DR. Some stationary emergency RICE that cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of emissions standards are now included in DR portfolios. Stationary emergency RICE should be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of emissions standards.

- **Greenhouse Gas Emissions.** The EPA has for years regulated $CO_2$ as a pollutant using CAA provisions that apply to pollutants not subject to NAAQS.[170] [171] On February 12, 2026, the EPA rescinded the 2009 finding that greenhouse gas (GHG)_emissions (e.g., $CO_2$, methane) endanger public health and welfare, removing the legal foundation for the EPA GHG regulation.[172] The EPA concluded it lacks statutory authority under CAA Section 202(a) to regulate GHGs for climate change purposes (citing West Virginia v. EPA, Loper Bright, and arguments about "major questions").[173]

- **Cooling Water Intakes.** An EPA rule implementing Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires that cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts.[174]

- **Waters of the United States.** On November 17, 2025, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a rule revising the definition of Waters of the United States in the CWA to fully implement *Sackett v. EPA*'s narrowed requirement that wetlands have a "continuous surface connection" to relatively permanent waters in to be jurisdictional.[175]

- **Effluents.** Under the CWA, the EPA regulates (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)) discharges from and intakes to power plants, including water cooling systems at steam electric power generating stations. Since 2015, the EPA has been strengthening certain discharge limits applicable to steam generating units, and some plant owners have already indicated an intent to close certain generating units as a result. In May 2024, the EPA finalized a rule strengthening

168 40 CFR § 52.21.
169 See 40 CFR § 63.6640(f).

170 See CAA § 111.
171 On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the EPA's determination that it was not authorized to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA and remanded the matter to the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases endanger public health and welfare. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497. On December 7, 2009, the EPA determined that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, endanger public health and welfare. See *Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act*, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66497 (Dec. 15, 2009). In a decision dated June 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the endangerment finding, rejecting challenges brought by industry groups and a number of states. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No 09-1322.
172 See *Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards under the Clean Air Act*, EPA–HQ–OAR–2025–0194; FRL–12715–02– OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 7686 (February 18, 2026).
173 See *id.* at 7702–7710.
174 See EPA, *National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities*, EPA-HQ-OW-2008-0667, 79 Fed. Reg. 48300 (August 15, 2014).
175 See Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023); *Updated Definition of "Waters of the United States,"* EPA–HQ–OW–2025–0322; FRL 11132.1–01– OW, 90 Fed. Reg. 52498 (November 20, 2025).


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regulation of effluent discharges.[176] On December 23, 2025, EPA extended the deadlines promulgated in the 2024 rule.[177]

- **Coal Ash.** The EPA administers the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which governs the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.[178] The EPA has adopted significant changes to the implementing regulations that will require closing noncompliant impoundments, and, as a result, the host power plant. The EPA is implementing a process for extensions to as late as October 17, 2028. The EPA is reviewing applications received from PJM plant owners for extensions of the deadline for compliance with the revised Coal Combustion Residuals Rule.

## State Environmental Regulation

- **Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).** The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a $CO_2$ emissions cap and trade agreement among Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia (as of July 1, 2026) that applies to power generation facilities. The most recent RGGI auction, held on June 3, 2026, cleared at $35.00 per short ton, or $38.58 per metric tonne.
- **Illinois Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA).** On September 16, 2021, the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA) became effective. CEJA created an expanded nuclear subsidy program. CEJA established emissions caps for investor owned, gas-fired units with three years of operating history, effective October 1, 2021, on a rolling 12 month basis. More than 10,000 MW of capacity are currently affected. The CEJA operating hour limits have resulted in significant opportunity cost adders to cost-based energy market offers for affected units. CEJA mandated that all fossil fuel plants "permanently reduce all $CO_2$e and copollutant emissions to zero" by the end of 2045.[179] CEJA included more specific dates for closure depending on public versus private ownership, $NO_x$ and $SO_2$ emission rates, commercial operation date, heat rate and location relative to environmental justice communities.
- **Carbon Price.** If the price of carbon were $50.00 per metric tonne, short run marginal costs would have increased by $24.45 per MWh or 45.3 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT) unit, $16.85 per MWh or 39.1 percent for a new combined cycle (CC) unit and $43.12 per MWh or 92.5 percent for a new coal plant (CP).
- **Offshore Wind.** New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia have taken significant steps to promote offshore wind. New Jersey and Maryland enacted legislation for offshore wind renewable energy credits (ORECs) in 2010.[180] On January 20, 2025, the Trump Administration issued a Presidential Memorandum withdrawing "from disposition for wind energy leasing all areas within the Offshore Continental Shelf."[181] The withdrawal effectively put on hold indefinitely the offshore wind projects in New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia. On May 5, 2025, the Attorneys General of New Jersey and Maryland, along with the 16 other states, filed suit against the withdrawal of offshore leasing.[182] On January 16, 2026, a federal judge temporarily lifted the Trump administration suspension of Dominion's Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) project.[183]

## State Renewable Portfolio Standards

- **RPS.** In PJM, ten of 14 jurisdictions have enacted legislation requiring that a defined percentage of retail suppliers' load be served by renewable resources, for which definitions vary. These are typically known as renewable portfolio standards, or RPS. As of June 30, 2026, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, DC have renewable portfolio standards. Indiana has a voluntary renewable portfolio standard.

176 See *Supplemental Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category*, Final Rule, EPA Docket No. EPA–HQ–OW–2009–0819; FRL–8794–01– OW, 89 Fed. Reg. 40199 (May 9, 2024).
177 See *Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category—Deadline Extensions*, EPA–HQ–OW–2009–0819, 90 Fed. Reg. 61328 (December 31, 2025).
178 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 *et seq.*
179 Climate and Equitable Jobs Act, P.A. 102-0662, at Section 9.15 (g) – (k).
180 See Offshore Wind Economic Development Act of 2010, P.L. 2010, c. 57, as amended, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 to -87.2.
181 *Temporary Withdrawal of all Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government's Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects*, Presidential Memorandum (January 20, 2025) <*https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/temporary-withdrawal-of-all-areas-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-from-offshore-wind-leasing-and-review-of-the-federal-governments-leasing-and-permitting-practices-for-wind-projects/*>.
182 State of New York v. Trump, Case No. 1:25-cv-11221 (Dist. of Mass. May 5, 2025).
183 See Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia, et al. v. United States Department of the Interior, et al., (E.D. Va. No. 2:25-cv-00830) (granting a preliminary injunction, staying a December 22, 2025, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management stop-work order and allowing construction on the CVOW project to resume while the case proceeds).

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Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia do not have renewable portfolio standards.

- **RPS Cost.** The cost of complying with RPS, as reported by the states, is $17.8 billion over the 11 year period from 2014 through 2024, an average annual RPS compliance cost of $1.6 billion. The compliance cost for 2024, the most recent year with almost complete data, was $3.2 billion.[184]

## Emissions Controls in PJM Markets

- **Regulations.** Environmental regulations affect decisions about emission control investments in existing units, investment in new units and decisions to retire units. As a result of environmental regulations and agreements to limit emissions, many PJM units burning fossil fuels have installed emission control technology.
- **Emissions Controls.** In PJM, as of June 30, 2026, 98.0 percent of coal steam MW had some type of flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) technology to reduce $SO_2$ emissions, 99.8 percent of coal steam MW had some type of particulate matter (PM) control, and 99.8 percent of coal steam MW had $NO_x$ emission control technology. All coal steam units in PJM are compliant with the state and federal emissions limits established by MATS.

## Renewable Generation

- **Renewable Generation.** Wind and solar generation was 8.0 percent of total generation in PJM in the first six months of 2026. RPS Tier I generation was 9.3 percent of total generation in PJM and RPS Tier II generation was 2.0 percent of total generation in PJM in the first six months of 2026. Only Tier I generation is defined to be renewable but Tier I includes some carbon emitting generation.
- PJM states with RPS rely heavily on imports and generation from behind the meter resources for RPS compliance. In the first six months of 2026, Tier I generation from PJM generators met only 53.6 percent of the Tier I RPS requirements.

## Section 8 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that renewable energy credit markets based on state renewable portfolio standards be brought into PJM markets as they are an increasingly important component of the wholesale energy market. The MMU recommends that there be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that jurisdictions with a renewable portfolio standard make the price and quantity data on supply and demand more transparent. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Commission reconsider its disclaimer of jurisdiction over RECs markets because, given market changes since that decision, it is clear that RECs materially affect jurisdictional rates. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that load and generation located at separate nodes be treated as separate resources in order to ensure that load and generation face consistent incentives throughout the markets. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that stationary emergency RICE be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet the capacity market requirements to be DR as a result of emissions standards that impose environmental run hour limitations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

184 The 2024 compliance cost value for PJM states does not include Delaware, Michigan or North Carolina. Based on past data these states generally account for approximately 2.0 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states.



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## Section 8 Conclusion

Environmental requirements and renewable energy mandates at both the federal and state levels have a significant impact on the cost of energy and capacity in PJM markets.

Environmental requirements and initiatives at both the federal and state levels, and state renewable energy mandates and associated subsidies have resulted in the construction of substantial amounts of renewable capacity in the PJM footprint, especially wind and solar resources, and the retirement of emitting resources. Renewable energy credit (REC) markets created by state programs, federal subsidies, and federal tax credits have significant impacts on PJM wholesale markets. However, state renewables programs in PJM are not coordinated with one another, are generally not consistent with the PJM market design or PJM prices, have widely differing objectives, including supporting some emitting resources, have widely differing implied prices of carbon and are not transparent on pricing and quantities. The effectiveness of state renewables programs would be enhanced if they were coordinated with one another and with PJM markets, and if they increased transparency. States could evaluate the impacts of a range of carbon prices if PJM would provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. A single carbon price across PJM, established by the states, would be the most efficient way to reduce carbon output, if that is the goal. These are state decisions.

In the absence of a PJM market carbon price, a single PJM market for RECs would contribute significantly to market efficiency and to the procurement of renewable resources in a least cost manner. Ideally, there would be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. States would continue to have the option to create separate RECs for additional products that did not fit the product definition, e.g. waste coal, trash incinerators, or black liquor. This is a state decision.

RECs are an important mechanism used by PJM states to implement environmental policy. RECs clearly affect prices in the PJM wholesale power market. Some resources are not economic except for the ability to purchase or sell RECs. RECs provide out of market payments to qualifying renewable resources, primarily wind and solar. The credits provide an incentive to make negative energy offers and more generally provide an incentive to enter the market, to remain in the market and to operate whenever possible. These subsidies affect the offer behavior and the operational behavior of these resources in PJM markets and in some cases the existence of these resources and thus the market prices and the mix of clearing resources.

RECs markets are, as an economic fact, integrated with PJM markets including energy and capacity markets, but are not formally recognized as part of PJM markets. If elected by the relevant states, it would be preferable to have a single, transparent market for RECs operated by the PJM RTO on behalf of the states that would meet the standards and requirements of all states in the PJM footprint. This would provide better information for market participants about supply and demand and prices and contribute to a more efficient and competitive market and to better price formation. This could also facilitate entry by qualifying renewable resources by reducing the risks associated with lack of transparent market data.

Existing REC markets are not consistently or adequately transparent. Data on REC prices, clearing quantities and markets are not publicly available for all PJM states. The economic logic of RPS programs and the associated REC and SREC prices are not always clear. The price of carbon implied by REC prices ranges from $8.71 per tonne in Ohio to $64.11 per tonne in Virginia. The price of carbon implied by SREC prices ranges from $65.84 per tonne in Pennsylvania to $836.43 per tonne in Washington, DC. The effective prices for carbon compare to the average RGGI auction clearing price of $32.10 per tonne in the first six month of 2026 and to the social cost of carbon which is estimated in the range of $50 per tonne.[185] [186] The impact on the cost of

185 "Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis – Under Executive Order 12899," Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government, (Aug. 2016), <*https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf*>.

186 A recent update by the EPA estimates the social cost of carbon emissions for 2030 to be between $140 and $380 per metric ton (2020 dollars). See Table ES.1 in Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (November 2023) "Supplementary Material for the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Rulemaking, "Standards of Performance for

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generation from a new combined cycle unit of a $50 per tonne carbon price would be $16.85 per MWh.[187] The impact of an $800 per tonne carbon price would be $269.59 per MWh. This wide range of implied carbon prices is not consistent with an efficient, competitive, least cost approach to the reduction of carbon emissions.

In addition, even the explicit environmental goals of RPS programs are not clear. While RPS is frequently considered to target carbon emissions, Tier 1 resources include some carbon emitting generation and Tier 2 resources include additional carbon emitting generation.

PJM markets provide a flexible mechanism for incorporating the costs of environmental controls and meeting environmental requirements in a cost effective manner. Costs for environmental controls are part of offers for capacity resources in the PJM Capacity Market. The costs of emissions credits are included in energy offers. PJM markets also provide a flexible mechanism that incorporates renewable resources and the impacts of renewable energy credit markets, and ensures that renewable resources have access to a broad market. PJM markets provide efficient price signals that permit valuation of resources with very different characteristics when they provide the same product.

If the states chose this policy option, PJM markets could also provide a flexible mechanism to limit carbon output, for example by incorporating a consistent carbon price in unit offers which would be reflected in PJM's economic dispatch. If there is a social decision to limit carbon output, a consistent carbon price would be the most efficient way to implement that decision. The states in PJM could agree, if they decided it was in their interests, with the appropriate information, on a carbon price and on how to allocate the revenues from a carbon price that would make all states better off. A mechanism like RGGI leaves all decision making with the states. The carbon price would not be FERC jurisdictional or subject to PJM decisions. The MMU continues to recommend that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. The results of the analysis would include the impact on the dispatch of every unit, the impact on energy prices and the carbon pricing revenues that would flow to each state.

For example, states receiving high levels of revenue could shift revenue to states disproportionately hurt by a carbon price if they believed that all states would be better off as a result. A carbon price would also be an alternative to specific subsidies to individual nuclear power plants and to the current wide range of implied carbon prices embedded in RPS programs and instead provide a market signal to which any resource could respond. The imposition of specific and prescriptive environmental dispatch rules would, in contrast, pose a threat to economic dispatch and efficient markets and create very difficult market power monitoring and mitigation issues. The provision of subsidies to individual units creates a discriminatory regime that is not consistent with competition. The use of inconsistent implied carbon prices by state is also inconsistent with an efficient market and inconsistent with the least cost approach to meeting state environmental goals.

The annual average cost of complying with RPS over the 11 year period from 2014 through 2024 for the ten jurisdictions that had RPS was $1.6 billion, or a total of $17.8 billion over 11 years. The RPS compliance cost for 2024, the most recent year for which there is almost complete data, was $3.2 billion.[188] RPS costs are payments by customers to the sellers of qualifying resources. The revenues from carbon pricing flow to the states.

If all the PJM states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances would be approximately $12.5 billion per year if the carbon price were $35.00 per short ton and emissions levels were five percent below 2025 emission levels. If all the PJM states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon

New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review"<*https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-12/epa_scghg_2023_report_final.pdf*>. Continued use of the calculation of social cost of carbon by the EPA is under review, now pending, <*https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-action-address-costly-obama-biden-climate-measurements-social-cost*>.

187 The cost impact calculation assumes a heat rate of 6.296 MMBtu per MWh and a carbon emissions rate of 52.91 kg per MMBtu. The $800 per tonne carbon price represents the approximate upper end of the carbon prices implied by the 2026 REC and SREC prices in the PJM jurisdictions with RPS. Additional cost impacts are provided in Table 89.

188 The 2024 compliance cost value for PJM states does not include Delaware, Michigan or North Carolina. Based on past data these states generally account for approximately 2.0 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states.



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allowances would be approximately $17.8 billion if the carbon price were $50 per short ton and emission levels were five percent below 2025 levels. If only the current RPS states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances at $35.00 per short ton would be about $8.3 billion. The costs of a carbon price are the impact on energy market prices, net of the revenue returned to states/customers.

## Overview: Section 9, Interchange Transactions

### Interchange Transaction Activity

- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the real-time energy market in all months.[189] In the first six months of 2026, the real-time net interchange was -11,826.5 GWh. The real-time net interchange in the first six months of 2025 was -17,194.6 GWh.
- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the day-ahead energy market in all months. In the first six months of 2026, the total day-ahead net interchange was -13,028.4 GWh. The day-ahead net interchange in the first six months of 2025 was -16,895.4 GWh.
- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead and the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, gross imports in the day-ahead energy market were 51.9 percent of gross imports in the real-time energy market (58.0 percent in the first six months of 2025). In the first six months of 2026, gross exports in the day-ahead energy market were 81.5 percent of the gross exports in the real-time energy market (84.6 percent in the first six months of 2025).
- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at 12 of PJM's 19 interfaces in the real-time energy market.
- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for real-time transactions in the real-time energy market.
- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at 13 of PJM's 19 interfaces in the day-ahead energy market.
- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions in the day-ahead energy market.
- **Up To Congestion Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, up to congestion transactions were net exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions in the day-ahead energy market.
- **Inadvertent Interchange.** In the first six months of 2026, net scheduled interchange was -11,826.5 GWh and net actual interchange was -11,986.3 GWh, a difference of 159.9 GWh. In the first six months of 2025, the difference was 182.1 GWh. This difference is inadvertent interchange.
- **Loop Flows.** In the first six months of 2026, the Northern Indiana Public Service (NIPS) Interface had the largest loop flows of any interface with -360.1 GWh of net scheduled interchange and -6,323.0 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 5,962.9 GWh. In the first six months of 2026, the SOUTH interface pricing point had the largest loop flows of any interface pricing point with 4,603.4 GWh of net scheduled interchange and 9,720.1 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 5,116.7 GWh.

### Interactions with Bordering Areas

#### PJM Interface Pricing with Organized Markets

- **PJM and MISO Interface Prices.** In the first six months of 2026, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface in 53.6 percent of the hours.
- **PJM and New York ISO Interface Prices.** In the first six months of 2026, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly

189 Calculated values shown in Section 9, "Interchange Transactions," are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

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price differences between the PJM/NYIS Interface and the NYISO/PJM proxy bus in 61.7 percent of the hours.

- **Neptune Underwater Transmission Line to Long Island, New York.** In the first six months of 2026, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Neptune Interface and the NYISO Neptune bus in 82.7 percent of the hours.
- **Linden Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT) Facility.** In the first six months of 2026, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Linden Interface and the NYISO Linden bus in 77.7 percent of the hours.
- **Hudson DC Line.** In the first six months of 2026, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Hudson Interface and the NYISO Hudson bus in 77.5 percent of the hours.

## Interchange Transaction Issues

- **PJM Transmission Loading Relief Procedures (TLRs).** PJM issued three TLRs of level 3a or higher in the first six months of 2026, and two such TLRs in the first six months of 2025.
- **Up To Congestion.** The average number of up to congestion bids submitted in the day-ahead energy market increased by 14.6 percent, from 47,825 bids per day in the first six months of 2025 to 54,791 bids per day in the first six months of 2026. The average cleared volume of up to congestion bids submitted in the day-ahead energy market decreased by 23.5 percent, from 242,420 MWh per day in the first six months of 2025, to 185,501 MWh per day in the first six months of 2026.

## Section 9 Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU recommends that PJM apply after the fact market settlement adjustments to identified sham scheduling segments to ensure that market participants cannot benefit from sham scheduling. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule by concealing the true source or sink of the transaction. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would require market participants to submit transactions on paths that reflect the expected actual power flow in order to reduce unscheduled loop flows. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the locational price impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the MISO interface pricing point. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM review the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual interface pricing points to reflect changes to the impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines as a result of system topology changes. The MMU recommends that this review occur at least annually. (Priority: Low. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, in order to permit a complete analysis of loop flow, FERC and NERC ensure that the identified data are made available to market monitors as well as other industry entities determined appropriate by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2003. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that would remove


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the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams. Such a solution would include an optimized, but limited, joint dispatch approach that uses supply curves and treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to other constraints within an LMP market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports as well as unlimited nonfirm point to point willing to pay congestion imports and exports at all PJM interfaces in order to improve the efficiency of the market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the emergency interchange cap be replaced with a market based solution. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1800 on the day prior, to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes. These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be used to meet load in the most economic manner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted, 2015.)
- The MMU recommends eliminating the mechanism that defines FFE and M2M payments. These mechanisms are not consistent with markets and are not needed for efficient interface pricing. The MMU recommends that PJM file with the Commission to eliminate the FFE calculation and M2M payment of the PJM and MISO joint operating agreement. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends clear, explicit and detailed rules that define the conditions under which PJM will and will not recall energy from PJM capacity resources and prohibit new energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends that those rules define the conditions under which PJM will purchase emergency energy while at the same time not recalling energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends clear rules governing when PJM may recall capacity backed exports. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)

## Section 9 Conclusion

Transactions between PJM and multiple balancing authorities in the Eastern Interconnection are part of a single energy market. While some of these balancing authorities are termed market areas and some are termed nonmarket areas, all electricity transactions are part of a single energy market. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between market and nonmarket areas. Market areas, like PJM, include essential features of an energy market including locational marginal pricing, financial congestion offsets (FTRs and ARRs in PJM) and transparent, least cost, security constrained economic dispatch for all available generation. Nonmarket areas do not include these features. Pricing in the market areas is transparent and pricing in the nonmarket areas is not transparent.

The MMU's recommendations related to transactions with external balancing authorities all share the goal of improving the economic efficiency of interchange transactions. The standard of comparison is an LMP market. In an LMP market, redispatch based on LMP and competitive generator offers results in an efficient dispatch and efficient prices. The goal of designing interface transaction rules should be to match the outcomes that would exist in an LMP market across the interfaces.

It is not appropriate to have special pricing agreements between PJM and any external entity. The same market pricing should apply to all transactions. External entities wishing to receive the benefits of the PJM LMP market should join PJM.

In 2020, PJM terminated a number of interface pricing points, consistent with longstanding MMU recommendations. Following the termination of the Northwest pricing point on October 1, 2020, PJM failed to correctly map the pricing points to transactions that had been mapped to the Northwest pricing point to pricing points that are consistent with electrical impacts on the PJM system. The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the electrical impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM.

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The MMU continues to recommend the termination of the Ontario interface pricing point. The Ontario interface pricing point is noncontiguous to the PJM footprint that creates opportunities for market participants to engage in sham scheduling activities.

## Overview: Section 10, Ancillary Services

### Primary Reserve

Primary reserves consist of both synchronized and nonsynchronized reserves that can provide energy within 10 minutes and sustain that output for at least 30 minutes during a contingency event. PJM made several changes to the primary reserve market, effective October 1, 2022. These included a must offer requirement and correction of misspecified cost-based offers. By removing opportunities for physical and economic withholding, the changes resulted in clearing increased quantities of available synchronized reserves at competitive prices. Starting in May 2023, to compensate for poor unit specific resource performance, PJM unilaterally increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, which in turn increased the primary reserve reliability requirement. That increase was not justified when implemented, as current data demonstrates and the increase should be removed.

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** Primary reserve is provided by both synchronized reserve (generation or demand response currently synchronized to the grid and available within 10 minutes) and nonsynchronized reserve (generation currently offline but available to start and provide energy within 10 minutes).
- **Demand.** The primary reserve reliability requirement is equal to 150 percent of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. The primary reserve requirement is equal to the primary reserve reliability requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $850 per MWh, plus the extended reserve requirement (190 MW), with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MWh. The synchronized reserve requirement is equal to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement plus the extended reserve requirement, with a default level of 190 MW. The synchronized reserve reliability requirement is normally equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). Starting in May 2023, PJM increased the size of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the most severe single contingency (MSSC), in effect increasing the primary reserve reliability requirement to 195 percent of the MSSC. On January 9, 2026, PJM decreased the size of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone to 120 percent of the MSSC, in effect setting the primary reserve reliability requirement to 180 percent of the MSSC. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average primary reserve requirement was 3,181.6 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 2,576.8 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead average primary reserve requirement was 3,169.2 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 2,560.0 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Market Concentration.** The Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone Market for primary reserve was characterized by structural market power in the first six months of 2026. The average HHI for real-time primary reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone was 1159, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The real-time RTO primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 2.0 percent of intervals.[190] The average HHI for day-ahead primary reserve in the RTO Zone was 1154, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The day-ahead RTO primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 2.0 percent of hours. The average HHI for real-time primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2526, which is classified as highly concentrated. The real-time MAD primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 80.3 percent of intervals. The average HHI for day-ahead primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2147, which is classified as highly concentrated. The day-ahead MAD primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 65.6 percent of hours.

### Synchronized Reserve Market

Synchronized reserves include all capacity synchronized to the grid and available to provide power within 10 minutes. This includes online resources loaded below their full output, storage, and condensing resources synchronized

190 FERC defines a highly concentrated market as having an HHI greater than 1800.



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to the grid but consuming energy, and 10-minute demand response capability. As of October 1, 2022, all generation capacity resources must offer their entire synchronized reserve capability to the PJM market at all times. PJM jointly optimizes energy, synchronized reserve, primary reserve, and 30-minute reserve needs in both the day-ahead and real-time markets. Synchronized reserve prices are based on opportunity costs calculated by PJM in the market optimization plus the anticipated cost of a performance penalty. All real-time cleared synchronized reserves are obligated to perform when PJM initiates a synchronized reserve event.

## Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of available synchronized reserve was 5,119.3 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 2,254.7 MW on average was located in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead average supply of available synchronized reserve was 6,254.3 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 2,946.1 MW on average was located in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Demand.** The synchronized reserve requirement is equal to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $850 per MWh, plus the extended reserve requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MWh and a default value of 190 MW. The synchronized reserve reliability requirement is normally equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). From May 19, 2023, through January 8, 2026, PJM inappropriately set the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to 130 percent of the MSSC for the RTO Reserve Zone. Since January 9, 2026, PJM has inappropriately set the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to 120 percent of the MSSC for the RTO Reserve Zone. The real-time average synchronized reserve requirement in the first six months of 2026 was 2,184.4 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 1,781.2 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. The day-ahead average synchronized reserve requirement in the first six months of 2026 was 2,176.1 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 1,770.0 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Market Concentration.** The Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone Market for synchronized reserve was characterized by structural market power in the first six months of 2026. The average HHI for real-time synchronized reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone was 927, which is classified as unconcentrated. The real-time RTO synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.2 percent of intervals. The average HHI for day-ahead synchronized reserve in the RTO Zone was 932, which is classified as unconcentrated. The day-ahead RTO synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.4 percent of hours. The average HHI for real-time synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2086, which is classified as highly concentrated. The real-time MAD synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 59.1 percent of intervals. The average HHI for day-ahead synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 1788, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The day-ahead MAD synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 41.8 percent of hours.

## Market Behavior

- **Offers.** There is a must offer requirement for synchronized reserve. All nonemergency generation capacity resources are required to offer their entire synchronized reserve capability. PJM calculates the available synchronized reserve for all conventional resources based on the energy offer ramp rate, energy dispatch point, and the lesser of the synchronized reserve maximum or economic maximum output. Hydro resources, Energy Storage Resource model participants, and demand response resources submit their available synchronized reserve MW. Wind, solar, and nuclear resources are by default considered incapable of providing synchronized reserve, but may offer with an exception approved by PJM. Synchronized reserve offers are capped at cost plus the expected value of performance penalties. PJM calculates opportunity costs based on LMP.

  In December 2024, PJM updated the economic basepoint signal to include deployed reserve MW during synchronized reserve events, improving performance. The yearly average performance in 2024 for events that were 10 minutes or longer was 58.2 percent, while for 2025 it was 78.3 percent and for the first six months of 2026 it was 72.3 percent.

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However, significant communications technology and modelling issues when calling resources during spinning events continue to result in slow response from a significant share of resources.

### Market Performance

- **Price.** In the first six months of 2026, for the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone, the weighted average real-time price for synchronized reserve was $5.01 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $6.22 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, for the RTO Reserve Zone, the weighted average real-time price for synchronized reserve was $4.92 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $5.77 per MWh.

## Nonsynchronized Reserve

Nonsynchronized reserve is comprised of nonemergency energy resources not currently synchronized to the grid that can provide energy within 10 minutes. Nonsynchronized reserve is available to meet the portions of the primary reserve requirement and the 30-minute reserve requirement not already satisfied by reserve cleared for the synchronized reserve requirement.

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of eligible and available nonsynchronized reserve was 1,089.7 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 747.9 MW on average was available in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of eligible and available nonsynchronized reserve was 1,056.4 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 656.6 MW on average was available in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Demand.** Demand for nonsynchronized reserve is the primary reserve requirement less the amount of synchronized reserves cleared by PJM.[191] Although nonsynchronized reserve can be used to meet the 30-minute reserve requirement, any 30-minute reserve beyond the primary reserve requirement is usually provided by secondary reserve due to secondary reserve having lower cost and greater availability.

### Market Behavior

- **Offers.** Generation owners do not submit supply offers for nonsynchronized reserve from non-hydroelectric units. Nonemergency generation resources that are available to provide energy and can start in 10 minutes or less are defined to be available for nonsynchronized reserves. For non-hydroelectric units, PJM calculates the MW available from a unit based on the unit's energy offer. Hydroelectric units set their own offered reserve amount. For all units, the offer price of nonsynchronized reserve is $0 per MWh.[192] Hybrid units and Energy Storage Resource model participants are not eligible to provide nonsynchronized reserves.

### Market Performance

- **Price.** The nonsynchronized reserve price is determined by the marginal primary reserve resource. In the first six months of 2026, the nonsynchronized reserve weighted average real-time price for all intervals in the RTO Reserve Zone was $2.10 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $1.74 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the nonsynchronized reserve weighted average real-time price for all intervals in the MAD Reserve Subzone was $2.71 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $1.72 per MWh.

## 30-Minute Reserve Market

The supply of 30-minute reserves consists of resources, online or offline, which can respond within 30 minutes. This includes primary reserves and secondary reserves. By default, there is no reserve subzone for 30-minute reserves.

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** The supply of 30-minute reserves is provided by both primary reserves (synchronized and nonsynchronized resources that can provide energy within 10 minutes) and secondary reserves (synchronized and nonsynchronized resources that can provide energy within 30 minutes but that take more than 10 minutes). In the first six months of 2026, the

191 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.1 Overview of the PJM Reserve Markets, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

192 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).



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real-time average supply of available 30-minute reserve was 24,982.6 MW in the RTO Zone.

- **Demand.** The 30-minute reserve requirement is equal to the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $850 per MWh, plus the extended reserve requirement (190 MW), with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MWh. The 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is equal to the maximum of: the primary reserve reliability requirement; the largest active gas contingency; and 3,000 MW. Since PJM increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is frequently equal to the primary reserve reliability requirement. In the first six months of 2026, the average 30-minute reserve requirement was 3,378.4 MW in the real-time market and 3,374.0 MW in the day-ahead market.
- **Market Concentration.** The RTO Reserve Zone Market for 30-minute reserves was characterized by low concentration in the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the average HHI for real-time 30-minute reserves was 774, which is classified as unconcentrated. The real-time RTO 30-minute reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.03 percent of intervals. In the first six months of 2026, the average HHI for day-ahead 30-minute reserves was 867, which is classified as unconcentrated. The day-ahead RTO 30-minute reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.02 percent of hours.

## Secondary Reserve

Secondary reserves are reserves that take more than 10 minutes to convert to energy, but less than 30 minutes. This includes the unloaded capacity of online generation that can be achieved according to the resource ramp rates in 10 to 30 minutes, and offline resources with a start time of less than 30 minutes. Secondary reserves can only be used to satisfy the 30-minute reserve requirement.

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, in the RTO Reserve Zone, the real-time average supply of available secondary reserve was 20,096.7 MW and the day-ahead average supply of available secondary reserve was 12,146.1 MW. As with the 30-minute reserve service, there is no defined reserve subzone for secondary reserves.
- **Demand.** Demand for secondary reserve is the 30-minute reserve requirement less the amount of primary reserves cleared by PJM.[193]

### Market Behavior

- **Offers.** Energy Storage Resource model participants, hydroelectric resources, hybrid resources, and demand-side response resources submit their available secondary reserve MW. For all other resource types, PJM calculates the MW available from a resource based on the resource's energy offer. For all resources, the offer price of secondary reserve is $0 per MWh.[194] In both the day-ahead and real-time secondary reserves markets, PJM uses lost opportunity costs as the offers and not offers submitted by market participants. For online secondary reserves, PJM calculates an opportunity cost based on LMP.

### Market Performance

- **Price.** The secondary reserve price is determined by the marginal 30-minute reserve resource. In the first six months of 2026, the secondary reserve real-time price for all intervals was $0.00 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the secondary reserve day-ahead price for all hours was $0.00 per MWh.

## Regulation Market

The PJM Regulation Market is a real-time market. The regulation market design changed significantly on October 1, 2025. PJM jointly optimizes regulation with synchronized reserve and energy to provide all three products at least cost. The PJM regulation market design includes three clearing price components: capability; performance; and opportunity cost.

PJM plans to implement additional changes to the regulation market in a second phase, to be implemented on December 1, 2026. This Phase 2 will

193 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.1 Overview of the PJM Reserve Markets, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
194 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

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include separate regulation up and regulation down markets. The Phase 1 changes eliminated many of the significant issues identified by the MMU under the pre-October 1, 2025, design. However, the Phase 1 changes introduced new issues that are significantly increasing market prices above the efficient and competitive level.

This report analyzes the results of the regulation market in the first six months of 2026.

## Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, the average half hour offered supply of regulation for nonramp hours was 914.7 actual MW (797.5 effective MW), 1,060.4 actual MW (923.0 effective MW) for shoulder hours, and 1,134.7 actual MW (994.8 effective MW) for ramp hours.
- **Demand.** The half hour regulation demand is 550 MW for nonramp hours, 650 MW for shoulder hours, and 750 MW for ramp hours.
- **Supply and Demand.** The nonramp regulation requirement of 550.0 effective MW was provided by 623.3 hourly average actual MW in the first six months of 2026. The shoulder regulation requirement of 650.0 effective MW was provided by 738.1 hourly average actual MW in the first six months of 2026. The ramp regulation requirement of 750.0 effective MW was provided by 850.3 hourly average actual MW in the first six months of 2026.

  The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for nonramp hours was 1.46 in the first six months of 2026. The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for shoulder hours was 1.43 in the first six months of 2026. The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for ramp hours was 1.34 in the first six months of 2026.
- **Market Concentration.** In the first six months of 2026, the three pivotal supplier test was failed in 91.8 percent of half hours. In the first six months of 2026, the effective MW weighted average HHI was 1373, which is moderately concentrated.

## Market Behavior

- **Offers.** Daily regulation offer prices are submitted for each unit by the unit owner. Owners are required to submit a cost-based offer and may submit a price-based offer. Offers include both a capability offer and a performance offer. In the first six months of 2026, there were 232 resources providing regulation.

## Market Performance

- **Price and Cost.** The weighted average clearing price for regulation was $136.40 per MW of regulation in first six months of 2026. The weighted average cost of regulation in the first six months of 2026 was $138.61 per MW of regulation.

## Black Start Service

Black start service is required for the reliable restoration of the grid following a blackout. Black start service is the ability of a generating unit to start without an outside electrical supply, or is the demonstrated ability of a generating unit to automatically remain operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid (automatic load rejection or ALR).[195]

In the first six months of 2026, total black start charges were $22.3 million, a decrease of $6.5 million (22.5 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total revenue requirement charges were $22.0 million, a decrease of $6.5 million (22.7 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total black start uplift charges were $0.4 million, a decrease of $0.04 million (11.2 percent) from 2025. Black start revenue requirements consist of fixed black start service costs, variable black start service costs, training costs, fuel storage costs, and an incentive payment. Black start uplift charges are paid to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market or committed in real time to provide black start service under the ALR option or for black start testing. Black start zonal charges in

195 OATT Schedule 1 § 1.3BB. There are no ALR units currently providing black start service.


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the first six months of 2026 ranged from $0 in the OVEC and REC Zones to $4.4 million in the AEP Zone.

CRF values are a key determinant of total payments to black start units. The CRF values in PJM tariff tables should have been changed for both black start and the capacity market when the tax laws changed effective January 1, 2018. As a result of the failure to reduce the CRF values, black start units have been and continue to be significantly overcompensated since the changes to the tax code. In March 2023, FERC issued an order establishing hearing and settlement judge procedures.[196] By order issued September 23, 2025, the Commission approved a settlement over the MMU's objection that continued to allow overcompensation.[197] On July 4, 2025, enactment of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) changed the rules for bonus depreciation again, allowing 100 percent bonus depreciation for assets constructed between January 20, 2025 and December 31, 2028, and placed in service before January 1, 2031.[198] The CRF values for affected units should incorporate 100 percent bonus depreciation. It is essential that PJM not repeat its earlier mistake when it ignored the tax law changes in 2017.

## Reactive

Reactive service, reactive supply and voltage control are provided by generation and other sources of reactive power (measured in MVAr). Reactive power helps maintain appropriate voltage levels on the transmission system and is essential to the flow of real power (measured in MW). The same equipment provides both MVAr and MW. Generation resources are required to meet defined reactive capability requirements as a condition to receive interconnection service in PJM.[199]

The longstanding nonmarket approach to reactive capability payments will be eliminated effective June 1, 2026, based on FERC's Order No. 904 and the order approving PJM's compliance filing.[200]

In the first six months of 2026, PJM customers paid $141.6 million for reactive capability based on archaic, nonmarket and unsupported assertions about cost allocation and a regulatory review process of filings by individual units that results in unsupported black box settlements. The current rules have permitted over recovery of reactive costs through reactive capability charges. The Commission resolved these issues in Order No. 904.

Reactive service charges based on opportunity costs are appropriately paid to units that operate in real time outside of their normal range at the direction of PJM for the purpose of providing real-time reactive power.

In the first six months of 2026, total reactive charges were $143.7 million, a decrease of $38.2 million (21.0 percent) from first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total reactive capability charges were $141.6 million, a decrease of $39.8 million (22.0 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total reactive service charges were $2.2 million, an increase of $1.6 million (293.9 percent) from the first six months of 2025.

Total zonal reactive service charges ranged from $0 in the REC and OVEC Zones, to $21.3 million in the AEP Zone in the first six months of 2026.

## Primary Frequency Response

On February 15, 2018, the Commission issued Order No. 842, which modified the pro forma large and small generator interconnection agreements and procedures to require all newly interconnecting non-nuclear generating facilities, both synchronous and nonsynchronous, to include equipment for primary frequency response capability as a condition to receive interconnection service.[201] [202]

Primary frequency response begins within a few seconds and extends up to a minute. The purpose of primary frequency response is to arrest and stabilize the system until other measures (secondary and tertiary frequency response) become active. This includes a governor or equivalent controls capable of

196 See 182 FERC ¶ 61,194.
197 See 193 FERC ¶ 61,059.
198 OBBA § 70301(b)(3).
199 OATT Attachment O.
200 See *Compensation for Reactive Power within the Standard Power Factor Range*, Order No. 904, 189 FERC ¶ 61,034 (2024); PJM compliance filing, Docket No. ER24-1073 (January 28, 2025); 192 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2025).

201 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulated facilities are exempt from this provision. Behind the meter generation that is sized to load is also exempt.
202 Frequency bias settings and frequency response obligations are shared in NERC's Resources Subcommittee <https://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/Pages/Resources-Subcommittee.aspx> and PJM's Operating Committee <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/committees/oc.aspx>.

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operating with a maximum five percent droop and a ±0.036 Hz deadband.[203] In addition to resource capability, resource owners must comply by setting control systems to autonomously adjust real power output in a direction to correct for frequency deviations.

The response of generators within PJM to NERC identified frequency events occurs two to three times per month. A frequency event is declared whenever the system frequency stays outside ±0.040 Hz deadband for at least one minute, and the minimum/maximum frequency reaches ±0.053 Hz.[204] Exclusions to PJM monitoring include nuclear plants, offline units, units with no available headroom, units assigned to regulation, and units with a current outage ticket in eDART.

The MMU has identified several issues with PJM's enforcement and evaluation of generation PFR performance.

## Market Procurement of Real-Time Ancillary Services

PJM uses market mechanisms to varying degrees in the procurement of ancillary services including synchronized reserves, primary reserves, 30-minute reserves, and regulation. When a resource is used for an ancillary service instead of providing energy in real time, the cost of removing the resource, either fully or partially, from the energy market should be included in the offer for the ancillary service. The degree to which PJM markets account for these interactions depends on the timing of the product clearing, software limitations, and the accuracy of resource parameters and offers.

All reserve products are jointly cleared with energy in every real-time market solution. The synchronized reserve market clearing is more integrated with the energy market clearing than the other ancillary services because dispatched energy and synchronized reserve are outputs of the same optimization problem for each market interval. Given the joint clearing of energy and flexible synchronized reserves, the synchronized reserve market clearing price should always cover the opportunity cost of providing flexible synchronized reserves. Inflexible synchronized reserves, provided by resources that require hourly commitments due to run-time or staffing constraints, are not cleared with energy in the real-time market solution.[205] Instead, inflexible synchronized reserves are cleared hourly by the Ancillary Service Optimizer (ASO) or the day-ahead energy market.[206] The ASO considers energy market price forecasts, availability of resources for flexible synchronized reserves, and regulation requirements to estimate the costs and benefits of using a resource for inflexible synchronized reserves. The ASO selected inflexible reserves are a fixed input to RT SCED, which clears the balance of the requirement with flexible synchronized reserves.

Nonsynchronized reserves and offline secondary reserves are cleared with every real-time energy market solution. The energy commitment decisions to keep the resources offline have already been made when the RT SCED clears the five-minute reserves markets. Therefore, offline reserves have no lost opportunity cost. They will not be called on for energy during the market interval for which they are assigned as offline resources.

Prices for the regulation and reserve markets are set by the pricing calculator (LPC), which uses the RT SCED solution as an input. The LPC includes fast start pricing logic and system marginal price caps, so the final prices can be inconsistent with the marginal cost of the resources that clear regulation and reserves.

## Section 10 Recommendations

### Reserve Markets

- The MMU recommends that, to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and automatically respond to the notifications. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted 2024.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM replace the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone with a reserve zone structure consistent with the actual

203 OATT Attachment O § 4.7.2 (Primary Frequency Response).
204 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 3.6.2 Event Selection, Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025).
205 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.3 Reserve Market Clearing, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
206 Starting October 1, 2025, the ASO now schedules regulation in half-hour blocks. However, as before the change, the ASO still schedules reserves in one-hour blocks.


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deliverability of reserves based on current transmission constraints. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)

- The MMU recommends that the components of the cost-based offers for providing regulation and synchronous condensing be defined in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the unit repay all credits back to the last time that the unit successfully responded to an event 10 minutes or longer. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the synchronized reserve shortfall penalty should include LOC payments as well as SRMCP and MW of shortfall. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that aggregation not be permitted to offset unit specific penalties for failure to respond to a synchronized reserve event. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM immediately remove the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement that PJM added based on a misunderstanding of reserve performance during synchronized reserve events. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that reserve resources operating below economic minimum should not be treated as being backed down by that amount to provide reserve. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Regulation Market

- The MMU recommends that the two signal regulation market design be replaced with a one signal regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Adopted 2025.)[207]
- The MMU recommends that the ability to make dual offers (to make offers as both a RegA and a RegD resource in the same market hour) be removed from the regulation market. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Adopted 2025.)[208]
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market be modified to incorporate a consistent application of the marginal benefit factor (MBF) throughout the optimization, assignment and settlement process. The MBF should be defined as the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution (MRTS) between RegA and RegD. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Adopted 2025.)[209]
- The MMU recommends that the calculation of the performance score (based on precision, delay and correlation metrics) be replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the performance score be revised to eliminate the effect of the size of the regulation assignment and to directly calculate the performance score based on the actual performance and the requested performance. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market optimization be reviewed to address the logic that allows the partial clearing of inframarginal resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that if a unit sets its economic maximum at a value greater than its regulation maximum, the lost opportunity cost (LOC) of the unit should be calculated assuming the economic maximum of the unit is equal to the regulation maximum of the unit. The MMU recommends that, in cases where offered ramp is greater than actual ramp, the actual ramp be used to calculate the LOC of the unit. The MMU recommends that these fixes to the LOC logic be implemented prior to implementing Phase 2 of the regulation market design. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2026. Status: Not adopted.).

207 PJM filed proposed changes to the regulation market with the FERC on April 16, 2024, (Regulation Market Design Filing," Docket No. ER24-1772-000). The Commission Order on June 17, 2024 accepted the PJM Proposal as filed. PJM will implement the changes to the regulation market in two phases. Phase 1, was implemented on October 1, 2025, resulting in a single signal, bidirectional market with one clearing price that eliminates the need for an MBF. Phase 1 eliminated RegA and RegD dual offers. Phase 1 reduced the regulation commitment period from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. In Phase 1 the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market is based on the resource's dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule.

208 See *id.*

209 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).

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- The MMU recommends that, in cases where a unit is already committed for regulation, that the actual residual ramp (based on the current market interval's regulation assignment) be used when calculating the potential regulation set point and the LOC for purposes of clearing resources. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market commitment period be reduced from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Adopted 2025.).[210]
- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost in all of the ancillary services markets be calculated using the schedule on which the unit was scheduled to run in the energy market. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Adopted 2025.[211] FERC rejected.)[212]
- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market be based on the resource's dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Adopted 2025. FERC accepted.)[213]
- The MMU recommends that the $12.00 margin adder be eliminated from the definition of the cost based regulation offer because it is a markup and not a cost. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the ramp rate limited desired MW output be used in the regulation uplift calculation, to reflect the physical limits of the unit's ability to ramp and to eliminate overpayment for opportunity costs when the payment uses an unachievable MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Adopted 2025.)[214]
- The MMU recommends enhanced documentation of the implementation of the regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.)[215]
- The MMU recommends that PJM be required to save data elements necessary for verifying the performance of the regulation market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the regulation market three pivotal supplier test be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the total regulation (TReg) signal sent on a fleet wide basis be eliminated and replaced with individual regulation signals for each unit. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, to prevent gaming, there be a penalty enforced in the regulation market as a reduction in performance score and/or a forfeiture of revenues when resource owners elect to deassign assigned regulation resources within the hour. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.)[216]

## Frequency Response, Reactive, and Black Start

- The MMU recommends that all resources, new and existing, have a requirement to include and maintain equipment for primary frequency response capability as a condition of interconnection service. The PJM markets already compensate resources for frequency response capability and any marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the generator primary frequency response evaluation be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM maintain a full list of all units subject to the Primary Frequency Response generator requirements. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM develop the metric(s) necessary to objectively evaluate each unit's performance during primary frequency

210 See *id.*
211 This recommendation was adopted by PJM for the energy market and the regulation market. Lost opportunity costs in the energy market and the regulation market are calculated using the schedule on which the unit is scheduled to run.
212 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).
213 See *id.*
214 In Phase 1 the ramp rate limited desired MW output is used in the regulation uplift calculation. The MMU does not agree with how this change has been implemented.
215 See *id.*
216 See *id.*


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response events. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM create the necessary tariff/manual language to properly enforce compliance with the NERC mandated Primary Frequency Response generator requirements. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that separate cost of service payments for reactive capability be eliminated and the cost of reactive capability be recovered in PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Adopted 2024.)[217]
- The MMU recommends that new CRF rates for black start units, incorporating current tax code changes, be implemented immediately. The new CRF rates should apply to all black start units. Black start units should be required to commit to providing black start service for the life of the unit. CRF rates effective January 20, 2025, should reflect 100 percent bonus depreciation.[218] (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that black start planning and coordination be on a regional basis recognizing cross zonal cranking paths and not on a narrowly or purely zonal basis and that the costs of black start service be shared on an equal per MWh basis across the region. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the black start rate under the Base Formula Rate should be based on the actual cost of providing the black start service, plus an incentive, rather than the unsupported use of Net CONE, escalated each year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the fuel assurance rules be modified to recognize actual fuel assured resources within and across zones. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Reliability Backstop for black start service be eliminated. There is no reason that PJM cannot acquire black start resources if the TOs can acquire black start resources. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 10 Conclusion

The October 1, 2022, changes to the reserve markets included a synchronized reserve must offer requirement applicable to all generation capacity resources. This resulted in an increase in available supply. Combined with the removal of the $7.50 per MWh margin and the invalid variable operations and maintenance cost, supply and demand logic predicts lower prices, which occurred in 2022, except during Winter Storm Elliott. This is evidence of market efficiency. With the elimination of tier 1 reserves, the total reserve market clearing price credits, while based on lower prices, are paid to a larger MW quantity. Prices have been higher since PJM increased the demand for reserves in May 2023.

The new reserve market design has been called into question by PJM based on a slow response during synchronized reserve events. In all cases, other than once during Winter Storm Elliott and once during the July 2025 hot weather event, the ACE recovered within the required time frame. No reliability problems have occurred. While the total response met the needs of the system, PJM responded to the poor performance of individual units by unilaterally and inappropriately increasing reserve requirements. This increase shifts the burden of poor resource performance from the resources themselves to customers, clearing more reserves instead of directly dealing with the causes of poor performance. These increases in reserve requirements were the primary cause of higher reserve prices in 2023, 2024, 2025, and the first six months of 2026, including 35 intervals of shortage pricing in May 2023 and several intervals of shortage pricing during spin events in 2024, 2025, and the first six months of 2026, even while reserve markets cleared over 1,000 MW more than what was normally cleared in the months and years prior.

The data on synchronized reserve event recovery do not support the conclusion that there was or is a need to increase the demand for reserves. The focus

217 On October 17, 2024, the Commission issued a final rule, Order No. 904, eliminating separate payments for reactive in all jurisdictional markets, including PJM. On January 28, 2025, PJM submitted a compliance filing to implement Order No. 904 ("Compliance Filing") that proposed a transition mechanism lasting through May 31, 2026. See Docket No. ER25-1073. This recommendation will be implemented effective June 1, 2026.

218 OBBA § 70301(b)(3).

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should be on correcting issues related to the responses of individual units rather than increasing demand.

Significant communications technology and modelling issues when calling resources during spinning events result in slow response. While PJM now calculates reserve offer MW for the majority of resource types, a resource's cleared reserve MW are based on a resource's energy output at the end of a scheduling interval. If a unit is still moving when an event is called, such as near the beginning of a scheduling interval, it may or may not be able to achieve its scheduled output. Likewise, a unit that is decreasing output to create more headroom might not be able to immediately increase output when an event is called.

Although PJM now augments a resource's economic basepoint with its dispatched reserve MW during a spin event, PJM does not require resources to be able to receive this signal. Many resources are still dispatched using phone calls, either from markets operation centers waiting for the PJM ALL-CALL or from MOCs themselves manually calling plant personnel.

Even if a unit is on AGC and receiving the augmented basepoint, depending on where that unit is on its ramp rate curve, it might have to spend time coming off AGC or decreasing output in order to start ramping using power augmentation. Having a synchronized reserve maximum that is less than the unit's economic maximum can address this case, but it is the unit's responsibility to request the exception.

The immediate solution is to improve the deployment of reserves in synchronized reserve events by requiring the capability to use an electronic signal for all synchronized reserves and by requiring the actual use of the signal. The archaic telephone communications technology has been a source of slow response times, such as markets operation centers waiting for the PJM ALL-CALL or manually calling unit personnel to deploy reserves. Phone calls are not an effective or efficient method for deploying resources for immediate response. The MMU recommends that, to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and automatically respond to the notifications. On December 17, 2024, PJM partially adopted this recommendation by implementing an electronic deployment of reserves via an augmented dispatch signal, but PJM does not require that resources be able to receive this signal nor that the receiving units be able to follow the signal for deploying reserves. Further improvements in communications technology and requirements are necessary, and PJM should pursue them immediately.

Along with changes to the communications and deployment process, PJM and the MMU have worked with generators and DSR to identify circumstances where reserves were not accurately measured based on the energy and reserve offer parameters. More broadly, the MMU's proposal is to buy the correct amount of reserves. No increase in demand is required. There has been no change in the need/demand for reserves. PJM ignored the supply side. The issue is that resources have not provided the reserves that were offered and paid for. With improved communications technology, instead of buying more MW of poorly performing reserves, PJM will be able to accurately recognize the actual supply of reserves and to more efficiently deploy them in synchronized reserve events. PJM should immediately remove the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in place from May 2023 through June 2026.

PJM will implement significant changes to the regulation market in two phases.[219] Phase 1, implemented on October 1, 2025, is a single product, single signal market with one clearing price. Phase 2, to be implemented on December 1, 2026, will include separate regulation up and regulation down markets. The Phase 1 changes eliminated many of the significant issues identified by the MMU that resulted from a two product, two signal market design including the incorrect and inconsistent use and application of the MBF/MRTS. The actual implementation of the new design is flawed, but the design is significantly improved. Significant new issues were created by Phase 1 that significantly increased prices and should be fixed as soon as possible and prior to implementation of Phase 2.

219 See 187 FERC ¶ 61,173.



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The benefits of markets can be realized under the current approach to ancillary service markets. Even in the presence of structurally noncompetitive markets, there can be transparent, market clearing prices based on competitive offers that account explicitly and accurately for opportunity cost. This is consistent with the market design goal of ensuring competitive outcomes that provide appropriate incentives without reliance on the exercise of market power and with explicit mechanisms to prevent the exercise of market power. However, there are significant issues with the PJM ancillary services markets.

The MMU concludes that the synchronized reserve market results were not competitive. The MMU concludes that the nonsynchronized reserve market results were not competitive. The MMU concludes that the secondary reserve market results were competitive. The MMU concludes that the regulation market results were not competitive, and that the pre-October 1, 2025, market design is significantly flawed.

## Overview: Section 11, Congestion

### Congestion Cost

- **Total Congestion.** Total congestion costs increased by $2,275.0 million or 179.9 percent, from $1,264.7 million in the first six months of 2025 to $3,539.7 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Day-Ahead Congestion.** Day-ahead congestion costs increased by $2,3562.8 million or 150.9 percent, from $1,566.3 million in the first six months of 2025 to $3,929.0 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Balancing Congestion.** Negative balancing congestion costs increased by $87.8 million, from -$301.6 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$389.3 million in the first six months of 2026. Negative balancing explicit charges increased by $25.5 million, from -$160.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$185.4 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Real-Time Congestion.** Real-time congestion costs increased by $2,668.0 million, from $1,871.5 million in the first six months of 2025 to $4,539.4 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Monthly Congestion.** Monthly total congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $171.4 million in March to $1,205.7 million in January.
- **Geographic Differences in CLMP.** Differences in CLMP between southern and eastern control zones in PJM were primarily a result of binding constraints on the Bedington Transformer, the Pruntytown Transformer, the Bedington – Black Oak Interface, the Graceton – Manor Line, and the Pleasant View – Ashburn Line.
- **Congestion Frequency.** Congestion frequency continued to be significantly higher in the day-ahead energy market than in the real-time energy market in the first six months of 2026. The number of congestion event hours in the day-ahead energy market was about two times the number of congestion event hours in the real-time energy market.
- Day-ahead congestion frequency increased by 2.6 percent from 37,440 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 38,396 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026.
- Real-time congestion frequency increased by 21.2 percent from 15,339 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 18,586 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026.
- **Congested Facilities.** Day-ahead, congestion event hours decreased on interfaces and transformers and increased on lines and flowgates.
- The Bedington Transformer was the largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026. With $376.5 million in total congestion costs, it accounted for 10.6 percent of the total PJM congestion costs in the first six months of 2026.
- **CT Price Setting Logic and Closed Loop Interface Related Congestion.** PJM's use of CT pricing logic officially ended with the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. While CT pricing logic was officially discontinued, PJM continues to use a related logic to force inflexible units and demand response to be on the margin in both real time and day ahead. None of the PJM defined closed loop interfaces were binding in the first six months of 2025 or 2026.

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- **Zonal Congestion.** DOM had the highest zonal congestion costs among all control zones in the first six months of 2026. DOM had $643.9 million in zonal congestion costs, comprised of $720.3 million in day-ahead congestion costs and -$76.4 million in balancing congestion costs.

### Marginal Loss Cost

- **Total Marginal Loss Costs.** Total marginal loss costs increased by $501.0 million or 69.9 percent, from $716.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $1,217.2 million in the first six months of 2026. The loss MWh in PJM increased by 631.6 GWh or 7.4 percent, from 8,504.0 GWh in the first six months of 2025 to 9,135.6 GWh in the first six months of 2026. The loss component of real-time LMP in the first six months of 2026 was $0.07, compared to $0.04 in the first six months of 2025.
- **Day-Ahead Marginal Loss Costs.** Day-ahead marginal loss costs increased by $490.4 million or 65.0 percent, from $754.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to $1,244.4 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Balancing Marginal Loss Costs.** Negative balancing marginal loss costs decreased by $10.6 million or 28.1 percent, from -$37.8 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$27.2 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Total Marginal Loss Surplus.** The total marginal loss surplus increased by $194.1 million or 74.1 percent, from $262.0 million in the first six months of 2025, to $456.2 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Monthly Total Marginal Loss Costs.** Monthly total marginal loss costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $94.3 million in March to $517.4 million in January.

### System Energy Cost

- **Total System Energy Costs.** Total system energy costs decreased by $309.9 million or 68.4 percent, from -$453.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$762.9 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Day-Ahead System Energy Costs.** Day-ahead system energy costs decreased by $317.3 million or 61.6 percent, from -$514.9 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$832.3 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Balancing System Energy Costs.** Balancing system energy costs decreased by $7.8 million or 11.5 percent, from $67.5 million in the first six months of 2025 to $59.8 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Monthly Total System Energy Costs.** Monthly total system energy costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from -$323.8 million in January to -$58.5 million in April.

### Section 11 Conclusion

Congestion is defined as the total payments by load in excess of the total payments to generation, excluding marginal losses. The level and distribution of congestion reflects the underlying characteristics of the power system, including the nature and defined capability of transmission facilities, the offers and geographic distribution of generation facilities, the level and geographic distribution of incremental bids and offers and the geographic and temporal distribution of load.

The current ARR/FTR design should ensure but does not ensure that load receives the rights to all congestion revenues. The congestion offset provided by ARRs and self-scheduled FTRs in the 2025/2026 planning period was 55.7 percent. The cumulative offset of congestion by ARRs for the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period, using the rules effective for each planning period, was 65.7 percent. Load has received $7.1 billion less than load should have received from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period.

## Overview: Section 12, Generation and Transmission Planning

### Generation Interconnection Planning

#### Existing Generation Mix

- As of June 30, 2026, PJM had a total installed capacity of 202,384.2 MW, of which 37,741.4 MW (18.6 percent) are coal fired steam units, 57,047.7 MW (28.2 percent) are combined cycle units, 7,563.1 MW (3.7 percent) are hydro units (including both pumped storage and run of river) and


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33,452.6 MW (16.5 percent) are nuclear units. This measure of installed capacity differs from capacity market installed capacity because it includes energy only units, excludes all external units, and uses nameplate values for solar and wind resources.

- Of the 202,384.2 MW of installed capacity, 76,094.5 MW (37.6 percent) are from units older than 40 years, of which 30,189.3 MW (39.7 percent) are coal fired steam units, 255.0 MW (0.3 percent) are combined cycle units, 7,152.2 MW (9.4 percent) are hydro units (including both pumped storage and run of river) and 26,711.6 MW (35.1 percent) are nuclear units.

### Generation Retirements[220]

- As of June 30, 2026, there were 56,414.6 MW of generation that have been retired since 2011, of which 41,409.8 MW (73.4 percent) are coal fired steam units.
- In the first six months of 2026, 669.0 MW of generation retired. The largest generators that retired in the first six months of 2026 were the four 150.0 MW Elwood CT-Natural Gas units located in the COMED Zone. Of the 669.0 MW of generation that retired in the first six months of 2026, 600.0 MW (89.7 percent) were located in the COMED Zone.
- As of June 30, 2026, there were 7,932.3 MW of generation that have requested retirement after June 30, 2026, of which 2,620.0 MW (33.0 percent) are located in the AEP Zone. Of the generation requesting retirement in the AEP Zone, 2,620.0 MW (100.0 percent) are coal fired steam units.

## Generation Queue

### New Service Requests Serial Process[221]

- On November 29, 2022, the Commission issued an order accepting PJM's tariff revisions to improve the queue process.[222] The new queue process includes modifications to implement a cluster/cycle based processing method to replace the first in/first out serial processing method.[223] This change will allow projects to move forward based on a first ready/first out analysis, where readiness is demonstrated through site control and financial milestones and there is an option to exit the study process early based on system impacts. The transition to the new queue process began on July 10, 2023.
- There were 8,190 generation request projects submitted in the new service request serial process queue from 1997 until the implementation of the new cycle process on July 10, 2023. As a result of the transition to the new services cycle process, 312 projects (40,650.1 MW) were moved to transition cycle 1 (TC1). There were 1,347 projects eligible to resubmit for evaluation in transition cycle 2 (TC2). Of those 1,347 eligible projects, 550 projects (49,168.4 MW) resubmitted and are now being evaluated in TC2. Of the 1,347 eligible projects, 797 projects (53,155.5 MW) did not resubmit, and were withdrawn from the queue. There were 1,070 projects initially entered into the AH2 queue and beyond. Those 1,070 projects (70,729.8 MW) are now considered invalid and have been removed from the queue. As a result of the transition to the cycle process, the 8,190 projects in the serial process queue have been reduced to 5,461 projects. Projects that will be evaluated in TC1 and TC2, and those projects no longer eligible to be evaluated in the serial process have been removed from the new service requests serial process metrics. New service requests cycle process metrics are reported separately from the serial process metrics.
- As of June 30, 2026, a total of 38,064.0 MW, on an energy basis, were in generation request serial service queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended.[224] Based on historical completion rates, 19,675.3 MW (51.7 percent), on an energy basis, of new generation in the queue are expected to go into service. As projects move through the queue process, projects can be removed from the queue due to incomplete or invalid data, withdrawn by the market participant or placed in service.

220 See PJM. Planning. "Generator Deactivations," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/gen-deactivations>.
221 See PJM. Planning. "Serial Service Request Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/serial-service-request-status>.
222 See 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).
223 See "Interconnection Process Reform," presented at April 27, 2022 meeting of the Members Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2022/20220427/20220427-item-01a-1-interconnection-process-reform-presentation.ashx>.
224 Unless otherwise noted, the queue totals in this report are the winter net MW energy for the interconnection requests ("MW Energy") as shown in the queue.

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- Of the 4,182.5 MW, on an energy basis, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas, CT oil and coal fired steam projects) in the serial queue, 3,002.7 MW (71.8 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.
- Of the 2,960.4 MW, on an energy basis, of battery projects in the serial queue, only 779.4 MW (26.3 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.
- Of the 30,877.1 MW, on an energy basis, of renewable projects in the serial queue, 15,870.6 MW (51.4 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.
- Of the 4,150.6 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas. CT oil and coal fired steam projects) requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 2,906.4 MW (70.0 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction,[225] the 4,150.6 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 2,181.8 MW of capacity (52.6 percent of the total requested capacity).[226]
- Of the 2,000.6 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 215.6 MW (10.8 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 2,000.6 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 127.2 MW of capacity (6.4 percent of the total requested capacity).
- Of the 15,914.7 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in the serial generation queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 8,134.3 MW (51.1 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 15,914.7 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 937.5 MW of capacity (5.9 percent of the total requested capacity).
- As of June 30, 2026, 22,109.9 MW of capacity requests (requested CIRs) were in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended. Based on historical completion rates, 11,278.4 MW (51.0 percent) are expected to go into service. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 22,109.9 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 3,267.8 MW of capacity (14.8 percent of the total requested capacity).
- As of June 30, 2026, 5,461 projects, representing 610,103.6 MW, have entered the serial queue process since its inception. Of those, 1,288 projects, representing 97,476.7 MW (16.0 percent of the MW), went into service. Of the projects that entered the serial queue process, 3,786 projects, representing 474,562.9 MW (77.8 percent of the MW) withdrew prior to completion. Such projects may create barriers to entry for projects that would otherwise be completed, by taking up queue positions, increasing interconnection costs and creating uncertainty.
- In the first six months of 2026, 1,000.1 MW from the serial queue went into service. Of the 1,000.1 MW that went in service, 940.0 MW (94.0 percent) were Combined Cycle units, 31.8 MW (3.2 percent) were solar units, 15.7 MW (1.6 percent) were battery units and 12.6 MW (1.3 percent) were wind units.
- Of the 2,809 projects that entered the serial queue from January 1, 2015, through July 10, 2023, 2,063 projects (73.4 percent) were renewable. Of

225 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate factors in this section are based on the *ELCC Class Ratings for 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (February 25, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/28-29-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf>.

226 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate adjusted MW are calculated using the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction ELCC factors. The adjusted MW are calculated using the four hour storage ELCC derate for battery resources, tracking solar for solar resources and onshore wind for wind resources.



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the 690 projects that entered the serial queue in 2020, 546 projects (79.1 percent) were renewable. Renewable projects make up 85.3 percent of all projects in the serial queue and account for 81.1 percent of the nameplate MW currently active, suspended or under construction in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026.

- On June 30, 2026, 26,968.4 MW, on an energy basis, were in generation request serial queues that had reached the construction service agreement milestone or equivalent, in the status of active, suspended or under construction. Of the 26,968.4 MW, 9,721.1 MW (36.0 percent) had not begun construction, 7,121.7 MW (26.4 percent) had begun construction, but are now suspended, and 10,125.6 MW (37.5 percent) are currently under construction. Reaching the final milestone required prior to construction does not mean a project will immediately begin construction or even that it necessarily will ever begin construction.

## New Service Requests Cycle Process[227]

### Transition Cycle 1 (TC1)

- Transition cycle 1 (TC1) is comprised of 312 proposed generation projects. Those projects make up 40,650.1 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in TC1 were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 40,650.1 MW in TC1, 14,120.0 MW (34.7 percent) were active or under construction (10,763.0 MW (26.5 percent) were active and 3,357.0 MW (8.2 percent) were under construction) and 26,530.1 MW (65.3 percent) were withdrawn.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 14,120.0 MW, on an energy basis, of which 6,798.9 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in TC1 in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 6,798.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 1,741.7 MW (25.6 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 569.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including CT natural gas projects) requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 381.2 MW (67.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 3,727.4 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 372.7 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 1,022.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 603.0 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 5,207.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 757.5 MW (14.5 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

### Transition Cycle 2 (TC2) and Reliability Resource Initiative (RRI)

- On December 13, 2024, PJM submitted modifications to its Open Access Transmission Tariff to add provisions, through a one-time reliability based expansion of the projects in TC2.[228] On February 11, 2025, the Commission approved the RRI tariff modifications.[229] The proposed RRI Tariff revisions created a second TC2 application window that enabled RRI projects to join TC2 and be studied for interconnection during the transition period.
- PJM received 97 applications (28.6 GW) of RRI projects during the RRI application window. Of these projects, 48 involved uprates, in which existing resources are modified to increase the economic maximum generation capability, and 49 proposed building new generation. PJM reviewed the submitted RRI projects using the Commission approved

227 See PJM. Planning. "Cycle Service Request Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/m/cycle-service-request-status>.

228 See *PJM Interconnection L.L.C.* Docket No. ER25-712 (December 13, 2024).

229 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 (February 11, 2025).

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scoring criteria, and approved 51 projects (11,577.4 MW).[230] On June 30, 2026, all RRI projects were either in the status of active or withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 11,577.4 MW of approved RRI projects, 7,932.4 MW (68.5 percent) were active and 3,645.0 MW (31.5 percent) were withdrawn.

- Transition cycle 2 (TC2) is comprised of 647 proposed generation projects. TC2 includes 550 projects submitted during the TC2 window, and 97 projects submitted through the RRI window. Those projects make up 77,760.6 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in TC2 were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 77,760.6 MW in TC2, 29,822.6 MW (38.3 percent) were active or under construction (29,742.6 MW (38.2 percent) were active and 80.0 MW (0.1 percent) were under construction) and 47,938.0 MW (61.6 percent) were withdrawn.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 29,822.6 MW, on an energy basis, of which 21,719.2 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in TC2 in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 21,719.2 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 10,753.4 MW (49.5 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 7,337.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle and CT natural gas projects) requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 5,642.4 MW (76.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 6,366.4 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 636.6 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 5,122.3 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 3,022.2 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 7,919.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 811.2 MW (10.2 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

### Cycle Process Totals[231]

- On June 30, 2026, there were 959 proposed generation projects in the new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 118,410.7 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in the cycle process queues were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn. Of the 118,410.7 MW in the cycle process queues, 43,942.6 MW (37.1 percent) were active or under construction (40,505.6 MW (34.2 percent) were active and 3,437.0 MW (2.9 percent) were under construction) and 74,468.0 MW (62.9 percent) were withdrawn.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 43,942.6 MW, on an energy basis, of which 28,518.1 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 28,518.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in the cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 12,495.1 MW (43.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 7,906.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle and CT natural gas projects) requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 6,023.6 MW (76.2 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

230 The RRI proposal was to select the top 50 projects using the approved scoring criteria. The implemented scoring criteria resulted in a tie for the 50th project. This resulted in PJM selecting 51 projects as part of the RRI process.

231 As of June 30, 2026, the cycle process totals include those projects included in TC1 and TC2.



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- Of the 10,093.8 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active, 1,009.4 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 6,144.3 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 3,625.1 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 13,127.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 1,568.6 MW (11.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

### Serial and Cycle Process Totals

- On July 10, 2023, there were 287,185.2 MW in the status of active, under construction or suspended in the serial queue. As part of the transition to the new cycle process projects were removed from the queue because developers chose to not resubmit their projects in the TC2 queue, invalid projects were removed and must be resubmitted in Cycle 1, and projects were withdrawn as part of the normal queue process. On June 30, 2026, of the 287,185.2 MW, there were 74,074.2 MW (25.8 percent) in the status of active, in service or under construction, 11,726.7 MW (4.1 percent) went in service, and 201,384.3 MW (70.1 percent) have been withdrawn from the queue.
- As of June 30, 2026, 6,420 proposed generation projects had been submitted to the combined serial and new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 728,514.3 MW. On June 30, 2026, projects in the combined serial and cycle process queues were in the status of active, under construction, suspended, in service or were withdrawn. Of the 728,514.3 MW in the combined serial and cycle process queues, 82,006.7 MW (11.3 percent) were active, under construction or suspended, (58,486.0 MW (8.0 percent) were active, 16,399.0 MW (2.3 percent) were under construction and 7,121.7 MW (1.0 percent) were suspended), 97,476.7 MW (13.4 percent) were in service and 549,030.9 MW (75.4 percent) were withdrawn.
- Of the 82,006.7 MW in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 12,458.1 MW (15.2 percent) are thermal projects.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 82,006.7 MW, on an energy basis, of which 50,628.0 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 50,628.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 18,681.5 MW (36.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 12,057.5 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas, CT oil and coal fired steam projects) requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 9,139.0 MW (75.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 23,601.5 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 2,360.1 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 8,144.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 4,805.5 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

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- Of the 29,041.7 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 3,417.1 MW (11.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

## Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP)

### Market Efficiency Process

- There are significant issues with PJM's benefit/cost analysis that should be addressed prior to approval of additional projects. If done correctly and if FTRs/ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the benefit/cost analysis would include the total net change in production costs and would not include congestion. In addition, PJM's benefit/cost analysis includes only the decreases in costs to load and ignores the increases in costs to load associated with market efficiency projects.
- Through June 30, 2026, PJM has completed six market efficiency cycles under Order No. 1000.[232] In February 2024, PJM completed the 2024/2025 market efficiency base case. In May 2024, PJM posted the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency planning assumptions. The long term market efficiency window opened on April 11, 2025, and closed on June 10, 2025. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on three identified flowgates. PJM received 14 proposals from five entities. Two projects, submitted by incumbent transmission owners, were selected as the preferred solutions.[233] These projects were presented to, and approved by, the PJM Board on February 12, 2026. There were no projects selected for acceleration in the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency window. The 2026/2027 Market Efficiency cycle will be performed on study years 2027, 2031, 2034, 2037 and 2041. The preliminary base case for the 2026/2027 Market Efficiency cycle is expected to be posted in July 2026, with stakeholder feedback accepted through October 2026.

### PJM MISO Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP)

- PJM and MISO developed a process to facilitate the construction of interregional projects in response to the Commission's concerns about interregional coordination along the PJM-MISO seam. This process, called the Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP), operates on a two year study schedule and is designed to address forward looking congestion.
- The simultaneous use for joint projects of an incorrectly defined benefit/cost method by PJM and the correct method by MISO results in an overallocation of the costs associated with joint PJM/MISO projects to PJM participants and in some cases approval of projects that do not pass a correctly defined benefit/cost test.

### PJM MISO Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP)

- PJM and MISO developed the Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP) to facilitate the resolution of historic congestion issues that could be addressed through small, quick implementation projects.

### PJM MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS)

- PJM and MISO developed the Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS) to help identify potential transmission projects that could incrementally improve the systems' ability to mitigate constraints, improve market efficiency, respond to extreme weather and increase interregional transfer capability.

### Supplemental Transmission Projects

- Supplemental projects are defined to be "transmission expansions or enhancements that are not required for compliance with PJM criteria and are not state public policy projects according to the PJM Operating Agreement. These projects are used as inputs to RTEP models, but are not required for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance criteria, as determined by PJM."[234] Supplemental projects are exempt from competition.

232 See *Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities*, Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323 (2011) (Order No. 1000), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 1000-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132 (2012).

233 One of the three identified congestion drivers included in the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency window was addressed in the 2025 RTEP Window 1.

234 See PJM. "Transmission Construction Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/m/project-construction>.



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- The average number of supplemental projects expected in each in service year increased by 1,150.0 percent, from 20 for years 1998 through 2007 (pre Order No. 890) to 250 for years 2008 through 2026 (post Order 890).[235]

### End of Life Transmission Projects

- An end of life transmission project is a project submitted for the purpose of replacing existing infrastructure that is at, or is approaching, the end of its useful life. End of life transmission projects should be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build the project. Under the current approach, end of life projects are excluded from the RTEP process and exempt from competition.

### Board Authorized Transmission Upgrades

- The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) reviews proposals to improve transmission reliability in PJM and between PJM and neighboring regions. These proposals, which include reliability baseline, network, market efficiency and targeted market efficiency projects, as well as scope changes and project cancellations, but exclude supplemental and end of life projects, are periodically presented to the PJM Board of Managers for authorization.[236] In the first six months of 2026, the PJM Board approved a net change of $11.2 billion in transmission upgrades. As of June 30, 2026, the PJM Board has approved $69.7 billion in system enhancements since 1999.

### Transmission Competition

- The MMU makes several recommendations related to the competitive transmission planning process. The recommendations include improved process transparency, incorporation of competition between transmission and generation alternatives, and the removal of barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission. These recommendations would help ensure that the process is an open and transparent process that results in the most competitive solutions.
- On May 24, 2018, the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) approved a motion that required PJM, with input from the MMU, to develop a comparative framework to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of competitive transmission proposals with binding cost containment proposals compared to proposals from incumbent and nonincumbent transmission companies without cost containment provisions.

### Qualifying Transmission Upgrades (QTU)

- A Qualifying Transmission Upgrade (QTU) is an upgrade to the transmission system, financed and built by market participants, that increases the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL) into an LDA and can be offered into capacity auctions as capacity. Once a QTU is in service, the upgrade is eligible to continue to offer the approved incremental import capability into future RPM Auctions. As of June 30, 2026, no QTUs have cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction.

## Transmission Facility Outages

- PJM maintains a list of reportable transmission facilities. When a reportable transmission facility needs to be taken out of service, PJM transmission owners are required to report planned transmission facility outages as early as possible. PJM processes the transmission facility outage requests according to rules in PJM's Manual 3 to decide if the outage is on time or late and whether or not they will allow the outage.[237]
- There were 22,073 transmission outage requests submitted in the 2025/2026 planning period. Of the requested outages, 75.5 percent were planned for less than or equal to five days and 9.3 percent were planned for greater than 30 days. Of the requested outages, 40.7 percent were submitted late according to the rules in PJM's Manual 3.

## Section 12 Recommendations

### Generation Retirements

- The MMU recommends that CIRs end on the date of retirement in order to help ensure competitive markets and competitive access to the grid. The rules need to ensure that incumbents cannot exploit control of CIRs

235 See *Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service*, Order No. 890, 118 FERC ¶ 61,119, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 890-A, 121 FERC ¶ 61,297 (2007), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2008), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228, *order on clarification*, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009).

236 Supplemental Projects, including the end of life subset of supplemental projects, do not require PJM Board of Managers authorization.

237 See "PJM Manual 03: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).

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to block or postpone entry of competitors or to exercise market power by requiring high payments for CIRs.[238] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2012.)

## Generation Queue

- Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data. PJM does not update this data. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that barriers to entry be addressed in a timely manner in order to help ensure that the capacity market will result in the entry of new capacity to meet the needs of PJM market participants. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM establish an expedited PJM managed queue process to identify commercially viable projects that could help eliminate or reduce the need for specific RMRs or that could address specific reliability needs and allow the identified projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends improvements in queue management including that PJM establish a review process to ensure that projects are removed from the queue if they are not viable, as well as an expedited process to allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming.[239] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends continuing analysis of the study phase of PJM's transmission planning to reduce the need for postponements of study results, to decrease study completion times, and to improve the likelihood that a project at a given phase in the study process will successfully go into service.[240] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends outsourcing interconnection studies to an independent party to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Currently, these studies are performed by incumbent transmission owners under PJM's direction. This creates potential conflicts of interest, particularly when transmission owners are vertically integrated and the owner of transmission also owns generation. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

## RTEP Model and Assumptions

- The MMU recommends that PJM include only existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied, and queued generation with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, that has a high probability of completion, in the RTEP models. If a future study cannot achieve power balance with such generation, then the addition of load should be capped at the level that can be supplied by actual generation and not allowed to connect until expected generation can support it. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Market Efficiency Process

- The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated because it is not consistent with a competitive market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, PJM modify the rules governing benefit/cost analysis, the evaluation process for selecting among competing market efficiency projects and cost allocation for economic projects in order to ensure that all changes in production costs but not congestion costs, including increased costs to load and the risk of project cost increases, in all zones are included in order to ensure that the correct metrics are used for defining benefits. The MMU also recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, market efficiency projects that fail to meet PJM benefit/cost criteria in a Schedule

238 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER12-1177-000 (March 12, 2012) <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/Filings/2012/IMM_Comments_ER12-1177-000_20120312.PDF>.

239 PJM Filing, FERC Docket No. ER22-2110-000 (June 14, 2022); 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).

240 Ibid.



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6 annual reevaluation, prior to construction commencing or prior to state approval, be canceled and removed from further consideration. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

## Comparative Cost Framework

- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the project proposal templates to include data necessary to perform a detailed project lifetime financial analysis. The required data includes, but is not limited to: capital expenditure; capital structure; return on equity; cost of debt; tax assumptions; ongoing capital expenditures; ongoing maintenance; and expected life. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Transmission Competition

- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of supplemental projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that the basis for all such exemptions be reviewed and modified to ensure that the supplemental project designation is not used to exempt transmission projects from a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects or to effectively replace the RTEP process. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.) [241]
- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of end of life projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that end of life transmission projects be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.) [242]
- The MMU recommends that PJM enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission providers. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM incorporate the principle that the goal of transmission planning should be the incorporation of transmission investment decisions into market driven processes as much as possible. (Priority: Low. First reported 2001. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the creation of a mechanism to permit a direct comparison, or competition, between transmission and generation alternatives, including which alternative is less costly and who bears the risks associated with each alternative. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM establish fair terms of access to rights of way and property, such as at substations, in order to remove any barriers to entry and require competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers in the RTEP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that rules be implemented to require competition to provide financing for transmission projects. This competition could reduce the cost of capital for transmission projects and significantly reduce total costs to customers. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources not be includable as transmission assets for any reason. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Cost Allocation

- The MMU recommends a comprehensive review of the ways in which the solution based dfax allocation method is implemented. The goal for such a process would be to ensure that the most rational and efficient approach to implementing the solution based dfax method is used in PJM. Such an approach should allocate costs consistent with benefits and appropriately calibrate the incentives for investment in new transmission capability. No replacement approach should be approved until all potential alternatives,

241 The FERC accepted tariff provisions that exclude supplemental projects from competition in the RTEP. 162 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2018).

242 In recent decisions addressing competing proposals on end of life projects, the Commission accepted a transmission owner proposal excluding end of life projects from competition in the RTEP process, 172 FERC ¶ 61,136 (2020), *reh'g denied*, 173 FERC ¶ 61,225 (2020), *affirmed*, American Municipal Power, Inc., et al. v. FERC, Case No. 20-1449 (D.C. Cir. November 17, 2023), and rejected a proposal from PJM stakeholders that would have included end of life projects in competition in the RTEP process, 173 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020).

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including the status quo, are thoroughly reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends changing the minimum distribution factor in the allocation from 0.01 to 0.00 and adding a threshold minimum usage impact on the transmission facilities.[243] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted, 2026.)[244]

### Transmission Line Ratings

- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners use the same methods to define line ratings and that all PJM transmission owners implement dynamic line ratings (DLR), subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners investigate the applicability and potential cost savings of Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) and that all PJM transmission owners implement cost effective GET, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the implementation of Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) be opened to competition from third parties, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)

### Transmission Facility Outages

- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate all transmission outage tickets as on time or late as if they were new requests when an outage is rescheduled, create options for late requests based on the reasons, and apply the modified rules for late submissions to any such outages. The MMU recommends that PJM create options for treatment of late outages. The current rules apply more stringent rules, based on controlling actions, to late outages without distinguishing among reasons for late outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM draft a definition of the economic and physical congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests and associated triggers, including both the extent of overloaded facilities and the level of economic congestion, to include in PJM manuals after appropriate review with appropriate rules for on time and late outage requests. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM create options for late requests based on the reasons, and modify the rules to reduce or eliminate the approval of late outage requests submitted or rescheduled after the FTR auction bidding opening date, based on those options. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not permit transmission owners to divide long duration outages into smaller segments to avoid complying with the requirements for long duration outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 12 Conclusion

The goal of the PJM market design should be to enhance competition and to ensure that competition is the core element of all PJM markets. Transmission investments have not been fully incorporated into competitive markets. The construction of new transmission facilities has significant impacts on the energy and capacity markets. When generating units retire or load increases, there is no market mechanism in place that would require or even permit direct competition between transmission and generation to meet loads in the affected area. In addition, despite FERC Order No. 1000, there is not yet a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build transmission projects, to ensure that competitors provide an enforceable total project cost cap, or to obtain least cost financing through the capital markets.

The MMU recognizes that the Commission has issued orders that are inconsistent with the recommendations of the MMU and that PJM cannot unilaterally

243 See *2015 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Section 12: Generation and Transmission Planning, at 463, Cost Allocation Issues.

244 On June 4, 2026, in Docket No. ER26-2736-000, PJM submitted revisions to its Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff) in compliance with the Commission's March 6, 2026, Order on Remand to eliminate the de minimis threshold from the solution based DFAX method.



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modify those directives. It remains the recommendation of the MMU that the PJM rules for competitive transmission development through the RTEP should build upon FERC Order No. 1000 to create real competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers. The ability of transmission owners to block competition for supplemental projects and end of life projects and the reasons for that policy should be reevaluated. PJM should enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission. Rigorous standards that protect customers from risk should be applied to competitive transmission suppliers to ensure that customers receive the benefits of competition.

Order No. 1000 removed the right of first refusal (ROFR) for transmission projects for incumbent transmission owners except for the case of supplemental projects. This created an incentive for incumbent transmission owners to designate projects as supplemental projects to avoid the Order No. 1000 competitive provisions. Two PJM states, Indiana and Michigan, have passed laws that provide ROFR to incumbent utilities/transmission owners.[245] [246]

Given the significant impact of transmission line ratings on all aspects of wholesale power markets, ensuring and improving the accuracy and transparency of line ratings is essential. Line ratings should incorporate ambient temperature conditions, wind speed and other relevant operating conditions. Line ratings should be provided for a range of durations to ensure that operators understand the actual impact of short term flows versus longer term flows when making decisions that affect market prices. PJM real-time prices are calculated every five minutes for thousands of nodes. PJM prices are extremely sensitive to transmission line ratings. For consistency with the dynamic nature of wholesale power markets, line ratings should be updated in real time to reflect real time conditions and to help ensure that real-time prices are based on actual current line ratings. New technologies that permit dynamic line ratings (DLR) should be implemented. All PJM Transmission Owners should be required to immediately adopt current dynamic line rating (DLR) methods for all transmission facilities, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC.

Given the slow pace of adoption by Transmission Owners of Grid Enhancing Technologies (GETs), PJM and the Commission should introduce rules that would allow third parties to propose adding GETs to the transmission system, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. The third parties would be compensated in the same way that TOs would be compensated for comparable investments.

Another element of opening competition would be to consider transmission owners' ownership of property and rights of way at or around transmission substations. In many cases, the land acquired included property intended to support future expansion of the grid. Incumbents have included the costs of the property in their rate base, paid for by customers. PJM now has the responsibility for planning the development of the grid under its RTEP process. Property bought to facilitate future expansion should be a part of the RTEP process and be made available to all providers on equal terms.

It would be antithetical to competition to permit transmission owners to own black start units under the backstop rules, to own batteries (storage as a transmission asset) or to permit transmission owners to build new generation, all under the antiquated cost of service regulation rules that were displaced by more efficient competitive markets. Such an approach would undermine competitive markets and require market projects built with investors' capital at risk to compete with subsidized resources. Nonetheless, PJM supports the ownership of black start units by transmission owners under the backstop rules and PJM supports storage as a transmission asset.

The process for determining the reasonableness or purpose of supplemental transmission projects that are asserted to be not needed for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance as defined under the RTEP process needs additional oversight and transparency. If there is a need for a

245 See IN Code § 8-1-38-9, effective 7/1/2023. Applies to transmission facilities approved for construction through an RTO planning process. Incumbent Transmission Owner must exercise within 90 days.

246 See MCL §460.593, effective 12/17/2021. Applies to regionally cost shared transmission lines included in a plan adopted by a recognized planning authority. Must be exercised by the incumbent (s) within 90 days after plan is adopted/approved.

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supplemental project, that need should be clearly defined and there should be a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build the project. If there is no defined need for a supplemental project for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance then the project should not be included in rates.

Managing the generation queues is a complex process. The PJM queue evaluation process is being significantly improved, based on the proposal submitted by PJM on June 14, 2022, and approved by FERC on November 29, 2022.[247] [248] The new rules include significant modifications to the interconnection process designed to address some of the key underlying issues and significantly improve the efficiency of the process. These modifications include process efficiency enhancements, recognition of project clusters affecting the same transmission facilities, incentives to reduce the entry of speculative projects in the queue, and incentives to remove projects that are not expected to reach commercial operation. The new process should help to reduce backlog and to remove projects that are not viable earlier to help improve the overall efficiency of the queue process and to reduce uncertainty for new generation. However, the interconnection queue remains an inefficient barrier to the entry of new generation and more work is required to remove any such barrier.

On June 30, 2026, there were 959 proposed generation projects in the new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 118,410.7 MW. Of the 118,410.7 MW in the cycle process queues, 43,942.6 MW (37.1 percent) were active or under construction (40,505.6 MW (34.2 percent) were active and 3,437.0 MW (2.9 percent) were under construction) and 74,468.0 MW (62.9 percent) were withdrawn. The volume of withdrawn projects in the new cycle process does not necessarily mean that the new process is not effective. Under the new cycle queue process, the impact on the studies that account for withdrawn projects and the impacts on other projects in the queue has been significantly reduced. So far, the transition cycles have remained on schedule while managing withdrawn projects.

While the changes in the queue process will clearly improve the process, the MMU's recommendations related to the queue process will remain until the new process is fully in place and it can be evaluated. The impact of the new cycle process will not be fully known until after the first complete cycle under the new process is completed (the Cycle 1 final negotiation phase is currently scheduled to end on May 19, 2028) and generation from Cycle 1 is actually put in service. The impact of the modifications to the queue process will need to be evaluated to determine if they successfully remove projects from the queue if they are not viable, and allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress. There has already been a significant reduction in queue projects as a result of PJM's improvements to the process. The behavior of project developers also creates issues with queue management. When developers put multiple projects in the queue to maintain their own optionality while planning to build only one project they also affect all the projects that follow them in the queue. Project developers may also enter speculative projects in the queue and then put the project in suspended status while they address financing. The impacts of such behavior and the incentives for such behavior are addressed in the new process which includes nonrefundable fees, credit requirements, enhanced site control, elimination of the ability to suspend a project and milestone requirements. The impact of these aspects of the revised interconnection process should continue to be evaluated to ensure that they are having the desired effect on project developer behavior. Initial results from the transition cycles have shown that developers are withdrawing their projects at the specified decision points, which is helping to remove speculative projects from the queue process sooner. Whether the new cycle process will result in enough new dispatchable and renewable generation to meet system needs cannot be determined until after a full cycle has been completed, projects go in service and completion rates can be evaluated. The PJM queue evaluation process should continue to be improved to help ensure that barriers to competition for new generation investments are not created. Issues that need to be addressed include the ownership rights to CIRs and whether transmission owners should perform interconnection studies.

247 See *PJM*, Docket No. ER22-2110 (June 14, 2022).
248 See 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).


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The roles and efficiency of PJM, TOs and developers in the queue process all need to be examined and enhanced in order to help ensure that the queue process can function effectively and efficiently as the gateway to competition in the energy and capacity markets and not as a barrier to competition.

The Commission should require PJM, for example, to enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission while ensuring that customers receive the benefits of competition.

On January 31, 2025, PJM submitted revisions to the PJM Tariff to expedite the transfer of CIRs from deactivating generating resources to new replacement resources.[249] The Market Monitor filed opposing comments.[250] The Commission rejected the filing, finding (i) "that the lack of a maximum time limit for Commercial Operation Date extensions, which introduces the opportunity to delay commercial operation for an indefinite period of time, would result in a generator replacement process that does not promote the efficient interconnection of new resources;" and (ii) "because the unrestricted opportunity for a Replacement Generation Resource Project Developer to significantly delay commercial operation may result in CIRs and associated transmission capacity dedicated to accommodate the Replacement Generation Resource's operation going unused."[251] PJM filed a new proposal that continued to be flawed. [252] On January 29, 2026, the Commission approved the tariff revisions.[253]

The suggestion that generation owners should be permitted to avoid the queue process and directly transfer the generation CIRs to an affiliate or directly sell the CIRs to an unaffiliated entity should be rejected.[254] [255] This proposed approach is about creating a process to maximize the value of existing CIRs to incumbent generators and not about facilitating the efficient replacement of retiring resources. In effect, this approach, if adopted by the large number of retiring units, would create a chaotic, bilateral private queue process that would create market power and facilitate the exercise of market power in the sale of CIRs by incumbent generators. In effect, the proposed approach would replace a significant part of the recently redesigned PJM queue process. The proposed continuation of retention of CIRs by incumbent generators creates the potential for delays of up to a year and the proponents have proposed the option to request further delays. This approach would inappropriately delegate the authority from PJM to the incumbent generator to choose the new resource based on highest offer for CIRs rather than based on PJM defined system reliability needs. There would be no requirement to even be a capacity resource and there would be no requirement to offer the capacity into the capacity market. After the entire process, the contribution to PJM reliability could be zero. PJM's recently proposed expedited process for addressing reliability needs (RRI) is preferable and should be considered as the preferred alternative to the proposed approach from the Planning Committee stakeholder process.

The MMU recommends that PJM establish an expedited PJM managed queue process to identify commercially viable projects that could help eliminate or reduce the need for specific RMRs or that could address specific reliability needs and allow the identified projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming. Rules should be developed to permit PJM to advance projects in the queue if they would resolve immediate reliability issues that result, for example, from unit retirements. The rules should be consistent with the flexibility included in the new queue process but add the option for PJM to expedite the interconnection and commercial operation of projects in the queue that would address identified reliability issues, consistent with the standing of the projects in the queue.

On February 27, 2026, PJM filed revisions to the tariff to establish an expedited interconnection track (EIT) process for generating facilities.[256] The

249 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER25-1128 (January 31, 2025).
250 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER25-1128-000 (February 21, 2025).
251 See 192 FERC ¶ 61,137 at PP 38–39 (2025).
252 *See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. ER26-403-000 (October 31, 2025).
253 See 194 FERC ¶ 61,079 (January 29, 2026).
254 See PJM. "*Enhancing Capacity Interconnection Rights (CIR) Transfer Efficiency: Problem / Opportunity Statement*," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/ips/2023/20230731/20230731-item-08b---enhancing-capacity-interconnection-rights---cir---transfer-efficiency-problem-statement.ashx>.
255 On April 30, 2024, the CIR Transfer Efficiency issue was transferred from the Interconnection Process Subcommittee (IPS) to the Planning Committee (PC).
256 See PJM. Docket No. ER26-1563 (February 27, 2026).

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EIT was designed to expedite the interconnection of new generation that commits to firm commercial in service dates, has a commitment from the relevant siting authority (or a state executive officer in certain circumstances) to expedite consideration of applicable siting, and provides a pathway for new generation. On June 9, 2026, the Commission approved the revised tariff revisions to establish the EIT process effective July 31, 2026.[257]

The PJM queue process should continue to define available and needed CIRs for all capacity queue projects. CIRs from retiring units should be made available to the next resource in the queue that can use them, on the retirement date of the retiring resource. Generation owners do not have property rights in CIRs. The value of CIRs is a result of the entire transmission system which has been paid for by customers and other generators. The value of CIRs is a result of the existence of a network and is not a result solely or even primarily of the investment that may or may not have been required in order to get CIRs. The cost of CIRs is part of project costs included in generation owners' investment decisions like any other project cost and subject to the same risk and reward structure. Open access to the transmission system by new resources should not be limited by claims to own the access rights by retiring units.

The fundamental purpose of the queue process is to provide open access to the grid for supply resources. More specifically, the fundamental purpose of the queue process for capacity resources is to provide open access to the grid and to ensure that the energy from capacity resources is deliverable so that capacity resources can meet their must offer obligations in the energy market and provide reliable energy supply during all conditions.

The addition of a planned transmission project changes the parameters of the capacity auction for the area, changes the amount of capacity needed in the area, changes the capacity market supply and demand fundamentals in the area and may effectively forestall the ability of generation to compete. However, there is no mechanism to permit a direct comparison, let alone competition, between transmission and generation alternatives. There is no mechanism to evaluate whether the generation or transmission alternative is less costly, whether there is more risk associated with the generation or transmission alternatives, or who bears the risks associated with each alternative. Creating such a mechanism should be an explicit goal of PJM market design.

The current market efficiency process does exactly the opposite by permitting transmission projects to be approved without competition from generation. The broader issue is that the market efficiency project approach explicitly allows transmission projects to compete against future generation projects, but without allowing the generation projects to compete. Projecting speculative transmission related benefits for 15 years based on the existing generation fleet and existing patterns of congestion eliminates the potential for new generation to respond to market signals. The market efficiency process allows assets built under the cost of service regulatory paradigm to displace generation assets built under the competitive market paradigm. In addition, there are significant issues with PJM's current benefit/cost analysis which cause it to consistently overstate the potential benefits of market efficiency projects. The market efficiency process is misnamed. The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated.

In addition, the use of an incorrectly defined cost-benefit method by PJM and the correct method by MISO results in an over allocation of the costs associated with joint PJM/MISO transmission projects to PJM participants and in some cases approval of projects that do not pass a correctly defined benefit/cost test.

If it is retained, there are significant issues with PJM's benefit/cost analysis that should be addressed prior to approval of additional projects. The current benefit/cost analysis explicitly and incorrectly ignores the increased costs to load in zones that results from an RTEP project when calculating the energy market benefits. All increases and decreases in costs should be included in all zones and LDAs. The definition of benefits should also be reevaluated.

The benefit/cost analysis should also account for the fact that the transmission project costs are not subject to cost caps and may exceed the estimated costs by a wide margin. When actual costs exceed estimated costs, the benefit/cost analysis is effectively meaningless and low estimated costs may result in inappropriately favoring transmission projects over market generation

257 195 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2026).


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projects. The risk of cost increases for transmission projects should be incorporated in the benefit/cost analysis.

Recent proposals from Transmission Owners to use storage as a transmission asset (SATA) raises a number of additional concerns about PJM's benefit/cost analysis. Storage is a market asset and should not be owned by transmission owners. PJM should not be evaluating SATA at all without a decision from FERC that SATA is allowable in PJM. At present, it is not allowed.

A significant flaw in PJM's benefit/cost analysis is that projected benefits are based on load forecasts which are currently dominated by projected large data center loads that are not verified by PJM and cannot be verified by PJM. That creates a bias towards finding transmission projects beneficial despite the fact that data center loads are imposing transmission costs on other customers as a result.

There are currently no market incentives for transmission owners to plan, submit and complete transmission outages in a timely and efficient manner. Requiring transmission owners to pay does not create an effective incentive when those payments are passed through to transmission customers. The process for the submission of planned transmission outages needs to be carefully reviewed and redesigned to limit the ability of transmission owners to submit transmission outages that are late for FTR auction bid submission dates and are late for the day-ahead energy market and that have large and unnecessary impacts on the PJM energy market. The submission of late transmission outages can inappropriately affect market outcomes when market participants do not have the ability to modify market bids and offers. The PJM process for evaluating the congestion impact of transmission outages needs to be clearly defined and upgraded to provide for management of transmission outages to minimize market impacts. The MMU continues to recommend that PJM draft a clear and expanded definition of the congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests that is incorporated in the PJM Market Rules. PJM Manual 38 currently defines congestion resulting from a transmission outage as an overload on transmission facilities rather than using the general economic definition of congestion resulting from out of merit generation to control constraints. PJM does not currently evaluate the economic impact of congestion when reviewing proposed transmission outages.[258]

The treatment by PJM and Dominion Virginia Power of the outage for the Lanexa – Dunnsville Line illustrates some of the issues with the current process. The outage was submitted and delayed more than once. PJM's analysis of expected congestion did not highlight the magnitude of the issue. Dominion Virginia Power did not stage the outage so as to minimize market disruption and congestion until after there were significant disruptions and congestion.

As an example of the complexities of defining the benefits of transmission investments, the reduction in congestion is frequently and incorrectly cited as a metric of benefits. Congestion is frequently misunderstood. Congestion is not static. Congestion exhibits dynamic intertemporal variability and dynamic locational variability. More importantly, congestion is not the correct metric for evaluating the potential benefits of enhancing the transmission grid. The correct metric is the total net change in production costs.

There is not a secular trend towards increasing congestion in PJM. Congestion is volatile on a monthly, daily and hourly basis. For example, higher congestion can result from changes in seasonal and daily/hourly fuel costs. The level and distribution of congestion at a point in time is a function of the location and size of generating units, the relative costs of the fuels burned and the associated marginal costs of generating units, the location and size of load and the locational capability of the transmission grid. Each of these factors changes over time.

The geographic distribution of congestion is dynamic. The nature and location of congestion in the PJM system has changed significantly over the last 10 years and continues to change. The nature and location of congestion in PJM can also change from one day to the next as a result of changes in relative fuel costs. As a result, building transmission to address a specific pattern of congestion does not make sense, unless the technology can be easily moved to new locations as conditions change. The transmission system is only one of many reasons that congestion exists. The dynamic nature of congestion

258 PJM, "Manual 38: Operations Planning," Rev. 20 (January 22, 2026) at 19-20.

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and the multiple, interactive causes of congestion make it virtually impossible to identify the standalone impacts of an individual transmission investment on future congestion. It is possible, for example, that congestion occurring during a period of a few days in the winter as a result of very high fuel prices, significantly increases the reported level of congestion for the entire year. This has occurred in PJM. It would be a mistake to consider that level of congestion to be a signal to build transmission.

At a more fundamental level, congestion is not the correct metric for evaluating the potential benefits of enhancing the transmission grid. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. Congestion is neither good nor bad, but is a direct measure of the extent to which there are multiple marginal generating units with different offers dispatched to serve load as a result of transmission constraints. Congestion occurs when available, least-cost energy cannot be delivered to all load because transmission facilities are not adequate to deliver that energy to one or more areas, and higher cost units in the constrained area(s) must be dispatched to meet the load. The result is that the price of energy in the constrained area(s) is higher than in the unconstrained area. Load in the constrained area pays the higher price for all energy including energy from low cost generation and energy from high cost generation, while only high cost generators are paid the high price at their bus and low cost generators are paid only the low price at their bus.

If FTRs worked perfectly and were assigned directly to load, FTRs would return all congestion to the load that paid the congestion. Congestion is not a cost, it is an accounting result of a market based on locational energy prices in which all load in a constrained area pays the higher single market clearing locational price, resulting in excess payments by load that are not paid to generation, which should be returned to load.

Counterintuitively, congestion actually increases when the transmission capacity between areas with lower cost generation and areas with higher cost generation increases but does not fully eliminate the need for some higher cost local generation. The smaller the amount of higher cost local generation needed to meet load, the more of the local load is met via low cost generation delivered over the transmission system and therefore the higher is the difference between what load pays and generation receives, congestion.

For all these reasons, if done correctly and if FTRs/ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the benefit/cost analysis for transmission projects would include the total net change in production costs and would not include congestion. The change in production costs correctly measures the changes in cost to load that result from a project.

The PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) successfully addresses the need for transmission investment to reliably meet load. Together with the requirement that new generation pay interconnection costs, the RTEP process has resulted in the appropriate level of new transmission investment in PJM. There is no evidence that the PJM planning process is not adequate to meet the requirements of the PJM markets. Additional transmission investment is not a panacea. Transmission investment is expensive and long lived and it is essential that transmission investments be carefully planned for clearly identified needs in order to ensure that power markets can continue to provide reliable service at a competitive price.

PJM must make out of market payments to units that want to retire (deactivate) but that PJM requires to remain in service, for limited operation, for a defined period because the unit is needed for reliability.[259] This provision has been known as Reliability Must Run (RMR) service but RMR is not defined in the PJM tariff. The correct term is Part V reliability service. The need to retain uneconomic units in service reflects a flawed market design and/or planning process problems. If a unit is needed for reliability, the market should reflect a locational value consistent with that need which would result in the unit remaining in service or being replaced by a competitor unit. The planning process should evaluate the impact of the loss of units at risk and determine in advance whether transmission upgrades are required in order to limit the duration of Part V service for individual units. It is essential that the deactivation provisions of the tariff be evaluated and modified. It is also essential that PJM look forward and attempt to plan for foreseeable

259 OATT Part V §114.


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unit retirements, whether for economic or regulatory reasons. PJM should consider an expedited queue process for projects that could replace the retiring capacity including the immediate transfer of the retiring unit's CIRs to units in the queue in order to permit generation to compete as an alternative to the current transmission only approach.

An area in northern Virginia in the Dominion Transmission Zone, known as Data Center Alley, has experienced significant load growth from data centers. Dominion has presented 44 supplemental project requests to serve the increase in load through the summer of 2025. As part of the supplemental planning process, PJM performs a do no harm analysis. PJM identified the need for additional baseline reinforcements to support the load growth. These baseline reinforcements were addressed in the 2022 RTEP Window 3, when the PJM board approved $1.4 billion of necessary baseline upgrades specific to the Data Center Alley reinforcements.[260] These regional transmission costs were allocated according to Schedule 12 of PJM's Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), where costs are shared across all zones by a combination of load ratio share and distribution factor impacts. The transmission owners include these project costs in their base case, and all retail customers in the PJM footprint pay for those upgrade costs through increased energy bills. The cost allocation of the $1.4 billion in baseline upgrades are assigned to all retail customers and not solely to the customers requesting interconnection.

The high level of customer requests in Data Center Alley resulted in the need for significant baseline reliability upgrades. These costs were allocated per Schedule 12 of the PJM OATT. Not all customer requests result in reliability upgrades. Transmission upgrades for customer requests that are submitted through the supplemental planning process are allocated 100 percent to the zone where they are interconnecting. The transmission owner of that zone then includes those project costs in their rate base, and all retail customers in that zone pay those costs.

The Virginia case illustrates the imposition of transmission costs by data centers on other PJM customers. These additional transmission costs are in addition to the significant capacity market costs imposed on other customers by the actual and forecast addition of large data centers.

The main focus of PJM's planning requirements has been to ensure adequate transmission to allow for generation to reliably serve load. Historically, PJM has had enough excess generation to serve the forecasted load in the RTEP process. In recent years, due in part to the significant increase in load resulting from large load data center interconnection requests and an increase in thermal unit deactivations, meeting forecasted loads and reserves with existing generation has become an issue. In order to solve the RTEP study cases, PJM must make assumptions about the existing and future generation to include in the RTEP model based on the need to serve load. The RTEP analysis first includes all existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied. When the forecasted load exceeds the expected in service generation, the RTEP analysis includes future generation. Planned generators with a signed interconnection service agreement (ISA) or generation interconnection agreement (GIA), or that cleared a BRA, are included. When the PJM load in the RTEP analysis exceeds the sum of existing generation and generation with an executed final agreement, the RTEP analysis simply adds speculative new generation that is in its Phase 3 system impact study status to meet the load. If needed, additional generation (pre-GIA stage or with a suspended status) may be modeled (assumed) consistent with the procedures noted in Manual 14B.[261] [262] The RTEP analysis is not adequately coordinated with PJM markets analysis including the energy and capacity markets. In effect, the RTEP process could result in building expensive transmission based on speculation about the location and type of capacity additions and load additions. The related impacts are exacerbated by the uncertainty about the actual additions of large data centers. This approach to planning is inefficient and unsustainable.

260 See "*Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) Recommendations to the PJM Board*," December 2023. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2023/20231205/20231205-pjm-teac-board-whitepaper-december-2023.ashx>.

261 See "Review of 2025 RTEP Assumptions," presented at the January 7, 2025 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250107/20250107-item-11---2025-rtep-assumption.pdf>.

262 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).

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# Overview: Section 13, FTRs and ARRs

## Auction Revenue Rights

### Market Design

- **ARR Target Allocations.** The value of ARRs is defined by the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction and Monthly FTR Auctions, times the MW of the ARR. ARR target allocations are the minimum value of an ARR. If any ARRs are deficient at the end of the planning period, deficient ARR holders will receive an uplift payment that will charged to FTR holders. If FTRs are fully funded at the end of the planning period, ARR holders will receive all surplus congestion revenues, proportional to ARR target allocations.

### Market Structure

- **ARR Ownership.** In the 2026/2027 planning period, ARRs were allocated to 1,626 individual participants, held by 131 parent companies, up from 1,560 individual parents, held by 130 parent companies in the 2025/2026 planning period. ARR ownership for the 2026/2027 planning period was unconcentrated with an HHI of 590, down from 600 for the 2025/2026 planning period.

### Market Behavior

- **Self Scheduled FTRs.** For the 2026/2027 planning period, 26.5 percent of eligible ARRs were self scheduled as FTRs, up from 25.9 percent for the 2025/2026 planning period.

### Market Performance

- **ARRs as an Offset to Congestion.** ARRs have not served as an effective mechanism to return all congestion revenues to load. For the 2025/2026 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 55.7 percent of total congestion. Congestion payments by load in some zones were more than offset and congestion payments in other zones were less than offset. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was only 65.7 percent of total congestion. If ARR holders had self scheduled all of their allocated ARRs as FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period, the self scheduled FTR target allocations would have increased the offset from 55.7 percent to 83.6 percent of total congestion.
- **ARR Payments.** For the 2025/2026 planning period, the ARR target allocations, which are defined by the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction and Monthly FTR Auctions times the MW of the ARR, were $1,885.5 million, while PJM collected $2,158.1 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. For the 2024/2025 planning period, the ARR target allocations were $1,448.1 million while PJM collected $1,664.9 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.
- **ARR Revenue.** For the 2025/2026 planning period there was enough total day-ahead congestion to pay FTR target allocations. However, as a result of the monthly settlement logic for FTRs and ARRs, $117.7 million of FTR auction revenue over ARR target allocations was transferred from ARR holders (load) to FTR holders in individual months. In the 2024/2025 planning period all $196.2 million of FTR auction revenue over ARR target allocations was transferred from ARR holders to FTR holders. Although PJM refers to this as a surplus, there is no such thing as surplus FTR Auction revenue based on market logic. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason.
- **Residual ARRs.** Residual ARRs are only available on contract paths prorated in Stage 1 of the annual ARR allocation, are only effective for single, whole months and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR clearing prices are based on monthly FTR auction clearing prices. Residual ARRs with negative target allocations are not allocated to participants. Instead, they are removed and the model is rerun.

  In the 2025/2026 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 27,865.4 MW of residual ARRs, down 8,232.2 MW (a 22.8 percent decrease) from 36,097.6 MW, with a total target allocation of $81.7 million, up $55.4


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million (a 210.6 percent increase) from $26.3 million in the 2024/2025 planning period.

- **ARR Deficiency.** In July 2025, there was not enough FTR auction revenue collected from the monthly FTR auction to pay the high target allocations from Residual ARRs. As a result, July ARR funding was deficient for the first time since ARRs were introduced. The congestion revenues at the end of the 2025/2026 were sufficient to fund FTR target allocations and to fund the July ARR deficiency.
- **ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching.** There were 34,066 MW of ARRs associated with $3.6 million of revenue that were reassigned for the 2025/2026 planning period. There were 32,594 MW of ARRs associated with $1.2 million of revenue that were reassigned in the 2024/2025 planning period.

## Financial Transmission Rights

### Market Design

- **FTR Target Allocations.** The value of FTRs is defined in the PJM market rules as the day-ahead CLMP difference between the source and sink of the FTR times the MW of the FTR. FTR Target allocations are the maximum value of an FTR. If the FTR target allocations are greater than the congestion revenue paid in the planning period, payments to all FTRs are prorated, proportional to FTR target allocations. This would not be possible if the value of FTRs were defined logically and consistent with the LMP market design.
- **Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.** The design of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions includes auctions for each remaining month in the planning period.

### Market Structure

- **Patterns of Ownership.**[263] For the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, financial entities purchased 96.6 of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 95.5 percent of prevailing flow and 97.9 percent of counter flow FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period. Financial entities owned 89.2 percent of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 83.0 percent of all prevailing flow FTRs and 96.0 percent of all counter flow FTRs during the 2025/2026 planning period. Self scheduled FTRs account for 3.4 percent of all FTRs held.
- **Market Concentration.** In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period, ownership of cleared prevailing flow bids was unconcentrated in all periods. Ownership of cleared counter flow bids was unconcentrated in 69.2 percent of periods and moderately concentrated in 30.8 percent of periods.

### Market Behavior

- **Sell Offers.** In a given auction, market participants can sell FTRs acquired in preceding auctions or preceding rounds of auctions. In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 2,354,507 MW, up 51.2 percent from 1,557,455 in the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 2,031,149 MW, up 19.8 percent from 1,695,004 for the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 66,529,876 MW, up 45.0 percent from 45,897,764 for the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **Buy Bids.** In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR buy bids were 7,319,380 MW, up 8.8 percent from 6,729,600 MW in the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction, total participant FTR buy and self scheduled bids were 4,385,836 MW, down 34.1 percent from 6,658,483 MW in the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period, total participant FTR buy bids were 89,547,538 MW, up 22.7 percent from 66,979,067 for the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **FTR Forfeitures.** Total FTR forfeitures were $6,687,074 for the 2025/2026 planning period, up 67.2 percent from $4,000,330 from the 2024/2025 planning period.

263 Beginning in the *2025 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*, the MMU categorizes all participants owning FTRs in PJM as either physical or financial at an account level. In prior reports, participants were categorized as either physical or financial at an organization level.

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- **Credit.** There were two collateral defaults and four payment defaults in the first six months of 2026.

## Market Performance

- **Quantity.** In the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction 1,247,476 MW (17.0 percent) of buy bids cleared and 334,486 MW (14.2 percent) of sell offers cleared. In the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction 1,324,299 MW (19.9 percent) of buy and self scheduled bids cleared, up 28.8 percent from the 2024/2025 Annual FTR Auction, and 183,410 MW (10.8 percent) of sell offers cleared, up 47.6 percent from the 2024/2025 Annual Auction. In the 2025/2026 planning period, Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions 16,198,371 MW (18.1 percent) of FTR buy bids cleared, up 44.1 percent from the 2024/2025 planning period and 10,330,538 MW (15.5 percent) of FTR sell offers cleared, up 55.0 percent from the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **Price.** The weighted average buy bid FTR price in the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction was $0.09 per MW, a $0.005 per MW decrease from the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. The weighted average buy bid FTR price in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2026/2027 planning period was $0.40 per MW, down from $0.53 per MW in the 2025/2026 planning period. The weighted average buy bid cleared FTR price in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for all periods in the 2025/2026 planning period was $0.44 per MWh, up from $0.43 per MW in the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **Revenue.** The 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction generated $102.5 million of net auction revenue, down 36.9 percent from $162.3 million from the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. The 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction generated $3,755.8 million of net auction revenue, up 98.2 percent from $1,875.3 million for the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions resulted in net auction revenue of $105.0 million in the 2025/2026 planning period, up 31.9 percent from $79.6 million in the 2024/2025 planning period. Net auction revenue is difference between what FTR buyers pay and what FTR sellers receive in an auction.
- **"Revenue Adequacy."** For the 2025/2026 planning period there was enough total day-ahead congestion revenue to pay FTR target allocations. However, as a result of the monthly settlement logic for FTRs and ARRs, $117.7 million of FTR auction revenue was transferred from ARR holders (load) to FTR holders in months where congestion revenue was less than FTR target allocation. For the 2025/2026 planning period FTRs were paid 100.0 percent of the target allocations and the total revenue distributed to ARR holders was $762.0 million, including $522.1 million of congestion revenue and $239.9 of ARR auction revenue. All day-ahead congestion revenue greater than FTR target allocations was distributed to ARR holders at the end of the planning period. Based on market logic, there is no such thing as surplus FTR auction revenue and there is no such thing as revenue inadequacy. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason.
- **Profitability.** FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received directly from holding an FTR plus any revenue from the sale of an FTR, and the cost of buying the FTR. In the 2025/2026 planning period, profits for all participants were $2.2 billion, up from $897.3 million in profits in the 2024/2025 planning period and the highest level of profits since at least the 2010/2011 planning period. In the 2025/2026 planning period, physical entities received $595.3 million in profits on FTRs purchased directly (not self scheduled), up from $42.6 million profits in the 2024/2025 planning period. Financial entities received $1.6 billion in profits, up from $854.8 million profits in the 2024/2025 planning period.

# Section 13 Recommendations

## Market Design

- The MMU recommends that the current ARR/FTR design be replaced with defined congestion revenue rights (CRRs). A CRR is the right to actual congestion revenue that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)


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### ARR

- The MMU recommends that the ARR/FTR design be modified to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all historical generation to load paths be eliminated as a basis for assigning ARRs. The MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, the rights to all congestion revenue be allocated as ARRs prior to sale as FTRs. Reductions in allocated revenue as a contingency for outages and increased system capability should be reserved for ARRs rather than sold in the Long Term FTR Auction. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from PJM's tariff, but that if IARRs are not eliminated, IARRs should be subject to the same proration rules that apply to all other ARR rights. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR

- The MMU recommends that FTR funding be based on total congestion, including both day-ahead and balancing congestion. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that bilateral transactions be eliminated and that all FTR transactions occur in the PJM market. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)[264]
- The MMU recommends a requirement that the details of all bilateral FTR transactions be reported to PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM continue to evaluate the bilateral indemnification rules and any asymmetries they may create. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs, including a clear definition of persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2014/2015 planning period.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate generation to generation paths and all other paths that do not represent the delivery of power to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Long Term FTR product be eliminated. If the Long Term FTR product is not eliminated, the Long Term FTR Market should be modified so that the supply of prevailing flow FTRs in the Long Term FTR Market is based solely on counter flow offers in the Long Term FTR Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models, including the use of probabilistic outage modeling. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

### "Surplus"

- The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FTR auction revenues not be used by PJM to buy counter flow FTRs for the purpose of improving FTR payout ratios.[265] (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR Subsidies

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR market participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)

264 If adopted, this recommendation would replace the next two recommendations.

265 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

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- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR Liquidation

- The MMU recommends that the FTR portfolio of a defaulted member be canceled rather than liquidated or allowed to settle as a default cost to the membership. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

### Credit

- The MMU recommends that PJM's minimum credit requirements be reviewed and updated to appropriately reflect the risk created for the markets and other market participants. The PJM minimum credit requirements (minimum tangible net worth and minimum tangible assets) were set as fixed dollars amounts in 2011 in FERC Order No. 741 based on the specific market participation (FTRs or other). (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 13 Conclusion

### Solutions

The annual ARR allocation should be designed to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load, without requiring contract path or point to point physical or financial transmission rights that are inconsistent with the network based delivery of power and the actual way congestion is generated in PJM's security constrained LMP market. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. As a result, congestion belongs to load and should be returned to load.

The current contract path based design should be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right should be to the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load can retain the right to the congestion revenues or sell the rights through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the voluntary sale by load of their congestion revenue rights at terms defined by load, recognizing that load has property rights to congestion.

### Issues

If the original PJM FTR approach had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without the use of generation to load contract paths, and if the distortions subsequently introduced into the FTR design had not been added, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design and complex redesigns would have been avoided. PJM would not have had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy.

PJM has persistently and subjectively intervened in the FTR market in order to affect the payments to FTR holders. These interventions are not appropriate. For example, in the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 planning periods, PJM significantly reduced the allocation of ARR capacity, and FTRs, in order to guarantee full FTR funding. PJM reduced system capability in the FTR auction model by including more outages, reducing line limits and including additional constraints. PJM's modeling changes resulted in significant reductions in Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations, a corresponding reduction in the available quantity of FTRs, a reduction in congestion revenues assigned to ARRs, and an associated surplus of congestion revenue relative to FTR target allocations. This also resulted in a significant redistribution of ARRs among ARR holders based on differences in allocations between Stage 1A and


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Stage 1B ARRs. Starting in the 2017/2018 planning period, with the allocation of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load rather than FTRs, PJM increased system capability allocated to Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs, but continued to conservatively select outages to manage FTR funding levels.

PJM has intervened aggressively in the FTR market since its inception in order to meet various subjective objectives including so called revenue adequacy. PJM should not intervene in the FTR market to subjectively manage FTR funding. PJM should fix the FTR/ARR design and then should let the market work to return congestion to load and to let FTR values reflect actual congestion.

Load should never be required to subsidize payments to FTR holders, regardless of the reason.[266] The FERC order of September 15, 2016, introduced a subsidy to FTR holders at the expense of ARR holders.[267] The order requires PJM to ignore balancing congestion when calculating total congestion dollars available to fund FTRs. As a result, balancing congestion and M2M payments are assigned to load, rather than to FTR holders, as of the 2017/2018 planning period. When combined with the direct assignment of both surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenues to FTR holders, the Commission's order shifted substantial revenue from load to the holders of FTRs and further reduced the offset to congestion payments by load. This approach ignores the fact that load pays both day-ahead and balancing congestion, and that actual congestion is the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. Eliminating balancing congestion from the FTR revenue calculation requires load to pay twice for congestion. Load pays total congestion and pays negative balancing congestion again. The fundamental reasons that there has been a significant and persistent difference between day-ahead and balancing congestion include inadequate transmission modeling in the FTR auction and the role of UTCs in taking advantage of these modeling differences and creating negative balancing congestion. There is no reason to impose these costs on load.

These changes were made in order to increase the payout to holders of FTRs who are not loads. Increasing the payout to FTR holders at the expense of the load is not a supportable market objective. PJM should implement an FTR design that calculates and assigns congestion rights to load rather than continuing to modify the current, fundamentally flawed, design.

Load was made significantly worse off as a result of the changes made to the FTR/ARR process by PJM based on the FERC order of September 15, 2016. ARR revenues were significantly reduced for the 2017/2018 FTR Auction, the first auction under the new rules. ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 49.5 percent of total congestion costs for the 2017/2018 planning period rather than the 58.0 percent offset that would have occurred under the prior rules, a difference of $101.4 million.

A subsequent rule change was implemented that modified the allocation of what is termed surplus auction revenue to load. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period, surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenue are assigned to FTR holders only up total target allocations, and then distributed to ARR holders.[268] ARR holders will only be allocated this surplus after FTRs are paid 100 percent of their target allocations. While this rule change increased the level of congestion revenues returned to load under some conditions, the rules do not recognize ARR holders' rights to all congestion revenue, and only improves congestion payouts to load when there is a surplus. There was no surplus for the 2020/2021 or 2021/2022 planning years. With this rule in effect for the 2021/2022 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 31.6 percent of total congestion. There was surplus for the 2022/2023 and the 2023/2024 planning periods. However, FTR auction surplus revenues were taken from load and given to FTR holders because day-ahead congestion revenues were less than target allocations in the 2023/2024 planning period. For the 2024/2025 planning period, there was not enough congestion revenue to fund FTR target allocations and all FTR auction surplus revenues were taken from load and given to FTR holders. For the 2025/2026 planning period, there was enough congestion revenue to fund FTR target allocations, and FTR auction surplus revenues were distributed to ARR holders. Based on market logic, there is no such thing as surplus FTR auction revenue. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason. ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 55.7

266 Such subsidies have been suggested repeatedly. See FERC Dockets Nos. EL13-47-000 and EL12-19-000.
267 See 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016), *reh'g denied*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,093 (2017).
268 163 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2018).

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percent of total congestion paid by load in the 2025/2026 planning period. Load was underpaid $2.2 billion in the 2025/2026 planning period, an increase from the $0.9 billion underpayment in the 2024/2025 planning period. This is the largest underpayment that load has experienced in a single planning period. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was only 65.7 percent of total congestion.

The complex process related to what is termed the overallocation of Stage 1A ARRs is entirely an artificial result of reliance on the contract path model in the assignment of FTRs. For example, there is a reason that transmission is not actually built to address the Stage 1A overallocation issue. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load contract paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows.

PJM proposed, and on March 11, 2022, FERC accepted, an increase to Stage 1A ARR allocations from 50 percent of Network Service Base Load (NSBL) to 60 percent of Network Service Peak Load (NSPL).[269] NSBL is a network service customer's contribution to the lowest daily zonal peak load in the prior twelve month period, and NSPL is a network service customer's contribution to the highest daily zonal peak load in the prior twelve month period. PJM's new ARR allocation rules have increased Stage 1A rights at the cost of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations. More importantly, PJM's new ARR allocation rules have exacerbated the current misalignment between congestion property rights and the congestion paid by load.

## Proposed Design

To address the issues with the current contract path based ARR/FTR market design, the MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right would be the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load could retain the right to the congestion or sell the right through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the voluntary sale by load of their congestion revenue rights at terms defined by load.

With a network assignment of actual congestion, there would be no cross subsidies among rights holders and no over or under allocation of rights relative to actual network market solutions. There would be no revenue shortfalls as congestion payments equal congestion collected. The risk of default would be isolated to the buyer and seller of the right, and any default would not be socialized to other rights holders. In the case of a defaulting buyer, the rights to the congestion revenues would revert to the load. There would be no risk of a network right flipping in value from positive to negative, because congestion is always the positive difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy as a result of transmission constraints.

The MMU proposal requires the calculation of constraint specific congestion and the calculation of that specific constraint's congestion related charges to each physical load bus downstream of that constraint. Under the MMU proposal, the constraint specific congestion calculated by hour, from both the day-ahead and balancing market would be paid directly to the physical load as a credit against the associated load serving entity's (LSE) energy bill. This right to the congestion is defined as the congestion revenue right (CRR) that belongs to the physical load at a defined bus, zone or aggregate. The LSE could choose to sell all or a portion of the CRR through auctions.

A CRR is the right to actual, realized network related congestion that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. Under the MMU proposal a bus, zone or aggregate specific CRR could be sold as a defined share of the actual congestion. For example, an LSE could sell 50 percent of its congestion revenue right for the planning period to a third party. The third party buyer would then be entitled to 50 percent of the congestion that is credited to that specific bus, zone or aggregate for the planning period. The remaining 50 percent of the congestion credit for the specified bus, zone or aggregate would be paid to the LSE along with the auction clearing price for the 50 percent of the CRR that was sold to the third party. Depending on actual congestion and

269 See 178 FERC ¶ 61,170.



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the price paid for a CRR, an LSE selling its congestion revenue rights could be better or worse off than if it retained its rights.

Under the MMU proposal, the LSE would be able to set reservation prices in the auction for the sale of portions or all of its CRR. Third parties would have an opportunity to bid for the offered portions of the CRR, and the market for the congestion revenue associated with the specified bus, zone or aggregate would clear at a price. If the reservation price of an identified portion of the offered CRR was not met at the clearing price, that portion of the offered CRR would remain with the load. Auctions could be annual and/or monthly and/or more frequent.

Under the MMU proposal, point to point rights (FTRs) could exist as a separate, self-funded hedging product based on simultaneously feasible prevailing and counter flows in a PJM managed network based auction. The only supply and the only source of revenues in the point to point market for prevailing flow FTRs would be counter flow offers and direct payments for specific rights.

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# 2. Recommendations

In order to perform its role in PJM market design, the MMU evaluates existing and proposed PJM Market Rules and the design of the PJM Markets.[1] The MMU initiates and proposes changes to the design of the markets and the PJM Market Rules in stakeholder and regulatory proceedings.[2] In support of this function, the MMU engages in discussions with stakeholders, State Commissions, PJM management, and the PJM Board; participates in PJM stakeholder meetings and working groups regarding market design matters; publishes proposals, reports and studies on market design issues; and makes filings with the Commission on market design issues.[3] The MMU also recommends changes to the PJM Market Rules to the staff of the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation, State Commissions, and the PJM Board.[4] The MMU may provide in its annual, quarterly and other reports "recommendations regarding any matter within its purview."[5]

## Recommendation Priority

Priority rankings are relative. The creation of rankings recognizes that there are limited resources available to address market issues and that problems must be ranked in order to determine the order in which to address them. It does not mean that all the problems should not be addressed. Priority rankings are dynamic and as new issues are identified, priority rankings will change. The rankings reflect a number of factors including the significance of the issue for efficient markets, the difficulty of completion and the degree to which items are already in progress. A low ranking does not necessarily mean that an issue is not important, but could mean that the issue would be easy to resolve.

There are three priority rankings: High, Medium and Low. High priority indicates that the recommendation requires action because it addresses a market design issue that creates significant market inefficiencies and/or long lasting negative market effects. Medium priority indicates that the recommendation addresses a market design issue that creates intermediate market inefficiencies and/or near term negative market effects. Low priority indicates that the recommendation addresses a market design issue that creates smaller market inefficiencies and/or more limited market effects or that it could be easily resolved.

## Recommendation Status

The MMU also tracks PJM's progress in addressing these recommendations. The MMU recognizes that part of the process of addressing recommendations may include discussions in the stakeholder process, FERC decisions and court decisions and those elements are included in the tracking. The MMU recognizes that PJM does not have the unilateral authority to implement changes to the tariff but PJM has a significant role in the issues PJM focuses on, in proposed changes to the PJM manuals, and in the recommendations PJM makes to the stakeholders and to FERC. Each recommendation includes a status. The status categories are:

- **Adopted:** PJM has implemented the recommendation made by the MMU.
- **Partially adopted:** PJM has implemented part of the recommendation made by the MMU.
- **Not adopted:** PJM does not plan to implement the recommendation made by the MMU, or has not yet implemented any part of the recommendation made by the MMU. Where the subject of the recommendation is pending stakeholder, FERC, or court action, that status is noted.
- **Withdrawn:** The MMU no longer makes the recommendation because it has become irrelevant or because it has been replaced by another recommendation.

1 OATT Attachment M § IV.D.
2 *Id.*
3 *Id.*
4 *Id.*
5 OATT Attachment M § VI.A.

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# New Recommendations

Consistent with its core function to "[e]valuate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes," the MMU recommends specific enhancements to existing market rules and implementation of new rules that are required for competitive results in PJM markets and for continued improvements in the functioning of PJM markets. [6]

In this *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, the MMU includes five new recommendations made for the second quarter of 2026.

## New Recommendation from Section 4, Energy Uplift

- The MMU recommends that PJM improve its advanced scheduling and commitment process in order to implement a transparent process in which units are scheduled and committed economically based on the known constraints prior to the day-ahead market. The multiday advance commitment process needs to address the communication process, the offers used for commitment evaluation, the operating parameters used for commitment evaluation, the financial consequences of commitment and the appropriate uplift rules. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## New Recommendation from Section 5, Capacity Market

- The MMU recommends that all forecast data center load be excluded from capacity market auctions if it is not on line on June 1, 2026. Only organic load and existing data center load as of June 1, 2026, would be included in the capacity market auctions. PJM would operate a reliability auction for forecast data center load that has not signed or committed to sign a bilateral contract for capacity.[7] (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## New Recommendation from Section 6, Demand Response

- The MMU recommends that CSPs be required to provide metered data to PJM within 24 hours following the dispatch of economic or emergency DR. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## New Recommendation from Section 10, Ancillary Services

- The MMU recommends that, in cases where a unit is already committed for regulation, that the actual residual ramp (based on the current market interval's regulation assignment) be used when calculating the potential regulation set point and the LOC for purposes of clearing resources. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.).

## New Recommendation from Section 12, Generation and Transmission Planning

- The MMU recommends that PJM include only existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied, and queued generation with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, that has a high probability of completion, in the RTEP models. If a future study cannot achieve power balance with such generation, then the addition of load should be capped at the level that can be supplied by actual generation and not allowed to connect until expected generation can support it. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

# Complete List of Current MMU Recommendations

The recommendations are explained in each section of the report.

## Section 3, Energy Market

### Market Power

- The MMU recommends that the market rules explicitly require that offers in the energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to

6 18 CFR § 35.28(g)(3)(ii)(A); see also OATT Attachment M § IV.D.

7 The details of the MMU's proposed design are included in two executive summaries: See "IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf>. See also "IMM Curtailable Load Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf>.



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be the short run marginal cost of the units, including parameter limited schedules. The short run marginal cost should reflect opportunity cost when appropriate. The MMU recommends that the level of incremental costs includable in cost-based offers per the PJM Operating Agreement not exceed the short run marginal cost of the unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

## Fuel Cost Policies

- The MMU recommends that PJM require that all fuel cost policies be algorithmic, verifiable, and systematic, and accurately reflect short run marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the temporary cost method be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to have an approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Low. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the penalty exemption provision be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to follow their approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Cost-Based Offers

- The MMU recommends removal of all use of FERC System of Accounts in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of all use of cyclic starting and peaking factors from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of all maintenance costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, given that maintenance costs are currently allowed in cost-based offers, that market participants be permitted to include only variable maintenance costs, linked to verifiable operational events and that can be supported by clear and unambiguous documentation of the operational data (e.g. run hours, MWh, MMBtu) that support the maintenance cycle of the equipment being serviced/replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Partially adopted 2023.)
- The MMU recommends explicitly accounting for soak costs and changing the definition of the start heat input for combined cycles to include only the amount of fuel used from first fire to the first breaker close in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that soak costs, soak time and the MWh produced during soaking be modeled separately. This will ensure that the time required for units to reach a dispatchable level is known and used in the unit commitment process instead of only being communicated verbally between dispatchers and generators. Separating soak costs from start costs and modeling the MWh produced during soaking allows for a better representation of the costs because it eliminates the need to simply assume the price paid for those MWh. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of nuclear fuel and nonfuel operations and maintenance costs that are not short run marginal costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends revising the pumped hydro fuel cost calculation to include day-ahead and real-time power purchases. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

## Market Power: TPS Test and Offer Capping

- The MMU recommends that the rules governing the application of the TPS test be clarified and documented. The TPS test application in the day-ahead energy market is not documented. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[8]

8 The real-time market formula for determining the lowest cost schedule is documented. The day-ahead market formula for determining the lowest cost schedule is not documented.

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- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the process of applying the TPS test in the day-ahead energy market to ensure that all local markets created by binding constraints are tested for market power and to ensure that market sellers with market power are appropriately mitigated to their competitive offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that offer capping be applied to units that fail the TPS test in the real-time market that were not offer capped at the time of commitment in the day-ahead market or at a prior time in the real-time market. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation and to ensure that capacity resources meet their obligations to be flexible, that capacity resources be required to use flexible parameters in all offers at all times. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, PJM always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters for all cost-based and all price-based offers during high load conditions such as cold and hot weather alerts and emergency conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require every market participant to make available at least one cost schedule based on the same hourly fuel type(s) and parameters at least as flexible as their offered price schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that markup be consistently positive or negative across the full MWh range of price and cost-based offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, that PJM commit all resources that fail the TPS test on their cost-based offers, that the Market Seller designate the cost-based offer if there is more than one, and that PJM implement this solution as soon as possible. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM retain the $1,000 per MWh offer cap in the PJM energy market except when cost-based offers exceed $1,000 per MWh, and retain other existing rules that limit incentives to exercise market power. (Priority: High. First reported 1999. Status: Partially adopted, 1999, 2017.)
- The MMU recommends the elimination of FMU and AU adders. FMU and AU adders no longer serve the purpose for which they were created and interfere with the efficient operation of PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted, 2014.)[9]

## Offer Behavior

- The MMU recommends that resources not be allowed to violate the ICAP must offer requirement. The MMU recommends that PJM enforce the ICAP must offer requirement by assigning a forced outage to any unit that is derated in the energy market below its committed ICAP without an outage that reflects the derate. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets that reflects the limitations of these resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that capacity resources not be allowed to offer any portion of their capacity market obligation as maximum emergency energy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM integrate all the outage reporting tools in order to enforce the ICAP must offer requirement, ensure that outages are reported correctly and eliminate reporting inconsistencies. Generators currently submit availability in three different tools that are not integrated, Markets Gateway, eDART and eGADS. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

9 The applicability of the FMU and AU adders is limited by the rule implemented in 2014 requiring that net revenues must fall below avoidable costs, but the possibility of FMU and AU adders is still part of the PJM Market Rules.


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- The MMU recommends that gas generators be required to check with pipelines throughout the operating day to confirm that nominations are accepted beyond the NAESB deadlines, that gas generators be required to inform PJM about whether they have gas, and that gas generators be required to place their units on forced outage until the time that pipelines allow nominations to consume gas at a unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Capacity Resources

- The MMU recommends that capacity resources be held to the OEM operating parameters of the capacity market CONE reference resource for performance assessment and energy uplift payments and that this standard be applied to all technologies on a uniform basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the parameters which determine nonperformance charges and the amounts of uplift payments should reflect the flexibility goals of the capacity market design. The operational parameters used by generation owners to indicate to PJM operators what a unit is capable of during the operating day should not determine capacity resource performance assessment or uplift payments. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[10]
- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly define the business rules that apply to the unit specific parameter adjustment process, including PJM's implementation of the tariff rules in the PJM manuals to ensure market sellers know the requirements for their resources. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM update the tariff to clarify that all generation resources are subject to unit specific parameter limits on their cost-based offers using the same standard and process as capacity resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that resources not be paid the daily capacity payment when unable to operate to their unit specific parameter limits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not approve temporary exceptions that are based on pipeline tariff terms that are not enforced at the time, or are based on inferior transportation service procured by the generator. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require generators that violate their approved turn down ratio (by either using the fixed gen option or increasing their economic minimum) to use the temporary parameter exception process that requires market sellers to demonstrate that the request is based on a physical and actual constraint. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends: that gas generators be required to confirm, regularly during the operating day, that they can obtain gas if requested to operate at their economic maximum level; that gas generators provide that information to PJM during the operating day; and that gas generators be required to be on forced outage if they cannot obtain gas during the operating day to meet their must offer requirement as a result of pipeline restrictions, and they do not have backup fuel. As part of this, the MMU recommends that PJM collect data on each individual generator's fuel supply arrangements at least annually or when such arrangements change, and analyze the associated locational and regional risks to reliability. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Accurate System Modeling

- The MMU recommends that PJM explicitly state its policy on the use of transmission constraint penalty factors including: the level of the penalty factors; the triggers for the use of the penalty factors; the appropriate line ratings to trigger the use of penalty factors; the allowed duration of the violation and when the transmission constraint penalty factors will be used to set the shadow price. The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing

10 Flexible parameter standards are in place for combined cycle and combustion turbine resources when operating on a parameter limited schedule, but not for other schedules or generating technologies.

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software (SCED) and included in LMP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted 2020.)[11]

- The MMU recommends that PJM routinely review all transmission facility ratings and any changes to those ratings to ensure that the normal, emergency and load dump ratings used in modeling the transmission system are accurate and reflect standard ratings practice. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not use closed loop interface or surrogate constraints to artificially override nodal prices based on fundamental LMP logic in order to: accommodate rather than resolve the inadequacies of the demand side resource capacity product; address the inability of the power flow model to incorporate the need for reactive power; accommodate rather than resolve the flaws in PJM's approach to shortage pricing; or for any other reason. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM update the outage impact studies, the reliability analyses used in RPM for capacity deliverability, and the reliability analyses used in RTEP for transmission upgrades to be consistent with the more conservative emergency operations (post contingency load dump limit exceedance analysis) in the energy market that were implemented in June 2013.[12] (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM include in the tariff or appropriate manual an explanation of the initial creation of hubs, the process for modifying hub definitions and a description of how hub definitions have changed.[13] [14] (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all buses with a net withdrawal be treated as load for purposes of calculating load and load-weighted LMP, even if the MW are settled to the generator. The MMU recommends that during hours when a load bus shows a net injection, the energy injection be treated as generation, not negative load, for purposes of calculating generation and load-weighted LMP, even if the injection MW are settled to the load serving entity. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM identify and collect data on available behind the meter generation resources, including nodal location information and relevant operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM document how LMPs are calculated when demand response is marginal. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not allow nuclear generators which do not respond to prices or which only respond to manual instructions from the operator to set the LMPs in the real-time market. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM increase the coordination of outage and operational restrictions data submitted by market participants via eDART/eGADs and offer data submitted via Markets Gateway. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM model generators' operating transitions, including soak time for units with a steam turbine, configuration transitions for combined cycles, and peak operating modes. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clarify, modify and document its process for dispatching reserves and energy when SCED indicates that supply is less than total demand including forecasted load and reserve requirements. The modifications should define: a SCED process to economically convert reserves to energy; a process for the recall of energy from capacity resources; and the minimum level of synchronized reserves that would trigger load shedding. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

11 PJM created a more transparent process for transmission constraint penalty factors and added it to the tariff in 2020. Policies on reductions in control limits and the duration of violations remain discretionary and undocumented in the PJM Market Rules.

12 This recommendation was the result of load shed events in September, 2013. For detailed discussion, please see *2013 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 3: Energy Market at 114 – 116.

13 According to minutes from the first meeting of the Energy Market Committee (EMC) on January 28, 1998, the EMC unanimously agreed to be responsible for approving additions, deletions and changes to the hub definitions to be published and modeled by PJM. Since the EMC has become the Market Implementation Committee (MIC), the MIC now appears to be responsible for such changes.

14 There is currently no PJM documentation in the tariff or manuals explaining how hubs are created and how their definitions are changed. The general definition of a hub can be found in the PJM.com Glossary <http://www.pjm.com/Glossary.aspx>.



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- The MMU recommends that PJM stop capping the system marginal price in RT SCED and LPC and instead limit the sum of violated reserve constraint shadow prices that are included in the determination of LMP in LPC to $1,700 per MWh. While PJM no longer caps prices in RT SCED, PJM continues to apply a cap to the system marginal price in the pricing run (LPC) under fast start pricing. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM adjust the ORDCs during spin events to reduce the reserve requirement for synchronized and primary reserves by the amount of the reserves deployed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

### Transparency

- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly document the calculation of shortage prices and implementation of reserve price caps in the PJM manuals, including defining all the components of reserve prices, and all the constraints whose shadow prices are included in reserve prices. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM allow generators to report fuel type on an hourly basis in their offer schedules and to designate schedule availability on an hourly basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[15]
- The MMU recommends that PJM define clear criteria for operator approval of RT SCED cases, including shortage cases, that are used to send dispatch signals to resources, and for pricing, to minimize discretion. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)[16]

### Virtual Bids and Offers

- The MMU recommends eliminating up to congestion (UTC) bidding at pricing nodes that aggregate only small sections of transmission zones with few physical assets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends eliminating INC, DEC, and UTC bidding at pricing nodes that allow market participants to profit from modeling issues. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 4, Energy Uplift

- The MMU recommends that uplift be paid only based on operating parameters that reflect the flexibility of the benchmark new entrant unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not pay uplift to units for energy produced because of not following dispatch. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)[17]
- The MMU recommends that PJM pay uplift based on the offer at the lower of the actual unit output or the desired MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)[18]
- The MMU recommends eliminating intraday segments from the calculation of uplift payments and returning to calculating the need for uplift based on the entire 24 hour operating day. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the elimination of day-ahead uplift to ensure that units receive an energy uplift payment based on their real-time output and not their day-ahead scheduled output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units not be paid lost opportunity cost uplift credits when PJM directs a unit to reduce output based on a transmission constraint or other reliability issue. There is no lost opportunity because the unit is required to reduce for the reliability of the unit and the system. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends reincorporating the use of net regulation revenues as an offset in the calculation of balancing generator credits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

15 Fuel type is reported by offer schedule, but it can be inaccurate on an hourly basis.
16 The PJM Market Rules clarify that shortage case approval will be based on RT SCED, but does not address RT SCED case choice or load bias.
17 PJM filed proposed changes to the uplift rules with the FERC on October 7, 2025 ("Reform to Energy Uplift Credit Rules," Docket No. ER26-59-000). The Commission Order on December 5, 2025, accepted the PJM Proposal as filed. PJM expects to implement the changes in 2027.
18 Id.

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- The MMU recommends that self scheduled units not be paid energy uplift credits for their startup cost when the units are scheduled by PJM to start before the self scheduled hours. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends three modifications to the energy lost opportunity cost calculations:
- The MMU recommends calculating LOC based on 24 hour daily periods for combustion turbines and diesels scheduled in the day-ahead energy market, but not committed in real time. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time should be compensated for LOC based on their real-time desired and achievable output, not their scheduled day-ahead output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that only flexible fast start units (startup plus notification times of 10 minutes or less) and units with short minimum run times (one hour or less) be eligible by default for the LOC compensation to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time. Other units should be eligible for LOC compensation only if PJM explicitly cancels their day-ahead commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that up to congestion (UTC) transactions be required to pay energy uplift charges for both the injection and the withdrawal sides of the UTC. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends allocating the energy uplift credits paid to units scheduled by PJM as must run in the day-ahead energy market for reasons other than voltage/reactive or black start services as a reliability charge to real-time load, real-time exports and real-time wheels. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the total cost of providing reactive support be categorized and allocated as reactive services. Reactive services credits should be calculated consistent with the balancing generator credit calculation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends including real-time exports and real-time wheels in the allocation of the cost of providing reactive support to the 500 kV system or above, in addition to real-time load. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends modifications to the calculation of lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units. The lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units should be based on the lesser of the desired output, the estimated output based on actual wind conditions and the capacity interconnection rights (CIRs). The MMU recommends that PJM require wind units to request CIRs based on the maximum output used in the ELCC calculation for wind units. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly identify and classify all reasons for incurring uplift in the day-ahead and the real-time energy markets and the associated uplift charges in order to make all market participants aware of the reasons for these costs and to help ensure a long term solution to the issue of how to allocate the costs of uplift. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the current uplift confidentiality rules in order to allow the disclosure of complete information about the level of uplift by unit and the detailed reasons for the level of uplift credits by unit in the PJM region. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.) [19]
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve its advanced scheduling and commitment process in order to implement a transparent process in which units are scheduled and committed economically based on the known constraints prior to the day-ahead market. The multiday advance commitment process needs to address the communication process, the offers used for commitment evaluation, the operating parameters used for commitment evaluation, the financial consequences of commitment and

19 On September 7, 2018, PJM made a compliance filing for FERC Order No. 844 to publish unit specific uplift credits. The compliance filing was accepted by FERC on June 21, 2019. 166 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2019). PJM began posting unit specific uplift reports on May 1, 2019. 167 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2019).


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the appropriate uplift rules. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

# Section 5, Capacity Market

## Definition of Capacity

- The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the enforcement of a consistent definition of capacity resources. The MMU recommends that the tariff requirement to be a physical resource be enforced and enhanced. The requirement to be a physical resource should apply at the time of auctions and should also constitute a commitment to be physical in the relevant delivery year. The requirement to be a physical resource should be applied to all resource types, including planned generation, demand resources, and imports.[20] [21] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that DR providers be required to have a signed contract with specific customers for specific facilities for specific levels of DR at least six months prior to any capacity auction in which the DR is offered. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that Energy Efficiency Resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market construct because PJM's load forecasts have accounted for EE since the 2016 load forecast for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year. EE is not a capacity resource as defined in the tariff, and there is no reason to continue to pay large subsidies to EE providers.[22] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Adopted 2024.)[23]
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market participants to meet their deliverability requirements under the same rules. PJM should end the practice of giving away winter CIRs to intermittent resources that appear to exist because other resources paid for the supporting network upgrades. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)[24]
- The MMU recommends that the must offer rule in the capacity market apply to all capacity resources. There is no reason to exempt intermittent and capacity storage resources, including hydro, and demand resources from the must offer requirement. The same rules should apply to all capacity resources in order to ensure open access to the transmission system and prevent the exercise of market power through withholding. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market sellers of proposed generation capacity resources, including thermal and intermittent, to submit a binding notice of intent to offer at least six months prior to the base residual auction. This is consistent with the overall MMU recommendation that all capacity resources have a must offer obligation in the capacity market auctions. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM's application of the ELCC approach be replaced with an ELCC approach that is based on the actual hourly availability of all individual generators for accreditation and for payment. The MMU recommends short term modifications to PJM's approach to include hourly data that would permit unit specific ELCC ratings, to weight summer and winter risk in a more balanced manner, to eliminate PAI risks, and to pay for actual hourly performance rather than based on inflexible class capacity accreditation ratings derived from a small number of nonrepresentative hours of poor performance from PV1 and WSE. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

## Market Design and Parameters

- The MMU recommends that PJM establish a load queue for large new data center loads to ensure that such loads are not added until there is adequate generation capacity to serve them. The MMU recommends that an expedited queue option that would permit both the load and the

20 See also Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER14-503-000 (December 20, 2013).

21 See "Analysis of Replacement Capacity for RPM Commitments: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2019," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2019/IMM_Analysis_of_Replacement_Capacity_for_RPM_Commitments_June_1_2007_to_June_1_2019_20190913.pdf> (September 13, 2019).

22 "PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis," § 3.2 Development of the Forecast, Rev. 39 (June 30, 2026).

23 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2024).

24 This recommendation was first made in the 2020/2021 BRA report in 2017. See the "Analysis of the 2020/2021 RPM Base Residual Auction," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2017/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20202021_RPM_BRA_20171117.pdf> (November 11, 2017).

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generation to be added without delays be available to large data centers if they bring their own new generation with locational and temporal characteristics reasonably matched to their load profile. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that all forecast data center load be excluded from capacity market auctions if it is not on line on June 1, 2026. Only organic load and existing data center load as of June 1, 2026, would be included in the capacity market auctions. PJM would operate a reliability auction for forecast data center load that has not signed or committed to sign a bilateral contract for capacity.[25] (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate the shape of the VRR curve. The shape of the VRR curve directly results in load paying substantially more for capacity than load would pay with a vertical demand curve. More specifically, the MMU recommended that the VRR curve be rotated halfway towards the vertical demand curve at the reliability requirement in the 2022 Quadrennial Review. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum price on the VRR curve be defined as 1.5 times Net CONE, capped at Gross CONE. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the reference resource be a CT rather than a CC. The MMU recommends that the ELCC value used to convert the gross CONE in ICAP terms for a CT to the gross CONE in UCAP terms be the ELCC based on winter ratings. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Adopted 2025.)
- The MMU recommends that the test for determining modeled Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) in RPM be redefined. A detailed reliability analysis of all at risk units should be included in the redefined model including transmission constraints inside LDAs. The market design should clear and pay units that are needed for reliability per PJM's transmission reliability analysis in order to forestall RMRs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clear the capacity market based on nodal capacity resource locations and the characteristics of the transmission system inside and outside LDAs consistent with the actual electrical facts of the grid. Absent a fully nodal capacity market clearing process, the MMU recommends that PJM use a non-nested model with all LDAs modeled including VRR curves for all LDAs. Each LDA requirement should be met with the capacity resources located within the LDA and exchanges from neighboring LDAs up to the transmission limit. LDAs should be allowed to price separate if that is the result of the LDA supply curves and the transmission constraints between LDAs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the net revenue offset calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical net revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)[26]
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce the number of incremental auctions to a single incremental auction held three months prior to the start of the delivery year and reevaluate the triggers for holding conditional incremental auctions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not sell back any capacity in any IA procured in a BRA. If PJM continues to sell back capacity, the MMU recommends that PJM offer to sell back capacity in incremental auctions only at the BRA clearing price for the relevant delivery year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not buy any capacity in any IA if PJM has already procured excess reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

25 The details of the MMU's proposed design are included in two executive summaries: See "IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf>. See also "IMM Curtailable Load Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf> .

26 This recommendation was first made during the Quadrennial Review in 2014, including the PJM Capacity Senior Task Force (CSTF), the MRC and the MC. <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/closed-groups/cstf>.



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- The MMU recommends changing the RPM solution method to explicitly incorporate the cost of uplift (make whole) payments in the objective function. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) rules, including obligations and performance requirements, be revised and updated to ensure that the rules reflect current market realities and that FRR entities do not unfairly take advantage of those customers paying for capacity in the PJM capacity market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the value of CTRs be defined by the total MW cleared in the capacity market, the internal MW cleared and the imported MW cleared, and not redefined later prior to the delivery year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the market clearing results be used in settlements rather than the reallocation process currently used, or that the process of modifying the obligations to pay for capacity be reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.) [27]
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve the clarity and transparency of its CETL calculations. The MMU also recommends that CETL for capacity imports into PJM be based on the ability to import capacity only where PJM capacity exists and where that capacity has a must offer requirement in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)

## Offer Caps, Offer Floors, and Must Offer

- The MMU recommends using the lower of the cost or price-based energy market offer to calculate energy costs in the calculation of the historical net revenues which are an offset to gross ACR in the calculation of unit specific capacity resource offer caps based on net ACR. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that modifications to existing resources, including relatively small proposed increases in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource be treated as an existing resource and subject to the corresponding market power mitigation rules and no longer be treated as planned and exempt from offer capping. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)[28]
- The MMU recommends that the RPM market power mitigation rules be modified to apply offer caps in all cases when the three pivotal supplier test is failed and the sell offer is greater than the offer cap. This will ensure that market power does not result in an increase in uplift (make whole) payments for seasonal products. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that any combined seasonal resources be required to be in the same LDA and at the same location, in order for the energy market and capacity market to remain synchronized and reliability metrics correctly calculated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the definition of avoidable costs in the tariff be corrected to be consistent with the economic definition. Avoidable costs are costs that are neither short run marginal costs, like fuel or consumables, nor fixed costs like depreciation and rate of return. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity and therefore the competitive offer level for capacity resources and therefore the market seller offer cap. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity for both new resources and existing resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)[29]
- The MMU recommends that major maintenance costs be included in the definition of avoidable costs and removed from energy offers because such costs are avoidable costs and not short run marginal costs. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that capacity market sellers be required to explicitly request and support the use of minimum MW quantities

27 This recommendation was first made in the 2023/2024 BRA report in 2022. See "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction Revised," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).

28 This recommendation was first made in the 2014/2015 BRA report in 2012. See "Analysis of the 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2012/Analysis_of_2014_2015_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20120409.pdf> (April 9, 2012).

29 This recommendation was first made in the 2023/2024 BRA report in 2022. See "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction Revised," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).

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(inflexible sell offer segments) and that the requests only be permitted for defined physical reasons. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that, as part of the MOPR unit specific standard of review, all projects be required to use the same basic modeling assumptions. That is the only way to ensure that projects compete on the basis of actual costs rather than on the basis of modeling assumptions.[30] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The only function the current MOPR is serving now is to create unnecessary administrative work in the application and compliance screening and to create barriers to entry for generation resources. Absent a meaningful change to MOPR, the MMU recommends eliminating the MOPR. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Performance Incentive Requirements of RPM

- The MMU recommends that any unit not capable of supplying energy equal to its day-ahead must offer requirement (ICAP) be required to reflect an appropriate outage and associated performance penalty. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that retroactive replacement transactions associated with a failure to perform during a PAI not be allowed and that, more generally, retroactive replacement capacity transactions not be permitted. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that there be an explicit requirement that capacity resource offers in the day-ahead energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units, including flexible operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that Capacity Performance resources be required to perform without excuses. Resources that do not perform should not be paid regardless of the reason for nonperformance. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require actual seasonal tests as part of the Summer/Winter Capability Testing rules, that the number of tests be limited, and that the ambient conditions under which the tests are performed be defined to reflect seasonal extreme conditions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM select the time and day that a unit undergoes Net Capability Verification Testing, not the unit owner, and that this information not be communicated in advance to the unit owner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Capacity Imports and Exports

- The MMU recommends that all capacity imports be required to be deliverable to PJM load in an identified LDA, zonal or subzonal, or defined combinations of specific zones, e.g. MAAC, prior to the relevant delivery year to ensure that they are full substitutes for internal, physical capacity resources. Pseudo ties alone are not adequate to ensure deliverability to PJM load. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all costs incurred as a result of a pseudo tied unit be borne by the unit itself and included as appropriate in unit offers in the capacity market. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the PJM Tariff be modified to explicitly state that in order to qualify, a Capacity Market Seller requesting a must offer exception based on a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity must provide a confirmed firm transmission reservation, covering the entire path from source to sink, for the full requested ICAP MW of the external sale that covers the entire delivery year, by the tariff defined deadline. The MMU recommends that this language apply to all external sales of Generation Capacity Resources,

30 See 143 FERC ¶ 61,090 (2013) ("We encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider, for example, whether the unit-specific review process would be more effective if PJM requires the use of common modeling assumptions for establishing unit-specific offer floors while, at the same time, allowing sellers to provide support for objective, individual cost advantages. Moreover, we encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider these modifications to the unit-specific review process together with possible enhancements to the calculation of Net CONE."); see also, Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER13-535-001 (March 25, 2013); Complaint of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. Unnamed Participant, Docket No. EL12-63-000 (May 1, 2012); Motion for Clarification of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER11-2875-000, et al. (February 17, 2012); Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER11-2875-002 (June 2, 2011); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket Nos. EL11-20 and ER11-2875 (March 4, 2011).


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including those where an external balancing authority does not require this level of transmission service in order to consider a PJM resource as a network resource. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Deactivations/Retirements

- The MMU recommends that the notification requirement for deactivations be extended from the current one quarter prior (See Table 5-31) to 12 months prior to an auction in which the unit will not be offered due to deactivation; and no less than 12 months prior to the date of deactivation (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the same reliability standard be used in capacity auctions as is used by PJM transmission planning. One result of the current design is that a unit may fail to clear in a BRA, decide to retire as a result, but then be found to be needed for reliability by PJM planning and paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) to remain in service while transmission upgrades are made. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends elimination of both the cost of service recovery rate option and the deactivation avoidable cost rate option for providing Part V reliability service (RMR), and their replacement with clear language that provides for the recovery of 100 percent of the actual incremental costs required to operate to provide the service plus a defined incentive. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units recover all and only the incremental costs, including incremental investment costs without a cap, required to provide Part V reliability service (RMR service) that the unit owner would not have incurred if the unit owner had deactivated its unit as it proposed, plus a defined incentive payment. Customers should bear no responsibility for paying previously incurred (sunk) costs, including a return on or of prior investments. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that if units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) are included in the calculation of CETO and/or reliability in the relevant LDA, the capacity of the RMR resources should also be included in capacity market supply at zero cost, but without all the obligations of a capacity resource, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) not be included in the calculation of CETO or reliability in the relevant LDA, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions, until a decision is made to build transmission as a replacement, and then should be included. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all CIRs be returned to the pool of available interconnection capability on the retirement date of generation resources in order to facilitate timely and competitive entry into the PJM markets, open access to the transmission system and maintain the priority order defined by the queue process. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 6, Demand Response

- The MMU recommends that PJM report the response of emergency demand response resources to dispatch by PJM as the actual change in load rather than simply the difference between the amount of capacity purchased by the customer and the actual metered load. The performance metric should be (CBL – Metered load)/(CBL – FSL). The current approach significantly overstates the expected response to PJM dispatch. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FSL registrations be required to reduce to their FSL and GLD registrations be required to reduce by their committed amount in every event hour. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources offering as supply in the capacity market be required to offer a guaranteed

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load drop (GLD) below their PLC to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends, as an alternative to including emergency demand response resources as supply in the capacity market, that demand resources have the option to be on the demand side of the markets, that customers be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion, that customer payments be determined only by metered load, and that PJM forecasts immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the option to specify a minimum dispatch price (strike price) for emergency demand response resources be eliminated and that participating resources receive the hourly real-time LMP less any generation component of their retail rate.[31] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum offer for emergency demand response resources and price response demand resources be the same as the maximum offer for generation resources and that the same cost verification rules applied to generation resources apply to demand resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the emergency demand response resources be treated as economic resources, responding to economic price signals like other capacity resources. The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources not be treated as emergency resources. The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources be available for every hour of the year. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Emergency Program Energy Only option be eliminated because the opportunity to receive the appropriate energy market prices is already provided in the economic program. (Priority: Low. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, if emergency demand response resources remain in the capacity market, a daily energy market must offer requirement apply to emergency demand response resources, comparable to the rule applicable to generation capacity resources.[32] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources be required to provide their nodal location, comparable to generation resources. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require nodal dispatch of emergency demand response resources with no advance notice required or, if nodal location is not required, subzonal dispatch of demand resources with no advance notice required. The MMU recommends that, if PJM continues to use subzones for any purpose, PJM clearly define the role of subzones in the dispatch of demand response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not remove any defined subzones and maintain a public record of all created and removed subzones. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the measurement of compliance across zones within a compliance aggregation area (CAA). The multiple zone approach is less locational than the zonal and subzonal approach and creates larger mismatches between the locational need for the resources and the actual response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that measurement and verification methods for all demand resources be modified to reflect compliance more accurately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that compliance rules be revised to include submittal of all necessary hourly load data, and that negative values be included when calculating event compliance across hours and registrations. Compliance by demand resources with PJM dispatch instructions should

31 See "Complaint and Motion to Consolidate of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL14-20-000 (January 28, 2014), "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. ER15-852-000 (February 13, 2015).

32 See "Complaint and Motion to Consolidate of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL14-20-000 (January 27, 2014) at 1.



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include both increases and decreases in load. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM adopt the ISO-NE five-minute metering requirements in order to ensure that operators have the necessary information for reliability and that market payments to demand resources be calculated based on interval meter data at the site of the demand reductions.[33] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends demand response event compliance be calculated on a five minute basis for all emergency demand response resources and that the penalty structure reflect five minute compliance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that demand response testing be initiated by PJM with advance notice to CSPs identical to the actual lead time required in an emergency in order to accurately represent the conditions of an emergency event. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that shutdown cost be defined as the cost to curtail load for a given period that does not vary with the measured reduction or, for behind the meter generators, be the start cost defined in Manual 15 for generators. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Net Benefits Test be eliminated and that economic demand response resources be paid LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the tariff rules for emergency demand response resources clarify that a resource and its CSP, if any, must notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and must terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at defined levels because load has been reduced or eliminated, as in the case of bankrupt and/or out of service facilities. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that there be only one demand response product in the capacity market, with an obligation to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.[34])
- The MMU recommends that all demand resources register as Pre-Emergency and that the Emergency Program be eliminated. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the lead times for emergency demand response resources be shortened to 30 minutes with a one hour minimum dispatch for all resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends setting the baseline for measuring capacity compliance under winter compliance at the customers' PLC, similar to GLD, to avoid double counting. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the Relative Root Mean Squared Test be required for all demand resources with a CBL. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that 30 minute pre-emergency and emergency demand response be considered to be 30 minute reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that energy efficiency resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market mechanism and that PJM should ensure that the impact of EE measures on the load forecast is incorporated immediately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Adopted 2024.)[35] [36]
- The MMU recommends that demand reductions based entirely on behind the meter generation be capped at the lower of economic maximum or

33 See ISO-NE Tariff, Section III, Market Rule 1, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2, "Demand Response," <https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/rules-procedures/tariff/market-rule-1>. (Accessed October 17, 2017) ISO-NE requires that DR have an interval meter with five-minute data reported to the ISO and each behind the meter generator is required to have a separate interval meter. After June 1, 2017, demand response resources in ISO-NE must also be registered at a single node.

34 PJM's Capacity Performance design requires resources to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year, but demand resources still have a limited mandatory compliance window.

35 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095.

36 Originally incorporated with auctions conducted in 2016 for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and forward. The mechanics of the EE addback mechanism were modified beginning with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.

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actual generation output. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that DER aggregations that clear in a capacity auction not be permitted to change status from homogeneous demand response to any other status for any additional auctions for the same delivery year, or for the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported Q3, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that EDCs not be allowed to participate in markets as DER aggregators in addition to their EDC role. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM include a 5.0 MW maximum size cap on DER aggregations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM use a nodal approach for DER participation in PJM markets that excludes multinodal aggregation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Commission require PJM to include in OATT Attachment M the explicit statement that the Market Monitor's role includes the right to collect information from EDCs and DERA related to actions taken on the distribution system related to DERs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that net metering resources be prohibited from participating in wholesale ancillary services markets if they are compensated for the service at the retail level. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the requirements for reporting expected real time energy load reductions by CSPs to PJM to improve the accuracy and usefulness to PJM's system operators. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI. The MMU recommends that PJM revise the performance requirements for demand resources to include an event specific measurement for dispatch occurring outside of Performance Assessment Events and penalties for nonperformance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PRD be required to respond during a PAI, regardless of whether the real-time LMP at the applicable location meet or exceeds the PRD strike price, to be consistent with all CP resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that CSPs be required to provide metered data to PJM within 24 hours following the dispatch of economic or emergency DR. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 7, Net Revenue

- The MMU recommends that the net revenue calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 8, Environmental and Renewables

- The MMU recommends that renewable energy credit markets based on state renewable portfolio standards be brought into PJM markets as they are an increasingly important component of the wholesale energy market. The MMU recommends that there be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that jurisdictions with a renewable portfolio standard make the price and quantity data on supply and demand more transparent. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Commission reconsider its disclaimer of jurisdiction over RECs markets because, given market changes since


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that decision, it is clear that RECs materially affect jurisdictional rates. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that load and generation located at separate nodes be treated as separate resources in order to ensure that load and generation face consistent incentives throughout the markets. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that stationary emergency RICE be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet the capacity market requirements to be DR as a result of emissions standards that impose environmental run hour limitations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 9, Interchange Transactions

- The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU recommends that PJM apply after the fact market settlement adjustments to identified sham scheduling segments to ensure that market participants cannot benefit from sham scheduling. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule by concealing the true source or sink of the transaction. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would require market participants to submit transactions on paths that reflect the expected actual power flow in order to reduce unscheduled loop flows. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the locational price impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the MISO interface pricing point. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM review the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual interface pricing points to reflect changes to the impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines as a result of system topology changes. The MMU recommends that this review occur at least annually. (Priority: Low. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, in order to permit a complete analysis of loop flow, FERC and NERC ensure that the identified data are made available to market monitors as well as other industry entities determined appropriate by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2003. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that would remove the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams. Such a solution would include an optimized, but limited, joint dispatch approach that uses supply curves and treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to other constraints within an LMP market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports as well as unlimited nonfirm point to point willing to pay congestion imports and exports at all PJM interfaces in order to improve the efficiency of the market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

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- The MMU recommends that the emergency interchange cap be replaced with a market based solution. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1800 on the day prior, to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes. These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be used to meet load in the most economic manner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted, 2015.)
- The MMU recommends eliminating the mechanism that defines FFE and M2M payments. These mechanisms are not consistent with markets and are not needed for efficient interface pricing. The MMU recommends that PJM file with the Commission to eliminate the FFE calculation and M2M payment of the PJM and MISO joint operating agreement. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends clear, explicit and detailed rules that define the conditions under which PJM will and will not recall energy from PJM capacity resources and prohibit new energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends that those rules define the conditions under which PJM will purchase emergency energy while at the same time not recalling energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends clear rules governing when PJM may recall capacity backed exports. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)

## Section 10, Ancillary Services

### Reserve Markets

- The MMU recommends that, to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and automatically respond to the notifications. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted 2024.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM replace the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone with a reserve zone structure consistent with the actual deliverability of reserves based on current transmission constraints. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)
- The MMU recommends that the components of the cost-based offers for providing regulation and synchronous condensing be defined in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the unit repay all credits back to the last time that the unit successfully responded to an event 10 minutes or longer. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the synchronized reserve shortfall penalty should include LOC payments as well as SRMCP and MW of shortfall. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that aggregation not be permitted to offset unit specific penalties for failure to respond to a synchronized reserve event. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM immediately remove the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement that PJM added based on a misunderstanding of reserve performance during synchronized reserve events. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that reserve resources operating below economic minimum should not be treated as being backed down by that amount to provide reserve. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)


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## Regulation Market

- The MMU recommends that the two signal regulation market design be replaced with a one signal regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Adopted 2025.)[37]
- The MMU recommends that the ability to make dual offers (to make offers as both a RegA and a RegD resource in the same market hour) be removed from the regulation market. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Adopted 2025.)[38]
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market be modified to incorporate a consistent application of the marginal benefit factor (MBF) throughout the optimization, assignment and settlement process. The MBF should be defined as the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution (MRTS) between RegA and RegD. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Adopted 2025.)[39]
- The MMU recommends that the calculation of the performance score (based on precision, delay and correlation metrics) be replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the performance score be revised to eliminate the effect of the size of the regulation assignment and to directly calculate the performance score based on the actual performance and the requested performance. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market optimization be reviewed to address the logic that allows the partial clearing of inframarginal resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that if a unit sets its economic maximum at a value greater than its regulation maximum, the lost opportunity cost (LOC) of the unit should be calculated assuming the economic maximum of the unit is equal to the regulation maximum of the unit. The MMU recommends that, in cases where offered ramp is greater than actual ramp, the actual ramp be used to calculate the LOC of the unit. The MMU recommends that these fixes to the LOC logic be implemented prior to implementing Phase 2 of the regulation market design. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2026. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that, in cases where a unit is already committed for regulation, that the actual residual ramp (based on the current market interval's regulation assignment) be used when calculating the potential regulation set point and the LOC for purposes of clearing resources. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market commitment period be reduced from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Adopted 2025.).[40]
- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost in all of the ancillary services markets be calculated using the schedule on which the unit was scheduled to run in the energy market. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Adopted 2025.[41] FERC rejected.)[42]
- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market be based on the resource's dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Adopted 2025. FERC accepted.)[43]
- The MMU recommends that the $12.00 margin adder be eliminated from the definition of the cost based regulation offer because it is a markup and not a cost. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the ramp rate limited desired MW output be used in the regulation uplift calculation, to reflect the physical limits of the unit's ability to ramp and to eliminate overpayment for opportunity costs when the payment uses an unachievable MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Adopted 2025.)[44]

37 PJM filed proposed changes to the regulation market with the FERC on April 16, 2024, (Regulation Market Design Filing," Docket No. ER24-1772-000). The Commission Order on June 17, 2024 accepted the PJM Proposal as filed. PJM will implement the changes to the regulation market in two phases. Phase 1, was implemented on October 1, 2025, resulting in a single signal, bidirectional market with one clearing price that eliminates the need for an MBF. Phase 1 eliminated RegA and RegD dual offers. Phase 1 reduced the regulation commitment period from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. In Phase 1 the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market is based on the resource's dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule.

38 See *id.*

39 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).

40 See *id.*

41 This recommendation was adopted by PJM for the energy market and the regulation market. Lost opportunity costs in the energy market and the regulation market are calculated using the schedule on which the unit is scheduled to run.

42 See **162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018)**, *reh'g denied*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).

43 See *id.*

44 In Phase 1 the ramp rate limited desired MW output is used in the regulation uplift calculation. The MMU does not agree with how this change has been implemented.

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- The MMU recommends enhanced documentation of the implementation of the regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.)[45]
- The MMU recommends that PJM be required to save data elements necessary for verifying the performance of the regulation market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the regulation market three pivotal supplier test be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the total regulation (TReg) signal sent on a fleet wide basis be eliminated and replaced with individual regulation signals for each unit. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, to prevent gaming, there be a penalty enforced in the regulation market as a reduction in performance score and/or a forfeiture of revenues when resource owners elect to deassign assigned regulation resources within the hour. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.)[46]

## Frequency Response, Reactive, and Black Start

- The MMU recommends that all resources, new and existing, have a requirement to include and maintain equipment for primary frequency response capability as a condition of interconnection service. The PJM markets already compensate resources for frequency response capability and any marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the generator primary frequency response evaluation be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM maintain a full list of all units subject to the Primary Frequency Response generator requirements. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM develop the metric(s) necessary to objectively evaluate each unit's performance during primary frequency response events. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM create the necessary tariff/manual language to properly enforce compliance with the NERC mandated Primary Frequency Response generator requirements. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that separate cost of service payments for reactive capability be eliminated and the cost of reactive capability be recovered in PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Adopted 2024.)[47]
- The MMU recommends that new CRF rates for black start units, incorporating current tax code changes, be implemented immediately. The new CRF rates should apply to all black start units. Black start units should be required to commit to providing black start service for the life of the unit. CRF rates effective January 20, 2025, should reflect 100 percent bonus depreciation.[48] (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that black start planning and coordination be on a regional basis recognizing cross zonal cranking paths and not on a narrowly or purely zonal basis and that the costs of black start service be shared on an equal per MWh basis across the region. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the black start rate under the Base Formula Rate should be based on the actual cost of providing the black start service, plus an incentive, rather than the unsupported use of Net CONE,

45 See *id.*
46 See *id.*

47 On October 17, 2024, the Commission issued a final rule, Order No. 904, eliminating separate payments for reactive in all jurisdictional markets, including PJM. On January 28, 2025, PJM submitted a compliance filing to implement Order No. 904 ("Compliance Filing") that proposed a transition mechanism lasting through May 31, 2026. See Docket No. ER25-1073. This recommendation will be implemented effective June 1, 2026.
48 OBBA § 70301(b)(3).


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escalated each year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that the fuel assurance rules be modified to recognize actual fuel assured resources within and across zones. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Reliability Backstop for black start service be eliminated. There is no reason that PJM cannot acquire black start resources if the TOs can acquire black start resources. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 11, Congestion

There are no recommendations in this section.

## Section 12, Generation and Transmission Planning

### Generation Retirements

- The MMU recommends that CIRs end on the date of retirement in order to help ensure competitive markets and competitive access to the grid. The rules need to ensure that incumbents cannot exploit control of CIRs to block or postpone entry of competitors or to exercise market power by requiring high payments for CIRs.[49] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2012.)

### Generation Queue

- Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data. PJM does not update this data. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that barriers to entry be addressed in a timely manner in order to help ensure that the capacity market will result in the entry of new capacity to meet the needs of PJM market participants. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM establish an expedited PJM managed queue process to identify commercially viable projects that could help eliminate or reduce the need for specific RMRs or that could address specific reliability needs and allow the identified projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends improvements in queue management including that PJM establish a review process to ensure that projects are removed from the queue if they are not viable, as well as an expedited process to allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming.[50] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends continuing analysis of the study phase of PJM's transmission planning to reduce the need for postponements of study results, to decrease study completion times, and to improve the likelihood that a project at a given phase in the study process will successfully go into service.[51] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends outsourcing interconnection studies to an independent party to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Currently, these studies are performed by incumbent transmission owners under PJM's direction. This creates potential conflicts of interest, particularly when transmission owners are vertically integrated and the owner of transmission also owns generation. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

49 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER12-1177-000 (March 12, 2012) <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/Filings/2012/IMM_Comments_ER12-1177-000_20120312.PDF>.

50 PJM Filing, FERC Docket No. ER22-2110-000 (June 14, 2022); 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).

51 Ibid.

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## RTEP Model and Assumptions

- The MMU recommends that PJM include only existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied, and queued generation with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, that has a high probability of completion, in the RTEP models. If a future study cannot achieve power balance with such generation, then the addition of load should be capped at the level that can be supplied by actual generation and not allowed to connect until expected generation can support it. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Market Efficiency Process

- The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated because it is not consistent with a competitive market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, PJM modify the rules governing benefit/cost analysis, the evaluation process for selecting among competing market efficiency projects and cost allocation for economic projects in order to ensure that all changes in production costs but not congestion costs, including increased costs to load and the risk of project cost increases, in all zones are included in order to ensure that the correct metrics are used for defining benefits. The MMU also recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, market efficiency projects that fail to meet PJM benefit/cost criteria in a Schedule 6 annual reevaluation, prior to construction commencing or prior to state approval, be canceled and removed from further consideration. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

## Comparative Cost Framework

- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the project proposal templates to include data necessary to perform a detailed project lifetime financial analysis. The required data includes, but is not limited to: capital expenditure; capital structure; return on equity; cost of debt; tax assumptions; ongoing capital expenditures; ongoing maintenance; and expected life. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Transmission Competition

- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of supplemental projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that the basis for all such exemptions be reviewed and modified to ensure that the supplemental project designation is not used to exempt transmission projects from a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects or to effectively replace the RTEP process. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.) [52]
- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of end of life projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that end of life transmission projects be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.) [53]
- The MMU recommends that PJM enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission providers. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM incorporate the principle that the goal of transmission planning should be the incorporation of transmission investment decisions into market driven processes as much as possible. (Priority: Low. First reported 2001. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the creation of a mechanism to permit a direct comparison, or competition, between transmission and generation alternatives, including which alternative is less costly and who bears the

52 The FERC accepted tariff provisions that exclude supplemental projects from competition in the RTEP. 162 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2018).

53 In recent decisions addressing competing proposals on end of life projects, the Commission accepted a transmission owner proposal excluding end of life projects from competition in the RTEP process, 172 FERC ¶ 61,136 (2020), *reh'g denied*, 173 FERC ¶ 61,225 (2020), *affirmed*, American Municipal Power, Inc., et al. v. FERC, Case No. 20-1449 (D.C. Cir. November 17, 2023), and rejected a proposal from PJM stakeholders that would have included end of life projects in competition in the RTEP process, 173 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020).



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risks associated with each alternative. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM establish fair terms of access to rights of way and property, such as at substations, in order to remove any barriers to entry and require competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers in the RTEP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that rules be implemented to require competition to provide financing for transmission projects. This competition could reduce the cost of capital for transmission projects and significantly reduce total costs to customers. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources not be includable as transmission assets for any reason. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Cost Allocation

- The MMU recommends a comprehensive review of the ways in which the solution based dfax allocation method is implemented. The goal for such a process would be to ensure that the most rational and efficient approach to implementing the solution based dfax method is used in PJM. Such an approach should allocate costs consistent with benefits and appropriately calibrate the incentives for investment in new transmission capability. No replacement approach should be approved until all potential alternatives, including the status quo, are thoroughly reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends changing the minimum distribution factor in the allocation from 0.01 to 0.00 and adding a threshold minimum usage impact on the transmission facilities.[54] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted, 2026.)[55]

## Transmission Line Ratings

- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners use the same methods to define line ratings and that all PJM transmission owners implement dynamic line ratings (DLR), subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners investigate the applicability and potential cost savings of Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) and that all PJM transmission owners implement cost effective GET, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the implementation of Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) be opened to competition from third parties, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)

## Transmission Facility Outages

- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate all transmission outage tickets as on time or late as if they were new requests when an outage is rescheduled, create options for late requests based on the reasons, and apply the modified rules for late submissions to any such outages. The MMU recommends that PJM create options for treatment of late outages. The current rules apply more stringent rules, based on controlling actions, to late outages without distinguishing among reasons for late outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM draft a definition of the economic and physical congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests and associated triggers, including both the extent of overloaded facilities and the level of economic congestion, to include in PJM manuals after appropriate review with appropriate rules for on time and late outage requests. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

54 See *2015 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Section 12: Generation and Transmission Planning, at 463, Cost Allocation Issues.

55 On June 4, 2026, in Docket No. ER26-2736-000, PJM submitted revisions to its Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff) in compliance with the Commission's March 6, 2026, Order on Remand to eliminate the de minimis threshold from the solution based DFAX method.

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- The MMU recommends that PJM create options for late requests based on the reasons, and modify the rules to reduce or eliminate the approval of late outage requests submitted or rescheduled after the FTR auction bidding opening date, based on those options. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not permit transmission owners to divide long duration outages into smaller segments to avoid complying with the requirements for long duration outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

## Section 13, FTRs and ARRs

### Market Design

- The MMU recommends that the current ARR/FTR design be replaced with defined congestion revenue rights (CRRs). A CRR is the right to actual congestion revenue that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

### ARR

- The MMU recommends that the ARR/FTR design be modified to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all historical generation to load paths be eliminated as a basis for assigning ARRs. The MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, the rights to all congestion revenue be allocated as ARRs prior to sale as FTRs. Reductions in allocated revenue as a contingency for outages and increased system capability should be reserved for ARRs rather than sold in the Long Term FTR Auction. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from PJM's tariff, but that if IARRs are not eliminated, IARRs should be subject to the same proration rules that apply to all other ARR rights. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR

- The MMU recommends that FTR funding be based on total congestion, including both day-ahead and balancing congestion. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that bilateral transactions be eliminated and that all FTR transactions occur in the PJM market. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)[56]
- The MMU recommends a requirement that the details of all bilateral FTR transactions be reported to PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM continue to evaluate the bilateral indemnification rules and any asymmetries they may create. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs, including a clear definition of persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2014/2015 planning period.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate generation to generation paths and all other paths that do not represent the delivery of power to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Long Term FTR product be eliminated. If the Long Term FTR product is not eliminated, the Long Term FTR Market should be modified so that the supply of prevailing flow FTRs in the Long Term FTR Market is based solely on counter flow offers in the Long Term FTR Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models, including the use of probabilistic outage modeling. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

56 If adopted, this recommendation would replace the next two recommendations.


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## "Surplus"

- The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FTR auction revenues not be used by PJM to buy counter flow FTRs for the purpose of improving FTR payout ratios.[57] (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

## FTR Subsidies

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR market participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)

## FTR Liquidation

- The MMU recommends that the FTR portfolio of a defaulted member be canceled rather than liquidated or allowed to settle as a default cost to the membership. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

## Credit

- The MMU recommends that PJM's minimum credit requirements be reviewed and updated to appropriately reflect the risk created for the markets and other market participants. The PJM minimum credit requirements (minimum tangible net worth and minimum tangible assets) were set as fixed dollars amounts in 2011 in FERC Order No. 741 based on the specific market participation (FTRs or other). (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

57 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

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# 3. Energy Market

The PJM energy market comprises all types of energy transactions, including the sale or purchase of energy in PJM's Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets, bilateral and forward markets and self supply. Energy transactions analyzed in this report include those in the PJM Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets. These markets provide key benchmarks against which market participants may measure results of transactions in other markets.

The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of market structure, participant conduct and market performance, including market size, concentration, pivotal suppliers, offer behavior, markup, and price. The MMU concludes that the PJM energy market results were competitive in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 3-1 The energy market results were competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Partially Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Competitive** | **Effective** |

- The aggregate market structure was evaluated as partially competitive because the aggregate market power test based on pivotal suppliers indicates that the aggregate day-ahead market structure was not competitive on 93.5 percent of the days in the first six months of 2026. The hourly HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) results indicate that the PJM aggregate energy market in the first six months of 2026 was, on average, unconcentrated by FERC HHI standards. The average HHI was 783 with a minimum of 569 and a maximum of 1045. The baseload segment of the supply curve was unconcentrated. The intermediate segment of the supply curve was moderately concentrated. The peaking segment of the supply curve was highly concentrated. The fact that the average HHI is in the unconcentrated range does not mean that the aggregate market was competitive in all hours. As demonstrated for the day-ahead market, it is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. It is possible to have an exercise of market power even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power.
- The local market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to the highly concentrated ownership of supply in local markets created by transmission constraints and local reliability issues. The results of the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test, used to test local market structure, indicate the existence of market power in local markets created by transmission constraints. The local market performance is competitive as a result of the application of the TPS test. Transmission constraints create the potential for the exercise of local market power. The goal of PJM's application of the three pivotal supplier test is to identify local market power and offer cap to competitive offers, correcting for structural issues created by local transmission constraints. There are, however, identified issues with the definition of cost-based offers and the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that need to be addressed because unit owners can exercise market power even when they fail the TPS test.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the analysis of markup shows that marginal units generally make offers at, or close to, their marginal costs in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although the behavior of some participants both routinely and during periods of high demand represents noncompetitive economic withholding. The ownership of marginal units is concentrated. The markups of pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market and of many pivotal suppliers in local markets remain unmitigated due to the lack of aggregate market power mitigation and the flawed implementation of offer caps for resources that fail the TPS test. The markups of those participants affected LMP.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because market results in the energy market reflect the outcome of a competitive market, as PJM prices are set, on average, by marginal units operating at, or close to, their

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marginal costs in both day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although high markups for some marginal units did affect prices.

- Market design was evaluated as effective because the analysis shows that the PJM energy market resulted in competitive market outcomes. In general, PJM's energy market design provides incentives for competitive behavior and results in competitive outcomes. In local markets, where market power is an issue, the market design identifies market power and causes the market to provide competitive market outcomes in most cases although issues with the implementation of market power mitigation and development of cost-based offers remain. The role of UTCs in the day-ahead energy market continues to be an issue. Market design implementation issues, including inaccuracies in modeling of the transmission system and of generator capabilities as well as inefficiencies in price formation, undermine market efficiency in the energy market. The implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, undermined market efficiency by setting inefficient higher prices that are inconsistent with the dispatch signals. In the first six months of 2026, the estimated impact of fast start pricing, based on the difference between the real-time PLMP and DLMP times real-time load, was $2.2 billion.[1] The expanding use of transmission constraint penalty factors by PJM is inconsistent with competitive markets and added $6.0 billion to the cost of energy in the first six months of 2026.
- PJM markets are designed to promote competitive outcomes derived from the interaction of supply and demand in each of the PJM markets. Market design itself is the primary means of achieving and promoting competitive outcomes in PJM markets. One of the MMU's core functions is to identify actual or potential market design flaws.[2] The approach to market power mitigation in PJM has focused on market designs that promote competition (a structural basis for competitive outcomes) and on mitigating market power in instances where the market structure is not competitive and thus where market design alone cannot mitigate market power. FERC relies on effective market power mitigation when it approves market sellers to participate in the PJM market at market based rates.[3] In the PJM energy market, market power mitigation occurs primarily in the case of local market power. When a transmission constraint creates the potential for local market power, PJM applies a structural test to determine if the local market is competitive, applies a behavioral test to determine if generator offers exceed competitive levels and applies a market performance test to determine if such generator offers would affect the market price.[4] There are, however, identified issues with the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that can result in the exercise of local market power even when market power mitigation rules are applied. These issues need to be addressed, but, so far, PJM and FERC have failed to address them.[5] [6] [7] Some units with market power have positive markups and some have inflexible parameters, which means that the cost-based offer was not used and that the process for offer capping units that fail the TPS test does not consistently result in competitive market outcomes in the presence of market power. There are issues related to the definition of gas costs includable in energy offers that need to be addressed. There are issues related to the level of maintenance expense includable in energy offers that need to be addressed. There are currently no market power mitigation rules in place that limit the ability to exercise market power when aggregate market conditions are tight and there are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market. Aggregate market power needs to be addressed. Market design must reflect appropriate incentives for competitive behavior, the application of local market power mitigation needs to be fixed, the definition of a competitive offer needs to be fixed, and aggregate market power mitigation rules need to be developed. The importance of these issues is amplified by the rules permitting cost-based offers in excess of $1,000 per MWh.

1 See Market Monitor Report, MMU report to the PJM Members Committee (July 28, 2026) at 39.
2 OATT Attachment M (PJM Market Monitoring Plan).
3 See *Refinements to Horizontal Market Power Analysis for Sellers in Certain Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Markets*, Order No. 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040 (2019); *order on reh'g*, Order No. 861-A; 170 FERC ¶ 61,106 (2020).
4 The market performance test means that offer capping is not applied if the offer does not exceed the competitive level and therefore market power would not affect market performance.
5 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
6 185 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2023).
7 189 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2024).


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# Overview

## Supply and Demand

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, 1,241 MW of new resources were added in the energy market, and 669 MW of resources were retired.
- The real-time hourly on peak average offered supply in the first six months of 2026 decreased by 0.6 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from 139,347 MWh to 138,477 MWh.
- The day-ahead hourly on peak average offered supply in the first six months of 2026 decreased by 2.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from 149,354 MWh to 145,896 MWh.
- The real-time hourly average cleared generation in the first six months of 2026 increased by 1.3 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 96,763 MWh to 98,028 MWh.
- The day-ahead hourly average cleared supply in the first six months of 2026, including INCs and UTCs, decreased by 0.7 percent from the first six months of 2025 from 110,458 MWh to 109,740 MWh.
- **Demand.** The real-time hourly peak load without exports in the first six months of 2026 was 146,175 MWh (151,547 MWh with net exports) in the HE 1800 (EPT) on June 30, 2026, lower than the PJM peak load in the first six months of 2025, which was 156,256 MWh (158,889 MWh with net exports) in the HE 1800 (EPT) on June 23, 2025.
- The real-time hourly average load in the first six months of 2026 increased by 2.5 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 90,914 MWh to 93,187 MWh.
- The day-ahead hourly average cleared demand in the first six months of 2026, including DECs and UTCs, increased by 0.05 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 104,018 MWh to 104,069 MWh.

### Market Behavior

- **Virtual Offers and Bids.** Any market participant in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market can use increment offers, decrement bids, up to congestion transactions, import transactions and export transactions as financial instruments that do not require physical generation or load. The hourly average submitted increment offer MW decreased by 2.6 percent and the cleared increment MW decreased by 9.0 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The hourly average submitted decrement bid MW increased by 10.0 percent and the cleared decrement MW increased by 6.8 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The hourly average submitted up to congestion bid MW decreased by 18.0 percent and the cleared up to congestion bid MW decreased by 23.5 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Market Performance

- **Generation Fuel Mix.** In the first six months of 2026, generation from coal units decreased 3.2 percent, generation from natural gas units increased 2.6 percent, generation from oil units increased 29.7 percent, generation from wind units increased 2.1 percent, and generation from solar units increased 23.9 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.
- **Fuel Diversity.** The fuel diversity of energy generation in the first six months of 2026, measured by the fuel diversity index for energy ($FDI_e$), decreased 0.1 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.
- **Marginal Resources.** In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, coal units were 9.6 percent, natural gas units were 67.3 percent and wind units were 17.0 percent of marginal resources. In the first six months of 2025, coal units were 7.6 percent, natural gas units were 74.1 and wind units were 13.8 percent of marginal resources.
- **Prices.** The real-time load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $20.79 per MWh, or 40.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $51.75 per MWh to $72.54 per MWh.

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- The day-ahead load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $24.52 per MWh, or 49.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $49.72 per MWh to $74.25 per MWh. This is the highest day-ahead load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of a year since the introduction of the PJM day-ahead energy market.
- **Fast Start Pricing.** The real-time load-weighted average PLMP was $72.54 per MWh for the first six months of 2026, which is 7.0 percent, $5.32 per MWh, higher than the real-time load-weighted average DLMP of $67.22 per MWh.
- **Components of Real-Time LMP.** In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, 39.5 percent of the real-time load-weighted LMP was the result of gas costs, 20.3 percent was the result of transmission constraint violation penalty factors, 8.3 percent was the result of coal costs, and 3.4 percent was the result of the cost of emission allowances.
- **Components of Day-Ahead LMP.** In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, 22.7 percent of the day-ahead load-weighted LMP was the result of decrement bids, 15.5 percent was the result of increment offers, 22.5 percent was the result of gas costs, and 6.2 percent was the result of coal costs.
- **Changes in Real-Time LMP.** Of the $20.79 per MWh increase in the real-time load-weighted average LMP, $9.43 per MWh (45.3 percent) was the transmission constraint penalty factor component of LMP, $7.26 per MWh (34.9 percent) was the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP, $1.82 per MWh (8.8 percent) was the sum of the markup, maintenance, and ten percent adder components of LMP, $1.06 per MWh (5.1 percent) was the emissions cost components of LMP, and -$1.24 per MWh (-6.0 percent) was the scarcity component of LMP. The pre-emergency demand response component decreased by $1.16 per MWh, -5.6 percent of the increase in LMP. The administrative cap component decreased LMP by less in the first six months of 2026 than the first six months of 2025, $0.16 per MWh increase in LMP, 0.7 percent of the increase in LMP.
- **Price Convergence.** Hourly and daily price differences between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets fluctuate continuously and substantially from positive to negative. The average difference between day-ahead and real-time average prices was -$1.22 per MWh in the first six months of 2026, and $1.17 per MWh in the first six months of 2025. The difference between day-ahead and real-time average prices, by itself, is not a measure of the competitiveness or effectiveness of the day-ahead energy market.

### Shortage

- **Shortage Intervals.** There were 102 intervals with five minute shortage pricing on 23 days in the first six months of 2026. Of the 102 intervals, 40 occurred during cold weather from late January into early February, including Winter Storm Fern, for which PJM issued several emergency warnings and actions. Three of the 102 intervals of shortage overlapped with synchronized reserve events.
- **SCED Shortage Intervals.** In the first six months of 2026, there were 2,330 five minute intervals, or 4.5 percent of all five minute intervals, for which at least one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves. In the first six months of 2026, there were 797 five minute intervals, or 1.5 percent of all five minute intervals, for which more than one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves. In the first six months of 2026, PJM triggered shortage pricing for 102 five minute intervals, or 4.4 percent of all five minute intervals.

## Competitive Assessment

### Market Structure

- **Aggregate Pivotal Suppliers.** The PJM energy market, at times, requires generation from pivotal suppliers to meet load, resulting in aggregate market power even when the HHI level indicates that the aggregate market is unconcentrated. Three suppliers were jointly pivotal in the day-ahead market on 169 days, 93.4 percent of the days, in the first six months of 2026 and 166 days, 91.7 percent of the days, in the first six months of 2025. The overall frequency of pivotal suppliers rose in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 due to an increase in the frequency of days with daily peak load above 130 GW.


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- **Local Market Power.** In the first six months of 2026, in the real-time market, the 500 kV system, 13 zones, and the PJM/MISO interface experienced congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours. For seven out of the top 10 congested facilities (by real-time binding hours) in the first six months of 2026, the average number of suppliers providing constraint relief was three or fewer. There was a high level of concentration within the local markets for providing relief to the most congested facilities in the PJM Real-Time Energy Market. The local market structure was not competitive.

## Market Behavior

- **Offer Capping for Local Market Power.** PJM offer caps units when the local market structure is noncompetitive. Offer capping is an effective means of addressing local market power when the rules are designed and implemented properly. Offer capping levels have historically been low in PJM. In the day-ahead energy market, for units committed to provide energy for local constraint relief, offer-capped unit hours increased from 1.4 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 4.0 percent in the first six months of 2026. In the real-time energy market, for units committed to provide energy for local constraint relief, offer-capped unit hours decreased from 1.1 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 0.8 percent in the first six months of 2026. While overall offer capping levels have been low, there are a significant number of units with persistent structural local market power that would have had a significant impact on prices in the absence of local market power mitigation.
- The analysis of the application of the TPS test to local markets demonstrates that it is working to identify pivotal owners when the market structure is noncompetitive and to ensure that owners are not subject to offer capping when the market structure is competitive. There are, however, identified issues with the application of market power mitigation to resources whose owners fail the TPS test that can result in the exercise of local market power. These issues need to be addressed promptly.
- **Offer Capping for Reliability.** PJM also offer caps units that are committed for reliability reasons, including for reactive support. In the day-ahead energy market, for units committed for reliability reasons, offer-capped unit hours decreased from 0.14 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 0.08 percent in the first six months of 2026. In the real-time energy market, for units committed for reliability reasons, offer-capped unit hours remained at 0.06 percent in the first six months of 2025 and 0.06 percent in the first six months of 2026. The low offer cap percentages for reliability commitments, relative to offer capping for transmission constraints, do not mean that units committed for reliability reasons do not have market power. All units manually committed for reliability have market power and all are committed on their least cost schedule as defined in the day-ahead and real-time markets.
- **Parameter Mitigation.** PJM applies operating parameter limits (PLS) to units that fail the TPS test and to all units during hot and cold weather alerts. In the first six months of 2026, 24.9 percent of unit hours for units that failed the TPS test in the day-ahead market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their cost-based schedules. On days when cold weather alerts and hot weather alerts were declared, 26.7 percent of unit hours in the day-ahead energy market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their price PLS schedules. These units should be committed on their parameter limited schedules to resolve the market power issue. If PJM promptly implemented the FERC approved solution to address the failure to correctly apply market power mitigation, this issue would no longer occur.
- **Frequently Mitigated Units (FMU) and Associated Units (AU).** In the first six months of 2026, no units qualified for an FMU adder. In 2025, 2024, 2023 and 2022, no units qualified for an FMU adder. In 2021, one unit qualified for an FMU adder.
- **Markup Index.** The markup index is a summary measure of participant offer behavior for individual marginal units. While the average markup index in the real-time market was -$0.03 when using unadjusted cost-based offers in the first six months of 2026, some marginal units did have substantial markups. The highest markup for any marginal unit in the real-time market in the first six months of 2026 was more than $900 per

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MWh and the highest markup in the first six months of 2025 was more than $800 per MWh, using unadjusted cost-based offers.

- While the average markup index in the day-ahead market was $0.82 per MWh in the first six months of 2026, some marginal units did have substantial markups. The highest markup for any marginal unit in the day-ahead market in the first six months of 2026 was more than $600 per MWh.[8]
- **Markup.** The markup frequency distributions show that a significant proportion of units make price-based offers less than the cost-based offers permitted under the PJM market rules. This behavior means that competitive price-based offers reveal actual unit marginal costs and that PJM market rules permit the inclusion of costs in cost-based offers that are not short run marginal costs.

  The markup frequency distributions also show that a significant proportion of units were offered with high markups, consistent with the exercise of market power.

## Market Performance

- **Markup.** The markup conduct of individual owners and units has an identifiable impact on market prices. Markup is a key indicator of the competitiveness of the energy market.
- In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, the unadjusted markup component (net of positive and negative markup components) of LMP was $0.48 per MWh or 0.7 percent of the PJM load-weighted average LMP. February had the highest unadjusted peak markup component, $4.16 per MWh, or 5.2 percent of the real-time peak hour load-weighted average LMP for February.
- In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market in the first six months of 2026, the unadjusted markup component (net of positive and negative markup components) of LMP was $1.32 per MWh or 4.7 percent of the PJM load-weighted average LMP. January had the highest unadjusted peak markup component, $5.37 per MWh, or 3.30 percent of the day-ahead peak hour load-weighted average LMP for January.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the analysis of markup shows that marginal units generally make offers at, or close to, their marginal costs in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, although the behavior of some participants represents noncompetitive economic withholding.
- **Markup and Local Market Power.** Comparison of the markup behavior of marginal units with TPS test results shows that for 3.1 percent of all real-time marginal unit intervals in the first six months of 2026, the marginal unit had both local market power, as determined by the TPS test, and a positive markup. The marginal unit had local market power in 22.8 percent of all real-time marginal unit intervals in the first six months of 2026. For 13.6 percent of all marginal unit intervals with local market power, the unit had a positive markup. This occurred in 4,307 intervals, or 8.2 percent of all real-time market intervals in the first six months of 2026. The fact that units with market power had a positive markup means that the cost-based offer was not used, that a higher price-based offer was used, and that the process for offer capping units that fail the TPS test does not consistently result in competitive market outcomes in the presence of market power.
- **Markup and Aggregate Market Power.** In the first six months of 2026, pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market, committed in the day-ahead market and identified as one of three day-ahead aggregate pivotal suppliers, set real-time market prices with markups over $100 per MWh during 513 real-time market intervals (42.8 hours) and 64 day-ahead market hours. Some of the marginal units had local market power, but were not offer capped due to issues with the method that PJM uses to select offer schedules for units that fail the TPS test. Some of the marginal units had aggregate market power, for which there is no offer capping, and some had both local and aggregate market power.

8 The MMU identified an error in the PJM marginal resource identification algorithm within the day ahead clearing optimization. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors requires accurate identification of marginal resources. The error was fixed by the PJM software vendor in March 2025. The MMU was unable to calculate the component breakdown for 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 due to the inaccurate identification of marginal resources.


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# Recommendations

## Market Power

- The MMU recommends that the market rules explicitly require that offers in the energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units, including parameter limited schedules. The short run marginal cost should reflect opportunity cost when appropriate. The MMU recommends that the level of incremental costs includable in cost-based offers per the PJM Operating Agreement not exceed the short run marginal cost of the unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)

## Fuel Cost Policies

- The MMU recommends that PJM require that all fuel cost policies be algorithmic, verifiable, and systematic, and accurately reflect short run marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the temporary cost method be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to have an approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Low. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the penalty exemption provision be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to follow their approved fuel cost policy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Cost-Based Offers

- The MMU recommends removal of all use of FERC System of Accounts in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of all use of cyclic starting and peaking factors from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of all maintenance costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, given that maintenance costs are currently allowed in cost-based offers, that market participants be permitted to include only variable maintenance costs, linked to verifiable operational events and that can be supported by clear and unambiguous documentation of the operational data (e.g. run hours, MWh, MMBtu) that support the maintenance cycle of the equipment being serviced/replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Partially adopted 2023.)
- The MMU recommends explicitly accounting for soak costs and changing the definition of the start heat input for combined cycles to include only the amount of fuel used from first fire to the first breaker close in the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that soak costs, soak time and the MWh produced during soaking be modeled separately. This will ensure that the time required for units to reach a dispatchable level is known and used in the unit commitment process instead of only being communicated verbally between dispatchers and generators. Separating soak costs from start costs and modeling the MWh produced during soaking allows for a better representation of the costs because it eliminates the need to simply assume the price paid for those MWh. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the removal of nuclear fuel and nonfuel operations and maintenance costs that are not short run marginal costs from the Cost Development Guidelines. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends revising the pumped hydro fuel cost calculation to include day-ahead and real-time power purchases. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)

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## Market Power: TPS Test and Offer Capping

- The MMU recommends that the rules governing the application of the TPS test be clarified and documented. The TPS test application in the day-ahead energy market is not documented. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[9]
- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the process of applying the TPS test in the day-ahead energy market to ensure that all local markets created by binding constraints are tested for market power and to ensure that market sellers with market power are appropriately mitigated to their competitive offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that offer capping be applied to units that fail the TPS test in the real-time market that were not offer capped at the time of commitment in the day-ahead market or at a prior time in the real-time market. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation and to ensure that capacity resources meet their obligations to be flexible, that capacity resources be required to use flexible parameters in all offers at all times. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, PJM always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters for all cost-based and all price-based offers during high load conditions such as cold and hot weather alerts and emergency conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require every market participant to make available at least one cost schedule based on the same hourly fuel type(s) and parameters at least as flexible as their offered price schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that markup be consistently positive or negative across the full MWh range of price and cost-based offers. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, that PJM commit all resources that fail the TPS test on their cost-based offers, that the Market Seller designate the cost-based offer if there is more than one, and that PJM implement this solution as soon as possible. (Priority: High. First reported Q3 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM retain the $1,000 per MWh offer cap in the PJM energy market except when cost-based offers exceed $1,000 per MWh, and retain other existing rules that limit incentives to exercise market power. (Priority: High. First reported 1999. Status: Partially adopted, 1999, 2017.)
- The MMU recommends the elimination of FMU and AU adders. FMU and AU adders no longer serve the purpose for which they were created and interfere with the efficient operation of PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted, 2014.)[10]

## Offer Behavior

- The MMU recommends that resources not be allowed to violate the ICAP must offer requirement. The MMU recommends that PJM enforce the ICAP must offer requirement by assigning a forced outage to any unit that is derated in the energy market below its committed ICAP without an outage that reflects the derate. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer rule in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets that reflects the limitations of these resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that capacity resources not be allowed to offer any portion of their capacity market obligation as maximum emergency energy. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)

9 The real-time market formula for determining the lowest cost schedule is documented. The day-ahead market formula for determining the lowest cost schedule is not documented.

10 The applicability of the FMU and AU adders is limited by the rule implemented in 2014 requiring that net revenues must fall below avoidable costs, but the possibility of FMU and AU adders is still part of the PJM Market Rules.



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- The MMU recommends that PJM integrate all the outage reporting tools in order to enforce the ICAP must offer requirement, ensure that outages are reported correctly and eliminate reporting inconsistencies. Generators currently submit availability in three different tools that are not integrated, Markets Gateway, eDART and eGADS. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that gas generators be required to check with pipelines throughout the operating day to confirm that nominations are accepted beyond the NAESB deadlines, that gas generators be required to inform PJM about whether they have gas, and that gas generators be required to place their units on forced outage until the time that pipelines allow nominations to consume gas at a unit. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Capacity Resources

- The MMU recommends that capacity resources be held to the OEM operating parameters of the capacity market CONE reference resource for performance assessment and energy uplift payments and that this standard be applied to all technologies on a uniform basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the parameters which determine nonperformance charges and the amounts of uplift payments should reflect the flexibility goals of the capacity market design. The operational parameters used by generation owners to indicate to PJM operators what a unit is capable of during the operating day should not determine capacity resource performance assessment or uplift payments. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[11]
- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly define the business rules that apply to the unit specific parameter adjustment process, including PJM's implementation of the tariff rules in the PJM manuals to ensure market sellers know the requirements for their resources. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM update the tariff to clarify that all generation resources are subject to unit specific parameter limits on their cost-based offers using the same standard and process as capacity resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that resources not be paid the daily capacity payment when unable to operate to their unit specific parameter limits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not approve temporary exceptions that are based on pipeline tariff terms that are not enforced at the time, or are based on inferior transportation service procured by the generator. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require generators that violate their approved turn down ratio (by either using the fixed gen option or increasing their economic minimum) to use the temporary parameter exception process that requires market sellers to demonstrate that the request is based on a physical and actual constraint. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends: that gas generators be required to confirm, regularly during the operating day, that they can obtain gas if requested to operate at their economic maximum level; that gas generators provide that information to PJM during the operating day; and that gas generators be required to be on forced outage if they cannot obtain gas during the operating day to meet their must offer requirement as a result of pipeline restrictions, and they do not have backup fuel. As part of this, the MMU recommends that PJM collect data on each individual generator's fuel supply arrangements at least annually or when such arrangements change, and analyze the associated locational and regional risks to reliability. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Accurate System Modeling

- The MMU recommends that PJM explicitly state its policy on the use of transmission constraint penalty factors including: the level of the penalty factors; the triggers for the use of the penalty factors; the appropriate

11 Flexible parameter standards are in place for combined cycle and combustion turbine resources when operating on a parameter limited schedule, but not for other schedules or generating technologies.

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line ratings to trigger the use of penalty factors; the allowed duration of the violation and when the transmission constraint penalty factors will be used to set the shadow price. The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) and included in LMP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted 2020.)[12]

- The MMU recommends that PJM routinely review all transmission facility ratings and any changes to those ratings to ensure that the normal, emergency and load dump ratings used in modeling the transmission system are accurate and reflect standard ratings practice. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not use closed loop interface or surrogate constraints to artificially override nodal prices based on fundamental LMP logic in order to: accommodate rather than resolve the inadequacies of the demand side resource capacity product; address the inability of the power flow model to incorporate the need for reactive power; accommodate rather than resolve the flaws in PJM's approach to shortage pricing; or for any other reason. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM update the outage impact studies, the reliability analyses used in RPM for capacity deliverability, and the reliability analyses used in RTEP for transmission upgrades to be consistent with the more conservative emergency operations (post contingency load dump limit exceedance analysis) in the energy market that were implemented in June 2013.[13] (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM include in the tariff or appropriate manual an explanation of the initial creation of hubs, the process for modifying hub definitions and a description of how hub definitions have changed.[14] [15] (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all buses with a net withdrawal be treated as load for purposes of calculating load and load-weighted LMP, even if the MW are settled to the generator. The MMU recommends that during hours when a load bus shows a net injection, the energy injection be treated as generation, not negative load, for purposes of calculating generation and load-weighted LMP, even if the injection MW are settled to the load serving entity. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM identify and collect data on available behind the meter generation resources, including nodal location information and relevant operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM document how LMPs are calculated when demand response is marginal. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not allow nuclear generators which do not respond to prices or which only respond to manual instructions from the operator to set the LMPs in the real-time market. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM increase the coordination of outage and operational restrictions data submitted by market participants via eDART/eGADs and offer data submitted via Markets Gateway. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM model generators' operating transitions, including soak time for units with a steam turbine, configuration transitions for combined cycles, and peak operating modes. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clarify, modify and document its process for dispatching reserves and energy when SCED indicates that supply is

12 PJM created a more transparent process for transmission constraint penalty factors and added it to the tariff in 2020. Policies on reductions in control limits and the duration of violations remain discretionary and undocumented in the PJM Market Rules.

13 This recommendation was the result of load shed events in September, 2013. For detailed discussion, please see *2013 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 3: Energy Market at 114 – 116.

14 According to minutes from the first meeting of the Energy Market Committee (EMC) on January 28, 1998, the EMC unanimously agreed to be responsible for approving additions, deletions and changes to the hub definitions to be published and modeled by PJM. Since the EMC has become the Market Implementation Committee (MIC), the MIC now appears to be responsible for such changes.

15 There is currently no PJM documentation in the tariff or manuals explaining how hubs are created and how their definitions are changed. The general definition of a hub can be found in the PJM.com Glossary <http://www.pjm.com/Glossary.aspx>.



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less than total demand including forecasted load and reserve requirements. The modifications should define: a SCED process to economically convert reserves to energy; a process for the recall of energy from capacity resources; and the minimum level of synchronized reserves that would trigger load shedding. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM stop capping the system marginal price in RT SCED and LPC and instead limit the sum of violated reserve constraint shadow prices that are included in the determination of LMP in LPC to $1,700 per MWh. While PJM no longer caps prices in RT SCED, PJM continues to apply a cap to the system marginal price in the pricing run (LPC) under fast start pricing. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM adjust the ORDCs during spin events to reduce the reserve requirement for synchronized and primary reserves by the amount of the reserves deployed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)

## Transparency

- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly document the calculation of shortage prices and implementation of reserve price caps in the PJM manuals, including defining all the components of reserve prices, and all the constraints whose shadow prices are included in reserve prices. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM allow generators to report fuel type on an hourly basis in their offer schedules and to designate schedule availability on an hourly basis. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)[16]
- The MMU recommends that PJM define clear criteria for operator approval of RT SCED cases, including shortage cases, that are used to send dispatch signals to resources, and for pricing, to minimize discretion. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)[17]

16 Fuel type is reported by offer schedule, but it can be inaccurate on an hourly basis.

17 The PJM Market Rules clarify that shortage case approval will be based on RT SCED, but does not address RT SCED case choice or load bias.

## Virtual Bids and Offers

- The MMU recommends eliminating up to congestion (UTC) bidding at pricing nodes that aggregate only small sections of transmission zones with few physical assets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends eliminating INC, DEC, and UTC bidding at pricing nodes that allow market participants to profit from modeling issues. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Conclusion

The MMU analyzed key elements of PJM energy market structure, participant conduct and market performance in the first six months of 2026, including aggregate supply and demand, concentration ratios, aggregate pivotal supplier results, local three pivotal supplier test results, offer capping, markup, marginal units, participation in demand response programs, virtual bids and offers, loads and prices.

Prices are a key outcome of markets. Prices vary across hours, days and years for multiple reasons. Price is an indicator of the level of competition in a market. In a competitive market, prices are directly related to input prices, the marginal cost to serve load. In the first six months of 2026, LMP increased by $20.79 per MWh compared to the first six months of 2025, or 40.2 percent. The transmission constraint penalty factor component increased by $9.43 per MWh, 45.3 percent of the increase in LMP, as a result of PJM actions to reduce the line limits applied in SCED (control limits) below the actual line limits. The fuel cost components of LMP (the sum of gas, coal, oil, landfill gas, and consumables) increased by $7.26 per MWh, 34.9 percent of the increase in LMP. The pre-emergency demand response component decreased by $1.16 per MWh, -5.6 percent of the increase in LMP. The emissions cost components of LMP, including opportunity costs for emissions limited resources, increased by $1.06 per MWh, 5.1 percent of the increase in LMP. The administrative cap component decreased LMP by less in the first six months of 2026 than the first six months of 2025, $0.16 per MWh increase in LMP, 0.7 percent of the increase in LMP.

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The pattern of prices within days and across months and years illustrates how prices are directly related to supply and demand conditions and illustrates the potential significance of the impact of the price elasticity of demand on prices. Energy market results in the first six months of 2026 generally reflected supply-demand fundamentals, although the behavior of some participants both routinely and during high demand periods represents noncompetitive economic withholding. Economic withholding occurs when generator offers are greater than competitive levels, the short run marginal cost of generation. In the first six months of 2026, the sum of the markup, ten percent adder, and maintenance cost (not short run marginal cost) components increased by $1.82 per MWh or 8.8 percent of the increase in LMP. In the first six months of 2026, PJM actions, in the form of transmission constraint penalty factors, significantly increased prices. In the first six months of 2026, the transmission constraint penalty factor component increased by $9.43 per MWh, 45.3 percent of the increase in LMP.

Data center load growth affects energy market prices. Increased demand without matching energy supply puts upward pressure on prices, all else equal. It is difficult to shield customers from the costs caused by data center load growth in the energy market. The impact on the energy market is greater when data centers are added without adding corresponding generating capacity and its associated energy output, what has been termed connect and manage.

The potential for prolonged and excessively high administrative pricing in the energy market due to reserve penalty factors and transmission constraint penalty factors remains an issue that needs to be addressed.[18] The transmission constraint penalty factors are currently the second largest determinant of LMP after the marginal cost of gas. PJM has not experienced a prolonged load shedding event, but, if one were to occur, LMP could exceed $3,700 per MWh for the entire event.

With or without a capacity market, energy market design must permit shortage pricing when such pricing is consistent with market conditions and constrained by reasonable rules to ensure that market power is not exercised and to ensure no shortage pricing when such pricing is not consistent with market conditions. The point of shortage pricing is to ensure that the price of energy and reserves reflects the actual marginal cost of supply. The point of shortage pricing is not to set prices to arbitrarily high levels based on subjective assertions about the value of lost load. Shortage pricing implemented to increase generators' revenue is not consistent with a competitive market design. Changes in the market, like data center load growth and renewable energy growth, do not imply that PJM's current shortage pricing levels are too low. Artificially increasing energy market prices through market design changes is not a solution for managing either data center load growth or renewable energy growth. Load growth, largely driven by new data centers in the PJM region, increased the frequency of energy market shortages in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.[19] Arbitrarily increasing shortage pricing during shortage events by raising the administrative prices on the demand curve for reserves (Operating Reserves Demand Curve or ORDC), as PJM proposes in the Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force (RCSTF), would increase the costs imposed on all customers from data center load growth, counter to the Principles of the PJM governors and the White House, as well as the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.[20] [21] Data centers are already raising energy market costs to all customers by increasing load, specifically increasing the frequency of emergency high load alert events, and straining the transmission system, as evidenced by a $24.5 million single day of profits to UTCs during a transmission outage on May 26 in Data Center Alley. PJM's proposals would undermine the efforts of the Principles and the Pledge by changing the market design in a way that exacerbates the higher energy costs of data centers imposed on other customers.

Shortage pricing for price signals that reflect market conditions and actual short run marginal costs during periods of reserve or energy shortages is consistent with a competitive market design. Shortage pricing is part of an appropriate pricing structure facing both load and generation owners in a working wholesale electric power market design. Shortage pricing must

18 177 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2021).

19 See PJM, "PJM Load Forecast Accuracy Report," (May 29, 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/load-forecast/2026-load-forecast-accuracy-report.pdf> .

20 See Statement of Principles Regarding PJM, National Energy Dominance Council and PJM State Governors (February 15, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/statement-principles-regarding-pjm>.

21 See Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances Energy Affordability with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (March 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (March 4, 2026), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-advances-energy-affordability-with-the-ratepayer-protection-pledge/>.


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be designed to ensure that market prices reflect actual market conditions, that shortage pricing reflects actual short run marginal costs, that shortage pricing occurs with transparent triggers based on measured reserve levels and transparent prices, that shortage pricing only occurs when shortage exists, that shortage pricing not be excessive or punitive, that shortage pricing recognize that electric power serves a unique and critical role for customers, and that there are strong incentives for competitive behavior and strong disincentives to exercise market power. Such administrative shortage pricing is a key link between energy and capacity markets.

PJM defined inputs to the dispatch tools, particularly RT SCED, have substantial effects on energy market outcomes. Transmission line ratings in SCED, transmission constraint penalty factors, load forecast bias, hydro resource schedules, fast start pricing, and the treatment of demand resources change the dispatch of the system, affect prices, and can create significant price increases, particularly through transmission constraint penalty factors. PJM operator interventions to reduce the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings in RT SCED unnecessarily trigger transmission constraint penalty factors and significantly increase prices. The transmission constraint penalty factor contribution to the load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 was $14.75 per MWh or $6.0 billion of the total $29.3 billion cost of real-time load. In the first six months of 2026, the transmission constraint penalty factor contribution to the cost of real time load was more than five times higher than the $1.13 billion of energy uplift charges. Most of the LMP costs due to transmission constraint penalty factors occurred during Winter Storm Fern. During peak load conditions, there were significant power flows on several high voltage constraints, including Bedington – Black Oak and BC/PEPCO Doubles. This led to constraint violations in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets. A majority of the real-time violations were the result of PJM reducing the line rating in SCED. The high constraint shadow prices that result from the application of the transmission constraint penalty factor on high voltage constraints have a larger and broader effect on LMP throughout the market than lower voltage constraints. Differences between day-ahead and real-time unit commitments contributed to these issues, and differences between day-ahead and real-time market pricing also resulted from the different transmission constraint penalty factors used in the day-ahead dispatch run and pricing run.

There were also constraint violations for several hours on May 26, 2026, for multiple 230kV constraints in Data Center Alley during a transmission line outage. Pricing during this event contributed to a record day in UTC profits for the first six months of 2026, which must be paid for by customers through higher prices or balancing congestion charges. In the first six months of 2026, the control limit used in RT SCED for 89 percent of violated transmission constraint intervals was less than 100 percent of the actual line limit, with an average reduction of 5.2 percent. If the control limits had not been artificially reduced and everything else remained unchanged, the transmission constraint penalty factor's contribution to the load weighted average LMP in first six months of 2026 would have decreased by 99.6 percent from $14.75 to $0.06 per MWh.

The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) and included in LMP.

Fast start pricing, implemented on September 1, 2021, inappropriately disconnected pricing from dispatch instructions and despite the stated goal of reducing overall uplift, created a greater reliance on uplift rather than price as an incentive to follow PJM's instructions. In the first six months of 2026, the pricing run LMP (PLMP) exceeded the dispatch run LMP (DLMP) by $5.32 per MWh in the real-time market. The large difference resulted from the interaction between high fuel costs during Winter Storm Fern and PJM's fast start pricing rules. The fuel costs included in the no load offer for fast start CTs were added to the LMP in the pricing run, creating the majority of the difference. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to minimize system production costs, not to minimize uplift. Repricing the market to reflect commitment costs using fast start pricing prioritizes minimizing uplift over minimizing production costs.[22] The tradeoff exists because when commitment costs are included in prices, the price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient

22 See 173 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2020).

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behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. Units that start in one hour are not actually fast start units, and their commitment costs are not marginal in a five minute market. The differences between the actual LMP and the fast start LMP distort the incentive for market participants to behave competitively and to follow PJM's dispatch instructions. PJM pays uplift in an attempt to counter the distorted incentives inherent in fast start pricing. PJM also uses the pricing run to implement administrative pricing rules that are not related to fast start pricing. Specifically, PJM uses lower transmission constraint penalty factors in the day-ahead pricing run than in the dispatch run and implements system marginal price capping in the pricing run. Every difference between the dispatch run and the pricing run introduces another inefficiency in the market. In the four years since fast start pricing was introduced, the market has not responded with new entry of fast start units despite consistently higher LMPs when a fast start unit sets price.

The energy market requires more flexible operation of the dispatchable fleet as wind and solar resource penetration grows. Since 2018, PJM has argued that the way to incent investment in flexible units is to increase reserve requirements and to increase the administrative prices defined in the ORDCs. In fact, higher LMPs due to higher ORDCs would benefit inflexible units. Providing windfall gains to all generation through higher LMPs during more frequent reserve shortages is not an effective incentive for flexibility.

The question of how to provide market incentives for investment in flexibility, and for operating to the full capability of that flexibility should be addressed directly. Are units inflexible because they are old and inefficient, because they face gas pipeline constraints, because owners have not invested in increased flexibility or because they serve as a mechanism for the exercise of market power? Are units inflexible because the PJM software does not model combined cycle transitions?

A direct solution would include improved modelling of generator capabilities, so that PJM can send more targeted dispatch signals that generators are consistently capable of following. A direct solution would include targeted reforms to PJM software, like multi-interval dispatch and combined cycle modelling that would directly address PJM energy market performance. A direct solution would include stronger standards in the PJM Market Rules for performance of resources to their actual physical parameters. These reforms would be more efficient and effective than simply raising prices across the board.

The relationship between supply and demand is referred to as supply-demand fundamentals, or economic fundamentals, or market structure. The market structure of the PJM aggregate energy market is only partially competitive because aggregate market power does exist for a significant number of hours. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. It is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. Even a low HHI may be consistent with the exercise of market power with a low price elasticity of demand. The current market power mitigation rules for the PJM energy market rely on the assumption that the ownership structure of the aggregate market ensures competitive outcomes at all times. This assumption requires that the total demand for energy can be met without the supply from any individual supplier or from a small group of suppliers. This assumption is not correct. There are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate energy market with increasing frequency as daily peak loads increase. The frequency of days with aggregate pivotal suppliers was 93.4 percent in the first six months of 2026, compared to 91.7 percent in the first six months of 2025. High markups for some units demonstrate the potential to exercise market power both routinely and during high demand conditions. In the first six months of 2026, pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market, committed in the day-ahead market and identified as one of three day-ahead aggregate pivotal suppliers, set real-time market prices with markups over $100 per MWh for 553, or 0.4 percent of, marginal unit intervals. The existing market power mitigation measures do not address aggregate market power. The MMU is developing an aggregate market power test and will propose market power mitigation rules to address aggregate market power.


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The three pivotal supplier test is applied by PJM on an ongoing basis for local energy markets in order to determine whether offer capping is required for transmission constraints.[23] However, there are issues with the application of market power mitigation in the day-ahead energy market and the real-time energy market when market sellers fail the TPS test. The Commission recognized some of these issues in its order issued on June 17, 2021, but failed to address them in its November 30, 2023 order.[24] [25] Many of these issues can be resolved by simple rule changes. PJM filed and, on October 25, 2024, FERC accepted a proposal that requires that sellers that fail the TPS test be offer capped at their cost-based offers and that operating parameters will be mitigated.[26] That order has no current effect because FERC approved the PJM filing that linked, for no logical reason, implementing the improved rules to PJM's adoption of a software improvement, with no defined date. The flawed rules remain in place. There is no reason to delay implementation of the FERC approved rules until PJM addresses combined cycle modelling. The changes would decrease the solution time for the day-ahead market and enhance market efficiency. The approved approach should be implemented as soon as possible to help ensure effective market power mitigation.

The enforcement of market power mitigation rules is undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. A competitive offer is equal to short run marginal costs. The significance of competition metrics like markup is also undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. The definition of a competitive offer, under the PJM Market Rules, is not currently correct. The definition, that all costs that are related to electric production are short run marginal costs, is not clear or correct. All costs and investments for power generation are related to electric production. Under this definition, unit owners are allowed to include costs in cost-based energy offers that are not short run marginal costs in offers, especially maintenance costs. This issue can be resolved by simple rule changes to incorporate a clear and accurate definition of short run marginal costs. This rule also had unintended consequences for market seller offer caps in the capacity market. Maintenance costs includable in energy offers cannot be included in capacity market offer caps based on avoidable costs. As a result, capacity market offer caps based on net avoidable costs were lower than they would have been if maintenance costs had been correctly included in avoidable costs rather than incorrectly defined to be part of short marginal costs of producing energy and includable in energy offers.

A competitive power market will result in higher prices when fuel costs increase and in lower prices when fuel costs decrease. A competitive market will not result in higher prices when markups increase based on market power, or when PJM selects a price-based offer including a markup rather than a cost-based offer when there is local market power, or when PJM artificially triggers transmission constraint penalty factors. The overall energy market results support the conclusion that energy prices in PJM are set, generally, by marginal units operating at, or close to, their marginal costs, although this was not always the case in the first six months of 2026 or prior years. Given the design of the energy market which can permit the exercise of aggregate and local market power, some participants' offer behavior results in the exercise of market power in the energy market. This is a reason to use correctly defined short run marginal cost as the sole basis for cost-based offers, to correct the offer capping process for resources with local market power, and to implement an aggregate market power test. In addition, PJM's extensive administrative interventions in the energy market should be reduced or eliminated. The MMU concludes that the PJM energy market results were competitive in the first six months of 2026.

# Supply and Demand

## Market Structure

### Supply

Supply includes physical generation, imports and virtual transactions.

In the first six months of 2026, 1,241 MW of new resources were added in the energy market, and 669 MW of resources were retired.


23 The MMU reviews PJM's application of the TPS test and brings issues to the attention of PJM.
24 See 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
25 185 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2023).
26 189 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2024).

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Figure 3-1 shows real-time and day-ahead hourly supply curves for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.[27] The real-time supply curve includes hourly on peak average offers. The real-time supply curve only includes available MW from units that are online or have a notification plus start time that is no more than one hour. The day-ahead supply curve shows all available hourly on peak average offers.

The real-time hourly on peak average offered supply in the first six months of 2026 decreased by 0.6 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from 139,347 MWh to 138,477 MWh. The day-ahead on peak hourly average offered supply in the first six months of 2026 decreased by 2.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from 149,354 MWh to 145,896 MWh.

### Figure 3-1 Real-time and day-ahead hourly supply curves: January through June, 2025 and 2026




27 Real-time supply includes real-time generation offers and import MWh.

Figure 3-2 shows the typical dispatch range.

### Figure 3-2 Typical dispatch range of supply curves





Table 3-2 shows the price elasticity of the real-time supply curve for the peak hours for the first six months of 2020 through 2026 by load level.[28]

The supply curve in the first six months of 2026 was most elastic in the 75 to 95 GW range at 0.361, which was less elastic than the supply curve in the 75 to 95 GW range in the first six months of 2025, with an elasticity of 0.453.

The price elasticity of the supply curve measures the responsiveness of the quantity supplied (GW) to a change in price:

$$\text{Elasticity of Supply} = \frac{\text{Percent change in quantity supplied}}{\text{Percent change in price}}$$

28 The price elasticity results have been corrected from previous reports.



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The supply curve is defined to be elastic when elasticity is greater than 1.0. The quantity supplied is more sensitive to changes in price the higher the elasticity. Although the aggregate supply curve may appear flat as a result of the wide range in prices and quantities, the supply curve is inelastic throughout.

### Table 3-2 Price elasticity of the supply curve

| | | | GW | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Min - 75 | 75 - 95 | 95 - 115 | 115 - 135 | 135 - Max |
| 2020 | 0.129 | 0.706 | 0.531 | 0.004 | - |
| 2021 | 0.093 | 0.655 | 0.446 | 0.006 | - |
| 2022 | 0.048 | 0.583 | 0.377 | 0.043 | 0.011 |
| 2023 | 0.088 | 0.352 | 0.260 | 0.007 | - |
| 2024 | 0.103 | 0.324 | 0.302 | 0.007 | - |
| 2025 | 0.053 | 0.453 | 0.323 | 0.034 | 0.007 |
| 2026 | 0.060 | 0.361 | 0.244 | 0.025 | 0.010 |

## Real-Time Supply


In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market, there are three types of supply offers:[29]

- **Self Scheduled Generation Offer.** Offer to supply a fixed block of MW, as a price taker, from a unit that may also have a dispatchable component above the fixed MW.
- **Dispatchable Generation Offer.** Offer to supply a schedule of MW and corresponding offer prices from a unit.
- **Import.** An import is an external energy transaction scheduled to PJM from another balancing authority. A real-time import must have a valid OASIS reservation when offered, must have available ramp room to support the import, must be accompanied by a NERC Tag, and must pass the neighboring balancing authority checkout process.

## PJM Real-Time Supply Duration

Figure 3-3 shows the hourly distribution of the real-time generation plus imports in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Figure 3-3 Distribution of real-time generation plus imports: January through June, 2025 and 2026[30]




29 Generation data are the net MWh injections and withdrawals MWh at every generation bus in PJM.

30 Each range on the horizontal axis excludes the start value and includes the end value.

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## PJM Real-Time Average Cleared Supply

Table 3-3 shows the real-time hourly average cleared supply and its standard deviation in the first six months of 2026.

The real-time hourly average cleared generation in the first six months of 2026 increased by 1.3 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 96,763 MWh to 98,028 MWh. This was the highest cleared generation for the first six months of any year since the start of the PJM markets.

The real-time hourly average cleared supply including imports in the first six months of 2026 increased by 1.9 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 98,789 MWh to 100,666 MWh. This was the highest cleared generation plus imports for the first six months of any year since the start of the PJM markets.

### Table 3-3 Real-time hourly average generation and generation plus imports: January through June, 2001 through 2026

| | PJM Real-Time Supply (MWh) | | | | Year-to-Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Generation | | Generation Plus Imports | | Generation | | Generation Plus Imports | |
| Jan-Jun | Generation | Standard Deviation | Supply | Standard Deviation | Generation | Standard Deviation | Supply | Standard Deviation |
| 2001 | 29,428 | 4,679 | 32,412 | 4,813 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | 30,967 | 5,770 | 34,730 | 6,238 | 5.2% | 23.3% | 7.2% | 29.6% |
| 2003 | 36,034 | 6,008 | 39,644 | 6,021 | 16.4% | 4.1% | 14.1% | (3.5%) |
| 2004 | 41,430 | 9,435 | 45,597 | 9,699 | 15.0% | 57.0% | 15.0% | 61.1% |
| 2005 | 74,365 | 12,661 | 79,693 | 13,242 | 79.5% | 34.2% | 74.8% | 36.5% |
| 2006 | 80,249 | 11,011 | 84,819 | 11,574 | 7.9% | (13.0%) | 6.4% | (12.6%) |
| 2007 | 83,478 | 12,105 | 88,150 | 13,192 | 4.0% | 9.9% | 3.9% | 14.0% |
| 2008 | 83,294 | 12,458 | 88,824 | 12,778 | (0.2%) | 2.9% | 0.8% | (3.1%) |
| 2009 | 77,508 | 12,961 | 82,928 | 13,580 | (6.9%) | 4.0% | (6.6%) | 6.3% |
| 2010 | 80,702 | 13,968 | 85,575 | 14,455 | 4.1% | 7.8% | 3.2% | 6.4% |
| 2011 | 81,483 | 13,677 | 86,268 | 14,428 | 1.0% | (2.1%) | 0.8% | (0.2%) |
| 2012 | 86,310 | 13,695 | 91,526 | 14,279 | 5.9% | 0.1% | 6.1% | (1.0%) |
| 2013 | 87,974 | 13,528 | 93,166 | 14,277 | 1.9% | (1.2%) | 1.8% | (0.0%) |
| 2014 | 92,458 | 15,722 | 98,186 | 16,710 | 5.1% | 16.2% | 5.4% | 17.0% |
| 2015 | 90,097 | 16,028 | 96,626 | 17,168 | (2.6%) | 1.9% | (1.6%) | 2.7% |
| 2016 | 86,335 | 14,576 | 91,218 | 15,231 | (4.2%) | (9.1%) | (5.6%) | (11.3%) |
| 2017 | 88,669 | 13,528 | 91,108 | 14,029 | 2.7% | (7.2%) | (0.1%) | (7.9%) |
| 2018 | 91,631 | 14,828 | 94,091 | 15,312 | 3.3% | 9.6% | 3.3% | 9.1% |
| 2019 | 91,613 | 14,403 | 92,947 | 14,735 | (0.0%) | (2.9%) | (1.2%) | (3.8%) |
| 2020 | 87,044 | 13,308 | 87,861 | 13,453 | (5.0%) | (7.6%) | (5.5%) | (8.7%) |
| 2021 | 91,798 | 15,382 | 92,655 | 15,620 | 5.5% | 15.6% | 5.5% | 16.1% |
| 2022 | 92,987 | 14,805 | 94,872 | 15,050 | 1.3% | (3.8%) | 2.4% | (3.6%) |
| 2023 | 88,904 | 11,194 | 90,773 | 11,404 | (4.4%) | (24.4%) | (4.3%) | (24.2%) |
| 2024 | 93,623 | 14,737 | 95,382 | 14,927 | 5.3% | 31.7% | 5.1% | 30.9% |
| 2025 | 96,763 | 16,841 | 98,789 | 17,135 | 3.4% | 14.3% | 3.6% | 14.8% |
| 2026 | 98,028 | 16,413 | 100,666 | 16,820 | 1.3% | (2.5%) | 1.9% | (1.8%) |




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## PJM Real-Time Monthly Average Cleared Supply

Figure 3-4 compares the real-time monthly average generation in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 with the historic five year range. The real-time monthly average generation from January through May 2026 was higher than the maximum monthly average generation for the past five years.

### Figure 3-4 Real-time monthly average generation: 2025 through June 2026




## Day-Ahead Supply

In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market, there are five types of financially binding supply offers:


- **Self Scheduled Generation Offer.** Offer to supply a fixed block of MW, as a price taker, from a unit that may also have a dispatchable component above the minimum.
- **Dispatchable Generation Offer.** Offer to supply a schedule of MW and corresponding offer prices from a unit.
- **Increment Offer (INC).** Financial offer to supply MW and corresponding offer prices. INCs can be submitted by any market participant.
- **Up to Congestion Transaction (UTC).** Conditional transaction that permits a market participant to specify a maximum price spread for a specific amount of MW between the transaction source and sink. An up to congestion transaction is a matched pair of an injection and a withdrawal.
- **Import.** An import is an external energy transaction for a specific MW amount scheduled to PJM from another balancing authority. An import must have a valid willing to pay congestion (WPC) OASIS reservation when offered. An import energy transaction that clears the day-ahead energy market is financially binding. There is no link between transactions submitted in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market and the PJM Real-Time Energy Market, so an import energy transaction approved in the day-ahead energy market will not physically flow in real-time unless it is also submitted through the real-time energy market scheduling process.

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## PJM Day-Ahead Supply Duration

Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of the day-ahead hourly cleared supply, including increment offers, up to congestion transactions, and imports in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Figure 3-5 Distribution of day-ahead cleared supply plus imports: January through June, 2025 and 2026 [31]




## PJM Day-Ahead Average Cleared Supply

Table 3-4 presents day-ahead hourly cleared supply summary statistics for each year for the first six months of 2001 through 2026.

The day-ahead hourly average cleared supply in the first six months of 2026, including INCs and UTCs, decreased by 0.7 percent from the first six months of 2025 from 110,458 MWh to 109,740 MWh.

The day-ahead hourly average cleared supply in the first six months of 2026, including INCs, UTCs and imports, decreased by 0.4 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 110,712 MWh to 110,285 MWh.

### Table 3-4 Day-ahead hourly average cleared supply and cleared supply plus imports: January through June, 2001 through 2026

| | PJM Day-Ahead Supply (MWh) | | | | Year-to-Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Supply | | Supply Plus Imports | | Supply | | Supply Plus Imports | |
| Jan-Jun | Supply | Standard Deviation | Supply | Standard Deviation | Supply | Standard Deviation | Supply | Standard Deviation |
| 2001 | 26,796 | 4,305 | 27,540 | 4,382 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | 25,840 | 10,011 | 26,398 | 10,021 | (3.6%) | 132.5% | (4.1%) | 128.7% |
| 2003 | 36,420 | 7,000 | 36,994 | 7,023 | 40.9% | (30.1%) | 40.1% | (29.9%) |
| 2004 | 50,089 | 10,108 | 50,836 | 10,171 | 37.5% | 44.4% | 37.4% | 44.8% |
| 2005 | 87,855 | 14,365 | 89,382 | 14,395 | 75.4% | 42.1% | 75.8% | 41.5% |
| 2006 | 95,562 | 12,620 | 97,796 | 12,615 | 8.8% | (12.1%) | 9.4% | (12.4%) |
| 2007 | 106,470 | 14,522 | 108,815 | 14,772 | 11.4% | 15.1% | 11.3% | 17.1% |
| 2008 | 104,705 | 14,124 | 107,169 | 14,190 | (1.7%) | (2.7%) | (1.5%) | (3.9%) |
| 2009 | 97,607 | 16,283 | 100,076 | 16,342 | (6.8%) | 15.3% | (6.6%) | 15.2% |
| 2010 | 102,626 | 18,206 | 105,463 | 18,378 | 5.1% | 11.8% | 5.4% | 12.5% |
| 2011 | 108,143 | 16,666 | 110,656 | 16,926 | 5.4% | (8.5%) | 4.9% | (7.9%) |
| 2012 | 132,326 | 15,710 | 134,747 | 15,841 | 22.4% | (5.7%) | 21.8% | (6.4%) |
| 2013 | 148,381 | 15,606 | 150,554 | 15,830 | 12.1% | (0.7%) | 11.7% | (0.1%) |
| 2014 | 165,620 | 13,930 | 167,939 | 14,119 | 11.6% | (10.7%) | 11.5% | (10.8%) |
| 2015 | 115,150 | 18,851 | 117,613 | 18,996 | (30.5%) | 35.3% | (30.0%) | 34.5% |
| 2016 | 127,715 | 20,380 | 129,798 | 20,518 | 10.9% | 8.1% | 10.4% | 8.0% |
| 2017 | 133,601 | 19,109 | 134,433 | 19,293 | 4.6% | (6.2%) | 3.6% | (6.0%) |
| 2018 | 113,028 | 21,246 | 113,493 | 21,258 | (15.4%) | 11.2% | (15.6%) | 10.2% |
| 2019 | 115,511 | 16,792 | 115,896 | 16,811 | 2.2% | (21.0%) | 2.1% | (20.9%) |
| 2020 | 109,126 | 16,253 | 109,369 | 16,248 | (5.5%) | (3.2%) | (5.6%) | (3.3%) |
| 2021 | 101,836 | 17,741 | 102,057 | 17,778 | (6.7%) | 9.2% | (6.7%) | 9.4% |
| 2022 | 106,340 | 17,069 | 106,616 | 17,122 | 4.4% | (3.8%) | 4.5% | (3.7%) |
| 2023 | 120,028 | 14,490 | 120,495 | 14,567 | 12.9% | (15.1%) | 13.0% | (14.9%) |
| 2024 | 109,580 | 17,820 | 109,876 | 17,868 | (8.7%) | 23.0% | (8.8%) | 22.7% |
| 2025 | 111,068 | 18,937 | 111,322 | 18,959 | 1.4% | 6.3% | 1.3% | 6.1% |
| 2026 | 109,740 | 17,892 | 110,285 | 17,930 | (1.2%) | (5.5%) | (0.9%) | (5.4%) |


31 Each range on the horizontal axis excludes the start value and includes the end value.


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## PJM Day-Ahead Monthly Average Cleared Supply

Figure 3-6 compares the day-ahead monthly average cleared supply including increment offers and up to congestion transactions in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 with the historic five year range.

### Figure 3-6 Day-ahead monthly average cleared supply: 2025 through June 2026




## Real-Time and Day-Ahead Supply

Table 3-5 presents summary statistics for day-ahead and real-time cleared supply in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The last two columns of Table 3-5 are the day-ahead cleared supply minus the real-time cleared supply. The first column is the total physical day-ahead generation less the total physical real-time generation and the second column is the total day-ahead cleared supply less the total real-time cleared supply. The total real-time cleared supply includes real-time generation and real-time imports. The total day-ahead cleared supply includes physical day-ahead generation, INCs, UTCs, and day-ahead imports.

The difference between total physical day-ahead average generation and total real-time average generation decreased 806 MWh from the first six months of 2025, from -1,419 MWh to -612 MWh. The difference between total day-ahead average supply and total real-time average supply decreased 2,304 MWh from the first six months of 2025, from 11,922 MWh to 9,618 MWh.

### Table 3-5 Day-ahead and real-time hourly cleared supply (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | | Day Ahead | | | | | Real Time | | Day Ahead Less Real Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Jan-Jun | Generation | INC Offers | Up to Congestion | Imports | Total Supply | Generation | Total Supply | Generation | Supply |
| Average | 2025 | 95,345 | 5,620 | 9,493 | 254 | 110,712 | 96,763 | 98,789 | (1,419) | 11,922 |
| | 2026 | 97,416 | 5,114 | 7,211 | 545 | 110,285 | 98,028 | 100,666 | (612) | 9,618 |
| Median | 2025 | 92,186 | 5,575 | 9,294 | 190 | 108,469 | 93,389 | 95,332 | (1,203) | 13,137 |
| | 2026 | 94,877 | 5,013 | 6,999 | 505 | 108,196 | 95,275 | 97,586 | (398) | 10,610 |
| Standard Deviation | 2025 | 16,840 | 1,786 | 3,150 | 231 | 18,818 | 16,841 | 17,135 | (1) | 1,683 |
| | 2026 | 16,674 | 1,558 | 2,629 | 319 | 17,930 | 16,413 | 16,820 | 261 | 1,111 |
| Peak Average | 2025 | 101,965 | 6,398 | 10,752 | 287 | 119,402 | 103,223 | 105,327 | (1,258) | 14,076 |
| | 2026 | 103,504 | 5,738 | 8,325 | 580 | 118,147 | 103,788 | 106,494 | (284) | 11,653 |
| Peak Median | 2025 | 96,409 | 6,316 | 10,491 | 234 | 114,570 | 97,303 | 99,244 | (894) | 15,326 |
| | 2026 | 101,281 | 5,694 | 8,144 | 543 | 116,561 | 101,598 | 104,110 | (317) | 12,451 |
| Peak Standard Deviation | 2025 | 16,267 | 1,691 | 2,917 | 244 | 16,807 | 16,401 | 16,626 | (134) | 181 |
| | 2026 | 15,083 | 1,482 | 2,518 | 351 | 15,365 | 14,985 | 15,264 | 98 | 102 |
| Off-Peak Average | 2025 | 89,524 | 4,937 | 8,386 | 224 | 103,070 | 91,083 | 93,041 | (1,560) | 10,029 |
| | 2026 | 92,063 | 4,564 | 6,231 | 514 | 103,372 | 92,963 | 95,543 | (901) | 7,829 |
| Off-Peak Median | 2025 | 86,303 | 4,937 | 8,152 | 160 | 99,831 | 87,425 | 89,264 | (1,123) | 10,567 |
| | 2026 | 88,355 | 4,408 | 5,828 | 477 | 99,532 | 89,096 | 91,467 | (741) | 8,065 |
| Off-Peak Standard Deviation | 2025 | 15,098 | 1,575 | 2,923 | 215 | 17,099 | 15,087 | 15,434 | 11 | 1,665 |
| | 2026 | 16,165 | 1,410 | 2,317 | 284 | 17,162 | 15,940 | 16,455 | 225 | 706 |

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Figure 3-7 shows the average cleared volumes of day-ahead and real-time supply by hour of the day in the first six months of 2026. The day-ahead cleared supply consists of cleared MW of physical generation, imports, increment offers and up to congestion transactions. The real-time cleared supply consists of cleared MW of physical generation and imports.

### Figure 3-7 Day-ahead and real-time cleared supply (Average volumes by hour of the day): January through June, 2026






Figure 3-8 shows the difference between day-ahead and real-time daily average cleared supply in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. The blue line is the total physical day-ahead generation less the total physical real-time generation, and the green line is the total day-ahead cleared supply less the total real-time cleared supply. The total real-time cleared supply includes real-time generation and real-time imports. The total day-ahead cleared supply includes physical day-ahead generation, INCs, UTCs, and day-ahead imports.

### Figure 3-8 Difference between day-ahead and real-time daily average cleared supply: 2025 through June 2026




## Demand

In the real-time energy market, demand includes physical load and exports. In the day-ahead energy market, demand includes physical load, exports, and virtual transactions.

## Peak Demand

In the real-time energy market, demand refers to physical accounting load and exports, and in the day-ahead energy market, demand also includes virtual demand transactions.[32]

32 PJM reports peak load including accounting load plus an addback equal to PJM's estimated load drop from demand side resources. This will generally result in PJM reporting peak load values greater than accounting load values. PJM's load drop estimate is based on PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis," Attachment A: Load Drop Estimate Guidelines.


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Table 3-6 shows the seasonal peak load, net exports, real-time generation and the LMP for the peak load hour from 2004 through the first six months of 2026.

The summer peak load in the first six months of 2026 was 146,175 MWh (151,547 MWh with net exports) in the HE 1800 (EPT) on June 30, 2026, lower than the summer peak load for the full year 2025, which was 156,256 MWh (158,889 MWh with net exports) in the HE 1800 (EPT) on June 23, 2025.

### Table 3-6 Actual PJM peak load by season: 2004 through June 2026[33] [34]

| Summer Peak Load Hour | | | | | | Winter Peak Load Hour | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | Hour Ending | RT Load (MWh) | Net Export (MWh) | RT Generation (MWh) | LMP ($/MWh) | Date | Hour Ending | RT Load (MWh) | Net Export (MWh) | RT Generation (MWh) | LMP ($/MWh) |
| Tuesday, August 03, 2004 | 17 | 77,950 | 435 | 78,666 | $90.55 | Monday, December 20, 2004 | 19 | 96,838 | 1,796 | 98,797 | $129.90 |
| Tuesday, July 26, 2005 | 16 | 134,017 | (2,206) | 131,975 | $156.02 | Wednesday, December 14, 2005 | 19 | 110,632 | (376) | 110,406 | $163.45 |
| Wednesday, August 02, 2006 | 17 | 144,904 | (782) | 143,957 | $404.80 | Friday, December 08, 2006 | 19 | 106,866 | 873 | 108,002 | $83.17 |
| Wednesday, August 08, 2007 | 16 | 136,368 | 404 | 140,170 | $471.98 | Monday, February 05, 2007 | 20 | 119,072 | (3,964) | 115,252 | $178.18 |
| Monday, June 09, 2008 | 17 | 127,216 | 2,862 | 125,804 | $155.67 | Thursday, January 03, 2008 | 19 | 109,239 | (641) | 112,339 | $130.11 |
| Monday, August 10, 2009 | 17 | 123,900 | 163 | 127,229 | $85.64 | Friday, January 16, 2009 | 19 | 114,765 | (2,316) | 115,093 | $80.73 |
| Tuesday, July 06, 2010 | 17 | 133,297 | (247) | 136,442 | $194.02 | Tuesday, December 14, 2010 | 19 | 113,121 | (1,688) | 115,284 | $137.02 |
| Thursday, July 21, 2011 | 17 | 154,095 | (5,906) | 151,790 | $162.28 | Monday, January 24, 2011 | 8 | 108,156 | (1,218) | 109,394 | $176.49 |
| Tuesday, July 17, 2012 | 17 | 150,879 | (4,825) | 149,582 | $203.72 | Tuesday, January 03, 2012 | 19 | 119,450 | 109 | 122,802 | $67.07 |
| Thursday, July 18, 2013 | 17 | 153,790 | (7,607) | 149,806 | $244.92 | Tuesday, January 22, 2013 | 19 | 123,473 | (3,412) | 123,283 | $119.20 |
| Tuesday, June 17, 2014 | 18 | 138,448 | (7,382) | 134,914 | $113.51 | Tuesday, January 07, 2014 | 19 | 136,932 | (9,127) | 131,731 | $386.36 |
| Tuesday, July 28, 2015 | 17 | 140,266 | (3,942) | 139,450 | $101.40 | Friday, February 20, 2015 | 8 | 139,647 | (6,994) | 137,504 | $381.93 |
| Thursday, August 11, 2016 | 16 | 148,577 | 1,235 | 153,820 | $128.83 | Thursday, December 15, 2016 | 19 | 127,759 | (2,946) | 128,979 | $107.06 |
| Wednesday, July 19, 2017 | 18 | 142,387 | 3,166 | 148,409 | $59.49 | Monday, January 09, 2017 | 8 | 124,210 | (1,054) | 126,761 | $67.72 |
| Tuesday, August 28, 2018 | 17 | 147,042 | 3,238 | 154,067 | $131.36 | Friday, January 05, 2018 | 19 | 133,851 | (403) | 137,173 | $164.15 |
| Friday, July 19, 2019 | 18 | 148,228 | 3,253 | 154,542 | $37.47 | Thursday, January 31, 2019 | 8 | 134,060 | 1,077 | 138,744 | $85.21 |
| Monday, July 20, 2020 | 17 | 141,449 | 6,013 | 150,667 | $74.91 | Wednesday, January 22, 2020 | 8 | 116,761 | 4,230 | 123,609 | $31.76 |
| Tuesday, August 24, 2021 | 17 | 145,563 | 2,984 | 151,708 | $243.98 | Friday, January 29, 2021 | 9 | 114,457 | 3,200 | 120,648 | $27.87 |
| Wednesday, July 20, 2022 | 18 | 144,356 | 3,190 | 151,620 | $204.29 | Friday, December 23, 2022 | 19 | 131,474 | 3,340 | 136,132 | $2,011.80 |
| Thursday, July 27, 2023 | 18 | 144,215 | 7,211 | 151,896 | $110.52 | Friday, February 03, 2023 | 20 | 117,705 | 746 | 121,952 | $56.22 |
| Tuesday, July 16, 2024 | 18 | 148,890 | 508 | 152,864 | $384.56 | Wednesday, January 17, 2024 | 9 | 130,293 | 9,291 | 143,324 | $103.66 |
| Monday, June 23, 2025 | 18 | 156,256 | 2,533 | 162,599 | $273.39 | Wednesday, January 22, 2025 | 9 | 140,043 | 7,660 | 151,437 | $355.76 |
| Tuesday, June 30, 2026 | 18 | 146,175 | 5,372 | 155,099 | $141.96 | Thursday, January 29, 2026 | 8 | 135,722 | 1,316 | 140,610 | $295.93 |


33 Peak loads shown are accounting load, without losses. See the *MMU Technical Reference for the PJM Markets*, at "Load Definitions," for detailed definitions of load. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

34 Peak loads shown have been corrected to reflect the accounting load value excluding PJM loss adjustment. The values presented in this table do not include settlement adjustments made prior to January 1, 2017.

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Figure 3-9 compares prices and load plus net exports on the peak load days for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The real-time average LMP for the June 23, 2025, peak load hour was $273.39 per MWh, and for the June 30, 2026, peak load hour it was $141.96 per MWh.

### Figure 3-9 Peak load with net export day comparison




## Real-Time Demand

In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market, there are two types of demand:[35]


- **Load.** The actual MWh level of energy used by load within PJM.
- **Export.** An export is an external energy transaction scheduled from PJM to another balancing authority. A real-time export must have a valid OASIS reservation when offered, must have available ramp room to support the export, must be accompanied by a NERC Tag, and must pass the neighboring balancing authority's checkout process.

35 Load data are the net MWh injections and withdrawals MWh at every load bus in PJM.

## PJM Real-Time Demand Duration

Figure 3-10 shows the distribution of the real-time hourly load plus exports in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.[36]

### Figure 3-10 Distribution of real-time load plus exports: January through June, 2025 and 2026[37]




36 All real-time load data in Section 3, "Energy Market," "Market Performance: Load and LMP," are based on PJM accounting load. See the *Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, "Load Definitions," for detailed definitions of accounting load. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

37 Each range on the horizontal axis excludes the start value and includes the end value.



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## PJM Real-Time Average Demand

Table 3-7 presents real-time hourly demand summary statistics for the first six months of 2001 through 2026.[38]

The real-time hourly average load in the first six months of 2026 increased by 2.5 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 90,914 MWh to 93,187 MWh. This was the highest real-time hourly average load for the first six months of any year since the start of the PJM markets.

The real-time hourly average demand including exports in the first six months of 2026 increased by 1.7 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 96,900 MWh to 98,548 MWh. This was the highest real-time hourly average demand for the first six months of any year since the start of the PJM markets.

### Table 3-7 Real-time hourly average load and load plus exports: January through June, 2001 through 2026

| | PJM Real-Time Demand (MWh) | | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Load | | Load Plus Exports | | Load | | Load Plus Exports | |
| Jan-Jun | Load | Standard Deviation | Demand | Standard Deviation | Load | Standard Deviation | Demand | Standard Deviation |
| 2001 | 30,180 | 5,274 | 32,041 | 5,103 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | 32,678 | 6,457 | 33,969 | 6,557 | 8.3% | 22.4% | 6.0% | 28.5% |
| 2003 | 36,727 | 6,428 | 38,775 | 6,554 | 12.4% | (0.4%) | 14.1% | (0.0%) |
| 2004 | 41,787 | 8,999 | 44,808 | 10,033 | 13.8% | 40.0% | 15.6% | 53.1% |
| 2005 | 71,939 | 13,603 | 78,745 | 13,798 | 72.2% | 51.2% | 75.7% | 37.5% |
| 2006 | 77,232 | 12,003 | 83,606 | 12,377 | 7.4% | (11.8%) | 6.2% | (10.3%) |
| 2007 | 81,110 | 13,499 | 86,557 | 13,819 | 5.0% | 12.5% | 3.5% | 11.6% |
| 2008 | 78,685 | 12,819 | 85,819 | 13,242 | (3.0%) | (5.0%) | (0.9%) | (4.2%) |
| 2009 | 75,991 | 12,899 | 81,062 | 13,253 | (3.4%) | 0.6% | (5.5%) | 0.1% |
| 2010 | 78,106 | 13,643 | 83,758 | 14,227 | 2.8% | 5.8% | 3.3% | 7.3% |
| 2011 | 78,823 | 13,931 | 84,288 | 14,046 | 0.9% | 2.1% | 0.6% | (1.3%) |
| 2012 | 84,946 | 13,941 | 89,638 | 13,848 | 7.8% | 0.1% | 6.3% | (1.4%) |
| 2013 | 86,897 | 13,871 | 91,199 | 13,848 | 2.3% | (0.5%) | 1.7% | 0.0% |
| 2014 | 90,529 | 16,266 | 96,189 | 16,147 | 4.2% | 17.3% | 5.5% | 16.6% |
| 2015 | 90,586 | 16,192 | 94,782 | 16,589 | 0.1% | (0.5%) | (1.5%) | 2.7% |
| 2016 | 85,800 | 14,517 | 89,746 | 14,798 | (5.3%) | (10.3%) | (5.3%) | (10.8%) |
| 2017 | 84,569 | 13,670 | 89,477 | 13,638 | (1.4%) | (5.8%) | (0.3%) | (7.8%) |
| 2018 | 88,847 | 14,683 | 92,352 | 14,818 | 5.1% | 7.4% | 3.2% | 8.7% |
| 2019 | 86,297 | 14,038 | 91,262 | 14,303 | (2.9%) | (4.4%) | (1.2%) | (3.5%) |
| 2020 | 81,255 | 13,191 | 86,344 | 13,133 | (5.8%) | (6.0%) | (5.4%) | (8.2%) |
| 2021 | 85,958 | 14,269 | 90,960 | 15,221 | 5.8% | 8.2% | 5.3% | 15.9% |
| 2022 | 87,616 | 14,092 | 93,031 | 14,577 | 1.9% | (1.2%) | 2.3% | (4.2%) |
| 2023 | 83,226 | 10,827 | 89,146 | 11,125 | (5.0%) | (23.2%) | (4.2%) | (23.7%) |
| 2024 | 87,764 | 14,208 | 93,605 | 14,522 | 5.5% | 31.2% | 5.0% | 30.5% |
| 2025 | 90,914 | 16,153 | 96,900 | 16,647 | 3.6% | 13.7% | 3.5% | 14.6% |
| 2026 | 93,187 | 15,691 | 98,548 | 16,337 | 2.5% | (2.9%) | 1.7% | (1.9%) |

38 Accounting load is used because accounting load is the load customers pay for in PJM settlements. The use of accounting load with losses before June 1, and without losses after June 1, 2007, is consistent with PJM's calculation of LMP. Before June 1, 2007, transmission losses were included in accounting load. After June 1, 2007, transmission losses were excluded from accounting load and losses were addressed through the incorporation of marginal loss pricing in LMP.

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## PJM Real-Time Monthly Average Demand

Figure 3-11 compares the real-time monthly average load plus exports in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 with the historic five year range. The real-time monthly average load plus exports from January to May was higher than the maximum monthly average load plus exports for the past five years.

### Figure 3-11 Real-time monthly average hourly load plus exports: 2025 through June 2026






Figure 3-12 compares the real-time daily average load in 2025 and the first six months of 2026, with the historic five year range.

### Figure 3-12 Real-time daily load: 2025 and through June, 2026




The real-time load is significantly affected by weather conditions. Table 3-8 compares the monthly heating and cooling degree days in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.[39] Heating degree days increased 0.8 percent compared to the first six months of 2025. Cooling degree days increased 6.1 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.

39 A heating degree day is defined as the number of degrees that a day's average temperature is below 65 degrees F (the temperature below which buildings need to be heated). A cooling degree day is the number of degrees that a day's average temperature is above 65 degrees F (the temperature when people will start to use air conditioning to cool buildings). Reference: <https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/units-and-calculators/degree-days.php>. This calculation was modified starting in 2024 Q3 from the method used in prior State of the Market Reports which was the PJM calculation method based on 60 degrees for heating degree days and 65 degrees for cooling degree days.

Heating and cooling degree days are calculated by weighting the temperature at each weather station in the individual transmission zones using weights provided by PJM in Manual 19. Then the temperature is weighted by the real-time zonal accounting load for each transmission zone. After calculating an average hourly temperature across PJM, the heating and cooling degree formulas are used to calculate the daily heating and cooling degree days, which are summed for monthly reporting. The weather stations that provided the basis for the analysis are ABE, ACY, AVP, BWI, CAK, CLE, CMH, CRW, CVG, DAY, DCA, ERI, EWR, FWA, IAD, ILG, IPT, LEX, ORD, ORF, PHL, PIT, RIC, ROA, TOL and WAL.



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Table 3-8 Heating and cooling degree days: 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | 2026 | | Percent Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Heating Degree Days | Cooling Degree Days | Heating Degree Days | Cooling Degree Days | Heating Degree Days | Cooling Degree Days |
| Jan | 985 | 0 | 986 | 0 | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| Feb | 720 | 0 | 750 | 0 | 4.2% | 0.0% |
| Mar | 370 | 2 | 365 | 4 | (1.3%) | 89.1% |
| Apr | 173 | 10 | 130 | 39 | (25.2%) | 280.8% |
| May | 21 | 31 | 58 | 70 | 180.2% | 129.4% |
| Jun | 1 | 302 | 0 | 254 | (100.0%) | (16.1%) |
| Jul | 0 | 433 | | | | |
| Aug | 0 | 242 | | | | |
| Sep | 0 | 139 | | | | |
| Oct | 128 | 15 | | | | |
| Nov | 432 | 0 | | | | |
| Dec | 837 | 0 | | | | |
| Jan-Jun | 2,270 | 345 | 2,289 | 366 | 0.8% | 6.1% |

## Day-Ahead Demand

In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market, there are five types of financially binding demand bids:


- **Fixed-Demand Bid.** Bid to purchase a defined MWh level of energy, regardless of LMP. Fixed-Demand Bids are included in Day-Ahead physical load.
- **Price-Sensitive Bid.** Bid to purchase a defined MWh level of energy only up to a specified LMP, above which the load bid is zero. Price-Sensitive Bids are included in Day-Ahead physical load.
- **Decrement Bid (DEC).** Financial bid to purchase a defined MWh level of energy up to a specified LMP, above which the bid is zero.
- **Up to Congestion Transaction (UTC).** A conditional transaction that permits a market participant to specify a maximum price spread between the transaction source and sink. An up to congestion transaction is evaluated as a matched pair of an injection and a withdrawal.
- **Export.** An external energy transaction scheduled from PJM to another balancing authority. An export must have a valid willing to pay congestion (WPC) OASIS reservation when offered. There is no link between transactions submitted in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market and the PJM Real-Time Energy Market, so an export energy transaction approved in the day-ahead energy market will not physically flow in real-time unless it is also submitted through the real-time energy market scheduling process.

PJM day-ahead demand is the sum of the five types of cleared demand bids.

### PJM Day-Ahead Demand Duration

Figure 3-13 shows the hourly distribution of the day-ahead cleared demand including DECs, UTCs and exports in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

Figure 3-13 Distribution of day-ahead cleared demand plus exports: January through June, 2025 and 2026[40]




### PJM Day-Ahead Average Demand

Table 3-9 shows day-ahead hourly average cleared demand including DECs, UTCs and exports in 2001 through the first six months of 2026.

40 Each range on the horizontal axis excludes the start value and includes the end value.

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The day-ahead hourly average cleared demand in the first six months of 2026, including DECs and UTCs, increased by 0.05 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 104,018 MWh to 104,069 MWh.

The day-ahead hourly average cleared demand in the first six months of 2026, including DECs, UTCs and exports, decreased by 0.5 percent from the first six months of 2025, from 108,299 MWh to 107,746 MWh.


### Table 3-9 Day-ahead hourly average cleared demand and demand plus exports: January through June, 2001 through 2026

| | PJM Day-Ahead Demand (MWh) | | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Demand Standard | Demand Plus Exports | Standard | | Demand Standard | Demand Plus Exports | Standard |
| Jan-Jun | Demand | Deviation | Demand | Deviation | Demand | Deviation | Demand | Deviation |
| 2001 | 32,425 | 6,014 | 33,075 | 5,857 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | 37,561 | 8,293 | 37,607 | 8,311 | 15.8% | 37.9% | 13.7% | 41.9% |
| 2003 | 44,391 | 7,717 | 44,503 | 7,704 | 18.2% | (6.9%) | 18.3% | (7.3%) |
| 2004 | 50,161 | 10,304 | 50,596 | 10,557 | 13.0% | 33.5% | 13.7% | 37.0% |
| 2005 | 86,890 | 14,677 | 89,388 | 14,827 | 73.2% | 42.4% | 76.7% | 40.4% |
| 2006 | 94,470 | 12,925 | 97,460 | 13,303 | 8.7% | (11.9%) | 9.0% | (10.3%) |
| 2007 | 104,737 | 15,019 | 107,647 | 15,269 | 10.9% | 16.2% | 10.5% | 14.8% |
| 2008 | 100,948 | 14,255 | 104,499 | 14,461 | (3.6%) | (5.1%) | (2.9%) | (5.3%) |
| 2009 | 95,130 | 15,878 | 98,001 | 15,972 | (5.8%) | 11.4% | (6.2%) | 10.4% |
| 2010 | 99,691 | 18,097 | 103,573 | 18,366 | 4.8% | 14.0% | 5.7% | 15.0% |
| 2011 | 105,071 | 16,452 | 108,756 | 16,578 | 5.4% | (9.1%) | 5.0% | (9.7%) |
| 2012 | 129,881 | 15,268 | 133,046 | 15,436 | 23.6% | (7.2%) | 22.3% | (6.9%) |
| 2013 | 145,280 | 15,552 | 148,414 | 15,588 | 11.9% | 1.9% | 11.6% | 1.0% |
| 2014 | 160,805 | 13,872 | 164,740 | 13,800 | 10.7% | (10.8%) | 11.0% | (11.5%) |
| 2015 | 111,750 | 18,076 | 115,117 | 18,477 | (30.5%) | 30.3% | (30.1%) | 33.9% |
| 2016 | 124,542 | 19,750 | 127,461 | 19,991 | 11.4% | 9.3% | 10.7% | 8.2% |
| 2017 | 128,690 | 18,440 | 131,976 | 18,746 | 3.3% | (6.6%) | 3.5% | (6.2%) |
| 2018 | 108,950 | 20,548 | 111,451 | 20,718 | (15.3%) | 11.4% | (15.6%) | 10.5% |
| 2019 | 110,890 | 15,994 | 113,738 | 16,323 | 1.8% | (22.2%) | 2.1% | (21.2%) |
| 2020 | 104,164 | 15,680 | 107,293 | 15,845 | (6.1%) | (2.0%) | (5.7%) | (2.9%) |
| 2021 | 97,083 | 16,637 | 100,060 | 17,277 | (6.8%) | 6.1% | (6.7%) | 9.0% |
| 2022 | 101,124 | 16,137 | 104,520 | 16,619 | 4.2% | (3.0%) | 4.5% | (3.8%) |
| 2023 | 114,206 | 13,973 | 117,987 | 14,195 | 12.9% | (13.4%) | 12.9% | (14.6%) |
| 2024 | 103,751 | 17,124 | 107,615 | 17,388 | (9.2%) | 22.6% | (8.8%) | 22.5% |
| 2025 | 104,018 | 18,054 | 108,299 | 18,321 | 0.3% | 5.4% | 0.6% | 5.4% |
| 2026 | 104,069 | 17,085 | 107,746 | 17,500 | 0.0% | (5.4%) | (0.5%) | (4.5%) |

## PJM Day-Ahead Monthly Average Demand

Figure 3-14 compares the day-ahead monthly average cleared demand including DECs and UTCs for 2025 and the first six months of 2026, with the historic five year range.

### Figure 3-14 Day-ahead monthly average cleared demand: 2025 through June 2026






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## Real-Time and Day-Ahead Demand

Table 3-10 presents summary statistics for day-ahead and real-time cleared demand in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The last two columns of Table 3-10 are day-ahead cleared demand minus real-time cleared demand. The first column is the total physical day-ahead load (fixed demand plus cleared price-sensitive demand) less the physical real-time load. The second column is the total cleared day-ahead demand less the total cleared real-time demand.

In the first six months of 2026, the difference between total physical day-ahead average load bids and total real-time average load increased 297 MWh from the first six months of 2025, from -1,417 MWh to -1,715 MWh. The difference between total day-ahead average demand and total real-time average demand decreased 2,202 MWh from the first six months of 2025, from 11,399 MWh to 9,197 MWh.

### Table 3-10 Day-ahead and real-time demand (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | | Day Ahead | | | | | | Real Time | | Day Ahead Less Real Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Year | Fixed Demand | Price Sensitive | DEC Bids | Up to Congestion | Exports | Total Demand | Load | Total Demand | Load | Demand |
| Average | 2025 | 89,088 | 409 | 5,165 | 9,356 | 4,280 | 108,299 | 90,914 | 96,900 | (1,417) | 11,399 |
| | 2026 | 91,018 | 454 | 5,518 | 7,079 | 3,677 | 107,746 | 93,187 | 98,548 | (1,715) | 9,197 |
| Median | 2025 | 86,298 | 399 | 4,972 | 9,143 | 4,193 | 106,145 | 88,088 | 93,563 | (1,391) | 12,582 |
| | 2026 | 87,989 | 465 | 5,175 | 6,845 | 3,768 | 105,506 | 90,296 | 95,570 | (1,841) | 9,936 |
| Standard Deviation | 2025 | 15,478 | 96 | 1,788 | 3,086 | 1,097 | 18,321 | 16,153 | 16,647 | (579) | 1,675 |
| | 2026 | 15,451 | 97 | 1,890 | 2,517 | 1,035 | 17,500 | 15,691 | 16,337 | (142) | 1,163 |
| Peak Average | 2025 | 95,741 | 426 | 5,738 | 10,527 | 4,301 | 116,733 | 97,347 | 103,304 | (1,179) | 13,429 |
| | 2026 | 97,059 | 465 | 6,094 | 8,128 | 3,646 | 115,391 | 99,027 | 104,237 | (1,504) | 11,153 |
| Peak Median | 2025 | 90,796 | 418 | 5,558 | 10,310 | 4,162 | 111,975 | 92,148 | 97,393 | (934) | 14,583 |
| | 2026 | 94,047 | 478 | 5,796 | 7,874 | 3,703 | 113,860 | 96,406 | 101,900 | (1,881) | 11,960 |
| Peak Standard Deviation | 2025 | 14,603 | 96 | 1,742 | 2,829 | 1,161 | 16,366 | 15,447 | 16,142 | (747) | 224 |
| | 2026 | 13,642 | 98 | 2,056 | 2,407 | 1,028 | 15,087 | 14,058 | 14,827 | (318) | 260 |
| Off-Peak Average | 2025 | 83,238 | 394 | 4,661 | 8,327 | 4,263 | 100,883 | 85,259 | 91,269 | (1,626) | 9,614 |
| | 2026 | 85,706 | 445 | 5,012 | 6,156 | 3,704 | 101,023 | 88,052 | 93,546 | (1,900) | 7,477 |
| Off-Peak Median | 2025 | 79,847 | 381 | 4,401 | 7,997 | 4,225 | 97,762 | 81,685 | 87,610 | (1,457) | 10,153 |
| | 2026 | 81,500 | 458 | 4,783 | 5,747 | 3,842 | 97,368 | 83,718 | 89,609 | (1,761) | 7,759 |
| Off-Peak Standard Deviation | 2025 | 13,771 | 93 | 1,672 | 2,932 | 1,038 | 16,669 | 14,568 | 14,966 | (704) | 1,703 |
| | 2026 | 14,993 | 96 | 1,566 | 2,235 | 1,041 | 16,700 | 15,253 | 15,965 | (163) | 734 |

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Figure 3-15 shows the average cleared volumes of day-ahead and real-time demand in the first six months of 2026. The day-ahead demand includes day-ahead load, decrement bids, up to congestion transactions, and day-ahead exports. The real-time demand includes real-time load and real-time exports.

### Figure 3-15 Day-ahead and real-time demand (Average hourly volumes): January through June, 2026






Figure 3-16 shows the difference between the physical day-ahead load and the physical real-time load, and the difference between the day-ahead demand including DECs, UTCs, and exports, and the real-time demand including exports, in 2025 through June 2026.

### Figure 3-16 Day-ahead minus real-time daily demand: 2025 through June 2026






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Figure 3-17 shows the difference between the day-ahead and real-time hourly average load by hour of the day. DECs, UTCs and exports are not included. The largest difference generally occurs during off peak hours, especially at hours beginning 1 and 2. The smallest difference generally occurs during peak hours, especially at hours beginning 9 and 10.

Compared to the first six months of 2025, the average difference between the day-ahead and real-time hourly average load has increased for every hour of the day in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-17 Difference between day-ahead and real-time hourly average physical load by hour of the day (Average hourly volumes): January through June, 2022 through 2026






Figure 3-18 shows the difference between the day-ahead and real-time on peak and off peak hourly average physical load by month. DECs, UTCs and exports are not included.

### Figure 3-18 Difference between day-ahead and real-time on peak and off peak hourly average physical load by month: 2022 through June 2026




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Table 3-11 shows the difference between the day-ahead and real-time on peak and off peak physical load by zone. DECs, UTCs and exports are not included. Some zones showed larger difference than other zones, such as DOM and BGE. Some zones did not show a big difference between on peak and off peak, such as DOM and AEP. Some zones showed a significant difference between on peak and off peak, such as AECO and JCPL.

**Table 3-11 Difference between day-ahead and real-time on peak and off peak physical load by zone: January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| | 2025 Jan-Jun | | | | 2026 Jan-Jun | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Off Peak | | On Peak | | Off Peak | | On Peak | |
| Zone | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load |
| AECO | (9.95) | (0.1%) | 6.39 | 2.4% | (11.22) | (0.5%) | 11.31 | 3.0% |
| AEP | (64.27) | (0.4%) | (8.72) | (0.0%) | 148.19 | 1.0% | 147.88 | 0.9% |
| APS | (103.01) | (1.8%) | (45.23) | (0.6%) | (5.68) | (0.2%) | 22.15 | 0.4% |
| ATSI | (62.69) | (0.7%) | 18.77 | 0.4% | (94.48) | (1.3%) | (12.29) | 0.0% |
| BGE | (123.26) | (3.4%) | (137.34) | (3.4%) | (150.01) | (4.4%) | (140.79) | (3.5%) |
| COMED | (87.13) | (0.6%) | (100.98) | (0.6%) | (255.74) | (2.5%) | (185.05) | (1.5%) |
| DAY | (26.69) | (1.2%) | (20.79) | (0.8%) | 2.76 | 0.4% | 18.82 | 1.1% |
| DOM | (695.93) | (5.0%) | (715.93) | (4.7%) | (1,227.33) | (8.3%) | (1,265.29) | (8.0%) |
| DPL | (45.64) | (2.1%) | (44.49) | (1.7%) | (35.00) | (1.6%) | (16.73) | (0.5%) |
| DUQ | 13.87 | 1.3% | 44.28 | 3.3% | (3.54) | (0.1%) | (3.54) | (0.1%) |
| EKPC/DEOK | (43.44) | (0.8%) | (30.97) | (0.5%) | (6.94) | (0.1%) | 13.54 | 0.4% |
| JCPL | (63.70) | (2.4%) | 10.24 | 1.5% | (7.20) | 0.2% | 39.38 | 2.8% |
| METED | 12.05 | 1.1% | 17.99 | 1.3% | (26.09) | (1.5%) | (15.29) | (0.7%) |
| PECO | (41.17) | (0.8%) | (27.55) | (0.4%) | (83.27) | (1.6%) | (76.49) | (1.4%) |
| PENELEC | (5.24) | (0.1%) | 8.60 | 0.6% | (8.29) | (0.3%) | (3.73) | (0.0%) |
| PEPCO | (103.76) | (3.3%) | (104.63) | (2.8%) | (68.12) | (2.1%) | (43.55) | (1.1%) |
| PPL | (20.33) | (0.3%) | 17.53 | 0.6% | 3.19 | 0.3% | 13.83 | 0.5% |
| PSEG | (142.51) | (3.0%) | (53.32) | (0.5%) | (57.19) | (0.8%) | 5.28 | 1.0% |
| RECO | (0.24) | (0.1%) | 0.64 | 0.7% | (0.69) | (0.1%) | 0.55 | 1.0% |


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Table 3-12 shows the difference between the day-ahead and real-time physical load by zone for the last five years. DECs, UTCs and exports are not included. Some zones showed a change from year to year. The largest difference between day-ahead physical load and real-time load was in DOM with - 1,245 MW, -8.2 percent of real-time load in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 3-12 Difference between day ahead and real-time physical load by zone: January through June, 2022 through 2026**

| | 2022 Jan-Jun | | 2023 Jan-Jun | | 2024 Jan-Jun | | 2025 Jan-Jun | | 2026 Jan-Jun | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load | Average DA-RT Difference | Average Percent of RT Load |
| AECO | (10.97) | (0.0%) | 6.96 | 1.3% | 20.36 | 2.4% | (2.30) | 1.1% | (0.68) | 1.2% |
| AEP | (108.46) | (0.7%) | (44.13) | (0.2%) | (159.76) | (1.1%) | (38.28) | (0.2%) | 148.05 | 0.9% |
| APS | (68.50) | (1.1%) | (117.75) | (2.1%) | (79.22) | (1.4%) | (75.97) | (1.2%) | 7.34 | 0.1% |
| ATSI | (126.11) | (1.6%) | 60.06 | 0.9% | (36.32) | (0.4%) | (24.57) | (0.2%) | (56.02) | (0.7%) |
| BGE | (112.83) | (3.2%) | (61.97) | (1.9%) | (167.61) | (4.8%) | (129.85) | (3.4%) | (145.70) | (4.0%) |
| COMED | (158.54) | (1.4%) | 93.15 | 1.1% | 24.26 | 0.4% | (93.61) | (0.6%) | (222.67) | (2.0%) |
| DAY | (44.75) | (2.1%) | 25.56 | 1.6% | (5.11) | (0.1%) | (23.93) | (1.0%) | 10.27 | 0.7% |
| DOM | (615.66) | (5.1%) | (611.72) | (5.0%) | (400.29) | (3.0%) | (705.29) | (4.8%) | (1,245.09) | (8.2%) |
| DPL | (57.57) | (2.8%) | (21.24) | (1.1%) | (30.96) | (1.4%) | (45.10) | (1.9%) | (26.45) | (1.1%) |
| DUQ | (78.19) | (5.2%) | 27.37 | 2.1% | 10.54 | 0.7% | 28.09 | 2.2% | (3.54) | (0.1%) |
| EKPC/DEOK | (95.41) | (2.0%) | (44.49) | (0.9%) | (53.58) | (1.0%) | (37.61) | (0.7%) | 2.64 | 0.2% |
| JCPL | (17.00) | (0.2%) | 19.41 | 1.3% | 1.59 | 0.7% | (29.10) | (0.6%) | 14.59 | 1.4% |
| METED | (25.05) | (1.2%) | 21.88 | 1.5% | 15.38 | 1.1% | 14.83 | 1.2% | (21.04) | (1.1%) |
| PECO | 27.38 | 0.9% | 86.53 | 2.3% | (30.09) | (0.5%) | (34.80) | (0.6%) | (80.10) | (1.5%) |
| PENELEC | 12.12 | 0.7% | 30.34 | 1.7% | 1.83 | 0.2% | 1.23 | 0.3% | (6.16) | (0.2%) |
| PEPCO | (36.38) | (1.0%) | (5.21) | (0.0%) | (141.71) | (4.5%) | (104.17) | (3.1%) | (56.62) | (1.6%) |
| PPL | (20.74) | (0.1%) | 106.08 | 2.5% | 52.55 | 1.3% | (2.61) | 0.1% | 8.17 | 0.4% |
| PSEG | (10.30) | (0.0%) | (55.58) | (1.1%) | (127.15) | (2.5%) | (100.78) | (1.9%) | (27.96) | 0.0% |
| RECO | (3.09) | (2.3%) | 1.65 | 1.5% | (9.59) | (5.9%) | 0.17 | 0.3% | (0.11) | 0.4% |

# Market Behavior

## Generator Offers

Generators indicate their availability in the day-ahead market by submitting offers that specify a status: must-run, economic, emergency, or unavailable.

- **Must-Run:** If a unit selects must-run status, the day-ahead market will commit the unit at no less than its economic minimum MW.
- **Economic:** If a unit selects economic status, the day-ahead market will commit the unit based on the unit offers
- **Emergency:** If a unit selects emergency status, the day-ahead market will commit the unit only as needed to preserve system reliability.
- **Unavailable:** If a unit selects unavailable status, the day-ahead market will not consider the unit for commitment.

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Table 3-13 shows the share of total MW offered in the day-ahead market by availability status in the first six months of 2026.

For each availability status, a unit may set its economic minimum MW equal to its economic maximum MW, termed block loading. These MW are reported in the Block Loaded column. If a unit sets its economic minimum MW below its economic maximum MW, the economic minimum MW are reported in the Eco Min column. The capacity between the economic minimum MW and the emergency maximum MW are reported in the Dispatchable column.

In the first six months of 2026, 25.9 percent of available MW were offered as must run, 52.5 percent of MW were offered as economic, 0.1 percent of MW were offered as emergency, and 21.4 percent of MW were unavailable in day-ahead market.[41]

### Table 3-13 Unit Status of day-ahead energy offers: January through June, 2026

| | Must Run | | | | Economic | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Block Loaded | Eco Min | Dispatchable | Total | Block Loaded | Eco Min | Dispatchable | Total | Emergency | Unavailable |
| CC | 0.3% | 6.2% | 5.7% | 12.2% | 0.8% | 35.8% | 31.0% | 67.6% | 0.0% | 20.1% |
| CT | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.8% | 8.7% | 45.6% | 24.2% | 78.6% | 0.7% | 20.0% |
| Diesel | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 97.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 97.4% | 0.4% | 2.2% |
| Hydro | 52.5% | 31.9% | 13.1% | 97.4% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Nuclear | 71.9% | 2.3% | 0.5% | 74.7% | 17.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 17.9% | 0.0% | 7.4% |
| Other | 12.5% | 0.0% | 6.3% | 18.9% | 15.6% | 21.5% | 28.0% | 65.2% | 4.1% | 11.8% |
| Solar | 10.8% | 0.0% | 6.3% | 17.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 82.7% | 83.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Coal | 1.4% | 14.5% | 9.2% | 25.1% | 0.7% | 18.6% | 17.8% | 37.1% | 0.0% | 37.8% |
| Steam - Other | 3.5% | 4.7% | 5.3% | 13.6% | 6.2% | 12.6% | 26.3% | 45.1% | 0.0% | 41.3% |
| Wind | 0.0% | 0.5% | 21.1% | 21.6% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 78.3% | 78.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| All Units | 14.9% | 6.0% | 4.9% | 25.9% | 5.6% | 23.9% | 23.0% | 52.5% | 0.1% | 21.4% |

41 Unavailable MW are calculated based on the total default emergency maximum MW of all the unavailable units in day-ahead market. Wind, Solar and Hydro were set to 0 MW based on the units' technology.



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Table 3-14 shows the share of total MW offered in the day-ahead market by dispatchable status in the first six months of 2026.

The Block Loaded column shows the percentage of total MW for all units that set their economic minimum MW equal to their economic maximum MW, regardless of commitment availability status. The Eco Min column shows the percentage of total MW represented by the economic minimum MW for all units that set their economic minimum MW below their economic maximum MW, regardless of commitment availability status. The Dispatchable column shows the percentage of total MW between the economic minimum MW and the economic maximum MW. The Dispatchable Range section shows the percentage of total MW offered within each price range. The Emergency column shows the percentage of total MW between the economic maximum MW and the emergency maximum MW. The numerator includes only available MW. The denominator is total available and unavailable MW. The columns for each row equal the total available percent by technology.

In the first six months of 2026, 20.6 percent of MW were offered as block loaded MW, 30.0 percent of MW were offered as economic minimum MW, 27.8 percent of MW were offered as dispatchable MW, and 0.1 percent of MW were offered as emergency MW in day-ahead market.

**Table 3-14 Dispatchable status of day-ahead energy offers: January through June, 2026**

| Unit Type | Dispatchable Percent | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Dispatchable Range | | | | | | | | | |
| | Block Loaded Percent | Eco Min | Dispatchable Percent | ($300) - $0 | $0 - $25 | $25 - $50 | $50 - $75 | $75 - $100 | $100 - $200 | $200 - $400 | $400 - $600 | $600 - $800 | $800 - $1000 | Emergency Percent |
| CC | 1.1% | 42.0% | 36.7% | 0.0% | 22.7% | 8.4% | 1.9% | 0.7% | 1.5% | 1.1% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| CT | 9.0% | 46.4% | 24.5% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 3.3% | 4.1% | 2.9% | 5.2% | 5.9% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Diesel | 97.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Hydro | 52.5% | 31.9% | 15.1% | 14.1% | 1.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Nuclear | 89.8% | 2.3% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Other | 32.3% | 21.5% | 34.3% | 4.1% | 1.9% | 10.5% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 14.1% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 2.1% | 0.1% |
| Solar | 10.9% | 0.1% | 89.0% | 72.1% | 12.5% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Coal | 2.1% | 33.1% | 27.0% | 0.0% | 4.0% | 17.8% | 2.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Steam - Other | 9.7% | 17.3% | 31.3% | 2.6% | 7.6% | 10.0% | 5.0% | 1.0% | 2.1% | 2.9% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% |
| Wind | 0.1% | 0.6% | 99.2% | 71.6% | 17.0% | 4.1% | 1.8% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 1.1% | 0.0% |
| All Units | 20.6% | 30.0% | 27.8% | 3.5% | 9.5% | 7.6% | 2.1% | 0.8% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 0.8% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |

## Hourly Offers and Intraday Offer Updates

All participants may make specific hourly offers. Hourly offers mean that participants can specify different MW and price pairs for each hour of the day. Hourly offers can be submitted in the day-ahead market and offers may be updated in the real-time market. Participants must opt in on a monthly basis to make intraday offer updates in real time. Participants that have opted in can make updates only based on the process defined in their fuel cost policies. Units typically use hourly offers to reflect the two gas days in a power day. A gas day is from 10:00 AM EPT to 10:00 AM EPT the next day. Therefore, gas fired units may face two different gas prices. Typically, gas units have one offer from 00:00 EPT until 10:00 EPT and a different offer from 10:00 EPT until 24:00 EPT. Units typically use intraday updates to reflect changes in gas costs that occur in real time.

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Table 3-15 shows the daily average number of units that made hourly offers in the day-ahead market, that opted in to intraday offer updates and that made intraday offer updates. In the first six months of 2026, an average of 361 units per day made hourly offers, a decrease of nine units from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, 644 units opted in for intraday offer updates, an increase of 38 units from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, an average of 161 units made intraday offer updates each day, an increase of two units from the first six months of 2025.

**Table 3-15 Daily average number of units making hourly offers, opted in for intraday offers and making intraday offer updates: January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| | Fuel Type | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hourly Offers | Natural Gas | 319 | 303 | (16) |
| | Other Fuels | 51 | 58 | 7 |
| | Total | 370 | 361 | (9) |
| Opt In | Natural Gas | 435 | 440 | 5 |
| | Other Fuels | 171 | 204 | 33 |
| | Total | 606 | 644 | 38 |
| Intraday Offer Updates | Natural Gas | 156 | 159 | 3 |
| | Other Fuels | 3 | 2 | (1) |
| | Total | 159 | 161 | 2 |
| Total Units with nonzero offers | | 850 | 887 | 37 |

## ICAP Must Offer Requirement

Committed generation capacity resources are required to offer their available capacity into the day-ahead and real-time energy market, and report an outage for the capacity not available.[42] Thermal resources are required to offer the ICAP equivalent of their committed UCAP and intermittent resources are required to offer their median forecast on an hourly basis. The full installed capacity (ICAP) is the ICAP of the resources that cleared in the capacity market. This is known as the ICAP must offer requirement. The categorical exemption for intermittent resources, capacity storage resources, and hybrid resources from the capacity market must offer requirement was eliminated in February 2025.[43] Only demand resources are exempt from the capacity market must offer requirement.

The MMU recommends that all capacity resources have a must offer obligation. The MMU also recommends that performance penalties not be applied to solar and wind resources when they are not capable of performing based on ambient conditions. For example, solar resources should be subject to performance penalties if they fail to perform when the sun is shining but should not be subject to performance penalties in the middle of the night. This would be a rational application of the PAI penalties that recognizes the physical capabilities of resources and is therefore not discriminatory, in contrast to PJM's current treatment of such resources.

The current enforcement of the ICAP must offer requirement is inadequate.[44] The problem is a complex combination of generator behavior, and inadequate and inconsistent reporting tools that are not synchronized. Compliance is subject to mistakes and susceptible to manipulation.

Resources are required to submit their available capacity in three different systems. Resources are required to make offers in the energy market via Markets Gateway. Resources are required to report outages in the Dispatch Application Reporting Tool (eDART) in advance or in real time. Resources are required to report outages in the Generator Availability Data System (eGADS) after the fact. The three applications are not linked and there is no formal process to ensure consistency.

For example, ambient ratings are an issue. When the weather is hotter than test conditions, the capacity of some units is reduced below the ICAP levels. While this fact may be reported by unit owners in eDART and reflected in lower offered MW in the energy market, the derates are not reported as outages in eGADS and are therefore not included as outages for purposes of defining capacity using EFORd.

42 OA Schedule 1 § 1.10.1A(d).

43 FERC approved extending the RPM must offer requirement to intermittent resources, capacity storage resources, and hybrid resources but not to demand resources on February 20, 2025. 190 FERC ¶ 61,117.

44 PJM compares the data submitted in eDART to the data submitted in Markets Gateway using the eDART Gen Checkout. Generators are supposed to acknowledge their Gen Checkout reports. Manual 10 and the eDART User Guide do not specify what acknowledging the Gen Checkout report means, any requirements to acknowledge the Gen Checkout report or any consequences for not doing so. Gen Checkout is also only triggered if generators fail by more than defined thresholds.



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The MMU recommends that PJM enforce the ICAP must offer requirement by assigning a forced outage to any unit that is derated in the energy market below its committed ICAP without an outage that reflects the derate.

The MMU recommends that storage resources also be subject to an enforceable ICAP must offer requirement that reflects the limitations of these resources.

Table 3-16 shows average hourly MW, for each month, that violated the ICAP must offer requirement in the first six months of 2026. On average for all hours, 1,382 MW did not meet the ICAP must offer requirement, but for 10 percent of the hours, 2,511 MW did not meet the must offer requirement. These MW levels are larger than the reserve shortages that trigger shortage pricing and larger than most supply contingencies that lead to synchronized reserve events.

**Table 3-16 Average hourly estimated capacity (MW) failing the ICAP must offer requirement: January through June, 2026**

| Month | 90th Percentile | Average | 10th Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-26 | 750 | 412 | 196 |
| Feb-26 | 2,006 | 1,542 | 1,190 |
| Mar-26 | 2,964 | 2,552 | 2,270 |
| Apr-26 | 1,569 | 1,058 | 571 |
| May-26 | 2,230 | 1,695 | 1,286 |
| Jun-26 | 1,522 | 1,028 | 525 |
| 2026 | 2,511 | 1,382 | 356 |

The outage data reported in eGADS do not exactly match the energy market data submitted in Markets Gateway. For example, economic maximum MW levels submitted in Markets Gateway that reflect expected ambient conditions (including ambient derates) can be inconsistent with the maximum capability submitted in eGADS. Another example is the start and end times of planned outages in the shoulder months. In many situations units are derated in Markets Gateway to reflect an upcoming planned outage for which the unit must ramp down over an extended period but in eGADS the outage start time is not reported until the unit is completely unavailable. These differences can result in units not meeting their ICAP must offer requirement.

The MMU recommends that PJM integrate all the outage reporting tools in order to enforce the ICAP must offer requirement, ensure that outages are reported correctly and eliminate reporting inconsistencies. Generators currently submit availability in three different tools that are not integrated, Markets Gateway, eDART and eGADS.

## Emergency Maximum MW

Generation resources are offered with economic maximum MW and emergency maximum MW. The economic maximum MW is the output level the resource can achieve following economic dispatch. The emergency maximum MW is the output level the resource can achieve when emergency conditions are declared by PJM. The MW difference between the two ratings equals emergency maximum MW. The PJM market rules allow generators to include emergency maximum MW as part of ICAP offered in the capacity market.[45]

Generation resources have to meet one of four conditions to offer any MW as emergency in the energy market: environmental limits imposed by a federal, state or other governmental agency that significantly limit availability; fuel limits beyond the control of the generation owner; temporary emergency conditions that significantly limit availability; or temporary MW additions not ordinarily available.[46]

The MMU recommends that capacity resources not be allowed to offer any portion of their capacity market obligation as maximum emergency energy.[47] Capacity resources should offer their full output in the energy market and be subject to economic dispatch. The result will be incentives for correct reporting of ICAP, more efficient energy market pricing, and a reduction in the need for manual overrides by PJM dispatchers during emergency conditions. Resources that do have capacity that can only be achieved with extraordinary measures could offer such capacity in the energy market but should not take on a capacity market obligation.

45 See 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 at P 476 (2015).
46 OA Schedule 1 § 1.10.1A(d).
47 This recommendation was accepted by PJM and filed with FERC in 2014 as part of the capacity performance updates to the RPM. See PJM Filing, Attachment A (Redlines of OA Schedule 1 § 1.10.1A(d), EL15-29-000 (December 12, 2014). FERC rejected the proposed change. See 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 at P 476 (2015).

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
Table 3-17 shows average hourly maximum emergency MW, for each month. The levels of maximum emergency MW change hourly, daily and seasonally. For example, in February 2026, 10 percent of hours had maximum emergency MW greater than or equal to 3,380 MW while 10 percent of hours had maximum emergency MW less than 194 MW. The hourly average, in the first six months of 2026, was 677 MW offered as maximum emergency, 122.7 percent higher than in the first six months of 2025.

Table 3-17 Maximum emergency MW by month: January through June, 2026

| Month | 90th Percentile | Average | 10th Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-26 | 2,141 | 1,261 | 116 |
| Feb-26 | 3,380 | 1,431 | 194 |
| Mar-26 | 470 | 284 | 129 |
| Apr-26 | 404 | 272 | 188 |
| May-26 | 735 | 504 | 236 |
| Jun-26 | 502 | 361 | 190 |
| 2026 | 1,593 | 677 | 173 |

Figure 3-19 shows maximum emergency MW by hour in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. The sharp increases in maximum emergency MW typically result from short term situations at generators, such as testing of equipment which can be suspended in the event of a system emergency. The increase in December 2025 was caused by operational restrictions such as limited run hours due to environmental permits. The increases in January and February 2026 was caused mainly by oil fired units that had limited inventory remaining due to their operation during Winter Storm Fern. During Winter Storm Fern, PJM increased the criterion for maximum emergency from 16 hours to 32 hours (meaning that units could be placed in maximum emergency if their inventory fell below 32 hours of full output operation).

Figure 3-19 Maximum Emergency MW by hour: 2025 and January through June, 2026




## Parameter Limited Schedules

### Cost-Based Offers

All resources in PJM are required to submit at least one cost-based offer. Cost-based offers, submitted by capacity resources for a defined set of technologies, are parameter limited based on unit specific parameter limits. Nuclear, wind, solar and hydro units are not subject to parameter limits.

### Price-Based Offers

All capacity resources that choose to make price-based offers are required to make available at least one price-based parameter limited offer (referred to as price-based PLS). The prices in a price-based PLS offer are at the discretion of the seller but the parameters are the same parameters used in the cost-based


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offers. For capacity resources, the price-based parameter limited schedule is used by PJM for committing generation resources when hot weather alerts and cold weather alerts are declared.

## Offer Schedule Selection

PJM's current process for selecting unit offers (schedules) does not prevent the exercise of market power through the use of markups or through the use of inflexible parameters. The goal of having parameter limited offers is to prevent the use of inflexible operating parameters to exercise market power. Instead of ensuring that parameter limits apply, PJM chooses the lower of the price-based schedule and the price-based parameter limited schedule during hot and cold weather alerts. The goal of having cost-based offers is to prevent the use of markups to exercise market power. Instead of ensuring the least cost solution, PJM frequently chooses the higher price-based schedule that includes no parameter limits rather than the cost-based schedule that includes parameter limits when a resource fails the TPS test. The result is that PJM does not select the lowest cost schedule and allows market power to be exercised. The Commission recognized this flaw in the implementation of market power mitigation in its order to show cause, issued June 17, 2021, but did not take corrective action in its November 30, 2023, order.[48] [49]

PJM raised the schedule selection issues in the stakeholder process to address computational time in the day-ahead market. PJM's original proposal would have weakened market power mitigation. FERC rejected PJM's proposal because PJM's proposal would create the ability for market sellers to exercise market power.[50] PJM filed and, on October 25, 2024, FERC accepted a revised proposal that would require that sellers that fail the TPS test be offer capped at their cost-based offers and that operating parameters be mitigated.[51] FERC accepted PJM's proposal that has no specific plans to implement the improved rules and instead links implementation to PJM's long delayed improvements to its combined cycle modelling. PJM's revised proposal also continues to use the flawed formula, which was the basis for the first proposal rejected by FERC, to select among cost-based offers. This will result in the illogical selection of cost-based offers in some circumstances, for example if a dual fuel unit submits offers for both oil and gas on a day when the economics change between the two fuels midday. PJM should modify its implementation to address that issue. The result would allow market sellers to select the correct cost-based fuel schedule. There is no reason to delay implementation until PJM addresses combined cycle modelling. The changes would decrease the solution time for the day-ahead market and enhance market efficiency. The new approach should be implemented as soon as possible.

The MMU analyzed the extent of parameter mitigation in the day-ahead energy market when units are committed after failing the TPS test for transmission constraints in the first six months of 2026. The analysis includes units with technologies that are subject to parameter limits and offer both price-based and cost-based schedules.[52] Table 3-18 shows the number and percentage of day-ahead unit run hours that failed the TPS test but were committed on price schedules. Table 3-18 shows that 24.9 percent of unit hours for units that failed the day-ahead TPS test were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their cost-based schedules. If there were effective market power mitigation there would be zero units that fail the TPS test and are committed with parameters less flexible than their cost-based schedules.

Table **3-18** Parameter mitigation for units failing the day-ahead TPS test: January through June, 2026

| Day-ahead Commitment For Units That Failed TPS Test | Day-ahead Unit Hours | Percent Day-ahead Unit Hours |
|---|---|---|
| Committed on price schedule less flexible than cost | 21,209 | 24.9% |
| Committed on price schedule as flexible as cost | 5,806 | 6.8% |
| Committed on cost (cost capped) | 54,634 | 64.2% |
| Committed on price PLS | 3,499 | 4.1% |
| Total committed on schedule as flexible as cost | 63,939 | 75.1% |
| Total failed TPS test commitments | 85,148 | 100.0% |

The MMU analyzed the extent of parameter mitigation in the day-ahead energy market for units in zones with a cold weather alert, a hot weather alert, or a maximum generation emergency declaration in the first six months

48 See 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
49 See 185 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2023).
50 See 187 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 25 (2024).
51 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2024).

52 Nuclear, wind, solar and hydro units are not subject to parameter limits.

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of 2026. PJM declared cold weather alerts on 16 days and hot weather alerts on 13 days in the first six months of 2026. The analysis includes units with technologies that are subject to parameter limits, with a capacity commitment, in the zones where the cold or hot weather alerts were declared. Table 3-19 shows that 26.7 percent of unit hours during weather alerts in the day-ahead energy market were committed on price-based schedules that were less flexible than their price PLS schedules. Effective market power mitigation would result in zero units committed during cold and hot weather alerts with parameters less flexible than their price PLS schedules.

**Table 3-19 Parameter mitigation during weather alerts: January through June, 2026**

| Day-ahead Commitment During Hot And Cold Weather Alerts | Day-ahead Unit Hours | Percent Day-ahead Unit Hours |
|---|---|---|
| Committed on price schedule less flexible than PLS | 42,287 | 26.7% |
| Committed on price schedule as flexible as PLS | 20,304 | 12.8% |
| Committed on cost (cost capped) | 12,288 | 7.8% |
| Committed on price PLS | 83,308 | 52.7% |
| Total committed on schedule as flexible as PLS | 115,900 | 73.3% |
| Total weather alert commitments | 158,187 | 100.0% |

Currently, there are no rules in the PJM tariff or manuals that limit the markup attributes of price-based PLS offers. The intent of the price-based PLS offer is to prevent the exercise of market power during high demand conditions by preventing units from offering inflexible operating parameters in order to extract higher market revenues or higher uplift payments. However, a generator can include a higher markup in the price-based PLS offer than in the price-based non-PLS schedule. The result is that the offer is higher and market prices are higher as a result of the exercise of market power using the PLS offer. This defeats the purpose of requiring price-based PLS offers.

The best solution to the use of inflexible parameters is to require the use of flexible parameters in all offers at all times for capacity resources. Capacity resources are paid to be flexible but that payment will not result in flexible offers in the energy market, the only place it matters, unless there are explicit requirements that energy offers from capacity resources incorporate that flexibility.

The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation and to ensure that capacity resources meet their obligations to be flexible, that capacity resources be required to use flexible parameters in all offers at all times.

If flexible parameters are not required at all times, the use of flexible parameters should be required whenever a unit fails the TPS test and whenever the system is facing weather alerts or emergency conditions. PJM should always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters in all price-based offers during weather alerts and emergencies. This approach would allow PJM to effectively mitigate inflexible operating parameters consistent with PJM's asserted processing time constraints. PJM's revised schedule selection proposal adopts this approach, but PJM has failed to propose an implementation date and the flawed rules remain in place as a result.

The MMU recommends that in order to ensure effective market power mitigation, PJM always use cost-based offers for units that fail the TPS test, and always use flexible parameters for all cost-based and all price-based offers during cold and hot weather alerts and emergency conditions.[53] [54]

## Parameter Limits

The unit specific parameter limits for capacity resources are based on default minimum operating parameter limits posted by PJM by technology type, and any adjustments based on a unit specific review process. These default parameters were based on analysis by the MMU.

The PJM tariff specifies that all generation capacity resources, regardless of the current commitment status, are subject to parameter limits on their cost-based offers. The MMU recommends that PJM update the tariff to clarify that

53 *See* "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL21-78 (October 15, 2021) at 18 - 19.
54 *See* "Schedule Selection: IMM Package," IMM Presentation to the Markets Implementation Committee (September 6, 2023), <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2023/IMM_MIC_Schedule_Selection_IMM_Package_20230906.pdf>.


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all generation resources are subject to unit specific parameter limits on their cost-based offers using the same standard and process as capacity resources.

## Unit Specific Adjustment Process

Market participants can request an adjustment to the default values of parameter limits for capacity resources by submitting supporting documentation which is reviewed by PJM and the MMU. The default minimum operating parameter limits or approved adjusted values are used by capacity resources for their parameter limited schedules.

PJM has the authority to approve adjusted parameters with input from the MMU. PJM has inappropriately applied different review standards to coal units than to CTs and CCs despite the objections of the MMU. PJM has approved parameter limits for boiler based steam units based on historical performance and existing equipment while holding CTs and CCs to higher standards based on OEM documentation and a best practices equipment configuration.

The PJM process for the review of unit specific parameter limit adjustments is generally described in Manual 11: Energy and Ancillary Services Market Operations. The standards used by PJM to review the requests are currently not described in the tariff or PJM manuals. The MMU recommends that PJM clearly define the business rules that apply to the unit specific parameter adjustment process, including PJM's implementation of the tariff rules in the PJM manuals to ensure market sellers know the requirements for their resources.

Only certain technology types are subject to limits on operating parameters in their parameter limited schedules.[55] Solar units, wind units, run of river hydro units, and nuclear units are currently not subject to parameter limits. The MMU analyzed, for the units that are subject to parameter limits, the proportion of units that use the default limits published by PJM and the proportion of units that have unit specific adjustments for some of the parameters. Table 3-20 shows, for the delivery year beginning June 1, 2026, the number of units with approved unit specific parameter limits, and the number of units that used the default parameter limits published by PJM.

**Table 3-20 Adjusted unit specific parameter limit statistics: 2026/2027 Delivery Year**

| Technology Classification | Units Using Default Parameter Limits | Units with One or More Adjusted Parameter Limits | Percent of Units with One or More Adjusted Parameter Limits |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aero CT | 115 | 36 | 23.8% |
| Frame CT | 147 | 106 | 41.9% |
| Combined Cycle | 95 | 28 | 22.8% |
| Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines | 55 | 3 | 5.2% |
| Solid Fuel NUG | 32 | 6 | 15.8% |
| Oil and Gas Steam | 10 | 22 | 68.8% |
| Subcritical and Supercritical Coal Steam | 5 | 65 | 92.9% |
| Total | 459 | 266 | 36.7% |

## Parameter Limited Schedule Exceptions

There are three different types of exceptions to the parameter limited schedule default values: temporary exceptions, period exceptions, and persistent exceptions, each differentiated by the length of time it applies. Market sellers must submit requests for exceptions to PJM and the MMU for approval, along with data and documentation. Valid exceptions must be based on physical operational or contractual limits.[56]

There are no defined consequences for real-time exceptions for units that change their parameters but do not meet the requirements in the tariff. Units that override their turn down ratio (economic maximum divided by economic minimum) either use PJM's fixed gen flag or simply increase their hourly economic minimum.[57] The turn down ratio has a defined parameter limit, but the limit can be evaded by the use of the fixed gen flag. These resources override their output limit parameters with no consequence.

55 For the default parameter limits by technology type, see PJM. "Unit-Specific Minimum Operating Parameters for Capacity Performance and Base Capacity Resources," which can be accessed at <*https://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/elc/postings/20150612-june-2015-capacity-performance-parameter-limitations-informational-posting.ashx*>.

56 *See* OA Schedule 1 § 6.6(i) and PJM Manual 11, Section 2.3.4.3.

57 PJM Markets Gateway User Guide, Section 5.8: Self-schedule a Generating Unit and Ignore PJM Dispatch Instruction at 54, Section 14.3 Submit Revised MW Operating Limits at 138 and Section 14.4 Revise the Status of a Generating Unit at 139 <https://www.pjm.com/~/media/etools/markets-gateway/markets-gateway-user-guide.ashx>.

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The MMU has proposed that such a unit should not be paid a portion of its capacity market revenues, the daily value for each day, if it fails to include its defined parameter values in its offer (by either using the fixed gen option or increasing their economic minimum). The MMU recommends that PJM require generators to request temporary parameter exceptions for the use of the fixed gen flag. The request process requires generators to demonstrate that the request is based on a physical and actual constraint.

Consistent with the no excuses approach of the capacity performance paradigm and consistent with long term incentives for flexibility, resources that operate with a denied temporary parameter limit exception should not be paid the corresponding portion of the daily capacity value of the resource for days when it is not fully available consistent with its parameter limited schedule. If flexibility is valued as a generator attribute, the market design should not provide incentives to be inflexible. An effective market design should reward flexible operation, and ensure that capacity resources are paid for their capacity only when they meet their required level of flexibility. Without clearly defined consequences, market sellers will continue to submit inflexible parameters. The MMU recommends that resources not be paid the daily capacity payment when unable to operate to their unit specific parameter limits.[58]

## Generator Flexibility Incentives in the Capacity Market

In its June 9, 2015, order on capacity performance, the Commission determined that capacity performance resources should be able to submit operating parameters to the market based not just on the resource physical constraints, but also based on other constraints, such as contractual limits.[59] The order primarily addressed limits imposed by natural gas pipelines. The Commission directed PJM to revise its tariff to establish a process through which capacity performance resources that operate outside the defined unit specific parameter limits can justify such operation and therefore remain eligible for make whole payments.[60]

A primary goal of the capacity performance market design is to assign performance risk to generation owners and to ensure that capacity prices reflect underlying supply and demand conditions, including the cost of mitigating the performance risk. The June 9th Order's determination on parameters is not consistent with that goal. By permitting generation owners to establish unit parameters based on nonphysical limits, the June 9th Order weakened the incentives for units to be flexible and weakened the assignment of performance risk to generation owners. Contractual limits and the option to choose from a range of gas pipeline tariff provisions, unlike generating unit operational limits, are a function of the interests and incentives of the generators making the choices. If a generation owner expects to be compensated through uplift payments for running for 24 hours regardless of whether the energy is economic or needed, that generation owner has no incentive to pay more to purchase the flexible gas service that would permit the unit to be flexible in response to dispatch.

The approach to parameters defined in the June 9th Order has increased energy market uplift payments substantially. While some uplift is necessary and efficient in an LMP market, this uplift is not. Electric customers are not in a position to determine the terms of the contracts that resources enter into. Customers rely on the market rules to create incentives that protect them by assigning operational risk to generators, who are in the best position to efficiently manage those risks.

The MMU recommends that capacity performance resources be held to the OEM operating parameters of the capacity market reference resource used for the Cost of New Entry (CONE) calculation for performance assessment and energy uplift payments and that this standard be applied to all technologies on a uniform basis. This solution creates the incentives for flexibility and preserves the incentive to follow PJM's dispatch instructions during high demand conditions.

## Parameter Impacts of Gas Pipeline Conditions

During extreme cold weather conditions, and more recently, also during hot weather conditions, a number of gas fired generators request temporary

58 *See* Monitoring Analytics LLC, "Real-Time Values," presented at the Markets Implementation Committee Special Session (October 7, 2020) at 12, *which can be accessed at* <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2020/20201007/20201007-item-06b-real-time-values-imm.ashx>.
59 See 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 at P 437 (2015).
60 *Id.* at P 440.


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exceptions to parameter limits for their parameter limited schedules due to restrictions imposed by natural gas pipelines. The parameters affected include notification time, minimum run time (MRT) and turn down ratio (TDR, the ratio of economic maximum MW to economic minimum MW). When pipelines issue critical notices and enforce ratable take requirements, generators may, depending on the nature of the transportation service purchased, be forced to nominate an equal amount of gas for each hour in a 24 hour period, with penalties for deviating from the nominated quantity. This leads to requests for 24 hour minimum run times and turn down ratios close to 1.0, to avoid deviations from the hourly nominated quantity. The frequency of 24 hour minimum run time requests increased after Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022. Table 3-21 shows the number of units, and the installed capacity MW that submitted parameter exception requests for a 24 hour minimum run time due to gas pipeline restrictions. In the first six months of 2026, there were 97 units in PJM with a total installed capacity of 12,351 MW that requested a 24 hour minimum run time on their parameter limited schedules based on pipeline restrictions.

**Table 3-21 Units with 24 hour minimum run times due to gas pipeline restrictions: January 2018 through June 2026**

| Year | Number of Units With 24 Hour Minimum Run Time Exceptions | Installed Capacity (MW) With 24 Hour Minimun Run Time Exceptions |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 25 | 3,627 |
| 2019 | 37 | 5,616 |
| 2020 | 13 | 3,873 |
| 2021 | 61 | 7,514 |
| 2022 | 81 | 10,019 |
| 2023 | 75 | 9,824 |
| 2024 | 79 | 10,476 |
| 2025 | 93 | 11,137 |
| 2026 | 97 | 12,351 |

The increase in units requesting 24 hour minimum run times is a result of pipelines enforcing the pipeline tariff ratable take provisions. Pipelines have the authority to require ratable takes under their tariffs at any time although pipelines do not enforce ratable takes on a routine basis. Some generators have also requested extremely long notification times based on pipeline nomination deadlines. (See Table 3-67.) When pipelines enforce these deadlines, generators cannot obtain gas to flow for a given market hour once the deadline has passed for that hour and therefore they cannot start according to their normal notification plus start times (normally less than 30 minutes). For example, at 1700 EPT, the next nomination cycle is intraday 3 (ID3). The ID3 deadline is 2000 EPT for gas to flow starting at 2300 EPT. When these nomination deadlines are enforced, at 1700 EPT, a gas unit can only start at 2300 EPT (or in 6 hours). This effectively increases the time to start (notification time plus start time) from 30 minutes to 6 hours. The long notification times make the units unavailable for commitment in ITSCED and the units can only be committed manually in real time. Generators may request temporary exceptions based on pipeline restrictions in order to provide PJM with offers that accurately reflect their capabilities. Units operating inflexibly due to pipeline restrictions are eligible for uplift. Temporary exceptions should be limited to the duration of restrictions imposed by pipelines.

In the first six months of 2026, PJM paid $228.1 million in day-ahead uplift to gas fired units with a 24 hour minimum run time, primarily during Winter Storm Fern. PJM paid an additional $264.3 million in balancing uplift for real-time commitments of units with a 24 hour minimum run time in the first six months of 2026.

After observing the misuse of and the failure to use temporary exceptions during Winter Storm Elliott, on September 8, 2023, PJM and the MMU posted guidelines for the correct use of temporary exceptions for pipeline related restrictions. The guidelines detail exactly how units should use temporary exceptions to reflect pipeline restrictions in units' minimum run time, notification time and turn down ratio parameters.[61] During Winter Storm Elliott (December 22-24, 2022), 71 units on average (totaling 8,791 MW) requested temporary exceptions due to pipeline restrictions. During Winter Storm Gerri (January 16-18, 2024), 96 units on average (totaling 13,462 MW) requested temporary exceptions due to pipeline restrictions. During the 2025 Polar Vortex (January 18-23, 2025) 115 units on average (totaling 17,635 MW) requested exceptions due to pipeline restrictions. During Winter Storm

61 *See* "Temporary Operating Parameter Limit (PLS) Exceptions due to Pipeline Restrictions" PJM and MMU memorandum to PJM Market Participants (September 8, 2023) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/Messages/IMM_Temporary_Operating_Parameter_Limit_(PLS)_Exceptions_due_to_Pipeline_Restrictions_20230908.pdf>.

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Fern (January 24-February 2, 2026) 131 units on average (totaling 18,429 MW) requested exceptions due to pipeline restrictions.

The MMU recognizes that pipeline restrictions must be reflected in units' operating parameters in order for PJM to properly schedule and manage the system but it is important to prevent abuse through the submission of inflexible parameters not based on actual constraints. The MMU recommends that PJM only approve temporary exceptions that are based on pipeline tariff terms and/or pipeline notices when actually enforced by the pipelines.


## Virtual Offers and Bids

Market participants may make virtual offers and bids in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market, and such offers and bids may be marginal.

Any market participant in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market may use increment offers, decrement bids, up to congestion transactions, import transactions and export transactions as financial instruments that do not require physical generation or load. Because virtual positions do not require physical generation or load, participants must buy or sell out of their virtual positions at real-time energy market prices. On February 20, 2018, FERC issued an order limiting the eligible bidding points for up to congestion transactions to hubs, interfaces and residual aggregate metered load nodes, and limiting the eligible bidding points for INCs and DECs to the same nodes plus active generation and load nodes.[62] Up to congestion transactions may be submitted between any two aggregates on a list of 46 aggregates eligible for up to congestion transaction bidding.[63] Import and export transactions may be submitted at any interface pricing point, where an import is equivalent to a virtual offer that is injected into PJM and an export is equivalent to a virtual bid that is withdrawn from PJM.

Figure 3-20 shows an example of the PJM day-ahead daily aggregate supply curve of increment offers, the system aggregate supply curve of imports, the system aggregate supply curve without increment offers and imports, the system aggregate supply curve with increment offers, and the system aggregate supply curve with increment offers and imports for an example day in the first six months of 2026.

**Figure 3-20 Day-ahead aggregate supply curves: 2026 example day**




62 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,139 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,170 (2018).

63 Prior to November 1, 2012, market participants were required to specify an interface pricing point as the source for imports, an interface pricing point as the sink for exports or an interface pricing point as both the source and sink for transactions wheeling through PJM. For the list of eligible sources and sinks for up to congestion transactions, see www.pjm.com "*OASIS-Source-Sink-Link.xls*"<http://www.pjm.com/~/media/etools/oasis/references/oasis-source-sink-link.ashx>.



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Table 3-22 shows the hourly average number of cleared and submitted increment offers and decrement bids by month in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.[64] The hourly average submitted increment offer MW decreased by 2.9 percent and cleared increment MW decreased by 9.0 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The hourly average submitted decrement bid MW increased by 10.0 percent and cleared decrement MW increased by 6.8 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

## Table 3-22 Average hourly number of cleared and submitted INCs and DECs by month: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Increment Offers | | | | Decrement Bids | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | | Average Cleared MW | Average Submitted MW | Average Cleared Volume | Average Submitted Volume | Average Cleared MW | Average Submitted MW | Average Cleared Volume | Average Submitted Volume |
| 2025 | Jan | 6,024 | 12,413 | 535 | 1,821 | 5,068 | 14,037 | 420 | 1,914 |
| 2025 | Feb | 6,207 | 12,420 | 566 | 1,868 | 5,152 | 14,703 | 444 | 2,089 |
| 2025 | Mar | 6,239 | 12,836 | 603 | 1,920 | 5,177 | 15,163 | 464 | 2,262 |
| 2025 | Apr | 6,142 | 12,604 | 584 | 1,679 | 4,343 | 14,247 | 486 | 2,124 |
| 2025 | May | 5,007 | 10,837 | 543 | 1,480 | 4,947 | 13,199 | 452 | 1,703 |
| 2025 | Jun | 4,130 | 10,385 | 466 | 1,435 | 6,310 | 16,189 | 570 | 2,171 |
| 2025 | Jul | 4,609 | 10,299 | 481 | 1,366 | 6,414 | 15,731 | 541 | 2,262 |
| 2025 | Aug | 4,694 | 11,329 | 472 | 1,481 | 6,253 | 14,633 | 502 | 1,821 |
| 2025 | Sep | 4,679 | 10,619 | 536 | 1,653 | 6,606 | 17,145 | 591 | 2,464 |
| 2025 | Oct | 6,030 | 11,949 | 636 | 1,885 | 5,103 | 15,481 | 465 | 2,281 |
| 2025 | Nov | 6,706 | 14,332 | 646 | 2,150 | 4,818 | 15,756 | 469 | 2,532 |
| 2025 | Dec | 5,956 | 12,815 | 693 | 2,007 | 5,494 | 16,867 | 550 | 2,665 |
| 2025 | Annual | 5,531 | 11,898 | 563 | 1,728 | 5,476 | 15,261 | 496 | 2,190 |
| 2026 | Jan | 5,215 | 11,014 | 631 | 1,706 | 4,986 | 13,413 | 439 | 2,129 |
| 2026 | Feb | 5,463 | 11,938 | 602 | 1,885 | 4,979 | 14,819 | 501 | 2,400 |
| 2026 | Mar | 5,214 | 11,562 | 688 | 1,950 | 5,696 | 16,731 | 606 | 2,616 |
| 2026 | Apr | 5,871 | 12,725 | 737 | 1,992 | 5,878 | 17,367 | 555 | 2,432 |
| 2026 | May | 4,576 | 11,061 | 583 | 1,731 | 4,968 | 14,991 | 523 | 2,270 |
| 2026 | Jun | 4,378 | 11,401 | 582 | 1,916 | 6,594 | 18,960 | 664 | 3,059 |
| 2026 | Jan-Jun | 5,114 | 11,607 | 638 | 1,862 | 5,518 | 16,043 | 548 | 2,483 |

64 Table 3-22 uses cleared day-ahead market data while final settlements data is used elsewhere in this report.

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Table 3-23 shows the average hourly number of up to congestion transactions and the average hourly MW by month in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. The hourly average submitted up to congestion bid MW decreased by 18.0 percent and cleared up to congestion bid MW decreased by 23.5 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Table 3-23 Average hourly cleared and submitted up to congestion bids by month: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Up to Congestion | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Average Cleared MW | Average Submitted MW | Average Cleared Volume | Average Submitted Volume |
| 2025 | Jan | 10,955 | 34,709 | 911 | 2,194 |
| 2025 | Feb | 12,000 | 34,801 | 798 | 2,034 |
| 2025 | Mar | 10,512 | 34,843 | 741 | 2,095 |
| 2025 | Apr | 8,415 | 29,420 | 610 | 1,999 |
| 2025 | May | 7,851 | 21,973 | 503 | 1,574 |
| 2025 | Jun | 11,046 | 32,384 | 791 | 2,071 |
| 2025 | Jul | 9,595 | 29,536 | 913 | 2,229 |
| 2025 | Aug | 9,019 | 25,911 | 669 | 1,802 |
| 2025 | Sep | 9,844 | 33,392 | 741 | 2,383 |
| 2025 | Oct | 9,237 | 38,217 | 660 | 2,624 |
| 2025 | Nov | 11,445 | 38,188 | 764 | 2,769 |
| 2025 | Dec | 10,808 | 34,726 | 853 | 2,721 |
| 2025 | Annual | 10,043 | 32,311 | 746 | 2,208 |
| 2026 | Jan | 9,525 | 31,204 | 798 | 2,791 |
| 2026 | Feb | 7,617 | 24,926 | 838 | 2,600 |
| 2026 | Mar | 7,556 | 26,358 | 652 | 2,029 |
| 2026 | Apr | 7,184 | 25,582 | 815 | 2,188 |
| 2026 | May | 6,812 | 22,819 | 749 | 2,025 |
| 2026 | Jun | 7,660 | 23,028 | 777 | 2,088 |
| 2026 | Jan-Jun | 7,731 | 25,680 | 770 | 2,283 |

Table 3-24 shows the average hourly number of day-ahead import/export transactions and the average hourly MW in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.[65] In the first six months of 2026, the average hourly submitted import transaction MW increased by 93.9 percent and the average hourly cleared import transaction MW increased by 107.9 percent compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, the average hourly submitted export transaction MW decreased by 14.5 percent and the average hourly cleared export transaction MW decreased by 14.1 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Table 3-24 Hourly average day-ahead number of cleared and submitted import and export transactions by month: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Imports | | | | Exports | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Average Cleared MW | Average Submitted MW | Average Cleared Volume | Average Submitted Volume | Average Cleared MW | Average Submitted MW | Average Cleared Volume | Average Submitted Volume |
| 2025 | Jan | 199 | 330 | 3 | 4 | 4,392 | 4,575 | 37 | 38 |
| 2025 | Feb | 355 | 403 | 5 | 6 | 4,948 | 4,992 | 41 | 42 |
| 2025 | Mar | 192 | 192 | 3 | 3 | 4,430 | 4,485 | 39 | 40 |
| 2025 | Apr | 366 | 384 | 5 | 6 | 3,789 | 3,821 | 26 | 27 |
| 2025 | May | 278 | 294 | 4 | 5 | 3,752 | 3,761 | 28 | 28 |
| 2025 | Jun | 193 | 215 | 3 | 4 | 4,426 | 4,467 | 33 | 34 |
| 2025 | Jul | 286 | 313 | 5 | 5 | 4,787 | 4,827 | 34 | 34 |
| 2025 | Aug | 213 | 242 | 4 | 5 | 5,232 | 5,268 | 39 | 40 |
| 2025 | Sep | 324 | 338 | 6 | 6 | 4,267 | 4,308 | 30 | 31 |
| 2025 | Oct | 740 | 752 | 10 | 13 | 2,829 | 2,875 | 21 | 25 |
| 2025 | Nov | 882 | 894 | 11 | 11 | 3,360 | 3,406 | 30 | 31 |
| 2025 | Dec | 827 | 870 | 11 | 12 | 4,540 | 4,578 | 35 | 36 |
| 2025 | Annual | 409 | 438 | 6 | 7 | 4,226 | 4,278 | 33 | 34 |
| 2026 | Jan | 495 | 540 | 7 | 8 | 4,458 | 4,513 | 37 | 38 |
| 2026 | Feb | 738 | 785 | 10 | 11 | 4,181 | 4,204 | 29 | 30 |
| 2026 | Mar | 434 | 452 | 6 | 6 | 3,779 | 3,798 | 32 | 32 |
| 2026 | Apr | 612 | 642 | 10 | 11 | 2,923 | 2,974 | 23 | 24 |
| 2026 | May | 627 | 663 | 9 | 10 | 2,447 | 2,477 | 19 | 19 |
| 2026 | Jun | 379 | 440 | 6 | 8 | 4,316 | 4,363 | 31 | 32 |
| 2026 | Jan-Jun | 545 | 584 | 8 | 9 | 3,677 | 3,714 | 29 | 29 |

65 Table 3-24 uses cleared day-ahead market data, while final settlements data is used elsewhere in this report.



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Figure 3-21 shows the monthly volume of bid and cleared INC, DEC and up to congestion bids by month from 2005 through the first six months of 2026. Cleared volumes were greater in 2023 than any year since 2020, when uplift charges for up to congestion transactions took effect on November 1, 2020. The monthly MW volume of UTC bids in April 2023 was at its highest level since 2017, but decreased significantly beginning May 2023 and has remained stable beginning August 2023 through June 2026.

### Figure 3-21 Monthly bid and cleared INCs, DECs and UTCs (GWh): January 2005 through June 2026






Figure 3-22 shows the daily volume of bid and cleared INC, DEC and up to congestion bids from January 2025 through June 2026.

### Figure 3-22 Daily bid and cleared INCs, DECs, and UTCs (GWh): January 2025 through June 2026




In order to evaluate the ownership of virtual bids, the MMU categorizes all participants making virtual bids in PJM as either physical or financial at an account level.[66] Physical entities are defined as individual accounts in PJM's settlement systems that take physical positions in PJM markets and typically include utilities and customers. Financial entities are defined as individual accounts in PJM's settlement systems that take financial positions in PJM markets and typically include banks and trading firms. International market participants that primarily take financial positions in PJM markets are generally considered to be financial entities even if they are utilities in their own countries. Financial entities' share of cleared MWh of INCs and DECs in

66 The MMU modified the method for categorizing participants as physical and financial participants. See the explanation in the *2025 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*, Section 13: Financial Transmission Rights at Market Structure (May 8, 2025).

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the first six months of 2026 decreased to 96.6 percent from 97.2 percent in the first six months of 2025.

Table 3-25 shows, in the first six months of 2025 and 2026, the total increment offers and decrement bids and cleared MW by organization type.

### Table 3-25 INC and DEC bids and cleared MWh by organization type (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Total Virtual Bid MWh | Percent | Total Virtual Cleared MWh | Percent | Total Virtual Bid MWh | Percent | Total Virtual Cleared MWh | Percent |
| Financial | 113,377,283 | 98.5% | 45,540,007 | 97.2% | 117,718,737 | 98.0% | 44,621,788 | 96.6% |
| Physical | 1,684,010 | 1.5% | 1,301,049 | 2.8% | 2,361,825 | 2.0% | 1,549,766 | 3.4% |
| Total | 115,061,292 | 100.0% | 46,841,056 | 100.0% | 120,080,562 | 100.0% | 46,171,554 | 100.0% |

Table 3-26 shows the total up to congestion bid and cleared MWh by organization type in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Up to congestion bids submitted by financial entities decreased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025, from 132.3 million MWh to 108.4 million MWh, while up to congestion bids submitted by physical entities decreased by 0.5 MWh. Financial entities submitted 97.2 percent of all up to congestion bids, down from 97.3 percent, and cleared 94.8 percent of all up to congestion bids, down from 94.9 percent. In the first six months of 2026, almost all up to congestion trading activity was by financial participants, however their submitted volumes decreased by 18.0 percent.

### Table 3-26 Up to congestion transactions by organization type (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Year | Category | Total Up to Congestion Bid MWh | Percent | Total Up to Congestion Cleared MWh | Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 (Jan-Jun) | Financial | 132,268,527 | 97.3% | 41,657,672 | 94.9% |
| | Physical | 3,676,379 | 2.7% | 2,220,287 | 5.1% |
| | Total | 135,944,906 | 100.0% | 43,877,959 | 100.0% |
| 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Financial | 108,408,356 | 97.2% | 31,813,169 | 94.8% |
| | Physical | 3,114,994 | 2.8% | 1,762,110 | 5.2% |
| | Total | 111,523,350 | 100.0% | 33,575,279 | 100.0% |
| (2026 minus 2025) | Financial | (23,860,171) | (18.0%) | (9,844,503) | (23.6%) |
| | Physical | (561,385) | (15.3%) | (458,177) | (20.6%) |
| | Difference | (24,421,556) | (18.0%) | (10,302,679) | (23.5%) |

Table 3-27 shows the total import and export transactions by organization type in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 3-27 Import and export transactions by organization type (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Category | Total Import and Export MWh | Percent | Total Import and Export MWh | Percent |
| Day-Ahead | Financial | 9,867,210 | 50.1% | 9,227,292 | 50.3% |
| | Physical | 9,823,965 | 49.9% | 9,106,969 | 49.7% |
| | Total | 19,691,175 | 100.0% | 18,334,261 | 100.0% |
| Real-Time | Financial | 18,361,377 | 52.8% | 21,147,449 | 60.8% |
| | Physical | 16,441,989 | 47.2% | 13,606,033 | 39.2% |
| | Total | 34,803,366 | 100.0% | 34,753,482 | 100.0% |

Table 3-28 shows the top 10 locations by total cleared INC and DEC MWh in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The top 10 locations included three hubs, five interface pricing points, and two residual metered load aggregates. For generator pnodes with elevated volumes that do not make the top 10 by total INC plus DEC volume, 955 RIVE16 KV RV-1 cleared the most INC volume of 228,251 MWh and TIDD_AEP24 KV CD2 the most DEC volume of 231,668 MWh in the first six months of 2026.



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## Table 3-28 Virtual offers and bids by top 10 locations (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | | | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aggregate/Bus Name | Aggregate/Bus Type | INC MWh | DEC MWh | Total MWh | Aggregate/Bus Name | Aggregate/Bus Type | INC MWh | DEC MWh | Total MWh |
| WESTERN HUB | HUB | 1,527,854 | 1,094,148 | 2,622,002 | SOUTH | INTERFACE | 3,172,515 | 311,625 | 3,484,140 |
| SOUTH | INTERFACE | 1,899,421 | 429,030 | 2,328,452 | WESTERN HUB | HUB | 1,147,296 | 2,049,823 | 3,197,119 |
| MISO | INTERFACE | 197,801 | 2,012,263 | 2,210,064 | N ILLINOIS HUB | HUB | 1,424,046 | 722,436 | 2,146,481 |
| N ILLINOIS HUB | HUB | 1,486,050 | 241,478 | 1,727,528 | MISO | INTERFACE | 497,700 | 1,418,809 | 1,916,510 |
| DOM_RESID_AGG | RESIDUAL METERED EDC | 226,080 | 1,091,182 | 1,317,261 | AEP-DAYTON HUB | HUB | 508,277 | 1,024,394 | 1,532,671 |
| NYIS | INTERFACE | 389,621 | 627,159 | 1,016,779 | NYIS | INTERFACE | 310,216 | 991,387 | 1,301,603 |
| AEP-DAYTON HUB | HUB | 388,253 | 593,298 | 981,551 | DOM_RESID_AGG | RESIDUAL METERED EDC | 181,334 | 1,110,112 | 1,291,446 |
| LINDENVFT | INTERFACE | 38,766 | 789,307 | 828,073 | LINDENVFT | INTERFACE | 20,947 | 777,055 | 798,001 |
| BGE_RESID_AGG | RESIDUAL METERED EDC | 338,541 | 473,160 | 811,701 | IMO | INTERFACE | 551,318 | 127,133 | 678,451 |
| CHICAGO HUB | HUB | 415,578 | 341,415 | 756,993 | BGE_RESID_AGG | RESIDUAL METERED EDC | 230,685 | 388,175 | 618,859 |
| Top ten total | | 6,907,964 | 7,692,439 | 14,600,404 | | | 8,044,332 | 8,920,948 | 16,965,280 |
| PJM total | | 24,409,566 | 22,429,897 | 46,839,463 | | | 22,208,433 | 23,964,714 | 46,173,148 |
| Top ten total as percent of PJM total | | 28.3% | 34.3% | 31.2% | | | 36.2% | 37.2% | 36.7% |

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Table 3-29 shows up to congestion transactions for the top 10 source and sink pairs and associated source, sink and overall profits on each path in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Total profits for up to congestion transactions in the first six months of 2026 were $77.2 million, a 52.0 percent increase compared to profits of $50.8 million in the first six months of 2025.[67] The UTCs from DOMINION HUB to DOM_RESID_AGG constituted 11.9 percent of all UTC cleared volume in the first six months of 2026, yielding a profit of $25.6 million. A majority of this profit occurred on a single day, May 26, 2026, due to emergency transmission outages at the Greenway-Roundtable parallel lines in Data Center Alley, resulting in transmission constraint violations for several hours.

**Table 3-29 Cleared up to congestion bids by top 10 source and sink pairs (MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026[68]**

| 2025 (Jan-Jun) Top 10 Paths by Cleared MWh | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Source Type | Sink | Sink Type | Cleared MW | Source Revenue | Sink Revenue | UTC Profit |
| DOMINION HUB | HUB | DOM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 4,604,359 | ($722,021) | $21,925,833 | $18,765,594 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | AEPIM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 1,531,631 | $1,819,458 | $960,055 | $1,488,393 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | CHICAGO HUB | HUB | 780,632 | ($2,369,001) | $3,008,213 | $127,063 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | EKPC_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 754,713 | $171,453 | $594,810 | $366,836 |
| AEP GEN HUB | HUB | AEPOHIO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 674,498 | ($1,462,648) | $3,529,426 | $1,527,636 |
| AEP GEN HUB | HUB | AEPAPCO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 645,873 | $4,666,123 | ($1,323,171) | $2,229,100 |
| SOUTH | INTERFACE | AEPAPCO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 482,892 | $393,968 | $362,659 | $311,227 |
| PECO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | BGE_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 443,309 | ($422,553) | $736,004 | $36,318 |
| BGE_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | DOM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 409,511 | $439,609 | $1,927,944 | $2,077,613 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | MISO | INTERFACE | 394,045 | $733,281 | ($596,938) | ($116,326) |
| Top ten total | | | | 10,721,464 | $3,247,670 | $31,124,834 | $26,813,454 |
| PJM total | | | | 43,877,959 | ($4,906,581) | $91,004,544 | $50,813,581 |
| Top ten total as percent of PJM total | | | | 24.4% | (66.2%) | 34.2% | 52.8% |

| 2026 (Jan-Jun) Top 10 Paths by Cleared MWh | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Source Type | Sink | Sink Type | Cleared MWh | Source Revenue | Sink Revenue | UTC Profit |
| DOMINION HUB | HUB | DOM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 4,007,634 | ($8,230,103) | $36,638,638 | $25,580,948 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | AEPIM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 945,095 | $8,158,777 | ($2,954,531) | $3,719,841 |
| AEP GEN HUB | HUB | AEPOHIO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 888,956 | $1,444,098 | $175,924 | $728,467 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | MISO | INTERFACE | 532,708 | $5,604,397 | ($3,131,902) | $1,013,778 |
| SOUTH | INTERFACE | AEPAPCO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 522,599 | $2,490,539 | $1,117,542 | $3,073,993 |
| ATSI GEN HUB | HUB | DUQ_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 510,965 | ($860,533) | $2,141,684 | $760,271 |
| SMECO_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | DOM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 409,566 | $7,574,178 | $337,833 | $7,203,053 |
| SOUTH | INTERFACE | DOM_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 362,063 | $213,842 | $3,290,473 | $3,284,512 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | OHIO HUB | HUB | 347,323 | $1,092,817 | ($239,560) | $282,275 |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | HUB | DEOK_RESID_AGG | AGGREGATE | 325,549 | ($100,903) | $164,661 | ($90,396) |
| Top ten total | | | | 8,852,458 | $17,387,108 | $37,540,760 | $45,556,742 |
| PJM total | | | | 33,575,619 | $76,034,384 | $50,238,126 | $77,218,371 |
| Top ten total as percent of PJM total | | | | 26.4% | 22.9% | 74.7% | 59.0% |

67 The source and sink aggregates in these tables refer to the name and location of a bus and do not include information about the behavior of any individual market participant.

68 The columns "Source Revenue" and "Sink Revenue" are totals before uplift charges are subtracted. The column "UTC Profit" includes uplift charges, in addition to the source and sink revenue, and so is less than the sum of the revenue from each side of the transaction.



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Table 3-30 shows the average daily number of distinct source-sink pairs that were offered and cleared each month from January 2025 through June 2026. The average number of submitted source-sink pairs per day increased from 1,458 source-sink pairs submitted in the first six months of 2025 to 1,526 in the first six months of 2026. The average number of cleared source-sink pairs per day increased from 1,157 in the first six months of 2025 to 1,229 per day in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 3-30 Number of offered and cleared UTC source and sink pairs: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Daily Number of Source-Sink Pairs | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Average Offered | Max Offered | Average Cleared | Max Cleared |
| 2025 | Jan | 1,454 | 1,641 | 1,222 | 1,490 |
| 2025 | Feb | 1,411 | 1,617 | 1,174 | 1,399 |
| 2025 | Mar | 1,523 | 1,844 | 1,278 | 1,641 |
| 2025 | Apr | 1,477 | 1,718 | 1,123 | 1,428 |
| 2025 | May | 1,360 | 1,597 | 938 | 1,325 |
| 2025 | Jun | 1,521 | 1,847 | 1,208 | 1,622 |
| 2025 | Jul | 1,680 | 1,852 | 1,380 | 1,654 |
| 2025 | Aug | 1,572 | 1,836 | 1,249 | 1,554 |
| 2025 | Sep | 1,554 | 1,766 | 1,257 | 1,497 |
| 2025 | Oct | 1,520 | 1,674 | 1,168 | 1,430 |
| 2025 | Nov | 1,614 | 1,856 | 1,215 | 1,536 |
| 2025 | Dec | 1,560 | 1,804 | 1,224 | 1,474 |
| 2025 | Annual | 1,520 | 1,754 | 1,203 | 1,504 |
| 2026 | Jan | 1,477 | 1,712 | 1,118 | 1,521 |
| 2026 | Feb | 1,462 | 1,748 | 1,170 | 1,620 |
| 2026 | Mar | 1,531 | 1,701 | 1,222 | 1,456 |
| 2026 | Apr | 1,622 | 1,918 | 1,345 | 1,652 |
| 2026 | May | 1,501 | 1,738 | 1,229 | 1,534 |
| 2026 | Jun | 1,563 | 1,760 | 1,291 | 1,540 |
| 2026 | (Jan-Jun) | 1,526 | 1,763 | 1,229 | 1,554 |

Table 3-31 and Figure 3-23 show total cleared up to congestion transactions and the share of the top 10 up to congestion paths by transaction type (import, export, wheel, or internal) in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Total cleared up to congestion transactions decreased by 23.5 percent from 43.9 million MWh in the first six months of 2025 to 33.6 million MWh in the first six months of 2026. Internal up to congestion transactions in the first six months of 2026 were 82.6 percent of all up to congestion transactions, a decrease from 84.8 percent in the first six months of 2025.

### Table 3-31 Cleared up to congestion transactions and share of top 10 paths by type (MW): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan-Jun) Cleared Up to Congestion Bids | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Import | Export | Wheel | Internal | Total |
| Top ten total (MW) | 1,923,392 | 1,076,442 | 672,655 | 10,614,467 | 14,286,956 |
| PJM total (MW) | 3,242,948 | 2,649,276 | 757,091 | 37,228,643 | 43,877,959 |
| Top ten total as percent of PJM total | 59.3% | 40.6% | 88.8% | 28.5% | 32.6% |
| PJM total as percent of all up to congestion transactions | 7.4% | 6.0% | 1.7% | 84.8% | 100.0% |
| | **2026 (Jan-Jun) Cleared Up to Congestion Bids** | | | | |
| | Import | Export | Wheel | Internal | Total |
| Top ten total (MW) | 1,669,664 | 1,263,136 | 643,331 | 8,309,919 | 11,886,049 |
| PJM total (MW) | 2,833,012 | 2,260,268 | 748,644 | 27,733,696 | 33,575,619 |
| Top ten total as percent of PJM total | 58.9% | 55.9% | 85.9% | 30.0% | 35.4% |
| PJM total as percent of all up to congestion transactions | 8.4% | 6.7% | 2.2% | 82.6% | 100.0% |

Figure 3-23 shows the total volume of import, export, wheel, and internal up to congestion transactions by month from January 2005 through June 2026. An initial increase and continued increase in internal up to congestion transactions by month followed the November 1, 2012, rule change permitting such transactions, until September 8, 2014. The reduction in up to congestion transactions (UTC) that followed a FERC order setting September 8, 2014, as the effective date for any uplift charges subsequently assigned to UTCs, was reversed.[69] There was an increase in up to congestion volume as a result of the expiration of the 15 month refund period for the proceeding related to uplift charges for UTC transactions. In 2018, total UTC activity and the percent of marginal up to congestion transactions again decreased significantly as the result of a FERC order issued on February 20, 2018, and implemented on February 22, 2018.[70] The order limited UTC trading to hubs, residual metered load, and interfaces. UTC activity increased following that reduction.

UTC activity decreased again beginning November 1, 2020, after a FERC order requiring UTCs to pay day-ahead and balancing operating reserve charges

69 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,139 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,170 (2018).
70 *Id.*

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equivalent to a DEC at the UTC sink point became effective on that date.[71] In 2022 and the first six months of 2023, the volume of cleared UTCs increased significantly, primarily internal transactions. The volume of cleared UTCs decreased consistently from July 2023 through June 2026.

### Figure 3-23 Monthly cleared up to congestion transactions by type (GWh): January 2005 through June 2026






Figure 3-24 shows the daily cleared up to congestion GWh by transaction type from January 1, 2025, through June 30, 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the total cleared GWh of import, export, and internal up to congestion transactions decreased significantly compared to the first six months of 2025, especially during Winter Storm Fern.

### Figure 3-24 Daily cleared up to congestion transaction by type (GWh): January 2025 through June 2026




One of the goals of the February 2018 FERC order accepting PJM's proposal limiting UTC bidding to hubs, interfaces and residual aggregate metered load nodes, and limiting INC and DEC bidding to the same nodes plus active generation nodes, was to limit the opportunities for traders to profit from opportunities for false arbitrage in which price spreads between the day-ahead

71 See 172 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2020).



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and real-time energy markets result from differences in the models used to operate each market that cannot be corrected through virtual bidding.[72]

A key assumption underlying the February 2018 order was that the limited set of nodes available for virtual trading is sufficiently protected from false arbitrage trades because price spreads resulting from modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets are mitigated by the averaging of prices over a large number of buses at aggregate nodes.[73] This assumption is not correct, given the large share of INC, DEC, and UTC profits still attributable to modeling or operational differences between day-ahead and real-time models since the February 2018 order.

The assumption that modeling differences are averaged out over the multiple individual nodes included in aggregate nodes does not hold for multiple aggregate nodes in the current list of available up to congestion bidding nodes. The MMU recommends eliminating up to congestion (UTC) bidding at pricing nodes that aggregate only small sections of transmission zones with few physical assets. For example, the MMU recommends eliminating UTC bidding at the following pricing points: DPLEASTON_RESID_AGG, GORHAM_RESID_AGG, PENNPOWER_RESID_AGG, UGI_RESID_AGG, SMECO_RESID_AGG, AEPKY_RESID_AGG, and VINELAND_RESID_AGG. In November 2025, GORHAM_RESID_AGG added to the list of UTC locations.

Prices at larger aggregate nodes can also be affected by transmission constraints, especially when the line ratings on constraints are violated and transmission constraint penalty factors are applied in the real-time energy market. This occurs both when line ratings are actually violated and when PJM operators reduce the line ratings in SCED. Even when the same constraints are modeled in day ahead and real time, constraint violations in real time may result from differences in the day-ahead and real-time operational environments such as intra hourly ramping limitations, changes to constraint limits, and unit commitments and decommitments. Price spreads due to modeling or operational differences can be significant, even when averaged over an aggregate node, and may persist for days or weeks. Virtual traders can often identify and profit from price spreads resulting from systematic modeling and operational differences between day-ahead and real-time affecting specific generators or aggregate nodes. The MMU recommends eliminating INC, DEC, and UTC bidding at pricing nodes that allow market participants to profit from modeling issues.

72 PJM Interconnection, LLC, "Proposed Revisions To Reduce Bidding Points for Virtual Transactions," Docket No. ER18-88, October 17, 2017 at 9–10: "Discrepancies between the models can occur for various reasons despite PJM's best attempts to minimize them…Because individual nodes are more highly impacted by modeling discrepancies than aggregated locations due to averaging, they are often locations where Virtual Transactions can profit. Profits collected by Virtual Transactions in these cases lead to additional costs for PJM members without any benefits."

73 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,139 at PP 35–36 ("We accept PJM's proposal to limit eligible bidding points for UTCs to hubs, residual metered load, and interfaces. First, we agree with the IMM's statement that PJM's proposal to limit the UTC bid locations to interfaces, zones, and hubs will minimize false arbitrage opportunities for UTCs currently being pursued through penny bids, as the effect of modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets are minimized at these aggregates.").

## Market Performance

PJM locational marginal prices (LMPs) are a direct measure of market performance. The market performs optimally when the market structure provides incentives for market participants to behave competitively. In a competitive market, prices equal the short run marginal cost of the marginal unit of output and reflect the most efficient and least cost allocation of resources to meet demand.

### LMP

The behavior of individual market entities within a market structure is reflected in market prices. PJM locational marginal prices (LMPs) are a direct measure of market performance. Price level is a good, general indicator of market performance, although overall price results must be interpreted carefully because of the multiple factors that affect them. Among other things, overall average prices reflect changes in supply and demand, generation fuel mix, the cost of fuel, emission related expenses, markup and local price differences caused by congestion. PJM also may administratively set prices with shortage pricing, the creation of closed loop interfaces related to demand side resources, surrogate constraints for reactive power and generator stability, or influence prices through manual interventions such as load biasing, changing constraint limits and transmission constraint penalty factors, and committing reserves beyond the requirement, or change price formation through fast start pricing.

The real-time average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $17.04 per MWh, or 36.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $47.08 per

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MWh to $64.12 per MWh. The real-time load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $20.79 per MWh, or 40.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $51.75 per MWh to $72.54 per MWh.

The costs of fuel, emissions, and consumables, fundamental components of the real-time load-weighted average LMP, increased $7.26 per MWh from $31.77 per MWh in the first six months of 2025 to $39.04 per MWh in the first six months of 2026, or 34.9 percent of the increase in real-time load-weighted average LMP.

The day-ahead average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $19.43 per MWh, or 42.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $45.91 per MWh to $65.34 per MWh. The day-ahead load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $24.52 per MWh, or 49.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $49.72 per MWh to $74.25 per MWh.

Occasionally, in a constrained market, the LMPs at some pricing nodes can exceed the offer price of the highest cleared generator in the supply curve.[74] In the nodal pricing system, the LMP at a pricing node is the total cost of meeting incremental demand at that node. When there are binding transmission constraints, satisfying the marginal increase in demand at a node may require increasing the output of some generators while simultaneously decreasing the output of other generators, to ensure that the transmission constraints are not violated. The total cost of redispatching multiple generators can at times exceed the cost of marginally increasing the output of the most expensive generator offered. Thus, the LMPs at some pricing nodes exceed $1,000 per MWh, the cap on the generators' offer price in the PJM market.[75]

LMP may, at times, be set by administratively defined transmission constraint penalty factors, which equal a default level of $30,000 per MWh in the day-ahead market dispatch run and $2,000 per MWh in the real-time market and in the day-ahead market pricing run. When a transmission constraint is binding and there are no generation alternatives to resolve the constraint, the transmission limits may be violated in the market dispatch solution. When this occurs, the shadow price of the constraint is set by transmission constraint penalty factors. The shadow price directly affects the LMP. Transmission constraint penalty factors are administratively determined and can be thought of as a form of locational shortage pricing. However, PJM operator interventions to reduce the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing unnecessarily trigger transmission constraint penalty factors and significantly increase prices. A competitive market does not require that prices increase when PJM artificially triggers transmission constraint penalty factors.

74 See O'Neill R. P, Mead D. and Malvadkar P. "On Market Clearing Prices Higher than the Highest Bid and Other Almost Paranormal Phenomena." *The Electricity Journal* 2005; 18(2) at 19–27.

75 The offer cap in PJM was temporarily increased to $1,800 per MWh prior to the winter of 2014/2015. A new cap of $2,000 per MWh, only for offers with costs exceeding $1,000 per MWh, went into effect on December 14, 2015. See 153 FERC ¶ 61,289 (2015).

## Fast Start Pricing: DLMP and PLMP

PJM implemented fast start pricing in both the day-ahead and real-time markets on September 1, 2021.[76] Fast start pricing is based on an incorrect LMP calculation called the pricing run. The pricing run LMP (PLMP) is the official settlement LMP in PJM, replacing the dispatch run LMP (DLMP). Unless otherwise specified, the LMP tables and figures show the PLMP for September 1, 2021, and after.

The pricing run calculates LMP using the same optimal power flow algorithm as the dispatch run while simultaneously ignoring (relaxing) the economic minimum and maximum output MW constraints for all eligible fast start units. Fast start units must have notification time plus start time less than or equal to one hour; minimum run time less than or equal to one hour; and can set price only when online and running for PJM, not self scheduled.

The goal of fast start pricing is to allow inflexible resources to set prices based on the sum of their commitment costs per MWh and their marginal costs. The price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. Units that start in one hour are not actually fast start units, and their commitment costs are not marginal in a five minute market. The differences between the actual LMP and the fast start LMP distort the incentive for market participants to behave competitively and

76 *See* 175 FERC ¶ 61,130 (2021).



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to follow PJM's dispatch instructions. PJM is paying new forms of uplift in an attempt to counter the distorted incentives inherent in fast start pricing.

PJM has also introduced other differences between the dispatch run and pricing run that are not related to fast start pricing. For example, in the day-ahead market, PJM uses a default $30,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the dispatch run and a $2,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the pricing run. The day-ahead market dispatch violated multiple high voltage constraints into the Dominion and BGE Zones during Winter Storm Fern, particularly on January 27, 2026. The higher TCPF in the dispatch run compared to the pricing run caused a negative $5,060 per MWh difference in the dispatch and pricing run day-ahead market prices for the 7:00 AM hour, which coincided with the winter peak load.

Starting on October 1, 2022, PJM uses capping of the system marginal price only in the pricing run, which affected real-time market prices for an extended period of time during Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022. Since then, PJM has applied price capping on several occasions during shortage conditions for shorter periods of time. Details of those capping events are provided in the System Marginal Price Cap subsection of Section 3.

This system marginal price (SMP) capping process has not been reviewed by FERC or included in the PJM Operating Agreement.

## DLMP and PLMP

Table 3-32 shows the day-ahead and real-time monthly load-weighted average PLMP and DLMP in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.

The real-time load-weighted average PLMP was $72.54 per MWh for the first six months of 2026, which is 7.9 percent, $5.32 per MWh, higher than the real-time load-weighted average DLMP of $67.22 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the estimated impact of fast start pricing, based on the difference between the real-time PLMP and DLMP times real-time load, was $2.2 billion.[77]

The day-ahead load-weighted average PLMP was $74.25 per MWh for the first six months of 2026, which is -3.5 percent, -$2.73 per MWh, lower than the day-ahead load-weighted average DLMP of $76.98 per MWh. The day-ahead DLMP was higher than the PLMP in January 2026 due to transmission constraint violations during Winter Storm Fern and the use of a $30,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the day-ahead DLMP calculation compared to a $2,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the day-ahead PLMP calculation.

### Table 3-32 Day-ahead and real-time load-weighted average DLMP and PLMP: 2025 through June 2026


| | | Day-Ahead Load-Weighted Average | | | | Real-Time Load-Weighted Average | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | DLMP | PLMP | Difference | Percent Difference | DLMP | PLMP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| 2025 | Jan | $67.53 | $67.74 | $0.21 | 0.3% | $59.93 | $62.87 | $2.94 | 4.9% |
| 2025 | Feb | $48.85 | $49.02 | $0.16 | 0.3% | $46.27 | $48.90 | $2.62 | 5.7% |
| 2025 | Mar | $40.76 | $40.74 | ($0.03) | (0.1%) | $37.82 | $42.11 | $4.30 | 11.4% |
| 2025 | Apr | $44.36 | $44.35 | ($0.01) | (0.0%) | $40.07 | $45.42 | $5.35 | 13.4% |
| 2025 | May | $37.56 | $37.40 | ($0.16) | (0.4%) | $33.98 | $36.34 | $2.36 | 6.9% |
| 2025 | Jun | $53.01 | $53.14 | $0.13 | 0.2% | $62.53 | $68.13 | $5.60 | 9.0% |
| 2025 | Jul | $66.56 | $66.76 | $0.20 | 0.3% | $52.41 | $59.38 | $6.97 | 13.3% |
| 2025 | Aug | $39.24 | $39.27 | $0.03 | 0.1% | $35.97 | $39.52 | $3.55 | 9.9% |
| 2025 | Sep | $41.26 | $41.24 | ($0.02) | (0.0%) | $40.49 | $43.71 | $3.22 | 7.9% |
| 2025 | Oct | $50.56 | $50.73 | $0.17 | 0.3% | $47.32 | $51.01 | $3.69 | 7.8% |
| 2025 | Nov | $49.70 | $49.85 | $0.15 | 0.3% | $43.82 | $47.08 | $3.26 | 7.4% |
| 2025 | Dec | $57.97 | $58.08 | $0.11 | 0.2% | $52.55 | $55.29 | $2.74 | 5.2% |
| 2025 | Jan - Jun | $49.66 | $49.72 | $0.06 | 0.1% | $47.90 | $51.75 | $3.85 | 8.0% |
| 2025 | | $50.61 | $50.70 | $0.09 | 0.2% | $46.79 | $50.73 | $3.93 | 8.4% |
| 2026 | Jan | $163.50 | $148.80 | ($14.70) | (9.0%) | $106.94 | $115.98 | $9.04 | 8.5% |
| 2026 | Feb | $83.61 | $83.95 | $0.34 | 0.4% | $86.43 | $93.41 | $6.98 | 8.1% |
| 2026 | Mar | $42.07 | $42.21 | $0.14 | 0.3% | $43.35 | $46.14 | $2.79 | 6.4% |
| 2026 | Apr | $45.70 | $45.95 | $0.24 | 0.5% | $45.41 | $48.46 | $3.05 | 6.7% |
| 2026 | May | $48.75 | $48.67 | ($0.08) | (0.2%) | $50.09 | $56.00 | $5.91 | 11.8% |
| 2026 | Jun | $56.92 | $57.14 | $0.22 | 0.4% | $58.59 | $61.76 | $3.17 | 5.4% |
| 2026 | Jan - Jun | $76.98 | $74.25 | ($2.73) | (3.5%) | $67.22 | $72.54 | $5.32 | 7.9% |

77 See Market Monitor Report, MMU report to the PJM Members Committee (July 28, 2026) at 39.

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Figure 3-25 shows the real-time daily average DLMP and PLMP in 2025 through June 2026.


### Figure 3-25 Real-time daily average DLMP and PLMP: 2025 through June 2026




Fast start pricing created a larger difference between DLMP and PLMP in real time than in day ahead. Figure 3-26 shows the hourly difference between DLMP and PLMP in day-ahead and real-time for the first six months of 2026.

The negative difference between DA DLMP and PLMP was a result of PJM's continued use of an extremely high transmission constraint penalty factor only in the DA DLMP run that resulted in high DA DLMP values when triggered and therefore DA DLMP values greater than DA PLMP values. The large differences between DA DLMP and PLMP on January 27, 2026, was negative $5,060 per MWh. In the dispatch run, the penalty factor was set at $30,000, while in the pricing run the penalty factor was set at $2,000. The large differences between RT DLMP and PLMP on May 18 and 19, 2026, were also caused by constraint violations in the pricing run that did not occur in the dispatch run.

### Figure 3-26 Hourly difference between DLMP and PLMP for day-ahead and real-time: January through June, 2026 [78]




78 This figure truncates a negative DA LMP difference of -$5,060 per MWh on January 27, 2026.


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Figure 3-27 shows the hourly average load and LMP difference by hour of the day for the first six months of 2026. The real-time PLMP minus DLMP difference is largest at the times of the morning and evening peak loads.

### Figure 3-27 Hourly average load and LMP difference: January through June, 2026





Table 3-33 shows the percent of total marginal units that are fast start units by unit type in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. While wind units are defined as fast start units, a wind unit on the margin does not result in a higher PLMP than DLMP when the unit has no commitment costs.

### Table 3-33 Fast start units as a percent of real-time marginal units: 2025 through June 2026

| | | Dispatch Run | | | | Pricing Run | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | CT | Diesel | Wind | All Fast Start Units | CT | Diesel | Wind | All Fast Start Units |
| 2025 | Jan | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.1% | 1.5% | 4.5% | 2.1% | 0.1% | 6.8% |
| 2025 | Feb | 1.5% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 2.0% | 3.7% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 4.6% |
| 2025 | Mar | 0.5% | 4.5% | 0.1% | 5.2% | 3.4% | 5.0% | 0.1% | 8.6% |
| 2025 | Apr | 1.9% | 1.8% | 0.3% | 4.1% | 7.1% | 2.2% | 0.3% | 9.7% |
| 2025 | May | 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 3.9% | 1.5% | 0.0% | 5.4% |
| 2025 | Jun | 1.4% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 6.2% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 7.0% |
| 2025 | Jul | 2.6% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 3.2% | 11.2% | 1.5% | 0.0% | 12.8% |
| 2025 | Aug | 2.2% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 2.7% | 7.8% | 1.1% | 0.0% | 8.9% |
| 2025 | Sep | 1.2% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 5.7% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 6.9% |
| 2025 | Oct | 1.4% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 1.8% | 4.8% | 0.6% | 0.2% | 5.6% |
| 2025 | Nov | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 1.8% | 3.8% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 5.7% |
| 2025 | Dec | 1.8% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 1.9% | 6.1% | 0.6% | 0.1% | 6.7% |
| 2025 | Jan - Jun | 0.9% | 1.8% | 0.2% | 2.9% | 3.9% | 2.6% | 0.2% | 6.7% |
| 2026 | Jan | 1.0% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 1.6% | 5.9% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 6.8% |
| 2026 | Feb | 1.5% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 3.0% | 6.3% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 8.5% |
| 2026 | Mar | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 1.4% | 3.0% | 0.6% | 0.1% | 3.8% |
| 2026 | Apr | 1.1% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 2.2% | 4.2% | 1.2% | 0.4% | 5.8% |
| 2026 | May | 0.9% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 1.9% | 4.2% | 1.2% | 0.4% | 6.0% |
| 2026 | Jun | 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 1.9% | 3.7% | 0.8% | 0.3% | 4.9% |
| 2026 | Jan - Jun | 1.1% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 2.0% | 5.1% | 0.9% | 0.4% | 6.4% |

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Table 3-34 shows the difference between day-ahead and real-time zonal average DLMP and PLMP for the first six months of 2026.

Fast start pricing affects some zones more than others. The average difference in real-time prices in BGE was $5.90 per MWh, while the average difference in real-time prices in COMED was $2.72 per MWh. In the day-ahead market, the average DLMPs in BGE and PEPCO were higher than the average PLMPs. This was primarily a result of constraint violations during Winter Storm Fern, especially in peak load hours. Constraint violations occurred for several high voltage constraints, including Bedington – Black Oak and BC/PEPCO Doubles. Differences between day-ahead and real-time unit commitments contributed to these issues. PJM uses a default $30,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the dispatch run and a $2,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the pricing run. This leads to inconsistencies between pricing and cleared MW in the day-ahead market solution and exacerbates differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets.

**Table 3-34 Day-ahead and real-time zonal average DLMP and PLMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2026**

| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
| Zone | Average DLMP | Average PLMP | Difference | Percent Difference | Average DLMP | Average PLMP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| ACEC | $56.87 | $56.93 | $0.06 | 0.1% | $49.27 | $53.52 | $4.25 | 8.6% |
| AEP | $59.11 | $58.84 | ($0.27) | (0.5%) | $53.39 | $57.41 | $4.01 | 7.5% |
| APS | $77.87 | $74.18 | ($3.70) | (4.7%) | $67.52 | $72.37 | $4.85 | 7.2% |
| ATSI | $55.70 | $55.93 | $0.23 | 0.4% | $48.80 | $52.69 | $3.89 | 8.0% |
| BGE | $106.88 | $95.29 | ($11.59) | (10.8%) | $84.83 | $90.73 | $5.90 | 7.0% |
| COMED | $39.84 | $40.22 | $0.38 | 0.9% | $29.33 | $32.05 | $2.72 | 9.3% |
| DAY | $60.82 | $60.68 | ($0.14) | (0.2%) | $53.10 | $57.18 | $4.08 | 7.7% |
| DUKE | $60.04 | $59.97 | ($0.07) | (0.1%) | $52.56 | $56.58 | $4.02 | 7.6% |
| DOM | $94.83 | $90.92 | ($3.91) | (4.1%) | $92.18 | $97.60 | $5.42 | 5.9% |
| DPL | $61.80 | $61.94 | $0.14 | 0.2% | $53.15 | $58.23 | $5.08 | 9.6% |
| DUQ | $53.76 | $54.26 | $0.50 | 0.9% | $47.53 | $51.50 | $3.97 | 8.4% |
| EKPC | $57.23 | $56.99 | ($0.24) | (0.4%) | $50.10 | $53.96 | $3.85 | 7.7% |
| JCPLC | $58.03 | $57.93 | ($0.10) | (0.2%) | $50.18 | $54.47 | $4.30 | 8.6% |
| MEC | $57.74 | $57.24 | ($0.49) | (0.9%) | $49.04 | $53.30 | $4.26 | 8.7% |
| OVEC | $56.76 | $56.73 | ($0.03) | (0.1%) | $49.03 | $52.88 | $3.84 | 7.8% |
| PECO | $55.94 | $56.02 | $0.08 | 0.1% | $48.61 | $52.79 | $4.19 | 8.6% |
| PE | $60.05 | $59.69 | ($0.36) | (0.6%) | $50.63 | $54.99 | $4.36 | 8.6% |
| PEPCO | $104.61 | $93.08 | ($11.54) | (11.0%) | $84.18 | $89.98 | $5.79 | 6.9% |
| PPL | $56.17 | $55.77 | ($0.39) | (0.7%) | $47.86 | $52.02 | $4.17 | 8.7% |
| PSEG | $58.81 | $58.77 | ($0.04) | (0.1%) | $51.39 | $55.70 | $4.32 | 8.4% |
| REC | $60.46 | $60.50 | $0.04 | 0.1% | $53.89 | $58.21 | $4.33 | 8.0% |


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Table 3-35 shows the difference between day-ahead and real-time average DLMP and PLMP for PJM hubs for the first six months of 2026.

The average difference in real-time prices for the WESTERN HUB was $4.92 per MWh, while the average difference in real-time prices for the N ILLINOIS HUB was $2.70 per MWh.

### Table 3-35 Day-ahead and real-time average DLMP and PLMP for PJM hubs (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
| Hub | Average DLMP | Average PLMP | Difference | Percent Difference | Average DLMP | Average PLMP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| AEP GEN HUB | $54.11 | $54.20 | $0.10 | 0.2% | $47.05 | $50.57 | $3.52 | 7.5% |
| AEP-DAYTON HUB | $57.08 | $56.95 | ($0.13) | (0.2%) | $49.95 | $53.80 | $3.85 | 7.7% |
| ATSI GEN HUB | $54.38 | $54.67 | $0.29 | 0.5% | $47.36 | $51.23 | $3.87 | 8.2% |
| CHICAGO GEN HUB | $39.56 | $39.94 | $0.38 | 1.0% | $29.78 | $32.54 | $2.76 | 9.3% |
| CHICAGO HUB | $40.07 | $40.44 | $0.37 | 0.9% | $29.41 | $32.14 | $2.72 | 9.3% |
| DOMINION HUB | $77.53 | $74.41 | ($3.12) | (4.0%) | $72.12 | $76.88 | $4.76 | 6.6% |
| EASTERN HUB | $60.64 | $60.79 | $0.14 | 0.2% | $52.36 | $57.25 | $4.89 | 9.3% |
| N ILLINOIS HUB | $39.75 | $40.13 | $0.38 | 1.0% | $29.22 | $31.92 | $2.70 | 9.2% |
| NEW JERSEY HUB | $58.12 | $58.08 | ($0.04) | (0.1%) | $50.52 | $54.81 | $4.29 | 8.5% |
| OHIO HUB | $56.79 | $56.73 | ($0.06) | (0.1%) | $49.75 | $53.61 | $3.86 | 7.8% |
| WEST INT HUB | $64.68 | $63.74 | ($0.94) | (1.4%) | $58.19 | $62.34 | $4.16 | 7.1% |
| WESTERN HUB | $79.45 | $74.29 | ($5.16) | (6.5%) | $65.54 | $70.46 | $4.92 | 7.5% |

Table 3-36 shows the frequency of the real-time pricing interval differences in DLMP and PLMP by price range for PJM zones for the first six months of 2026.

### Table 3-36 Frequency of real-time interval difference (dollars per MWh) between zonal DLMP and PLMP: January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | < ($50) | ($50) to ($10) | ($10) to $0 | $0 | $0 to $10 | $10 to $20 | $20 to $50 | $50 to $100 | $100 to $200 | >= $200 |
| PJM-RTO | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 51.6% | 36.1% | 5.6% | 4.4% | 1.2% | 0.3% | 0.1% |
| ACEC | 0.0% | 0.1% | 4.1% | 52.0% | 33.8% | 4.1% | 4.1% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% |
| AEP | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 51.8% | 35.2% | 5.9% | 4.2% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| APS | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.2% | 51.7% | 34.6% | 5.9% | 4.6% | 1.5% | 0.4% | 0.1% |
| ATSI | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 51.6% | 35.6% | 5.8% | 4.1% | 1.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| BGE | 0.1% | 0.4% | 2.9% | 51.5% | 31.5% | 6.0% | 5.2% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.2% |
| COMED | 0.0% | 0.2% | 5.3% | 52.5% | 34.3% | 4.3% | 2.7% | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| DAY | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 51.7% | 35.2% | 6.0% | 4.2% | 1.1% | 0.3% | 0.0% |
| DUKE | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 51.8% | 35.0% | 6.2% | 4.2% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| DOM | 0.1% | 0.2% | 2.2% | 51.7% | 33.3% | 6.0% | 4.4% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.2% |
| DPL | 0.0% | 0.1% | 4.8% | 51.9% | 32.5% | 3.9% | 3.9% | 1.9% | 0.9% | 0.1% |
| DUQ | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.5% | 51.6% | 35.4% | 5.8% | 4.2% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| EKPC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 51.8% | 35.4% | 5.9% | 4.1% | 1.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| JCPLC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.9% | 51.9% | 35.1% | 4.1% | 4.1% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% |
| MEC | 0.0% | 0.3% | 4.8% | 51.7% | 33.1% | 4.0% | 4.1% | 1.4% | 0.5% | 0.1% |
| OVEC | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.6% | 51.8% | 35.3% | 5.9% | 4.0% | 1.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| PECO | 0.0% | 0.1% | 4.6% | 51.9% | 33.4% | 4.0% | 4.1% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% |
| PE | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.2% | 51.6% | 36.2% | 4.9% | 4.3% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 0.0% |
| PEPCO | 0.1% | 0.3% | 2.7% | 51.6% | 32.2% | 6.0% | 4.8% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.2% |
| PPL | 0.0% | 0.2% | 4.6% | 51.7% | 33.7% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% |
| PSEG | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.6% | 51.9% | 35.2% | 4.2% | 4.2% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% |
| REC | 0.0% | 0.1% | 2.3% | 51.6% | 35.4% | 4.4% | 4.3% | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% |

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## Real-Time Average LMP

Real-time average LMP is the hourly average LMP for the PJM Real-Time Energy Market.[79]

## PJM Real-Time Average LMP

Table 3-37 shows the real-time average LMP for the first six months of 1998 through 2026.[80] The real-time average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $17.04 per MWh, or 36.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $47.08 per MWh to $64.12 per MWh.

### Table 3-37 Real-time average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 1998 through 2026

| | Real-Time LMP | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Average | Median | Standard Deviation | Average | Average Percent | Median | Standard Deviation |
| 1998 | $20.13 | $15.90 | $15.59 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1999 | $22.94 | $17.84 | $41.16 | $2.81 | 14.0% | 12.2% | 164.0% |
| 2000 | $25.38 | $18.03 | $25.65 | $2.44 | 10.6% | 1.1% | (37.7%) |
| 2001 | $33.10 | $25.69 | $21.11 | $7.72 | 30.4% | 42.5% | (17.7%) |
| 2002 | $24.10 | $19.64 | $13.21 | ($9.00) | (27.2%) | (23.6%) | (37.4%) |
| 2003 | $41.31 | $33.74 | $27.81 | $17.21 | 71.4% | 71.8% | 110.6% |
| 2004 | $44.99 | $40.75 | $22.97 | $3.68 | 8.9% | 20.8% | (17.4%) |
| 2005 | $45.71 | $39.80 | $23.51 | $0.72 | 1.6% | (2.3%) | 2.3% |
| 2006 | $49.36 | $43.46 | $25.26 | $3.65 | 8.0% | 9.2% | 7.5% |
| 2007 | $55.03 | $48.05 | $31.42 | $5.67 | 11.5% | 10.6% | 24.4% |
| 2008 | $70.19 | $59.53 | $41.77 | $15.16 | 27.6% | 23.9% | 33.0% |
| 2009 | $40.12 | $35.42 | $19.30 | ($30.07) | (42.8%) | (40.5%) | (53.8%) |
| 2010 | $43.27 | $37.11 | $22.20 | $3.16 | 7.9% | 4.8% | 15.0% |
| 2011 | $45.51 | $37.40 | $32.52 | $2.24 | 5.2% | 0.8% | 46.5% |
| 2012 | $29.74 | $28.32 | $16.10 | ($15.77) | (34.6%) | (24.3%) | (50.5%) |
| 2013 | $36.56 | $32.79 | $17.18 | $6.82 | 22.9% | 15.8% | 6.7% |
| 2014 | $62.14 | $39.69 | $88.87 | $25.58 | 69.9% | 21.0% | 417.4% |
| 2015 | $38.87 | $29.04 | $34.04 | ($23.27) | (37.4%) | (26.8%) | (61.7%) |
| 2016 | $25.84 | $23.17 | $13.61 | ($13.03) | (33.5%) | (20.2%) | (60.0%) |
| 2017 | $28.72 | $25.76 | $12.03 | $2.88 | 11.1% | 11.2% | (11.6%) |
| 2018 | $38.82 | $27.21 | $38.76 | $10.10 | 35.2% | 5.6% | 222.3% |
| 2019 | $26.41 | $23.81 | $15.75 | ($12.41) | (32.0%) | (12.5%) | (59.4%) |
| 2020 | $18.70 | $17.54 | $8.46 | ($7.71) | (29.2%) | (26.3%) | (46.3%) |
| 2021 | $29.17 | $23.89 | $21.30 | $10.47 | 56.0% | 36.2% | 151.8% |
| 2022 | $64.42 | $52.43 | $62.26 | $35.25 | 120.8% | 119.5% | 192.3% |
| 2023 | $28.41 | $25.42 | $16.40 | ($36.01) | (55.9%) | (51.5%) | (73.7%) |
| 2024 | $29.72 | $24.03 | $23.89 | $1.30 | 4.6% | (5.5%) | 45.7% |
| 2025 | $47.08 | $35.22 | $60.62 | $17.36 | 58.4% | 46.5% | 153.7% |
| 2026 | $64.12 | $34.35 | $89.93 | $17.04 | 36.2% | (2.5%) | 48.4% |

79 See the *Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, at "Calculating Locational Marginal Price," p 16-18 for detailed definition of Real-Time LMP. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

80 The system average LMP is the average of the hourly LMP without any weighting. The only exception is that market-clearing prices (MCPs) are included for January to April 1998. MCP was the single market-clearing price calculated by PJM prior to implementation of LMP.




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## PJM Real-Time Average LMP Duration

Figure 3-28 shows the hourly distribution of the real-time average LMP in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2025, the most common price range was $20 to $30 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the most common price range was $20 to $30 per MWh.

### Figure 3-28 Distribution of real-time LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026




## Real-Time Load-Weighted Average LMP

Higher demand generally results in higher prices, all else constant. As a result, load-weighted, average prices are generally higher than average prices. Load-weighted average LMP reflects the average real-time LMP paid for actual MWh consumed during a year. Load-weighted average LMP is the average of PJM hourly LMP, with each hourly LMP weighted by the PJM total hourly load.

## PJM Real-Time Load-Weighted Average LMP

Table 3-38 shows the real-time load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of 1998 through 2026. The real-time load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $20.79 per MWh, or 40.2 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $51.75 per MWh to $72.54 per MWh.

### Table 3-38 Real-time load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 1998 through 2026

| | Real-Time Load-Weighted Average LMP | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Average | Median | Standard Deviation | Average | Average Percent | Median | Standard Deviation |
| 1998 | $21.66 | $16.80 | $18.39 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1999 | $25.34 | $18.59 | $52.06 | $3.69 | 17.0% | 10.7% | 183.1% |
| 2000 | $27.76 | $18.91 | $29.69 | $2.42 | 9.5% | 1.7% | (43.0%) |
| 2001 | $35.27 | $27.88 | $22.12 | $7.51 | 27.0% | 47.4% | (25.5%) |
| 2002 | $25.93 | $20.67 | $14.62 | ($9.34) | (26.5%) | (25.9%) | (33.9%) |
| 2003 | $44.43 | $37.98 | $28.55 | $18.50 | 71.4% | 83.8% | 95.2% |
| 2004 | $47.62 | $43.96 | $23.30 | $3.19 | 7.2% | 15.8% | (18.4%) |
| 2005 | $48.67 | $42.30 | $24.81 | $1.06 | 2.2% | (3.8%) | 6.5% |
| 2006 | $51.83 | $45.79 | $26.54 | $3.16 | 6.5% | 8.3% | 7.0% |
| 2007 | $58.32 | $52.52 | $32.39 | $6.49 | 12.5% | 14.7% | 22.1% |
| 2008 | $74.77 | $64.26 | $44.25 | $16.45 | 28.2% | 22.4% | 36.6% |
| 2009 | $42.48 | $36.95 | $20.61 | ($32.30) | (43.2%) | (42.5%) | (53.4%) |
| 2010 | $45.75 | $38.78 | $23.60 | $3.27 | 7.7% | 5.0% | 14.5% |
| 2011 | $48.47 | $38.63 | $37.59 | $2.72 | 5.9% | (0.4%) | 59.3% |
| 2012 | $31.21 | $28.98 | $17.69 | ($17.26) | (35.6%) | (25.0%) | (52.9%) |
| 2013 | $37.96 | $33.58 | $18.54 | $6.75 | 21.6% | 15.9% | 4.8% |
| 2014 | $69.92 | $42.61 | $103.35 | $31.96 | 84.2% | 26.9% | 457.6% |
| 2015 | $42.30 | $30.34 | $37.85 | ($27.62) | (39.5%) | (28.8%) | (63.4%) |
| 2016 | $27.09 | $23.82 | $14.49 | ($15.21) | (36.0%) | (21.5%) | (61.7%) |
| 2017 | $29.81 | $26.47 | $12.88 | $2.72 | 10.1% | 11.1% | (11.1%) |
| 2018 | $42.44 | $28.36 | $43.68 | $12.63 | 42.4% | 7.1% | 239.1% |
| 2019 | $27.49 | $24.40 | $16.38 | ($14.95) | (35.2%) | (14.0%) | (62.5%) |
| 2020 | $19.40 | $18.13 | $8.93 | ($8.09) | (29.4%) | (25.7%) | (45.5%) |
| 2021 | $30.62 | $24.61 | $22.60 | $11.22 | 57.8% | 35.7% | 153.2% |
| 2022 | $67.77 | $54.30 | $72.74 | $37.15 | 121.3% | 120.7% | 221.8% |
| 2023 | $29.33 | $26.32 | $17.37 | ($38.44) | (56.7%) | (51.5%) | (76.1%) |
| 2024 | $31.70 | $25.37 | $26.13 | $2.36 | 8.1% | (3.6%) | 50.4% |
| 2025 | $51.75 | $37.22 | $74.11 | $20.05 | 63.2% | 46.7% | 183.6% |
| 2026 | $72.54 | $36.61 | $100.44 | $20.79 | 40.2% | (1.6%) | 35.5% |

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## PJM Real-Time Monthly Load-Weighted Average LMP

Figure 3-29 shows the real-time monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP for 1999 through the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-29 Real-time monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP: 1999 through June 2026





Table 3-39 shows the real-time monthly on peak and off peak load-weighted average LMP for 2025 through the first six months of 2026.

### Table 3-39 Real-time monthly on peak and off peak load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): 2025 through June 2026


| | 2025 | | | | 2026 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Off Peak | On Peak | Difference | Percent Difference | Off Peak | On Peak | Difference | Percent Difference |
| Jan | $55.29 | $70.54 | $15.25 | 27.6% | $127.59 | $102.73 | ($24.86) | (19.5%) |
| Feb | $43.75 | $54.12 | $10.37 | 23.7% | $106.39 | $79.83 | ($26.56) | (25.0%) |
| Mar | $38.89 | $45.68 | $6.79 | 17.5% | $38.30 | $53.85 | $15.55 | 40.6% |
| Apr | $38.15 | $52.08 | $13.93 | 36.5% | $38.77 | $57.19 | $18.42 | 47.5% |
| May | $27.32 | $45.53 | $18.21 | 66.7% | $37.27 | $77.10 | $39.83 | 106.9% |
| Jun | $39.62 | $94.51 | $54.89 | 138.5% | $38.86 | $81.82 | $42.96 | 110.5% |
| Jul | $39.08 | $77.77 | $38.68 | 99.0% | | | | |
| Aug | $29.15 | $49.92 | $20.77 | 71.2% | | | | |
| Sep | $34.41 | $52.55 | $18.14 | 52.7% | | | | |
| Oct | $41.55 | $59.43 | $17.88 | 43.0% | | | | |
| Nov | $40.52 | $55.12 | $14.59 | 36.0% | | | | |
| Dec | $49.92 | $60.68 | $10.76 | 21.6% | | | | |


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## PJM Real-Time Daily Load-Weighted Average LMP

Figure 3-30 shows the real-time daily load-weighted average LMP for January 2025 through June 2026.


### Figure 3-30 Real-time daily load-weighted average LMP: January 2025 through June 2026




## PJM Real-Time Monthly Inflation Adjusted Load-Weighted Average LMP

Figure 3-31 shows the PJM real-time monthly load-weighted average LMP and inflation adjusted monthly load-weighted average LMP from January 1998 through June 2026.[81] [82] Table 3-40 shows the PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP and inflation adjusted load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of every year from 1998 through 2026.

### Figure 3-31 Real-time monthly load-weighted average LMP unadjusted and adjusted for inflation: January 1998 through June 2026




81 To obtain the inflation adjusted, monthly, load-weighted, average LMP, the PJM system-wide load-weighted average LMP is deflated using the US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (base period: January 1998), published by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. <http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems> (Accessed July 14, 2026)

82 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics did not publish CPI data for October 2025. October 2025 CPI data was approximated using the geometric mean of September and November 2025 index values. Further information on approximating BLS data for missing data points can be found at: <https://www.bls.gov/cpi/factsheets/approximating-missing-data.htm>.

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**Table 3-40 Real-time load-weighted and inflation adjusted load-weighted average LMP: January through June, 1998 through 2026**

| | Load-Weighted Average LMP | Inflation Adjusted Load-Weighted Average LMP |
|---|---|---|
| | Jan-Jun | Jan-Jun |
| 1998 | $21.66 | $21.54 |
| 1999 | $25.34 | $24.74 |
| 2000 | $27.76 | $26.25 |
| 2001 | $35.27 | $32.27 |
| 2002 | $25.93 | $23.40 |
| 2003 | $44.43 | $39.18 |
| 2004 | $47.62 | $41.02 |
| 2005 | $48.67 | $40.71 |
| 2006 | $51.83 | $41.78 |
| 2007 | $58.32 | $45.83 |
| 2008 | $74.77 | $56.29 |
| 2009 | $42.48 | $32.26 |
| 2010 | $45.75 | $33.99 |
| 2011 | $48.47 | $35.04 |
| 2012 | $31.21 | $22.05 |
| 2013 | $37.96 | $26.40 |
| 2014 | $69.92 | $47.96 |
| 2015 | $42.30 | $28.98 |
| 2016 | $27.09 | $18.34 |
| 2017 | $29.81 | $19.74 |
| 2018 | $42.44 | $27.48 |
| 2019 | $27.49 | $17.48 |
| 2020 | $19.40 | $12.17 |
| 2021 | $30.62 | $18.59 |
| 2022 | $67.77 | $37.89 |
| 2023 | $29.33 | $15.69 |
| 2024 | $31.70 | $16.42 |
| 2025 | $51.75 | $26.12 |
| 2026 | $72.54 | $35.60 |

## Real-Time Dispatch and Pricing

On November 1, 2021, PJM implemented a new real-time dispatch process that aligned the timing of dispatch and pricing in the real-time energy market. The PJM Real-Time Energy Market is based on applications that produce the generator dispatch for energy and reserves, and five minute locational marginal prices (LMPs). These applications include the real-time security constrained economic dispatch (RT SCED), the locational pricing calculator (LPC), and the ancillary services optimizer (ASO).[83] The final real-time LMPs and ancillary service clearing prices are determined for every five minute interval by LPC.

## Real-Time SCED and LPC

The LPC uses data from an approved RT SCED solution that was used to dispatch the resources in the system. RT SCED solves to meet load and reserve requirements forecast for a future point in time, called the target time. Prior to 2021, on average, PJM operators approved more than one RT SCED solution per five minute target time to send dispatch signals to resources. From 2021 through the first six months of 2026, on average, PJM operators approved one RT SCED solution per five minute target time to send dispatch signals to resources. PJM uses a subset of these approved RT SCED solutions in LPC to calculate real-time LMPs every five minutes. Prior to October 15, 2020, LPC used the latest available approved RT SCED solution to calculate prices, regardless of the target dispatch time of the RT SCED solution, but LPC assigned the prices to a five minute interval that did not contain the target time of the RT SCED case it used. On November 1, 2021, PJM implemented changes to RT SCED that solved the energy dispatch case using a five-minute dispatch period, and ramped resources for five minutes to meet the load and reserve requirements at the end of each five minute period. The approved RT SCED solution that dispatched units for each five minute period was also used to calculate prices for the same five minute interval, aligning the prices with the dispatch signals.

Table 3-41 shows the number of RT SCED case solutions, the number of solutions that were approved, and the number and percent of approved solutions used in LPC. The RT SCED execution frequency is once every five minutes. PJM operators have the ability to execute additional RT SCED cases. Each execution of RT SCED produces five solutions, using five different levels of load bias. Since prices are calculated every five minutes while five SCED solutions are produced every five minutes, there is, by definition, a larger number of SCED solutions than there are five minute intervals in any given period.

83 See PJM. "Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," Rev. 137 (July 28, 2026).


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Table 3-41 shows that in the first six months of 2026, 98.3 percent of approved RT SCED solutions that were used to send dispatch signals to generators were used in calculating real-time energy market prices, compared to 98.0 percent in all of 2025.

### Table 3-41 RT SCED cases solved, approved and used in pricing: January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | | | 2026 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Number of RT SCED Solutions | Number of Approved RT SCED Solutions | Number of Approved RT SCED Solutions Used in LPC | RT SCED Solutions Used in LPC as Percent of Approved RT SCED Solutions | Number of RT SCED Solutions | Number of Approved RT SCED Solutions | Number of Approved RT SCED Solutions Used in LPC | RT SCED Solutions Used in LPC as Percent of Approved RT SCED Solutions |
| Jan | 46,098 | 9,146 | 8,895 | 97.3% | 45,724 | 9,048 | 8,878 | 98.1% |
| Feb | 41,310 | 8,213 | 8,020 | 97.7% | 41,058 | 8,151 | 7,982 | 97.9% |
| Mar | 46,674 | 9,013 | 8,823 | 97.9% | 45,526 | 8,981 | 8,838 | 98.4% |
| Apr | 44,215 | 8,766 | 8,608 | 98.2% | 44,628 | 8,708 | 8,575 | 98.5% |
| May | 45,702 | 9,053 | 8,867 | 97.9% | 45,867 | 8,969 | 8,874 | 98.9% |
| Jun | 44,319 | 8,812 | 8,582 | 97.4% | 44,214 | 8,743 | 8,582 | 98.2% |
| Jul | 45,713 | 9,076 | 8,889 | 97.9% | | | | |
| Aug | 45,491 | 9,022 | 8,860 | 98.2% | | | | |
| Sep | 43,744 | 8,736 | 8,556 | 97.9% | | | | |
| Oct | 45,271 | 8,991 | 8,859 | 98.5% | | | | |
| Nov | 44,285 | 8,731 | 8,586 | 98.3% | | | | |
| Dec | 45,514 | 8,990 | 8,855 | 98.5% | | | | |
| Total | 538,336 | 106,549 | 104,400 | 98.0% | 267,017 | 52,600 | 51,729 | 98.3% |

## Recalculation of Five Minute Real-Time Prices

PJM's five minute interval LMPs are obtained from solved LPC cases. PJM recalculates five minute interval real-time LMPs as it believes necessary to correct errors. To do so, PJM reruns LPC cases with modified inputs. The PJM OATT allows for posting of recalculated real-time prices no later than 1700 (EPT) of the tenth calendar day following the operating day. The OATT also requires PJM to notify market participants of the underlying error no later than 1700 (EPT) of the second business day following the operating day.[84] Table 3-42 shows the number of five minute intervals in each month and number of five minute intervals in each month for which PJM recalculated real-time prices in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, PJM recalculated LMPs for 679 five minute intervals, or 1.3 percent of the total 52,116 five minute intervals.

84 OA Attachment K Section 1 § 1.10.8(e).

### Table 3-42 Number of five minute interval real-time prices recalculated: January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | | 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Number of Five Minute Intervals | Number of Five Minute Intervals for Which LMPs Were Recalculated | Percent | Number of Five Minute Intervals | Number of Five Minute Intervals for Which LMPs Were Recalculated | Percent |
| January | 8,928 | 154 | 1.7% | 8,928 | 123 | 1.4% |
| February | 8,064 | 189 | 2.3% | 8,064 | 136 | 1.7% |
| March | 8,916 | 680 | 7.6% | 8,916 | 87 | 1.0% |
| April | 8,640 | 126 | 1.5% | 8,640 | 104 | 1.2% |
| May | 8,928 | 153 | 1.7% | 8,928 | 79 | 0.9% |
| June | 8,640 | 162 | 1.9% | 8,640 | 150 | 1.7% |
| July | 8,928 | 183 | 2.0% | | | |
| August | 8,928 | 137 | 1.5% | | | |
| September | 8,640 | 142 | 1.6% | | | |
| October | 8,928 | 132 | 1.5% | | | |
| November | 8,652 | 93 | 1.1% | | | |
| December | 8,928 | 115 | 1.3% | | | |
| Total | 105,120 | 2,266 | 2.2% | 52,116 | 679 | 1.3% |

## Day-Ahead Average LMP

Day-ahead average LMP is the hourly average LMP for the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market.[85]

85 See the *MMU Technical Reference for the PJM Markets*, at "Calculating Locational Marginal Price," for a detailed definition of day-ahead LMP. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

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## PJM Day-Ahead Average LMP

Table 3-43 shows the day-ahead average LMP of the first six months of 2001 through 2026. The day-ahead average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $19.43 per MWh, or 42.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $45.91 per MWh to $65.34 per MWh.


### Table 3-43 Day-ahead average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2001 to 2026

| | Day-Ahead LMP | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Average | Median | Standard Deviation | Average | Average Percent | Median | Standard Deviation |
| 2001 | $35.02 | $31.34 | $17.43 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | $24.76 | $21.28 | $12.49 | ($10.26) | (29.3%) | (32.1%) | (28.4%) |
| 2003 | $42.83 | $39.18 | $23.52 | $18.08 | 73.0% | 84.1% | 88.3% |
| 2004 | $44.02 | $43.14 | $18.33 | $1.19 | 2.8% | 10.1% | (22.0%) |
| 2005 | $45.63 | $42.51 | $18.35 | $1.61 | 3.7% | (1.5%) | 0.1% |
| 2006 | $48.33 | $47.07 | $16.02 | $2.70 | 5.9% | 10.7% | (12.7%) |
| 2007 | $53.03 | $51.08 | $22.91 | $4.70 | 9.7% | 8.5% | 43.0% |
| 2008 | $70.12 | $66.09 | $31.98 | $17.09 | 32.2% | 29.4% | 39.6% |
| 2009 | $40.01 | $37.46 | $15.38 | ($30.10) | (42.9%) | (43.3%) | (51.9%) |
| 2010 | $43.81 | $40.64 | $15.66 | $3.80 | 9.5% | 8.5% | 1.8% |
| 2011 | $44.75 | $40.85 | $19.53 | $0.94 | 2.1% | 0.5% | 24.8% |
| 2012 | $30.44 | $29.64 | $11.77 | ($14.32) | (32.0%) | (27.4%) | (39.8%) |
| 2013 | $37.11 | $35.19 | $10.42 | $6.67 | 21.9% | 18.7% | (11.4%) |
| 2014 | $63.52 | $44.42 | $69.93 | $26.41 | 71.2% | 26.2% | 571.1% |
| 2015 | $39.98 | $31.93 | $28.76 | ($23.54) | (37.1%) | (28.1%) | (58.9%) |
| 2016 | $26.24 | $24.95 | $8.54 | ($13.73) | (34.4%) | (21.9%) | (70.3%) |
| 2017 | $29.03 | $27.26 | $8.87 | $2.79 | 10.6% | 9.3% | 3.9% |
| 2018 | $37.90 | $30.08 | $29.14 | $8.87 | 30.5% | 10.3% | 228.6% |
| 2019 | $26.86 | $25.31 | $9.56 | ($11.04) | (29.1%) | (15.8%) | (67.2%) |
| 2020 | $18.55 | $18.20 | $4.92 | ($8.31) | (30.9%) | (28.1%) | (48.6%) |
| 2021 | $29.46 | $25.58 | $15.30 | $10.91 | 58.8% | 40.5% | 211.3% |
| 2022 | $63.84 | $57.16 | $28.06 | $34.37 | 116.7% | 123.5% | 83.4% |
| 2023 | $29.45 | $27.85 | $11.40 | ($34.39) | (53.9%) | (51.3%) | (59.4%) |
| 2024 | $29.61 | $24.85 | $19.43 | $0.16 | 0.6% | (10.8%) | 70.5% |
| 2025 | $45.91 | $37.09 | $34.40 | $16.30 | 55.1% | 49.3% | 77.1% |
| 2026 | $65.34 | $37.78 | $93.32 | $19.43 | 42.3% | 1.9% | 171.3% |

## PJM Day-Ahead Average LMP Duration

Figure 3-32 shows the hourly distribution of the day-ahead average LMP for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Figure 3-32 Distribution of day-ahead LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026




## Day-Ahead Load-Weighted Average LMP

Day-ahead load-weighted LMP reflects the average LMP paid for day-ahead MWh. Day-ahead load-weighted LMP is the average of PJM day-ahead hourly LMP, each hourly LMP weighted by the PJM total cleared day-ahead, hourly load, including day-ahead fixed load, price-sensitive load, decrement bids and up to congestion.


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## PJM Day-Ahead Load-Weighted Average LMP

Table 3-44 shows the day-ahead load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2001 through 2026. The day-ahead load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased $24.52 per MWh, or 49.3 percent, from the first six months of 2025, from $49.72 per MWh to $74.25 per MWh. This is the highest day-ahead load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of a year since the introduction of the PJM day-ahead energy market.


### Table 3-44 Day-ahead load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2001 to 2026

| Day-Ahead Load-Weighted Average LMP | | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Average | Median | Standard Deviation | Average | Average Percent | Median | Standard Deviation |
| 2001 | $37.08 | $33.91 | $18.11 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | $26.88 | $23.00 | $14.36 | ($10.20) | (27.5%) | (32.2%) | (20.7%) |
| 2003 | $45.62 | $42.01 | $23.96 | $18.74 | 69.7% | 82.7% | 66.8% |
| 2004 | $46.12 | $45.45 | $18.62 | $0.49 | 1.1% | 8.2% | (22.3%) |
| 2005 | $48.12 | $44.88 | $19.24 | $2.00 | 4.3% | (1.3%) | 3.3% |
| 2006 | $50.21 | $48.67 | $16.23 | $2.09 | 4.3% | 8.5% | (15.7%) |
| 2007 | $55.70 | $54.26 | $23.47 | $5.49 | 10.9% | 11.5% | 44.7% |
| 2008 | $73.71 | $69.33 | $33.95 | $18.01 | 32.3% | 27.8% | 44.7% |
| 2009 | $42.21 | $38.83 | $16.16 | ($31.50) | (42.7%) | (44.0%) | (52.4%) |
| 2010 | $46.12 | $42.50 | $16.54 | $3.91 | 9.3% | 9.5% | 2.3% |
| 2011 | $47.12 | $42.58 | $22.34 | $1.00 | 2.2% | 0.2% | 35.1% |
| 2012 | $31.84 | $30.35 | $13.94 | ($15.28) | (32.4%) | (28.7%) | (37.6%) |
| 2013 | $38.23 | $36.19 | $11.03 | $6.39 | 20.1% | 19.3% | (20.8%) |
| 2014 | $70.67 | $47.04 | $79.85 | $32.43 | 84.8% | 30.0% | 623.8% |
| 2015 | $43.26 | $33.45 | $32.23 | ($27.41) | (38.8%) | (28.9%) | (59.6%) |
| 2016 | $27.33 | $25.92 | $8.89 | ($15.92) | (36.8%) | (22.5%) | (72.4%) |
| 2017 | $30.02 | $28.21 | $9.38 | $2.68 | 9.8% | 8.8% | 5.6% |
| 2018 | $40.96 | $31.44 | $32.70 | $10.95 | 36.5% | 11.4% | 248.5% |
| 2019 | $27.97 | $26.10 | $10.59 | ($12.99) | (31.7%) | (17.0%) | (67.6%) |
| 2020 | $19.23 | $18.73 | $5.14 | ($8.74) | (31.3%) | (28.2%) | (51.4%) |
| 2021 | $31.00 | $26.63 | $16.73 | $11.77 | 61.2% | 42.1% | 225.4% |
| 2022 | $66.50 | $59.32 | $30.46 | $35.51 | 114.6% | 122.8% | 82.1% |
| 2023 | $30.53 | $28.72 | $12.19 | ($35.97) | (54.1%) | (51.6%) | (60.0%) |
| 2024 | $31.66 | $25.97 | $21.51 | $1.13 | 3.7% | (9.6%) | 76.5% |
| 2025 | $49.72 | $39.03 | $39.49 | $18.07 | 57.1% | 50.3% | 83.6% |
| 2026 | $74.25 | $40.00 | $105.65 | $24.52 | 49.3% | 2.5% | 167.5% |

## PJM Day-Ahead Monthly Load-Weighted Average LMP

Figure 3-33 shows the day-ahead monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP in 2001 through the first six months of 2026.


### Figure 3-33 Day-ahead monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP: 2001 through June 2026




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Figure 3-34 shows the day-ahead daily load-weighted average LMP in January 2025 through June 2026 compared to the historic five year price range.


### Figure 3-34 Day-ahead daily load-weighted average LMP: 2025 through June 2026




## PJM Day-Ahead Monthly Inflation Adjusted Load-Weighted Average LMP

Figure 3-35 shows the PJM day-ahead monthly load-weighted average LMP and inflation adjusted monthly day-ahead load-weighted average LMP for June 2000 through June 2026.[86] [87] Table 3-45 shows the PJM day-ahead load-weighted average LMP and inflation adjusted load-weighted average LMP for the first six months every year from 2000 through 2026.

### Figure 3-35 Day-ahead monthly load-weighted and inflation adjusted load-weighted average LMP: June 2000 through June 2026




86 To obtain the inflation adjusted monthly load-weighted average LMP, the PJM system-wide load-weighted average LMP is deflated using US Consumer Price Index for all items, Urban Consumers (base period: January 1998), published by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. <http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems> (Accessed July 14, 2026).

87 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics did not publish CPI data for October 2025. October 2025 CPI data was approximated using the geometric mean of September and November 2025 index values. Further information on approximating BLS data for missing data points can be found at: <https://www.bls.gov/cpi/factsheets/approximating-missing-data.htm>.



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Table 3-45 Day-ahead yearly load-weighted and inflation adjusted load-weighted average LMP: January through June, 2000 through 2026

| | Load-Weighted Average LMP | Inflation Adjusted Load-Weighted Average LMP |
|---|---|---|
| | Jan-Jun | Jan-Jun |
| 2000 | $34.12 | $31.98 |
| 2001 | $37.08 | $33.94 |
| 2002 | $26.88 | $24.25 |
| 2003 | $45.62 | $40.23 |
| 2004 | $46.12 | $39.73 |
| 2005 | $48.12 | $40.24 |
| 2006 | $50.21 | $40.47 |
| 2007 | $55.70 | $43.76 |
| 2008 | $73.71 | $55.49 |
| 2009 | $42.21 | $32.06 |
| 2010 | $46.12 | $34.28 |
| 2011 | $47.12 | $34.08 |
| 2012 | $31.84 | $22.49 |
| 2013 | $38.23 | $26.59 |
| 2014 | $70.67 | $48.48 |
| 2015 | $43.26 | $29.64 |
| 2016 | $27.33 | $18.51 |
| 2017 | $30.02 | $19.88 |
| 2018 | $40.96 | $26.52 |
| 2019 | $27.97 | $17.79 |
| 2020 | $19.23 | $12.06 |
| 2021 | $31.00 | $18.82 |
| 2022 | $66.50 | $37.19 |
| 2023 | $30.53 | $16.33 |
| 2024 | $31.66 | $16.41 |
| 2025 | $49.72 | $25.11 |
| 2026 | $74.25 | $36.49 |

## Price Convergence

The introduction of the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market with virtuals as part of the design created the possibility that competition, exercised through the use of virtual offers and bids, could tend to cause prices in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets to converge more than would be the case without virtuals. Convergence is not the goal of virtual trading, but it is a possible outcome.

In practice, virtuals can receive a positive profit whenever there is a difference in prices at any location in any hour between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets that is greater than uplift and administrative charges.

Virtual trading can only result in price convergence at a given location and market hour if the factors affecting prices at that location and hour, such as modeled contingencies, transmission constraint limits and sources of flows, are the same in both the day-ahead and real-time models.

Where arbitrage incentives are created by systematic modeling differences, such as differences between the day-ahead and real-time modeled transmission contingencies and marginal loss calculations, virtual bids and offers cannot result in more efficient market outcomes. Such offers may result in positive profits for the virtual but cannot change the underlying reason for the price difference. The virtual transactions will continue to profit from the activity for that reason regardless of the volume of those transactions and without improving the efficiency of the energy market. This is termed false arbitrage.

The degree of convergence, by itself, is not a measure of the competitiveness or effectiveness of the day-ahead energy market. Price convergence does not necessarily mean a zero or even a very small difference in prices between day-ahead and real-time energy markets. There may be factors, from uplift charges to differences in risk that result in a competitive, market-based differential. In addition, convergence in the sense that day-ahead and real-time prices are equal at individual buses or aggregates on a day to day basis is not a realistic expectation as a result of uncertainty, lags in response time and modeling differences.

INCs, DECs and UTCs allow participants to benefit from price differences between the day-ahead and real-time energy market. In theory, virtual transactions receive positive profits, after uplift and administrative charges, when they contribute to price convergence, but with false arbitrage, profits result with little or no price convergence. The seller of an INC must buy energy in the real-time energy market to fulfill the financial obligation to provide energy. If the day-ahead price for energy is higher than the real-time price for energy, after uplift and administrative charges, the INC is profitable.

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The buyer of a DEC must sell energy in the real-time energy market to fulfill the financial obligation to buy energy. If the day-ahead price for energy is lower than the real-time price for energy, after uplift and administrative charges, the DEC is profitable.

The profit of a UTC transaction is the net of the separate revenues of the component INC and DEC, after uplift and administrative charges. A UTC can be profitable if the profits on one side of the UTC transaction exceed the losses on the other side.

Virtual transactions, including UTCs since November 1, 2020, are required to pay uplift charges. Cleared INCs and DECs pay deviation charges based on the daily RTO and applicable regional operating reserve charge rates. DECs pay day-ahead operating reserve charges in addition to deviation charges. Cleared UTCs are treated, for uplift purposes, like DECs at the UTC sink point, and pay the regional and RTO deviation rates in addition to the day-ahead rate. Uplift charges for deviations may not apply if the virtual transaction is partially or fully offset by a corresponding real-time physical transaction at the same location.

In the day-ahead market, load bids are submitted by market buyers at aggregate pnodes, and PJM uses historic bus level load data to distribute the aggregate bids among the bus level pnodes that comprise the aggregate pnode. Effective December 14, 2023, PJM modified the method used to assign load bids to nodes from a single snapshot at 8:00 AM the week prior to the hourly demand data from one week prior to the Operating Day for each hour. [88]

## Profitability of Virtual Transactions

The profit of a virtual transaction equals its net day-ahead and real-time energy market revenues minus uplift and administrative charges.

Table 3-46 shows, for cleared UTCs, the number of UTCs, the number of profitable UTCs, and the number of UTCs profitable at their source point, at their sink point, and at both source and sink points in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2026, 42.1 percent of all cleared UTC transactions were profitable. Of cleared UTC transactions, 64.2 percent were profitable on the source side and 33.3 percent were profitable on the sink side, but only 9.4 percent were profitable on both the source and sink side.

### Table 3-46 Cleared UTCs with positive profits at source and sink points: January through June, 2025 and 2026[89]

| (Jan-Jun) | Number of Cleared UTCs | Number of Profitable UTCs | Profitable at Source | Profitable at Sink | Profitable at Source and Sink | Share Profitable Overall | Share Profitable Source | Share Profitable Sink | Share Profitable Source and Sink |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 3,147,554 | 1,273,613 | 1,955,436 | 1,131,880 | 257,287 | 40.5% | 62.1% | 36.0% | 8.2% |
| 2026 | 3,344,926 | 1,408,024 | 2,146,827 | 1,112,192 | 313,000 | 42.1% | 64.2% | 33.3% | 9.4% |

Table 3-47 shows the number of cleared INC and DEC transactions and the number of profitable transactions in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Of cleared INC and DEC transactions in the first six months of 2026, 55.1 percent of INCs were profitable and 31.2 percent of DECs were profitable.

### Table 3-47 Cleared INC and DEC transactions with positive profits: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| (Jan-Jun) | Cleared INC | Profitable INC | Profitable INC Share | Cleared DEC | Profitable DEC | Profitable DEC Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 2,385,839 | 1,237,032 | 51.8% | 2,051,964 | 639,661 | 31.2% |
| 2026 | 2,768,804 | 1,525,785 | 55.1% | 2,379,925 | 742,428 | 31.2% |

88 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Tariff Revisions to Improve the Determination of Day-Ahead Zonal Load Factors, Docket No. ER23-1529 (March 31, 2023).
89 Calculations exclude PJM administrative charges.


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Figure 3-36 shows the positive, negative, and net daily profits for UTCs in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-36 Positive, negative, and net daily UTC profits: January through June, 2026






Figure 3-37 shows the cumulative UTC daily total net profits for each year from 2013 through the first six months of 2026.[90] Administrative charges are included for all dates, and uplift charges are included starting from November 1, 2020, when uplift was first charged to UTCs.

### Figure 3-37 Cumulative daily UTC profits: January 2013 through June 2026




90 UTCs paid uplift only after October 31, 2020.

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Table 3-48 shows UTC monthly total net profits for January 2013 through June 2026. Administrative charges are included for all months and uplift charges are included starting from November 1, 2020, when uplift was first charged to UTCs. UTC profits were $211 million in 2022, higher than any year since 2014, with the largest monthly total in December 2022 at $75 million. In 2023, the most profitable UTC transactions were concentrated in the Dominion Zone and on dates with high real-time congestion in the Dominion Zone, which occurred primarily in January through May, 2023. The year 2024 was the least profitable year ever for UTC transactions, with very large profitable days occurring with less frequency than prior years. DOMINION HUB to DOM_RESID_AGG UTC remains the path with the highest cleared volume in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. May 2026 was the most profitable month since December 2022, driven by emergency transmission outages at the Greenway-Roundtable parallel lines in Data Center Alley in the last week of the month.

### Table 3-48 UTC profits by month: January 2013 through June 2026

| | January | February | March | April | May | June | July | August | September | October | November | December | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | $17,048,654 | $8,304,767 | $5,629,392 | $7,560,773 | $25,219,947 | $3,484,372 | $8,781,526 | $2,327,168 | $31,160,618 | $4,393,583 | $8,730,701 | $6,793,990 | $129,435,490 |
| 2014 | $148,973,434 | $23,235,621 | $39,448,716 | $1,581,786 | $3,851,636 | $7,353,460 | $3,179,356 | $287,824 | $2,727,763 | $10,889,817 | $11,042,443 | $6,191,101 | $258,762,955 |
| 2015 | $16,132,319 | $53,830,098 | $44,309,656 | $6,392,939 | $19,793,475 | $824,817 | $8,879,275 | $5,507,608 | $6,957,012 | $4,852,454 | $392,876 | $6,620,581 | $174,493,110 |
| 2016 | $8,874,363 | $6,118,477 | $1,119,457 | $2,768,591 | ($1,333,563) | $841,706 | $3,128,346 | $3,200,573 | ($2,518,408) | $4,216,717 | $254,684 | $3,271,368 | $29,942,312 |
| 2017 | $5,716,757 | ($17,860) | $3,083,167 | $944,939 | $1,245,988 | $868,400 | $7,053,390 | $4,002,063 | $10,960,012 | $2,360,817 | $2,716,950 | $15,936,217 | $54,870,839 |
| 2018 | $13,184,346 | $506,509 | $3,410,577 | $688,796 | $9,499,735 | ($768,614) | $1,163,380 | $692,736 | $2,845,649 | $1,452,515 | $4,339,363 | $1,358,446 | $38,373,436 |
| 2019 | $574,901 | $2,407,307 | $5,287,985 | $332,036 | $1,833,879 | $3,382,009 | $4,066,461 | $2,442,971 | $12,599,278 | $5,914,042 | $1,171,145 | $3,722,403 | $43,734,418 |
| 2020 | $664,972 | $2,497,856 | $1,720,037 | $1,865,139 | $5,508,276 | $1,123,429 | $8,573,276 | $3,957,296 | ($141,240) | $1,628,186 | $1,170,367 | $2,319,727 | $30,887,320 |
| 2021 | $6,421,567 | $13,241,294 | $1,788,961 | $4,529,921 | $2,542,898 | $3,384,291 | ($1,199,849) | $5,330,600 | $2,649,331 | $2,148,861 | $5,091,590 | $2,665,873 | $48,595,339 |
| 2022 | $30,954,077 | $7,236,325 | $4,411,627 | $11,317,095 | $11,658,586 | $16,398,181 | $9,481,970 | $17,376,381 | $6,783,480 | $7,325,933 | $13,116,641 | $75,067,601 | $211,127,897 |
| 2023 | ($374,877) | $5,180,921 | $18,722,180 | $13,543,116 | $5,121,917 | ($6,820,656) | ($5,587,077) | $3,667,565 | $1,041,650 | $787,185 | $3,734,966 | $1,259,381 | $40,276,272 |
| 2024 | ($798,085) | $741,801 | $505,530 | ($1,048,989) | ($1,481,223) | ($1,997,609) | $3,605,145 | ($28,816) | $440,898 | ($852,701) | $472,000 | $677,521 | $235,473 |
| 2025 | $19,307,539 | $965,550 | $9,446,437 | $5,569,957 | ($1,921,483) | $17,309,458 | ($1,634,565) | ($406,499) | $1,936,052 | $10,057,277 | ($1,107,552) | $1,903,108 | $61,425,280 |
| 2026 | $17,417,904 | $5,488,600 | $2,880,710 | $3,168,987 | $38,539,496 | $9,713,489 | | | | | | | $77,209,185 |


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Figure 3-38 shows the positive, negative, and net daily profits for INCs and DECs in the first six months of 2026. Differences in the modeling of transmission constraints between day ahead and real time, including the use of different constraint limits or a constraint being modeled in one market but not the other, remain a principal source of false arbitrage profits and a major reason for the overall profitability of virtual transactions.

### Figure 3-38 Daily gross profits, gross losses, and net profits of all INC and DEC transactions: January through June, 2026[91]






Figure 3-39 shows the positive, negative, and net daily profits for INCs in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-39 Daily gross profits, gross losses, and net profits for INC transactions: January through June, 2026[92]




91 Calculations exclude PJM administrative charges.

92 Calculations exclude PJM administrative charges.

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Figure 3-40 shows the positive, negative, and net daily profits for DECs in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-40 Daily gross profits, gross losses, and net profits for DEC transactions: January through June, 2026






Figure 3-41 shows the cumulative INC and DEC daily profits in the first six months of 2026. Virtual trading can be profitable without contributing to price convergence because the addition of virtual supply or demand in the day-ahead market does not and cannot correct for factors not included in the day-ahead model, such as the use of different transmission constraint limits in day ahead versus real time.

### Figure 3-41 Cumulative daily INC and DEC profit: January through June, 2026





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Table 3-49 shows INC and DEC profits in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 3-49 INC and DEC profits by month: January through June, 2026**

| Month | January | February | March | April | May | June | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INCs | $83,147,065 | ($7,828,308) | ($12,003,647) | ($3,538,909) | $4,693,399 | ($6,358,518) | $58,111,082 |
| DECs | ($55,166,659) | $41,645,921 | $11,250,384 | $2,708,120 | $7,181,984 | $19,079,769 | $26,699,520 |
| INCs and DECs | $27,980,406 | $33,817,613 | ($753,263) | ($830,789) | $11,875,383 | $12,721,252 | $84,810,602 |

All virtual transactions are subject to uplift charges. Each cleared MWh of a virtual transaction pays uplift at the daily operating reserve charge rates, but UTCs pay uplift only at the transaction sink. Cleared increment offers pay the regional and RTO deviation rates, and cleared decrement bids pay the day-ahead rate in addition. Cleared up to congestion transactions pay the same rate as a decrement bid but only at the transaction's sink point. DECs and UTCs pay the day-ahead rate and RTO and regional deviation rates.

In the first six months of 2026, INCs paid a total of $29.8 million, DECs paid a total of $39.9 million, and UTCs paid a total of $49.1 million in uplift. This compares to total INC profits of $58.1 million, total DEC profits of $26.7 million, and total UTC profits of $77.2 million.

## Effect of Fast Start Pricing on Virtuals

The implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, has resulted in changes to the settlement of virtual transactions. Prior to fast start pricing, virtual products were cleared and settled based on a single set of prices. The dispatch and pricing run prices were the same. With fast start pricing, all virtual products are cleared using day-ahead dispatch run prices, but pay and receive the day-ahead and real-time pricing run prices. The use of fast start pricing has a direct effect on virtual settlements through the use of prices different from those used to dispatch virtuals. This means that a DEC may clear in the day-ahead market, based on the dispatch run, even though its offer is lower than the final, pricing run price. This means that an INC may clear even though its offer is higher than the day-ahead market price. The use of fast start pricing also results in divergence between day-ahead and real-time prices, which can be targeted by virtual traders. The fact that fast start pricing increases prices more in the real-time market, all else held equal, increases the profitability of DECs and decreases the profitability of INCs.

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Figure 3-42 shows the total monthly profits received by INCs, DECs, and UTCs, compared to the profits they would have received if dispatch run prices had been used in settlement for each month since the initial implementation of fast start pricing in September 2021. Since its implementation, fast start pricing has consistently increased profits for DECs and decreased profits for INCs but has not significantly affected profits for UTCs. Fast start pricing creates a difference between day-ahead and real-time prices. Virtual traders can benefit from this difference without contributing to price convergence.

**Figure 3-42 Monthly profits for virtuals using pricing run versus dispatch run prices: September 1, 2021 through June 30, 2026**




From the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, through June 30, 2026, the cumulative difference in profit resulting from the difference between the pricing run and the dispatch run for INCs was -$504.3 million, the cumulative difference in profit for DECs was $615.7 million, and the cumulative difference in profit for UTCs was $22.1 million. Fast start pricing led to a net increase of $133.5 million in cumulative profits for virtual transactions since September 1, 2021.

There are incentives to use virtual transactions to profit from price differences between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, but there is no reason to believe that such activity will result in price convergence and no data to support that claim. As a general matter, virtual offers and bids are based on expectations about both day-ahead and real-time energy market conditions and reflect the uncertainty about conditions in both markets, about modeling differences and the fact that these conditions change hourly and daily. PJM markets do not provide a mechanism that could result in immediate convergence after a change in system conditions as there is at least a one day lag after any change in system conditions before offers could reflect such changes. PJM markets do not provide a mechanism that could ever result in convergence in the presence of modeling differences.

Substantial virtual trading activity does not guarantee that market power cannot be exercised in the day-ahead energy market. Hourly and daily price differences between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets fluctuate continuously and substantially from positive to negative. There may be substantial, persistent differences between day-ahead and real-time prices even on a monthly basis.


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## Day-ahead and Real-time Prices

Table 3-50 shows the difference between the day-ahead and the real-time average LMP in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 3-50 Day-ahead and real-time average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026[93]

| | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | Real-Time | Difference | Percent of Real Time | Day-Ahead | Real-Time | Difference | Percent of Real Time |
| Average | $45.91 | $47.08 | $1.17 | 2.5% | $65.34 | $64.12 | ($1.22) | (1.9%) |
| Median | $37.09 | $35.22 | ($1.87) | (5.3%) | $37.78 | $34.35 | ($3.44) | (10.0%) |
| Standard deviation | $34.40 | $60.62 | $26.22 | 43.2% | $93.32 | $89.93 | ($3.39) | (3.8%) |
| Peak average | $54.51 | $56.70 | $2.19 | 3.9% | $73.45 | $69.92 | ($3.53) | (5.0%) |
| Peak median | $43.09 | $40.59 | ($2.50) | (6.1%) | $43.92 | $39.75 | ($4.17) | (10.5%) |
| Peak standard deviation | $41.46 | $81.46 | $40.00 | 49.1% | $103.57 | $88.39 | ($15.18) | (17.2%) |
| Off peak average | $38.35 | $38.62 | $0.27 | 0.7% | $58.20 | $59.02 | $0.81 | 1.4% |
| Off peak median | $32.95 | $32.08 | ($0.87) | (2.7%) | $33.12 | $30.33 | ($2.79) | (9.2%) |
| Off peak standard deviation | $24.32 | $30.34 | $6.03 | 19.9% | $82.65 | $90.98 | $8.34 | 9.2% |

Table 3-51 shows the difference between the day-ahead and the real-time load-weighted LMP in the first six months of 2001 through 2026.

### Table 3-51 Day-ahead and real-time load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2001 through 2026

| | Load-Weighted Average LMP | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Day-Ahead | Real-Time | Difference | Percent of Real-Time | Average Absolute Difference | Average Absolute Difference as a Percent of Real-Time |
| 2001 | $37.08 | $35.27 | ($1.81) | (5.1%) | $10.78 | 30.6% |
| 2002 | $26.88 | $25.93 | ($0.95) | (3.7%) | $5.41 | 20.9% |
| 2003 | $45.62 | $44.43 | ($1.20) | (2.7%) | $13.63 | 30.7% |
| 2004 | $46.12 | $47.62 | $1.50 | 3.1% | $10.82 | 22.7% |
| 2005 | $48.12 | $48.67 | $0.55 | 1.1% | $10.05 | 20.7% |
| 2006 | $50.21 | $51.83 | $1.62 | 3.1% | $11.83 | 22.8% |
| 2007 | $55.70 | $58.32 | $2.62 | 4.5% | $14.74 | 25.3% |
| 2008 | $73.71 | $74.77 | $1.06 | 1.4% | $18.35 | 24.5% |
| 2009 | $42.21 | $42.48 | $0.27 | 0.6% | $6.68 | 15.7% |
| 2010 | $46.12 | $45.75 | ($0.37) | (0.8%) | $8.96 | 19.6% |
| 2011 | $47.12 | $48.47 | $1.35 | 2.8% | $10.24 | 21.1% |
| 2012 | $31.84 | $31.21 | ($0.63) | (2.0%) | $5.19 | 16.6% |
| 2013 | $38.23 | $37.96 | ($0.27) | (0.7%) | $5.93 | 15.6% |
| 2014 | $70.67 | $69.92 | ($0.75) | (1.1%) | $21.58 | 30.9% |
| 2015 | $43.26 | $42.30 | ($0.96) | (2.3%) | $10.01 | 23.7% |
| 2016 | $27.33 | $27.09 | ($0.25) | (0.9%) | $5.09 | 18.8% |
| 2017 | $30.02 | $29.81 | ($0.21) | (0.7%) | $4.27 | 14.3% |
| 2018 | $40.96 | $42.44 | $1.47 | 3.5% | $9.66 | 22.8% |
| 2019 | $27.97 | $27.49 | ($0.48) | (1.8%) | $4.37 | 15.9% |
| 2020 | $19.23 | $19.40 | $0.17 | 0.9% | $2.86 | 14.8% |
| 2021 | $31.00 | $30.62 | ($0.37) | (1.2%) | $6.23 | 20.3% |
| 2022 | $66.50 | $67.77 | $1.27 | 1.9% | $13.97 | 20.6% |
| 2023 | $30.53 | $29.33 | ($1.20) | (4.1%) | $6.44 | 21.9% |
| 2024 | $31.66 | $31.70 | $0.04 | 0.1% | $8.46 | 26.7% |
| 2025 | $49.72 | $51.75 | $2.02 | 3.9% | $13.79 | 26.7% |
| 2026 | $74.25 | $72.54 | ($1.71) | (2.4%) | $26.29 | 36.2% |

93 The averages used are the annual average of the hourly average PJM prices for day-ahead and real-time.

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
Table 3-52 includes frequency distributions of the differences between the day-ahead and the real-time load-weighted LMP in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 3-52 Frequency distribution by hours of real-time load-weighted LMP minus day-ahead load-weighted LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 Jan - Jun | | 2026 Jan - Jun | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMP | Frequency | Cumulative Percent | Frequency | Cumulative Percent |
| < ($200) | 1 | 0.0% | 63 | 1.5% |
| ($200) to ($100) | 25 | 0.6% | 46 | 2.5% |
| ($100) to ($50) | 46 | 1.7% | 81 | 4.4% |
| ($50) to $0 | 2,631 | 62.2% | 2,743 | 67.5% |
| $0 to $50 | 1,526 | 97.4% | 1,112 | 93.1% |
| $50 to $100 | 79 | 99.2% | 186 | 97.4% |
| $100 to $200 | 23 | 99.7% | 66 | 98.9% |
| $200 to $400 | 4 | 99.8% | 33 | 99.7% |
| $400 to $800 | 4 | 99.9% | 12 | 100.0% |
| >= $800 | 4 | 100.0% | 1 | 100.0% |

Figure 3-43 shows the differences between day-ahead and real-time hourly average LMP in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-43 Real-time hourly average LMP minus day-ahead hourly average LMP: January through June, 2026






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Figure 3-44 shows day-ahead and real-time load-weighted average LMP by hour of the day in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Figure 3-44 System hourly average LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026




## Zonal LMP and Dispatch

Table 3-53 shows real-time zonal average and load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 3-53 Real-time zonal average and load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Real-Time Average LMP | | | Real-Time Load-Weighted Average LMP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | 2026 | | 2025 | 2026 | |
| Zone | Jan-Jun | Jan-Jun | Percent Change | Jan-Jun | Jan-Jun | Percent Change |
| ACEC | $41.85 | $53.52 | 27.9% | $49.28 | $62.18 | 26.2% |
| AEP | $46.10 | $57.41 | 24.5% | $49.50 | $62.64 | 26.5% |
| APS | $47.48 | $72.37 | 52.4% | $52.22 | $85.31 | 63.4% |
| ATSI | $44.93 | $52.69 | 17.3% | $48.29 | $56.74 | 17.5% |
| BGE | $55.28 | $90.73 | 64.1% | $63.19 | $111.47 | 76.4% |
| COMED | $33.24 | $32.05 | (3.6%) | $37.31 | $34.59 | (7.3%) |
| DAY | $45.09 | $57.18 | 26.8% | $48.80 | $63.01 | 29.1% |
| DUKE | $43.55 | $56.58 | 29.9% | $47.20 | $62.79 | 33.0% |
| DOM | $61.28 | $97.60 | 59.3% | $67.75 | $113.30 | 67.2% |
| DPL | $43.58 | $58.23 | 33.6% | $51.34 | $73.87 | 43.9% |
| DUQ | $43.93 | $51.50 | 17.2% | $47.46 | $55.77 | 17.5% |
| EKPC | $44.56 | $53.96 | 21.1% | $49.88 | $64.43 | 29.2% |
| JCPLC | $42.60 | $54.47 | 27.9% | $49.91 | $63.45 | 27.1% |
| MEC | $44.62 | $53.30 | 19.5% | $49.53 | $61.53 | 24.2% |
| OVEC | $41.83 | $52.88 | 26.4% | $42.51 | $55.65 | 30.9% |
| PECO | $40.75 | $52.79 | 29.5% | $46.19 | $61.81 | 33.8% |
| PE | $47.97 | $54.99 | 14.6% | $51.49 | $60.89 | 18.3% |
| PEPCO | $55.16 | $89.98 | 63.1% | $63.40 | $111.70 | 76.2% |
| PPL | $40.93 | $52.02 | 27.1% | $45.37 | $61.34 | 35.2% |
| PSEG | $43.43 | $55.70 | 28.3% | $49.25 | $63.00 | 27.9% |
| REC | $46.63 | $58.21 | 24.8% | $53.26 | $64.24 | 20.6% |
| PJM | $47.08 | $64.12 | 36.2% | $51.75 | $72.54 | 40.2% |

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Table 3-54 shows day-ahead zonal average and load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

## Table 3-54 Day-ahead zonal average and load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026


| | Day-Ahead Average LMP | | | Day-Ahead Load-Weighted Average LMP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | 2026 | | 2025 | 2026 | |
| Zone | Jan-Jun | Jan-Jun | Percent Change | Jan-Jun | Jan-Jun | Percent Change |
| ACEC | $41.85 | $56.93 | 36.0% | $46.55 | $65.97 | 41.7% |
| AEP | $45.15 | $58.84 | 30.3% | $48.16 | $64.72 | 34.4% |
| APS | $46.28 | $74.18 | 60.3% | $49.93 | $87.27 | 74.8% |
| ATSI | $45.11 | $55.93 | 24.0% | $47.71 | $60.36 | 26.5% |
| BGE | $54.71 | $95.29 | 74.2% | $61.12 | $116.02 | 89.8% |
| COMED | $33.16 | $40.22 | 21.3% | $36.05 | $44.18 | 22.6% |
| DAY | $45.38 | $60.68 | 33.7% | $48.58 | $67.46 | 38.9% |
| DUKE | $43.98 | $59.97 | 36.4% | $47.16 | $67.02 | 42.1% |
| DOM | $57.78 | $90.92 | 57.3% | $63.87 | $108.16 | 69.3% |
| DPL | $44.36 | $61.94 | 39.6% | $51.62 | $78.67 | 52.4% |
| DUQ | $43.51 | $54.26 | 24.7% | $46.17 | $58.93 | 27.7% |
| EKPC | $43.68 | $56.99 | 30.5% | $49.14 | $71.35 | 45.2% |
| JCPLC | $42.38 | $57.93 | 36.7% | $46.65 | $66.44 | 42.4% |
| MEC | $44.80 | $57.24 | 27.8% | $48.68 | $64.97 | 33.5% |
| OVEC | $42.51 | $56.73 | 33.4% | $38.17 | $43.10 | 12.9% |
| PECO | $40.79 | $56.02 | 37.3% | $44.88 | $65.18 | 45.2% |
| PE | $47.98 | $59.69 | 24.4% | $50.89 | $63.00 | 23.8% |
| PEPCO | $53.80 | $93.08 | 73.0% | $60.38 | $114.37 | 89.4% |
| PPL | $40.72 | $55.77 | 37.0% | $44.50 | $65.26 | 46.7% |
| PSEG | $42.55 | $58.77 | 38.1% | $46.19 | $64.68 | 40.0% |
| REC | $45.62 | $60.50 | 32.6% | $49.57 | $65.80 | 32.7% |
| PJM | $45.91 | $65.34 | 42.3% | $49.72 | $74.25 | 49.3% |



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Figure 3-45 is a map of the real-time load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of 2026. In the legend, green represents the real-time load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of 2026 and each increment to the right represents five percent of the pricing nodes above the real-time load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of 2026 and each increment to the left represents 25 percent of the pricing nodes below the real-time load-weighted average LMP for the first six months 2026.


### Figure 3-45 Real-time load-weighted average LMP: January through June, 2026




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Figure 3-46 includes maps of the real-time load-weighted average LMP for the first six months of 2023 through 2026. In the legend, green represents the average price and each color increment to the right represents five percent of the pricing nodes above the average price and each color increment to the left represents 25 percent of the pricing nodes below the average price. The scale is based on prices for the first six months of all four years.

**Figure 3-46 Real-time load-weighted average LMP map: January through June, 2023 through 2026**




## Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors (TCPF)

LMPs are generally set by the offer prices of marginal resources. When a transmission constraint is binding, the flow on the constraint is equal to its limit and the shadow price of the constraint is a function of offer prices of marginal resources. LMP may, at times, be set by transmission constraint penalty factors. When a transmission constraint is limiting and there are no generation alternatives to resolve the constraint, system operators may allow the transmission limit


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to be violated. When this occurs, the shadow price of the constraint is set by transmission constraint penalty factors. The shadow price directly affects the LMP. Transmission constraint penalty factors are administratively determined and can be thought of as a form of locational scarcity pricing, but only when properly applied. The TCPFs are applied incorrectly about 94 percent of the time. In addition, it is not clear that the line ratings are correctly defined, by duration of the flow and ambient conditions, by the transmission owners who have sole control over the line ratings with no meaningful oversight.

PJM operators routinely reduce the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) by setting the control limits to 95 percent of the actual line ratings.[94] The result is that transmission constraint penalty factors set price much more frequently than needed or appropriate. PJM reduces the control limits both to control for actual flows and for flows that would only result from a contingency (N-1).

Since the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, PJM set the default level of the transmission constraint penalty factor in the pricing run of the day-ahead market at $2,000 per MWh. The default level of the transmission constraint penalty factor in the dispatch run of the day-ahead market was left unchanged at $30,000 per MWh.

Table 3-55 shows the frequency and average shadow price of transmission constraints in the PJM real-time market. In the first six months of 2026, there were 132,024 transmission constraint five minute intervals in the real-time market with a nonzero shadow price. For 22,551, or 17.1 percent, of these transmission constraint intervals, the control limit was violated, meaning that the flow exceeded the facility limit used in SCED.[95] The data on violations includes both violations that result from reductions in the SCED control limit by PJM and violations that are based on the actual line ratings. Of the 22,251 constraint intervals, PJM used the actual line limits for 2,478 or 1.9 percent of the constraint intervals. For the remaining 20,073 or 15.2 percent of the constraint intervals, PJM used reduced line limits. In those cases, the actual line limit was not violated. In all cases where violations resulted from reductions by PJM from actual line ratings the shadow prices and resulting LMPs were set by the violation penalty factors. In the first six months of 2026, the average shadow price of transmission constraints ($1,993.85 per MWh) when the line limit used in SCED was violated with a reduced line limit was 7.1 times higher than when the transmission constraint was binding but not violated ($280.32 per MWh) at its limit used in SCED.

Of the 22,551 violated transmission constraint intervals in the first six months of 2026, 5,821 or 26 percent of the transmission constraint violations were during the Winter Storm Fern between January 22, 2026, and January 30, 2026.

Market to Market Transmission Constraints are categorized separately because of the unique rules governing the congestion management of these constraints by PJM and MISO. In the real-time market, PJM and MISO initiate a joint congestion management process commonly referred as "market to market" if they recognize substantial flows originating from the other RTO on their constraints. The identified constraints are then modeled in the dispatch optimizations of the both RTOs. After every approved solution, the shadow prices are exchanged between the RTOs.

### Table 3-55 Frequency and average shadow price of transmission constraints in the real-time market: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Frequency (Constraint Intervals) | | Average Shadow Price | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Description | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Actual) | 2,098 | 2,478 | $848.50 | $1,530.89 |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Reduced Limit) | 9,874 | 20,073 | $1,993.85 | $1,999.89 |
| Binding Transmission Constraints | 68,022 | 63,250 | $303.33 | $280.32 |
| Market to Market Transmission Constraints | 28,700 | 46,223 | $429.03 | $424.05 |
| All Transmission Constraints | 108,694 | 132,024 | $500.61 | $615.56 |

94 Actual transmission line limits are set by the transmission owner. PJM chooses the control limits. At present the actual line rating methods are not reviewed by FERC, or PJM, or the MMU.

95 The line limit of a facility associated with a transmission constraint is not necessarily the rated line limit. In PJM, the dispatcher has the discretion to lower the rated line limit.

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Table 3-56 shows the frequency and average shadow price of transmission constraints in the PJM day-ahead market. In the first six months of 2026, there were 39,467 transmission constraint hours in the day-ahead market with a nonzero shadow price. For 689, or 1.7 percent, of these transmission constraint hours, the line limit was violated, meaning that the flow exceeded the facility limit used in the day-ahead pricing run solution.

**Table 3-56 Frequency and average shadow price of transmission constraints in the day-ahead market: January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| | Frequency (Constraint Intervals) | | Average Shadow Price | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Description | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Actual) | 40 | 506 | $2,000.00 | $1,827.34 |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Reduced) | - | 183 | $0.00 | $2,000.00 |
| Binding Transmission Constraints | 31,227 | 32,080 | $96.27 | $122.62 |
| Market to Market Transmission Constraints | 6,179 | 6,698 | $148.97 | $146.74 |
| All Transmission Constraints | 37,446 | 39,467 | $107.00 | $157.27 |

Table 3-57 shows the frequency of violated transmission constraints by voltage level in the real-time market. In the first six months of 2026, 56.5 percent of the violated transmission constraint intervals had a voltage level at or below 230 kV.

Of the 8,920 violated 500 kV transmission constraint intervals in the first six months of 2026, 3,606 or 40 percent of the 500 kV transmission constraint violations were during the Winter Storm Fern between January 22, 2026, and January 30, 2026. This is a 378.3 percent increase in constraint violation intervals for the 500 kV constraints. All else being equal, transmission constraint violations at higher voltage levels have a greater impact on market prices. Of the 6,403 230 kV violated constraint intervals, 425 or 6.6 percent were located near the Data Center Alley in Virginia on May 26, 2026.

**Table 3-57 Frequency of PJM violated transmission constraints in the real-time market by voltage: January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voltage | Frequency (Constraint Intervals) | Percent | Frequency (Constraint Intervals) | Percent |
| 1 kV | 169 | 1.4% | 25 | 0.1% |
| 69 kV | 911 | 7.6% | 406 | 1.8% |
| 115 kV | 4,011 | 33.5% | 2,119 | 9.4% |
| 138 kV | 2,579 | 21.5% | 3,796 | 16.8% |
| 230 kV | 2,312 | 19.3% | 6,403 | 28.4% |
| 345 kV | 78 | 0.7% | 816 | 3.6% |
| 500 kV | 1,865 | 15.6% | 8,920 | 39.6% |
| 765 kV | 47 | 0.4% | 66 | 0.3% |
| Total | 11,972 | 100.0% | 22,551 | 100.0% |

Transmission constraint penalty factors should be applied without discretion, but not without additional rules that prevent unintended consequences. PJM adopted the MMU's recommendation to remove the constraint relaxation logic and allow transmission constraint penalty factors to set prices in the day-ahead and real-time markets for all internal transmission constraints.[96] But the potential for prolonged and excessively high administrative pricing in the energy market due to transmission constraint penalty factors remains an issue that needs to be addressed. There can be situations in which the application of transmission constraint penalty factors in real time for significant periods creates manipulation opportunities for virtuals and creates inefficient wealth transfers when market participants do not have the ability to react to the high prices either on the supply or demand side.[97] This could be the result of a lengthy planned transmission outage, for example.[98] It can also result from PJM reducing the control limit on the line rating in RT SCED below 100 percent of the actual line limit and triggering the transmission constraint penalty factor, while operating the system below the actual line limit for a prolonged period. PJM should not reduce the control limit on the transmission line ratings in SCED to trigger the inclusion of transmission constraint penalty factors in price. In addition, PJM has no information about

96 PJM applied a procedure that PJM termed constraint relaxation logic, under which a revised SCED dispatch solution was obtained with an artificially increased limit for the violated transmission facility. The logic typically resulted in reducing the shadow prices to be slightly below the defined constraint violation penalty factor.

97 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. EL22-26-000 et al. (February 1, 2022); 178 FERC ¶ 61,104 (2022).

98 See *id.*



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the accuracy of the line ratings that are determined by each transmission owner. It is not clear whether the line ratings that trigger the transmission constraint penalty factors are defined for the actual expected period of the power flow on the line. Line ratings vary significantly by duration of power flows, and by ambient conditions.

PJM also revised the tariff to list the conditions under which transmission constraint penalty factors would be changed from their default value of $2,000 per MWh. The new rules went into effect on February 1, 2019. The Commission approved the PJM and MISO joint filing to remove the constraint relaxation logic for market to market constraints on March 6, 2020. PJM and MISO implemented the changes to their dispatch software in the second half of 2020. On March 21, 2023, FERC approved new rules proposed by PJM to allow for reducing the transmission constraint penalty factors below the default $2,000 per MWh for constraints that are violated due to a transmission outage caused by the construction of upgrades to relieve congestion, for which limited generation resources are available to provide relief.[99]

PJM routinely, based on discretion, reduces the control limits on the transmission constraint line ratings modeled in SCED to below 100 percent, generally to 95 percent of the actual limit, administratively triggering the use of transmission constraint penalty factors.[100] The control limits set the limit of the constraint modeled in SCED. For example, in SCED, a transmission facility with a 100 MW line rating set at a 90 percent control limit would be modeled as a constraint with a limit of 90 MW. Table 3-58 shows the frequency of changes to the control limits for transmission constraints for binding and violated transmission constraints in the PJM real-time market. In the first six months of 2026, there were 20,073, or 89 percent, of 22,551 violated transmission constraint intervals in the real-time market with a control limit less than 100 percent. In the first six months of 2026, among the violated transmission constraints with a reduced control limit, the constraint limit was reduced on average by 5.2 percent. In the first six months of 2026, there were 62,168, or 98 percent, of 63,250 binding transmission constraint intervals in the real-time market with a control limit less than 100 percent. In the first six months of 2026, among the binding transmission constraints with a reduced control limit, the constraint limit was reduced on average by 6.0 percent. By arbitrarily lowering transmission facility limits, PJM is not using the full transmission system capacity available to serve the load to achieve the least cost dispatch solution. The cost to serve the load and the load payments would be lower had PJM not reduced the transmission line ratings.

99 See 182 FERC ¶ 61,183 (March 21, 2023). The Commission approved PJM's proposed tariff revisions to allow PJM to lower transmission constraint penalty factors generally for any situation similar to the high prices caused by Lanexa-Dunnsville-Northern Neck line outage in the Northern Neck peninsula in Virginia.

100 Actual transmission line limits are set by the transmission owner. PJM chooses the control limits. At present the actual line rating methods are not reviewed by FERC, or PJM, or the MMU.

### Table 3-58 Frequency of reduction in control limit of line ratings (constraint intervals) in the real-time market: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Frequency (Constraint Intervals) | | Constraints with Reduced Control Percent (Constraint Intervals) | | Average Reduction (Percent) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Description | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Actual) | 2,098 | 2,478 | - | - | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Reduced Limit) | 9,874 | 20,073 | 9,874 | 20,073 | 5.2% | 5.2% |
| Binding Transmission Constraints | 68,022 | 63,250 | 65,114 | 62,168 | 6.0% | 6.0% |
| Market to Market Transmission Constraints | 28,700 | 46,223 | 11,828 | 20,780 | 7.4% | 6.2% |
| All Transmission Constraints | 108,694 | 132,024 | 86,816 | 103,021 | 6.1% | 5.9% |

Table 3-59 shows the reasons provided by the PJM operators for changing the control limit on the line rating for violated transmission constraints. In the first six months of 2026, of the 20,073 violated transmission constraint intervals with reduced control limits, no reason was provided for 16,363 cases, or 81.5 percent of all the cases. In 2,481 cases, or 12.4 percent, the control limits were reduced because the relief calculated by the SCED optimization was less than the operator's desired relief for the transmission constraint. Although there were no cases in the first six months of 2026, the control limits can be reduced because PJM designates the constraint as a thermal surrogate. Thermal surrogate constraints are constraints that PJM activates and for which PJM generally reduces the line rating to enable specific resources called on to control a constraint to set price.

The MMU recommends that PJM end the practice of manual and automated discretionary reductions in the control limits on transmission constraint line ratings used in the market clearing software (SCED) and included in LMP. This

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practice has significant market effects by limiting economic power flows and increasing prices above the level that would exist if 100 percent of the actual line rating were used in clearing the market and setting energy market prices.

### Table 3-59 PJM's reasons for reduction in control limits of line ratings (constraint intervals) in the real-time market: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Constraint Intervals | | Average Reduction (Percent) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reason | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) |
| Modeled constraint is a thermal surrogate | 13 | - | 52.2% | 0.0% |
| No reason provided | 8,280 | 16,363 | 4.5% | 4.7% |
| Prepositioning of generation resources to support an operational requirement | 179 | 104 | 9.4% | 8.1% |
| Inadequate relief calculated by the SCED optimization | 1,040 | 2,481 | 8.3% | 7.4% |
| Transmission owner identified the flow on their constraint to be greater than PJM's calculated flow on the same constraint. | 53 | 172 | 9.6% | 8.3% |
| Power flow on the constraint is volatile due to various system conditions | 309 | 953 | 7.4% | 7.1% |
| All violated constraints | 9,874 | 20,073 | 5.2% | 5.2% |

Table 3-60 shows the impact on LMP of PJM dispatchers reducing the control limit of line ratings of transmission constraints and causing artificial line limit violations.[101] The transmission constraint penalty factor contribution to the load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 was $14.75 per MWh or $6.0 billion of the total $29.4 billion cost of real-time load. This impact includes reductions to the line limits of violated constraints during Winter Storm Fern. If 100 percent of the line limits had been used for the PJM transmission constraints and everything else remained unchanged, fewer constraints would have been violated and the transmission constraint penalty factor's contribution to the load-weighted average LMP would have decreased to $0.06 per MWh, a 99.6 percent reduction.

101 The MMU calculates the impact on system prices based on analysis using sensitivity factors. The transmission constraint penalty factor contribution with actual line limits is not based on a counterfactual redispatch of the system. See Technical Reference for PJM Markets, "Calculation and Use of Generator Sensitivity/Unit Participation Factors," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

### Table 3-60 Real-time LMP effect of reduced control limits on transmission constraint line ratings (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Contribution to LMP | |
|---|---|---|
| Line Limit Scenario for Violated Constraints | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) |
| Line Limits Reduced by PJM (Actual) | $5.32 | $14.75 |
| Hypothetical Use of Full Line Limits | $0.03 | $0.06 |
| Change in Contribution to LMP | ($5.29) | ($14.69) |
| Percent Change in Contribution to LMP | (99.4%) | (99.6%) |

Table 3-61 shows the frequency of changes to the magnitude of transmission constraint penalty factors for binding and violated transmission constraints in the PJM Real-Time Energy Market. In the first six months of 2025, there were 21,915, or 97 percent, of the total 22,551 violated transmission constraint intervals, which includes 1,842 violated transmission constraint intervals with actual line limits and 20,073 violated transmission constraint intervals with reduced line limits, in the real-time market with a transmission constraint penalty factor equal to the default $2,000 per MWh.

### Table 3-61 Frequency of changes to the magnitude of transmission constraint penalty factor (constraint intervals) in the real-time market: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Description | $2,000 per MWh (Default) | Above $2,000 per MWh | Below $2,000 per MWh | $2,000 per MWh (Default) | Above $2,000 per MWh | Below $2,000 per MWh |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Actual) | 677 | - | 1,421 | 1,842 | - | 636 |
| Violated Transmission Constraints (Reduced) | 9,857 | - | 17 | 20,073 | - | - |
| Binding Transmission Constraints | 65,706 | - | 2,316 | 62,899 | - | 351 |
| Market to Market Transmission Constraints | 8,021 | 15 | 20,664 | 4,026 | 28 | 42,169 |
| All Transmission Constraints | 84,261 | 15 | 24,418 | 88,840 | 28 | 43,156 |

Prior to September 1, 2022, transmission constraint penalty factors frequently set prices when PJM modeled a stability surrogate constraint to limit the dispatch of a generator that would experience voltage instability at its full output due to a transmission outage. Since September 1, 2022, PJM uses a generator output limit constraint to manage generator voltage instability issues. In the first six months of 2026, there were 56,401 constraint intervals



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during which PJM reduced the output of generators to manage instability. Changes to the surrogate constraint limit that exceed the unit's ability to reduce output cause constraint violations. Constraint violations also occur when the unit follows the regulation signal or increases its minimum operating parameters above the surrogate constraint limit. Prices set at the $2,000 per MWh penalty factor are not useful signals to the market under these conditions and create false arbitrage opportunities for virtuals.

## Net Generation by Zone

Figure 3-47 shows the difference between the PJM real-time generation and real-time load by zone in the first six months of 2026. Figure 3-47 is color coded using a scale on which red shades represent zones that have less generation than load and green shades represent zones that have more generation than load, with darker shades meaning greater amounts of net generation or load. Table 3-62 shows the difference between the real-time generation and real-time load by zone in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Figure 3-47 Map of real-time generation less real-time load by zone: January through June, 2026[102]




102 Real-time zonal generation data for the map and corresponding table is based on the zonal designation for every bus listed in the most current PJM LMP bus model, which can be found at <http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/energy/lmp-model-info.aspx>.

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**Table 3-62 Real-time generation less real-time load by zone (GWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| Zonal Generation and Load (GWh) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | |
| Zone | Generation | Load | Net | Generation | Load | Net |
| ACEC | 447 | 4,513 | (4,065) | 1,094 | 4,518 | (3,423) |
| AEP | 79,783 | 66,249 | 13,533 | 84,846 | 71,529 | 13,317 |
| APS | 24,716 | 24,526 | 190 | 25,319 | 24,626 | 692 |
| ATSI | 25,400 | 32,648 | (7,247) | 29,628 | 32,589 | (2,961) |
| BGE | 8,288 | 14,867 | (6,579) | 9,656 | 14,881 | (5,225) |
| COMED | 69,002 | 44,677 | 24,325 | 66,127 | 44,234 | 21,893 |
| DAY | 1,235 | 8,570 | (7,334) | 1,240 | 8,526 | (7,285) |
| DUKE | 6,755 | 12,909 | (6,154) | 7,280 | 12,655 | (5,375) |
| DOM | 53,823 | 63,953 | (10,130) | 52,977 | 68,217 | (15,240) |
| DPL | 2,379 | 9,113 | (6,734) | 2,753 | 9,229 | (6,475) |
| DUQ | 8,439 | 6,312 | 2,127 | 7,945 | 6,216 | 1,728 |
| EKPC | 5,304 | 7,090 | (1,785) | 5,443 | 7,126 | (1,684) |
| JCPLC | 3,465 | 10,280 | (6,815) | 3,299 | 10,487 | (7,187) |
| MEC | 9,763 | 7,452 | 2,311 | 8,353 | 7,534 | 819 |
| OVEC | 5,708 | 59 | 5,649 | 5,435 | 59 | 5,377 |
| PECO | 37,201 | 18,692 | 18,509 | 37,716 | 18,958 | 18,757 |
| PE | 15,026 | 8,170 | 6,856 | 13,087 | 8,164 | 4,923 |
| PEPCO | 5,589 | 13,763 | (8,174) | 5,862 | 13,615 | (7,754) |
| PPL | 37,946 | 20,246 | 17,701 | 37,676 | 20,357 | 17,319 |
| PSEG | 19,972 | 20,094 | (123) | 19,999 | 20,509 | (510) |
| REC | 0 | 661 | (661) | 0 | 681 | (681) |

## Net Generation and Load

PJM sums all negative (injections) and positive (withdrawals) at each designated load bus when calculating net load (accounting load). PJM sums all of the negative (withdrawals) and positive (injections) at each generation bus when calculating net generation. Netting withdrawals and injections by bus type (generation or load) affects the measurement of total load and total generation. Energy withdrawn at a generation bus to provide, for example, auxiliary/parasitic power or station power, power to synchronous condenser motors, power to onsite customers, or power to run pumped storage pumps, is actually load, not negative generation. Energy injected at load buses by behind the meter generation is actually generation, not negative load.

The zonal load-weighted LMP is calculated by weighting the zone's load bus LMPs by the zone's load bus accounting load. The definition of injections and withdrawals of energy as generation or load affects PJM's calculation of zonal load-weighted LMP.

The MMU recommends that during intervals when a generation bus shows a net withdrawal, the energy withdrawal be treated as load, not negative generation, for purposes of calculating load and load-weighted LMP. The MMU also recommends that during intervals when a load bus shows a net injection, the energy injection be treated as generation, not negative load, for purposes of calculating generation and load-weighted LMP.


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# Fuel Prices, LMP, and Dispatch

## Energy Production by Fuel Source

Table 3-63 shows PJM generation by fuel source in GWh for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

In the first six months of 2026, generation from coal units decreased 3.2 percent, generation from natural gas units increased 2.6 percent, generation from oil units increased 29.7 percent, generation from wind units increased 2.1 percent, and generation from solar units increased 23.9 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Table 3-63 Generation (By fuel source (GWh)): January through June, 2025 and 2026[103] [104]

| | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | Change in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | GWh | Percent | GWh | Percent | Output |
| Coal | 72,175.3 | 16.9% | 69,857.3 | 16.2% | (3.2%) |
| Bituminous | 60,472.5 | 14.2% | 59,785.0 | 13.8% | (1.1%) |
| Sub Bituminous | 8,140.4 | 1.9% | 6,664.6 | 1.5% | (18.1%) |
| Other Coal | 3,562.4 | 0.8% | 3,407.7 | 0.8% | (4.3%) |
| Nuclear | 133,994.6 | 31.5% | 134,859.1 | 31.2% | 0.6% |
| Gas | 174,849.7 | 41.0% | 179,309.9 | 41.5% | 2.6% |
| Natural Gas CC | 158,888.9 | 37.3% | 159,867.8 | 37.0% | 0.6% |
| Natural Gas CT | 9,216.1 | 2.2% | 10,426.8 | 2.4% | 13.1% |
| Natural Gas Other Units | 6,247.8 | 1.5% | 8,522.7 | 2.0% | 36.4% |
| Other Gas | 496.9 | 0.1% | 492.7 | 0.1% | (0.9%) |
| Hydroelectric | 8,905.7 | 2.1% | 8,091.6 | 1.9% | (9.1%) |
| Pumped Storage | 3,256.1 | 0.8% | 3,234.1 | 0.7% | (0.7%) |
| Run of River | 4,780.1 | 1.1% | 3,911.8 | 0.9% | (18.2%) |
| Other Hydro | 869.5 | 0.2% | 945.7 | 0.2% | 8.8% |
| Wind | 18,942.7 | 4.4% | 19,339.9 | 4.5% | 2.1% |
| Waste | 1,926.0 | 0.5% | 1,907.6 | 0.4% | (1.0%) |
| Oil | 2,301.2 | 0.5% | 2,985.8 | 0.7% | 29.7% |
| Heavy Oil | 124.0 | 0.0% | 292.4 | 0.1% | 135.8% |
| Light Oil | 1,261.9 | 0.3% | 1,755.8 | 0.4% | 39.1% |
| Diesel | 75.3 | 0.0% | 146.8 | 0.0% | 95.0% |
| Other Oil | 840.1 | 0.2% | 790.9 | 0.2% | (5.9%) |
| Solar | 12,300.0 | 2.9% | 15,242.7 | 3.5% | 23.9% |
| Battery | 32.2 | 0.0% | 72.4 | 0.0% | 124.8% |
| Biofuel | 586.7 | 0.1% | 591.1 | 0.1% | 0.8% |
| Total | 426,014.0 | 100.0% | 432,257.4 | 100.0% | 1.5% |

103 All generation is total gross generation output and does not net out the MWh withdrawn at a generation bus to provide auxiliary/parasitic power or station power, power to synchronous condenser motors, power to run pumped hydro pumps or power to charge batteries.

104 Other Gas includes: Landfill, Propane, Butane, Hydrogen, Gasified Coal, and Refinery Gas. Other Coal includes: Lignite, Liquefied Coal, Gasified Coal, and Waste Coal. Other oil includes: Gasoline, Jet Oil, Kerosene, and Petroleum-Other.

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### Table 3-64 Monthly generation (By fuel source (GWh)): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coal | 17,020.1 | 13,544.4 | 9,408.6 | 9,161.7 | 9,250.7 | 11,471.8 | 69,857.3 |
| Bituminous | 14,256.7 | 11,492.0 | 8,144.1 | 7,927.6 | 8,010.9 | 9,953.7 | 59,785.0 |
| Sub Bituminous | 2,109.5 | 1,410.2 | 677.5 | 827.9 | 689.6 | 950.0 | 6,664.6 |
| Other Coal | 653.9 | 642.2 | 587.0 | 406.3 | 550.1 | 568.1 | 3,407.7 |
| Nuclear | 24,959.6 | 21,526.0 | 22,284.1 | 19,988.4 | 22,560.5 | 23,540.6 | 134,859.1 |
| Gas | 35,496.0 | 32,024.7 | 28,390.5 | 24,112.8 | 25,545.9 | 33,740.0 | 179,309.9 |
| Natural Gas CC | 31,395.4 | 28,898.7 | 25,744.9 | 21,184.0 | 22,835.4 | 29,809.4 | 159,867.8 |
| Natural Gas CT | 2,422.4 | 1,855.5 | 1,395.7 | 1,542.3 | 1,423.7 | 1,787.1 | 10,426.8 |
| Natural Gas Other Units | 1,593.6 | 1,196.7 | 1,174.2 | 1,301.9 | 1,197.4 | 2,059.0 | 8,522.7 |
| Other Gas | 84.8 | 73.8 | 75.7 | 84.6 | 89.4 | 84.4 | 492.7 |
| Hydroelectric | 1,202.8 | 1,051.8 | 1,666.9 | 1,447.8 | 1,427.2 | 1,295.1 | 8,091.6 |
| Pumped Storage | 508.6 | 491.3 | 577.2 | 488.3 | 544.5 | 624.2 | 3,234.1 |
| Run of River | 557.9 | 430.6 | 936.2 | 809.8 | 730.5 | 446.9 | 3,911.8 |
| Other Hydro | 136.3 | 129.9 | 153.6 | 149.7 | 152.1 | 224.0 | 945.7 |
| Wind | 3,865.8 | 2,906.5 | 3,953.2 | 3,793.4 | 2,623.3 | 2,197.8 | 19,339.9 |
| Waste | 312.1 | 278.5 | 338.6 | 308.5 | 329.7 | 340.2 | 1,907.6 |
| Oil | 895.0 | 493.7 | 266.7 | 409.4 | 428.0 | 493.0 | 2,985.8 |
| Heavy Oil | 68.6 | 58.7 | 25.4 | 27.8 | 90.0 | 21.9 | 292.4 |
| Light Oil | 592.3 | 278.6 | 104.3 | 289.9 | 187.3 | 303.4 | 1,755.8 |
| Diesel | 93.8 | 31.8 | 0.3 | 2.2 | 11.7 | 7.0 | 146.8 |
| Other Oil | 140.2 | 124.7 | 136.7 | 89.5 | 139.0 | 160.8 | 790.9 |
| Solar | 1,337.0 | 1,689.6 | 2,369.4 | 3,052.7 | 3,293.3 | 3,500.6 | 15,242.7 |
| Battery | 9.8 | 9.5 | 11.6 | 11.4 | 11.3 | 18.7 | 72.4 |
| Biofuel | 123.4 | 115.4 | 60.5 | 75.0 | 114.7 | 102.1 | 591.1 |
| Total | 85,221.6 | 73,640.0 | 68,750.2 | 62,361.2 | 65,584.5 | 76,699.9 | 432,257.4 |

Table 3-65 shows the difference between the day-ahead and the real-time average generation by fuel source.

### Table 3-65 Day-ahead and real-time average generation (By fuel source (GWh)): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | Real-Time | | | Percent |
| | GWh | Percent | GWh | Percent | RT - DA | Difference |
| Coal | 70,016.9 | 16.6% | 69,857.3 | 16.2% | (159.7) | (0.2%) |
| Bituminous | 59,589.3 | 14.1% | 59,785.0 | 13.8% | 195.7 | 0.3% |
| Sub Bituminous | 7,104.4 | 1.7% | 6,664.6 | 1.5% | (439.8) | (6.2%) |
| Other Coal | 3,323.2 | 0.8% | 3,407.7 | 0.8% | 84.4 | 2.5% |
| Nuclear | 133,733.5 | 31.6% | 134,859.1 | 31.2% | 1,125.6 | 0.8% |
| Gas | 176,780.5 | 41.8% | 179,309.9 | 41.5% | 2,529.4 | 1.4% |
| Natural Gas CC | 158,441.2 | 37.5% | 159,867.8 | 37.0% | 1,426.6 | 0.9% |
| Natural Gas CT | 9,295.9 | 2.2% | 10,426.8 | 2.4% | 1,130.9 | 12.2% |
| Natural Gas Other Units | 8,548.4 | 2.0% | 8,522.7 | 2.0% | (25.7) | (0.3%) |
| Other Gas | 495.0 | 0.1% | 492.7 | 0.1% | (2.3) | (0.5%) |
| Hydroelectric | 7,930.0 | 1.9% | 8,091.6 | 1.9% | 161.5 | 2.0% |
| Pumped Storage | 3,922.6 | 0.9% | 3,234.1 | 0.7% | (688.5) | (17.6%) |
| Run of River | 4,007.4 | 0.9% | 3,911.8 | 0.9% | (95.6) | (2.4%) |
| Other Hydro | 0.0 | 0.0% | 945.7 | 0.2% | 945.7 | NA |
| Wind | 15,065.2 | 3.6% | 19,339.9 | 4.5% | 4,274.7 | 28.4% |
| Waste | 1,875.9 | 0.4% | 1,907.6 | 0.4% | 31.7 | 1.7% |
| Oil | 2,722.9 | 0.6% | 2,985.8 | 0.7% | 263.0 | 9.7% |
| Heavy Oil | 26.8 | 0.0% | 292.4 | 0.1% | 265.6 | 990.3% |
| Light Oil | 1,770.1 | 0.4% | 1,755.8 | 0.4% | (14.3) | (0.8%) |
| Diesel | 164.3 | 0.0% | 146.8 | 0.0% | (17.5) | (10.7%) |
| Other Oil | 761.7 | 0.2% | 790.9 | 0.2% | 29.2 | 3.8% |
| Solar | 13,843.0 | 3.3% | 15,242.7 | 3.5% | 1,399.7 | 10.1% |
| Battery | 30.2 | 0.0% | 72.4 | 0.0% | 42.2 | 139.8% |
| Biofuel | 692.6 | 0.2% | 591.1 | 0.1% | (101.5) | (14.7%) |
| Total | 422,690.7 | 100.0% | 432,257.4 | 100.0% | 9,566.7 | 2.3% |


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Table 3-66 shows the share of generation by natural gas, coal, nuclear and other fuel types in the real-time energy market since 2014.

**Table 3-66 Share of generation by fuel source: January through June, 2014 through 2026**


| Jan - Jun | Natural Gas | Coal | Nuclear | Solar | Wind | Other Fuel Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 15.8% | 43.0% | 36.0% | 0.0% | 2.2% | 3.1% |
| 2015 | 18.7% | 38.8% | 37.5% | 0.1% | 2.2% | 2.8% |
| 2016 | 22.1% | 33.1% | 39.0% | 0.1% | 2.6% | 3.1% |
| 2017 | 22.3% | 32.0% | 38.9% | 0.2% | 3.1% | 3.4% |
| 2018 | 26.7% | 29.6% | 36.5% | 0.3% | 3.0% | 3.9% |
| 2019 | 32.0% | 25.3% | 35.4% | 0.3% | 3.4% | 3.6% |
| 2020 | 38.6% | 17.8% | 35.9% | 0.4% | 3.8% | 3.5% |
| 2021 | 35.7% | 23.4% | 33.2% | 0.8% | 3.7% | 3.1% |
| 2022 | 36.9% | 21.6% | 32.8% | 1.2% | 4.3% | 3.2% |
| 2023 | 42.9% | 14.2% | 34.2% | 1.4% | 4.2% | 3.2% |
| 2024 | 43.4% | 14.7% | 32.2% | 2.0% | 4.3% | 3.4% |
| 2025 | 41.0% | 16.9% | 31.4% | 2.9% | 4.4% | 3.3% |
| 2026 | 41.4% | 16.2% | 31.2% | 3.5% | 4.5% | 3.3% |

## Net Load and LMP

Net load is defined to be the total real-time demand in PJM minus the power generated by wind and solar. Net load is the load that must be met by nonintermittent, dispatchable resources. As wind and solar output grow, there is a direct impact on the daily net load shape and an indirect impact on the hourly LMP pattern. Figure 3-48 shows PJM load, net load, LMP, solar and wind output by the hour of the day in the first six months of 2026.

In the first six months of 2026, solar output increased during the morning hours to a maximum of approximately 9,000 MWh at Hours 12 and 13, net load decreased correspondingly and average LMPs declined. The higher the solar output, the lower the LMPs during the period of solar output. LMPs during the period of highest solar output were close to the same average price level as at midnight. As solar generation decreased in the late afternoon and evening hours, net load increased and average LMPs increased. The highest LMPs occurred during the evening ramp period when solar output declined rapidly and net load reached its daily peak.

**Figure 3-48 Net Load, Load, LMP, Solar and Wind Generation by Hour of the Day: January through June, 2026**




## Fuel Diversity

Figure 3-49 shows the fuel diversity index ($FDI_e$) for PJM energy generation.[105] The $FDI_e$ is defined as $\mathbf{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2}$, where $s_i$ is the share of fuel type *i*. The minimum possible value for the $FDI_e$ is zero, corresponding to all generation from a single fuel type. The maximum possible value for the $FDI_e$ results when each fuel type has an equal share of total generation. For a generation fleet composed of 10 fuel types, the maximum achievable index is 0.9. The fuel type categories used in the calculation of the $FDI_e$ are the 10 primary fuel sources in Table **3-63** with nonzero generation values. As fuel diversity has increased, seasonality in the $FDI_e$ has decreased and the $FDI_e$ has exhibited less volatility. Since 2012, the monthly $FDI_e$ has been less volatile as a result of the decline in the share of coal from 51.3 percent prior to 2012 to 27.3 percent from 2012 through June 2026. A significant drop in the $FDI_e$ occurred in the fall of 2004 as a result of the expansion of the PJM market footprint into ComEd, AEP, and Dayton Power & Light Zones and the increased shares of

105 The MMU developed the FDI to provide an objective metric of fuel diversity. The FDI metric is similar to the HHI used to measure market concentration. The FDI is calculated separately for energy output and for installed capacity.

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coal and nuclear that resulted.[106] The increasing trend that began in 2008 is a result of decreasing coal generation, increasing gas generation and increasing renewable generation. Coal generation as a share of total generation was 56.0 percent for the first six months of 2008 and 16.2 percent for the first six months of 2026. Gas generation as a share of total generation was 6.1 percent for the first six months of 2008 and 41.5 percent for the first six months of 2026. Wind and solar generation as a share of total generation was 0.5 percent for the first six months of 2008 and 8.0 percent for the first six months of 2026.

The $FDI_e$ decreased 0.1 percent in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. Increased gas generation and less generation from coal fired and nuclear generators led to the decrease in the $FDI_e$.

The $FDI_e$ was also used to measure the impact on fuel diversity of potential retirements in 2026 through 2030. A total of 10,963 MW of capacity are at risk of retirement, consisting of 8,330 MW currently planning to retire and 2,633 MW expected to be uneconomic.[107] This capacity consists primarily of coal steam plants and CTs. The units expected to retire by the end of 2026 generated 2,422.9 GWh in the first six months of 2026. The dashed line (green) in Figure 3-49 shows a counterfactual result for $FDI_e$ assuming the 2,422.9 GWh of generation from uneconomic units and expected 2026 retirements were replaced by gas generation.[108] The $FDI_e$ for the first six months of 2026 under this counterfactual assumption would have been 0.3 percent lower than the actual $FDI_e$. The units expected to retire by the end of 2030 generated 10,171.1 GWh in the first six months of 2026. Replacing this generation with wind and solar generation results in a counterfactual $FDI_e$ that is 0.8 percent higher than the actual $FDI_e$.[109] The dashed line (blue) in Figure 3-49 shows a counterfactual result for $FDI_e$ assuming that this generation is replaced with gas, wind and solar generation.


106 See the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix A, "PJM Geography" for an explanation of the expansion of the PJM footprint. The integration of the ComEd Control Area occurred in May 2004 and the integration of the AEP and Dayton Zones occurred in October 2004.

107 See Units At Risk of Retirement in the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Vol. 2, Section 7: Net Revenue.

108 It is assumed that all of the replacement energy is from gas units. In previous reports, solar and wind energy have also been used for replacement energy with the amounts based on the expected increase in the PJM RPS obligation for the upcoming year. But the PJM RPS obligation will decrease in 2027 in comparison to 2026 due to the termination of the Ohio RPS in 2027.

109 The split between solar (73.1 percent) and wind (26.9 percent) is based on queue data and 2026 capacity factors in Table 8-33 and Table 8-37. In previous reports, the replacement energy was sourced from gas units in addition to solar and wind units with the amount of solar and gas replacement energy being based on the expected increase in the PJM RPS obligation in 2030 in comparison to current year. But the RPS increase for 2030 exceeds the energy attributable to the expected retirements, and only solar and wind are used for replacement energy in this scenario.

### Figure 3-49 Fuel diversity index for monthly generation: June 2000 through June 2026




## Natural Gas Supply Issues

Both pipeline transportation capacity and commodity natural gas are needed to deliver natural gas to power plants. Generators have a number of options which vary by pipeline and market area. A generator could purchase a delivered service in which the seller bundles the transportation and commodity, on a term contract or a spot basis. A generator could purchase pipeline transportation and commodity natural gas separately with a term supply contract or through daily purchases in the spot market. Generators could purchase storage service. Storage services can be bundled with pipeline transportation, or storage and


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transportation purchased separately to move gas to or from a storage facility. The storage service will determine the total storage capacity and the injection and withdrawal rights. Storage offers the owner the ability to have on demand supplies, or the ability to redirect unused supplies to storage. Predetermined allocation (PDA) nominations can be used to direct the pipeline as to how to treat an excess or a deficiency of gas at a delivery point. Combinations of these options are also available.

Pipelines build transportation capacity and sell firm capacity to customers. Most of the transportation capacity is sold at tariff rates but in some cases negotiated rates are agreed to. A majority of firm capacity is contracted with gas utilities, gas marketers, industrial customers and generators. The purchasers of firm transportation capacity have the right to resell their capacity. Any such release must be done on the pipeline's electronic bulletin board. Bidders must be approved by the pipeline. When firm capacity on the pipelines is not being used, the pipeline tariffs provide for interruptible service.

In order to be able to actually use the purchased pipeline transportation service, pipelines may enforce nomination deadlines to require generation owners to nominate the flow of gas by defined deadlines. Some pipelines may also impose site specific restrictions that limit the ability of generators to nominate and schedule gas beyond the nomination deadlines. Table 3-67 shows the approved nomination deadlines and corresponding start time of gas flow.[110] Pipelines provide that firm service requests may replace, or bump, interruptible nominations on the pipeline under defined conditions.

### Table 3-67 Approved nomination deadlines

| | Nomination Cycle | Nom Deadline (EPT) | Time of Flow (EPT) | Bumping | Hours left in gas day for supply to flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day Before Flow | Timely | 1400 | 1000 | | 24 |
| Day Before Flow | Evening | 1900 | 1000 | Yes | 24 |
| Day of Flow | Intraday 1 | 1100 | 1500 | Yes | 19 |
| Day of Flow | Intraday 2 | 1530 | 1900 | Yes | 15 |
| Day of Flow | Intraday 3 | 2000 | 2300 | No | 11 |

110 Nomination deadlines approved in FERC Order No. 809, implemented April 1, 2016.

In the winter period from November 2025 through March 2026, some interstate gas pipelines that provide service in the PJM service territory issued notices limiting the flexibility of firm and nonfirm transportation services. These notices included alerts, constraints, warnings of operational flow orders (OFO) and actual OFOs. These notices generally permit the pipelines to enforce nomination deadlines and to restrict the provision of gas to 24 hour ratable takes, meaning that nominations must be the same for each hour in the gas day. Pipelines may also enforce strict balancing constraints which limit the ability of gas users to deviate from the 24 hour ratable take and which may limit the ability of users to have access to unused gas. The pipelines providing service in the PJM service territory that issued notices were: ANR Pipeline, Columbia Gas Transmission, Cove Point, Eastern Gas Transmission Pipeline System, Eastern Shore Natural Gas Pipeline, East Tennessee Natural Gas, Eastern Gas Transmission & Storage, Horizon Pipeline, Natural Gas Pipeline, Northern Border Pipeline, Texas Eastern, Tennessee Gas Pipeline and Transcontinental Gas Pipeline.

Pipeline operators use restrictive and inflexible rules to manage the balance of supply and demand during constrained operating conditions determined by the pipeline. The independent operations of geographically overlapping pipelines during extreme conditions highlight the shortcomings of a gas pipeline network that relies on individual pipelines to manage the balancing of total supply and demand across a broad geographical area that includes multiple pipelines. The independent operational restrictions imposed by pipelines and the impact on electric generators during extreme conditions demonstrate the potential benefits to creating a separate gas ISO/RTO structure to coordinate the supply of gas across pipelines and with the electric RTOs and to facilitate the interoperability of the pipelines in an explicit network.

The increase in natural gas fired capacity in PJM, and the expected further increase, has highlighted issues with the dependence of PJM system reliability on the fuel transportation arrangements entered into by generators. The risks to the fuel supply for gas generators, including the risk of interruptible supply on cold days and the ability to get gas on short notice during times of critical pipeline operations, create risks for the bulk power system.

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In general, the availability status of gas generators in the PJM energy market does not accurately reflect their ability to procure and nominate gas on the pipelines based on the rules defined by the pipelines. If the result of the pipeline rules is that some gas generators cannot reliably procure gas during the operating day in order to respond to PJM directions to generate, the result could be an inflated estimate of reserves on the PJM system, if the generator does not have back up fuel. Gas units should be required to be on forced outage if they cannot obtain gas during the operating day to meet their must offer requirement.

PJM requires real-time situational awareness of the availability of all generators, including gas-fired generators, during the operating day, in order to operate the system effectively including knowledge of the level of available reserves. The MMU recommends: that gas generators be required to confirm, regularly during the operating day, that they can obtain gas if requested to operate at their economic maximum level; that gas generators provide that information to PJM during the operating day; and that gas generators be required to be on forced outage if they cannot obtain gas during the operating day to meet their must offer requirement as a result of pipeline restrictions, and they do not have backup fuel. As part of this, the MMU recommends that PJM collect data on each individual generator's fuel supply arrangements at least annually or when such arrangements change, and analyze the associated locational and regional risks to reliability.

Notification time is the period between PJM's notification and the beginning of the start sequence for a generating resource. Combustion turbines normally have notification times between six and 30 minutes. When pipelines require generators to nominate gas per the NAESB deadlines, generators must nominate gas well in advance and cannot start in six or 30 minutes. Instead, generators need significantly more time to nominate gas. This increase in the time needed should be requested and reflected in the units' notification time.

For example, the last nomination cycle available per NAESB is intraday 3 (ID3), see Table 3-67. The ID3 deadline is 20:00 EPT for gas that starts flowing at 23:00 (in three hours). The previous cycle, intraday 2 (ID2) deadline is at 15:30 EPT for gas that starts flowing at 19:00. A generator that has not nominated gas by ID2 cannot start until 23:00. Therefore, at 19:00, the unit has an implied time to start of four hours. Four hours is equal to 23:00 (the earliest the unit can start) minus 19:00. Table 3-68 shows the notification time gas fired generators should be requesting and submitting when pipelines require nominating per the NAESB cycle deadlines.

**Table 3-68 Generator notification times when pipeline NAESB cycle deadlines are imposed**

| Hour | HE1 | HE2 | HE3 | HE4 | HE5 | HE6 | HE7 | HE8 | HE9 | HE10 | HE11 | HE12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Notification Time | 15 | 14 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 8 |
| Time On (If Called) | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 19:00 | 19:00 |
| Nearest Cycle | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID2 | ID2 |

| Hour | HE13 | HE14 | HE15 | HE16 | HE17 | HE18 | HE19 | HE20 | HE21 | HE22 | HE23 | HE24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Notification Time | 7 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 16 |
| Time On (If Called) | 19:00 | 19:00 | 23:00 | 23:00 | 23:00 | 23:00 | 23:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 | 15:00 |
| Nearest Cycle | ID2 | ID2 | ID3 | ID3 | ID3 | ID3 | ID3 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 | ID1 |

The MMU proposed enhancements for situational awareness and transparency to improve the scheduling problem that PJM and gas fired units face, addressing how to reflect pipeline constraints in generator operating parameters, including how generators should submit notification times, and minimum run times and request temporary parameter exceptions.[111] The resultant guidelines were posted by the MMU and PJM on September 8, 2023.[112]

## Types of Marginal Resources

LMPs result from the operation of a market based on security-constrained, least-cost dispatch in which marginal resources determine system LMPs, based on their offers. Marginal resource designation is not limited to physical resources in the day-ahead energy market. INC offers, DEC bids and up to congestion transactions are dispatchable injections and withdrawals in the day-ahead energy market that can set price via their offers and bids.

111 "Gas Nomination Cycles and Units Operating Parameters," Electric Gas Coordination Senior Task Force (EGCSTF), August 15, 2023.

112 *See* Guidelines posted by the MMU and PJM: Temporary Operating Parameter Limit (PLS) Exceptions due to Pipeline Restrictions. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/Messages/IMM_Temporary_Operating_Parameter_Limit_(PLS)_Exceptions_due_to_Pipeline_Restrictions_20230908.pdf>.



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Table 3-69 shows the type of fuel used and technology by marginal resources in the real-time energy market. There can be more than one marginal resource in any given interval as a result of transmission constraints. In the first six months of 2026, coal units were 9.6 percent and natural gas units were 67.3 percent of marginal resources. In the first six months of 2026, natural gas combined cycle units were 55.8 percent of marginal resources. In the first six months of 2025, coal units were 7.6 percent and natural gas units were 74.1 percent of the total marginal resources. In the first six months of 2025, natural gas combined cycle units were 62.7 percent of the total marginal resources. In the first six months of 2026, 76.5 percent of the wind marginal units had negative offer prices, 22.2 percent had zero offer prices and 1.3 percent of the wind marginal units had positive offer prices. In the first six months of 2025, 73.7 percent of the wind marginal units had negative offer prices, 25.0 percent had zero offer prices and 1.3 percent had positive offer prices.

The proportion of marginal nuclear units increased from 0.13 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 0.21 percent in the first six months of 2026. Most nuclear units are offered as fixed generation in the PJM market. A small number of nuclear units have been offered with a dispatchable range since 2015. The dispatchable nuclear units do not always respond to dispatch instructions.

PJM implemented fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. The marginal resources shown in Table 3-69 are from the pricing run, which may not be the same as marginal resources from the dispatch run.

## Table 3-69 Type of fuel used and technology (By real-time marginal units): January through June, 2022 through 2026[113]

| | | (Jan - Jun) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel | Technology | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Gas | CC | 58.97% | 72.07% | 59.55% | 62.66% | 55.75% |
| Wind | Wind | 14.08% | 6.11% | 15.76% | 13.79% | 17.01% |
| Coal | Steam | 11.38% | 8.97% | 11.64% | 7.55% | 9.57% |
| Gas | CT | 9.14% | 9.14% | 9.21% | 8.74% | 8.66% |
| Other | Solar | 1.04% | 0.01% | 0.16% | 1.38% | 3.65% |
| Gas | Steam | 0.90% | 1.22% | 1.69% | 1.83% | 1.98% |
| Oil | CT | 2.99% | 0.34% | 0.67% | 1.36% | 1.77% |
| Gas | RICE | 0.74% | 0.92% | 0.63% | 0.82% | 0.92% |
| Uranium | Steam | 0.59% | 0.65% | 0.33% | 0.13% | 0.21% |
| Oil | Steam | 0.01% | 0.01% | 0.09% | 0.05% | 0.11% |
| Municipal Waste | Steam | 0.03% | 0.12% | 0.07% | 0.09% | 0.10% |
| Oil | RICE | 0.03% | 0.03% | 0.05% | 1.33% | 0.08% |
| Municipal Waste | RICE | 0.00% | 0.02% | 0.05% | 0.08% | 0.06% |
| Other | Steam | 0.05% | 0.04% | 0.05% | 0.06% | 0.06% |
| Other | Battery | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.01% | 0.01% | 0.04% |
| Oil | CC | 0.05% | 0.35% | 0.03% | 0.10% | 0.03% |
| Landfill Gas | CT | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Municipal Waste | CT | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Landfill Gas | Steam | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Gas | Fuel Cell | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Landfill Gas | RICE | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |

113 The unit type RICE refers to Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines.

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Figure 3-50 shows the type of fuel used by marginal resources in the real-time energy market for the first six months of every year since 2004. The role of coal as a marginal resource has declined while the role of gas as a marginal resource has increased.

### Figure 3-50 Type of fuel used (By real-time marginal units): January through June, 2004 through 2026





Table 3-70 shows the type of fuel and technology by fast start marginal resources and other marginal resources in the real-time energy market in the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, marginal fast start resources accounted for 5.9 percent of all marginal resources in the pricing run.

### Table 3-70 Fuel type and technology (Real-time marginal units and fast start marginal units): January through June, 2026

| | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel | Technology | Fast Start | Other | Both |
| Coal | Steam | 0.00% | 9.57% | 9.57% |
| Gas | CC | 0.00% | 55.75% | 55.75% |
| Gas | CT | 3.79% | 4.86% | 8.66% |
| Gas | RICE | 0.89% | 0.03% | 0.92% |
| Gas | Steam | 0.00% | 1.98% | 1.98% |
| Landfill Gas | CT | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Municipal Waste | RICE | 0.01% | 0.06% | 0.06% |
| Municipal Waste | Steam | 0.00% | 0.10% | 0.10% |
| Oil | CC | 0.00% | 0.03% | 0.03% |
| Oil | CT | 0.72% | 1.05% | 1.77% |
| Oil | RICE | 0.07% | 0.00% | 0.08% |
| Oil | Steam | 0.00% | 0.11% | 0.11% |
| Other | Battery | 0.00% | 0.04% | 0.04% |
| Other | Solar | 0.07% | 3.58% | 3.65% |
| Other | Steam | 0.00% | 0.06% | 0.06% |
| Uranium | Steam | 0.00% | 0.21% | 0.21% |
| Wind | Wind | 0.35% | 16.66% | 17.01% |
| All Marginal Units | | 5.90% | 94.10% | 100.00% |

## Fuel Price Trends and LMP


In a competitive market, changes in LMP follow changes in the marginal costs of marginal units, the units setting LMP. In general, fuel costs make up between 80 percent and 90 percent of short run marginal cost depending on generating technology, unit efficiency, unit age and other factors. The impact of fuel cost on marginal cost and on LMP depends on the fuel burned by marginal units and changes in fuel costs. Changes in emission allowance costs also contribute to changes in the marginal cost of marginal units.

Figure 3-51 shows fuel prices in PJM for 2012 through June 2026. Natural gas prices, coal prices and oil prices increased in the first six months of 2026


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compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, the price of eastern natural gas was 28.7 percent higher and the price of western natural gas was 10.7 percent higher than in the first six months of 2025. The price of Northern Appalachian coal was 12.9 percent higher; the price of Central Appalachian coal was 7.1 percent higher; and the price of Powder River Basin coal was 5.4 percent higher.[114] The price of ULSD NY Harbor Barge (ultra low sulfur diesel) was 45.9 percent higher in the first six months of 2026 than in the first six months of 2025.

**Figure 3-51 Spot average fuel price comparison: 2012 through June 2026 ($/MMBtu)**




# Components of LMP

## Components of Real-Time Load-Weighted LMP

LMPs result from the operation of a market based on security-constrained, economic (least cost) dispatch (SCED) in which the offers of marginal units determine system LMPs, based on their offers and forecasts of system conditions up to 14 minute ahead. Those offers can be decomposed into components including fuel costs, emission costs, variable operation and maintenance (VOM) costs, markup, FMU adder and the 10 percent cost adder. As a result, it is possible to decompose LMP by the components of the offers of marginal units.

Cost offers of marginal units are separated into their component parts. The fuel related component is based on unit specific heat rates and spot fuel prices. Emission costs are calculated using spot prices for $NO_x$, $SO_2$ and $CO_2$ emission credits, emission rates for $NO_x$, emission rates for $SO_2$ and emission rates for $CO_2$. The $CO_2$ emission costs are applicable to PJM units in the PJM states that participated in RGGI in the first six months of 2026: Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey.[115] The FMU adder is the calculated contribution of the FMU and AU adders to LMP that results when units with FMU or AU adders are marginal.

Since October 1, 2012, PJM jointly optimizes the commitment and dispatch of energy and reserves. When generators providing energy have to be dispatched down from their economic operating level to meet reserve requirements, the joint optimization of energy and reserves takes into account the opportunity cost of the reduced generation and the associated incremental cost to maintain reserves. If a unit incurring such opportunity costs is a marginal resource in the energy market, this opportunity cost will contribute to LMP. The component, ancillary service redispatch cost, shows the contribution of this cost to the PJM's load-weighted LMP. In addition, in periods when the pricing run solution does not meet the reserve requirements, PJM invokes shortage pricing. In shortage conditions, the LMPs reflect the administratively

114 Eastern natural gas consists of the average of Texas M3, Transco Zone 6 non-NY, Transco Zone 6 NY and Transco Zone 5 daily indices. Western natural gas prices are the average of Columbia Appalachia and Chicago Citygate daily indices. Production gas prices are the average of Dominion South Point, Tennessee Zone 4, and Transco Leidy Line receipts daily indices. Coal prices are the average of daily fuel prices for Central Appalachian coal, Northern Appalachian coal, and Powder River Basin coal. All fuel prices are from Platts.

115 New Jersey withdrew from RGGI, effective January 1, 2012, and rejoined RGGI effective January 1, 2020. Virginia joined RGGI effective January 1, 2021, left RGGI on December 31, 2023, and rejoined RGGI effective July 1, 2026. Pennsylvania took action to join RGGI on April 23, 2023. The action was enjoined in the course of litigation. The litigation ended after the legislative basis for Pennsylvania's participation in RGGI was removed on November 12, 2025.

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defined shortage pricing component, implemented through the operating reserve demand curve.[116]

Starting on September 1, 2021, the components shown in Table 3-71 and Table 3-73 are from the pricing run, which includes the impact of amortized start cost and amortized no load cost of the fast start marginal units. The components of LMP are shown in Table 3-71, including markup using unadjusted cost-based offers.[117] The percent column is the difference (in percentage points) in the proportion of LMP represented by each component in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Table 3-71 shows that in the first six months of 2026, 6.4 percent of the load-weighted LMP was the result of coal costs, 39.5 percent was the result of gas costs and 3.2 percent was the result of the cost of carbon emission allowances. The fuel-related components of LMP reflect the degree to which the cost of the identified fuel affects LMP and does not reflect the other components of the offers of units burning that fuel. Using unadjusted cost-based offers, negative markup was -7.6 percent of the load-weighted LMP. Using unadjusted cost-based offers, positive markup was 8.3 percent of the load-weighted LMP. LMP may, at times, be set by transmission constraint penalty factors. In the first six months of 2026, 20.3 percent of the load-weighted LMP was the result of transmission constraint penalty factors. In the first six months of 2026, the number of violated constraint intervals increased by 88 percent from 11,972 constraint intervals in the first six months of 2025 to 22,551 constraint intervals in the first six months of 2026. Of the 22,551 violated constraint intervals in the first six months of 2026, 33 percent were during the 11 days between January 20 and January 31 of 2026, and 39.9 percent involved high voltage (500 kV and above) constraints, which have a larger effect on market prices. More than 99 percent (99.6 percent) of this impact occurred as a result of PJM's administrative reductions to transmission line ratings in SCED that caused the constraints to violate (Table 3-60). The percent contribution of transmission constraint penalty factors has increased substantially since PJM allowed penalty factors to affect LMPs starting February 1, 2019.

## Table 3-71 Components of real-time (Unadjusted) load-weighted average LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026[118]

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Element | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Change in Percent |
| Gas | $24.35 | 47.1% | $28.63 | 39.5% | (7.6%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $5.32 | 10.3% | $14.75 | 20.3% | 10.0% |
| Positive Markup | $3.17 | 6.1% | $6.02 | 8.3% | 2.2% |
| Coal | $3.65 | 7.1% | $4.62 | 6.4% | (0.7%) |
| Oil | $2.44 | 4.7% | $4.08 | 5.6% | 0.9% |
| Ten Percent Adder | $3.16 | 6.1% | $3.80 | 5.2% | (0.9%) |
| Variable Maintenance | $3.02 | 5.8% | $3.29 | 4.5% | (1.3%) |
| Market-to-Market | $0.71 | 1.4% | $2.94 | 4.1% | 2.7% |
| CO2 Cost | $1.93 | 3.7% | $2.34 | 3.2% | (0.5%) |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $0.96 | 1.9% | $1.95 | 2.7% | 0.8% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $1.39 | 2.7% | $1.87 | 2.6% | (0.1%) |
| Variable Operations | $1.24 | 2.4% | $1.54 | 2.1% | (0.3%) |
| Increase Generation Differential | $0.59 | 1.1% | $0.75 | 1.0% | (0.1%) |
| Scarcity | $1.90 | 3.7% | $0.66 | 0.9% | (2.8%) |
| NA | $0.34 | 0.7% | $0.66 | 0.9% | 0.2% |
| LPA Rounding Difference | $0.49 | 0.9% | $0.54 | 0.7% | (0.2%) |
| Landfill Gas | $0.09 | 0.2% | $0.16 | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| NOx Cost | $0.02 | 0.0% | $0.16 | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Emergency Demand Response | $1.25 | 2.4% | $0.10 | 0.1% | (2.3%) |
| Other | $0.01 | 0.0% | $0.02 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| SO2 Cost | $0.00 | 0.0% | $0.00 | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| LPA-SCED Differential | ($0.00) | (0.0%) | ($0.00) | (0.0%) | 0.0% |
| PJM Administrative Cap | ($0.17) | (0.3%) | ($0.02) | (0.0%) | 0.3% |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($0.33) | (0.6%) | ($0.11) | (0.2%) | 0.5% |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($0.20) | (0.4%) | ($0.67) | (0.9%) | (0.5%) |
| Negative Markup | ($3.59) | (6.9%) | ($5.55) | (7.6%) | (0.7%) |
| Total | $51.75 | 100.0% | $72.54 | 100.0% | 0.0% |

116 Scarcity component includes ancillary service redispatch cost component during periods of scarcity.

117 These components are explained in the *Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, at p 27 "Calculation and Use of Generator Sensitivity/ Unit Participation Factors," <http://www. monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

118 The component NA is the unexplained portion of load-weighted LMP. For several intervals, PJM failed to provide all the data needed to accurately calculate generator sensitivity factors. As a result, the LMP for those intervals cannot be decomposed into component costs. The NA component is the cumulative effect of excluding those five minute intervals.



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## Components of Change in LMP

Table 3-72 shows the components of the increase in real-time load-weighted average LMP from the first six months of 2025 to the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time load-weighted average LMP increased by $20.79 per MWh, 40.2 percent. The transmission constraint penalty factor increased the LMP by $9.43 per MWh, 45.3 percent of the total increase, primarily as a result of PJM's reduction of line ratings in SCED. Increases in the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP (the sum of gas, coal, oil, landfill gas, variable operations expense) increased the LMP by $7.26 per MWh, 34.9 percent of increase in LMP. Increases in the emissions cost components of LMP (the sum of $NO_X$, $CO_2$, opportunity cost adder, $SO_2$, and renewable energy credits) increased the LMP by $1.06 per MWh, 5.1 percent of the increase in LMP. Increases in the sum of the positive and negative markups, ten percent adder, and maintenance cost components, all of which reflect market power, increased the LMP by $1.82 per MWh, 8.8 percent of the increase in LMP. A reduction in the scarcity component decreased the LMP by $1.24 per MWh, 6.0 percent of the increase in the LMP. The ancillary service redispatch cost, the opportunity cost of reduced marginal generation to meet reserve requirements, increased the LMP by $0.48 per MWh, 2.3 percent. The reduction in pre-emergency demand response decreased the LMP by $1.16 per MWh, 5.6 percent of the increase in LMP. The administrative cap component decreased LMP by less in the first six months of 2026 than the first six months of 2025, $0.16 per MWh increase in LMP, 0.7 percent of the increase in LMP.

**Table 3-72 Components of change in real-time load-weighted average LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| Component | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | Change in LMP | Percent of Total Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel and Consumables | $31.77 | $39.04 | $7.26 | 34.9% |
| Emission Related | $2.71 | $3.77 | $1.06 | 5.1% |
| Market Power Related | $5.75 | $7.57 | $1.82 | 8.8% |
| Scarcity | $1.90 | $0.66 | ($1.24) | (6.0%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $5.32 | $14.75 | $9.43 | 45.3% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $1.39 | $1.87 | $0.48 | 2.3% |
| Pre-emergency Demand Response | $1.25 | $0.10 | ($1.16) | (5.6%) |
| PJM Administrative Cap | ($0.17) | ($0.02) | $0.16 | 0.7% |
| All Other | $1.82 | $4.80 | $2.98 | 14.3% |
| Total Change | $51.75 | $72.54 | $20.79 | 100.0% |

In order to understand the markup behavior of market participants, real-time and day-ahead LMPs are decomposed using two different approaches. In the first approach (Table 3-71) markup is the difference between the price offer and the cost-based offer (unadjusted markup). In the second approach (Table 3-73), the 10 percent markup is removed from the cost-based offers of coal, gas, and oil units and treated as part of the overall markup (adjusted markup).

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### Table 3-73 Components of real-time (Adjusted) load-weighted average LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Element | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Change in Percent |
| Gas | $24.35 | 47.1% | $28.63 | 39.5% | (7.6%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $5.32 | 10.3% | $14.75 | 20.3% | 10.0% |
| Positive Markup | $4.97 | 9.6% | $8.19 | 11.3% | 1.7% |
| Coal | $3.65 | 7.1% | $4.62 | 6.4% | (0.7%) |
| Oil | $2.44 | 4.7% | $4.08 | 5.6% | 0.9% |
| Variable Maintenance | $3.02 | 5.8% | $3.29 | 4.5% | (1.3%) |
| Market-to-Market | $0.71 | 1.4% | $2.94 | 4.1% | 2.7% |
| CO2 Cost | $1.93 | 3.7% | $2.34 | 3.2% | (0.5%) |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $0.96 | 1.9% | $1.95 | 2.7% | 0.8% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $1.39 | 2.7% | $1.87 | 2.6% | (0.1%) |
| Variable Operations | $1.24 | 2.4% | $1.54 | 2.1% | (0.3%) |
| Increase Generation Differential | $0.59 | 1.1% | $0.75 | 1.0% | (0.1%) |
| Scarcity | $1.90 | 3.7% | $0.66 | 0.9% | (2.8%) |
| NA | $0.34 | 0.7% | $0.66 | 0.9% | 0.2% |
| LPA Rounding Difference | $0.49 | 0.9% | $0.54 | 0.7% | (0.2%) |
| Landfill Gas | $0.09 | 0.2% | $0.16 | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| NOx Cost | $0.02 | 0.0% | $0.16 | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Emergency Demand Response | $1.25 | 2.4% | $0.10 | 0.1% | (2.3%) |
| Other | $0.01 | 0.0% | $0.02 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Ten Percent Adder | $0.01 | 0.0% | $0.02 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| SO2 Cost | $0.00 | 0.0% | $0.00 | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| LPA-SCED Differential | ($0.00) | (0.0%) | ($0.00) | (0.0%) | 0.0% |
| PJM Administrative Cap | ($0.17) | (0.3%) | ($0.02) | (0.0%) | 0.3% |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($0.33) | (0.6%) | ($0.11) | (0.2%) | 0.5% |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($0.20) | (0.4%) | ($0.67) | (0.9%) | (0.5%) |
| Negative Markup | ($2.25) | (4.4%) | ($3.93) | (5.4%) | (1.1%) |
| Total | $51.75 | 100.0% | $72.54 | 100.0% | 0.0% |

The components of LMP for the dispatch run and the pricing run are shown in Table 3-74, including markup using unadjusted cost-based offers for in the first six months of 2026. The transmission constraint penalty factor component is the component with the largest difference in the share of total LMP between the dispatch run and the pricing run, a difference of 2.2 percentage points.

### Table 3-74 Comparison of components of real-time (Unadjusted) load-weighted average LMP in the dispatch run and pricing run: January through June, 2026

| | Dispatch | | Pricing | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Element | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Change in Percent |
| Gas | $27.40 | 40.8% | $28.63 | 39.5% | (1.3%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $15.12 | 22.5% | $14.75 | 20.3% | (2.2%) |
| Positive Markup | $5.43 | 8.1% | $6.02 | 8.3% | 0.2% |
| Coal | $4.89 | 7.3% | $4.62 | 6.4% | (0.9%) |
| Oil | $2.77 | 4.1% | $4.08 | 5.6% | 1.5% |
| Ten Percent Adder | $3.52 | 5.2% | $3.80 | 5.2% | 0.0% |
| Variable Maintenance | $2.24 | 3.3% | $3.29 | 4.5% | 1.2% |
| Market-to-Market | $2.86 | 4.3% | $2.94 | 4.1% | (0.2%) |
| CO2 Cost | $2.35 | 3.5% | $2.34 | 3.2% | (0.3%) |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $1.58 | 2.3% | $1.95 | 2.7% | 0.3% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $1.17 | 1.7% | $1.87 | 2.6% | 0.8% |
| Variable Operations | $1.46 | 2.2% | $1.54 | 2.1% | (0.0%) |
| Increase Generation Differential | $0.93 | 1.4% | $0.75 | 1.0% | (0.4%) |
| Scarcity | $0.85 | 1.3% | $0.66 | 0.9% | (0.3%) |
| NA | $0.41 | 0.6% | $0.66 | 0.9% | 0.3% |
| LPA Rounding Difference | $0.37 | 0.5% | $0.54 | 0.7% | 0.2% |
| Landfill Gas | $0.16 | 0.2% | $0.16 | 0.2% | (0.0%) |
| NOx Cost | $0.14 | 0.2% | $0.16 | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| Emergency Demand Response | $0.09 | 0.1% | $0.10 | 0.1% | (0.0%) |
| Other | $0.02 | 0.0% | $0.02 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| SO2 Cost | $0.00 | 0.0% | $0.00 | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| LPA-SCED Differential | $0.00 | 0.0% | ($0.00) | (0.0%) | (0.0%) |
| PJM Administrative Cap | $0.00 | 0.0% | ($0.02) | (0.0%) | (0.0%) |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($0.11) | (0.2%) | ($0.11) | (0.2%) | 0.0% |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($0.77) | (1.1%) | ($0.67) | (0.9%) | 0.2% |
| Negative Markup | ($5.66) | (8.4%) | ($5.55) | (7.6%) | 0.8% |
| Total | $67.22 | 100.0% | $72.54 | 100.0% | 0.0% |

The components of the total cost to real-time load ($M) are shown in Table 3-75, including markup using unadjusted cost-based offers. The components of the total cost to real-time load are shown in Table 3-76, including markup using adjusted cost-based offers. In the first six months of 2026, the cost to real-time load was $29,356.0 million. Of the $29,356.0 million in the total cost to real-time load in the first six months of 2026, $11,586.1 million was a result of the cost of gas, $5,969.0 million was a result of the transmission constraint penalty factor, $2,436.9 million was a result of the positive markup,


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$1,871.0 million was a result of the cost of coal, $1,331.4 million was a result of variable maintenance expense, and $1,539.8 million was a result of the ten percent adder.

### Table 3-75 Components of the cost of real-time (Unadjusted) load: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Contribution to Real Time Cost of Load ($Million) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Element | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | Change | Percent |
| Gas | $9,613.4 | $11,586.1 | $1,972.7 | 22.1% |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $2,102.1 | $5,969.0 | $3,867.0 | 43.3% |
| Positive Markup | $1,250.2 | $2,436.9 | $1,186.7 | 13.3% |
| Coal | $1,442.1 | $1,871.0 | $429.0 | 4.8% |
| Oil | $964.6 | $1,653.1 | $688.5 | 7.7% |
| Ten Percent Adder | $1,247.7 | $1,539.8 | $292.0 | 3.3% |
| Variable Maintenance | $1,190.8 | $1,331.4 | $140.6 | 1.6% |
| Market-to-Market | $280.2 | $1,190.3 | $910.1 | 10.2% |
| CO2 Cost | $763.0 | $945.4 | $182.4 | 2.0% |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $378.2 | $788.4 | $410.2 | 4.6% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $550.4 | $757.4 | $207.0 | 2.3% |
| Variable Operations | $490.2 | $623.4 | $133.1 | 1.5% |
| Increase Generation Differential | $233.8 | $302.9 | $69.0 | 0.8% |
| Scarcity | $751.2 | $269.0 | ($482.2) | (5.4%) |
| NA | $134.7 | $265.6 | $130.9 | 1.5% |
| LPA Rounding Difference | $192.1 | $218.3 | $26.2 | 0.3% |
| Landfill Gas | $35.3 | $64.5 | $29.2 | 0.3% |
| NOx Cost | $7.1 | $64.0 | $56.9 | 0.6% |
| Emergency Demand Response | $494.5 | $38.5 | ($456.0) | (5.1%) |
| Other | $4.7 | $9.4 | $4.7 | 0.1% |
| SO2 Cost | $0.1 | $0.1 | ($0.0) | (0.0%) |
| LPA-SCED Differential | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | 0.0% |
| PJM Administrative Cap | ($68.0) | ($6.8) | $61.2 | 0.7% |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($128.4) | ($45.2) | $83.1 | 0.9% |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($79.3) | ($272.1) | ($192.7) | (2.2%) |
| Negative Markup | ($1,418.8) | ($2,244.4) | ($825.6) | (9.3%) |
| Total | $20,431.8 | $29,356.0 | $8,924.1 | 100.0% |

### Table 3-76 Components of the (Adjusted) cost of real-time load: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Contribution to Real Time Cost of Load ($Million) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Element | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | Change | Percent |
| Gas | $9,613.4 | $11,586.1 | $1,972.7 | (281.8%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $2,102.1 | $5,969.0 | $3,867.0 | (552.4%) |
| Positive Markup | $1,963.4 | $3,314.2 | $1,350.7 | (193.0%) |
| Coal | $1,442.1 | $1,871.0 | $429.0 | (61.3%) |
| Oil | $964.6 | $1,653.1 | $688.5 | (98.4%) |
| Variable Maintenance | $1,190.8 | $1,331.4 | $140.6 | (20.1%) |
| Market-to-Market | $280.2 | $1,190.3 | $910.1 | (130.0%) |
| CO2 Cost | $763.0 | $945.4 | $182.4 | (26.1%) |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $378.2 | $788.4 | $410.2 | (58.6%) |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $550.4 | $757.4 | $207.0 | (29.6%) |
| Variable Operations | $490.2 | $623.4 | $133.1 | (19.0%) |
| Increase Generation Differential | $233.8 | $302.9 | $69.0 | (9.9%) |
| Scarcity | $751.2 | $269.0 | ($482.2) | 68.9% |
| NA | $134.5 | $265.6 | $131.0 | (18.7%) |
| LPA Rounding Difference | $192.1 | $218.3 | $26.2 | (3.7%) |
| Landfill Gas | $35.3 | $64.5 | $29.2 | (4.2%) |
| NOx Cost | $7.1 | $64.0 | $56.9 | (8.1%) |
| Emergency Demand Response | $494.5 | $38.5 | ($456.0) | 65.1% |
| Other | $4.7 | $9.4 | $4.7 | (0.7%) |
| Ten Percent Adder | $4.7 | $6.9 | $2.3 | (0.3%) |
| SO2 Cost | $0.1 | $0.1 | ($0.0) | 0.0% |
| LPA-SCED Differential | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | (0.0%) |
| PJM Administrative Cap | ($68.0) | ($6.8) | $61.2 | (8.7%) |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($128.4) | ($45.2) | $83.1 | (11.9%) |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($79.3) | ($272.1) | ($192.7) | 27.5% |
| Negative Markup | ($888.8) | ($1,588.8) | ($700.0) | 100.0% |
| Total | $20,431.8 | $29,356.0 | $8,924.1 | (1,274.9%) |

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Table 3-77 shows the components of the increase in the cost of real-time load from the first six months of 2025 to the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the cost to real-time load increased by $8,924.1 million or 43.7 percent compared to the first six months of 2025. Fuel and consumables cost components of LMP (the sum of gas, coal, oil, landfill gas, variable operations) increased the cost of real-time load by $3,252.5 million, 36.4 percent of the increase in the cost of real-time load. The transmission constraint penalty factor increased the cost of real-time load by $3,867.0 million, 43.3 percent. The emissions cost components (the sum of $NO_X$, $CO_2$, opportunity cost adder, $SO_2$, and renewable energy credits) increased the real-time cost of load by $456.9 million, 5.1 percent of the increase in the cost of real-time load. The sum of the positive and negative markups, ten percent adder, and maintenance cost components, all of which reflect market power, increased the cost of real-time load by $793.7 million, 8.9 percent of the increase in the cost of real time load. The reduction in the scarcity component decreased the cost of real-time load by $482.2 million, 5.4 percent of the increase in the cost of real-time load. The ancillary service redispatch cost, the opportunity cost of reduced marginal generation to meet reserve requirements, increased the cost of real-time load by $207.0, 2.3 percent of the cost of real-time load. The reduction in pre-emergency demand response decreased the cost of real-time load by $456.0 million, 5.1 percent of the increase in the cost of real-time load. The administrative cap component decreased LMP by less in the first six months of 2026 than the first six months of 2025, 0.7 percent of the increase in LMP.

**Table 3-77 Components of Change in the cost of real-time load: January through June, 2025 and 2026**

| | ($ Million) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Component | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | Change | Percent of Total Change |
| Fuel and Consumables | $12,545.5 | $15,798.0 | $3,252.5 | 36.4% |
| Emission Related | $1,069.0 | $1,525.8 | $456.9 | 5.1% |
| Market Power Related | $2,269.9 | $3,063.7 | $793.7 | 8.9% |
| Scarcity | $751.2 | $269.0 | ($482.2) | (5.4%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $2,102.1 | $5,969.0 | $3,867.0 | 43.3% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $550.4 | $757.4 | $207.0 | 2.3% |
| Pre-emergency Demand Response | $494.5 | $38.5 | ($456.0) | (5.1%) |
| PJM Administrative Cap | ($68.0) | ($6.8) | $61.2 | 0.7% |
| All Other | $717.2 | $1,941.3 | $1,224.1 | 13.7% |
| Total Change | $20,431.8 | $29,356.0 | $8,924.1 | 100.0% |

## Components of Day-Ahead Load-Weighted LMP

LMPs result from the operation of a market based on security-constrained, least-cost dispatch in which marginal resources determine system LMPs, based on their offers. For physical units, those offers can be decomposed into their components including fuel costs, emission costs, variable operation and maintenance costs, markup, and the 10 percent cost offer adder. INC offers, DEC bids and up to congestion transactions are dispatchable injections and withdrawals in the day-ahead energy market with an offer price that cannot be decomposed. Using identified marginal resource offers and the components of unit offers, it is possible to decompose PJM system LMP using the components of unit offers and sensitivity factors.


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Table 3-78 shows the components of the PJM day-ahead annual load-weighted average LMP. In the first six months of 2026, 22.7 percent of the load-weighted LMP was the result of gas costs, 6.2 percent of the load-weighted LMP was the result of coal costs, 15.5 percent was the result of INCs, 22.7 percent was the result of DECs, 3.9 percent was the result of UTCs, and 4.8 percent was the result of positive markup.[119] [120]

### Table 3-78 Components of day-ahead (Unadjusted) load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|
| Element | Contribution to LMP | Percent |
| DEC | $16.85 | 22.7% |
| Gas | $16.69 | 22.5% |
| INC | $11.53 | 15.5% |
| NA | $6.48 | 8.7% |
| Coal | $4.61 | 6.2% |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $3.65 | 4.9% |
| Positive Markup | $3.54 | 4.8% |
| Up to Congestion | $2.91 | 3.9% |
| CO2 Cost | $2.73 | 3.7% |
| Ten Percent Adder | $2.40 | 3.2% |
| Variable Maintenance | $1.55 | 2.1% |
| Oil | $1.20 | 1.6% |
| Variable Operations | $1.13 | 1.5% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $1.08 | 1.5% |
| Increase Generation Differential | $0.41 | 0.6% |
| NOx Cost | $0.12 | 0.2% |
| Landfill Gas | $0.01 | 0.0% |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| SO2 Cost | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| Other | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($0.08) | (0.1%) |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($0.35) | (0.5%) |
| Negative Markup | ($2.22) | (3.0%) |
| Total | $74.25 | 100.0% |

119 The MMU identified an error in the marginal resource identification algorithm within the day ahead clearing optimization. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors requires accurate identification of marginal resources. The error was fixed by the PJM software vendor in March 2025. The MMU was unable to calculate the component breakdown for 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 due to the inaccurate identification of marginal resources.

120 The MMU identified missing and erroneous distribution factors and shadow prices, primarily within the pricing run. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors requires accurate distribution factors and shadow prices. Where available, MMU used distribution factors from the dispatch run. The MMU also calculated missing shadow prices for the relevant transmission constraints when feasible. This approach reduced the impact of the errors. Any remaining errors contributed to the NA component.

Table 3-79 shows the components of the PJM day-ahead annual load-weighted average LMP including the adjusted markup calculated by excluding the 10 percent adder from the coal, gas and oil units.[121]

### Table 3-79 Components of day-ahead (Adjusted) load-weighted average LMP (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|
| Element | Contribution to LMP | Percent |
| DEC | $16.85 | 22.7% |
| Gas | $16.69 | 22.5% |
| INC | $11.53 | 15.5% |
| NA | $6.48 | 8.7% |
| Positive Markup | $5.00 | 6.7% |
| Coal | $4.61 | 6.2% |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | $3.65 | 4.9% |
| Up to Congestion | $2.91 | 3.9% |
| CO2 Cost | $2.73 | 3.7% |
| Variable Maintenance | $1.55 | 2.1% |
| Oil | $1.20 | 1.6% |
| Variable Operations | $1.13 | 1.5% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | $1.08 | 1.5% |
| Increase Generation Differential | $0.41 | 0.6% |
| NOx Cost | $0.12 | 0.2% |
| Landfill Gas | $0.01 | 0.0% |
| Ten Percent Adder | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| SO2 Cost | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| Other | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| Decrease Generation Differential | ($0.08) | (0.1%) |
| Renewable Energy Credits | ($0.35) | (0.5%) |
| Negative Markup | ($1.29) | (1.7%) |
| Total | $74.25 | 100.0% |

121 Id.

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## Shortage

PJM's real-time energy market experienced five-minute shortage pricing for one or more reserve products for 102 unique five-minute intervals across 23 days in the first six months of 2026. PJM implemented fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, creating the possibility that the pricing run and the dispatch run could classify different intervals as short. In the first six months of 2026, in the pricing run, there were 102 unique five-minute intervals with real-time shortage pricing for one or more reserve products. In the first six months of 2026, in the dispatch run, there were 96 unique intervals with real-time shortage pricing for one or more reserve products.

## Emergency Procedures

PJM can give members advanced notice of possible emergency actions that could occur during an operating day. These notifications are classified by urgency. Advisories are usually issued several days in advance. Alerts are declared at least a day in advance. Warnings are issued on the same operating day, usually for an expected emergency action.

Some emergency actions serve as triggers for performance assessment intervals (PAIs) when declared for the RTO or the active subzone. Some emergency actions trigger PAIs unconditionally while others only trigger PAIs when there is a primary reserve shortage for that area.[122] [123] The declaration of such emergency actions for smaller areas, such as for specific control zones, does not trigger a PAI. When communicating emergency procedures, PJM will also post NERC energy emergency alert (EEA) levels.[124] Table 3-80 provides a description of PJM declared emergency procedures, in alphabetical order, including whether they are a trigger for PAIs and the NERC EEA level triggered with the procedure, if any. [125] [126] [127] [128]

NERC energy emergency alerts (EEAs) are declared by reliability coordinators, such as PJM, on their own initiative or by request from a NERC regional entity, such as ReliabilityFirst. NERC Attachment 1-EOP-011-4 defines three EEA levels, each having associated circumstances and responsibilities.[129] PJM is a reliability coordinator, a balancing authority and a transmission operator.

Under NERC EEA 1 ("EEA1"), all available generation resources are being used. Under this alert, "all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments", the balancing authority is "concerned" about maintaining contingency reserves, and non-firm wholesale energy sales are curtailed. PJM declares an EEA1 when entering into capacity emergencies.[130] For example, PJM declares an EEA1 in the process of issuing a maximum generation emergency/load management alert.

Under NERC EEA 2 ("EEA2"), the balancing authority has activated load management procedures and is no longer able to meet its expected energy requirements, but is still able to meet its contingency reserve requirement. Under an EEA2, PJM must communicate and coordinate with other reliability coordinators. PJM must work with transmission owners to see whether equipment can be returned to service. For example, PJM declares an EEA2 in the process of issuing an emergency load management reduction action.

Under NERC EEA 3 ("EEA3"), the balancing authority is unable to meet its contingency reserve requirement and load is actively being dumped or will soon be dumped. An EEA3 can only be declared after all available generation is online and demand-side response resources are called. During an EEA3, PJM must continue steps begun in an EEA2. For example, PJM declares an EEA3 in the process of issuing a manual load dump warning and, when PJM is not able to meet its contingency reserve requirement, in the process of issuing a voltage reduction action.

122 See PJM. "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.4A Non-Performance Assessment, Rev. 62 (Dec. 17, 2025).
123 OATT, Part I (Common Service Provisions) § 1.
124 NERC Attachment 1-EOP-011-4. "Energy Emergency Alerts," February 15, 2024. <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/EOP-011-4.pdf>.
125 See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 3.3 Cold Weather Advisory / Alert, Rev. 98 (June 24, 2026).
126 See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 3.4 Hot Weather Alert, Rev. 98 (June 24, 2026).
127 See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 2.3.1 Advanced Notice Emergency Procedures: Alerts, Rev. 98 (June 24, 2026).
128 See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 2.3.2 Real-Time Emergency Procedures (Warnings and Actions), Rev. 98 (June 24, 2026).
129 NERC Attachment 1-EOP-011-4. "Energy Emergency Alerts," February 15, 2024. <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/EOP-011-4.pdf>.
130 See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 2.3.2 Real-Time Emergency Procedures (Warnings and Actions), Rev. 98 (June 26, 2026).


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## Table 3-80 Description of emergency procedures

| Emergency Procedure | Priority Level | Triggers NERC Energy Emergency Alert | Triggers Performance Assessment Interval | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cold Weather Advisory | Advisory | | | To notify personnel and facilities that PJM may issue a Cold Weather Alert. |
| Cold Weather Alert | Alert | | | To prepare personnel and facilities for extreme cold weather conditions, generally when forecast weather conditions approach minimum or temperatures fall below ten degrees Fahrenheit. |
| Conservative Operations | Alert | | | To notify personnel and facilities that PJM may operate more conservatively. This can be due to natural phenomena, weather events, security events, and other conditions. Conservative operations may result in the use of larger contingencies and stricter transfer limits. |
| Emergency Mandatory Load Management Reduction Action | Action | EEA2 | | To request load reductions from customers registered in the PJM Demand Response program that need 30, 60, or 120 minute lead time before declaring emergency load management reductions. |
| Geomagnetic Disturbance Action | Action | | | To inform members that PJM will operate the grid with more conservative transfer limits developed for such disturbances. Transmission owners must coordinate with PJM before acting upon their own disturbance procedures. |
| Geomagnetic Disturbance Warning | Warning | | | To warn members that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predict a possible geomagnetic storm of severity K7 or greater, which can induce currents in the system and equipment. |
| Heavy Load Voltage (HLV) Schedule Action | Action | | | To direct transmission owners and generation owners to implement the heavy load voltage schedule. |
| Heavy Load Voltage (HLV) Schedule Warning | Warning | | | To warn transmission owners and generation owners to prepare to maximumly support voltages during peak load. |
| High System Voltage Action | Action | | | To prepare the system for possible high voltages and to coordinate with transmission owners and generation owners for managing those high voltages. |
| Hot Weather Alert | Alert | | | To prepare personnel and facilities for extreme hot and/or humid weather conditions, generally when forecast temperatures exceed 90 degrees with high humidity. |
| Load Shed Directive | Action | | Yes, when for RTO or subzone | To shed load in a local area, reserve subzone, or the entire RTO. A load shed directive for the reserve subzone or the entire RTO triggers a Performance Assessment Interval. |
| Low Voltage Alert | Alert | | | To alert transmission owners and generation owners that a period of low voltage and high load are expected. |
| Maintenance Outage Recall | Informational | | | To request that generation owners make units available by canceling any maintenance outages within at least 72 hours of posting. After that time, maintenance outages are converted into forced outages. |
| Maximum Emergency Action | Action | | Yes, when PR short in same subzone or RTO | To provide real time notice to increase generation above the maximum economic level. It is implemented whenever generation is needed that is greater than the maximum economic level. |
| Maximum Emergency Generation/Load Management Alert | Alert | EEA1 | | To provide an early alert at least one day prior to the operating day that system conditions may require the use of the PJM emergency procedures and resources must be able to increase generation above the maximum economic level of their offers. |
| Non-Market Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warning | Warning | | | To warn transmission owners of the possibility of load shed in their area for non-market facilities. |
| Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warning | Warning | | | To warn transmission owners of the possibility of load shed in their area. |
| Pre-Emergency Mandatory Load Management Reduction Action | Action | | | To request load reductions from customers registered in the PJM Demand Response program that need 30, 60, or 120 minute lead time before declaring emergency load management reductions. |
| Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) | Informational | | | To maintain transmission operating security limits. This can involve curtailing external transactions and charging outside customers for the cost of congestion. |
| Unit Startup Notification Alert | Alert | | | To direct generation owners to prepare units so that long lead time units can come online within 48 hours. This notice is given days in advance of the predicted need. |

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Not all emergency procedures defined in Table 3-80 are included in Table 3-81, Table 3-82, Figure 3-52, Figure 3-53 and Figure 3-54, even if they occurred in the first six months of 2026. Synchronized reserve events are covered in more detail in Section 10. Information about frequent events is treated separately. Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warnings (PCLLRWs) and Non-Market Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warnings (NMPCLLRWs) are shown in Figure 3-56 and Figure 3-57. Transmission loading relief informational postings (TLRs) are discussed in the Interchange Transactions section of this report.[131] Local load relief warnings provide transmission owners advanced warning of possible local load shed in an area in order to relieve a local constraint and are separate from manual load dump warnings. Transmission loading relief (TLR) is a NERC procedure for curtailing interchange transactions to avoid violating operational limits of the system.[132] [133]

Table 3-81 shows the dates affected by emergency alerts, warnings, actions, and informational postings in the first six months of 2026. Events in Table 3-81 can span multiple days, but only the first day is shown. Advisories, alerts, warnings, and informational postings do not necessarily take effect immediately. For example, for cold weather alerts, the dates affected are when PJM expects the cold weather requiring the alert to occur. For maintenance outage recalls, the dates affected are from the date PJM initiates the recall until the date the units are expected to be available. Figure 3-52 shows the timeline of the advisories, alerts, warnings, actions, and the maintenance outage recall during the cold weather event in late January and early February, which included Winter Storm Fern.

## Table 3-81 Starting days of declared emergency alerts, warnings actions, and certain informational postings: January through June, 2026

| Date | Cold Weather Alert | Hot Weather Alert | Conservative Operations | Pre-Emergency Mandatory Load Management Reduction | Emergency Mandatory Load Management Reduction | Geomagnetic Disturbance Warning | Geomagnetic Disturbance Action | Low Voltage Alert | High System Voltage Action | Heavy Load Voltage (HLV) Schedule Warning | Heavy Load Voltage (HLV) Schedule Action | Unit Startup Notification Alert | Maintenance Outage Recall | Maximum Emergency Generation Alert | Maximum Emergency Generation Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19-Jan-2026 | Western | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | |
| 20-Jan-2026 | PJM RTO | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | |
| 21-Jan-2026 | | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | PJM RTO | | |
| 23-Jan-2026 | Western | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 24-Jan-2026 | PJM RTO | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25-Jan-2026 | | | | Southern, BGE, PEPCO | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 27-Jan-2026 | | | | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | PJM RTO | |
| 07-Feb-2026 | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03-Apr-2026 | | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | |
| 14-Apr-2026 | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16-Apr-2026 | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 09-May-2026 | | | | | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | |
| 10-May-2026 | | | | | | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | |
| 14-May-2026 | | | | | | | | | | | | | PJM RTO | | |
| 18-May-2026 | | PJM RTO | | Southern, BGE, PEPCO | | | | PJM RTO | | PJM RTO | | | | PJM RTO | |
| 19-May-2026 | | Western except COMED; Mid-Atlantic; Southern | | Southern, AEP_MARION, BGE, PEPCO | | | | | | Western except COMED; Mid-Atlantic; Southern | | | | PJM RTO | |
| 20-May-2026 | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | | | | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | Southern, Mid-Atlantic | | | | Southern, BGE, PEPCO | |
| 05-Jun-2026 | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | |
| 11-Jun-2026 | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-Jun-2026 | | Mid-Atlantic, Southern | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25-Jun-2026 | | | | | | | | | | | | | PJM RTO | | |
| 29-Jun-2026 | | Western | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30-Jun-2026 | | PJM RTO | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

131 See the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM,* Vol. 2, Section 9: Interchange Transactions.
132 NERC IRO-006-5. "Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)," November 4, 2010. <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/IRO-006-5.pdf>.
133 NERC IRO-006-EAST-2. "Transmission Loading Relief Procedure for the Eastern Interconnection," August 13, 2015. <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/IRO-006-EAST-2.pdf>.


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### Figure 3-52 Days with applicable alerts, actions, and recalls January 17 through February 4, 2026[134]





Table 3-82 shows the number of days for which emergency alerts, warnings, actions, and informational postings were declared by PJM in the first six months of 2025 and the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, there were zero days with emergency actions and shortages that triggered Performance Assessment Intervals (PAIs).[135]

### Table 3-82 Number of days for which PJM declared events (alerts, warnings, actions, and certain informational postings): January through June, 2025 and 2026[136] [137]

| | Number of days for which events declared | |
|---|---|---|
| Event Type | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) |
| Cold Weather Alert | 13 | 16 |
| Conservative Operations | 8 | 10 |
| Geomagnetic Disturbance Action | 1 | 0 |
| Geomagnetic Disturbance Warning | 10 | 5 |
| Heavy Load Voltage (HLV) Schedule Warning | 0 | 3 |
| High System Voltage Action | 13 | 2 |
| Hot Weather Alert | 5 | 14 |
| Low Voltage Alert | 5 | 7 |
| Maintenance Outage Recall | 9 | 10 |
| Maximum Emergency Generation/Load Management Alert | 4 | 4 |
| Pre-Emergency Mandatory Load Management Reduction Action | 4 | 3 |
| Shortage Pricing | 13 | 23 |
| Energy export recalls from PJM capacity resources | 0 | 0 |

134 To be consistent with other statistics in this section, the length of the maintenance outage recall has been reduced to the days starting from when the recall was issued until the time units were expected to be available. In the previous report, the recall was shown as lasting until near the end of the cold weather.

135 A PAI is triggered when PJM takes an emergency action and there is a shortage of primary reserves in the same zone or subzone. See 184 FERC ¶ 61,058 (2023).

136 TLRs, Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warnings, and Non-Market Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warnings are excluded due to their high frequency.

137 PJM can recall energy exports as needed as part of triggering emergency procedures. See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 2.3.2 Real-Time Emergency Procedures (Warnings and Actions), Rev. 98 (Jun. 24e 2026).

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Figure 3-53 shows the number of days for which emergency alerts were issued by PJM in the first six months of 2022 through 2026.

### Figure 3-53 Number of days for which emergency alerts declared: January through June, 2022 through 2026






Figure 3-54 shows the number of days for which emergency warnings and actions were declared by PJM in the first six months of 2022 through 2026.

### Figure 3-54 Declared emergency warnings and actions: January through June, 2022 through 2026








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Figure 3-55 shows the number of post contingency local load relief warnings (PCLLRWs) and non-market post contingency local load relief warnings (NMPCLLRWs) declared in PJM in the first six months of 2026. Figure 3-56 shows the number of post-contingency local load relief warnings (PCLLRWs) for each area targeted by a PCLLRW's declaration. A single PCLLRW can be declared for multiple regions.

### Figure 3-55 Declared local load relief warnings: January through June, 2026




### Figure 3-56 Number of post-contingency local load relief warnings per declared area: January through June, 2026




## Power Balance Constraint Violation

The purpose of the real-time energy market is to dispatch sufficient supply to meet demand. In the RT SCED optimization, the power balance constraint enforces the requirement that total dispatched generation (supply) equals the sum total of forecasted load, losses and net interchange (demand). The power balance constraint is violated when supply is less than demand but, for a number of reasons, it is difficult to determine when there is an actual power balance constraint violation.

The current process for meeting energy and reserve requirements in real time, and for pricing the system conditions when RT SCED forecasts that energy supply is less than the demand for energy and reserves, is opaque and not defined in the PJM governing documents. It is unclear whether and how PJM converts reserves to energy before violating the power balance constraint.

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It is unclear whether and when PJM uses its authority under the tariff to curtail energy exports from PJM capacity resources to meet the power balance constraint. It is unclear why PJM does not include demand side capacity resources in the definition of reserves. It is unclear whether PJM would maintain a minimum level of synchronized reserves even if that would result in a controlled load shed. The current RT SCED does not have a mechanism to convert inflexible reserves procured by the ASO to energy to satisfy the power balance constraint.[138] SCED solutions from October 1, 2019, February 16, 2020, and April 21, 2020, indicate that the defined logic met transmission constraint limits and reserve requirements but violated the power balance constraint. The definitions and implementation of reserves, combined with operator discretion to bias load, make it difficult to define when there is an actual power balance constraint violation. Effective August 8, 2024, PJM updated SCED and LPC to convert reserves to energy before violating the power balance constraint.[139]

During Winter Storm Elliott, on December 23, and December 24, 2022, PJM created what PJM termed virtual generation in real time to satisfy the power balance constraint. PJM did not convert any inflexible reserves to energy. In summary, the power balance constraint was violated solely as a result of the load bias added by PJM and that violation was corrected by PJM adding generation that does not actually exist to the supply (virtual generation). To the extent that there was not an actual violation of the power balance constraint, it was appropriate that PJM did not take actions to address the nonexistent violation.

The MMU recommends that PJM clarify, modify and document its process for dispatching reserves and energy when SCED indicates that supply is less than total demand including forecasted load and reserve requirements. The modifications should include: the exact definition of the power balance constraint including the role of PJM load bias; a SCED process to economically convert reserves to energy; a process for the recall of energy exports from capacity resources to address any actual or potential power balance issue; a process to call on demand side capacity resources, and the minimum level of synchronized reserves that would trigger load shedding.

Table 3-83 shows the number of five minute intervals for which the RT SCED solutions did not balance demand and supply. Prior to August 8, 2024, PJM reran the RT SCED with artificially increased supply to satisfy the power balance constraint. In the first six months of 2026, there were 14 five-minute intervals that used an RT SCED solution with an apparently violated power balance constraint. Across all intervals with violations, PJM's positive load bias exceeded the apparent MW shortfall. Among those eight intervals, PJM capped the energy LMP at $3,700 per MWh for two intervals on March 12, 2026, and one interval on March 13, 2026.

**Table 3-83 Number of five minute intervals using RT SCED solutions with apparently violated power balance constraint by year**

| Year | Number of five minute intervals | Average Energy Component of LMP in SCED ($/MWh) | Average Energy Component of LMP in Pricing Run ($/MWh) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | - | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2014 | 655 | $36.29 | $36.29 |
| 2015 | 71 | ($0.76) | ($0.76) |
| 2016 | 42 | $93.06 | $93.06 |
| 2017 | 31 | $279.86 | $279.86 |
| 2018 | 16 | $268.21 | $268.21 |
| 2019 | 36 | $845.48 | $845.48 |
| 2020 | 5 | $351.56 | $351.56 |
| 2021 | 10 | $976.06 | $976.06 |
| 2022 | 121 | $2,347.33 | $2,066.21 |
| 2023 | 23 | $357.34 | $361.14 |
| 2024 | 6 | $907.95 | $907.95 |
| 2025 | 8 | $3,408.63 | $2,937.25 |
| 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 14 | $3,117.78 | $3,041.01 |

## Shortage and Shortage Pricing

In electricity markets, shortage means that demand, including reserve requirements, is nearing the limits of the currently available capacity of the system. Shortage pricing is a mechanism for signaling shortage conditions through higher energy prices. Under the PJM rules that were in place through September 30, 2012, shortage pricing resulted from the exercise of aggregate

138 Inflexible reserves are those reserves that clear in the hour ahead Ancillary Service Optimizer (ASO) but cannot be dispatched in the real time dispatch tool, RT SCED.

139 These changes were not documented publicly in PJM manuals or elsewhere.



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market power by individual generation owners for specific units when the system was close to its available capacity. That was not an efficient way to manage shortage pricing and made it difficult to distinguish between market power and shortage pricing. Shortage pricing is an administrative pricing mechanism that sets a defined higher price when the system operates with real-time reserves that are lower than the target level.

In the first six months of 2026, there were 102 five minute intervals with real-time shortage pricing in the pricing run for one or more reserve products that occurred on 23 days in PJM.

In Order No. 825, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to trigger shortage pricing for any dispatch and pricing interval in which a shortage of energy or operating reserves is indicated by the RTO/ISO's software.[140] Prior to May 11, 2017, if the dispatch tools (Intermediate-Term SCED and Real-Time SCED) reflected a shortage of reserves (primary or synchronized) for a time period shorter than a defined threshold (30 minutes), it was considered a transient shortage, a shortage event was not declared, and shortage pricing was not implemented. As of May 11, 2017, the rule requires PJM to trigger shortage pricing for any five minute interval for which the Real-Time SCED (Security Constrained Economic Dispatch) indicates a shortage of synchronized reserves or primary reserves. In January 2019, PJM updated its business rules in Manual 11 to describe PJM's implementation of the five minute shortage pricing process. PJM Manual 11 states that shortage pricing is triggered when an approved RT SCED case that was used in the Locational Pricing Calculator (LPC) indicates a shortage of reserves. The implementation is not fully algorithmic or well defined because RT SCED can indicate a shortage that PJM does not use in pricing and because the load bias added to SCED may artificially create or suppress shortages. On June 22, 2020, PJM reduced the frequency of automatic RT SCED executions to every five minutes in order to match the frequency of pricing in the LPC, which reduced the frequency of unpriced shortage solutions.

Prior to September 1, 2021, the reserves calculated in the LPC solution, and the reserves calculated in the reference RT SCED case used by the LPC solution were the same. With the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, shortage pricing is now triggered by the pricing run in LPC.[141] This can lead to differences between the dispatched reserves in RT SCED and the reserves calculated in the pricing run in LPC. In the pricing run in LPC, shortage pricing could be triggered even when there is no actual shortage in dispatched reserves as determined by the reference RT SCED solution. This occurred for six intervals in the first six months of 2026.

Voltage reduction actions and manual load dump actions are also triggers for shortage pricing, reflecting the fact that when operators need to take these emergency actions to maintain reliability, the system is short reserves and prices should reflect the actual short run marginal costs of meeting load under those conditions, even if the administrative reduction of load means that the power balance constraint is met and there is no defined shortage of reserves.[142]

## Operating Reserve Demand Curves

Shortage pricing in the PJM Energy Market can occur in either the day-ahead or the real-time market for any of five reserve requirements: RTO Synchronized Reserves, Subzone Synchronized Reserves, RTO Primary Reserves, Subzone Primary Reserves, and 30-Minute Reserves. Each requirement is modelled in the market clearing engines as a demand curve priced administratively at $850 per MWh up to the minimum reserve requirement (MRR) and at $300 per MWh for additional reserves of at least 190 MW.[143] [144] The logic for the choice of the $850 and $300 shortage prices is not defined and its actual basis is not clear. During a reserve shortage, the marginal cost of the short reserve service is set to the administrative value of the ORDC ($850 per MWh if clearing less than the minimum reserve requirement, otherwise $300 per MWh). This is called shortage pricing, and this increases the LMP and the reserve product market clearing prices. This is why the values on the ORDC are sometimes called penalty factors. The penalty for being short of reserves is the increased cost administratively defined by the ORDC.

140 *Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, Order No. 825, 155 FERC ¶ 61,276 at P 162 (2016).

141 *See* PJM Operating Agreement, Schedule 1 § 2.5.1(a).

142 *See, e.g.*, Scarcity and Shortage Pricing, Offer Mitigation and Offer Caps Workshop, Docket No. AD14-14-000, Transcript 29:21–30:14 (Oct. 28, 2014).

143 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.3.3 Reserve Demand Curves and Penalty Factors, Rev. 137 (July 28, 2026).

144 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.3 Reserve Requirement Determination, Rev. 137 (July 28, 2026).


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Based on the current ORDC, the market clearing engine will incur up to $850 per MW to maintain reserves equal to the minimum reserve requirement. If there are reserve MW available at a marginal cost equal to or less than $850 per MW to satisfy the reserve requirement, the optimization will use resources to meet the demand for energy instead of reserves until the marginal price per MW of reserves is $850. At cleared reserve levels below the minimum reserve requirement, the marginal cost of converting reserve MW into energy MW to meet the load is administratively defined to be the $850 penalty price. Because an additional MW of energy on the margin would require another MW of reserves shortage, the administrative marginal cost of reserves defined by the ORDC is added to LMP. The marginal cost of energy under these circumstances is the marginal cost of the marginal energy resource plus the $850 marginal penalty for converting reserves to energy.

## Shortage Pricing and Energy Price Formation

The current operating reserve demand curves (ORDC) in PJM define an administrative price for estimated reserves (synchronized, primary, and 30-minute reserves) up to the extended reserve requirement quantities, which for each reserve service is the sum of that service's minimum reserve requirement (MRR) and an extended requirement of at least 190 MW. The price is $850 per MWh for reserve quantities less than the MRR. The price is $300 per MWh for reserve quantities between the MRR and the sum of the MRR and the extended requirement. The example demand curve shown in Figure 3-57 drops to a zero price for quantities above the extended reserve requirement.

**Figure 3-57 Example real-time extended synchronized reserve demand curve showing the permanent second step**




Historically, the minimum reserve requirement for each operating interval has equaled the size of the largest single source of supply on the PJM system during that operating interval, known as the most severe single contingency. Beginning May 12, 2023, PJM unilaterally increased the minimum reserve requirement based on what appeared to be low response rates from reserves but not based on any evidence about reliability issues. The changes to the reserve requirements are discussed in more detail in Section 10: Ancillary Service Markets.

The $850 per MWh price on the ORDCs has been in place since June 2015.[145] The age of the penalty factor does not determine its effectiveness. There is no evidence that the $850 per MWh value was too low through the first six months of 2026. PJM proposes to increase the ORDC prices, citing the

145 See Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C. *2015 State of the Market Report for PJM,* Vol. 2, Section 10: Ancillary Services, p. 369.


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age of the $850 per MWh value as its only justification.[146] The length of time that the ORDC prices have been in place is irrelevant. Reserve shortages have become more frequent in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 with load growth, including data center load growth.[147] Unnecessarily increasing shortage pricing during shortage events by arbitrarily raising the ORDC prices, as PJM proposes in the Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force, would increase the costs imposed on all customers from data center load growth, counter to the Principles of the PJM governors and the White House, as well as the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.[148] [149]

## Nesting

The reserve requirements are nested such that the reserves with shorter allowed response times and stricter synchronization requirements count toward the requirements for reserves with longer allowed response times and less strict synchronization requirements, and such that the reserves in the subzone count toward the total RTO requirement. For example, synchronized reserves count toward the primary reserve requirement, and Mid-Atlantic Dominion reserves count toward the PJM RTO reserve requirement. This nesting means that the effect of reserve constraints on prices can be additive.

The effect of the reserve constraints on pricing depends on the constraint shadow price. The market uses constraints to ensure that reliability requirements are met while production costs are minimized. A binding constraint means that the market incurred some additional production cost to satisfy the constraint. A violated constraint has no associated production cost, so an administrative cost is used instead. The shadow price of a constraint is the change in the total production cost (the objective function of the market dispatch software) if that constraint limit were increased at the margin. A reserve constraint violation (a shortage) means that the constraint cannot be satisfied at a defined marginal cost, and the administratively defined cost is used instead. For the RTO synchronized reserve constraint, the shadow price during a shortage is defined to equal the ORDC value. For the MAD synchronized reserve constraint, when reserves from both the RTO and MAD can be used, the shadow price equals the sum of the ORDC value for each constraint when both are violated. The same occurs for the primary and 30-minute reserve constraints. The total shadow price of reserve violations can reach five times the highest ORDC value of $850 per MWh, which is $4,250 per MWh. This value exceeds the PJM $1,700 per MWh price caps on reserve prices and the $3,700 per MWh price cap applied to the energy component of LMP (the system marginal price or SMP component of LMP). There is no underlying economic analysis that supports these extremely high prices when reserves are short. There is no evidence that the demand for electricity responds to these high prices which generally occur during extreme weather when the demand and need for power is high.

## Energy and Reserve Price Caps

Table 3-84 shows six example scenarios, under the current ORDCs, with combinations of energy offers, reserve shortage penalty factors and transmission constraint penalty factors that can add up to produce high LMPs at sample pnodes in the MAD Reserve Subzone and outside the MAD Reserve Subzone.

Scenario A shows a simple shortage in the RTO Reserve Zone. In scenario B, there is a reserve shortage for both primary and synchronized reserves in both MAD and RTO Reserve Zones that results in a $1,700 per MWh reserve shortage penalty in the RTO Zone LMP and a $3,400 per MWh reserve shortage penalty in the MAD Zone LMP. The price is lower when the marginal resource for energy is in the RTO Zone. If the RTO to MAD reserve transfer constraint is binding, the higher MAD reserve penalty does not affect the rest of RTO LMP.

In scenario C, there is a reserve shortage for both primary and synchronized reserves in both MAD and RTO Reserve Zones and a violated transmission constraint that affects the marginal congestion costs in the system marginal price. In scenario C, the sum of the marginal unit cost, reserve and transmission

146 PJM. "Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, and Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability," (May 6, 2026) at 47.

147 See PJM. "PJM Load Forecast Accuracy Report," (May 29, 2025), <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/load-forecast/2026-load-forecast-accuracy-report.pdf>.

148 See Statement of Principles Regarding PJM, National Energy Dominance Council and PJM State Governors (February 15, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/statement-principles-regarding-pjm>.

149 See Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances Energy Affordability with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (March 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (March 4, 2026), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-advances-energy-affordability-with-the-ratepayer-protection-pledge/>.

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constraint penalty factors equals $5,450 per MWh, which exceeds $3,700 per MWh, so SMP capping is triggered whether the marginal unit for energy can provide reserves for the MAD Zone or only the RTO Zone.

In scenario D, with a $1,000 per MWh offer price for the marginal unit for energy, violation of four reserve penalty factors does not trigger SMP capping, because the marginal unit for energy cannot serve the MAD reserve requirement. Scenario E and F show that LMPs can exceed $3,700 per MWh if there is a violated transmission constraint that is not exacerbated by an increase in load at the load weighted reference pricing node, which determines the SMP.[150]

In Scenario F, the energy component of LMP is at its highest level, $2,000 per MWh and there is a reserve shortage for primary and synchronized reserves in both MAD and RTO Reserve Zones and a shortage of 30 minute reserves, resulting in a capped $1,700 per MWh scarcity adder, and a violated transmission constraint with a $2,000 per MWh penalty factor that results in a $5,700 per MWh LMP. The LMPs in Scenario F are not the highest possible LMPs in the PJM energy market under the current rules. If there are multiple violated transmission constraints, the congestion costs contributing to the LMP at a pnode can exceed $2,000 per MWh resulting in LMPs higher than $5,700 per MWh.

Scenarios G and H are similar to conditions during the highest priced hours of Winter Storm Elliott on December 23 and 24, 2022. In G, the marginal unit offer price is $500 per MWh. The synchronized and primary reserve requirements are violated for the RTO and MAD zones. Transmission constraints affect both the system marginal price and other locations. The SMP in G is capped at $3,700 per MWh. In H, the marginal unit offer price is lower, at $40 per MWh, and the 30 minute reserve constraint is also violated. With the offer caps, the SMP is also at $3,700 per MWh.

The extent to which each transmission constraint penalty factor for a constraint affects the LMP at a pnode is directly proportional to the pnode's distribution factor (dfax) with respect to that constraint. In addition, the LMP at a pnode includes a loss component calculated as the product of the marginal loss factor and the uncapped system marginal price.

### Table 3-84 Real-time additive penalty factors under reserve shortage and transmission constraint violations: Status Quo

| Scenario | Marginal Unit Offer Price | Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factor | | Primary Reserve Penalty Factor | | 30 Minute Reserve Penalty Factor | Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor in SMP | System Marginal Price | | Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor in CLMP | Total LMP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | RTO | MAD | RTO | MAD | RTO | | RTO Marginal | MAD Marginal | | RTO Marginal | MAD Marginal |
| A | $50 | $850 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $900 | $900 | $0 | $900 | $900 |
| B | $50 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $0 | $0 | $1,750 | $3,450 | $0 | $1,750 | $3,450 |
| C | $50 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $0 | $2,000 | $3,700 | $3,700 | $0 | $3,700 | $3,700 |
| D | $1,000 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $0 | $0 | $2,700 | $3,700 | $0 | $2,700 | $3,700 |
| E | $1,000 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $2,000 | $3,700 | $3,700 | $2,000 | $5,700 | $5,700 |
| F | $2,000 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $2,000 | $3,700 | $3,700 | $2,000 | $5,700 | $5,700 |
| G | $500 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $0 | $2,000 | $3,700 | $3,700 | $2,000 | $5,700 | $5,700 |
| H | $40 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $850 | $2,000 | $3,700 | $3,700 | $2,000 | $5,700 | $5,700 |

150 The impact of the transmission constraint penalty factor at a pnode depends on its distribution factor (dfax) with respect to the constraint. The scenarios here assume a single violated transmission constraint with dfax of 1.0. If there are multiple violated transmission constraints, the total impact at a pnode is the sum of the product of transmission constraint penalty factors and distribution factors.


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### Shortage Pricing During Synchronized Reserve Events

Synchronized reserves are deployed when PJM declares a synchronized reserve event, also known as a spinning event. PJM's methods of communication prior to December 2024 failed to result in reliably timely responses, defined to be within 10 minutes. For units that could receive an electronic signal, PJM's instruction to units supplying reserves was to ignore the dispatch signals sent by RT SCED and to instead ramp their units up until the spin event ends. A significant number of resources did not have the capability to receive the electronic signals that PJM offered. The ALL-CALL system only calls a limited number of contacts at the same time. Although PJM's stated goal was an immediate response, in practice it took minutes for a generator's designated contact to respond to the ALL-CALL, who could then take minutes more to call personnel at the plant. If a unit was following automatic generation control when an event was declared, then additional minutes could also be lost switching to manual control. The end result of these communications issues was that resources started responding only after minutes into an event, even when everything went well.[151] In December 2024, PJM added an automated communication method that would add the reserve deployment instruction to the dispatch signal, which will allow generators following automatic generation control to automatically follow the signal. The new method did not affect any synchronized reserve events in 2024. The new method applied to the 28 events in 2025 (of which only seven lasted at least ten minutes) and the eight events in the first six months of 2026 (of which only one lasted at least ten minutes). Synchronized reserve performance improved in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. The new method did not resolve the communications issues for all resources. Significant communications issues remain unresolved.

Although PJM signals resources to increase their output, the approved SCED cases are solved with the reserve requirement intact, which dispatches the system to meet the load and reserve requirements 8 to 10 minutes into the future. Currently, RT SCED has the ability to back down units during events to create available reserves, which counteracts PJM's recovery effort. This results in a discrepancy between the RT SCED solutions and the operational need during a spinning event. While PJM recovers from a disturbance during a spinning event, PJM should adjust the operating reserve demand curve (ORDC) for synchronized reserves to ensure that RT SCED does not have a competing objective of immediately replacing reserves that have been paid for and are being used as intended. Without such an adjustment, the prices are artificially inflated, potentially triggering shortage pricing, during the times when reserves are used for their intended purpose. For example, three shortage pricing intervals were artificially triggered during the spin event on March 1, 2026. The MMU recommends that PJM adjust the ORDCs during spin events to reduce the reserve requirements by the amount of the reserves deployed.

151 See the *2024 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Vol. 2, Section 10: Ancillary Service Markets for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

## Reserve Shortages First Six Months of 2026

### Reserve Shortage in Real-Time SCED

The MMU analyzed the RT SCED solutions to determine how many of the five minute target time RT SCED solutions indicated a shortage of any of the reserve products in the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone (synchronized reserve and primary reserve in both areas and 30-minute reserve in the RTO), when multiple solutions indicated shortage of reserves, and how many of these resulted in shortage prices in LPC. Reserves are considered short if the quantity (MW) of reserves dispatched by RT SCED for a five minute interval is less than the extended reserve requirement. To trigger shortage pricing, PJM operators must approve an LPC case in which the MW of reserves in the pricing run of the LPC are short of the extended reserve requirement.

Until June 2, 2021, PJM generally solved one RT SCED case with three solutions per case, for each five minute target time.[152] [153] On June 3, 2021, PJM updated RT SCED to solve two additional scenarios, or a total of five solutions per case. In 2021, the frequency with which RT SCED solutions were approved increased to one solution per five minute interval. This approval frequency increased the proportion of approved SCED solutions that are reflected in LMPs. However, the process of selecting the SCED solution to approve, among

152 A case is executed when it begins to solve. Most but not all cases are solved. RT SCED cases take about one to two minutes to solve.

153 PJM updated the RT SCED execution frequency to solve one case for each five minute target time beginning June 22, 2020. PJM dispatchers may solve additional cases at their discretion.

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the solutions available to PJM operators, is subjective and is not based on clearly defined criteria. The criteria are especially important when only some of the SCED solutions reflect shortage pricing.

The MMU analyzed the target times for which one or more RT SCED case solutions indicated a shortage of one or more reserve products. Table 3-85 shows, in 2025 and the first six months of 2026, the total number of target times, the number of target times for which at least one RT SCED solution showed a shortage of reserves, the number of target times for which multiple RT SCED solutions showed a shortage of reserves, and the number of five-minute pricing intervals for which the LPC solution showed a shortage of reserves. Each execution of RT SCED produces five solutions, using five different levels of load bias. Table 3-85 shows that, in 2025, 5,496 target times, or 5.2 percent of all five-minute target times, had at least one RT SCED solution showing a shortage of reserves, and 1,824 target times, or 1.7 percent of all five-minute target times, had more than one RT SCED solution showing a shortage of reserves. In the first six months of 2026, there were 2,330 target times, or 4.5 percent of all five-minute target times, that had at least one RT SCED solution showing a shortage of reserves, and 797 target times, or 1.5 percent of all five-minute target times, that had multiple RT SCED solutions showing a shortage of reserves.

**Table 3-85 Real-time monthly five minute SCED target times and pricing intervals with shortage: January 2025 through June 2026**

| Year | Month | Number of Five Minute Intervals | Number of Target Times With At Least One SCED Solution Short of Reserves | Percent Target Times With At Least One SCED Solution Short of Reserves | Number of Target Times With Multiple SCED Solutions Short of Reserves | Percent Target Times With Multiple SCED Solutions Short of Reserves | Number of Five Minute Intervals With Shortage Prices in LPC | Percent RT SCED Target Times With Reserve Shortage With Shortage Prices in LPC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | 8,928 | 398 | 4.5% | 119 | 1.3% | 10 | 2.5% |
| 2025 | Feb | 8,352 | 606 | 7.3% | 156 | 1.9% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 2025 | Mar | 8,916 | 876 | 9.8% | 259 | 2.9% | 9 | 1.0% |
| 2025 | Apr | 8,640 | 434 | 5.0% | 103 | 1.2% | 2 | 0.5% |
| 2025 | May | 8,928 | 792 | 8.9% | 249 | 2.8% | 1 | 0.1% |
| 2025 | Jun | 8,640 | 404 | 4.7% | 115 | 1.3% | 2 | 0.5% |
| 2025 | Jul | 8,928 | 390 | 4.4% | 118 | 1.3% | 3 | 0.8% |
| 2025 | Aug | 8,928 | 532 | 6.0% | 119 | 1.3% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 2025 | Sep | 8,640 | 687 | 8.0% | 223 | 2.6% | 2 | 0.3% |
| 2025 | Oct | 8,928 | 654 | 7.3% | 205 | 2.3% | 6 | 0.9% |
| 2025 | Nov | 8,652 | 645 | 7.5% | 157 | 1.8% | 1 | 0.2% |
| 2025 | Dec | 8,928 | 393 | 4.4% | 82 | 0.9% | 3 | 0.8% |
| 2025 | Total | 105,408 | 6,811 | 6.5% | 1,905 | 1.8% | 39 | 0.6% |
| 2026 | Jan | 8,928 | 293 | 3.3% | 102 | 1.1% | 24 | 8.2% |
| 2026 | Feb | 8,064 | 493 | 6.1% | 171 | 2.1% | 41 | 8.3% |
| 2026 | Mar | 8,916 | 659 | 7.4% | 213 | 2.4% | 21 | 3.2% |
| 2026 | Apr | 8,640 | 363 | 4.2% | 126 | 1.5% | 4 | 1.1% |
| 2026 | May | 8,928 | 283 | 3.2% | 89 | 1.0% | 4 | 1.4% |
| 2026 | Jun | 8,640 | 239 | 2.8% | 96 | 1.1% | 8 | 3.3% |
| 2026 | Total | 52,116 | 2,330 | 4.5% | 797 | 1.5% | 102 | 4.4% |

As shown in Table 3-85, in 2025, there were 1,824 unique five-minute target times for which multiple RT SCED solutions showed a shortage of reserves for one or more reserve services, while there were 147 unique five-minute intervals with real-time shortage pricing for one or more reserve products. In the first six months of 2026, there were 797 unique five-minute target times for which multiple RT SCED solutions showed a shortage of reserves for one or more reserve


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services, while there were 102 unique five minute intervals with real-time shortage pricing for one or more reserve products. Clear criteria for approval of shortage cases are needed.

The PJM Real-Time Energy Market produces an efficient outcome only when prices are allowed to reflect the fundamental supply and demand conditions in the market in real time. There are two related issues, the definition of a shortage and the definition of an efficient shortage price. While it is appropriate for operators to ensure that cases use data that reflect the actual state of the system, it is essential that operator discretion not extend beyond what is necessary and that operator discretion not prevent shortage pricing when there are shortage conditions or implement shortage pricing when there are no shortage conditions. This is a critical issue now that PJM settles all real-time energy transactions on a five minute basis using the prices calculated by LPC. The MMU recommends that PJM define clear criteria for operator approval of RT SCED cases, including shortage cases that are used to send dispatch signals to resources, and for pricing, to minimize discretion. A rule based approach is essential for defining how LMPs are determined so that all market participants can be confident that energy market pricing is efficient. However, whether the triggered shortage pricing results in an efficient outcome is a function both of the rules defining a shortage and the rules defining the level of shortage pricing. It has not been demonstrated that PJM's administratively defined shortage pricing is efficient.

Prolonged and excessively high administrative shortage pricing in the energy market would impose inefficient wealth transfers. Inefficient wealth transfers from load to generation, among generators, or from physical to financial market participants occur when administrative pricing creates arbitrarily high price signals to which participants cannot respond. A solution would be to lower the default emergency pricing levels to avoid inefficient wealth transfers while providing an appropriate price signal.

## Shortage Pricing Intervals in LPC

Beginning October 1, 2022, shortage pricing can occur in both the PJM Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets for Synchronized Reserves, Primary Reserves, and 30-Minute Reserves.

In May 2023, PJM increased reserve requirements in response to poor reserve performance by the units selected to provide reserves. PJM unilaterally increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the most severe single contingency (MSSC), which consequently increased the primary reserve reliability requirement by 45 percentage points to 195 percent of the MSSC. On January 9, 2026, the synchronized reserve reliability requirement was decreased by 10 percentage points to be 120 percent of the MSSC, which made the primary reserve reliability requirement 180 percent of the MSSC. While the intervals listed in this section were short of their target requirements, many of these intervals still cleared above the average values of the requirements from before the increase. The average primary reserve requirement from January 2023 through April 2023 was 2,511.4 MW and the average synchronized reserve requirement was 1,741.7 MW. Many of the intervals with shortage pricing were not short in the sense of failing to clear a sufficient amount of reserves for recovering from a contingency event. They were short because of PJM's unilateral increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. Table 3-86 shows the count of intervals with shortage pricing for synchronized reserve (SR), primary reserve (PR), and 30-minute reserve (TMR) in the RTO. As seen in Table 3-86, the majority of intervals with shortage pricing cleared reserves in excess of the original reserve requirements absent PJM's adder. The adder does not apply to the MAD Reserve Subzone.

### Table 3-86 Number of shortage pricing intervals which satisfied the unmodified reserve service requirement: January through June, 2026

| | Reserve Service | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | SR | PR | TMR |
| Intervals with Shortage Pricing | 29 | 91 | 0 |
| Intervals where RT SCED Satisfied Original Requirement | 29 | 65 | NA |
| Percentage of Intervals where RT SCED Satisfied Original Requirement | 100.0% | 71.4% | NA |
| Intervals where RT SCED Did Not Satisfy Original Requirement | 0 | 26 | NA |

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There were 102 unique real-time five-minute intervals with shortage pricing for one or more reserve products in the first six months of 2026, compared to 98 intervals in the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, there were 96 unique real-time five-minute intervals with shortage in the dispatch run for one or more reserve products, compared to 89 intervals in the first six months of 2025. Table 3-87 through Table 3-90 show intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run for each reserve service for the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone. PJM implemented fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. Fast start pricing can result in differences in reserve shortages between the dispatch run and the pricing run. This applied to six intervals in the first six months of 2026.

In 2025, there were four hours with shortage pricing in the day-ahead reserve markets. In the first six months of 2026, there were four unique day-ahead hours with shortage pricing for one or more reserve products. For January 27, 2026, in the day-ahead market, there were two hours with shortage pricing for synchronized reserves in the RTO Reserve Subzone. For January 28, 2026, in the day-ahead market, there were two hours with shortage pricing for primary reserves in the RTO Reserve Zone.

Table 3-87 shows the extended synchronized reserve requirement, the total synchronized reserves, the synchronized reserve shortage, and the synchronized reserve clearing prices for the RTO Reserve Zone during the 29 intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run due to synchronized reserve shortage in the first six months of 2026. Table 3-87 shows that the 29 intervals were short of synchronized reserves in both the pricing run and the dispatch run. Six intervals were also short of synchronized reserves in MAD in the pricing and dispatch run. Eighteen intervals were also short of primary reserves in the RTO in the pricing and dispatch runs. Eleven intervals were also short of primary reserves in MAD in the pricing and dispatch runs. Three intervals overlapped with a spinning event on March 1, 2026.

Table 3-88 shows the extended synchronized reserve requirement, the total synchronized reserves, the synchronized reserve shortage, and the synchronized reserve clearing prices for the MAD Reserve Subzone during the six intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run due to synchronized reserve shortage in the first six months of 2026. Table 3-88 shows that the six intervals were short of synchronized reserves in both the pricing run and the dispatch run. Five intervals were also short of primary reserves in the RTO in the pricing and dispatch run. Three intervals were also short of primary reserves in the MAD Reserve Subzone in the pricing and dispatch run.

Table 3-89 shows a summary of the extended primary reserve requirement, the total primary reserves, the primary reserve shortage, and the primary reserve clearing prices for the RTO Reserve Zone during the 91 intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run due to primary reserve shortage in the first six months of 2026. The full version of Table 3-89 is published separately.[154] Of the 91 intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run, 85 were short in both the pricing run and the dispatch run. Seventeen intervals were also short of primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone in the pricing run and 15 were short in the dispatch run. Eighteen intervals were also short of synchronized reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone in the dispatch run and pricing run. Five intervals were also short of synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone in the dispatch run and pricing run. The three intervals on March 1 overlapped with a synchronized reserve event.

Table 3-90 shows the extended primary reserve requirement, the total primary reserves, the primary reserve shortage, and the primary reserve clearing prices for the MAD Reserve Subzone during the 17 intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run due to primary reserve shortage in the first six months of 2026. Table 3-89 shows that 15 of the 17 intervals were short of primary reserves in both the pricing run and the dispatch run. Seventeen intervals were also short of primary reserves in the RTO Reserve Zone in the pricing run and the dispatch run. Eleven intervals were also short of synchronized reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone in the pricing run and the dispatch run. Three intervals were also short of synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone in the pricing run and the dispatch run. The intervals on March 1 overlapped with a synchronized reserve event.

PJM enforces an RTO wide reserve requirement and a reserve requirement for the MAD region. The MAD Reserve Subzone is inside the RTO Reserve

154 See Monitoring Analytics LLC, "Reserve Shortages," (August 13, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2026/IMM_Reserve_Shortages_20260813.xlsx>.


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Zone. Resources located in the MAD Reserve Subzone can simultaneously satisfy the synchronized reserve requirement of the RTO Reserve Zone and the synchronized reserve requirement of the MAD Reserve Subzone. Resources located outside the MAD Reserve Subzone can satisfy the synchronized reserve requirement of the RTO Reserve Zone, and subject to transfer limits defined by transmission constraints, satisfy the reserve requirement of the MAD Subzone. The synchronized reserve clearing price of the RTO Reserve Zone is set by the shadow price of the binding reserve requirement constraint of the RTO Reserve Zone.[155] The synchronized reserve clearing price of the MAD Reserve Subzone is set by the sum of the shadow prices of the binding reserve requirement constraint of the RTO Reserve Zone and the shadow price of the binding reserve requirement constraint of the MAD Reserve Subzone.

The MCP for secondary reserves is capped by the PJM tariff at the 30-minute reserve penalty factor for the RTO ($850 per MWh).[156] The MCP for nonsynchronized reserves is capped at one and a half times the primary reserve penalty factor for each zone or subzone ($1,275 per MWh).[157] The MCP for synchronized reserves is capped at the sum of two of the three penalty factors for synchronized reserve, primary reserve, and 30-minute reserve ($1,700 per MWh).[158] However, the PJM tariff does not explicitly specify a cap on the system marginal price. The system marginal price cap of $3,700 per MWh that is actually applied by PJM should be included in the PJM tariff and Operating Agreement.

The intervals with 0.00001 shortage MW in Table 3-87 and the full version of Table 3-89 were not truly short; they result from a software issue.[159] PJM sets the synchronized reserve requirement for the RTO based on the largest generation contingency in the entire PJM system, including the MAD Reserve Subzone. Similarly, PJM sets the synchronized reserve requirement of the MAD Reserve Subzone based on the largest generation contingency located within the MAD Reserve Subzone. When the largest generation contingency on the system is located in the MAD Reserve Subzone, both the MAD and the RTO reserve requirements are set by the same generation contingency, and the reserve requirement quantities for MAD and RTO are identical. In the real-time market clearing software, to avoid an issue with inaccurate prices that result from such situations, the software adds a small quantity (0.00001 MW) to the RTO reserve requirement, to differentiate the constraint from the MAD reserve requirement constraint.[160] When the RT SCED solves with the RTO reserve requirement short by this quantity (0.00001 MW), there is no actual shortage of reserves, since this was an artificially added quantity to resolve a modeling issue. The market clearing prices for reserves and the LMPs should not include the penalty factor for the reserve product when the reserves are short by 0.00001 MW. The market clearing prices and LMPs during these intervals are not stated in the shortage pricing rules in the PJM tariff. Embedding a rule in nontransparent market software is not the same thing as including an explicit rule in the tariff.

The process of calculating reserve constraint shadow prices and implementing reserve price caps in PJM is not clearly defined or transparent. The MMU recommends that PJM clearly document the calculation of shortage prices and implementation of reserve price caps in the PJM manuals, including definitions of all the components of reserve prices, and all the constraints whose shadow prices are included in reserve prices.

155 If the reserve requirement cannot be met by the resources located within the reserve zone, the shadow price of the reserve requirement is set by the applicable operating reserve demand curve.
156 OATT, Attachment K - Appendix § 3.2.3A.01(d).
157 OATT, Attachment K - Appendix § 3.2.3A.001(c).
158 OATT, Attachment K - Appendix § 3.2.3A(d).
159 For the full version of Table 3-89, see Monitoring Analytics LLC, "Reserve Shortages," (August 13, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2026/IMM_Reserve_Shortages_20260813.xlsx>.

160 Adding 0.00001 MW only to the RTO reserve requirement constraint ensures that the MAD reserve requirement constraint is violated before the violation of the RTO reserve requirement constraint. However, this modeling feature may result in situations where it might be cheaper for the market to not satisfy 0.00001 MW of reserves and incur a small penalty ($850*0.00001). Under those conditions, PJM system would show 0.00001 MW shortage.

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## Table 3-87 Intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run for real-time RTO synchronized reserve: January through June, 2026

| | Pricing Run | | | | | Dispatch Run | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interval (EPT) | RTO Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement (MW) | Total RTO Synchronized Reserves (MW) | RTO Synchronized Reserve Shortage (MW) | Uncapped RTO Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Capped RTO Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | RTO Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement (MW) | Total RTO Synchronized Reserves (MW) | RTO Synchronized Reserve Shortage (MW) | Uncapped RTO Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Capped RTO Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) |
| 23-Jan-26 17:50 | 2,448.4 | 1,692.9 | 755.47461 | $850.00 | $850.00 | 2,448.4 | 1,692.9 | 755.47461 | $850.00 | $850.00 |
| 24-Jan-26 05:35 | 2,451.8 | 2,317.3 | 134.43503 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,451.8 | 2,317.3 | 134.43503 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 24-Jan-26 05:40 | 2,456.1 | 2,066.4 | 389.67304 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,456.1 | 2,066.4 | 389.673 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 30-Jan-26 17:50 | 1,920.0 | 1,920.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,920.0 | 1,920.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 01-Feb-26 03:20 | 1,904.0 | 1,904.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,904.0 | 1,904.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 01-Feb-26 03:30 | 1,904.0 | 1,904.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,904.0 | 1,904.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 01-Feb-26 03:50 | 1,904.0 | 1,904.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,904.0 | 1,904.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 01-Feb-26 08:15 | 1,930.0 | 1,930.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,930.0 | 1,930.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 04-Feb-26 22:25 | 1,917.0 | 1,917.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,917.0 | 1,917.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 06-Feb-26 18:00 | 1,898.0 | 1,898.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,898.0 | 1,898.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 07-Feb-26 18:05 | 1,920.0 | 1,920.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,920.0 | 1,920.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 01-Mar-26 19:30 | 2,417.6 | 2,032.6 | 384.95785 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,417.6 | 2,032.6 | 384.95785 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 01-Mar-26 19:35 | 2,413.5 | 1,915.6 | 497.92860 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,413.5 | 1,915.6 | 497.92860 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 18:55 | 2,386.6 | 1,903.0 | 483.57529 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,386.6 | 1,903.0 | 483.57529 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:00 | 2,392.8 | 1,868.0 | 524.82862 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,392.8 | 1,868.0 | 524.82862 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:05 | 2,387.0 | 2,223.2 | 163.74375 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,387.0 | 2,223.2 | 163.74375 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:10 | 2,391.2 | 1,730.3 | 660.88274 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,391.2 | 1,730.3 | 660.88274 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:10 | 2,401.7 | 2,299.1 | 102.60548 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,401.7 | 2,299.1 | 102.60548 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:15 | 2,408.0 | 1,452.5 | 955.47226 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,408.0 | 1,452.5 | 955.47226 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:20 | 2,405.9 | 1,364.6 | 1,041.27883 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,405.9 | 1,364.6 | 1,041.27883 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:25 | 2,402.6 | 1,934.6 | 468.00036 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,402.6 | 1,934.6 | 468.00036 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 14-Mar-26 00:30 | 2,360.8 | 2,309.5 | 51.29037 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 2,360.8 | 2,309.5 | 51.29037 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 06-Apr-26 19:55 | 1,803.8 | 1,555.7 | 248.03179 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,803.8 | 1,555.7 | 248.03179 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 06-Apr-26 20:00 | 1,803.8 | 1,555.7 | 248.03179 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,803.8 | 1,555.7 | 248.03179 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 18-May-26 11:40 | 2,359.8 | 2,311.3 | 48.49715 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,359.8 | 2,311.3 | 48.49715 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 18-May-26 11:45 | 2,359.8 | 2,311.3 | 48.49715 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,359.8 | 2,311.3 | 48.49715 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 02-Jun-26 20:05 | 2,371.6 | 2,044.0 | 327.62945 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 | 2,371.6 | 2,044.0 | 327.62945 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 17-Jun-26 22:15 | 1,810.0 | 1,810.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 1,810.0 | 1,810.0 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 29-Jun-26 20:00 | 2,217.3 | 2,216.1 | 1.21968 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,217.3 | 2,216.1 | 1.21968 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |


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## Table 3-88 Intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run for real-time MAD synchronized reserve: January through June, 2026

| | Pricing Run | | | | | Dispatch Run | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interval (EPT) | MAD Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement (MW) | Total MAD Synchronized Reserves (MW) | MAD Synchronized Reserve Shortage (MW) | Uncapped MAD Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Capped MAD Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | MAD Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement (MW) | Total MAD Synchronized Reserves (MW) | MAD Synchronized Reserve Shortage (MW) | Uncapped MAD Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Capped MAD Synchronized Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) |
| 23-Jan-26 17:50 | 1,877.0 | 1,692.9 | 184.1 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 1,877.0 | 1,692.9 | 184.1 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 18:55 | 1,907.0 | 1,903.0 | 4.0 | $2,000.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,907.0 | 1,903.0 | 4.0 | $2,000.00 | $2,000.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:00 | 1,907.0 | 1,868.1 | 39.0 | $2,000.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,907.0 | 1,868.1 | 39.0 | $2,000.00 | $2,000.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:10 | 1,908.0 | 1,730.3 | 177.7 | $2,850.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,908.0 | 1,730.3 | 177.7 | $2,850.00 | $2,850.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:15 | 1,917.0 | 1,452.5 | 464.5 | $3,400.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,917.0 | 1,452.5 | 464.5 | $3,400.00 | $3,400.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:20 | 1,916.0 | 1,364.6 | 551.4 | $3,400.00 | $1,700.00 | 1,916.0 | 1,364.6 | 551.4 | $3,400.00 | $3,400.00 |

## Table 3-89 Daily summary of intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run for real-time RTO primary reserve: January through June, 2026[161]

| | | | Pricing Run | | | | | Dispatch Run | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day | Number of Intervals Short in Pricing Run | Number of Intervals Also Short in Dispatch Run | Average RTO Extended Primary Reserve Requirement (MW) | Average Total RTO Primary Reserves (MW) | Average RTO Primary Reserve Shortage (MW) | Average Uncapped RTO Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Average Capped RTO Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Average RTO Extended Primary Reserve Requirement (MW) | Average Total RTO Primary Reserves (MW) | Average RTO Primary Reserve Shortage (MW) | Average Uncapped RTO Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Average Capped RTO Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) |
| 24-Jan-26 | 6 | 5 | 3,582.6 | 3,254.2 | 328.39312 | $575.00 | $575.00 | 3,582.6 | 3,260.9 | 321.73763 | $555.43 | $555.43 |
| 31-Jan-26 | 16 | 16 | 2,741.7 | 2,741.7 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 2,741.7 | 2,741.7 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 2-Feb-26 | 12 | 10 | 2,777.5 | 2,777.5 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 2,777.5 | 2,777.5 | 0.00001 | $288.29 | $288.29 |
| 6-Feb-26 | 5 | 5 | 2,770.3 | 2,770.3 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 2,770.3 | 2,770.3 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 9-Feb-26 | 15 | 12 | 2,749.5 | 2,597.3 | 152.21928 | $410.00 | $410.00 | 2,749.5 | 2,601.1 | 148.42362 | $404.24 | $404.24 |
| 13-Feb-26 | 1 | 1 | 2,792.5 | 2,792.5 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 2,792.5 | 2,792.5 | 0.00001 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 16-Feb-26 | 1 | 1 | 3,430.0 | 3,420.3 | 9.74452 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 3,430.0 | 3,420.3 | 9.74452 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 1-Mar-26 | 3 | 3 | 3,524.1 | 2,718.1 | 805.96097 | $850.00 | $850.00 | 3,524.1 | 2,718.1 | 805.96097 | $850.00 | $850.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 | 9 | 9 | 3,489.3 | 2,951.0 | 538.32150 | $727.78 | $727.78 | 3,489.3 | 2,951.5 | 537.86775 | $727.78 | $727.78 |
| 13-Mar-26 | 7 | 7 | 3,513.5 | 2,711.2 | 802.32860 | $700.57 | $700.57 | 3,513.5 | 2,711.2 | 802.32860 | $700.57 | $700.57 |
| 22-Mar-26 | 1 | 1 | 3,403.0 | 3,364.9 | 38.05309 | $300.00 | $300.00 | 3,403.0 | 3,364.9 | 38.05309 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 6-Apr-26 | 4 | 4 | 2,611.3 | 2,056.5 | 554.87773 | $850.00 | $850.00 | 2,611.3 | 2,056.5 | 554.87773 | $850.00 | $850.00 |
| 15-May-26 | 1 | 1 | 3,461.9 | 3,207.6 | 254.25168 | $850.00 | $850.00 | 3,461.9 | 3,207.6 | 254.25168 | $850.00 | $850.00 |
| 18-May-26 | 3 | 3 | 3,442.3 | 3,088.6 | 353.66061 | $850.00 | $850.00 | 3,442.3 | 3,088.6 | 353.66061 | $850.00 | $850.00 |
| 2-Jun-26 | 2 | 2 | 3,462.4 | 3,177.8 | 284.61472 | $737.65 | $737.65 | 3,462.4 | 3,177.8 | 284.61472 | $737.65 | $737.65 |
| 29-Jun-26 | 5 | 5 | 3,233.5 | 2,841.7 | 391.84695 | $780.55 | $780.55 | 3,233.5 | 2,841.7 | 391.84695 | $780.55 | $780.55 |

161 For the full version, see Monitoring Analytics LLC, "Reserve Shortages," (August 13, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2026/IMM_Reserve_Shortages_20260813.xlsx>.

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**Table 3-90 Intervals with shortage pricing in the pricing run for real-time MAD primary reserve shortage: January through June, 2026**

| | Pricing Run | | | | | Dispatch Run | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interval (EPT) | MAD Extended Primary Reserve Requirement (MW) | Total MAD Primary Reserves (MW) | MAD Primary Reserve Shortage (MW) | Uncapped MAD Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Capped MAD Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | MAD Extended Primary Reserve Requirement (MW) | Total MAD Primary Reserves (MW) | MAD Primary Reserve Shortage (MW) | Uncapped MAD Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) | Capped MAD Primary Reserve Clearing Price ($/MWh) |
| 24-Jan-26 05:40 | 2,780.5 | 2,659.4 | 121.1 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,780.5 | 2,659.4 | 121.1 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 09-Feb-26 07:15 | 2,749.0 | 2,703.6 | 45.4 | $600.00 | $600.00 | 2,749.0 | 2,749.0 | 0.0 | $322.08 | $322.08 |
| 09-Feb-26 07:20 | 2,749.0 | 2,058.0 | 691.0 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,749.0 | 2,058.0 | 691.0 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 09-Feb-26 07:25 | 2,749.0 | 1,965.9 | 783.2 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,749.0 | 1,965.9 | 783.2 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 09-Feb-26 07:30 | 2,750.5 | 1,998.3 | 752.2 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,750.5 | 1,998.3 | 752.2 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 09-Feb-26 07:35 | 2,752.0 | 2,740.5 | 11.6 | $600.00 | $600.00 | 2,752.0 | 2,752.0 | 0.0 | $579.55 | $579.55 |
| 01-Mar-26 19:30 | 2,693.5 | 2,497.5 | 196.0 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,693.5 | 2,497.5 | 196.0 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 01-Mar-26 19:35 | 2,698.0 | 2,380.5 | 317.5 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,698.0 | 2,380.5 | 317.5 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:05 | 2,765.5 | 2,688.2 | 77.4 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,765.5 | 2,688.2 | 77.4 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 12-Mar-26 19:10 | 2,767.0 | 2,195.2 | 571.8 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,767.0 | 2,195.2 | 571.8 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:10 | 2,779.0 | 2,764.1 | 15.0 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,779.0 | 2,764.1 | 15.0 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:15 | 2,780.5 | 1,917.4 | 863.1 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,780.5 | 1,917.4 | 863.1 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:20 | 2,779.0 | 1,829.5 | 949.5 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,779.0 | 1,829.5 | 949.5 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 13-Mar-26 07:25 | 2,779.0 | 2,399.5 | 379.5 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,779.0 | 2,399.5 | 379.5 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 06-Apr-26 19:55 | 2,206.0 | 1,871.7 | 334.3 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,206.0 | 1,871.7 | 334.3 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 06-Apr-26 20:00 | 2,206.0 | 1,871.7 | 334.3 | $1,700.00 | $1,275.00 | 2,206.0 | 1,871.7 | 334.3 | $1,700.00 | $1,700.00 |
| 06-Apr-26 20:05 | 2,206.0 | 2,151.3 | 54.6 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 | 2,206.0 | 2,151.3 | 54.6 | $1,150.00 | $1,150.00 |

## System Marginal Price Cap

Prior to PJM's implementation of the modified reserve markets on October 1, 2022, in the PJM real-time market, the SMP was capped at $3,750 per MWh. This cap was the sum of the Energy Offer Cap ($2,000 per MWh under defined conditions), the Synchronous Reserve Penalty Factor from the first step on the demand curve ($850 per MWh), the Primary Reserve Penalty Factor from the first step on the demand curve ($850 per MWh) and a threshold ($50 per MWh). The Operating Agreement stated that only two of the four reserve penalty factors may be applied.

In that prior implementation, if the SMP would otherwise exceed $3,750 per MWh, PJM solved the SCED optimization by progressively relaxing reserve requirement constraints until the SMP fell below the cap. For instance, if the original SMP was above $3,750, PJM would solve the SCED optimization by disabling the subzone (MAD) primary reserve requirement constraint. If the SMP from the relaxed SCED optimization was still above $3,750, PJM would solve the SCED optimization by disabling subzone (MAD) primary and synchronized reserve requirement constraints. If the relaxed SCED optimization was still above $3,750, PJM would solve the SCED optimization by disabling subzone (MAD) primary and synchronized reserve requirement constraints and the RTO primary reserve constraint.

Starting with PJM's implementation of the new Reserve Price Formation rules on October 1, 2022, in the PJM real-time market, the SMP has an administrative maximum price of $3,700 per MWh. Unlike the prior implementation, PJM's new cap does not include a $50 per MWh threshold and is not enforced by progressively relaxing reserve requirement constraints. PJM's new cap is an ex post administrative override of the SMP calculated in the pricing run


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(LPC). The SMP is not capped in the dispatch run (SCED). The congestion component of the LMP and the loss component of the LMP are not subject to this maximum price. The LMP at a pricing node could still exceed $3,700 per MWh. Unlike other administrative caps, such as the cap on the shadow price of a transmission constraint enforced through transmission penalty factor within the optimization, the SMP cap is not enforced within the optimization. When the SMP cap is enforced, the resulting LMPs are not consistent and do not accurately reflect the marginal cost of serving energy and reserves.

Table 3-91 shows the number of five minute intervals in the real-time market where the SMP was capped for each year since 2018. In the first six months of 2026, there were four five minute intervals in the real-time market in which the SMP was capped.

**Table 3-91 Number of five minute intervals with capped SMP: 2018 through June 2026**

| Year | Number of Five Minute Intervals with Capped SMP |
|---|---|
| 2018 | 0 |
| 2019 | 1 |
| 2020 | 1 |
| 2021 | 2 |
| 2022 | 51 |
| 2023 | 1 |
| 2024 | 0 |
| 2025 | 6 |
| 2026 (Jan - Jun) | 4 |

The MMU recommends that PJM stop capping the system marginal price and instead limit the sum of violated reserve constraint shadow prices used in LPC to $1,700 per MWh.

## Accuracy of Reserve Measurement

The definition of a shortage of synchronized and primary reserves is based on the measured and estimated levels of load, generation, interchange, demand response, and reserves from the real-time SCED software. The definition of such shortage also includes discretionary operator inputs to the ASO (Ancillary Service Optimizer) or RT SCED software, such as operator load bias. For shortage pricing to be accurate, there must be accurate measurement of real-time reserves. That does not appear to be the case at present in PJM, but there does not appear to be any reason that PJM cannot accurately measure reserves. Without accurate measurement of reserves on a minute by minute basis, system operators cannot know with certainty that there is a shortage condition and a reliable trigger for five minute shortage pricing does not exist. The benefits of five minute shortage pricing are based on the assumption that a shortage can be precisely and transparently defined.[162] PJM cannot accurately measure or price reserves due to the inaccuracy of its generator models. PJM's commitment and dispatch models rely on generator data to properly commit and dispatch generators. Generator data includes offers and parameters. When the models do not properly account for the different generator characteristics, both PJM dispatchers and generators have to make simplifications and assumptions using the tools available. Most of these actions taken by generators and by PJM dispatchers are not transparent. PJM manuals do not provide clarity regarding what actions generators can take when the PJM models and tools do not reflect their operational characteristics and PJM manuals do not provide sufficient clarity regarding the actions PJM dispatchers can take when generators do not follow dispatch.

In the energy and reserve markets, the actions that both generators and PJM dispatchers take have a direct impact on the amount of supply available for energy and reserves and the prices for energy and reserves. These flaws in PJM's models do not allow PJM to accurately calculate the amount of reserves available. PJM does not accurately model discontinuities in generator ramp rates, such as duct burners on combined cycle plants. PJM's generator models do not account for the complexities that may result in generators underperforming their submitted ramp rates. PJM should address these complexities through generator modeling improvements. PJM also fails to accurately model unit starts. The market software does not account for the energy output a resource produces prior to reaching its economic minimum output level, during its soak time.

162 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. RM15-24-000 (December 1, 2015) at 9.


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Generators can deselect themselves from providing reserves by communicating to PJM that their resources will not follow the dispatch signal (e.g. offer fixed gen or operate as nondispatchable). These actions allow generators to withhold reserves and result in a violation of the reserve must offer requirement when the resources operate below their economic maximum.

## Winter Storm Fern

Winter Storm Fern affected the PJM region from January 22 through January 30, 2026. The storm brought significant snow and ice precipitation from Friday, January 23 through Monday January 26, 2026. Cold temperatures persisted through the following week (January 27 through January 30).[163] Figure 3-58 shows the PJM load-weighted average temperatures from January 22 through February 2, 2026.

### Figure 3-58 PJM Load-Weighted Average Temperatures: January 22 through February 2, 2026




In preparation for the weather event, PJM declared several operating procedures including an Energy Emergency Alert 1 (EEA1) on January 27. See Figure 3-52 for the list of operating procedures declared by PJM during Winter Storm Fern and their duration.

On Thursday, January 22, PJM peak load forecast for the following week was 147,347 MWh (on Tuesday 27), higher than PJM's all time winter peak load of 143,714 MWh on January 22, 2025. The actual highest load was 139,047 MWh on January 29, 2026. PJM stated that warmer actual temperatures and building closures were reasons for the over forecast. The 10 day period between January 24 and February 2, 2026, had the highest average load in PJM's history at 125,573 MWh (5.6 percent higher than the previous 10 day period between June 22 through July 1, 2025).


For this event, PJM continued its approach of scheduling units in advance of the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market. PJM began this approach after Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022 to address supply uncertainty resulting from performance risk. The performance risk is attributable to units that cannot operate and/or start reliably in cold weather, based on data collected from the generators by PJM, and/or natural gas fired units that face fuel procurement uncertainty when the fuel is not purchased during the active trading window. This issue is especially critical during weekends since the trading window occurs on Friday for the next three days (known as the weekend package).

163 See PJM. "January Cold Weather Operations," Operating Committee (February 5, 2026). <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2026/20260205/20260205-item-03---cold-weather-update---revised.pdf>.


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
Figure 3-59 shows the economic maximum of all units committed in advance of the day-ahead energy market. Figure 3-59 separates the MW between units that were paid uplift because their operation was uneconomic and units that did not receive uplift because either their operation was economic or self scheduled.

### Figure 3-59 Economic Maximum (MW) of units committed in advance of the day-ahead energy market during Winter Storm Fern




The impact of the advance commitment is shown in Figure 3-60. Figure 3-60 shows the available capacity (green line) and the energy plus reserves that the generation resources provided (orange line). The difference between the green and the orange lines are the MW not being used (headroom available) to provide either energy or reserves. At its lowest point the amount of headroom available was 14,792 MW. This is a reflection of the improved performance from generating units resulting mainly from PJM's advanced commitment approach. Figure 3-60 also show the load and exports in the blue and yellow bars. The difference between the red line and the sum of the blue and yellow bars are the reserve MW (synchronized, primary or 30 minute reserves).


### Figure 3-60 Supply and demand during Winter Storm Fern




The improved performance incorporated a reduction in outages. Figure 3-61 shows the outages during the last three significant winter events and its comparison with Winter Storm Elliott (2022). Outages during Winter Storm Gerri (2024), Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern (2026) were much lower than the outages during Winter Storm Elliott. Fuel related outages, in particular, were significantly lower in the last three events than in Winter Storm Elliott. This demonstrates the results of PJM's implementation of advanced commitment in preparation for the last three events but not for Winter Storm Elliott.

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**Figure 3-61 Outages during the last three significant winter events and Winter Storm Fern**




The uplift associated with Winter Storm Fern was an expected outcome of conservative operations and a preferred result to the penalties that resulted from Winter Storm Elliott. This uplift is part of the way that PJM markets work and was the result of PJM's successful conservative operations approach to dealing with cold weather risks. The market results of PJM's actions in preparation for and during Winter Storm Gerri, Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern were better than the market results of PJM's actions during Winter Storm Elliott. Nonetheless, improvements are needed to make the advance commitment process more predictable and transparent and formalized, and made as market based as possible, in order to ensure that uplift is at an efficient and effective level.

# Competitive Assessment

## Market Structure

### Market Concentration

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) concentration ratio is the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in a market. Hourly PJM energy market HHIs are based on the shares of the real-time energy output of generators, adjusted for scheduled imports. Hourly HHIs for the baseload, intermediate and peaking segments of generation supply are based on hourly energy market shares, unadjusted for imports.

The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power. It is possible to have pivotal suppliers even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. It is possible to have an exercise of market power even when the HHI level is not in the highly concentrated range. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of both local and aggregate structural market power than the HHI.

The HHI may not accurately capture market power issues in situations where, for example, there is moderate concentration in all on line resources but there is a high level of concentration in resources needed to meet increases in load. A pivotal supplier test is required to accurately measure the ability of incremental resources to exercise market power.

FERC's Merger Policy Statement defines levels of concentration by HHI level. The market is unconcentrated if the market HHI is below 1000, the HHI if there were 10 firms with equal market shares. The market is moderately concentrated if the market HHI is from 1000 to 1800. The market is highly concentrated if the market HHI is greater than 1800, the HHI if there were between five and six firms with equal market shares.[164]

When transmission constraints exist, local markets are created in which ownership is typically significantly more concentrated than the overall energy market. PJM offer capping rules that limit the exercise of local market power

164 See *Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy under the Federal Power Act: Policy Statement, 77* FERC ¶ 61,263 *mimeo* at 80 (1996).


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were generally effective in preventing the exercise of market power in the first six months of 2026, although there are issues with the application of market power mitigation for resources whose owners fail the TPS test that permit local market power to be exercised even when PJM's flawed market power mitigation rules are applied. These issues include the lack of a method for consistently determining the cheaper of the cost and price schedules and the lack of rules requiring that cost-based offers equal short run marginal costs.

## PJM HHI Results

Hourly HHIs indicate that by FERC standards, the PJM energy market in the first six months of 2026 was unconcentrated on average (Table 3-92).[165] The fact that the average HHI and the maximum hourly HHI are in the unconcentrated range does not mean that the aggregate market was competitive in all hours. It is possible to have pivotal suppliers in the aggregate market even when the HHI level does not indicate a highly concentrated market structure. Given the low responsiveness of consumers to prices (inelastic demand), it is possible to have high markup even when HHI is low. It is possible to have an exercise of market power even when the HHI level does not indicate a highly concentrated market structure.

### Table 3-92 Real-time hourly aggregate energy market HHI: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| HHI Statistic | Hourly Market HHI (Jan-Jun 2025) | Hourly Market HHI (Jan-Jun 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Average | 704 | 783 |
| Minimum | 547 | 569 |
| Maximum | 988 | 1045 |
| Highest market share (One hour) | 24% | 25% |
| Average of the highest hourly market share | 18% | 19% |
| | | |
| # Hours | 4,343 | 4,343 |
| # Hours HHI > 1800 | 0 | 0 |
| % Hours HHI > 1800 | 0% | 0% |

Table 3-93 includes HHI values by supply curve segment, including base, intermediate and peaking plants in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. On average, ownership in the baseload segment was unconcentrated, in the intermediate segment was moderately concentrated, and in the peaking segment was highly concentrated.[166]

### Table 3-93 Real-time hourly energy market HHI by generation segment: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Jan-Jun 2025 | | | Jan-Jun 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Minimum | Average | Maximum | Minimum | Average | Maximum |
| Base | 586 | 749 | 979 | 649 | 851 | 1096 |
| Intermediate | 594 | 1736 | 9962 | 541 | 1183 | 8871 |
| Peak | 821 | 6507 | 10000 | 833 | 6585 | 10000 |

165 The HHI calculations use actual real time settled generation data for each unit in PJM. Each unit's output is assigned to the owner that is responsible for offering the unit in the energy market.

166 A unit is classified as base load if it runs for 50 percent of hours or more, as intermediate if it runs for less than 50 percent but greater than or equal to 10 percent of hours, and as peak if it runs for less than 10 percent of hours.

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Figure 3-62 shows the total installed capacity (ICAP) MW of units in the baseload, intermediate and peaking segments by fuel source in the first six months of 2026.[167]

### Figure 3-62 Real-time ICAP distribution by fuel and segment: January through June, 2026[168]






Figure 3-63 shows the ICAP of coal fired and gas fired units in PJM that are classified as baseload, intermediate and peaking in the first six months of 2014 through 2026. Figure 3-63 shows that the total ICAP of coal fired units in PJM classified as baseload generally decreased from 2014 through 2026, while the total ICAP of gas fired units in PJM classified as baseload generally increased.

### Figure 3-63 Real-time annual gas and coal unit segment classification: January through June, 2014 through 2026




167 The installed capacity (ICAP) used for wind and solar units here is their nameplate capacity in MW. In PJM's Capacity Market, the UCAP value of wind and solar units is derated from the ICAP value using ELCC.


168 The units classified as Distributed Gen are buses within Electric Distribution Companies (EDCs) that are modeled as generation buses to accurately reflect net energy injections from distribution level load buses. The modeling change was the outcome of the Net Energy Metering Task Force stakeholder group in July, 2012. See PJM. "Net Energy Metering Senior Task Force (NEMSTF) 1st Read - Final Report and Proposed Manual Revisions," (June 28, 2012).



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Figure 3-64 presents the hourly HHI values in chronological order and an HHI duration curve for the first six months of 2026. The HHI duration curve shows the number of hours that HHI was at or below a given value in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-64 Real-time hourly aggregate energy market HHI: January through June, 2026




## Market Based Rates

Participation by generators in the PJM market using offers that exceed costs requires market based rate authority approved by FERC.[169] FERC reviews the market based rate authority of PJM market sellers of generation on a triennial schedule to ensure that market sellers do not have market power or that market power is appropriately mitigated. The entire PJM region is included in the Northeast Region for purposes of the triennial review schedule. Triennial filings by utilities with market based rates authorizations must include a market power analysis or a statement that market power has been adequately mitigated under the PJM market rules. Based on Order No. 861, sellers may, in lieu of filing a market power analysis, rely on a rebuttable presumption that market monitoring and market power mitigation are sufficient to ensure competitive market outcomes.[170]

The rules specify a separate filing schedule for transmission owning utilities and nontransmission owning utilities. The rules define a study period for market power analyses including four complete seasons. A study runs from December of one year through November of the following year (i.e., the period includes one complete winter season rather than splitting winter as a calendar year approach would). The study period is not relevant for companies that choose the rebuttable presumption option.

The most recent triennial review filings for nontransmission owning utilities in PJM were filed in June 2026. The applicable study period for the June 2026 filings, ran from December 1, 2023, to November 30, 2024. Triennial review filings for transmission owners in PJM were filed in December 2025. The applicable study period for the December 2025 filings ran from December 1, 2023, to November 30, 2024.

The MMU has recommended since 2015 that changes to the offer capping process for the energy market are needed to ensure effective market power mitigation of units that fail the TPS test. With these results and the supporting evidence, the MMU challenged the rebuttable presumption of sufficient market power mitigation for the June 2020, December 2022, and June 2023 triennial review filings by generating unit owners in PJM. The MMU explained the issues with PJM's offer schedule selection process that allow generators to avoid energy market power mitigation as well as the then overstated capacity market seller offer cap. The MMU recommended that generators not be allowed to rely on PJM's implementation of market power mitigation rules to ensure competitive market outcomes until improvements are made to the offer capping processes in the energy and capacity markets so that suppliers cannot

169 See *Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities*, Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 (2007), *clarified*, 121 FERC ¶ 61,260 (2007), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 697-A, 123 FERC ¶ 61,055, *clarified*, 124 FERC ¶ 61,055, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 697-B, 125 FERC ¶ 61,326 (2008), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 697-C, 127 FERC ¶ 61,284 (2009), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 697-D, 130 FERC ¶ 61,206 (2010), *aff'd sub nom.* Mont. Consumer Counsel v. FERC, 659 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2011).

170 *Refinements to Horizontal Market Power Analysis for Sellers in Certain Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Markets*, Order No. 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040 (2019) ("Order No. 861").

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exercise market power.[171] In 2021, FERC issued orders requiring review of the adequacy of the market power mitigation rules and their implementation in the capacity and energy markets.[172] [173] FERC addressed the capacity market Market Seller Offer Cap later in 2021.[174] [175] FERC did not address the energy market power mitigation issues.

## Merger Reviews

FERC reviews proposed dispositions, consolidations, acquisitions, and changes in control of jurisdictional generating units and transmission facilities under section 203 of the Federal Power Act to determine whether such transactions are "consistent with the public interest."[176] [177]

FERC applies tests set forth in the 1996 Merger Policy Statement, written prior to the introduction of competitive markets in PJM.[178] [179] The 1996 Merger Policy Statement provides for review of jurisdictional transactions based on "(1) the effect on competition; (2) the effect on rates; and (3) the effect on regulation." FERC adopted the 1992 Department of Justice Guidelines and the Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guideline (1992 Guidelines) to evaluate the effect on competition. FERC continues to use the 1992 Guidelines even after the Department of Justice modified its guidelines in 2010.[180] Following the 1992 Guidelines, FERC applies a five step framework, which includes: defining the market; analyzing market concentration; analyzing mitigative effects of new entry; assessing efficiency gains; and assessing viability of the parties without a merger. FERC also evaluates the results of a Competitive Analysis Screen measuring HHI changes for markets defined by transmission zones. This approach does not take into account the effect of a transaction on actual PJM LMPs or capacity market prices.

The MMU reviews proposed mergers and acquisitions based on analysis of the impact of the merger or acquisition on market power given actual PJM market conditions under the current competitive market design. The analysis includes use of the three pivotal supplier test results in the real-time energy market. The TPS test results, along with the MMU's additional one pivotal supplier analyses, provide a more accurate measure of the ability to exercise market power in the PJM market than the Commission prescribed HHI analysis. The MMU's review ensures that mergers are evaluated based on their impact on local and aggregate market power in the PJM energy market using actual observed market conditions, actual binding constraints and actual congestion results. This is in contrast to the typical merger filing that uses predefined local markets based on historical conditions that no longer exist rather than the actual local markets based on current and potential market conditions. The MMU files comments with FERC including such analyses.[181] The MMU has proposed that FERC adopt this approach when evaluating mergers in PJM.[182] Subsequent to the MMU's arguments about local markets, FERC has required further analysis of local markets from applicants at the transmission zone level.[183] FERC has considered the MMU's analysis in reviewing mergers but continues to apply an analysis that does not accurately account for locational market power in an LMP market.[184]

Neither the MMU's analysis nor the FERC defined analysis is an adequate replacement for effective market power mitigation, because system conditions are dynamic and any owner can become pivotal at any time. FERC routinely approves mergers and acquisitions and grants Market Based Rates authority to PJM market sellers despite known issues in the market power mitigation

171 See Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER10-1556 et al. (August 28, 2020); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER10-1618-018 et al. (February 13, 2023); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER23-9-000 et al. (August 28, 2023).
172 See 175 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2021).
173 See 174 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2021).
174 See 176 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021), ***reh'g denied***, 178 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2022), ***appeal denied***, Vistra Corp. v. FERC, 80 F.4th 302 (2023).
175 ***See*** Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., ***2021 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM***, Vol. 2, Section 5: Capacity Market at 311-312.
176 18 U.S.C. § 824b.
177 In February 2019, in response to 2017 amendments to Section 203 of the Federal Power Act, the Commission issued Order No. 855, implementing a $10,000,000 minimum value for transactions requiring the Commission's review. See 166 FERC ¶ 61,120 (2019)
178 See Order No. 592, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,044 (1996) (1996 Merger Policy Statement), ***reconsideration denied***, Order No. 592-A, 79 FERC ¶ 61,321 (1997). See also FPA Section 203 Supplemental Policy Statement, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,253 (2007), ***order on clarification and reconsideration***, 122 FERC ¶ 61,157 (2008).
179 FERC has an open but inactive docket where the guidelines are under review. See 156 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2016); FERC Docket No. RM16-21-000.
180 See 138 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2012).
181 See, e.g., Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. EC14-141-000 (Nov. 10, 2014); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. EC14-96-000 (July 21, 2014) Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. EC11-83-000 (July 21, 2011); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. EC14-14 (Dec. 9, 2013); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. EC14-112-000 (Sept. 15, 2014); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. EC20-49 (June 1, 2020).
182 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. RM16-21 (Dec. 12, 2016).
183 See, for example, Darby Power, LLC, et al., Response to Second Deficiency Letter, Request for Confidential Treatment, Request for Shortened Comment Period, and Request for Expeditious Action, Docket No. EC24-125 (March 27, 2025).
184 See ***Dynegy Inc., et al.***, 150 FERC ¶ 61, 231 (2015); ***Exelon Corporation, Constellation Energy Group, Inc.***, 138 FERC ¶ 61,167 (2012); ***NRG Energy Holdings, Inc., Edison Mission Energy***, 146 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2014); ***see also Analysis of Horizontal Market Power under the Federal Power Act***, 138 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2012).


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process that allow market sellers to exercise their market power. For this reason, the MMU recommends that FERC approve mergers and acquisitions conditioned on behavioral commitments by the market sellers that prevent the exercise of market power.

The MMU has also reached agreements to mitigate market power in cases where market power concerns have been identified.[185] [186] Such mitigation is designed to mitigate behavior over the long term, in addition to or instead of structural mitigation in the form of asset divestiture requirements.

The MMU also reviews transactions that involve ownership changes of PJM generation resources that are submitted to the Commission pursuant to section 203 of the Federal Power Act. Table 3-94 shows ownership changes in the PJM market that involved entire resources that were completed in the first six months of 2026, as reported to the Commission. Table 3-95 shows transactions that involved transfers of partial unit ownership that were completed in the first six months of 2026, as reported to the Commission.[187] [188]

### Table 3-94 Completed transfers of entire resources: January through June, 2026

| Generator or Generation Owner Name | Total MW | From | To | Transaction Completion Date | Docket |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Calpine Corporation | 5,341.0 | Bridgepoint Group PLC | Constellation Energy Group | January 7, 2026 | EC25-43 |
| Eagle Creek Racine Hydro, LLC and Lake Lynn Generation, LLC | 98.6 | Ontario Power Generation Inc. | Apollo Global Management, Inc | January 9, 2026 | EC26-8 |
| Lightning Power, LLC (Armstrong Power, LLC; Aurora Generation, LLC; Chambersburg Energy, LLC; Doswell Limited Partnership; Gans Energy, LLC; Helix Ironwood, LLC; LSP University Park, LLC; Riverside Genering Company, L.L.LC; Rockford Power, LLC; Rockford Power II, LLC; Springdale Energy, LLC; Troy Energy, LLC; University Park Energy, LLC) | 7,821.0 | LS Power Group | NRG Energy, Inc. | January 30, 2026 | EC25-102 |
| Elwood Power Station Units 5-7 | 150.0 | J-POWER USA Generation, L.P. | Dairyland Power Cooperative | March 6, 2026 | EC25-127 |
| Hill Top Energy Center, LLC | 623.0 | Ardian Holding s.a.s. | Blackstone Inc. | March 26, 2026 | EC25-148 |
| Conetoe II Solar, LLC | 80.0 | Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. | BlackRock, Inc. | March 30, 2026 | EC26-13 |
| Glover Creek Solar, LLC | 50.0 | Pine Gate Renewables, LLC | Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. | April 17, 2026 | EC26-31 |
| Sugar Maple Wind, LLC | 81.0 | RWE Clean Energy, LLC | Partners Group Holding AG | April 17, 2026 | EC26-62 |
| KMC Thermo, LLC (Brandywine) | 288.8 | Onward Energy Holdings, LLC | ArcLight Capital Partners, LLC Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority | May 12, 2026 | EC26-39 |
| Cornerstone Generation Marketing, LLC (Darby Power, LLC; Lawrenceburg Power, LLC; Waterford Power, LLC) | 2,545.0 | Bridgepoint Group plc | Talen Energy Corporation | June 15, 2026 | E26-59 |

185 See 138 FERC ¶ 61,167 at P 19 (2012). The Maryland PSC accepted without condition or modification the settlement between Constellation and the MMU at the February 1, 2022, hearing in Case No. 9271. See *In the Matter of the Merger of Exelon Corporation and Constellation Energy Group, Inc.*, Order No. 90084, Order Approving 2021 Settlement Agreement and Denying Request to Require Exelon to Remain In PJM, Case No. 9271 (February 22, 2022). By its terms, the settlement became effective on February 1, 2022.

186 See 192 FERC ¶ 61,074 at 169. FERC accepted Constellation's behavioral commitments agreed to with the MMU and conditioned its approval of the acquisition of Calpine on those commitments.

187 The transaction completion date is based on the notices of consummation submitted to the Commission.

188 For transfers of partial unit ownership, total MW reflects the entire capacity of the transferred asset or assets, as reported to the Commission.

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### Table 3-95 Completed transfers of partial ownership of resources: January through June, 2026

| Generator or Generation Owner Name | Total MW | Percent | From | To | Transaction Completion Date | Docket |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton Solar LLC and Montpelier Solar, LLC | 99.0 | 50.0% | TotalEnergies SE | KKR & Co. Inc. | January 26, 2026 | EC26-12 |
| Heritage Power, LLC (Blossburg Power, LLC; Brunot Island Power, LLC; Gilber Power, LLC; Hunterstown Power, LLC; Mountain Power, LLC; New Castle Power, LLC; Niles Power, LLC; Lortanna Power, LLC; Portland Power, LLC; Sayreville Power, LLC; Shawnee Power, LLC; Shawville Power, LLC; Titus Power, LLC; Tolna Power, LLC; Warren Generation, LLC) | 2,283.8 | >10% | Avenue Capital Group | Hudson Bay Capital Management LP | January 21, 2026 | EC26-18 |
| Carroll County Energy LLC | 832.3 | 31.6% | JERA, Co., Inc (20.00%) and San Jacinto Carroll Holdings LLC (11.64%) | Strategic Value Partners, LLC | February 12, 2026 | EC25-152 |
| Carroll County Energy LLC | 832.3 | 10.6% | Ullico Infrastructure Master Fund, L.P. | ArcLight Capital Partners, LLC | February 6, 2026 | EC25-151 |
| Advanced Power US Holdings Inc. (Carroll County Energy LLC [17.76%]) and South Field Energy LLC [15.55%]) | 1,905.0 | 100% of controlling entity | Advanced Power AG | ArcLight Capital Partners, LLC | February 12, 2026 | EC25-123* |
| Alpha Generation, LLC (Clean Energy Future - Lordstown, LLC; Parkway Generation Keys Energy Center LLC; Parkway Generation Operating LLC;Parkway Generation Sewaren Urban Renewal Entity LLC) | 5,688.0 | >10% | ArcLight Capital Partners, LLC | Canada Pension Plan Investment Board | March 9, 2025 | EC26-21 |
| CPV Three Rivers, LLC | 1,300.0 | 10.0% | OPC Power Ventures LP | Osaka Gas Co. Ltd (15% ® 25%) | May 12, 2026 | EC26-39 |
| CPV Maryland, LLC | 775.3 | 25.0% | Osaka Gas Co. Ltd | OPC Power Ventures LP (75% ® 100%) | May 12, 2026 | EC26-39 |

## Aggregate Market Pivotal Supplier Results

Notwithstanding the HHI level, a supplier may have the ability to raise energy market prices. If reliably meeting the PJM system load requires energy from a single supplier, that supplier is singly pivotal and has monopoly market power in the aggregate energy market. If reliably meeting the PJM system load requires energy from a small number of suppliers, those suppliers are jointly pivotal and have oligopoly market power in the aggregate energy market. The number of pivotal suppliers in the energy market is a more precise measure of structural market power than the HHI. The HHI is not a definitive measure of structural market power. The identification of jointly pivotal suppliers as a source of market power does not require an assumption that the suppliers collude. There are multiple mechanisms that would permit the exercise of market power when there are limited suppliers providing relief to a constraint. FERC Order No. 697 also recognizes this explicitly in the discussion of HHI and pivotal suppliers.[189] FERC's definition of highly concentrated markets, based on an HHI greater than 1800, includes between five and six owners with equal market shares.

The current market power mitigation rules for the PJM energy market rely on the assumption that the aggregate market includes sufficient competing sellers to ensure competitive market outcomes. With sufficient competition, any attempt to economically or physically withhold generation would not result in higher market prices, because another supplier would replace the generation at a similar price. This assumption requires that the total demand for energy can be met without the supply from any individual supplier or without the supply from a small group of suppliers. This assumption is not generally correct, as demonstrated by these results. There are pivotal suppliers in the aggregate energy market.

189 Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at PP 104–117.


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The existing market power mitigation measures do not address aggregate market power.[190] Aggregate market power should be mitigated in the PJM Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets when the three pivotal supplier test for the aggregate market is failed.

## Day-Ahead Aggregate Energy Market Pivotal Suppliers

To assess the number of pivotal suppliers in the aggregate day-ahead energy market, the MMU determined, for each supplier, the MW available for economic commitment that were already running or were available to start between the close of the day-ahead energy market and the peak load hour of the operating day. The available supply is defined as MW offered at a price less than 150 percent of the applicable LMP because supply available at higher prices is not competing to meet the demand for energy. The offer price for determining available supply includes start up and no load costs for offline units. Generating units, import transactions, economic demand response, and INCs, are included for each supplier.[191] Demand is the total MW required by PJM to meet physical load, cleared load bids, export transactions, and DECs, which is the total cleared supply for the peak hour of the day. A supplier is pivotal if PJM would require some portion of the supplier's available economic capacity in the peak hour of the operating day in order to meet demand. Suppliers are jointly pivotal if PJM would require some portion of the joint suppliers' available economic capacity in the peak hour of the operating day in order to meet demand.

Based on this method, Table 3-96 shows the number of days in 2025 and the first six months of 2026 with one or multiple singly pivotal suppliers, labelled as one pivotal supplier, with two or more suppliers that were each jointly pivotal with one other supplier, labelled as two pivotal suppliers, and with three or more suppliers that were each jointly pivotal with two other suppliers, labelled as three pivotal suppliers. For 2025, there were three pivotal suppliers for 95.3 percent of days. For the first six months of 2026, there were three pivotal suppliers for 93.4 percent of days.

### Table 3-96 Number of days with day-ahead aggregate pivotal suppliers: January 2025 through June 2026

| Year | Month | Days with One Pivotal Suppliers | Percent of Days with One Pivotal | Days with Two Pivotal Suppliers | Percent of Days with Two Pivotal | Days with Three Pivotal Suppliers | Percent of Days with Three Pivotal |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | 0 | 0.0% | 10 | 32.3% | 28 | 90.3% |
| 2025 | Feb | 0 | 0.0% | 15 | 53.6% | 26 | 92.9% |
| 2025 | Mar | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 9.7% | 25 | 80.6% |
| 2025 | Apr | 0 | 0.0% | 9 | 30.0% | 27 | 90.0% |
| 2025 | May | 0 | 0.0% | 18 | 58.1% | 30 | 96.8% |
| 2025 | Jun | 4 | 13.3% | 26 | 86.7% | 30 | 100.0% |
| 2025 | Jul | 9 | 29.0% | 31 | 100.0% | 31 | 100.0% |
| 2025 | Aug | 0 | 0.0% | 29 | 93.5% | 31 | 100.0% |
| 2025 | Sep | 0 | 0.0% | 21 | 70.0% | 29 | 96.7% |
| 2025 | Oct | 2 | 6.5% | 11 | 35.5% | 30 | 96.8% |
| 2025 | Nov | 0 | 0.0% | 10 | 33.3% | 30 | 100.0% |
| 2025 | Dec | 0 | 0.0% | 19 | 61.3% | 31 | 100.0% |
| 2025 | Annual | 15 | 4.1% | 202 | 55.3% | 348 | 95.3% |
| 2026 | Jan | 2 | 6.5% | 16 | 51.6% | 28 | 90.3% |
| 2026 | Feb | 0 | 0.0% | 12 | 42.9% | 28 | 100.0% |
| 2026 | Mar | 0 | 0.0% | 10 | 32.3% | 25 | 80.6% |
| 2026 | Apr | 4 | 13.3% | 17 | 56.7% | 29 | 96.7% |
| 2026 | May | 7 | 22.6% | 21 | 67.7% | 29 | 93.5% |
| 2026 | Jun | 3 | 10.0% | 29 | 96.7% | 30 | 100.0% |
| 2026 | Jan-Jun | 16 | 8.8% | 105 | 58.0% | 169 | 93.4% |

Figure 3-65 shows the number of days in the first six months of 2025 and 2026 with one pivotal supplier, two jointly pivotal suppliers, and three jointly pivotal suppliers in the day-ahead aggregate energy market by daily peak load level. It shows that market power, measured by the average number of suppliers that are pivotal, increases with daily peak load. The average number of suppliers in the first six months of 2026 that were one of three pivotal suppliers (yellow line) was 84.7 on the 46 days with a peak load between 90 and 100 GW (dark gray bar) and was 185.3 suppliers on the four days with a peak load between 140 and 150 GW. The number of pivotal suppliers generally increases with load.

190 One supplier, Exelon Generating Company, LLC, is partially mitigated for aggregate market power through a settlement agreement with the MMU filed December 30, 2021 and approved by the Maryland Public Service Commission as a condition of its merger. *In the Matter of the Merger of Exelon Corporation and Constellation Energy Group, Inc.*, Order No. 90084, Maryland PSC Case No. 9271 (February 22, 2022). Order No. 90084 replaces the original 10 year settlement in this case included as a condition in Order No. 84698, issued February 17, 2012, which approved the merger between Exelon and Constellation Energy Group.

191 Generation, imports, demand response, and virtual transactions are assigned to parent companies based on the ultimate parent company owner of their PJM account.

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The frequency of daily aggregate pivotal suppliers in the day-ahead market increased in in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025 at high levels of daily peak load shown in Figure 3-65. The overall frequency of pivotal suppliers rose with an increase in the frequency of days with daily peak load above 130 GW. In the first six months of both 2025 and 2026, all days with peak load over 130 GW had day-ahead aggregate market pivotal suppliers. There were 21 days with a daily peak load over 130 GW in the first six months of 2026, compared to 16 in the first six months of 2025.

### Figure 3-65 Average number of pivotal suppliers in the day-ahead energy market by daily peak load level: January through June, 2025 and 2026





Table 3-97 provides the frequency with which each of the top 10 pivotal suppliers was singly or jointly pivotal for the day-ahead aggregate energy market in the first six months of 2026. All of the top 10 pivotal suppliers were one of three pivotal suppliers on at least 138 days in the first six months of 2026 (76.2 percent of the days). All of the top 10 pivotal suppliers were one of two pivotal suppliers on at least 25 days. The top three pivotal suppliers were singly pivotal on at least 3 days.

### Table 3-97 Day-ahead market pivotal supplier frequency: January through June, 2026

| Pivotal Supplier Rank | Days Singly Pivotal | Percent of Days | Days Jointly Pivotal with One Other Supplier | Percent of Days | Days Jointly Pivotal with Two Other Suppliers | Percent of Days |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 16 | 8.8% | 105 | 58.0% | 169 | 93.4% |
| 2 | 4 | 2.2% | 102 | 56.4% | 169 | 93.4% |
| 3 | 3 | 1.7% | 92 | 50.8% | 167 | 92.3% |
| 4 | 0 | 0.0% | 59 | 32.6% | 165 | 91.2% |
| 5 | 0 | 0.0% | 48 | 26.5% | 157 | 86.7% |
| 6 | 0 | 0.0% | 36 | 19.9% | 157 | 86.7% |
| 7 | 0 | 0.0% | 35 | 19.3% | 144 | 79.6% |
| 8 | 0 | 0.0% | 32 | 17.7% | 141 | 77.9% |
| 9 | 0 | 0.0% | 30 | 16.6% | 139 | 76.8% |
| 10 | 0 | 0.0% | 25 | 13.8% | 138 | 76.2% |

# Market Behavior

## Local Market Power

In the PJM energy market, market power mitigation rules currently apply only for local market power. Local market power exists when transmission constraints or reliability issues create local markets that are structurally noncompetitive.[192] If the owners of the units required to solve the constraint or reliability issue are pivotal or jointly pivotal, they have the ability to set the price. Absent market power mitigation, unit owners that submit noncompetitive offers, or offers with inflexible operating parameters, could exercise market power. This could result in LMPs being set at higher than competitive levels, or could result in noncompetitive uplift payments.

The three pivotal supplier (TPS) test is the test for local market power in the energy market.[193] If the TPS test is failed, market power mitigation is applied by offer capping the resources on the high price side of the constraint for the owners who have been identified as having local market power. Offer capping is designed to set offers at competitive levels. Competitive offers are defined to be cost-based energy offers. In the PJM energy market, units are required to submit cost-based energy offers, defined by fuel cost policies, and have

192 OA Schedule 1, Section 6.4.1.
193 See the MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets, at "Three Pivotal Supplier Test" for a more detailed explanation of the three pivotal supplier test. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.


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the option to submit market-based offers, also called price-based offers. Units are committed and dispatched on price-based offers, if offered, as the default offer. When a unit that submits both cost-based and price-based offers is mitigated to its cost-based offer by PJM, it is considered offer capped. A unit that submits only cost-based offers, or that requests PJM to dispatch it on its cost-based offer, is not considered offer capped.

Local market power mitigation is implemented in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets. However, the implementation of the TPS test and offer capping differ in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets.

## TPS Test Statistics for Local Market Power

The TPS test in the energy market defines whether three suppliers are jointly pivotal in a defined local market. The TPS test is applied when the system solution indicates that a transmission constraint is binding or requires the commitment of additional resources. The TPS test result for a constraint for a specific interval indicates whether a supplier failed or passed the test for that constraint for that interval. A failed test indicates that the resource owner has structural market power.

A metric to describe the number of local markets created by transmission constraints and the applicability of the TPS test is the number of hours that each transmission constraint was binding in the real-time energy market over a period, by zone.

In the first six months of 2026, in the day-ahead energy market, the 500 kV system, 19 of 21 zones, and PJM/MISO experienced congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours, or resulting from a binding interface constraint (Table 3-98).[194] Table 3-98 shows that the 500 kV system, 12 of 21 zones and PJM/MISO experienced congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours or resulting from a binding interface constraint in the first six months of every year from 2017 through 2026. DUKE and one zone did not experience congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours or resulting from any binding interface constraint in the first six months of any year from 2017 through 2026.

### Table 3-98 Day-ahead congestion hours resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours: January through June, 2017 through 2026

| | (Jan - Jun) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| 500 kV System | 3,845 | 2,704 | 2,781 | 3,123 | 1,068 | 1,358 | 491 | 710 | 1,018 | 1,651 |
| ACEC | 1,356 | 1,324 | 3,281 | 1,175 | 417 | 112 | 727 | 466 | 188 | 91 |
| AEP | 27,981 | 11,885 | 8,400 | 3,946 | 3,254 | 1,539 | 4,586 | 3,702 | 2,800 | 1,287 |
| APS | 5,648 | 1,481 | 1,310 | 1,676 | 1,718 | 1,007 | 1,146 | 1,668 | 1,385 | 2,467 |
| ATSI | 2,471 | 2,427 | 1,434 | 0 | 107 | 264 | 824 | 1,534 | 308 | 1,284 |
| BGE | 4,878 | 3,736 | 1,944 | 2,299 | 2,427 | 351 | 1,730 | 1,327 | 1,038 | 2,157 |
| COMED | 31,391 | 9,896 | 2,674 | 1,752 | 1,279 | 1,883 | 1,821 | 4,905 | 2,614 | 3,889 |
| DAY | 240 | 170 | 0 | 745 | 50 | 52 | 208 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DEOK | 3,109 | 1,716 | 360 | 60 | 491 | 406 | 600 | 208 | 0 | 157 |
| DLCO | 164 | 322 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 97 | 0 | 0 | 118 | 133 |
| DOM | 3,675 | 2,264 | 554 | 1,335 | 938 | 2,280 | 2,301 | 2,160 | 2,802 | 3,357 |
| DPL | 6,516 | 6,415 | 3,477 | 2,388 | 2,117 | 1,247 | 1,869 | 2,356 | 1,986 | 1,173 |
| DUKE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DUQ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| EKPC | 646 | 374 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 163 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| JCPLC | 1,629 | 882 | 114 | 637 | 0 | 0 | 1,263 | 963 | 138 | 0 |
| MEC | 3,105 | 2,626 | 1,628 | 705 | 725 | 882 | 1,197 | 1,734 | 1,649 | 748 |
| NYISO | 515 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OVEC | 440 | 0 | 314 | 1,411 | 60 | 427 | 1,188 | 213 | 639 | 502 |
| PE | 12,326 | 5,618 | 2,187 | 2,481 | 223 | 2,647 | 1,886 | 4,096 | 5,318 | 5,055 |
| PECO | 6,252 | 1,885 | 1,146 | 793 | 816 | 2,265 | 3,495 | 2,482 | 2,058 | 697 |
| PEPCO | 604 | 88 | 77 | 0 | 0 | 182 | 333 | 354 | 638 | 192 |
| PJM/MISO | 13,843 | 12,391 | 5,361 | 3,188 | 3,682 | 7,123 | 4,574 | 3,187 | 5,899 | 6,234 |
| PPL | 4,280 | 2,174 | 6,264 | 3,154 | 3,109 | 3,523 | 1,343 | 1,671 | 1,366 | 1,443 |
| PSEG | 11,937 | 5,125 | 2,197 | 468 | 2,235 | 3,301 | 1,297 | 1,016 | 1,304 | 2,152 |
| REC | 0 | 0 | 724 | 0 | 546 | 644 | 747 | 192 | 0 | 52 |
| TVA | 0 | 0 | 250 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 |

In the first six months of 2026, in the real-time energy market, the 500 kV system, 14 of 21 zones, and PJM/MISO experienced congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours, or resulting from a binding interface constraint (Table 3-99).[195] Table 3-99 shows that the 500

194 A constraint is mapped to the 500 kV system if its voltage is 500 kV and it is located in one of the zones including AECO, BGE, DPL, JCPLC, MEC, PECO, PENELEC, PEPCO, PPL and PSEG. All PJM/MISO reciprocally coordinated flowgates (RCF) are mapped to MISO regardless of the location of the flowgates. All PJM/NYISO RCF are mapped to NYISO as location regardless of the location of the flowgates.

195 A constraint is mapped to the 500 kV system if its voltage is 500 kV and it is located in one of the zones including AECO, BGE, DPL, JCPLC, MEC, PECO, PENELEC, PEPCO, PPL and PSEG. All PJM/MISO reciprocally coordinated flowgates (RCF) are mapped to MISO regardless of the location of the flowgates. All PJM/NYISO RCF are mapped to NYISO as location regardless of the location of the flowgates.

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kV system, six zones, and PJM/MISO experienced congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours or resulting from a binding interface constraint in the first six months of every year from 2017 through 2026. Four zones (DAY, JCPLC, DUQ and REC), and DUKE did not experience congestion resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours or resulting from any binding interface constraint in the first six months in any year from 2017 through 2026.[196]

### Table 3-99 Real-time congestion hours resulting from one or more constraints binding for 50 or more hours: January through June, 2017 through 2026

| | (Jan - Jun) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| 500 kV System | 316 | 792 | 1,275 | 1,641 | 435 | 754 | 155 | 212 | 339 | 1,055 |
| ACEC | 0 | 0 | 136 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| AEP | 456 | 853 | 140 | 585 | 1,096 | 266 | 516 | 837 | 972 | 779 |
| APS | 52 | 81 | 0 | 232 | 616 | 82 | 0 | 171 | 322 | 1,022 |
| ATSI | 189 | 647 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 128 | 78 | 792 | 87 | 617 |
| BGE | 680 | 1,881 | 206 | 879 | 1,088 | 235 | 631 | 719 | 400 | 1,276 |
| COMED | 533 | 325 | 187 | 656 | 626 | 785 | 420 | 2,348 | 1,652 | 2,747 |
| DAY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DEOK | 0 | 68 | 0 | 0 | 174 | 63 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DLCO | 0 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 62 |
| DOM | 80 | 136 | 0 | 584 | 372 | 1,172 | 233 | 304 | 1,018 | 1,433 |
| DPL | 326 | 295 | 0 | 0 | 144 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 158 | 0 |
| DUKE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DUQ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| EKPC | 0 | 159 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| EXT | 743 | 0 | 56 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| JCPLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MEC | 0 | 576 | 92 | 564 | 243 | 210 | 103 | 0 | 327 | 55 |
| NYISO | 332 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OVEC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 344 |
| PE | 1,169 | 965 | 1,016 | 1,605 | 52 | 1,504 | 694 | 2,588 | 2,727 | 2,214 |
| PECO | 1,180 | 387 | 324 | 263 | 460 | 1,583 | 2,020 | 1,127 | 1,299 | 485 |
| PEPCO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 77 | 74 | 0 |
| PJM/MISO | 2,879 | 2,869 | 1,920 | 1,612 | 2,106 | 5,318 | 3,390 | 2,722 | 3,385 | 3,284 |
| PPL | 334 | 59 | 709 | 525 | 624 | 1,061 | 91 | 158 | 138 | 393 |
| PSEG | 160 | 167 | 164 | 0 | 813 | 447 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 241 |
| REC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TVA | 0 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 89 |

196 In this report, the MMU used the dispatch run marginal resource and sensitivity factor data, rather than the pricing run data, in the analysis of constraints since 2021 because the PJM pricing run sensitivity factor data for day-ahead LMP was not correct for a small number of hours. The PJM pricing run LMPs are the final settlement LMPs.

In the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market, the TPS test is performed in PROBE, as part of the unit commitment process. Table 3-100 shows the average constraint relief required on the constraint, the average effective supply available to relieve the constraint, the average number of owners with available relief in the defined market and the average number of owners passing and failing the TPS test for the interface constraints in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market.

### Table 3-100 Day-ahead three pivotal supplier test details for internal interface constraints: January through June, 2026

| Constraint | Period | Number of Tests | Average Constraint Relief (MW) | Average Effective Supply (MW) | Average Number Owners | Average Number Owners Passing | Average Number Owners Failing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AEP - DOM | Peak | 17 | 398 | 213 | 20 | 5 | 16 |
| | Off Peak | 35 | 505 | 1,197 | 34 | 24 | 10 |
| AP South | Peak | 136 | 820 | 1,182 | 36 | 16 | 20 |
| | Off Peak | 82 | 665 | 1,133 | 35 | 14 | 21 |
| BCPEP | Peak | 27 | 432 | 390 | 13 | 2 | 10 |
| | Off Peak | 16 | 843 | 565 | 19 | 0 | 19 |
| Bedington - Black Oak | Peak | 68 | 150 | 173 | 26 | 9 | 17 |
| | Off Peak | 95 | 159 | 444 | 33 | 23 | 10 |
| West | Peak | 17 | 1,073 | 1,574 | 29 | 14 | 15 |
| | Off Peak | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 3-101 shows the average constraint relief required on the constraint, the average effective supply available to relieve the constraint, the average number of owners with available relief in the defined market, whether the TPS test was applied, and the average number of owners passing and failing the TPS test for the 10 constraints that were binding for the most hours in the day-ahead energy market. In the day-ahead energy market, the TPS test evaluates each constraint that was binding for each hour during the operating day after the initial unit commitment run. The set of constraints that are binding in the unit commitment run, for which the TPS test is applied, is not necessarily the same as the set of constraints that bind in the final day-ahead energy market solution. This is because PJM's day-ahead market is solved in three stages, and the initial set of constraints is from the Resource Scheduling and Commitment (RSC) (unit commitment) stage while the final set of binding constraints is from the Scheduling Pricing and Dispatch (SPD) (unit dispatch)


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stage.[197] The PJM approach fails to apply the TPS test to market sellers that provide relief to constraints in the final dispatch solution, and therefore fails to mitigate such sellers for market power.

The MMU recommends that PJM modify the process for applying the TPS test in the day-ahead energy market to ensure that all local markets created by binding constraints are tested for market power and to ensure that market sellers with market power are appropriately mitigated to their competitive offers.

### Table 3-101 Day-ahead three pivotal supplier test details for top 10 congested constraints: January through June, 2026

| Constraint | Period | Number of Tests | Average Constraint Relief (MW) | Average Effective Supply (MW) | Average Number Owners | Average Number Owners Passing | Average Number Owners Failing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Towanda - Hillside | Peak | 199 | 177 | 200 | 11 | 2 | 10 |
| | Off Peak | 206 | 179 | 262 | 13 | 2 | 11 |
| Haumesser Road - Steward | Peak | 807 | 171 | 119 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| | Off Peak | 801 | 176 | 98 | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| Graceton - Manor | Peak | 711 | 521 | 789 | 38 | 19 | 19 |
| | Off Peak | 848 | 363 | 730 | 32 | 21 | 11 |
| Burnham - Munster | Peak | 592 | 420 | 711 | 40 | 18 | 22 |
| | Off Peak | 1,088 | 545 | 1,429 | 41 | 28 | 13 |
| Chicago Ave - Praxair | Peak | 20 | 62 | 88 | 15 | 8 | 8 |
| | Off Peak | 87 | 88 | 22 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| Everts Drive - South Troy | Peak | 144 | 119 | 37 | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| | Off Peak | 135 | 81 | 74 | 7 | 1 | 6 |
| Kewanee | Peak | 215 | 79 | 63 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
| | Off Peak | 189 | 82 | 57 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Lenox - Macnew Tap | Peak | 3 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| | Off Peak | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Gardners - Texas Eastern | Peak | 314 | 90 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| | Off Peak | 181 | 112 | 22 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Nottingham | Peak | 249 | 483 | 1,041 | 43 | 29 | 14 |
| | Off Peak | 235 | 349 | 1,029 | 39 | 32 | 7 |

The local market structure in the real-time energy market associated with each of the frequently binding constraints was analyzed using the three pivotal supplier results for the first six months of 2026.[198] While the real-time constraint hours include constraints that were binding in the five minute real-time dispatch solution (RT SCED), IT SCED, the software that performs the TPS test, may contain different binding constraints because IT SCED looks ahead to target times that are in the near future to solve for constraints that could be binding, using the load forecast for those times.[199] IT SCED solves for target times that occur at 15 minute time increments, unlike RT SCED that solves for every five minute time increment. The TPS statistics shown in this section present the data from the IT SCED TPS solution. Some IT SCED TPS solutions are used to commit units, while others are not. PJM operators have discretion in choosing which units to commit and which IT SCED results to use as the basis for the commitment and therefore which units are tested for market power using the TPS test. The results of the TPS test are shown for tests that could have resulted in offer capping and tests that did result in offer capping.

Table 3-102 shows the average constraint relief required on the constraint, the average effective supply available to relieve the constraint, the average number of owners with available relief in the defined market and the average number of owners passing and failing for the interface constraints in the PJM Real-Time Energy Market. Table 3-103 shows the average constraint relief required on the constraint, the average effective supply available to relieve the constraint, the average number of owners with available relief in the defined market and the average number of owners passing and failing for the 10 constraints that were binding for the most hours in the PJM Real-Time Energy Market. Table 3-102 and Table 3-103 include analysis of all the tests for every target time where IT SCED determined that constraint relief was needed for each of the constraints shown. The same target time can be evaluated by multiple IT SCED cases at different look ahead times. Each 15 minute target time is solved by 12 different IT SCED cases at different look ahead times. The set of binding constraints for a target time may be different in 12 look ahead IT SCED solutions.

197 *See* PJM. "Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," Section 5.2.6, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

198 See the *MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, p. 38 "Three Pivotal Supplier Test" for a more detailed explanation of the three pivotal supplier test. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

199 Prior to September 1, 2021, the real-time binding constraints were identical in the dispatch (RT SCED) and pricing (LPC) solutions. Beginning September 1, 2021, with implementation of fast start pricing, the set of binding constraints can differ between RT SCED and LPC pricing solutions. The set of constraints reported here are based on the binding constraints in RT SCED. This is because PJM commits and mitigates units based on a dispatch solution in IT SCED without fast start pricing.

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### Table 3-102 Real-time three pivotal supplier test details for internal interface constraints: January through June, 2026

| Constraint | Period | Number of Tests | Average Constraint Relief (MW) | Average Effective Supply (MW) | Average Number Owners | Average Number Owners Passing | Average Number Owners Failing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bedington - Black Oak | Peak | 2,402 | 279 | 151 | 12 | 1 | 11 |
| | Off Peak | 3,298 | 303 | 149 | 11 | 0 | 11 |
| AEP - DOM | Peak | 378 | 585 | 367 | 11 | 0 | 11 |
| | Off Peak | 2,409 | 665 | 399 | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| AP South | Peak | 1,606 | 484 | 612 | 15 | 5 | 10 |
| | Off Peak | 706 | 439 | 546 | 13 | 3 | 11 |

### Table 3-103 Real-time three pivotal supplier test details for top 10 congested constraints: January through June, 2026

| Constraint | Period | Number of Tests | Average Constraint Relief (MW) | Average Effective Supply (MW) | Average Number Owners | Average Number Owners Passing | Average Number Owners Failing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Towanda - Hillside | Peak | 17,813 | 82 | 114 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| | Off Peak | 22,156 | 71 | 108 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Graceton - Manor | Peak | 18,041 | 168 | 253 | 14 | 5 | 9 |
| | Off Peak | 23,218 | 147 | 225 | 12 | 3 | 9 |
| Chicago Ave - Praxair | Peak | 3,846 | 38 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | Off Peak | 11,460 | 33 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Haumesser Road - Steward | Peak | 12,290 | 53 | 91 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| | Off Peak | 12,450 | 36 | 70 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Burnham - Munster | Peak | 10,443 | 238 | 209 | 11 | 1 | 10 |
| | Off Peak | 17,485 | 209 | 181 | 10 | 1 | 9 |
| Kewanee | Peak | 3,158 | 23 | 85 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | Off Peak | 3,588 | 15 | 67 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Lenox - Macnew Tap | Peak | 7,500 | 21 | 27 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | Off Peak | 11,104 | 20 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| State Line - Roxana | Peak | 2,477 | 62 | 20 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | Off Peak | 7,922 | 54 | 21 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Nottingham | Peak | 10,229 | 205 | 292 | 14 | 4 | 11 |
| | Off Peak | 8,408 | 179 | 248 | 13 | 2 | 11 |
| Bedington | Peak | 7,382 | 77 | 16 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | Off Peak | 11,679 | 102 | 15 | 3 | 0 | 3 |

The three pivotal supplier test is applied every time the IT SCED solution indicates that incremental relief is needed to relieve a transmission constraint. While every system solution that requires incremental relief to transmission constraints will result in a test, not all tested providers of effective supply are eligible for offer capping. Steam unit offers that are offer capped in the day-ahead energy market continue to be offer capped in the real-time energy market regardless of their inclusion in the TPS test in real time or the outcome of the TPS test in real time. Steam unit offers that are not offer capped in the day-ahead energy market continue to not be offer capped in the real-time energy market regardless of their inclusion in the TPS test in real time or the outcome of the TPS test in real time.[200] Offline units that are committed to provide relief for a transmission constraint, whose owners fail the TPS test, are committed on the cheaper of their cost or price-based offers. Beginning November 1, 2017, with the introduction of hourly offers and intraday offer updates, online units whose commitment is extended beyond the day-ahead or real-time commitment, and whose owners fail the TPS test, are also switched to the cost-based offer if it is cheaper than the price-based offer.

Units committed in the day-ahead market often fail the TPS test in the real-time market when they are redispatched to provide relief to transmission constraints, even though they did not fail the TPS test in the day-ahead market. Day-ahead committed units are not evaluated for offer capping in real-time unless they update their cost-based offer. These units are able to set prices with a positive markup in the real-time market. Units that cleared the day-ahead market on their price based schedule were evaluated to identify the units whose offers were mitigated in real-time and the units that cleared on price offers in real-time despite failing the real-time TPS test. Table 3-104 shows that, in the first six months of 2026, 5.5 percent of unit hours that cleared the day-ahead market on their price based offer were switched to cost in real-time. Table 3-104 shows that 10.7 percent of unit hours that cleared the day-ahead market on their price based offer cleared on their price based offer in real-time despite failing the real-time TPS test.

200 If a steam unit were to lower its cost-based offer in real time, it would become eligible for offer capping based on the online TPS test.


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### Table 3-104 Day-ahead units committed on price-based offers that cleared real-time: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Year (Jan-Jun) | Day Ahead Price Based Unit Hours That Cleared Real-Time | | | Percent Day Ahead Price Based Unit Hours That Cleared Real-Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | On Cost | On Price | On Price and Failed TPS Test | On Cost | On Price and Failed TPS Test |
| 2025 | 71,354 | 1,549,257 | 121,540 | 4.6% | 7.8% |
| 2026 | 87,859 | 1,602,126 | 170,629 | 5.5% | 10.7% |

The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that offer capping be applied to units that fail the TPS test in the real-time market that were not offer capped at the time of commitment in the day-ahead market or at a prior time in the real-time market.

Table 3-105 and Table 3-106 provide, for the identified constraints, information on total tests applied, the subset of three pivotal supplier tests that could have resulted in offer capping and the portion of those tests that did result in offer capping in the real-time energy market. Tests where there was at least one offline unit or an online unit eligible for offer capping by the online TPS test are considered tests that could have resulted in offer capping. A relatively small number of these tests result in offer capping because the offline or online units eligible for offer capping by the online TPS test may not fail the TPS test, may not be on the high price side of the constraint, or may have offers which, under current PJM rules, result in the unit's price-based offer being determined the least-cost offer. PJM operators also manually commit units for reliability reasons other than providing relief to a binding constraint. Manual commitments are offer capped along with resources that fail the TPS test.

### Table 3-105 Summary of real-time three pivotal supplier tests applied for internal interface constraints: January through June, 2026

| Constraint | Period | Total Tests Applied | Total Tests that Could Have Resulted in Offer Capping | Percent Total Tests that Could Have Resulted in Offer Capping | Total Tests Resulted in Offer Capping | Percent Total Tests Resulted in Offer Capping | Tests Resulted in Offer Capping as Percent of Tests that Could Have Resulted in Offer Capping |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bedington - Black Oak | Peak | 2,402 | 2,402 | 100% | 61 | 3% | 3% |
| | Off Peak | 3,298 | 3,249 | 99% | 101 | 3% | 3% |
| AEP - DOM | Peak | 378 | 378 | 100% | 21 | 6% | 6% |
| | Off Peak | 2,409 | 2,409 | 100% | 68 | 3% | 3% |
| AP South | Peak | 1,606 | 1,606 | 100% | 90 | 6% | 6% |
| | Off Peak | 706 | 706 | 100% | 48 | 7% | 7% |

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### Table 3-106 Summary of real-time three pivotal supplier tests applied for top 10 congested constraints: January through June, 2026

| Constraint | Period | Total Tests Applied | Total Tests that Could Have Resulted in Offer Capping | Percent Total Tests that Could Have Resulted in Offer Capping | Total Tests Resulted in Offer Capping | Percent Total Tests Resulted in Offer Capping | Tests Resulted in Offer Capping as Percent of Tests that Could Have Resulted in Offer Capping |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Towanda - Hillside | Peak | 17,813 | 8,376 | 47% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 22,156 | 7,826 | 35% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| Graceton - Manor | Peak | 18,041 | 18,019 | 100% | 220 | 1% | 1% |
| | Off Peak | 23,218 | 23,205 | 100% | 186 | 1% | 1% |
| Chicago Ave - Praxair | Peak | 3,846 | 882 | 23% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 11,460 | 2,067 | 18% | 2 | 0% | 0% |
| Haumesser Road - Steward | Peak | 12,290 | 1,863 | 15% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 12,450 | 1,416 | 11% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| Burnham - Munster | Peak | 10,443 | 8,960 | 86% | 146 | 1% | 2% |
| | Off Peak | 17,485 | 14,994 | 86% | 125 | 1% | 1% |
| Kewanee | Peak | 3,158 | 3 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 3,588 | 25 | 1% | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| Lenox - Macnew Tap | Peak | 7,500 | 3,186 | 42% | 1 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 11,104 | 2,165 | 19% | 2 | 0% | 0% |
| State Line - Roxana | Peak | 2,477 | 546 | 22% | 1 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 7,922 | 1,239 | 16% | 4 | 0% | 0% |
| Nottingham | Peak | 10,229 | 10,226 | 100% | 132 | 1% | 1% |
| | Off Peak | 8,408 | 8,397 | 100% | 100 | 1% | 1% |
| Bedington | Peak | 7,382 | 4,705 | 64% | 21 | 0% | 0% |
| | Off Peak | 11,679 | 6,579 | 56% | 34 | 0% | 1% |

## Offer Capping for Local Market Power

In the PJM energy market, offer capping occurs as a result of structurally noncompetitive local markets and noncompetitive offers in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets. PJM also uses offer capping for units that are committed for reliability reasons, like voltage support and N-2 contingencies, for providing black start and for providing reactive service as well as for conservative operations. There are no explicit rules governing market structure or the exercise of market power in the aggregate energy market.

There are some issues with the application of mitigation in the day-ahead energy market and the real-time energy market when market sellers fail the TPS test. There are also issues with the absence of a TPS test under some conditions. There is no tariff or manual language that defines in detail the application of the TPS test and offer capping in the day-ahead energy market and the real-time energy market. There is no tariff or manual language that defines the PJM process for evaluating units for multi-day commitments in the day-ahead energy market.

In both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets, generators with market power have the ability to evade mitigation by using varying markups in their price-based offers, offering different operating parameters in their price-based and cost-based offers, and using different fuels in their price-based and cost-based offers. These issues can be resolved by simple rule changes.


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When an owner fails the TPS test, the units offered by the owner that are committed to provide relief are committed on the cheaper of cost-based or price-based offers. In the day-ahead energy market, PJM commits a unit on the schedule that results in the lower overall system production cost. The day-ahead energy market selects which schedule to use for a resource that failed the TPS test based on its objective of clearing resources to meet the total demand at the lowest bid production cost for the system over the 24 hour period.

In the real-time energy market, PJM uses a dispatch cost formula to compare price-based offers and cost-based offers to select the cheaper offer.[201]


$$\text{Total Dispatch Cost} = \text{Startup Cost} + \sum_{\text{Min Run}} \text{Hourly Dispatch Cost}$$

where the hourly dispatch cost is calculated for each hour using the offers applicable for that hour as:

$$\text{Hourly Dispatch Cost} = (\text{Incremental Energy Offer@EcoMin} \times \text{EcoMin MW}) + \text{NoLoad Cost}$$

The hourly dispatch cost is calculated only at the economic minimum level and not at higher output levels. Given the ability to submit offer curves with different markups at different output levels in the price-based offer, unit owners with market power can evade mitigation by using a low markup at low output levels and a high markup at higher output levels. This strategy is called crossing curves, or markup switching. Figure 3-66 shows an example of offers from a unit that has a negative markup at the economic minimum MW level and a positive markup at the economic maximum MW level. The result would be that a unit that failed the TPS test would be committed on its price-based offer that has a lower dispatch cost, even though the price-based offer is higher than cost-based offer at higher output levels and includes positive markups, inconsistent with the explicit goal of local market power mitigation.

### Figure 3-66 Offers with varying markups at different MW output levels




201 See OA Schedule 1 § 6.4.1(g).

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Table 3-107 shows the number and percent of unit schedule hours, by month, when unit offers included crossing curves (markup switch) in the PJM Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets in the first six months of 2026. The analysis includes only units that offer both price-based and cost-based offers. Units in PJM are required to submit cost-based offers, but most elect to submit price-based offers.

### Table 3-107 Units offered with crossing curves (markup switch): January through June, 2026

| | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Number of Schedule Hours with Crossing Curves | Total Number of Cost Schedule Hours Offered by Price Based Units | Percent of Schedule Hours with Crossing Curves | Number of Schedule Hours with Crossing Curves | Total Number of Cost Schedule Hours Offered by Price Based Units | Percent of Schedule Hours with Crossing Curves |
| Jan | 71,460 | 903,312 | 7.9% | 60,246 | 850,012 | 7.1% |
| Feb | 63,354 | 814,296 | 7.8% | 52,191 | 735,377 | 7.1% |
| Mar | 73,320 | 923,695 | 7.9% | 53,035 | 779,829 | 6.8% |
| Apr | 72,100 | 896,976 | 8.0% | 48,717 | 718,785 | 6.8% |
| May | 71,131 | 926,712 | 7.7% | 51,019 | 770,325 | 6.6% |
| Jun | 76,643 | 903,000 | 8.5% | 65,063 | 835,604 | 7.8% |
| Total | 428,008 | 5,367,991 | 8.0% | 330,271 | 4,689,932 | 7.0% |

Table 3--108 shows the percent of unit schedule hours offered with crossing curves (markup switch), their average markup, their MW output weighted markup, and their average marginal unit LMP and markup contribution, when units failed the three pivotal supplier test in the PJM Day-Ahead Market and were marginal in the Real-Time Energy Market in the first six months of 2022 through 2026. The analysis only includes units that offer both price-based and cost-based offers.

### Table 3-108 Marginal units offered with crossing curves (markup switch) and local market power: January through June, 2022 through 2026

| | Unit hours with Crossing Curves Committed on Price Offer and Eligible for Offer-Capping DA and Marginal in Real-Time | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year (Jan-Jun) | Percent of Unit hours with Crossing Curves | Average Markup Day-Ahead | Average Markup Real-Time | Load-Weighted Average Markup Day-Ahead | Load-Weighted Average Markup Real-Time | Average Marginal Unit LMP Contribution | Average Marginal Unit Markup Contribution |
| 2022 | 13.0% | $8.86 | $3.94 | $10.07 | $6.59 | $1.76 | $0.15 |
| 2023 | 11.6% | $14.00 | $4.52 | $14.29 | $6.43 | $1.73 | $0.22 |
| 2024 | 12.1% | $6.94 | $2.59 | $7.92 | $4.74 | $1.31 | $0.08 |
| 2025 | 7.8% | $8.19 | $4.17 | $8.83 | $6.14 | $1.90 | $0.21 |
| 2026 | 13.1% | $35.56 | $15.09 | $48.29 | $30.53 | $2.13 | $0.05 |


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Table 3-109 shows the percent of unit schedule hours offered with crossing curves (markup switch), their average markup, their MW output weighted markup, and their average marginal unit LMP and markup contribution, when units failed the three pivotal supplier test in the PJM Day-Ahead Market, were marginal in the Real-Time Energy Market and had a negative markup in the PJM Day-Ahead Market in the first six months of 2022 through 2026. The analysis only includes units that offer both price-based and cost-based offers.

### Table 3-109 Marginal units offered with crossing curves (markup switch), local market power and negative markup day-ahead: January through June, 2022 through 2026

| | | Unit hours with Crossing Curves Committed on Price Offer with Negative Markup and Eligible for Offer-Capping DA and Marginal with Positive Markup in Real-Time | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year (Jan-Jun) | Percent of Unit hours with Crossing Curves | Average Markup Day-Ahead | Average Markup Real-Time | Load-Weighted Average Markup Day-Ahead | Load-Weighted Average Markup Real-Time | Average Marginal Unit LMP Contribution | Average Marginal Unit Markup Contribution |
| 2022 | 2.6% | ($4.70) | $11.25 | ($4.53) | $13.67 | $1.63 | $0.28 |
| 2023 | 2.3% | ($2.88) | $17.83 | ($2.35) | $19.96 | $2.33 | $0.60 |
| 2024 | 2.7% | ($3.16) | $10.54 | ($2.90) | $12.19 | $1.22 | $0.24 |
| 2025 | 2.2% | ($3.03) | $13.54 | ($2.73) | $15.81 | $1.17 | $0.25 |
| 2026 | 2.7% | ($4.95) | $22.02 | ($3.24) | $28.50 | $2.87 | $0.81 |

Offering a different economic minimum MW level, different minimum run times, or different start up and notification times in the cost-based and price-based offers can also be used to evade mitigation. For example, a unit may have a price-based offer with a positive markup, but have a shorter minimum run time (MRT) in the price-based offer resulting in a lower dispatch cost for the price-based offer but setting prices at a level that includes a positive markup. Table 3-110 shows the number and percent of unit schedule hours when units offered lower minimum run times in price-based offers than in cost-based offers while having a positive markup in the price-based offer.

### Table 3-110 Units offered with lower minimum run time on price compared to cost and with positive markup: January through June, 2026


| | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Number of Schedule Hours with Lower Min Run Time in Price Compared to Cost | Total Number of Cost Schedule Hours Offered by Price Based Units | Percent of Schedule Hours with Lower Min Run Time in Price Compared to Cost | Number of Schedule Hours with Lower Min Run Time in Price Compared to Cost | Total Number of Cost Schedule Hours Offered by Price Based Units | Percent of Schedule Hours with Lower Min Run Time in Price Compared to Cost |
| Jan | 3,274 | 903,312 | 0.4% | 2,981 | 850,012 | 0.4% |
| Feb | 3,212 | 814,296 | 0.4% | 2,251 | 735,377 | 0.3% |
| Mar | 3,214 | 923,695 | 0.3% | 2,099 | 779,829 | 0.3% |
| Apr | 2,968 | 896,976 | 0.3% | 1,803 | 718,785 | 0.3% |
| May | 3,144 | 926,712 | 0.3% | 2,098 | 770,325 | 0.3% |
| Jun | 3,405 | 903,000 | 0.4% | 3,337 | 835,604 | 0.4% |
| Total | 19,217 | 5,367,991 | 0.4% | 14,569 | 4,689,932 | 0.3% |

A unit may offer a lower economic minimum MW level on the price-based offer than the cost-based offer. Such a unit may appear to be cheaper to commit on the price-based offer even with a positive markup. A unit with a positive markup can have lower dispatch cost with the price-based offer with a lower economic minimum level compared to the cost-based offer. Figure 3-67 shows an example of offers from a unit that has a positive markup and a price-based offer with a lower economic minimum MW than the cost-based offer. Keeping the startup cost, Minimum Run Time and no load cost constant between the price-based offer

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and cost-based offer, the dispatch cost for this unit is lower on the price-based offer than on the cost-based offer solely as a result of the lower economic minimum MW. However, the price-based offer includes a positive markup and could result in setting the market price at a noncompetitive level even after the resource owner fails the TPS test.


### Figure 3-67 Offers with a positive markup but different economic minimum MW




The behavior in which units offered lower economic minimum MW in price-based offers than in cost-based offers while having a positive markup in the price-based offer is limited to a number of units that does not permit data to be provided under the PJM confidentiality rules in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets.

In the case of dual fuel units, if the price-based offer uses a cheaper fuel and the cost-based offer uses a more expensive fuel, the price-based offer will appear to be cheaper even when it includes a markup. Figure 3-68 shows an example of offers by a dual fuel unit, where the active cost-based offer uses a more expensive fuel and the price-based offer uses a cheaper fuel and includes a markup. Table 3-111 shows the number and percent of dual fuel unit hours where the price-based offer does not have a comparable cost-based offer with a matching fuel, and the cost-based offer exceeds the price-based offer. The analysis includes only those units that offered multiple offers (cost or price) with different fuels in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-68 Dual fuel unit offers





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Table 3-111 Dual fuel unit offers with cost-based offers exceeding price-based offers (negative markup) but different fuel: January through June, 2026

| | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Number of Unit Hours With Negative Markup And No Matching Fuel on Cost | Total Number of Unit Hours By Units With Multiple Fuels | Percent Unit Hours With Negative Markup And No Matching Fuel on Cost | Number of Unit Hours With Negative Markup And No Matching Fuel on Cost | Total Number of Unit Hours By Units With Multiple Fuels | Percent Unit Hours With Negative Markup And No Matching Fuel on Cost |
| Jan | 9,866 | 195,216 | 5.1% | 9,866 | 190,925 | 5.2% |
| Feb | 11,986 | 179,688 | 6.7% | 11,986 | 167,397 | 7.2% |
| Mar | 13,944 | 212,310 | 6.6% | 13,944 | 182,450 | 7.6% |
| Apr | 18,102 | 207,408 | 8.7% | 18,102 | 161,071 | 11.2% |
| May | 25,388 | 220,104 | 11.5% | 25,388 | 191,932 | 13.2% |
| Jun | 26,967 | 219,120 | 12.3% | 26,967 | 209,303 | 12.9% |
| Total | 106,253 | 1,233,846 | 8.6% | 106,253 | 1,103,078 | 9.6% |

These issues can be solved by simple rule changes.[202] The MMU recommends, in order to ensure effective market power mitigation when the TPS test is failed, that markup be consistently positive or negative across the full MWh range of price and cost-based offers. This means that the cost-based and price-based offer curves never cross.[203]

PJM filed and, on October 25, 2024, FERC accepted a revised proposal that would require that sellers that fail the TPS test will be offer capped at their cost-based offers and that operating parameters will be mitigated. However, PJM has no plans to implement the improved rules, so the flawed rules remain in place. PJM's proposal also uses the flawed formula rejected by FERC to select among cost-based offers. This will result in the illogical selection of cost-based offers in some circumstances, particularly if a dual fuel unit submits offers for both oil and gas on a day when the economics change between the two fuels midday. PJM should modify its implementation to address that issue. The result would allow market sellers to select the correct cost-based fuel schedule. There is no reason to delay implementation until PJM addresses combined cycle modelling. The changes would decrease the solution time for the day-ahead market and enhance market efficiency. The new approach should be implemented as soon as possible to help ensure effective market power mitigation.

The issues with offer capping will continue to allow the exercise of market power to affect prices until PJM implements the new approach. Currently, there is no implementation date. The simplified schedule selection process would shorten the time required to reach the day-ahead market solution, which is a market efficiency gain regardless of whether PJM implements combined cycle modelling. The MMU recommends that PJM commit all resources that fail the TPS test on their cost-based offers and that PJM implement that solution as soon as possible. [204]

Levels of offer capping have historically been low in PJM, as shown in Table 3-113. But offer capping remains a critical element of PJM market rules because it is designed to prevent the exercise of local market power. While overall offer capping levels have been low, there are a significant number of units with persistent structural local market power that would have a significant impact on prices in the absence of local market power mitigation. Until November 1, 2017, only uncommitted resources, started to relieve a transmission constraint, were subject to offer capping. Beginning November 1, 2017, under certain circumstances, online resources that are committed beyond their original commitment (day-ahead or real-time) can be offer capped if the owner fails the TPS test, and the

202 The MMU proposed these offer rule changes as part of a broader reform to address generator offer flexibility and associated impact on market power mitigation rules in the Generator Offer Flexibility Senior Task Force (GOFSTF) and subsequently in the MMU's protest in the hourly offers proceeding in Docket No. ER16-372-000, filed December 14, 2015.

203 See related recommendations about mitigation of operating parameters and financial offer parameters.

204 See "Schedule Selection: IMM Package," MMU Presentation to the Market Implementation Committee (September 6, 2023), <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2023/IMM_MIC_Schedule_Selection_IMM_Package_20230906.pdf>.

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latest available cost-based offer is determined to be lower than the price-based offer.[205] Units running in real time as part of their original commitment on the price-based offer on economics, and that can provide incremental relief to a constraint, cannot be switched to their cost-based offer by PJM.

The offer capping percentages shown in Table 3-112 include units that are committed to provide constraint relief whose owners failed the TPS test in the energy market, but excluding units that were committed for reliability reasons, providing black start or providing reactive support. Offer capped unit run hours and offer capped generation (in MWh) are shown as a percentage of the total run hours and the total generation (MWh) from all the units in the PJM energy market.[206] Beginning November 1, 2017, with the introduction of hourly offers, certain online units, whose owners fail the TPS test in the real-time energy market for providing constraint relief, can be offer capped and dispatched on their cost-based offer subsequent to a real-time hourly offer update.

### Table 3-112 Offer capping statistics for units committed for constraints: January through June, 2018 to 2026

| | Real-Time | | Day-Ahead | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year (Jan - Jun) | Unit Hours Capped | MWh Capped | Unit Hours Capped | MWh Capped |
| 2018 | 1.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| 2019 | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.4% |
| 2020 | 0.9% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 1.2% |
| 2021 | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 0.8% |
| 2022 | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.9% |
| 2023 | 1.2% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.6% |
| 2024 | 1.4% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.0% |
| 2025 | 1.1% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.0% |
| 2026 | 0.8% | 0.6% | 4.0% | 1.6% |

Table 3-113 shows the offer capping percentages including both units committed to provide constraint relief and units committed for reliability reasons, black start or reactive support. Reliability reasons include reactive support or local voltage support. PJM creates closed loop interfaces to, in some cases, model reactive constraints. The closed loop interface creates demand for the output of the resource needed to provide reactive power. The resulting higher LMPs in the closed loop interfaces increased economic dispatch, which contributed to the reduction in units offer capped for reactive support over time in Table 3-114. In instances where units are committed and offer capped for the modeled closed loop interface constraints, they are considered offer capped for providing constraint relief, and not for reliability. They are included in the offer capping percentages in Table 3-112. Prior to closed loop interfaces, these units were considered as committed for reactive support, and were included in the offer capping statistics for reliability in Table 3-114.

### Table 3-113 Offer capping statistics for units committed for constraints or for reliability: January through June, 2018 to 2026

| | Real-Time | | Day-Ahead | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year (Jan - Jun) | Unit Hours Capped | MWh Capped | Unit Hours Capped | MWh Capped |
| 2018 | 1.5% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.4% |
| 2019 | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.4% |
| 2020 | 0.9% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 1.2% |
| 2021 | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 0.8% |
| 2022 | 1.2% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.0% |
| 2023 | 1.2% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.7% |
| 2024 | 1.5% | 1.3% | 1.9% | 1.2% |
| 2025 | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.2% |
| 2026 | 0.8% | 0.7% | 4.1% | 1.8% |

205 See OA Schedule 1 § 6.4.1.

206 Prior to the *2018 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, these tables presented the offer cap percentages based on total bid unit hours and total load MWh. Beginning with the quarterly report for January through June, 2018, the statistics have been updated with percentages based on run hours and total generation MWh from units modeled in the energy market.



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Table 3-114 shows the offer capping percentages only for units committed for reliability reasons, black start or reactive support. The low offer capping percentages do not mean that units manually committed for reliability reasons do not have market power. All units manually committed for reliability have market power, and all are treated consistent with that fact.[207]

### Table 3-114 Offer capping statistics for units committed for reliability: January through June, 2018 to 2026

| | Real-Time | | Day-Ahead | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year (Jan - Jun) | Unit Hours Capped | MWh Capped | Unit Hours Capped | MWh Capped |
| 2018 | 0.18% | 0.32% | 0.13% | 0.25% |
| 2019 | 0.01% | 0.02% | 0.01% | 0.02% |
| 2020 | 0.01% | 0.01% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 2021 | 0.01% | 0.01% | 0.02% | 0.01% |
| 2022 | 0.04% | 0.08% | 0.05% | 0.09% |
| 2023 | 0.03% | 0.05% | 0.04% | 0.05% |
| 2024 | 0.12% | 0.25% | 0.16% | 0.27% |
| 2025 | 0.06% | 0.13% | 0.14% | 0.27% |
| 2026 | 0.06% | 0.16% | 0.08% | 0.20% |

Table 3-115 presents data on the frequency with which units were offer capped in the first six months of 2025 and 2026 as a result of failing the TPS test to provide energy for constraint relief in the real-time energy market, or for reliability reasons.

### Table 3-115 Real-time offer capped unit statistics: January through June, 2025 and 2026


| | | Offer-Capped Hours | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Run Hours Offer-Capped, Percent Greater Than Or Equal To: | | Hours ≥ 500 | Hours ≥ 400 and < 500 | Hours ≥ 300 and < 400 | Hours ≥ 200 and < 300 | Hours ≥ 100 and < 200 | Hours ≥ 1 and < 100 |
| 90% | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 |
| 80% and < 90% | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| 75% and < 80% | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 70% and < 75% | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | 2026 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 60% and < 70% | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | 2026 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 50% and < 60% | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| | 2026 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 25% and < 50% | 2025 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 11 | 24 |
| | 2026 | 6 | 3 | 12 | 7 | 33 | 59 |
| 10% and < 25% | 2025 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 40 |
| | 2026 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 24 | 56 |

207 OA Schedule 1, Section 6.4.1.

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Figure 3-69 shows the frequency with which units were offer capped in the first six months of 2025 and 2026 for failing the TPS test to provide energy for constraint relief in the real-time energy market or for reliability reasons.

### Figure 3-69 Real-time offer capped unit statistics: January through June, 2025 and 2026




In response to FERC's request for Common Metrics for 2019 through 2022, which were published in FERC's 2023 Common Metrics Staff report, PJM filed a report stating that between 2019 and 2022 the percent of unit hours in the day-ahead energy market with active market power mitigation was between 78.8 and 100 percent, while the actual results were between 1.4 and 1.6 percent.[208] [209] PJM also reported that between 2019 and 2022, the percent of unit intervals in the real-time energy market with active market power mitigation was between 43.3 and 53.3 percent, while the actual results were between 1.0 and 1.7 percent. PJM's reported results were incorrect because PJM provided hours of mitigation instead of unit hours or unit intervals mitigated. In the day-ahead market, a mitigated unit hour is one unit mitigated for one hour. The denominator is all cleared units cleared for all hours. In the real-time market, a mitigated unit interval is one unit mitigated for one interval. The denominator is all cleared units for all intervals. For example, if there were 10 units running in a given hour in the day-ahead market, if one unit was mitigated for that hour, then the percent of unit hours mitigated would be 10 percent, but PJM defined the percent mitigated as 100 percent of the hour. The PJM filed report dramatically overstated the frequency of market power mitigation in the PJM energy market. The MMU has correctly reported this metric in the State of the Market Reports for 2002 and subsequent years. The MMU also reports the MWh subject to market power mitigation, which reflects the relative size of the units subject to market power mitigation.

208 See Common Performance Metrics, Docket No. AD19-16-000, PJM Compliance Filing, PJM Metrics Spreadsheet 2023 (April 17, 2023).

209 See 2023 Common Metrics: Performance Metrics for ISOs, RTOs, and Regions Outside ISOs and RTOs for the Reporting Period 2019 to 2022, FERC Staff Report (January 31, 2024), <https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_num=20240131-4000>.

## Markup Index

Markup is a summary measure of the degree to which a participant's offer behavior or conduct for individual units is competitive. When a seller makes a competitive offer, markup is zero. When a seller exercises market power in its offer, markup is positive. The degree of markup increases with the degree of market power. The markup index for each marginal unit is calculated as (Price – Cost)/Price.[210] The markup index is normalized and can vary from -1.00 when the offer price is less than the cost-based offer price, to 1.00 when the offer price is higher than the cost-based offer price. The markup index does not measure the impact of unit markup on total LMP. The dollar markup for a unit is the difference between price and cost.

## Real-Time Markup Index

Table 3-116 shows the average markup index of marginal units in the real-time energy market, by offer price category using unadjusted cost-based offers. Table 3-117 shows the average markup index of marginal units in the real-time energy market, by offer price category using adjusted cost-based offers. The unadjusted markup is the difference between the price-based offer

210 In order to normalize the index results (i.e., bound the results between +1.00 and -1.00) for comparison across both low and high cost units, the index is calculated as (Price – Cost)/Price when price is greater than cost, and (Price – Cost)/Cost when price is less than cost.



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and the cost-based offer including the 10 percent adder in the cost-based offer at the dispatch point on the offer curves. The adjusted markup is the difference between the price-based offer and the cost-based offer excluding the 10 percent adder from the cost-based offer. The adjusted markup is calculated for coal, gas and oil units because these units have consistently had price-based offers less than cost-based offers.[211] The markup is negative if the cost-based offer of the marginal unit is greater than its price-based offer at its operating point.

All generating units are allowed to add an additional 10 percent to their cost-based offer. The 10 percent adder was included prior to the implementation of PJM markets in 1999, based on the uncertainty of calculating the hourly operating costs of CTs under changing ambient conditions. The owners of coal units, facing competition, typically exclude the additional 10 percent from their actual offers. The owners of many gas fired and oil fired units also exclude the 10 percent adder. The introduction of hourly offers and intraday offer updates in November 2017 allows gas and oil generators to directly incorporate the impact of ambient temperature changes in fuel consumption in offers.

PJM implemented Fast Start Pricing on September 1, 2021. For all the fast start marginal units beginning on September 1, 2021, the markup includes markup in the incremental offer, markup in the amortized start up offer, and markup in the amortized no load offer.

Even the adjusted markup overestimates the negative markup because units facing increased competitive pressure have excluded both the 10 percent and components of operating and maintenance costs that are not short run marginal costs. The PJM Market rules permit the 10 percent adder and maintenance costs, which are not short run marginal costs, under the definition of cost-based offers. Actual market behavior reflects the fact that neither is part of a competitive offer and neither is a short run marginal cost.[212]

In the first six months of 2026, the average dollar markup of units with offer prices less than $10 was negative (-$2.87 per MWh) when using unadjusted cost-based offers. The average dollar markup of units with offer prices between $10 and $15 was negative (-$2.55 per MWh) when using unadjusted cost-based offers. Negative markup means the unit is offering to run at a price less than its cost-based offer, revealing a short run marginal cost that is less than the maximum allowable cost-based offer under the PJM Market Rules.

Some marginal units did have substantial markups. Among the units that were marginal in the first six months of 2026, 4.3 percent had offer prices above $150 per MWh. Using the unadjusted cost-based offers, the highest markup for any marginal unit in the first six months of 2026 was more than $900, and the highest markup in the first three months of 2025 was more than $900.

### Table 3-116 Real-time average marginal unit markup index (By offer price category unadjusted): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Offer Price Category | Average Markup Index | Average Dollar Markup | Frequency | Average Markup Index | Average Dollar Markup | Frequency |
| < $10 | (0.17) | ($4.27) | 20.1% | 0.08 | ($2.87) | 22.8% |
| $10 to $15 | (0.15) | ($2.68) | 5.2% | (0.13) | ($2.55) | 7.7% |
| $15 to $20 | (0.10) | ($2.39) | 10.3% | (0.08) | ($2.02) | 18.1% |
| $20 to $25 | (0.08) | ($2.17) | 18.2% | (0.08) | ($2.90) | 10.7% |
| $25 to $50 | (0.03) | ($2.01) | 33.5% | (0.04) | ($3.13) | 27.5% |
| $50 to $75 | 0.04 | ($0.18) | 6.1% | 0.02 | ($2.08) | 5.5% |
| $75 to $100 | 0.11 | $8.38 | 1.8% | 0.10 | $4.35 | 1.7% |
| $100 to $125 | 0.14 | $14.72 | 0.8% | 0.10 | $4.57 | 0.9% |
| $125 to $150 | 0.14 | $17.05 | 0.6% | 0.12 | $10.21 | 0.7% |
| >= $150 | 0.05 | $11.78 | 3.4% | 0.09 | $20.03 | 4.3% |
| All Offers | (0.06) | ($1.56) | 100.0% | (0.03) | ($1.46) | 100.0% |

211 The MMU will calculate adjusted markup for gas units also in future reports because gas units also more consistently have price-based offers less than cost-based offers.

212 See PJM. "Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines," Rev. 48 (July 15, 2026).

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Table 3-118 shows the percentage of marginal units that had markups, calculated using unadjusted cost-based offers, below, above and equal to zero for coal, gas and oil fuel types.[213]

### Table 3-117 Real-time average marginal unit markup index (By offer price category adjusted): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Offer Price Category | Average Markup Index | Average Dollar Markup | Frequency | Average Markup Index | Average Dollar Markup | Frequency |
| < $10 | (0.16) | ($3.99) | 20.1% | 0.08 | ($2.76) | 22.8% |
| $10 to $15 | (0.07) | ($1.46) | 5.2% | (0.06) | ($1.24) | 7.7% |
| $15 to $20 | (0.02) | ($0.75) | 10.3% | (0.01) | ($0.51) | 18.1% |
| $20 to $25 | (0.00) | ($0.20) | 18.2% | (0.01) | ($0.88) | 10.7% |
| $25 to $50 | 0.04 | $0.80 | 33.5% | 0.04 | ($0.35) | 27.5% |
| $50 to $75 | 0.10 | $4.15 | 6.1% | 0.09 | $2.58 | 5.5% |
| $75 to $100 | 0.17 | $13.70 | 1.8% | 0.16 | $10.28 | 1.7% |
| $100 to $125 | 0.19 | $20.74 | 0.8% | 0.15 | $11.59 | 0.9% |
| $125 to $150 | 0.19 | $24.59 | 0.6% | 0.17 | $18.81 | 0.7% |
| >= $150 | 0.12 | $32.66 | 3.4% | 0.16 | $39.61 | 4.3% |
| All Offers | 0.00 | $1.18 | 100.0% | 0.04 | $1.24 | 100.0% |

Table 3-119 shows the percentage of marginal units that had markups, calculated using adjusted cost-based offers, below, above and equal to zero for coal, gas and oil fuel types. In the first six months of 2026, using unadjusted cost-based offers for coal units, 55.33 percent of marginal coal units had negative markups. The share of marginal coal units with negative markups at the dispatch point on their offer curve increased from 48.49 percent in the first six months of 2025 to 55.33 percent in the first six months of 2026 when using unadjusted cost-based offers.

### Table 3-118 Percent of marginal units with markup below, above and equal to zero (By fuel type with unadjusted offers): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type/Fuel | Negative | Zero | Positive | Negative | Zero | Positive |
| Coal | 48.5% | 32.3% | 19.2% | 55.3% | 33.1% | 11.6% |
| Gas | 66.6% | 17.2% | 16.2% | 60.7% | 23.0% | 16.2% |
| Oil | 10.9% | 85.8% | 3.3% | 14.3% | 82.4% | 3.2% |

In the first six months of 2026, using adjusted cost-based offers for coal units, 41.27 percent of marginal coal units had negative markups.

### Table 3-119 Percent of marginal units with markup below, above and equal to zero (By fuel type with adjusted offers): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type/Fuel | Negative | Zero | Positive | Negative | Zero | Positive |
| Coal | 33.6% | 7.8% | 58.6% | 41.3% | 12.6% | 46.1% |
| Gas | 32.7% | 10.0% | 57.3% | 32.2% | 14.2% | 53.6% |
| Oil | 9.8% | 84.8% | 5.3% | 14.1% | 81.3% | 4.6% |

213 Other fuel types were excluded based on data confidentiality rules.



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Figure 3-70 shows the frequency distribution of hourly markups for all gas units offered in the first six months of 2025 and 2026 using unadjusted cost-based offers. The highest markup within the economic operating range of the unit's offer curve was used in the frequency distributions.[214] Of the gas units offered in the PJM market in the first six months of 2026, 17.3 percent of gas unit hours had a maximum markup that was negative and 27.2 percent of gas fired unit hours had a maximum markup above $100 per MWh. The share of offered gas units with maximum markup that was negative and the share of marginal gas units with negative markups at the dispatch point decreased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Figure 3-70 Frequency distribution of highest markup of gas units offered using unadjusted cost offers: January through June, 2025 and 2026





Figure 3-71 shows the frequency distribution of hourly markups for all coal units offered in the first six months of 2025 and the first six months of 2026 using unadjusted cost-based offers. Of the coal units offered in the PJM market in the first six months of 2026, 36.8 percent of coal unit hours had a maximum markup that was negative or equal to zero, increasing from 33.5 percent in the first six months of 2025. The share of offered coal units with maximum markup that was negative and the share of marginal coal units with negative markups at the dispatch point increased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Figure 3-71 Frequency distribution of highest markup of coal units offered using unadjusted cost offers: January through June, 2025 and 2026






Figure 3-72 shows the frequency distribution of hourly markups for all offered oil units in the first six months of 2025 and the first six months of 2026 using unadjusted cost-based offers. Of the oil units offered in the PJM market in the first six months of 2026, 38.4 percent of oil unit hours had a maximum markup that was negative or equal to zero and 3.1 percent of oil fired unit hours had a maximum markup above $100 per MWh.


214 The categories in the frequency distribution were chosen so as to maintain data confidentiality.

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### Figure 3-72 Frequency distribution of highest markup of oil units offered using unadjusted cost offers: January through June, 2025 and 2026




### Figure 3-73 Cumulative number of marginal unit intervals with markups above $150 per MWh: January 2025 through June 2026




The markup frequency distributions show that a significant proportion of units make price-based offers less than the cost-based offers permitted under the PJM market rules. This behavior means that competitive price-based offers reveal actual unit marginal costs and that PJM market rules permit the inclusion of costs in cost-based offers that are not short run marginal costs.

The markup behavior shown in the markup frequency distributions also shows that a substantial number of units were offered with high markups, consistent with the exercise of market power.

Figure 3-73 shows the number of marginal unit intervals in the first six months of 2026 and the first six months of 2025 with markup above $150 per MWh.

## Day-Ahead Markup Index

Table 3-120 shows the average markup index of marginal generating units in the day-ahead energy market, by offer price category using unadjusted cost-based offers.[215]

In the first six months of 2026, the average dollar markup of units with offer prices less than $10 was positive ($17.36 per MWh) when using unadjusted cost-based offers. The average dollar markup of units with offer prices between $10 and $15 was positive ($4.23 per MWh) when using unadjusted cost-based offers. Negative markup means the unit is offering to run at a price less than

215 The MMU identified an error in the marginal resource identification algorithm within the day ahead clearing optimization. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors and markup index require accurate identification of marginal resources. The error was fixed by the PJM software vendor in March 2025. The MMU was unable to calculate markup index for 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 due to the inaccurate identification of marginal resources.


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its cost-based offer, revealing a short run marginal cost that is less than the maximum allowable cost-based offer under the PJM Market Rules.

Some marginal units did have substantial markups. Among the units that were marginal in the first six months of 2026, 3.8 percent had offer prices above $150 per MWh when using unadjusted cost-based offers. Using the unadjusted cost-based offers, the highest markup for any marginal unit in the first six months of 2026 was more than $600 per MWh.

### Table 3-120 Average day-ahead marginal unit markup index (By offer price category, unadjusted): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offer Price Category | Average Markup Index | Average Dollar Markup | Frequency |
| < $10 | 10.71 | $17.36 | 16.0% |
| $10 to $15 | 0.45 | $4.23 | 6.3% |
| $15 to $20 | 0.13 | $1.47 | 16.0% |
| $20 to $25 | 0.09 | $1.15 | 11.9% |
| $25 to $50 | 0.06 | $1.09 | 37.5% |
| $50 to $75 | 0.18 | $10.13 | 5.2% |
| $75 to $100 | 0.15 | $13.23 | 1.8% |
| $100 to $125 | 0.25 | $27.07 | 0.9% |
| $125 to $150 | 0.22 | $28.48 | 0.6% |
| >= $150 | 0.11 | $25.98 | 3.8% |
| All Offers | 0.82 | $6.00 | 100.0% |

Table 3-121 shows the average markup index of marginal generating units in the day-ahead energy market, by offer price category using adjusted cost-based offers.

### Table 3-121 Average day-ahead marginal unit markup index (By offer price category, adjusted): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offer Price Category | Average Markup Index | Average Dollar Markup | Frequency |
| < $10 | 10.72 | $17.41 | 16.0% |
| $10 to $15 | 0.51 | $5.30 | 6.3% |
| $15 to $20 | 0.19 | $2.78 | 16.0% |
| $20 to $25 | 0.15 | $2.88 | 11.9% |
| $25 to $50 | 0.13 | $3.67 | 37.5% |
| $50 to $75 | 0.24 | $13.86 | 5.2% |
| $75 to $100 | 0.22 | $18.66 | 1.8% |
| $100 to $125 | 0.30 | $33.71 | 0.9% |
| $125 to $150 | 0.26 | $33.97 | 0.6% |
| >= $150 | 0.16 | $46.53 | 3.8% |
| All Offers | 0.88 | $8.62 | 100.0% |

## No Load and Start Cost Markup

Generator energy offers in PJM are comprised of three parts, an incremental energy offer curve, no load cost and start cost. In cost-based offers, all three parts are capped at the level allowed by Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, the Cost Development Guidelines (Manual 15) and fuel cost policies approved by PJM. In price-based offers, the incremental energy offer curve is capped at $1,000 per MWh (unless the verified cost-based offer exceeds $1,000 per MWh, but cannot exceed $2,000 per MWh). Generators are allowed to choose whether to use price-based or cost-based no load cost and start costs twice a year. If price-based is selected, the no load and start costs do not have a cap, but the offers cannot be changed for six months (April through September and October through March). If cost-based is selected, the cap is the same as the cap of the no load and start costs in the cost-based offers, and the offers can be updated daily or hourly based on changes in costs. Table 3-122 shows the caps on the three parts of cost-based and price-based offers.

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### Table 3-122 Cost-based and price-based offer caps

| Offer Type | No Load and Start Cost Option | Incremental Offer Curve Cap | No Load Cost Cap | Start Cost Cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost-Based | Cost-Based | Based on OA Schedule 2, Cost Development Guidelines (Manual 15) and Fuel Cost Policies | | |
| Price-Based | Cost-Based | $1,000/MWh or based on OA Schedule 2, Cost Development Guidelines (Manual 15) and Fuel Cost Policies if verified cost-based offer exceeds $1,000/MWh but no more than $2,000/MWh. | Based on OA Schedule 2, Cost Development Guidelines (Manual 15) and Fuel Cost Policies | Based on OA Schedule 2, Cost Development Guidelines (Manual 15) and Fuel Cost Policies |
| | Price-Based | | No cap but can only be changed twice a year. | No cap but can only be changed twice a year. |

Table 3-123 shows the number of units that chose the cost-based option and the price-based option. In the first six months of 2026, 90 percent of all generators that submitted no load or start costs chose to have cost-based no load and start costs in their price-based offers, the same percent as in the first six months of 2025.

### Table 3-123 Number of units selecting cost-based and price-based no load and start costs: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| No Load and Start Cost Option | 2025 (Jan -Jun) | | 2026 (Jan -Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of units | Percent | Number of units | Percent |
| Cost-Based | 466 | 90% | 459 | 90% |
| Price-Based | 51 | 10% | 50 | 10% |
| Total | 517 | 100% | 509 | 100% |

Generators can have positive or negative markups in their no load and start costs under the price-based option. Generators cannot have positive markups in no load and start costs when they select the cost-based option. Table 3-124 shows the average markup in the no load and start costs in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Generators that selected the cost-based start and no load option offered on average with a negative markup on the no load cost and a negative markup on the start costs. The price-based offers were lower than the cost-based offers. In the first six months of 2026, generators that selected the price-based start and no load option offered on average with a negative markup on the no load cost and with very large positive markups on the start costs.

### Table 3-124 No load and start cost markup: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Period | No Load and Start Cost Option | No Load Cost | Cold Start Cost | Intermediate Start Cost | Hot Start Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 (Jan -Jun) | Cost-Based | (14%) | (5%) | (6%) | (7%) |
| | Price-Based | 25% | 140% | 125% | 125% |
| 2026 (Jan -Jun) | Cost-Based | (12%) | (5%) | (6%) | (6%) |
| | Price-Based | (34%) | 78% | 71% | 74% |

## Energy Market Cost-Based Offers

The application of market power mitigation rules in the day-ahead energy market and the real-time energy market helps ensure competitive market outcomes even in the presence of structural market power.

Cost-based offers in PJM affect all aspects of the PJM energy market. Cost-based offers affect prices when units are committed and dispatched on their cost-based offers. In the first six months of 2026, 14.5 percent of the marginal units set prices based on cost-based offers, 4.5 percentage points higher than in the first six months of 2025.

The efficacy of market power mitigation rules depends on the definition of a competitive offer. A competitive offer is equal to short run marginal costs. The enforcement of market power mitigation rules is undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. The significance of competition metrics like markup is also undermined if the definition of a competitive offer is not correct. The definition of a competitive offer in the PJM market rules is not correct. Some unit owners include costs that are not short run marginal costs in offers, including maintenance costs. The market rules allow these overstated cost-based offers. This issue can be resolved by simple changes to the PJM market rules to incorporate a clear and accurate definition of short run marginal costs.


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The efficacy of market power mitigation rules also depends on the accuracy of cost-based offers. Some unit owners use fuel cost policies that are not algorithmic, verifiable, and systematic. These inadequate fuel cost policies permit overstated fuel costs in cost-based offers.

When market power mitigation is not effective due to inaccurate cost-based offers that exceed short run marginal costs, market power causes increases in market prices above the competitive level.

## Short Run Marginal Costs

Short run marginal costs are the only costs relevant to competitive offers in the energy market. Specifically, the competitive energy offer level is the short run marginal cost of production. The current PJM market rules distinguish costs includable in cost-based energy offers from costs includable in cost-based capacity market offers based on whether costs are "directly related to energy production." The rules do not provide a clear standard. Energy production is the sole purpose of a power plant. Therefore, all costs, including the sunk costs, are directly related to energy production. This current ambiguous criterion is incorrect and allows for multiple interpretations, which could lead to tariff violations. The incorrect rules lead to higher energy market prices and higher uplift.

There are three types of costs identified in PJM rules as of April 15, 2019: variable costs, avoidable costs, and fixed costs. The criterion for whether a generator may include a cost in an energy market cost-based offer, a variable cost, is that the cost is "directly related to electric production."[216]

Variable costs, as defined in the PJM rules, are comprised of short run marginal costs and avoidable costs that are directly related to electric production. Short run marginal costs are the cost of inputs consumed or converted to produce energy, and the costs associated with byproducts that result from consuming or converting materials to produce energy, net of any revenues from the sale of those byproducts. The categories of short run marginal costs are fuel costs, emission allowance costs, operating costs, and energy market opportunity costs.[217]

216 See 167 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2019).
217 See OA Schedule 2 § 1.1(a).

Avoidable costs are annual costs that would be avoided if energy were not produced over an annual period. The PJM rules divide avoidable costs into those that are directly related to electric production and those not directly related to electric production. The distinction is ambiguous at best. PJM includes overhaul and maintenance costs, replacement of obsolete equipment, and overtime staffing costs in costs related to electric production. PJM includes taxes, preventative maintenance to auxiliary equipment, improvement of working equipment, maintenance expenses triggered by a time milestone (e.g. annual, weekly) and pipeline reservation charges in costs not related to electric production.

Fixed costs are costs associated with an investment in a facility including the return on and of capital.

The MMU recommends that PJM require that the level of costs includable in cost-based offers in the energy market not exceed the unit's short run marginal cost.

## Fuel Cost Policies

Fuel cost policies (FCP) document the process by which market sellers calculate the fuel cost component of their cost-based offers. Short run marginal fuel costs include commodity costs, transportation costs, fees, and taxes for the purchase of fuel.

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## Fuel Cost Policy Review

Table 3-125 shows the status of all fuel cost policies (FCP). As of June 30, 2026, 717 units (92 percent) had an FCP passed by the MMU and 64 units (eight percent) had an FCP failed by the MMU. The units with fuel cost policies failed by the MMU represented 15,465 MW. All units' FCPs were approved by PJM. As of June 30, 2026, 635 units did not have FCPs. Units without FCPs cannot submit nonzero cost-based offers, unless they use the temporary cost method.[218]

### Table 3-125 FCP Status for PJM generating units: June 30, 2026

| | MMU Status | | | | Units without |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PJM Status | Pass | Submitted | Fail | Total | FCPs |
| Approved | 717 | 0 | 64 | 781 | |
| Rejected | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Under Review | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Customer Input Required | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Submitted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Total | 717 | 0 | 64 | 781 | 635 |

The MMU performed a detailed review of every FCP. PJM approved the FCPs that the MMU passed. PJM approved every FCP failed by the MMU.

The standards for the MMU's market power evaluation are that FCPs be algorithmic, verifiable and systematic, accurately reflecting the short run marginal cost of producing energy. In its filings with FERC, PJM agreed with the MMU that FCPs should be verifiable and systematic.[219] Verifiable means that the FCP requires a market seller to provide a fuel price that can be calculated by the MMU after the fact with the same data available to the market seller at the time the decision was made, and documentation for that data from a public or a private source. Systematic means that the FCP must document a clearly defined quantitative method or methods for calculating fuel costs, including objective triggers for each method.[220] PJM and FERC did not agree that fuel cost policies should be algorithmic, although PJM's standard effectively requires algorithmic fuel cost policies by describing the requirements.[221] Algorithmic means that the FCP must use a set of defined, logical steps, analogous to a recipe, to calculate the fuel costs. These steps may be as simple as a single number from a contract, a simple average of broker quotes, a simple average of bilateral offers, or the weighted average index price posted on the Intercontinental Exchange trading platform ('ICE').[222]

FCPs are not verifiable and systematic if they are not algorithmic. The natural gas FCPs failed by the MMU and approved by PJM are not verifiable and systematic.

Not all FCPs approved by PJM met the standard of the PJM tariff. The tariff standards that some fuel cost policies did not meet are: accuracy (reflect applicable costs accurately); and fuel contracts (reflect the market seller's applicable commodity and/or transportation contracts where it holds such contracts). [223]

The MMU failed FCPs not related to natural gas submitted by some market sellers because they do not accurately describe the short run marginal cost of fuel. Some policies include contractual terms (in dollars per MWh or in dollars per MMBtu) that do not reflect the actual cost of fuel. The MMU determined that the terms used in these policies do not reflect the cost of fuel based on the information provided by the market sellers and information gathered by the MMU for similar units.

The MMU failed the remaining FCPs because they do not accurately reflect the cost of natural gas. The main issues identified by the MMU in the natural gas policies were the use of available market information that results in inaccurate and overstated expected costs. Overstated costs permit the exercise of market power.

Some of the failed fuel cost policies include the use of available market information that results in inaccurate expected costs because the information does not represent a cleared market price. Some market sellers include the use of offers to sell natural gas on ICE as the sole basis for the cost of natural gas. An offer to sell is not a market clearing price and is not an accurate

218 See OA Schedule 2 § 2.1.
219 Answer of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Protests and Comments, Docket No. ER16-372-002 (October 7, 2016) at P 11 ("October 7th Filing").
220 Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER16-372-002 (September 16, 2016) at P 8 ("September 16th Filing").
221 October 7th Filing at P12; 158 FERC ¶ 61,133 at P 57 (2017).
222 September 16th Filing at P 8.
223 See PJM Operating Agreement Schedule 2 § 2.3 (a).


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indication of the expected fuel cost. The price of uncleared offers on the exchange generally exceeds the price of cleared transactions, often by a wide margin. Use of sell offers alone is equivalent to using the supply curve alone to determine the market price of a good without considering the demand curve. It is clearly incorrect.

The FCPs that failed the MMU's evaluation also fail to meet the standards defined in the PJM tariff. PJM should not have approved noncompliant fuel cost policies. The MMU recommends that PJM require that all fuel cost policies be algorithmic, verifiable, and systematic.

Units are required to have an approved fuel cost policy before they can submit nonzero cost-based offers or request from PJM the use of a temporary cost method. The temporary cost offer method allows units to submit nonzero cost-based offers without an approved fuel cost policy if they follow the temporary cost offer method. The use of the method results in cost-based offers that do not follow the fuel cost policy rules. The approach significantly weakens market power mitigation by allowing market sellers to make offers without an approved fuel cost policy, allowing the use of an inaccurate and unsupported fuel cost calculation in place of an accurate fuel cost policy.

The MMU recommends that the temporary cost method be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to have an approved fuel cost policy.

## Cost-Based Offer Penalties

Market sellers are assessed penalties when they submit cost-based offers that do not comply with Schedule 2 of the PJM Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15.[224] Penalties are assessed when both PJM and the MMU are in agreement.

In the first six months of 2026, 57 penalty cases were identified, 21 have been assessed cost-based offer penalties and 36 remain pending. These cases were for 45 units owned by 10 different companies. Table 3-126 shows the penalties by the year in which participants were notified.

### Table 3-126 Cost-based offer penalty cases by year notified: May 2017 through June 2026

| Year notified | Cases | Assessed penalties | Self Identified | MMU and PJM Disagreement | Pending cases | Number of units impacted | Number of companies impacted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2017** | **57** | **56** | **0** | **1** | **0** | **55** | **16** |
| 2018 | 187 | 161 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 138 | 35 |
| 2019 | 57 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 57 | 19 |
| 2020 | 142 | 137 | 24 | 5 | 0 | 124 | 25 |
| 2021 | 129 | 124 | 42 | 5 | 0 | 124 | 21 |
| 2022 | 116 | 116 | 51 | 0 | 0 | 110 | 20 |
| 2023 | 65 | 65 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 61 | 18 |
| 2024 | 77 | 77 | 39 | 0 | 0 | 67 | 21 |
| 2025 | 41 | 41 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 19 |
| 2026 | 57 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 36 | 45 | 10 |
| Total | 928 | 855 | 183 | 37 | 36 | 530 | 89 |

224 See OA Schedule 2 § 6.

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Since 2017 through June 2026, of the 928 penalty cases, 855 resulted in assessed cost-based offer penalties, 37 resulted in disagreement between the MMU and PJM and 37 remain pending. A total of 183 were self identified by market sellers. The 855 cases were from 530 units owned by 89 different companies. The total penalties were $7.3 million, charged to units that totaled 173,295 available MW. The average penalty was $1.85 per available MW. This means that a 100 MW unit would have paid a penalty of $4,440.[225] There is no link between the increased costs to the market that result from a penalized fuel cost policy and the amount of the penalty. The increased costs to the market can exceed the penalty payment and the reverse can also be true. Table 3-127 shows the total cost-based offer penalties since 2017 by year. The increase in the average penalty in the first six months of 2026 was the result of violations that occurred during Winter Storm Fern, a period with high LMPs. Cost-based offer penalties are a function of real-time LMPs.

**Table 3-127 Cost-based offer penalties by year: May 2017 through June 2026**

| Year | Number of units | Number of companies | Penalties | Average Available Capacity Charged (MW) | Average Penalty ($/MW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 92 | 21 | $556,826 | 16,930 | $1.56 |
| 2018 | 127 | 33 | $1,242,102 | 25,743 | $2.28 |
| 2019 | 73 | 23 | $378,245 | 15,073 | $1.14 |
| 2020 | 140 | 28 | $407,283 | 21,908 | $0.85 |
| 2021 | 125 | 27 | $753,463 | 24,808 | $1.31 |
| 2022 | 123 | 22 | $1,613,621 | 24,385 | $2.76 |
| 2023 | 61 | 15 | $333,948 | 10,383 | $1.33 |
| 2024 | 79 | 21 | $549,736 | 21,900 | $1.05 |
| 2025 | 41 | 19 | $216,648 | 7,854 | $1.18 |
| 2026 | 21 | 8 | $1,235,711 | 4,311 | $11.94 |
| Total | 882 | 79 | $7,287,582 | 173,295 | $1.85 |

The incorrect cost-based offers resulted from incorrect application of fuel cost policies, lack of approved fuel cost policies, fuel cost policy violations, miscalculation of no load costs, inclusion of prohibited maintenance costs, use of incorrect incremental heat rates, use of incorrect start cost, and use of incorrect emission costs.

225 Cost-based offer penalties are assessed by hour. Therefore, a $1 per available MW penalty results in a total of $24 for a 1 MW unit if the violation is for the entire day.

Penalties do not apply when PJM determines that an unforeseen event hindered the market seller's ability to submit a compliant cost-based offer. This allows market sellers to not follow their fuel cost policy, submit cost-based offers that are not verifiable or systematic and not face any penalties for doing so. This practice is inappropriate and should stop.

The MMU recommends that the penalty exemption provision be removed and that all units that submit nonzero cost-based offers be required to follow their approved fuel cost policy.

## Cost Development Guidelines

The Cost Development Guidelines contained in PJM Manual 15 do not clearly or accurately describe the short run marginal cost of generation. The MMU recommends that PJM Manual 15 be replaced or updated with a straightforward description of the components of cost-based offers based on short run marginal costs and the correct calculation of cost-based offers for thermal resources. In 2022, PJM made updates recommended by the MMU to Manual 15 to add straightforward descriptions for some of the most essential cost offer calculations.[226]

### Variable Operating and Maintenance Costs

PJM Manual 15 and the PJM Operating Agreement Schedule 2 include rules related to VOM costs. On October 29, 2018, PJM filed tariff revisions changing the rules related to VOM costs.[227] The changes proposed by PJM attempted but failed to clarify the rules. The proposed rules defined all costs directly related to electricity production as includable in cost-based offers. This also included the long term maintenance costs of combined cycles and combustion turbines, which had been explicitly excluded in PJM Manual 15.

On April 15, 2019, FERC accepted PJM's filing, subject to revisions requested by FERC.[228] On October 28, 2019, FERC issued a final order accepting PJM's compliance filing.[229] Regardless of the changes, the rules remain unclear

226 See PJM Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines, Revision 48 (July 15, 2026).
227 See PJM Interconnection Maintenance Adder Revisions to the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement, L.L.C., Docket No. EL19-8-000.
228 167 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2019).
229 168 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2019).


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and are now inconsistent with economic theory and effective market power mitigation and competitive market results.

Maintenance costs are not short run marginal costs. Generators perform maintenance during outages. Generators do not perform maintenance in the short run, while operating the generating unit. Generators do not perform maintenance in real time to increase the output of a unit. Some maintenance costs are correlated with the historic operation of a generator. Correlation between operating hours or starts and maintenance expenditures over a long run, multiyear time frame does not indicate the necessity of any specific maintenance expenditure to produce power in the short run.

A generating unit does not consume a defined amount of maintenance parts and labor in order to start. A generating unit does not consume a defined amount of maintenance parts and labor in order to produce an additional MWh. Maintenance events do not occur in the short run. The company cannot optimize its maintenance costs in the short run.

PJM allows for the calculation of VOM costs in dollars per MWh, dollars per MMBtu, dollars per run hour, dollars per equivalent operating hour (EOH) and dollars per start. The MMU converted all VOM costs into dollars per MWh using the units' heat rates, the average economic maximum and average minimum run time of the units in 2024.

Table 3-128 shows the average VOM by unit type. The VOM equals the sum of variable operating cost, major maintenance adder and minor maintenance adder as submitted by market participants.[230]

### Table 3-128 Effective VOM costs in dollars per MWh in 2025

| Unit Type | VOM ($/MWh) |
|---|---|
| Combined Cycles | $3.18 |
| Combustion Turbines and RICE | $21.98 |
| Gas/Oil Steam Turbines | $11.51 |
| Coal | $6.67 |

230 PJM reviews and approved VOM adders yearly. The effective VOM costs in dollars per MWh reflect the latest approved VOM adders. The values are updated once PJM finishes its annual VOM review process.

The level of costs accepted by PJM for inclusion in VOM depends on PJM's interpretation of the maintenance activities or expenses directly related to electricity production and the level of detailed support provided by market sellers to PJM.

PJM's VOM review is not adequate to determine whether all costs included in VOM are compliant. PJM's VOM review focuses only on the expenses submitted for the last year of up to 20 years of data. For example, a market seller can provide data from ten years ago without any supporting documentation as long as the data from the current year has documentation. PJM's review is dependent on the level of detail provided by the market seller. As a result of questions raised by the MMU, PJM now requires more details from market sellers, which has led to the appropriate exclusion of expenses that were previously included.[231]

The flaws in PJM's review process for VOM are compounded by the ambiguity in the criteria used to determine if costs are includable. PJM's definition of allowable costs for cost-based offers, "costs resulting from electric production," is so broad as to be meaningless. Most costs incurred at a generating station result from electric production in one way or another. The generator itself would not exist but for the need for electric production. PJM's broad definition cannot identify which costs associated with electric production are includable in cost-based offers. The definition is not verifiable or systematic and permits wide discretion by PJM and generators.

On February 17, 2023, PJM filed tariff revisions changing the rules related to VOM costs. The changes included separating maintenance expenses into major and minor maintenance, allowing the use of default adders for minor maintenance and operating costs and eliminating the annual review requirement for units that choose to use default adders. The proposal, that included the tariff changes, also included Manual 15 changes that introduced additional documentation requirements. Regarding maintenance expenses, market participants will be required to provide all supporting documentation for all expenses submitted, regardless of year. Regarding operating expenses,

231 See "Maintenance Adder & Operating Cost Submission Process," 55-57 PJM presentation to the Tech Change Forum. (April 21, 2020) <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/forums/tech-change/2020/20200421-special/20200421-item-01-maintenance-adder-and-operating-cost-submission-process.ashx>

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market participants will be required to provide the amount of consumables used during operation and the cost per unit of each consumable. [232] On April 18, 2023, FERC accepted PJM's filing. Table 3-129 shows the default adders for operating cost and minor maintenance.

**Table 3-129 Default operating cost and minor maintenance adder: 2025**

| Unit Type | Operating Cost ($/MWh) | Minor Maintenance Cost ($/MWh) |
|---|---|---|
| Combined Cycle | 0.49 | 1.21 |
| Combustion Turbine | 0.92 | 4.43 |
| Reciprocating Engine | 2.00 | 4.97 |
| Steam Turbine | 3.54 | 2.11 |

The MMU recommended that market participants be required to document the amount and cost of consumables used when operating in order to verify that the total operating cost is consistent with the total quantity used and the unit characteristics. The revisions to Manual 15 based on the February 17, 2023, filing included this requirement.

The MMU recommends, given that maintenance costs are currently allowed in cost-based offers, that market participants be permitted to include only variable maintenance costs, linked to verifiable operational events and that can be supported by clear and unambiguous documentation of operational data (e.g. run hours, MWh, MMBtu) that support the maintenance cycle of the equipment being serviced/replaced. The revisions to Manual 15 based on the February 17, 2023, filing partially included this requirement. Even though Manual 15 requires maintenance expenses to be the result of operating hours, starts or a combination of the two, the expenses are not tied to a maintenance cycle. Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish between maintenance that resulted from operating the resource versus maintenance from normal wear and tear.

The MMU understands that companies have different document retention policies but in order to be allowed to include maintenance costs, such costs must be verified, and they cannot be verified without documentation. Supporting documentation includes internal financial records, maintenance project documents, invoices, and contracts. Market participants should be required to provide the operational data (e.g. run hours, MWh, MMBtu) that supports the maintenance cycle of the equipment being serviced/replaced. For example, if equipment is serviced every 5,000 run hours, the market participant must include at least 5,000 run hours of historical operation in its maintenance cost history.

### FERC System of Accounts

PJM Manual 15 relies on the FERC System of Accounts, which predates markets and does not define costs consistent with market economics. Market sellers should not rely solely on the FERC System of Accounts for the calculation of their variable operating and maintenance costs. The FERC System of Accounts does not differentiate between short run marginal costs and avoidable costs. The FERC System of Accounts does not differentiate between costs directly related to energy production and costs not directly related to energy production. Reliance on the FERC System of Accounts for the calculation of variable operating and maintenance costs is likely to lead to incorrect, overstated costs.

The MMU recommends removal of all references to and reliance on the FERC System of Accounts in PJM Manual 15.

### Cyclic Starting and Peaking Factors

The use of cyclic starting and peaking factors for calculating VOM costs for combined cycles and combustion turbines is designed to allocate a greater proportion of long term maintenance costs to starts and the tail block of the incremental offer curve. The use of such factors is not appropriate given that long term maintenance costs are not short run marginal costs and should not be included in cost offers. PJM Manual 15 allows for a peaking cyclic factor of three, which means that a unit with a $300 per hour (EOH) VOM cost can add $180 per MWh to a 5 MW peak segment.[233]

The MMU recommends the removal of all cyclic starting and peaking factors from PJM Manual 15.

232 See PJM Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines, Revision 48 (July 15, 2026).

233 The peak adder is equal to $300 times three divided by 5 MW.



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## Labor Costs

PJM Manual 15 allows for the inclusion of plant staffing costs in energy market cost offers. This is inappropriate given that labor costs are not short run marginal costs.

The MMU recommends the removal of all labor costs from the PJM Manual 15. On December 2, 2022, PJM filed tariff changes removing labor costs from cost-based offers. The changes were approved by the Commission on January 10, 2023 and became effective on June 1, 2023.[234]

## Combined Cycle Start Heat Input Definition

PJM Manual 15 defines the start heat input of combined cycles as the amount of fuel used from the firing of the first combustion turbine to the close of the steam turbine breaker plus any fuel used by other combustion turbines in the combined cycle from firing to the point at which the HRSG steam pressure matches the steam turbine steam pressure. This definition is inappropriate given that after each combustion turbine is synchronized, some of the fuel is used to produce energy for which the unit is compensated in the energy market. To account for this, PJM Manual 15 requires reducing the station service MWh used during the start sequence by the output in MWh produced by each combustion turbine after synchronization and before the HRSG steam pressure matches the steam turbine steam pressure. The formula and the language in this definition are not appropriate and are unclear.

The MMU recommended changing the definition of the start heat input for combined cycles to include only the amount of fuel used from firing each combustion turbine in the combined cycle to the breaker close of each combustion turbine. This change will make the treatment of combined cycles consistent with steam turbines. Exceptions to this definition should be granted when the amount of fuel used from synchronization to steam turbine breaker close is greater than the no load heat plus the output during this period times the incremental heat rate.

In 2022, the MMU and PJM proposed changing the start cost definition of units with a steam process to include the costs from the beginning of the start sequence to dispatchable.[235] The new definition included what is commonly consider soak costs in the start cost. The new definition was combined with the elimination of make whole payments to units with a steam process for MW produced before the unit becomes dispatchable. The proposal was approved by the Commission on January 10, 2023 and became effective on June 1, 2023.[236]

Even though the MMU developed and supported the new definition, it is important to recognize that this approach should be temporary until PJM implements an approach that reflects soak time, soak costs and soak energy output. The main shortcoming of the new definition is that PJM models do not properly value the energy produced during the soak process (soak energy output). Instead, the proposal simply assumes that such MWh are valued at PJM's station service rate. The ideal solution is to model start costs and soak costs separately since there are revenues associated with the MWh produced during soaking, while during the start process there are no MWh being injected into the grid.

The MMU recommends that soak costs, soak time and the MWh produced during soaking be modeled separately. This will ensure that the time required for units to reach a dispatchable level is known and used in the unit commitment process instead of only being communicated verbally between dispatchers and generators. Separating soak costs from start costs and modeling the MWh produced during soaking allows for a better representation of the costs because it eliminates the need to simply assume the price paid for those MWh.

## Nuclear Costs

The fuel costs for nuclear plants are fixed in the short run and amortized over the period between refueling outages. The short run marginal cost of fuel for nuclear plants is zero. Operations and maintenance costs for nuclear power plants consist primarily of labor and maintenance costs incurred during outages, which are also fixed in the short run.

234 *See* Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. ER23-557-000 (January 10, 2023) at 1.

235 *See* "Start Cost Alternate Proposal," MMU presentation to the Cost Development Subcommittee. (December 2, 2021) <20211202-item-06-start-cost-alternate-proposal.ashx>.

236 *See* Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. ER23-557-000 (January 10, 2023) at 1.

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The MMU recommends the removal of nuclear fuel and nonfuel operations and maintenance costs that are not short run marginal costs from the PJM Manual 15.

### Pumped Hydro Costs

The calculation of pumped hydro costs for energy storage in Section 7.3 of PJM Manual 15 is inaccurate. The mathematical formulation does not take into account the purchase of power for pumping in the day-ahead market.

The MMU recommends revising the pumped hydro fuel cost calculation to include day-ahead and real-time power purchases.

### Gas Pipeline Penalties

Section 2.2.2 of PJM Manual 15 states that gas pipeline penalties are not includable in cost-based offers. Penalties can be incurred by units for many reasons, for example, withdrawing gas not nominated and deviating from an imposed threshold during an operational flow order. Any unit with cost-based offers that include gas pipeline penalties will be subject to penalties per Schedule 2 of the PJM Operating Agreement.

Many Market Sellers rely on independent third party quotes to estimate or determine the gas spot price. The quotes received from these third parties should not be based on incurring gas pipeline penalties. It is recommended that Market Sellers confirm with their third parties that gas is available to them without the need to incur gas pipeline penalties. If that is not possible, the units should be unavailable until the third party can confirm that gas is available without incurring penalties.

## Frequently Mitigated Units (FMU) and Associated Units (AU)

The rules for determining the qualification of a unit as an FMU or AU became effective November 1, 2014. The number of units that were eligible for an FMU or AU adder declined from an average of 70 units during the first 11 months of 2014, to zero units eligible for an FMU or AU adder for the period between December 2014 and August 2019.[237] One unit qualified for an FMU adder for the months of September and October, 2019. In 2020, five units qualified for an FMU adder in at least one month. In 2021, one unit qualified for an FMU adder in January. In 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 no units qualified for an FMU adder. In the first six months of 2026, no units qualified for an FMU adder

237 For a definition of FMUs and AUs, and for historical FMU/AU results, see the *2018 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 3, Energy Market, at Frequently Mitigated Units (FMU) and Associated Units (AU).



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Table 3-130 shows, by month, the number of FMUs and AUs from January 2021 through June 2026. For example, in January 2021, there were zero units that qualified as an FMU or AU in Tier 1, one unit qualified as an FMU or AU in Tier 2, and zero units qualified as an FMU or AU in Tier 3.

## Table 3-130 Number of frequently mitigated units and associated units (By month): January 2021 through June 2026

| | 2012 | | | | 2013 | | | | 2014 | | | | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | | 2017 | | | | 2018 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder |
| January | 26 | 21 | 52 | 99 | 18 | 17 | 10 | 45 | 7 | 27 | 49 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| February | 26 | 22 | 47 | 95 | 18 | 11 | 12 | 41 | 13 | 17 | 48 | 78 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| March | 25 | 17 | 47 | 89 | 18 | 8 | 12 | 38 | 30 | 18 | 33 | 81 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| April | 23 | 17 | 46 | 86 | 16 | 5 | 15 | 36 | 30 | 20 | 29 | 79 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May | 23 | 14 | 47 | 84 | 11 | 5 | 15 | 31 | 36 | 19 | 23 | 78 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| June | 22 | 13 | 48 | 83 | 24 | 8 | 12 | 44 | 38 | 18 | 21 | 77 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| July | 25 | 11 | 50 | 86 | 19 | 15 | 19 | 53 | 27 | 13 | 23 | 63 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| August | 25 | 23 | 43 | 91 | 14 | 25 | 20 | 59 | 37 | 15 | 19 | 71 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| September | 17 | 6 | 33 | 56 | 11 | 22 | 31 | 64 | 22 | 13 | 20 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| October | 10 | 18 | 14 | 42 | 19 | 26 | 38 | 83 | 16 | 11 | 19 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| November | 9 | 21 | 10 | 40 | 10 | 29 | 49 | 88 | 25 | 15 | 15 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| December | 14 | 17 | 10 | 41 | 10 | 31 | 40 | 81 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Cont'd

| | 2019 | | | | 2020 | | | | 2021 | | | | 2022 | | | | 2023 | | | | 2024 | | | | 2025 | | | | 2026 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | Total Eligible for Any Adder |
| January | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| February | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| March | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| April | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| June | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| July | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| August | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| September | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| October | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| November | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| December | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | |

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The MMU recommends the elimination of FMU and AU adders. FMU and AU adders no longer serve the purpose for which they were created and interfere with the efficient operation of PJM markets.

# Market Performance

## Ownership of Marginal Resources

Table 3-131 shows the contribution to real-time, load-weighted LMP by individual marginal resource owners.[238] The contribution of each marginal resource to price at each load bus is calculated for each five minute interval of first six months of 2026, and summed by the parent company that offers the marginal resource into the real-time energy market. In the first six months of 2026, the offers of one company resulted in 9.1 percent of the real-time load-weighted PJM system LMP and the offers of the top four companies resulted in 32.7 percent of the real-time load-weighted average PJM system LMP. In the first six months of 2026, the offers of one company resulted in 8.8 percent of the peak hour real-time load-weighted PJM system LMP.

**Table 3-131 Marginal unit contribution to real-time load-weighted LMP (By parent company): January through June, 2025 and 2026**


| 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Hours | | | Peak Hours | | | All Hours | | | Peak Hours | | |
| Company | Percent of Price | Cumulative Percent | Company | Percent of Price | Cumulative Percent | Company | Percent of Price | Cumulative Percent | Company | Percent of Price | Cumulative Percent |
| 1 | 16.3% | 16.3% | 1 | 14.8% | 14.8% | 1 | 9.1% | 9.1% | 1 | 8.8% | 8.8% |
| 2 | 10.8% | 27.1% | 2 | 9.6% | 24.4% | 2 | 8.8% | 17.9% | 2 | 8.7% | 17.6% |
| 3 | 9.0% | 36.0% | 3 | 9.2% | 33.5% | 3 | 8.8% | 26.7% | 3 | 7.3% | 24.9% |
| 4 | 5.9% | 41.9% | 4 | 6.0% | 39.5% | 4 | 6.0% | 32.7% | 4 | 6.2% | 31.1% |
| 5 | 5.8% | 47.7% | 5 | 5.3% | 44.8% | 5 | 5.9% | 38.6% | 5 | 6.0% | 37.1% |
| 6 | 5.6% | 53.3% | 6 | 5.1% | 50.0% | 6 | 5.3% | 43.9% | 6 | 5.4% | 42.6% |
| 7 | 4.0% | 57.3% | 7 | 4.5% | 54.5% | 7 | 4.7% | 48.6% | 7 | 5.3% | 47.8% |
| 8 | 3.8% | 61.1% | 8 | 4.0% | 58.4% | 8 | 4.7% | 53.3% | 8 | 4.2% | 52.0% |
| 9 | 3.8% | 64.9% | 9 | 3.8% | 62.3% | 9 | 4.5% | 57.8% | 9 | 4.1% | 56.1% |
| Other (91 companies) | 35.1% | 100.0% | Other (88 companies) | 37.7% | 100.0% | Other (95 companies) | 42.2% | 100.0% | Other (94 companies) | 43.9% | 100.0% |

238 See the *MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, at "Calculation and Use of Generator Sensitivity/Unit Participation Factors."


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Figure 3-74 shows the marginal unit contribution to the real-time load-weighted PJM system LMP summed by parent companies for the first six months of every year since 2012.

**Figure 3-74 Marginal unit contribution to real-time load-weighted LMP (By parent company): January through June, 2012 through 2026**




## Markup

The markup index is a measure of the competitiveness of participant behavior for individual units. The markup in dollars is a measure of the impact of participant behavior on the generator bus market price when a unit is marginal. As an example, if unit A has a $90 cost and a $100 price, while unit B has a $9 cost and a $10 price, both would show a markup index of 10 percent, but the price impact of unit A's markup at the generator bus would be $10 while the price impact of unit B's markup at the generator bus would be $1. Depending on each unit's location on the transmission system, those bus level impacts could also have different impacts on total system price. Markup can also affect prices when units with markups are not marginal by altering the economic dispatch order of supply.

The MMU calculates an explicit measure of the impact of marginal unit incremental energy offer markups on LMP using the mathematical relationships among LMPs in the market solution.[239] The markup impact calculation sums, over all marginal units, the product of the dollar markup of the unit and the marginal impact of the unit's offer on the system load-weighted LMP. The markup impact includes the impact of the identified markup behavior of all marginal units. Positive and negative markup impacts may offset one another. The markup analysis is a direct measure of market performance. It does not take into account whether or not marginal units have either locational or aggregate structural market power.

The markup calculation is not based on a counterfactual redispatch of the system to determine the marginal units and their marginal costs that would have occurred if all units had made all offers at short run marginal cost. A full redispatch analysis is practically impossible and a limited redispatch analysis would not be dispositive. Nonetheless, such a hypothetical counterfactual analysis would reveal the extent to which the actual system dispatch is less than competitive if it showed a difference between dispatch based on short run marginal cost and actual dispatch. It is possible that the unit specific markup, based on a redispatch analysis, would be lower than the markup component of price if the reference point were an inframarginal unit with a lower price and a higher cost than the actual marginal unit. If the actual marginal unit has short run marginal costs that would cause it to be inframarginal, a new unit would be marginal. If the offer of that new unit were greater than the cost of the original marginal unit, the markup impact would be lower than the MMU measure. If the newly marginal unit is on a price-based schedule, the analysis would have to capture the markup impact of that unit as well.

239 The MMU calculates the impact on system prices of marginal unit price-cost markup, based on analysis using sensitivity factors. The calculation shows the markup component of LMP based on a comparison between the price-based incremental energy offer and the cost-based incremental energy offer of each actual marginal unit on the system. This is the same method used to calculate the fuel cost adjusted LMP and the components of LMP. *See* Calculation and Use of Generator Sensitivity/Unit Participation Factors, 2010 State of the Market Report for PJM: Technical Reference for PJM Markets.

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## Real-Time Markup

### Markup Component of Real-Time Price by Fuel, Unit Type

The markup component of price is the difference between the system price, when the system price is determined by the active offers of the marginal units, whether price or cost-based, and the system price, based on the cost-based offers of those marginal units.

PJM implemented fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. Under the fast start pricing rules, the LMPs are calculated in the pricing run, where the offer price of a marginal fast start unit includes amortized commitment costs. For all the fast start marginal units starting from September 1, 2021, the markup includes markup in the incremental offer, markup in the amortized start up offer and markup in the amortized no load offer.

Table 3-132 shows the impact (markup component of LMP) of the marginal unit markup behavior by fuel type and unit type on the real-time load-weighted average system LMP using unadjusted and adjusted offers. The adjusted markup component of LMP increased from $2.73 per MWh in the first six months of 2025 to $4.27 per MWh in the first six months of 2026. The adjusted markup contribution of coal units in the first six months of 2026 was $1.08 per MWh, an increase of $0.57 per MWh from the first six months of 2025. The adjusted markup component of gas fired units in the first six months of 2026 was $3.28 per MWh, an increase of $0.70 per MWh from the first six months of 2025. The markup component of wind units was $0.30 per MWh. If a price-based offer is negative, but less negative than a cost-based offer, the markup is positive. In the first six months of 2026, among the wind units that were marginal, 76.5 percent had negative offer prices.

**Table 3-132 Markup component of real-time load-weighted average LMP by primary fuel type and unit type: January through June, 2025 and 2026[240]**

| | | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel | Technology | Markup Component of LMP (Unadjusted) | Markup Component of LMP (Adjusted) | Markup Component of LMP (Unadjusted) | Markup Component of LMP (Adjusted) |
| Coal | Steam | $0.09 | $0.52 | $0.55 | $1.08 |
| Gas | CC | $0.17 | $1.86 | $0.19 | $2.12 |
| Gas | CT | $0.06 | $0.73 | $0.31 | $1.14 |
| Gas | RICE | $0.01 | $0.02 | ($0.04) | $0.00 |
| Gas | Steam | ($0.15) | ($0.04) | ($0.12) | $0.01 |
| Municipal Waste | RICE | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 |
| Oil | CC | ($0.00) | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 |
| Oil | CT | ($0.64) | ($0.45) | ($0.88) | ($0.58) |
| Oil | RICE | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.00) | $0.00 |
| Oil | Steam | ($0.02) | ($0.01) | ($0.02) | $0.01 |
| Other | Battery | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.08 | $0.08 |
| Other | Solar | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.10 | $0.05 |
| Other | Steam | $0.00 | $0.00 | ($0.03) | $0.05 |
| Wind | | ($0.00) | $0.02 | $0.30 | $0.25 |
| Total | | ($0.43) | $2.73 | $0.48 | $4.27 |

### Markup Component of Real-Time Price

Table 3-133 shows the markup component, calculated using unadjusted offers, of average prices and of average monthly on peak and off peak prices. Table 3-134 shows the markup component, calculated using adjusted offers, of average prices and of average monthly on peak and off peak prices. In the first six months of 2026, when using unadjusted cost-based offers, $0.48 per MWh of the PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP was attributable to markup. Using adjusted cost-based offers, $4.26 per MWh of the PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP was attributable to markup. In the first six months of 2026, the peak markup component was highest in February, $4.16 per MWh using unadjusted cost-based offers and $8.25 per MWh using adjusted cost-based offers. This corresponds to 5.2 percent and 10.3 percent of the real-time peak load weighted average LMP in February.

240 The unit type RICE refers to Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines.


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### Table 3-133 Monthly markup components of real-time load-weighted LMP (Unadjusted): January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | | 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| Jan | ($2.00) | ($1.17) | ($2.83) | ($3.80) | ($6.96) | ($1.03) |
| Feb | ($0.22) | ($0.59) | $0.15 | $5.04 | $4.16 | $5.88 |
| Mar | ($0.37) | ($1.02) | $0.22 | $1.11 | $0.73 | $1.50 |
| Apr | $0.68 | $0.32 | $1.07 | $0.78 | $0.09 | $1.55 |
| May | ($0.54) | ($0.29) | ($0.79) | $0.86 | $2.26 | ($0.38) |
| Jun | $0.29 | ($0.08) | $0.69 | ($0.19) | $1.52 | ($2.15) |
| Jul | $0.55 | $2.74 | ($1.87) | | | |
| Aug | ($0.91) | ($0.94) | ($0.87) | | | |
| Sep | $1.52 | $1.48 | $1.56 | | | |
| Oct | $1.69 | $2.28 | $1.04 | | | |
| Nov | ($1.06) | ($2.04) | ($0.26) | | | |
| Dec | ($1.40) | ($1.31) | ($1.49) | | | |
| Total | ($0.16) | $0.01 | ($0.40) | $0.48 | $0.16 | $0.85 |


### Table 3-134 Monthly markup components of real-time load-weighted LMP (Adjusted): January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | | 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| Jan | $2.16 | $3.38 | $0.95 | $3.32 | ($0.24) | $6.45 |
| Feb | $3.21 | $3.08 | $3.35 | $9.50 | $8.25 | $10.70 |
| Mar | $2.40 | $1.79 | $2.94 | $3.59 | $3.41 | $3.77 |
| Apr | $3.53 | $3.24 | $3.85 | $3.25 | $2.79 | $3.76 |
| May | $1.68 | $2.16 | $1.20 | $3.30 | $4.97 | $1.81 |
| Jun | $3.34 | $3.47 | $3.21 | $2.64 | $4.74 | $0.23 |
| Jul | $4.01 | $6.66 | $1.08 | | | |
| Aug | $1.72 | $2.08 | $1.37 | | | |
| Sep | $3.86 | $4.05 | $3.66 | | | |
| Oct | $4.56 | $5.42 | $3.59 | | | |
| Nov | $2.13 | $1.50 | $2.64 | | | |
| Dec | $2.23 | $2.49 | $1.96 | | | |
| Total | $2.94 | $3.39 | $2.40 | $4.26 | $3.93 | $4.64 |

## Hourly Markup Component of Real-Time Prices


Figure 3-75 shows the markup contribution to the hourly load-weighted LMP using unadjusted cost offers in 2025 and the first six months of 2026. Figure 3-76 shows the markup contribution to the hourly load-weighted LMP using adjusted cost-based offers in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 3-75 Markup contribution to real-time hourly load-weighted LMP (Unadjusted): January 2025 through June 2026




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### Figure 3-76 Markup contribution to real-time hourly load-weighted LMP (Adjusted): January 2025 through June 2026




### Table 3-135 Real-time average zonal markup component (Unadjusted): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| ACEC | ($2.06) | ($3.16) | ($0.96) | ($1.59) | ($2.71) | ($0.49) |
| AEP | ($0.16) | $0.08 | ($0.41) | $0.45 | $0.50 | $0.41 |
| APS | $0.04 | $0.26 | ($0.18) | $0.89 | $0.81 | $0.96 |
| ATSI | ($0.25) | $0.01 | ($0.50) | $0.11 | $0.21 | $0.02 |
| BGE | $0.42 | ($0.02) | $0.85 | $2.60 | $2.72 | $2.47 |
| COMED | ($0.39) | ($0.41) | ($0.36) | $0.83 | $0.57 | $1.09 |
| DAY | ($0.36) | ($0.23) | ($0.48) | $0.46 | $0.39 | $0.53 |
| DOM | ($0.23) | ($0.28) | ($0.19) | $1.95 | $1.27 | $2.62 |
| DPL | ($2.53) | ($4.02) | ($1.04) | ($1.73) | ($2.80) | ($0.68) |
| DUKE | ($0.37) | ($0.27) | ($0.47) | $0.41 | $0.26 | $0.57 |
| DUQ | ($0.13) | $0.34 | ($0.60) | ($0.08) | $0.12 | ($0.29) |
| EKPC | ($0.32) | ($0.28) | ($0.36) | $0.46 | $0.34 | $0.57 |
| JCPLC | ($0.72) | ($0.62) | ($0.81) | ($1.30) | ($2.25) | ($0.36) |
| MEC | ($0.96) | ($1.06) | ($0.87) | ($1.11) | ($1.71) | ($0.52) |
| OVEC | ($0.13) | $0.25 | ($0.51) | $0.41 | $0.30 | $0.52 |
| PE | $0.33 | $0.56 | $0.09 | ($0.10) | $0.18 | ($0.39) |
| PECO | ($2.13) | ($3.27) | ($0.99) | ($1.66) | ($2.70) | ($0.64) |
| PEPCO | $0.41 | $0.04 | $0.79 | $2.43 | $2.16 | $2.70 |
| PPL | ($1.20) | ($1.17) | ($1.23) | ($0.97) | ($1.36) | ($0.59) |
| PSEG | ($0.63) | ($0.56) | ($0.70) | ($1.11) | ($2.05) | ($0.19) |
| REC | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.05 | ($0.59) | ($0.97) | ($0.22) |

## Markup Component of Real-Time Zonal Prices

The unit markup component of average real-time price using unadjusted offers is shown for each zone in the first six months of 2025 and 2026 in Table 3-135 and for adjusted offers in Table 3-136.[241] The smallest zonal all hours average markup component using unadjusted offers in the first six months of 2026, was in the DPL Zone, -$1.73 per MWh, while the highest was in the BGE Zone, $2.60 per MWh. The smallest zonal on peak average markup component using unadjusted offers in the first six months of 2026, was in the DPL Zone, -$2.80 per MWh, while the highest was in the BGE Zone, $2.72 per MWh.

241 A marginal unit's offer price affects LMPs in the entire PJM market. The markup component of average zonal real-time price is based on offers of units located within the zone and units located outside the transmission zone.



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### Table 3-136 Real-time average zonal markup component (Adjusted): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| ACEC | $0.85 | ($0.03) | $1.74 | $2.14 | $0.97 | $3.30 |
| AEP | $2.96 | $3.43 | $2.50 | $3.99 | $4.09 | $3.88 |
| APS | $3.27 | $3.75 | $2.80 | $4.89 | $4.79 | $4.98 |
| ATSI | $2.85 | $3.35 | $2.36 | $3.55 | $3.77 | $3.33 |
| BGE | $4.02 | $3.93 | $4.12 | $7.27 | $7.32 | $7.21 |
| COMED | $2.24 | $2.53 | $1.95 | $3.52 | $3.39 | $3.64 |
| DAY | $2.74 | $3.09 | $2.40 | $4.02 | $4.07 | $3.98 |
| DOM | $3.36 | $3.66 | $3.06 | $6.52 | $5.67 | $7.36 |
| DPL | $0.51 | ($0.67) | $1.70 | $2.22 | $1.01 | $3.41 |
| DUKE | $2.63 | $2.94 | $2.32 | $3.91 | $3.88 | $3.94 |
| DUQ | $2.93 | $3.63 | $2.22 | $3.31 | $3.61 | $3.02 |
| EKPC | $2.74 | $2.97 | $2.50 | $3.91 | $3.83 | $3.98 |
| JCPLC | $2.24 | $2.56 | $1.92 | $2.47 | $1.51 | $3.42 |
| MEC | $2.06 | $2.23 | $1.89 | $2.66 | $1.99 | $3.32 |
| OVEC | $2.78 | $3.36 | $2.20 | $3.80 | $3.78 | $3.83 |
| PE | $3.51 | $3.99 | $3.04 | $3.51 | $3.88 | $3.14 |
| PECO | $0.71 | ($0.22) | $1.64 | $2.03 | $0.94 | $3.11 |
| PEPCO | $3.94 | $3.87 | $4.01 | $7.09 | $6.71 | $7.47 |
| PPL | $1.73 | $2.00 | $1.45 | $2.67 | $2.28 | $3.07 |
| PSEG | $2.36 | $2.65 | $2.07 | $2.70 | $1.81 | $3.59 |
| REC | $3.15 | $3.35 | $2.94 | $3.24 | $3.00 | $3.49 |

## Markup by Real-Time Price Levels

Table 3-137 shows the markup contribution to the LMP, based on the unadjusted cost-based offers and adjusted cost-based offers of the marginal units, when the PJM system wide load-weighted average LMP was in the identified price range.

### Table 3-137 Real-time markup contribution (By load-weighted LMP category, unadjusted): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMP Category | Markup Component | Frequency | Markup Component | Frequency |
| < $10 | ($3.99) | 0.2% | ($2.83) | 0.4% |
| $10 to $15 | ($2.61) | 1.2% | ($1.37) | 2.5% |
| $15 to $20 | ($1.95) | 6.1% | ($1.45) | 8.7% |
| $20 to $25 | ($2.07) | 11.1% | ($2.51) | 12.2% |
| $25 to $50 | ($1.60) | 56.2% | ($1.63) | 45.6% |
| $50 to $75 | $1.43 | 14.9% | $1.18 | 11.4% |
| $75 to $100 | $2.26 | 4.7% | $3.22 | 4.7% |
| $100 to $125 | $9.83 | 2.3% | $6.73 | 3.2% |
| $125 to $150 | $8.36 | 1.2% | $4.85 | 2.4% |
| >= $150 | $1.08 | 2.1% | $8.51 | 8.9% |

### Table 3-138 Real-time markup contribution (By load-weighted LMP category, adjusted): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMP Category | Markup Component | Frequency | Markup Component | Frequency |
| < $10 | ($2.84) | 0.2% | ($1.73) | 0.4% |
| $10 to $15 | ($1.27) | 1.2% | ($0.12) | 2.5% |
| $15 to $20 | ($0.39) | 6.1% | $0.07 | 8.7% |
| $20 to $25 | ($0.19) | 11.1% | ($0.56) | 12.2% |
| $25 to $50 | $1.16 | 56.2% | $1.04 | 45.6% |
| $50 to $75 | $5.12 | 14.9% | $4.76 | 11.4% |
| $75 to $100 | $6.67 | 4.7% | $6.91 | 4.7% |
| $100 to $125 | $14.79 | 2.3% | $11.49 | 3.2% |
| $125 to $150 | $15.51 | 1.2% | $10.25 | 2.4% |
| >= $150 | $9.72 | 2.1% | $19.93 | 8.9% |

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## Markup by Company

Table 3-139 shows the markup contribution based on the unadjusted cost-based offers and adjusted cost-based offers to real-time load-weighted average LMP by individual marginal resource owners. The markup contribution of each marginal resource to price at each load bus is calculated for each five-minute interval, and summed by the parent company that offers the marginal resource into the real-time energy market. In the first six months of 2026, when using unadjusted cost-based offers, the markup of one company accounted for 0.9 percent of the load-weighted average LMP, the markup of the top five companies accounted for 2.5 percent of the load-weighted average LMP, and the markup of all companies accounted for 0.7 percent of the load-weighted average LMP. The share of top five companies' markup contribution to the load-weighted average LMP and the dollar values of their markup increased in the first six months of 2026. The markup contribution to the load-weighted average LMP and share of the markup contribution to the load-weighted average LMP increased in the first six months of 2026. The markup contribution of a unit to the real-time load-weighted average LMP can be positive or negative.

### Table 3-139 Markup component of real-time load-weighted average LMP by Company: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component of LMP (Unadjusted) | | Markup Component of LMP (Adjusted) | | Markup Component of LMP (Unadjusted) | | Markup Component of LMP (Adjusted) | |
| | $/MWh | Percent of Load Weighted LMP | $/MWh | Percent of Load Weighted LMP | $/MWh | Percent of Load Weighted LMP | $/MWh | Percent of Load Weighted LMP |
| Top 1 Company | $0.32 | 0.6% | $0.60 | 1.2% | $0.67 | 0.9% | $0.93 | 1.3% |
| Top 2 Companies | $0.58 | 1.1% | $1.11 | 2.1% | $0.99 | 1.4% | $1.61 | 2.2% |
| Top 3 Companies | $0.81 | 1.6% | $1.57 | 3.0% | $1.29 | 1.8% | $2.09 | 2.9% |
| Top 4 Companies | $0.96 | 1.9% | $1.88 | 3.6% | $1.59 | 2.2% | $2.53 | 3.5% |
| Top 5 Companies | $1.12 | 2.2% | $2.15 | 4.2% | $1.82 | 2.5% | $2.88 | 4.0% |
| All Companies | ($0.43) | (0.8%) | $2.72 | 5.3% | $0.48 | 0.7% | $4.32 | 6.0% |


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## Day-Ahead Markup[242]

### Markup Component of Day-Ahead Price by Fuel, Unit Type

The markup component of the PJM day-ahead load-weighted average LMP by primary fuel and unit type is shown in Table 3-140. INC, DEC and up to congestion transactions (UTC) have zero markups. The adjusted markup of coal, gas and oil units is calculated as the difference between the price-based offer and the cost-based offer excluding the 10 percent adder.

Table 3-140 shows the markup component of LMP for marginal generating resources. The adjusted markup component of LMP for coal fired units was $0.49 per MWh in the first six months of 2026. The adjusted markup component of LMP for gas fired CC units was $2.03 per MWh in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 3-140 Markup component of day-ahead load-weighted average LMP by primary fuel type and technology type: January through June, 2026**

| | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel | Technology | Markup Component of LMP (Unadjusted) | Markup Component of LMP (Adjusted) |
| Coal | Steam | ($0.07) | $0.49 |
| Gas | CC | $0.50 | $2.03 |
| Gas | CT | $0.30 | $0.37 |
| Gas | RICE | $0.04 | $0.01 |
| Gas | Steam | ($0.22) | ($0.07) |
| Municipal Waste | RICE | ($0.00) | ($0.00) |
| Oil | CT | ($0.06) | $0.05 |
| Oil | RICE | $0.00 | $0.01 |
| Oil | Steam | ($0.17) | ($0.16) |
| Other | Solar | $0.13 | $0.13 |
| Other | Steam | ($0.01) | ($0.01) |
| Wind | | $0.87 | $0.87 |
| Total | | $1.32 | $3.72 |

### Markup Component of Day-Ahead Price

The markup component of price is the difference between the system price, when the system price is determined by the active offers of the marginal units, whether price or cost-based, and the system price, based on the cost-based offers of those marginal units. Only hours when generating units were marginal on either priced-based offers or on cost-based offers were included in the markup calculation.

Table 3-141 shows the markup component of average prices and of average monthly on peak and off peak prices using unadjusted cost-based offers. Table 3-142 shows the markup component of average prices and of average monthly on peak and off peak prices using adjusted cost-based offers. In the first six months of 2026, when using unadjusted cost-based offers, $1.32 per MWh of the PJM day-ahead load-weighted average LMP was attributable to markup. Using adjusted cost-based offers, $3.72 per MWh of the PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP was attributable to markup. In the first six months of 2026, the peak markup component was highest in January, $5.37 per MWh using unadjusted cost-based offers and $9.33 per MWh using adjusted cost-based offers. This corresponds to 3.3 percent and 5.7 percent of the day-ahead peak load weighted average LMP in January.

**Table 3-141 Monthly markup components of day-ahead (Unadjusted) load-weighted LMP: January 2026 through June 2026**

| | 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| Jan | $3.39 | $5.37 | $1.64 |
| Feb | $1.30 | $0.02 | $2.54 |
| Mar | ($0.98) | $2.28 | ($4.31) |
| Apr | ($2.58) | ($3.89) | ($1.13) |
| May | $1.60 | $0.77 | $2.34 |
| Jun | $4.17 | $9.17 | ($1.67) |
| Total | $1.32 | $2.59 | $0.04 |

242 The MMU identified an error in the marginal resource identification algorithm within the day ahead clearing optimization. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors and markup index require accurate identification of marginal resources. The error was fixed by the PJM software vendor in March 2025. The MMU was unable to calculate markup index for 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 due to the inaccurate identification of marginal resources.

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### Table 3-142 Monthly markup components of day-ahead (Adjusted) load-weighted LMP: January 2026 through June 2026

| | 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| Jan | $7.73 | $9.33 | $6.31 |
| Feb | $3.51 | $2.01 | $4.95 |
| Mar | $0.76 | $3.49 | ($2.03) |
| Apr | ($0.56) | ($1.83) | $0.86 |
| May | $3.09 | $2.22 | $3.87 |
| Jun | $6.31 | $11.74 | ($0.04) |
| Total | $3.72 | $4.86 | $2.57 |

## Markup Component of Day-Ahead Zonal Prices

Table 3-143 shows the markup component of annual average day-ahead price using unadjusted cost-based offers for each zone and for adjusted offers in Table 3-144.

The smallest zonal all hours average markup component using unadjusted cost-based offers for the first six months of 2026 was in DPL, -$2.90 per MWh, while the highest was in DAY, $5.51 per MWh. The smallest zonal on peak average markup using unadjusted cost-based offers was in PPL, -$2.62 per MWh, while the highest was in DAY, $10.51 per MWh.

### Table 3-143 Day-ahead average zonal markup component (Unadjusted): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| ACEC | ($0.79) | $1.50 | ($3.07) |
| AEP | $5.12 | $9.15 | $1.11 |
| APS | $3.25 | $5.48 | $1.03 |
| ATSI | $4.85 | $5.94 | $3.77 |
| BGE | $1.92 | $2.16 | $1.67 |
| COMED | $0.72 | $3.03 | ($1.59) |
| DAY | $5.51 | $10.51 | $0.53 |
| DOM | $0.37 | $0.79 | ($0.05) |
| DPL | ($2.90) | ($2.59) | ($3.20) |
| DUKE | $4.78 | $6.97 | $2.59 |
| DUQ | $4.52 | $7.26 | $1.78 |
| EKPC | $5.20 | $8.32 | $2.08 |
| JCPLC | ($1.46) | ($0.43) | ($2.48) |
| MEC | ($1.63) | ($0.89) | ($2.37) |
| OVEC | $1.54 | $2.83 | $0.21 |
| PE | $1.39 | $1.89 | $0.89 |
| PECO | ($0.32) | $1.91 | ($2.54) |
| PEPCO | $0.76 | $1.75 | ($0.23) |
| PPL | ($2.56) | ($2.62) | ($2.50) |
| PSEG | ($2.07) | ($2.07) | ($2.08) |
| REC | $0.08 | $0.44 | ($0.29) |


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### Table 3-144 Day-ahead average zonal markup component (Adjusted): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Markup Component (All Hours) | Peak Markup Component | Off Peak Markup Component |
| ACEC | $2.30 | $4.57 | $0.05 |
| AEP | $7.11 | $10.48 | $3.78 |
| APS | $5.90 | $7.70 | $4.12 |
| ATSI | $7.26 | $7.60 | $6.91 |
| BGE | $5.02 | $5.48 | $4.57 |
| COMED | $3.32 | $5.94 | $0.72 |
| DAY | $7.70 | $11.37 | $4.08 |
| DOM | $3.60 | $4.16 | $3.03 |
| DPL | $0.12 | $0.42 | ($0.19) |
| DUKE | $7.77 | $8.94 | $6.61 |
| DUQ | $6.90 | $9.04 | $4.79 |
| EKPC | $8.21 | $10.67 | $5.77 |
| JCPLC | $1.67 | $2.71 | $0.64 |
| MEC | $1.68 | $2.54 | $0.84 |
| OVEC | $4.49 | $5.96 | $3.01 |
| PE | $4.22 | $4.24 | $4.20 |
| PECO | $2.85 | $5.09 | $0.62 |
| PEPCO | $3.74 | $4.95 | $2.54 |
| PPL | $0.81 | $1.12 | $0.49 |
| PSEG | $1.20 | $1.25 | $1.16 |
| REC | $3.09 | $3.42 | $2.78 |

## Markup by Day-Ahead Price Levels

Table 3-145 and Table 3-146 show the average markup component of LMP, based on the unadjusted cost-based offers and adjusted cost-based offers of the marginal units, when the PJM system LMP was in the identified price range.

### Table 3-145 Day-ahead average markup component (By LMP category, unadjusted): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|
| LMP Category | Markup Component | Frequency |
| $10 to $15 | $2.08 | 0.1% |
| $15 to $20 | ($0.57) | 3.3% |
| $20 to $25 | ($0.95) | 9.4% |
| $25 to $50 | ($0.78) | 57.4% |
| $50 to $75 | $2.73 | 13.9% |
| $75 to $100 | ($5.35) | 4.2% |
| $100 to $125 | ($7.65) | 2.1% |
| $125 to $150 | $5.50 | 1.8% |
| >= $150 | $17.40 | 7.8% |

### Table 3-146 Day-ahead average markup component (By LMP category, adjusted): January through June, 2026

| | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | |
|---|---|---|
| LMP Category | Markup Component | Frequency |
| $10 to $15 | $2.67 | 0.1% |
| $15 to $20 | $0.35 | 3.3% |
| $20 to $25 | $0.28 | 9.4% |
| $25 to $50 | $1.04 | 57.4% |
| $50 to $75 | $4.58 | 13.9% |
| $75 to $100 | ($4.02) | 4.2% |
| $100 to $125 | ($4.68) | 2.1% |
| $125 to $150 | $8.42 | 1.8% |
| >= $150 | $25.36 | 7.8% |

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## Market Structure, Participant Behavior, and Market Performance

The goal of regulation through competition is to achieve competitive market outcomes even in the presence of market power. Market structure in the PJM energy market is not competitive in local markets created by transmission constraints. At times, market structure is not competitive in the aggregate energy market. Market sellers pursuing their financial interests may choose behavior that benefits from structural market power in the absence of an effective market power mitigation program. The overall competitive assessment evaluates the extent to which participant behavior results in competitive or above competitive pricing. The competitive assessment brings together the structural measures of market power, HHI and pivotal suppliers, with participant behavior, specifically markup, and pricing outcomes.

### HHI and Markup

In theory, the HHI provides insight into the relationship between market structure, behavior, and performance. In the case where participants compete by producing output at constant, but potentially different, marginal costs, the HHI is directly proportional to the expected average price cost markup in the market:[243]

$$\frac{HHI}{\varepsilon} = \frac{P - MC}{P}$$

where ε is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand, $P$ is the market price, and $MC$ is the average marginal cost of production. This is called the Lerner Index. The left side of the equation quantifies market structure, and the right side of the equation measures market performance. The assumed participant behavior is profit maximization. As HHI decreases, implying a more competitive market, prices converge to marginal cost, the competitive market outcome. But even a low HHI may result in substantial markup with a low price elasticity of demand. If HHI is very high, meaning competition is lacking, prices can reach the monopoly level. Price elasticity of demand (ε) determines the degree to which suppliers with market power can impose higher prices on customers. The Lerner Index is a measure of market power that connects market structure (HHI and demand elasticity) to market performance (markup).

The PJM energy market HHIs and application of the FERC concentration categories understate the degree of market power because, in the absence of aggregate market power mitigation, even the unconcentrated HHI level implies substantial markups due to the low short run price elasticity of demand. For example, research estimates find short run electricity demand elasticity ranging from -0.2 to -0.4.[244] Using the Lerner Index, the elasticity of -0.2 implies, for example, an average markup ranging from 25 to 50 percent at the low end of the moderately concentrated threshold HHI of 1000:[245]

$$\frac{HHI}{\varepsilon} = \frac{0.1}{0.2} = \frac{P - MC}{P} = 0.5$$

With knowledge of HHI, elasticity, and marginal cost, one can solve for the price level theoretically indicated by the Lerner Index, based on profit maximizing behavior including the exercise of market power. With marginal costs of $72.07 per MWh and an average HHI of 783 in the first six months of 2026, average PJM prices would theoretically range from $90 to $118 per MWh, an implied markup of 19.6 to 39.2 percent, using the elasticity range of -0.2 to -0.4. Given the elasticity estimates, the theoretical prices exceed marginal costs because the exercise of market power is profit maximizing. In the PJM market, market power mitigation limits the exercise of market power, so prices cannot reach the higher theoretical level. Actual prices, averaging $72.54 per MWh with markups at 0.6 percent, are lower than the theoretical range, supporting the MMU's competitive assessment of the market. However,

243 *See* Tirole, Jean. *The Theory of Industrial Organization*, MIT (1988), Chapter 5: Short-Run Price Competition.

244 See Patrick, Robert H. and Frank A. Wolak (1997), "Estimating the Customer-Level Demand for Electricity Under Real-Time Market Prices," <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w8213/w8213.pdf>, last accessed July 30, 2026 and Fan, Shu and Rob Hyndman (2010), "The price elasticity of electricity demand in South Australia," <https://robjhyndman.com/papers/Elasticity2010.pdf>, last accessed July 30, 2026.

245 The HHI used in the equation is based on market shares. For the FERC HHI thresholds and standard HHI reporting, market shares are multiplied by 100 prior to squaring the market shares.



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markup is not zero. In some market intervals, markup and prices reach levels that reflect the exercise of market power.

## Aggregate Market Power and Markup

The HHI is not the only test for market power in the aggregate market. The determination of the existence of pivotal suppliers is a better measure than HHI of whether a resource has market power in the PJM aggregate energy market. Table 3-147 compares the markup by marginal resources in the energy market for pivotal suppliers in the day-ahead market to all other suppliers. The results show that when a company is one of three pivotal suppliers in the day-ahead energy market, it is more likely to set price with a positive markup. In the first six months of 2026, 17.5 percent of day-ahead marginal units and 10.3 percent of real-time marginal units set price with a positive markup when they were one of three day-ahead pivotal suppliers for the day. Of those, 93 marginal unit hours in the day-ahead market and 666 marginal unit intervals in the real-time market had markups over $100 per MWh. Only 7.4 percent of day-ahead and 4.1 percent of real-time marginal units set price with a positive markup when they were not one of three pivotal suppliers.

**Table 3-147 Percent of marginal unit intervals with markup and aggregate market power: January through June, 2026**

| | Day-ahead Market | | | Real-time Market | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Markup Category | Not TPS Aggregate | TPS Aggregate | Percent in Category | Not TPS Aggregate | TPS Aggregate | Percent in Category |
| Negative Markup | 15.1% | 35.7% | 50.8% | 13.3% | 37.9% | 51.2% |
| Zero Markup | 2.9% | 21.4% | 24.3% | 6.7% | 27.7% | 34.4% |
| | | | | | | |
| $0 to $5 | 3.2% | 7.6% | 10.8% | 2.2% | 5.0% | 7.2% |
| $5 to $10 | 0.6% | 2.1% | 2.8% | 0.4% | 1.4% | 1.8% |
| $10 to $15 | 0.2% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 0.2% | 0.8% | 1.0% |
| $15 to $20 | 0.3% | 0.7% | 1.0% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% |
| $20 to $25 | 0.3% | 0.7% | 1.0% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.5% |
| $25 to $50 | 1.8% | 2.7% | 4.5% | 0.8% | 1.4% | 2.2% |
| $50 to $75 | 0.7% | 1.1% | 1.8% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.5% |
| $75 to $100 | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Above $100 | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.5% |
| Total Positive Markup | 7.4% | 17.5% | 24.9% | 4.1% | 10.3% | 14.4% |
| | | | | | | |
| Total | 25.4% | 74.6% | 100.0% | 24.1% | 75.9% | 100.0% |

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## Market Power Mitigation and Markup

Fully effective local market power mitigation would not allow a seller that fails the structural market power test (the TPS test) to set prices with a positive markup. With the flaws in PJM's implementation of the TPS test, resources can and do set prices with a positive markup while failing the TPS test.

Table 3-148 categorizes day-ahead and real-time marginal unit intervals by markup level and TPS test status. In the first six months of 2026, 3.1 percent of real-time marginal unit intervals and 3.0 percent of day-ahead marginal unit hours included a positive markup even though the resource failed the TPS test for local market power. Unmitigated local market power affects PJM market prices. Zero markup with a TPS test failure indicates the mitigation of a marginal unit.

**Table 3-148 Percent of marginal unit intervals with markup and local market power: January through June, 2026**

| | Day-ahead Market | | | Real-time Market | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Markup Category | Not Failing TPS Test | Failing TPS Test | Percent in Category | Not Failing TPS Test | Failing TPS Test | Percent in Category |
| Negative Markup | 43.2% | 7.6% | 50.8% | 41.6% | 9.6% | 51.2% |
| Zero Markup | 19.0% | 5.3% | 24.3% | 24.3% | 10.1% | 34.4% |
| | | | | | | |
| $0 to $5 | 9.4% | 1.3% | 10.8% | 5.9% | 1.3% | 7.2% |
| $5 to $10 | 2.3% | 0.5% | 2.8% | 1.2% | 0.6% | 1.8% |
| $10 to $15 | 1.3% | 0.4% | 1.7% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 1.0% |
| $15 to $20 | 0.9% | 0.1% | 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.6% |
| $20 to $25 | 0.9% | 0.1% | 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.5% |
| $25 to $50 | 4.2% | 0.3% | 4.5% | 1.9% | 0.3% | 2.2% |
| $50 to $75 | 1.7% | 0.1% | 1.8% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.5% |
| $75 to $100 | 0.6% | 0.1% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.2% |
| Above $100 | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.5% |
| Total Positive Markup | 21.8% | 3.0% | 24.9% | 11.3% | 3.1% | 14.4% |
| | | | | | | |
| Total | 84.0% | 16.0% | 100.0% | 77.2% | 22.8% | 100.0% |

The markup of marginal units was zero or negative in 85.6 percent of real-time marginal unit intervals and 75.1 percent of day-ahead marginal unit intervals in the first six months of 2026. Zero and negative markup are the expected results in a competitive market. Allowing positive markups to affect prices in the presence of market power permits the exercise of market power and has a negative impact on the competitiveness of the PJM energy market. This problem can and should be addressed.


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# 4 Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves)

In a well designed wholesale power market, energy uplift is paid as credits to market participants under specified conditions in order to ensure that competitive energy and ancillary service market outcomes do not require efficient resources operating at the direction of PJM, to operate at a loss.[1] Referred to in PJM as operating reserve credits, lost opportunity cost credits, dispatch differential lost opportunity credits, reactive services credits, synchronous condensing credits or black start services credits, these uplift payments are intended to be one of the incentives to generation owners to offer their energy to the PJM energy market for dispatch based on short run marginal costs and to operate their units as directed by PJM. These uplift credits are paid by PJM market participants as operating reserve charges, reactive services charges, synchronous condensing charges or black start services charges. Fast start pricing, implemented on September 1, 2021, required a new uplift credit to pay the lost opportunity costs of units that are backed down in real time to accommodate the less flexible fast start units for which fast start pricing assumes flexibility. The result of fast start pricing is to create a greater reliance on uplift rather than price signals as an incentive to follow PJM's instructions.

Uplift is an inherent part of the PJM market design. Part of uplift is the result of the nonconvexity of power production costs. Uplift payments cannot be eliminated, but uplift payments should be limited to the efficient level. In wholesale power market design, a choice must be made between efficient prices and prices that fully compensate costs. Economists recognize that no single price achieves both goals in markets with nonconvex production costs, like the costs of producing electric power.[2] [3] In wholesale power markets like PJM, efficient prices equal the short run marginal cost of production by location. The dispatch of generators based on these efficient price signals minimizes the total market cost of production. For generators with nonconvex costs, marginal cost prices may not cover the total cost of starting the generator and running at the efficient output level. Uplift payments cover the difference. The PJM market design concept incorporates efficient prices with minimal uplift payments.

But PJM's practice does not minimize uplift payments. In some cases, PJM pays uplift that is not consistent with the rules. In some cases, the rules permit the payment of uplift that is not consistent with the goal of PJM market design. Regulation revenues should be included as an offset to the daily uplift calculation for generators that receive regulation revenues, but are not currently included. The need for uplift should be calculated on a daily basis, as incorporated in the initial PJM market design, rather than on an hourly segment basis. The goal of uplift should be to ensure that units are not required to run at a loss on a daily basis. The goal should not be to lock in profits in some hourly segments and require uplift in other hourly segments. In the case where PJM makes multiday commitments, the uplift calculation should cover the entire multiday period rather than allowing a generator to be paid uplift on day one and earn significant profits on day three. There are identified improvements to PJM's application of the rules, and to the market design and uplift rules that could reduce uplift payments to the efficient level.

PJM's day-ahead generator credits and balancing generator credits are calculated by operating day and by hourly segments. Segments for day-ahead generator credits equal the hours in which the unit cleared in the day-ahead market. Segments for balancing generator credits are defined as the greater of the length of the day-ahead schedule and the unit's minimum run time. Intervals in excess of the minimum run time or in excess of the hours cleared in the day-ahead market become new segments. The net revenues in those new segments are not counted as contributing to covering costs in the initial segment. The reverse is also true. Uplift is paid even when total net revenues cover or more than cover costs when the entire day is included.

In PJM, all energy payments to demand response resources are uplift payments. The energy payments to these demand response resources are not part of the supply and demand balance, they are not paid by LMP revenues

1 Losses occur when gross energy and ancillary services market revenues are less than short run marginal costs, including all elements of the energy offer, which are startup, no load and incremental offers, and the unit is following PJM instructions including both commitment and dispatch instructions. There is no corresponding assurance required when units are self scheduled or not following PJM dispatch instructions.

2 *See* Stoft, *Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity,* New York: Wiley (2002) at 272; Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, *Microeconomic Theory,* New York: Oxford University Press (1995) at 570; and Quinzii, *Increasing Returns and Efficiency*, New York: Oxford University Press (1992).

3 The production of output is convex if the production function has constant or decreasing returns to scale, which result in constant or rising average costs with increases in output. Production is nonconvex with increasing returns to scale, which is the case when generating units have start or no load costs that are large relative to marginal costs. *See* Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green at 132.

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and therefore the energy payments to demand response resources have to be paid as uplift. The energy payments to economic DR are funded by real-time load and real-time exports. The energy payments to emergency DR are funded by participants with net energy purchases in the real-time energy market. The current payment structure for DR is an inefficient element of the PJM market design.[4]

Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern (2026) both resulted in a significant increase in uplift payments as a result of the fact that PJM chose a significantly different and better approach to the preparations for these winter weather events than PJM had taken for Winter Storm Elliott. Rather than rely on ineffective, inefficient, risky, and disruptive PAI incentives to provide assurance that generators would be ready for cold weather, PJM took direct steps to ensure a reliable outcome. The market results of PJM's actions during Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern vindicated PJM's strategy. PJM took conservative measures to ensure reliability, including voltage support, by scheduling resources in advance of the day-ahead energy market. These commitments were not made to meet reserve requirements. Higher reserve requirements would not have addressed the Polar Vortex 2025 issues, Winter Storm Fern issues, or cold weather reliability issues more generally. Units needed to buy gas in advance and actually be operating in order to meet the reliability issues.

The uplift associated with Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern was an expected outcome of conservative operations. This uplift is part of the way that PJM markets work and was the result of PJM's successful conservative operations approach to dealing with cold weather risks. PJM's commitment approach during Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern was significantly different than in 2024, for example. PJM committed only 1.4 percent of units on schedules less flexible than PLS during Polar Vortex 2025 and 1.3 percent during Winter Storm Fern, compared to 17.2 percent during weather alert days in 2024.

The market results of PJM's actions in preparation for and during Winter Storm Gerri, Polar Vortex 2025 and Winter Storm Fern were better than the market results of PJM's actions during Winter Storm Elliott. Uplift was the expected result and the preferred result to the penalties that resulted from Winter Storm Elliott. Nonetheless, improvements are needed to make the advance commitment process more predictable, transparent and formalized. and made as market based as possible, in order to limit uplift to an efficient and effective level. These improvements should include implementing a multiday security constrained economic dispatch and commitment model that incorporates PJM's load forecast, energy cost forecasts, and units at risk, and provides commitment recommendations to PJM's dispatch prior to the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In addition, there should be rules about energy offers used for these commitments, and uplift rules should be revised to account for the multiday nature of these commitments.

4 Demand response payments are addressed in Section 6: Demand Response.

# Overview

## Energy Uplift Credits

- **Energy uplift credits.** Total energy uplift credits increased by $563.3 million, or 99.0 percent, during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025, from $569.2 million to $1,132.5 million.
- **Types of energy uplift credits.** During the first six months of 2026, total energy uplift credits included $239.1 million in day-ahead generator credits, $746.1 million in balancing generator credits, $144.3 million in lost opportunity cost credits, $0.9 million in dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits, and $2.1 million in reactive service credits.
- **Types of units.** During the first six months of 2026, non-coal steam units received 94.9 percent of the day-ahead generator credits. Combined cycle units and combustion turbines received 87.0 percent of balancing generator credits. Combustion turbines received 74.9 percent of lost opportunity credits and 48.8 percent of dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits. Hydro, wind, and solar received 35.7 percent of dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits.
- **Concentration of energy uplift credits.** In the first six months of 2026, the top 10 units receiving energy uplift credits received 36.0 percent of all credits and the top 10 organizations received 77.6 percent of all credits.


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- **Lost opportunity cost credits.** Lost opportunity cost credits increased by $123.7 million, from $20.6 million to $144.3 million, or 601.4 percent, during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.
- Some combustion turbines and diesels are scheduled day-ahead but not requested in real time, and receive day-ahead lost opportunity cost credits as a result. This was the source of 76.0 percent of the $144.3 million of lost opportunity costs.
- **Following dispatch.** Some units are incorrectly paid uplift despite not meeting uplift eligibility requirements, including not following dispatch, not having the correct commitment status, or not operating with PLS offer parameters. Since 2018, the MMU has made cumulative resettlement requests for the most extreme overpaid units of $17.9 million, of which PJM has resettled only $3.9 million, or 22.0 percent.

## Energy Uplift Charges

- **Energy Uplift Charges.** During the first six months of 2026, total energy uplift charges increased by $563.2 million, or 98.9 percent, compared to the first six months of 2025, from $569.2 million to $1,132.5 million.
- **Types of Energy Uplift Charges.** During the first six months of 2026, total uplift charges included $239.0 million in day-ahead operating reserve charges, $890.5 million in balancing generator charges, $2.2 million in reactive charges, and $0.3 million in black start services, and $0.5 million in local congestion charges.

## Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that uplift be paid only based on operating parameters that reflect the flexibility of the benchmark new entrant unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not pay uplift to units for energy produced because of not following dispatch. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)[5]
- The MMU recommends that PJM pay uplift based on the offer at the lower of the actual unit output or the desired MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)[6]
- The MMU recommends eliminating intraday segments from the calculation of uplift payments and returning to calculating the need for uplift based on the entire 24 hour operating day. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the elimination of day-ahead uplift to ensure that units receive an energy uplift payment based on their real-time output and not their day-ahead scheduled output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units not be paid lost opportunity cost uplift credits when PJM directs a unit to reduce output based on a transmission constraint or other reliability issue. There is no lost opportunity because the unit is required to reduce for the reliability of the unit and the system. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends reincorporating the use of net regulation revenues as an offset in the calculation of balancing generator credits. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that self scheduled units not be paid energy uplift credits for their startup cost when the units are scheduled by PJM to start before the self scheduled hours. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends three modifications to the energy lost opportunity cost calculations:
  - The MMU recommends calculating LOC based on 24 hour daily periods for combustion turbines and diesels scheduled in the day-ahead energy market, but not committed in real time. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
  - The MMU recommends that units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time should be compensated for LOC based on their real-time desired and achievable output, not their

5 PJM filed proposed changes to the uplift rules with the FERC on October 7, 2025 ("Reform to Energy Uplift Credit Rules," Docket No. ER26-59-000). The Commission Order on December 5, 2025, accepted the PJM Proposal as filed. PJM expects to implement the changes in 2027.

6 Id.

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scheduled day-ahead output. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that only flexible fast start units (startup plus notification times of 10 minutes or less) and units with short minimum run times (one hour or less) be eligible by default for the LOC compensation to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market and not committed in real time. Other units should be eligible for LOC compensation only if PJM explicitly cancels their day-ahead commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that up to congestion (UTC) transactions be required to pay energy uplift charges for both the injection and the withdrawal sides of the UTC. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends allocating the energy uplift credits paid to units scheduled by PJM as must run in the day-ahead energy market for reasons other than voltage/reactive or black start services as a reliability charge to real-time load, real-time exports and real-time wheels. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the total cost of providing reactive support be categorized and allocated as reactive services. Reactive services credits should be calculated consistent with the balancing generator credit calculation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends including real-time exports and real-time wheels in the allocation of the cost of providing reactive support to the 500 kV system or above, in addition to real-time load. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends modifications to the calculation of lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units. The lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units should be based on the lesser of the desired output, the estimated output based on actual wind conditions and the capacity interconnection rights (CIRs). The MMU recommends that PJM require wind units to request CIRs based on the maximum output used in the ELCC calculation for wind units. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM clearly identify and classify all reasons for incurring uplift in the day-ahead and the real-time energy markets and the associated uplift charges in order to make all market participants aware of the reasons for these costs and to help ensure a long term solution to the issue of how to allocate the costs of uplift. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the current uplift confidentiality rules in order to allow the disclosure of complete information about the level of uplift by unit and the detailed reasons for the level of uplift credits by unit in the PJM region. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)[7]
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve its advanced scheduling and commitment process in order to implement a transparent process in which units are scheduled and committed economically based on the known constraints prior to the day-ahead market. The multiday advance commitment process needs to address the communication process, the offers used for commitment evaluation, the operating parameters used for commitment evaluation, the financial consequences of commitment and the appropriate uplift rules. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Conclusion

Competitive market outcomes result from energy offers equal to short run marginal costs that incorporate flexible operating parameters. When PJM permits a unit to include inflexible operating parameters in its offer and pays uplift based on those inflexible parameters, there is an incentive for the unit to remain inflexible. The rules regarding operating parameters should be implemented in a way that creates incentives for flexible operations rather than inflexible operations. The standard for paying uplift should be the maximum achievable flexibility, based on OEM standards for the benchmark new entrant

7 On September 7, 2018, PJM made a compliance filing for FERC Order No. 844 to publish unit specific uplift credits. The compliance filing was accepted by FERC on June 21, 2019. 166 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2019). PJM began posting unit specific uplift reports on May 1, 2019. 167 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2019).


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unit (CONE unit) in the PJM Capacity Market demand (VRR) curve. Applying a weaker standard effectively subsidizes inflexible units by paying them based on inflexible parameters that result from lack of investment and that could be made more flexible. The result inflates uplift costs, suppresses energy prices, and is an incentive for inflexibility.

It is not appropriate to accept that inflexible units should be paid uplift based on inflexible offers. The question of why units make inflexible offers should be addressed directly. Are units inflexible because they are old and inefficient, because owners have not invested in increased flexibility or because they serve as a mechanism for the exercise of market power? The question of why the inflexible unit was built, whether it was built under cost of service regulation and whether it is efficient to retain the unit should be answered directly. The question of how to provide market incentives for investment in flexible units and for investment in increased flexibility of existing units should be addressed directly. The question of whether inflexible units should be paid uplift at all should be addressed directly. Marginal cost pricing without paying uplift to inflexible units would create incentives for market participants to provide flexible solutions including replacing inefficient units with flexible, efficient units.

Implementing combined cycle modeling, to permit the energy market model optimization to take advantage of the versatility and flexibility of combined cycle technology in commitment and dispatch, would provide significant flexibility without requiring a distortion of the market rules. Such modeling should not be used as an excuse to eliminate market power mitigation or an excuse to permit inflexible offers to be paid uplift. There are defined steps that could and should be taken immediately to improve the modeling of combined cycle plants that do not require investment in combined cycle modeling software, including modeling soak time, and accurately accounting for transition times to power augmentation offer segments.

The reduction of uplift payments should not be a goal to be achieved at the expense of the fundamental logic of the LMP system. For example, the use of closed loop interfaces to reduce uplift should be eliminated because it is not consistent with LMP fundamentals and constitutes a form of subjective price setting. The same is true of fast start pricing. The same is true of PJM's proposals to modify the ORDC in order to increase energy prices and reduce uplift.

Accurate short run price signals, equal to the short run marginal cost of generating power, provide market incentives for cost minimizing production to all economically dispatched resources and provide market incentives to load based on the marginal cost of additional consumption. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to minimize system production costs, not to minimize uplift. Repricing the market to reflect commitment costs creates a tradeoff between minimizing production costs and reduction of uplift. The tradeoff exists because when commitment costs are included in prices, the price signal no longer equals the short run marginal cost and therefore no longer provides the correct signal for efficient behavior for market participants making decisions on the margin, whether resources, load, interchange transactions, or virtual traders. This tradeoff now exists based on fast start pricing.[8] Fast start pricing affects uplift calculations by introducing a new category of uplift in the balancing market, and changing the calculation of uplift in the day-ahead market.

When units routinely receive substantial revenues through energy uplift payments, these payments are not fully transparent to the market, in part because of the current confidentiality rules. As a result, other market participants, including generation and transmission developers, do not have the opportunity to compete to displace them. As a result, substantial energy uplift payments to a concentrated group of units and organizations have persisted. FERC Order No. 844 authorized the publication of unit specific uplift payments for credits incurred after July 1, 2019.[9] However, Order No. 844 failed to require the publication of unit specific uplift credits for the largest units receiving significant uplift payments, inflexible steam units committed for reliability by PJM in the day-ahead market.

8 Fast start pricing was approved by FERC and implemented on September 1, 2021. See 173 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2020).

9 On June 21, 2019, FERC accepted PJM's Order No. 844 compliance filing. 166 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2019). The filing stated that PJM would begin posting unit specific uplift reports on May 1, 2019. On April 8, 2019, PJM filed for an extension on the implementation date of the zonal uplift reports and unit specific uplift reports to July 1, 2019. On June 28, 2019, FERC accepted PJM's request for extension of effective dates. 167 FERC ¶ 61,280 (2019).

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Uplift payments could be significantly reduced by reversing many of the changes that have been made to the original basic uplift rules. The goal of uplift is to ensure that competitive energy and ancillary service market outcomes do not require efficient resources operating for the PJM system, at the direction of PJM, to operate at a loss. In the original PJM design, uplift was calculated on a daily basis, including all costs and net revenues. But that rule was changed to use only segments of the day. The result is to overstate uplift payments because units may be paid uplift for a day in which their net revenues exceed their costs. In the original PJM design, all net revenues from energy and ancillary services were an offset to uplift payments. That rule was changed to eliminate net revenue from the regulation market. The result is to overstate uplift payments, for no logical reason.

Uplift payments could also be significantly reduced to a more efficient level by eliminating all day-ahead operating reserve credits. It is illogical and unnecessary to pay units day-ahead operating reserve credits because units do not incur any costs to run and any revenue shortfalls are addressed by balancing generator credits.

The MMU has recommended that PJM pay substantially more attention to the details of uplift payments including accurately tracking whether units are following dispatch, identifying the actual need for units to be dispatched out of merit and determining whether better definitions of constraints would be a more market based approach. PJM has paid uplift to units even when they do not operate as requested by PJM, i.e. when units do not follow dispatch.

PJM and the MMU have defined and worked to implement systematic and verifiable rules for determining when units are following dispatch as a primary screen for eligibility for uplift payments. On October 7, 2025, PJM submitted those rules as tariff revisions. The rules address the fact that, under the status quo, resources receive make whole payments for energy produced while not following PJM's dispatch instructions. The rules were approved by FERC on December 5, 2025. PJM expects to implement the rules in the first half of 2027.

While energy uplift charges are an appropriate part of the cost of energy, market efficiency would be improved by ensuring that the level and variability of these charges are as low as possible consistent with the reliable operation of the system and consistent with pricing at short run marginal cost. The goal should be to minimize the total incurred energy uplift charges and to increase the transactions over which those charges are spread in order to reduce the impact of energy uplift charges on markets. The result would be to reduce the level of per MWh charges, to reduce the uncertainty associated with uplift charges and to reduce the impact of energy uplift charges on decisions about how and when to participate in PJM markets. The result would also be to increase incentives for flexible operation and to decrease incentives for the continued operation of inflexible and uneconomic resources. PJM does not need a new flexibility product. PJM needs to provide incentives to existing and new entrant resources to unlock the significant flexibility potential that already exists, to end incentives for inflexibility and to stop creating new incentives for inflexibility.

## Energy Uplift Credits

The level of energy uplift credits paid to specific units depends on the level of the resource's energy offer, the LMP, the resource's operating parameters and the decisions of PJM operators. Energy uplift credits result in part from decisions by PJM operators, who follow reliability requirements and market rules, to start resources or to keep resources operating even when LMP is less than the offer price including incremental, no load and startup costs. Energy uplift payments also result from units' operational parameters that require PJM to schedule or commit resources when they are not economic. Energy uplift payments currently also result, incorrectly, from decisions by units to maintain an output level not consistent with PJM dispatch instructions. The resulting costs not covered by energy revenues are collected as energy uplift credits.

The day-ahead operating reserves category includes multiple credit types that are paid to resources cleared uneconomically in the day-ahead market. These resources include generators, imports, and load response.


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The balancing operating reserves category includes multiple credit types based on the service provided by the resources. These credit types, paid to compensate for uneconomic generation in the balancing market, include generator credits, lost opportunity cost credits, dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits, local constraint control credits, load response credits, import credits, and canceled resource credits. The largest credit type in the balancing operating reserves category is balancing generator credits. The reactive services category includes multiple credit types. Black start services credits exist to compensate resources for black start services in the day-ahead and balancing markets, as well as testing. Black start credits and local constraint credits are not broken out individually and are included in the category of balancing generator credits, matching PJM's Market Settlements Reporting System.

Table 4-1 shows the uplift totals for each credit category during the first six months of 2025 and 2026.[10] During the first six months of 2026, energy uplift credits increased by $563.3 million or 99.0 percent compared to the first six months of 2025. PJM commitment and dispatch decisions associated with the Winter Storm Fern caused significant increases in day-ahead generator credits, balancing generator credits, and lost opportunity cost credits.

The dispatch differential lost opportunity cost is a credit that exists only as a result of fast start pricing. This credit is paid to flexible resources that are artificially dispatched down, to an output level below the level that is economic at fast start prices, in order to accommodate inflexible fast start resources. Fast start pricing was introduced on September 1, 2021.

**Table 4-1 Energy uplift credits by category: January through June, 2025 and 2026[11]**

| Category | Type | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Credits (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Credits (Millions) | Change | Percent Change | 2025 Share | 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day-Ahead | Generators | $175.1 | $239.1 | $64.0 | 36.5% | 30.8% | 21.1% |
| Balancing | Generators | $371.3 | $746.1 | $374.8 | 100.9% | 65.2% | 65.9% |
| | Canceled Resources | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | (2.1%) | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | $20.6 | $144.3 | $123.7 | 601.4% | 3.6% | 12.7% |
| | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost | $1.7 | $0.9 | ($0.8) | (49.0%) | 0.3% | 0.1% |
| Synchronous Condensing | Synchronous Condensing | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | NA | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Synchronous Condensing Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | NA | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Reactive Services | Generators | $0.5 | $2.1 | $1.6 | 305.9% | 0.1% | 0.2% |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 541.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Condensing | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | NA | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Condensing Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | NA | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total | | $569.2 | $1,132.5 | $563.3 | 99.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

## Categories of Credits and Charges

Energy uplift charges include day-ahead and balancing operating reserves, reactive services, synchronous condensing and black start services categories. Uplift credits paid to individual participants are paid for by charges to the groups of PJM market participants. The groups of participants charged varies depending on the type of uplift credit. For this reason, operating reserve charges do not always have the same value as operating reserve credits, since not all categories of uplift credits are paid for by the same PJM participants. For example, in the case of local constraint credits, credits are paid to generators in the form of balancing

10 Billing data can be modified by PJM Settlements at any time to reflect changes in the evaluation of energy uplift. The billing data reflected in this report were current on July 10, 2026.
11 Year to year change is rounded to $0.01 million.

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operating reserve credits but charges are allocated as local constraint charges. The same applies in the case of units scheduled day ahead for reactive support, for which the credits are paid in the form of day-ahead operating reserve credits but charges are allocated as reactive services charges. Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 show the categories of credits and charges and their relationships.

For example, in Table 4-2, day-ahead operating reserve credits for generators are paid for by day-ahead operating reserve charges. Those charges are paid for by market participants in proportion to their day-ahead load, day-ahead exports, and virtual transactions (DECs and UTCs). The charges are aggregated over the entire RTO region. Balancing generator reserve credits are paid for by two different types of charges: balancing operating reserve charges for reliability and balancing operating reserve charges for deviations. Charges for reliability are paid for by PJM members in proportion to their real-time load and real-time export transactions. Reliability charges are aggregated regionally over the entire RTO region, within the Western region, or within the Eastern region. Balancing operating reserve charges for deviations are paid for by PJM members in proportion to their deviations, which includes virtuals (INCs and DECs), UTCs, load, and interchange. The deviation charges are aggregated regionally over the entire RTO region, and within the Eastern region. Lost opportunity cost credits are paid for by balancing operating reserve charges for deviations. The charges for deviations are paid for by PJM members in proportion to their deviations, which includes virtuals (INCs and DECs), UTCs, load, and interchange. The deviation charges are aggregated regionally over the entire RTO region.

Starting with the *2024 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, black start credits and local constraint credits are not broken out individually and are included in the category of balancing generator credits. Similarly, cancellation charges, lost opportunity charges, and dispatch differential lost opportunity cost charges are not broken out individually and are included in the category of balancing generator charges.

Table 4-3 shows the relationship between credits and charges for resources providing reactive, synchronous condensing, and black start services. For example, the five sub-categories of reactive services credits (day-ahead operating reserves, generator, LOC, condensing, and synchronous condensing LOC) are paid by two different charge categories: reactive service charges and local constraint reactive services. The reactive service charges are paid by PJM members in proportion to their zonal real-time load, while the local constraint reactive service charges are paid for by transmission owners.


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## Table 4-2 Day-ahead and balancing operating reserve credits and charges

| | Credit Category | Charges Category | Charge Responsibility | Geographic Charge Aggregation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DAY-AHEAD | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Transaction | Day-Ahead Operating Reserves for Transactions | Day-Ahead Load, Day-Ahead Exports, DECs & UTCs | RTO Region |
| | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Generator | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve for Generators | | |
| | Day-Ahead Operating Reserves for Load Response | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve for Load Response | | |
| | Unallocated Negative Load Congestion Charges<br>Unallocated Positive Generation Congestion Credits | Unallocated Congestion | | |
| BALANCING | Balancing Generator Reserves | Balancing Operating Reserve for Reliability | Real-Time Load plus Real-Time Export Transactions | RTO, Eastern, and Western Region |
| | | Balancing Operating Reserve for Deviations | Deviations (includes virtual bids, UTCs, load, and interchange) | |
| | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost (DDLOC) | Balancing Operating Reserve for Deviations | Real-Time Load plus Real-Time Export Transactions | RTO Region |
| | Canceled Resources | Balancing Operating Reserve for Deviations | Deviations (includes virtual bids, UTCs, load, and interchange) | |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC) | | | |
| | Real-Time Import Transactions | | | |
| | Balancing Operating Reserves for Load Response | Balancing Operating Reserve for Load Response | Deviations (includes virtual bids, UTCs, load, and interchange) | |
| | Local Constraints Control | NA | Transmission Owner | NA |

## Table 4-3 Reactive services, synchronous condensing and black start services credits and charges

| | Credits Category | Charges Category | Charge Responsibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Reactive** | | Reactive Services Charge | Zonal Real-Time Load |
| | Condensing Reactive Services | Local Constraint Reactive Services | Transmission owner |
| | Synchronous Condensing LOC Reactive Services | | |
| **Synchronous Condensing** | Synchronous Condensing | Synchronous Condensing | Real-Time Load |
| | Synchronous Condensing LOC | | Real-Time Export Transactions |
| **Black Start** | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve | Black Start Service Charge | Zone/Non-zone Peak Transmission Use and Point to Point Transmission Reservations |
| | Balancing Operating Reserve | | |
| | Black Start Testing | | |

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## Types of Units

Table 4-4 shows the distribution of total energy uplift credits by unit type during the first six months of 2026 and the first six months of 2025. A combination of factors led to overall increased uplift payments, including unit specific issues and market issues including high fuel costs and PJM conservative operations during Winter Storm Fern (January 22 through 30, 2026).

Uplift credits paid to combustion turbines increased by $326.3 million or 160.7 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. During the first six months of 2026, CTs received 74.9 percent of lost opportunity cost credits. Lost opportunity cost credits increased by $123.7 million or 601.4 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

Uplift credits paid to steam coal units increased by $33.7 million or 119.1 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. During the first six months of 2026, day-ahead uplift credits in the PEPCO Zone made up 95.2 percent of total day-ahead uplift credits and accounted for 129.2 percent of the increase in day-ahead uplift during the first six months of 2026, primarily as a result of unit specific issues for the Chalk Point 3 and 4 units. Historically, steam coal units Brandon Shores 1 and 2, received a large share of day-ahead uplift credits, but during the first six months of 2026 Brandon Shores 1 and 2 did not receive any day-ahead credits, a consequence of their new RMR status which was implemented June 1, 2025.

Uplift credits paid to non-coal (gas or oil fired) steam units increased by $107.5 million or 62.6 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. During the first six months of 2026, gas or oil fired steam units received $280.3 million, 24.7 percent of total credits, compared to $172.8 million, 30.3 percent of total credits during the first six months of 2025. During the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead uplift paid to gas or oil fired steam units was 45.7 percent higher than during the first six months of 2025, and accounted for 111.3 percent of the total increase in day-ahead operating reserves. The increase in day-ahead generator credits paid to gas or oil fired steam units in the PEPCO Zone accounted for 127.8 percent of the overall increase in day-ahead generator credits during the first six months of 2026. In the PEPCO Zone, gas fired steam units Chalk Point 3 and 4 received $225.6 million in uplift during the first six months of 2026.[12] During Winter Storm Fern, non-coal steam units received $120.7 million, or 43.0 percent of all credits received by non-coal steam units during the first six months of 2026. Non-coal steam units received 15.7 percent of total uplift credits during the Winter Storm Fern.

Uplift credits paid to combined cycle plants increased by $96.8 million or 62.2 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. This increase occurred primarily in January 2026 as a result of the commitments made in advance of the day-ahead energy market during the Winter Storm Fern. Winter Storm Fern accounted for 89.5 percent of the uplift credits paid to combined cycle plants, and accounted for 22.3 percent of total uplift credits during the first six months of 2026. During this period, uplift credits to wind units were $2.9 million, down by 51.0 percent compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Table 4-4 Total energy uplift credits by unit type: January through June, 2025 and 2026[13] [14]

| Unit Type | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Credits (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Credits (Millions) | Change | Percent Change | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Share | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combined Cycle | $155.8 | $252.6 | $96.8 | 62.2% | 27.4% | 22.3% |
| Combustion Turbine | $203.0 | $529.3 | $326.3 | 160.7% | 35.7% | 46.7% |
| Diesel | $1.9 | $3.5 | $1.6 | 82.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% |
| Hydro | $0.9 | $0.1 | ($0.8) | (86.8%) | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| Nuclear | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 245.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Solar | $0.5 | $1.6 | $1.1 | 212.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Steam - Coal | $28.3 | $62.1 | $33.7 | 119.1% | 5.0% | 5.5% |
| Steam - Other | $172.8 | $280.3 | $107.5 | 62.2% | 30.3% | 24.7% |
| Wind | $6.0 | $2.9 | ($3.0) | (51.0%) | 1.0% | 0.3% |
| Total | $569.2 | $1,132.5 | $563.3 | 99.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

12 See Table 4-19.

13 Table 4-4 does not include balancing imports credits and load response credits in the total amounts.

14 Solar units should be ineligible for all uplift payments because they do not follow PJM's dispatch instructions. The MMU notified PJM of the discrepancy.



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Table 4-5 shows the distribution of energy uplift credits by category and by unit type during the first six months of 2026. The largest share of day-ahead credits, 95.7 percent, went to steam units (non-coal and coal). Steam units tend to be longer lead time units that are committed before the operating day. If a steam unit is needed for reliability and it is uneconomic, it will be committed in the day-ahead energy market and receive day-ahead uplift credits. The PJM market rules permit combustion turbines (CT), unlike other unit types, to be committed and decommitted in the real-time market. As a result of the rules and the characteristics of CT offers, CTs received 55.5 percent of balancing credits and 74.9 percent of lost opportunity cost credits. Combustion turbines committed in the real-time market may be paid balancing credits due to inflexible operating parameters, volatile real-time LMPs, and intraday segment settlements. Combustion turbines committed in the day-ahead market but not committed in real time receive lost opportunity credits to cover the profits they would have made had they operated in real time.

**Table 4-5 Energy uplift credits by unit type: January through June, 2026**

| Unit Type | Day-Ahead Generator | Balancing Generator | Canceled Resources | Lost Opportunity Cost | Reactive Services | Synchronous Condensing | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combined Cycle | 2.5% | 31.5% | 0.0% | 8.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.5% |
| Combustion Turbine | 1.8% | 55.5% | 100.0% | 74.9% | 98.1% | 0.0% | 48.8% |
| Diesel | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Hydro | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 13.6% |
| Nuclear | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Solar | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 6.1% |
| Steam - Coal | 0.8% | 6.0% | 0.0% | 10.8% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 2.7% |
| Steam - Other | 94.9% | 6.9% | 0.0% | 1.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.1% |
| Wind | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.0% |
| Total (Millions) | $239.1 | $746.1 | $0.0 | $144.3 | $2.2 | $0.0 | $0.9 |

## Day-Ahead Unit Commitment for Reliability

PJM can schedule units as must run in the day-ahead energy market that would otherwise not have been committed in the day-ahead market, when needed in real time to address reliability issues. Such reliability issues include thermal constraints, reactive transfer interface constraints, and reactive service.[15] Units committed for reliability by PJM are eligible for day-ahead operating reserve credits and may set LMP if raised above economic minimum and follow the dispatch signal. Participants can submit units as self scheduled (must run), meaning that the unit must be committed, but a unit submitted as self scheduled by a participant is not eligible for day-ahead operating reserve credits.[16]

Pool scheduled units are units that are committed in the day-ahead market based on economics. Units committed for reliability by PJM are units that are committed to satisfy reliability needs, regardless of whether the offers are economic. Self scheduled units are self committed by the generation owner and are not eligible for uplift. Pool scheduled units and units committed for reliability are made whole in the day-ahead energy market if their total cost-based offer (including no load and startup costs) is greater than the revenues from the day-ahead energy market. Such units are paid day-ahead uplift.

It is illogical and unnecessary to pay units day-ahead operating reserves because units do not incur any costs to run in the day-ahead market and any revenue shortfalls are addressed by balancing operating reserve payments.

## Balancing Uplift (Operating Reserve) Credits/ Balancing Generator Credits

Balancing operating reserve (BOR) credits are paid to resources that operate as requested by PJM that do not recover all of their operating costs from market revenues. Balancing operating reserves include multiple credit types that are paid to units in the balancing market, such as generator credits, lost opportunity cost credits, dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits, local constraints control credits, load response credits, import credits, and canceled resource credits. Balancing generator credits are the largest category of balancing operating reserves. Balancing generator credits are calculated by hourly segments as the difference between a resource's revenues (day-ahead market, balancing market, reserve markets, reactive service credits, and day-ahead operating reserve credits but excluding regulation revenues) and its real-time offer (startup, no load, and incremental energy offer). Segments

15 See OA Schedule 1 § 3.2.3(b).
16 See OA Schedule 1 § 3.2.3(a).

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for balancing generator credits are defined as the greater of the day-ahead schedule and the unit's minimum run time. Intervals in excess of the minimum run time are treated as new segments. Table 4-1 shows that balancing generator credits increased by 378.4 million or 100.9 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. Table 4-5 shows that combustion turbines (CTs) received 55.5 percent of balancing generator credits in during the first six months of 2026, or $414.3 million. Combined cycle plants (CCs) received 31.5 percent of balancing generator credits during the first six months of 2026, or $234.79 million. During Winter Storm Fern, the balancing generator credits to CTs exceeded CCs.

Uplift is higher than necessary because settlement rules do not include all revenues and costs for the entire day. Uplift is also higher than necessary because settlement rules do not disqualify units from receiving uplift when they do not follow PJM's dispatch instructions. Units should be disqualified from receiving uplift when the units do not follow dispatch instructions, block load or self schedule.

CTs that operate on a day-ahead schedule tend to receive lower balancing generator credits because it is more likely that the day-ahead LMPs will support (prices above offer) committing the units. The day-ahead model optimizes the system for all 24 hours, unlike in real time when PJM uses ITSCED to optimize CT commitments with an approximately two hour look ahead. In addition, uplift rules continue to define all day-ahead scheduled hours as one segment for the uplift calculation (in which profits and losses during all hours offset each other). The shorter segments in real-time are defined by the minimum run time and allow for fewer offsets, resulting in greater amounts of uplift. Losses during the minimum run time segment are not offset by profits made in other segments on that day.

There are multiple reasons why the commitment of CTs is different in the day-ahead and real-time markets, including differences in the hourly pattern of load, and differences in interchange transactions. Modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets also affect CT commitment, including: the modeling of different transmission constraints in the day-ahead and real-time market models; the exclusion of soak time for generators in the day-ahead market model; and the different optimization time periods used in the day-ahead and real-time markets.

## Lost Opportunity Cost Credits

Balancing operating reserve lost opportunity cost (LOC) credits are intended to provide an incentive for units to follow PJM's dispatch instructions when PJM's dispatch instructions deviate from a unit's desired or scheduled output. LOC credits are paid under two scenarios.[17] The first scenario occurs if a unit of any type generating in real time with an offer price lower than the real-time LMP at the unit's bus is manually reduced or suspended by PJM due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue. In this scenario the unit will receive a credit for LOC based on its desired output. Such units are not actually forgoing an option to increase output because the reliability of the system and in some cases the generator depend on reducing output. This LOC is referred to as real-time LOC. The second scenario occurs if a combustion turbine or diesel engine clears the day-ahead energy market, but is not committed in real time. In this scenario the unit will receive a credit which covers any lost profit in the day-ahead financial position of the unit plus the balancing energy market position. This LOC is referred to as day-ahead LOC.

Table 4-6 shows monthly day-ahead and real-time LOC credits during 2025 and the first six months of 2026. During the first six months of 2026, LOC credits increased by $123.8 million or 599.0 percent compared to the first six months of 2025. The overall increase included a $97.9 million increase in day-ahead LOC and a $25.9 million increase in real-time LOC.

Table 4-4 shows that during the first six months of 2026, wind units received $2.8 million of lost opportunity cost credits, down $3.1 million compared to the first six months of 2025. Wind units that are capacity resources are now required to procure Capacity Interconnection Rights (CIRs) equal to the maximum facility output included in the calculation of their ELCC value. Wind units that are capacity resources are paid uplift when PJM requests that the units reduce output below the maximum facility output but above the CIR level. Units do not have a right to inject power at levels greater than the CIR level that they pay for and therefore should not be paid uplift when system

17 Desired output is defined as the MW on the generator's offer curve consistent with the LMP at the generator's bus.


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conditions do not permit output at a level greater than the CIR. The real-time lost opportunity costs credits paid to wind units should use the lowest of the desired output, the estimated output based on actual wind conditions, and the capacity interconnection rights (CIRs) as the definition of the foregone opportunity.

### Table 4-6 Monthly lost opportunity cost credits[18] [19] [20] (Millions): January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | | 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead Lost Opportunity Cost (Millions) | Real-Time Lost Opportunity Cost (Millions) | Total | Day-Ahead Lost Opportunity Cost (Millions) | Real-Time Lost Opportunity Cost (Millions) | Total |
| Jan | $2.5 | $4.4 | $7.0 | $73.9 | $17.1 | $91.0 |
| Feb | $0.1 | $0.4 | $0.5 | $9.3 | $8.9 | $18.2 |
| Mar | $0.7 | $1.5 | $2.1 | $6.1 | $3.3 | $9.4 |
| Apr | $1.1 | $1.0 | $2.1 | $6.6 | $1.2 | $7.8 |
| May | $2.0 | $0.1 | $2.1 | $6.2 | $1.5 | $7.7 |
| Jun | $5.4 | $1.4 | $6.8 | $7.4 | $2.8 | $10.3 |
| Jul | $2.4 | $0.6 | $3.0 | | | |
| Aug | $1.7 | $0.4 | $2.1 | | | |
| Sep | $2.8 | $0.2 | $2.9 | | | |
| Oct | $2.6 | $0.2 | $2.9 | | | |
| Nov | $1.2 | $0.7 | $1.9 | | | |
| Dec | $4.4 | $5.2 | $9.6 | | | |
| Total (Jan - Jun) | $11.8 | $8.9 | $20.7 | $109.7 | $34.8 | $144.5 |
| Share (Jan - Jun) | 57.1% | 42.9% | 100.0% | 75.9% | 24.1% | 100.0% |
| Total | $26.9 | $16.1 | $43.0 | $109.7 | $34.8 | $144.5 |
| Share | 62.5% | 37.5% | 100.0% | 75.9% | 24.1% | 100.0% |

18 Table 4-6 does not include pumped hydro lost opportunity cost credits in Real-Time Lost Opportunity Cost Credits.

19 Table 4-6 includes CT lost opportunity cost forfeiture in the Day-Ahead Lost Opportunity Cost. *See* "MSRS Report Format Documentation: CT Lost Opportunity Cost Forfeiture," Ver. 5, for more details (Dec. 1, 2024). <https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/billing-settlements-and-credit/msrs-reports-documentation.aspx>.

20 Tables 4-1 and 4-6 are based on PJM Settlements reports that are updated by PJM with different resettlement bill cycles. As a result, the values in these tables may not match.

# Energy Uplift Charges

## Energy Uplift Charges

Table 4-7 shows that energy uplift charges for the first six months of 2026 were $1,132.5 million, or 1.9 percent of total PJM billing.

### Table 4-7 Total energy uplift charges: 2001 through June 2026

| | Total Energy Uplift Charges (Millions) | Change (Millions) | Percent Change | Energy Uplift as a Percent of Total PJM Billing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2001 | $284.0 | $67.0 | 30.9% | 8.5% |
| 2002 | $273.7 | ($10.3) | (3.6%) | 5.8% |
| 2003 | $376.5 | $102.8 | 37.6% | 5.4% |
| 2004 | $537.6 | $161.1 | 42.8% | 6.1% |
| 2005 | $712.6 | $175.0 | 32.6% | 3.1% |
| 2006 | $365.6 | ($347.0) | (48.7%) | 1.7% |
| 2007 | $503.3 | $137.7 | 37.7% | 1.6% |
| 2008 | $474.3 | ($29.0) | (5.8%) | 1.4% |
| 2009 | $322.7 | ($151.6) | (32.0%) | 1.2% |
| 2010 | $623.2 | $300.5 | 93.1% | 1.8% |
| 2011 | $603.4 | ($19.8) | (3.2%) | 1.7% |
| 2012 | $649.8 | $46.4 | 7.7% | 2.2% |
| 2013 | $843.0 | $193.2 | 29.7% | 2.5% |
| 2014 | $961.2 | $118.2 | 14.0% | 1.9% |
| 2015 | $312.0 | ($649.2) | (67.5%) | 0.7% |
| 2016 | $136.7 | ($175.3) | (56.2%) | 0.4% |
| 2017 | $127.3 | ($9.4) | (6.9%) | 0.3% |
| 2018 | $198.2 | $70.9 | 55.7% | 0.4% |
| 2019 | $88.5 | ($109.7) | (55.3%) | 0.2% |
| 2020 | $90.9 | $2.4 | 2.7% | 0.3% |
| 2021 | $178.4 | $87.5 | 96.3% | 0.3% |
| 2022 | $284.5 | $106.1 | 59.5% | 0.3% |
| 2023 | $158.7 | ($125.8) | (44.2%) | 0.3% |
| 2024 | $270.0 | $111.3 | 70.1% | 0.5% |
| 2025 | $766.2 | $607.5 | 382.8% | 1.0% |
| 2026 (Jan - Jun) | $1,132.5 | $366.2 | 47.8% | 1.9% |

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Table 4-8 shows total energy uplift charges by category for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The increase of $563.2 million is comprised of a $63.9 million increase in day-ahead uplift (operating reserve) charges, a $497.4 million increase in balancing generator charges, a $1.6 million increase in reactive service charges, and a $0.4 million increase in local congestion charges.

### Table 4-8 Total energy uplift charges by category: January through June, 2025 and 2026[21]

| Category | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Charges (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Charges (Millions) | Change (Millions) | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day-Ahead Operating Reserves | $175.1 | $239.0 | $63.9 | 36.5% |
| Balancing Operating Reserves | $393.1 | $890.5 | $497.4 | 126.6% |
| Reactive Services | $0.5 | $2.2 | $1.6 | 293.9% |
| Black Start Services | $0.4 | $0.3 | ($0.0) | (11.2%) |
| Local Congestion Charges | $0.1 | $0.5 | $0.4 | 290.3% |
| Total | $569.2 | $1,132.5 | $563.2 | 98.9% |
| Energy Uplift as a Percent of Total PJM Billing | 1.6% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 75.0% |

Table 4-9 compares monthly energy uplift charges by category for 2025 through the first six months of 2026.

### Table 4-9 Monthly energy uplift charges: January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 Charges (Millions) | | | | | | 2026 Charges (Millions) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Reactive Services | Local Congestion | Black Start Services | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Reactive Services | Local Congestion | Black Start Services | Total |
| Jan | $153.9 | $246.2 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $400.2 | $177.3 | $682.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $859.4 |
| Feb | $2.5 | $33.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $36.2 | $31.1 | $55.56 | $0.1 | $0.3 | $0.2 | $87.4 |
| Mar | $6.1 | $28.6 | $0.5 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $35.3 | $2.3 | $32.16 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $34.6 |
| Apr | $3.9 | $36.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $40.6 | $6.0 | $39.45 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $0.1 | $45.6 |
| May | $2.9 | $16.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $19.6 | $6.8 | $48.32 | $1.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $57.1 |
| Jun | $5.8 | $31.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $37.3 | $15.5 | $32.89 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $48.5 |
| Jul | $2.3 | $45.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $48.1 | | | | | | |
| Aug | $3.1 | $24.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $27.1 | | | | | | |
| Sep | $0.9 | $16.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $17.0 | | | | | | |
| Oct | $0.6 | $19.6 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $20.4 | | | | | | |
| Nov | $0.7 | $32.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $33.0 | | | | | | |
| Dec | $18.2 | $33.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $51.3 | | | | | | |
| Total (Jan - Jun) | $175.1 | $393.1 | $0.5 | $0.1 | $0.4 | $569.2 | $239.0 | $890.5 | $2.2 | $0.5 | $0.3 | $1,132.5 |
| Share (Jan - Jun) | 30.8% | 69.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 100.0% | 21.1% | 78.6% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| Total | $200.9 | $563.9 | $0.7 | $0.3 | $0.5 | $766.2 | $239.0 | $890.5 | $2.2 | $0.5 | $0.3 | $1,132.5 |
| Share | 26.2% | 73.6% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 100.0% | 21.1% | 78.6% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |

21 The total PJM billing used in Table 4-8 is different from the total cost shown in Table 1-9. The total PJM billing in Table 4-8 represents the total dollars that pass through the PJM settlement process, while the total cost shown in Table 1-9 is the total cost to load and includes additional costs to load accounted for outside the PJM settlement process.


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Table 4-10 shows the composition of the balancing operating reserve charges. Balancing operating reserve charges consist of balancing operating reserve reliability charges (credits to generators), balancing operating reserve deviation charges (credits to generators and import transactions), balancing operating reserve charges for economic load response and balancing local constraint charges. Balancing operating reserve charges increased by $497.8 million or 126.6 percent during the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The balancing operating reserve charges for reliability and deviation do not include the balancing local constraint charges or the dispatch differential lost opportunity cost charges, which must be added separately to get the total balancing operating reserve charges. For example, during the first six months of 2026 the balancing operating reserve charges and local congestion charges in Table 4-8 were $890.5 million and $0.5 million. The sum is equal to $891.0, which is the total of the balancing operating reserve reliability charges, the balancing operating reserve reliability charges, the balancing local constraint charges, and the dispatch different lost opportunity cost charges during the first six months of 2026 in Table 4-10.

### Table 4-10 Balancing operating reserve charges: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Category | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Charges (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Charges (Millions) | Change | Percent Change | 2025 Share | 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Balancing Operating Reserve Reliability Charges | $295.5 | $633.8 | $338.3 | 114.5% | 75.2% | 71.1% |
| Balancing Operating Reserve Deviation Charges | $95.8 | $255.8 | $159.9 | 166.9% | 24.4% | 28.7% |
| Balancing Local constraint Charges | $0.1 | $0.5 | $0.4 | 290.3% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost Charges | $1.7 | $0.9 | ($0.8) | (49.0%) | 0.4% | 0.1% |
| Total | $393.2 | $891.0 | $497.8 | 126.6% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Table 4-11 shows the balancing operating reserve deviation charges by category for the first six months of 2025 and the first six months of 2026. Balancing operating reserve charges for deviations are allocated to virtual bids, UTCs, load, and interchange. The deviation charges attributed to generators during the first six months of 2026 were $255.8 million, or 166.9 percent higher than during the first six months of 2025. Deviation charges attributed to lost opportunity costs during the first six months of 2026 were $144.5 million, or 463.0 percent higher than during the first six months of 2025, and deviation charges attributed to dispatch differential lost opportunity costs during the first six months of 2026 were $0.9 million, or 49.0 percent lower than during the first six months of 2025.

### Table 4-11 Balancing operating reserve deviation charges: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Source of Balancing Operating Reserve | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Charges (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Charges (Millions) | Change (Millions) | Percent Change | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Share | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generators | $68.5 | $110.4 | $42.0 | 61.3% | 71.4% | 43.2% |
| Lost Opportunity Costs | $25.7 | $144.5 | $118.8 | 463.0% | 26.8% | 56.5% |
| Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Costs | $1.7 | $0.9 | ($0.8) | (49.0%) | 1.8% | 0.3% |
| Canceled Resources | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | (2.1%) | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total | $95.8 | $255.8 | $159.9 | 166.9% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

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Table 4-12 shows additional energy uplift charges by category for the first six months of 2025 and the first six months of 2026. Reactive service charges during the first six months of 2026 increased by 74.6 percent compared to the first six months of 2025, and black start service charges decreased by 12.6 percent compared to the first six months of 2025. During the first six months of 2026, reactive services made up 86.0 percent of additional charges and black start services charges made up 14.0 percent.

### Table 4-12 Additional energy uplift charges: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Type | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Charges (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Charges (Millions) | Change (Millions) | Percent Change | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Share | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reactive Services Charges | $0.5 | $2.2 | $1.6 | 74.6% | 58.1% | 86.0% |
| Black Start Services Charges | $0.4 | $0.3 | ($0.0) | (12.6%) | 41.9% | 14.0% |
| Total | $0.9 | $2.5 | $1.6 | 62.4% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

## Operating Reserve Rates

Under the operating reserves cost allocation rules, PJM calculates ten separate rates: a day-ahead operating reserve rate, a reliability rate for each region (RTO, East, or West), a deviation rate for each region, a lost opportunity cost rate, a canceled resources rate, and a dispatch differential lost opportunity cost rate. Table 4-13 shows a breakdown of operating reserve rates in the first six months of 2025 and the first six months of 2026. The operating reserve rates are calculated on a daily basis, and the table provides the minimum, maximum, and average value during the first six months of both 2025 and 2026. Balancing operating reserve charges for reliability cover a part of the balancing generator credits, and therefore the reliability rates are elevated when balancing generator credits are high, as was the case with Winter Storm Fern. The RTO region, which includes the East and West regions plus exports that are at the interfaces or hubs not completely contained in either the East or West region, has an elevated reliability rate in the first six months of 2026 due to high balancing operating reserve credits that were paid to units during Winter Storm Fern.

### Table 4-13 Operating reserve rates ($/MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Rate | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Avg ($/MWh) | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Min ($/MWh) | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Max ($/MWh) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Avg ($/MWh) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Min ($/MWh) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Max ($/MWh) | Difference of Avg ($/MWh) | Percent Difference of Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day-Ahead | 0.000 | (0.000) | 0.006 | 0.000 | (0.000) | 0.005 | 0.000 | 37.1% |
| RTO Reliability | 0.692 | 0.000 | 22.978 | 1.471 | 0.000 | 55.837 | 0.778 | 112.4% |
| East Reliability | 0.030 | 0.000 | 0.850 | 0.036 | 0.000 | 0.667 | 0.006 | 18.8% |
| West Reliability | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.144 | 0.011 | 0.000 | 0.313 | 0.009 | 467.5% |
| RTO Deviation | 0.545 | 0.000 | 0.020 | 1.288 | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.743 | 136.2% |
| East Deviation | 0.158 | 0.000 | 2.604 | 0.958 | 0.000 | 5.804 | 0.800 | 506.5% |
| West Deviation | 0.018 | 0.000 | 0.701 | 0.034 | 0.000 | 0.446 | 0.016 | 91.5% |
| Lost Opportunity Cost | 0.114 | 0.000 | 2.173 | 0.875 | 0.000 | 31.756 | 0.761 | 668.6% |
| Canceled Resources | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.000 | 4.5% |
| Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.022 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.064 | (0.002) | (46.6%) |


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Table 4-14 shows the composition of charges and the transactions included in the charge calculation. For example, balancing operating reserve charges for deviations are calculated by adding the RTO deviation rate, the regional deviation rates, the LOC rate, and the canceled resources rate. The INCs are responsible for paying the RTO deviation rate, the regional deviation rate, the LOC rate, and the canceled resources rate.

### Table 4-14 Composition of charges

| | | Transaction / Resource Type | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Charge | Rate | Load | Generation | Imports [1] | Exports [1] | Wheels | Economic DR | INCs | DECs | UTCs |
| Day-Ahead Operating Reserve | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Rate | X | | | X | | | | X | X |
| Balancing Operating Reserves for Reliability | RTO Reliability Rate | X | | | X | | | | | |
| | Regional (East or West) Reliability Rate | X | | | X | | | | | |
| Balancing Operating Reserves for Deviations [2] | RTO Deviation Rate | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| | Regional (East or West) Deviation Rate | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| | LOC Rate | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | |
| | Canceled Resources Rate | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | |
| Reactive Services | Implicit Rates | X | | | | | | | | |
| Black Start Services | Implicit Rates | X [3] | | X [4] | X [4] | X [4] | | | | |
| Synchronous Condensing | Implicit Rate | X | | | X | | | | | |

1 Dynamic scheduled transactions are exempt from operating reserve charges.
2 Participants only pay deviation charges if they incur deviations based on the rules specified in Manual 28.
3 Load is charged black start services based on their zonal peak load contribution.
4 Interchange transactions are charged black start services based on their point to point firm and non-firm reservations.

## Uplift Eligibility

In PJM, units have either a pool scheduled or self scheduled commitment status. Pool scheduled units are committed by PJM while self scheduled units are committed by generation owners. Table 4-15 provides a description of commitment and dispatch status, uplift eligibility and the ability to set price.[22] In the day-ahead energy market only pool scheduled resources are eligible for day-ahead operating reserve credits. A unit may be self scheduled in the day-ahead market and then be pool scheduled and dispatched in subsequent days to remain online, in which case they would be eligible for uplift for the subsequent days. In the real-time energy market only pool scheduled resources that follow PJM's dispatch are defined in the tariff as eligible for balancing operating reserve credits. However, in practice, units receive uplift credits when not following PJM's dispatch signal. Units are paid day-ahead operating reserve credits based on their scheduled operation for the entire day. Balancing operating reserve credits are paid on a segmented basis for each period defined by the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time. Resources receive day-ahead and balancing operating reserve credits only when they are eligible and unable to recover their operating cost for the day or segment. [23]

22 PJM has modified the basic rules of eligibility to set price using its CT price setting logic.
23 Resources do not recover their operating cost when market revenues for the day are less than the short run marginal cost defined by the startup, no load, and incremental offer curve.

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**Table 4-15 Dispatch status, commitment status and uplift eligibility[24]**

| | | Commitment Status | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dispatch Status | Dispatch Description | Self Scheduled (units committed by the generation owner) | Pool Scheduled and following PJM's dispatch signal (units committed by PJM) |
| Block Loaded | MWh offered to PJM as a single MWh block which is not dispatchable | Not eligible to receive uplift<br>Not eligible to set LMP | Eligible to receive uplift<br>Not eligible to set LMP unless fast start eligible |
| Economic Minimum | MWh from the nondispatchable economic minimum component for units that offer a dispatchable range to PJM | Not eligible to receive uplift<br>Not eligible to set LMP | Eligible to receive uplift<br>Not eligible to set LMP unless fast start eligible |
| Dispatchable | MWh above the economic minimum level for units that offer a dispatchable range to PJM. | Only eligible to receive LOC credits if dispatched down by PJM Eligible to set LMP | Eligible to receive uplift<br>Eligible to set LMP |

# Energy Uplift Issues

## Uplift Resettlement

Some units have been incorrectly paid uplift despite not meeting uplift eligibility requirements, including not following dispatch, not having the correct commitment status, or not operating with PLS offer parameters. The MMU has requested that PJM correctly resettle the uplift payments in these cases.[25] Since 2018, the cumulative resettlement requests total $17.9 million, of which PJM has agreed and resettled only $3.9 million over the last two years, 22.0 percent, and 0.9 percent are waiting for a PJM response. The remaining 77.1 percent occurred prior to July 2024 and are subject to the OATT's limitation on claims. That limit does not apply and would not have applied if PJM informed the market participant within two years of the occurrence of the issue.[26] PJM should inform market participants of a potential issue when the MMU raises the issue with PJM and the market participant in order to ensure that the issues can be addressed. PJM has refused to accept the voluntary return of incorrectly paid uplift credits by generators when the MMU has identified such cases.

The MMU identifies units that are not following dispatch and that are therefore not eligible to receive uplift payments. These findings are communicated to unit owners and to PJM. The units are identified by comparing their actual generation to the dispatch level that they should have achieved based on the real-time LMP, unit operating parameters (e.g. economic minimum, maximum and ramp rate) and energy offer.

## Uplift Forfeiture Rule

The uplift forfeiture rule was introduced in 2000 after PJM observed that in the summer of 1999 units could circumvent the $1,000/MWh offer cap by submitting high offers associated with a long minimum run time (e.g. 24 hours). The rule states that units will not be paid operating reserve credits (uplift) when they are scheduled on their price-based offers during maximum generation conditions and their effective energy offer price exceeds $1,000 per MWh.[27] Maximum generation conditions include maximum generation emergencies, maximum generation emergency alerts, and when PJM schedules units based on the anticipation of a maximum generation emergency or maximum generation emergency alert.

24 PJM allows block loaded CTs to set LMP by relaxing the economic minimum by 10 to 20 percent using CT price setting logic.
25 To date, the MMU has only requested resettlement of the most egregious cases.
26 OATT § 10.4.
27 See OA Schedule 1 Section 3.2.3 (m) Operating Reserves


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In 2026, PJM declared maximum generation conditions for January 27 and May 18-20. On January 27, during Winter Storm Fern, uplift forfeiture was triggered for some units in the day-ahead market but not in the balancing market. On May 18-20, uplift forfeiture was triggered for some units in the balancing market. The uplift forfeiture rule was triggered because these units received uplift that resulted in an effective energy payment that exceeded $1,000 per MWh. In 2025, PJM declared maximum generation conditions for January 22, June 23-25, July 15-16, July 24-25, and July 28-30. The uplift forfeiture rule was triggered on June 23-24, July 15-16, and July 24. As a result of the uplift forfeiture rule, some operating reserve uplift payments that would have been paid on the days uplift forfeiture was triggered were not paid.

## Regulation Market Offsets

PJM does not include regulation market payments as an offset like other market revenues in the operating reserve calculations, although it should be included. Including regulation market revenues would result in lower uplift. Table 4-16 shows that the regulation market revenues in the first six months of 2026 were $363.4 million and that the balancing generator credits for those units receiving regulation revenues were $44.3 million. The table shows that if the regulation market revenues had been incorporated in the operating reserve calculation as an offset, the balancing generator payment for those units would have been $41.0 million instead of $44.3 million, $3.3 million lower, or 7.4 percent. The impact of including the regulation market revenue as an offset in the uplift payment results in only a slight reduction in uplift payments because not all units receiving regulation market payments also received balancing operating reserve payments on the same days.

**Table 4-16 Adjusted operating reserve credits: January through June, 2026**

| Month | Regulation Market Revenues (Millions) | Balancing Generator Credits (Millions) | Adjusted Balancing Generator Credits (Millions) | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | $61.8 | $38.9 | $37.5 | ($1.4) |
| Feb | $79.0 | $2.6 | $1.5 | ($1.1) |
| Mar | $47.2 | $0.4 | $0.3 | ($0.1) |
| Apr | $46.6 | $1.0 | $0.7 | ($0.2) |
| May | $46.5 | $0.9 | $0.5 | ($0.4) |
| Jun | $82.3 | $0.5 | $0.4 | ($0.2) |
| Total | $363.4 | $44.3 | $41.0 | ($3.3) |

## Concentration of Energy Uplift Credits

The recipients of uplift payments are highly concentrated by unit and by company. This concentration results from a combination of unit operating parameters, PJM's persistent need to commit specific units out of merit in particular locations and the fact that a lack of full transparency has made it more difficult for competition to affect these payments.[28]

Table 4-17 shows the concentration of energy uplift credits by unit. During the first six months of 2026, the top 10 units received $407.7 million in energy uplift credits, 36.0 percent of total energy uplift credits. During the first six months of 2025, the top 10 units received $225.3 million in energy uplift credits, 39.6 percent of total energy uplift credits.

**Table 4-17 Top 10 units energy uplift credits: January through June, 2026**

| Category | Type | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Credits (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Credits (Millions) | Change | Percent Change | 2025 Share | 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day-Ahead | Generators | $171.0 | $232.3 | $61.3 | 35.8% | 97.7% | 97.2% |
| Balancing | Canceled Resources | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | (2.1%) | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Generators | $74.4 | $211.8 | $137.4 | 184.7% | 20.0% | 28.4% |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | $5.4 | $38.9 | $33.4 | 613.8% | 26.5% | 26.9% |
| | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.9 | $0.2 | ($0.7) | (75.5%) | 55.3% | 26.6% |
| | Total Balancing | $80.8 | $250.9 | $170.1 | 210.6% | 20.5% | 28.2% |
| Reactive Services | | $0.5 | $2.0 | $1.5 | 300.7% | 96.2% | 94.5% |
| Total | | $225.3 | $407.7 | $182.4 | 81.0% | 39.6% | 36.0% |

28 As a result of FERC Order No. 844, PJM began publishing total uplift credits by unit by month for credits paid on and after July 1, 2019, on September 10, 2019.

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Table 4-18 shows the concentration of uplift credits by company. During the first six months of 2026, the top 10 companies received $878.5 million in energy uplift credits, 77.6 percent of total energy uplift credits. During the first six months of 2025, the top 10 companies received $403.7 million in energy uplift credits, 70.9 percent of total energy uplift credits.

### Table 4-18 Top 10 orgs energy uplift credits: January through June, 2026

| Category | Type | (Jan - Jun) 2025 Credits (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Credits (Millions) | Change | Percent Change | 2025 Share | 2026 Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day-Ahead | Generators | $174.2 | $237.8 | $63.6 | 36.5% | 99.5% | 99.5% |
| Balancing | Canceled Resources | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | (2.1%) | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Generators | $233.6 | $568.2 | $334.6 | 143.3% | 62.9% | 76.2% |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | $14.1 | $105.4 | $91.3 | 648.4% | 68.5% | 73.1% |
| | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost | $1.4 | $0.6 | ($0.8) | (55.0%) | 81.8% | 72.2% |
| | Total Balancing | $249.1 | $674.3 | $425.2 | 170.7% | 63.3% | 75.7% |
| Reactive Services | | $0.5 | $2.2 | $1.6 | 307.8% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Total | | $403.7 | $878.5 | $474.7 | 117.6% | 70.9% | 77.6% |

## Unit Specific Uplift Payments

FERC Order No. 844 allows PJM and the MMU to publish unit specific uplift payments by category by month. Table 4-19 through Table 4-23 show the top 10 recipients of total uplift, day-ahead operating reserve credits, lost opportunity cost credits, and dispatch differential lost opportunity credits.

Chalk Point 3 and 4 are non-coal steam units in the PEPCO Zone with an ICAP of 582 MW each. In the first six months of 2026, the Chalk Point 3 and 4 units received a combined total of $228.3 million in uplift credits or 20.2 percent of total uplift credits, including $225.6 million in day-ahead operating reserve credits or 94.4 percent of total day-ahead operating reserve credits. In the first six months of 2025, the Chalk Point 3 and 4 units received a combined total of $147.6 million in uplift credits or 25.9 percent of total uplift credits, including $143.9 million in day-ahead operating reserve credits or 92.1 percent of total day-ahead operating reserve credits.

### Table 4-19 Top 10 recipients of total uplift: January through June, 2026

| Rank | Unit Name | Zone | Total Uplift Credit | Share of Total Uplift Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | PEP CHALKPOINT 4 F | PEPCO | $128,842,333 | 11.4% |
| 2 | PEP CHALKPOINT 3 F | PEPCO | $99,452,422 | 8.8% |
| 3 | JC REDOAK 1 CC | JCPL | $33,197,035 | 2.9% |
| 4 | ACE WEST DEPTFORD CROWN POINT 1 CC | AECO | $25,771,898 | 2.3% |
| 5 | PE PHILLIPS ISL LINWOOD 1 CC | PECO | $22,921,869 | 2.0% |
| 6 | COM 940 CORDOVA 3 CC | COMED | $21,134,698 | 1.9% |
| 7 | COM 900 ELWOOD 5 CT | COMED | $20,346,070 | 1.8% |
| 8 | BC BRANDON SHORES 2 F | BGE | $19,935,370 | 1.8% |
| 9 | BC BRANDON SHORES 1 F | BGE | $18,324,074 | 1.6% |
| 10 | BC WAGNER 3 F | BGE | $17,727,372 | 1.6% |
| Total of Top 10 | | | $407,653,140 | 36.0% |
| Total Uplift Credits | | | $1,132,483,901 | 100.0% |

### Table 4-20 Top 10 recipients of day-ahead generation credits: January through June, 2026

| Rank | Unit Name | Zone | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Credit | Share of Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | PEP CHALKPOINT 4 F | PEPCO | $128,107,905 | 53.6% |
| 2 | PEP CHALKPOINT 3 F | PEPCO | $97,503,498 | 40.8% |
| 3 | VP ROSEMARY IPP 1 F | DOM | $2,445,894 | 1.0% |
| 4 | PEP ST CHARLES-KELSON RIDGE 2 CC | PEPCO | $938,975 | 0.4% |
| 5 | PEP ST CHARLES-KELSON RIDGE 1 CC | PEPCO | $848,994 | 0.4% |
| 6 | PL MONTOUR 1 F | PPL | $604,212 | 0.3% |
| 7 | DPL VIENNA 8 F | DPL | $565,438 | 0.2% |
| 8 | ME BIRDSBORO 1 CC | METED | $432,756 | 0.2% |
| 9 | COM 951 AURORA 3 CT | COMED | $432,204 | 0.2% |
| 10 | COM 951 AURORA 1 CT | COMED | $422,063 | 0.2% |
| Total of Top 10 | | | $232,301,938 | 97.2% |
| Total day-ahead operating reserve credits | | | $239,081,312 | 100.0% |



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### Table 4-21 Top 10 recipients of balancing generator credits: January through June, 2026

| Rank | Unit Name | Zone | Balancing Generator Credits | Share of Balancing Generator Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | JC REDOAK 1 CC | JCPL | $33,141,109 | 13.9% |
| 2 | ACE WEST DEPTFORD CROWN POINT 1 CC | AECO | $25,759,175 | 10.8% |
| 3 | PE PHILLIPS ISL LINWOOD 1 CC | PECO | $22,843,662 | 9.6% |
| 4 | COM 940 CORDOVA 3 CC | COMED | $21,134,685 | 8.8% |
| 5 | COM 900 ELWOOD 5 CT | COMED | $20,342,925 | 8.5% |
| 6 | BC BRANDON SHORES 2 F | BGE | $19,898,100 | 8.3% |
| 7 | BC BRANDON SHORES 1 F | BGE | $18,283,928 | 7.6% |
| 8 | BC WAGNER 3 F | BGE | $17,727,189 | 7.4% |
| 9 | COM 900 ELWOOD 7 CT | COMED | $17,125,465 | 7.2% |
| 10 | DPL ROCK SPRINGS CT4 | DPL | $15,515,152 | 6.5% |
| Total of Top 10 | | | $211,771,392 | 28.4% |
| Total balancing operating reserve credits | | | $746,057,677 | 100.0% |

### Table 4-22 Top 10 recipients of lost opportunity cost credits: January through June, 2026

| Rank | Unit Name | Zone | Lost Opportunity Cost Credits | Share of Lost Opportunity Cost Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | PEP DICKERSON H 1 CT | PEPCO | $5,298,713 | 3.7% |
| 2 | VP FOUR RIVERS 1 CT | DOM | $4,805,431 | 3.3% |
| 3 | VP LOUISA 5 CT | DOM | $4,254,233 | 2.9% |
| 4 | VP MARSHRUN 1 CT | DOM | $4,115,511 | 2.9% |
| 5 | PEP DICKERSON H 2 CT | PEPCO | $4,019,366 | 2.8% |
| 6 | VP MARSHRUN 3 CT | DOM | $3,753,919 | 2.6% |
| 7 | VP DOSWELL 2 CT | DOM | $3,748,518 | 2.6% |
| 8 | AEP AMOS 3 F | AEP | $3,614,687 | 2.5% |
| 9 | VP MARSHRUN 2 CT | DOM | $2,644,660 | 1.8% |
| 10 | VP LADYSMYTH 5 CT | DOM | $2,630,513 | 1.8% |
| Total of Top 10 | | | $38,885,550 | 26.9% |
| Total lost opportunity cost credits | | | $144,297,869 | 100.0% |

### Table 4-23 Top 10 recipients of dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits: January through June, 2026

| Rank | Unit Name | Zone | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost Credits | Share of Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VP BATH COUNTY 1-6 H | DOM | $33,758 | 3.9% |
| 2 | AP BATH COUNTY 1-6 H | DOM | $32,104 | 3.7% |
| 3 | VP DOSWELL 2 CT | DOM | $28,910 | 3.3% |
| 4 | VP ROANOKE RAPIDS 1-4 H | DOM | $23,930 | 2.7% |
| 5 | VP LOUISA 5 CT | DOM | $23,857 | 2.7% |
| 6 | PEP CHALKPOINT 4 CT | PEPCO | $21,644 | 2.5% |
| 7 | PEP CHALKPOINT 3 CT | PEPCO | $20,788 | 2.4% |
| 8 | AEP SMITH MOUNT 1-5 H | AEP | $16,020 | 1.8% |
| 9 | VP MARSHRUN 1 CT | DOM | $15,637 | 1.8% |
| 10 | VP MARSHRUN 3 CT | DOM | $15,117 | 1.7% |
| Total of Top 10 | | | $231,767 | 26.6% |
| Total dispatch differential lost opportunity cost credits | | | $872,546 | 100.0% |

## Reliability Must Run Units

Brandon Shores 1 and 2 are coal units in BGE with an ICAP of 635 MW and 638 MW. Wagner 3 and 4 are oil units in BGE with an ICAP of 305 MW and 397 MW.

Brandon Shores 1 and Brandon Shores 2 and Wagner 3 and Wagner 4 submitted retirement notifications to PJM and the MMU in April and October of 2023. PJM determined that these resources were needed for reliability until transmission upgrades can be completed. Brandon Shores 1 and Brandon Shores 2 and Wagner 3 and Wagner 4 began providing Reliability Must Run (RMR) Service on June 1, 2025.[29] [30] When PJM requests the units to operate, they are paid LMP and receive uplift as balancing generator credits.

In the first six months of 2026, the units providing RMR service received a combined $67.7 million in uplift credits or 6.0 percent of total uplift credits and $19.9 million in day-ahead generator credits. During the first six months of 2025, the units providing RMR service received a combined $31.1 million in uplift credits or 5.5 percent of total uplift credits and $0.0 million in day-

29 See further discussion of RMR units in the 2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June, Section 5: Capacity Market, at p 105.

30 See 191 FERC ¶ 61,098 (2025), reh'g denied, 191 FERC ¶ 62,189 (2025).

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ahead generator credits. The shift from day-ahead generator credits to balancing generator credits was a result of the RMR service. When providing RMR service the units are made unavailable in the day-ahead and real time markets and are committed by PJM for reliability. With no day-ahead commitment the units are paid uplift in the balancing market.

Table 4-24 shows Pre-RMR and RMR uplift credits for Brandon Shores 1 and Brandon Shores 2 and Wagner 3 and Wagner 4 in 2025 and during the first six months of 2026. In the first five months of 2025, Brandon Shores 1 and Brandon Shores 2 and Wagner 3 and Wagner 4 were capacity resources in the PJM market and received a total of $19.9 million in day-ahead generator credits and $3.7 million in balancing generator credits. In the last seven months of 2025, Brandon Shores 1 and Brandon Shores 2 and Wagner 3 and Wagner 4 began providing RMR service and received $0.0 million in day-ahead generator credits and $41.4 million in balancing generator credits. During the first six months of 2026, Brandon Shores 1 and Brandon Shores 2 and Wagner 3 and Wagner 4 received $0.0 million in day-ahead generator credits, $67.6 million in balancing generator credits and $0.1 million in lost opportunity cost credits.

### Table 4-24 Uplift credits for Brandon Shores and Wagner by RMR status

| RMR Status | | Unit | Day-Ahead Generator Credits (Millions) | Balancing Generator Credits (Millions) | Lost Opportunity Cost Credits (Millions) | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost Credits (Millions) | Total Credits (Millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Pre-RMR (Jan - May) | BC WAGNER 3 F | $3.3 | $0.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $3.5 |
| | | BC WAGNER 4 F | $1.5 | $0.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.9 |
| | | BC BRANDON SHORES 1 F | $6.5 | $1.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $7.7 |
| | | BC BRANDON SHORES 2 F | $8.6 | $1.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $10.5 |
| | | Total | $19.9 | $3.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $23.6 |
| | RMR (Jun - Dec) | BC WAGNER 3 F | $0.0 | $9.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $9.4 |
| | | BC WAGNER 4 F | $0.0 | $1.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.7 |
| | | BC BRANDON SHORES 1 F | $0.0 | $20.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $20.8 |
| | | BC BRANDON SHORES 2 F | $0.0 | $9.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $9.5 |
| | | Total | $0.0 | $41.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $41.4 |
| 2026 | RMR (Jan - Jun) | BC WAGNER 3 F | $0.0 | $17.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $17.7 |
| | | BC WAGNER 4 F | $0.0 | $11.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $11.7 |
| | | BC BRANDON SHORES 1 F | $0.0 | $18.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $18.3 |
| | | BC BRANDON SHORES 2 F | $0.0 | $19.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $19.9 |
| | | Total | $0.0 | $67.6 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $67.7 |


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## Department of Energy (DOE) 202(c) Orders

Eddystone 3 and 4 are dual fuel (natural gas and oil) steam units in PECO with an ICAP of 380 MW each.

Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 planned to retire on May 31, 2025. On May 30, 2025, the DOE ordered that the operational availability and economic dispatch of Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 were necessary to meet resource adequacy and serve the public interest.[31] Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 remained in operation and are currently scheduled to continue operation until August 22, 2026.[32] Eddystone 3 and 4 are not offered into the day-ahead energy market. When PJM requests the units to operate, they are paid LMP and receive uplift as balancing generator credits.

Table 4-25 shows Pre-202(c) and 202(c) uplift credits for Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 in 2025 and during the first six months of 2026. In the first five months of 2025, Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 were capacity resources in the PJM market and received a total of $3.8 million in balancing generator credits. In the last seven months of 2025, Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 remained in operation due to the 202(c) orders and received $0.9 million in balancing generator credits. During the first six months of 2026, Eddystone 3 and Eddystone 4 remained in operation due to the 202(c) order and received $0.6 million in balancing generator credits.

### Table 4-25 Uplift credits for Eddystone by 202(c) status

| 202(c) Status | | Unit | Day-Ahead Generator Credits (Millions) | Balancing Generator Credits (Millions) | Lost Opportunity Cost Credits (Millions) | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost Credits (Millions) | Total Credits (Millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Pre-202(c) (Jan - May) | PE EDDYSTONE 3 F | $0.0 | $2.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $2.0 |
| | | PE EDDYSTONE 4 F | $0.0 | $1.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.8 |
| | | Total | $0.0 | $3.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $3.8 |
| | 202(c) (Jun - Dec) | PE EDDYSTONE 3 F | $0.0 | $0.4 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $0.5 |
| | | PE EDDYSTONE 4 F | $0.0 | $0.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.5 |
| | | Total | $0.0 | $0.9 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $1.0 |
| 2026 | 202(c) (Jan - Jun) | PE EDDYSTONE 3 F | $0.0 | $0.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.3 |
| | | PE EDDYSTONE 4 F | $0.0 | $0.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.3 |
| | | Total | $0.0 | $0.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.6 |

31 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
32 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-24 (May 21, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-emergency-order-202-26-24>.

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## Uplift Credits and Market Power Mitigation

Absent effectively implemented market power mitigation, unit owners that submit noncompetitive offers or offers with inflexible operating parameters, can exercise market power, resulting in noncompetitive and excessive uplift payments.

The three pivotal supplier (TPS) test is the test for local structural market power in the energy market.[33] If the TPS test is failed, market power mitigation is applied by offer capping the resources of the owners identified as having local market power to their cost-based offer. Offer capping is designed to set offers at competitive levels.

Table 4-26 shows day-ahead operating reserve credits paid to committed and dispatched units called on the first six months of 2026, classified by commitment schedule type. Units using price-based offers with parameter limited schedules received $1.0 million or 0.4 percent of day-ahead operating reserve credits in the first six months of 2026, units using price-based offers received $5.8 million or 2.4 percent, and units using cost-based offers received $232.2 or 97.1 percent.

### Table 4-26 Day-ahead operating reserve credits by Offer Type: January through June, 2026

| Offer Type | Day Ahead Operating Reserve Credits (Millions) | Share of DAOR |
|---|---|---|
| Cost | $232.2 | 97.1% |
| Price | $5.8 | 2.4% |
| Price PLS | $1.0 | 0.4% |
| Total | $239.1 | 100.0% |

Table 4-27 shows day-ahead operating reserve credits paid to units called on days with hot and cold weather alerts, classified by commitment schedule type. On weather alert days, PJM can require the use of parameter limited schedules (PLS) to prevent the exercise of market power through the use of inflexible parameters. Of all the day-ahead credits received during days with weather alerts, 97.7 percent went to units that were committed on cost schedules, which are parameter limited, 0.2 percent went to units that were committed on price PLS schedules, 1.5 percent went to units committed on price schedules less flexible than PLS, and 0.6 percent on price schedules as flexible as PLS. In the first six months of 2026, including both cost and price schedules, 98.5 percent of day-ahead credits received during days with weather alerts went to units that were committed on a schedule that was as flexible as PLS. These results indicate a significant change in PJM's commitment approach during weather alerts. In 2024, PJM committed 17.2 percent of units on schedules less flexible than PLS during weather alert days. Starting in 2025, PJM began scheduling units in advance of the day-ahead market to ensure reliability. In 2025, PJM committed only 1.5 percent of units on schedules less flexible than PLS during weather alert days. During the first six months of 2026, PJM committed 1.5 percent of units on schedules less flexible than PLS during weather alert days.

### Table 4-27 Day-ahead operating reserve credits during weather alerts by commitment schedule: January through June, 2026

| Commitment Type During Hot and Cold Weather Alerts | Day Ahead Operating Reserve Credits ($Millions) | Share of DAOR during emergency alerts |
|---|---|---|
| Committed on cost (cost capped) | $156.4 | 97.7% |
| Committed on price schedule as flexible as PLS | $0.3 | 0.2% |
| Committed on price schedule less flexible than PLS | $2.4 | 1.5% |
| Committed on price PLS | $1.0 | 0.6% |
| Total | $160.2 | 100.0% |

Gas fired generators may request temporary exceptions to parameter limits such as minimum run time based on restrictions imposed by natural gas pipelines, including ratable takes.[34] Temporary exceptions apply to cost based schedules and price based PLS schedules. In Table 4-26, units with temporary exceptions can be included in the committed on cost, committed on price PLS, and committed on price schedule as flexible as PLS categories. Table 4-28 shows the day-ahead operating reserve uplift credits received from 2018 through the first six months of 2026 by units that submitted parameter exception requests for a 24 hour minimum run time based on gas pipeline restrictions. In the first six months of 2026, 97 units requested an exception for a 24 hour minimum run time and 82 units received uplift payments

33 See the MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets, at "Three Pivotal Supplier Test" for a more detailed explanation of the three pivotal supplier test. <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

34 See OA Schedule 1 Section 6.6 (C) Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules.



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amounting to $228.1 million of day ahead operating reserves and $264.3 million in balancing operating reserves, or 95.4 percent of total day-ahead operating reserves and 35.4 percent of total balancing operating reserves, corresponding to 20.1 percent and 23.3 percent of total uplift.

**Table 4-28 Uplift credits for units with 24 hour minimum run times due to gas pipeline restrictions: 2018 through June 2026**

| Year | Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Credits (Millions) | Balancing Generator Credits (Millions) | Number of Units with 24 Hour Min Run Time Exceptions | Number of Units with 24 Hour Min Run Time Exceptions that Received Uplift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | $4.9 | $0.7 | 25 | 2 |
| 2019 | $0.2 | $0.6 | 37 | 12 |
| 2020 | $0.2 | $0.2 | 13 | 2 |
| 2021 | $0.7 | $0.6 | 61 | 42 |
| 2022 | $14.4 | $9.8 | 81 | 38 |
| 2023 | $10.7 | $1.5 | 75 | 23 |
| 2024 | $30.2 | $2.4 | 79 | 41 |
| 2025 | $149.4 | $31.7 | 93 | 64 |
| 2026 (Jan - Jun) | $228.1 | $264.3 | 97 | 82 |

## Winter Storm Fern (January 22 through 30, 2026)

Winter Storm Fern is defined to include the meteorological definition of the storm plus related cold weather from January 22 through 30, 2026. Winter Storm Fern resulted in significant uplift payments. Table 4-29 summarizes the uplift payments by category during Winter Storm Fern. During the storm, generating units received $107.9 million in day-ahead operating reserve credits, 14.0 percent of total Winter Storm Fern uplift and 45.1 percent of total day-ahead operating reserves during the first six months of 2026. During the storm, generating units received $576.2 million in balancing generator credits, 75.1 percent of total Winter Storm Fern uplift, and 77.2 percent of total balancing generator credits during the first six months of 2026. Total uplift payments during the storm were $767.8 million, 67.8 percent of total uplift during the first six months of 2026.

**Table 4-29 Energy uplift credits by category during Winter Storm Fern**

| Category | Type | 2026 Winter Storm Fern Credits (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Credits (Millions) | Share of Winter Storm Fern Uplift (Jan 22-30) | Winter Storm Fern Share of 2026 uplift (Jan - Jun) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day-Ahead | Generators | $107.9 | $239.1 | 14.0% | 45.1% |
| Balancing | Generators | $576.2 | $746.1 | 75.1% | 77.2% |
| | Canceled Resources | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | $83.6 | $144.3 | 10.9% | 57.9% |
| | Dispatch Differential Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.1 | $0.9 | 0.0% | 13.1% |
| Synchronous Condensing | Synchronous Condensing | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| | Synchronous Condensing Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| Reactive Services | Generators | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| | Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.0 | $2.1 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Condensing | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Condensing Lost Opportunity Cost | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | NA |
| Total | | $767.8 | $1,132.5 | 100.0% | 67.8% |

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Uplift during Winter Storm Fern was a result of advance commitments made by PJM in anticipation of the cold weather. PJM made advance commitments for the January 24 – February 2 operating days. These commitments were made before day-ahead energy market offers were due. Some of the units cleared the day-ahead energy market and did not require uplift payments because their offers were covered by the day-ahead LMP. The rest of the units committed in advance that did not clear the day-ahead energy market received balancing operating reserves credits because their offers were not fully covered by the real-time LMP. PJM made these commitments to mitigate generator performance risks based on available information about startup and operating uncertainty due to expected cold temperatures, natural gas supply illiquidity, and efforts to conserve oil fired generation in order to meet the forecasted peaks.[35] PJM also committed specific units in advance of the day-ahead market to ensure transmission system reliability, including voltage support.

As a result of the low temperatures expected on Saturday, January 24 and subsequent days, PJM committed units before temperatures reached the expected levels. On Friday, January 23, natural gas traded as a multiday package, referred to as the weekend package. The weekend package included gas days January 24, 25, and 26, covering the period from 10:00 AM on Saturday, January 24, to 10:00 AM on Tuesday, January 27. PJM committed units on Friday to ensure that the units could procure gas over the weekend. For the same reasons, PJM also committed gas units in advance of the January 27 to January 30 gas days, and in advance of the January 31 through February 2 weekend package.

Table 4-30 shows the total energy uplift credits by unit type during Winter Storm Fern, as a share of total uplift in the first six months of 2026, and as a share of total Fern uplift. Combined cycle plants received $226.1 million in uplift payments, non-coal steam units received $120.7 million and combustion turbines received $402.1 million. Winter Storm Fern accounted for 89.5 percent of the uplift received by combined cycle plants during the first six months of 2026, and during the storm combined cycle plants received 29.4 percent of the uplift.

### Table 4-30 Total energy uplift credits by unit type during the 2026 Winter Storm Fern

| Unit Type | 2026 Winter Storm Fern Credits (Millions) | (Jan - Jun) 2026 Credits (Millions) | Share of Winter Storm Fern Uplift (Jan. 22 - 30) | Winter Storm Fern Share of 2026 uplift (Jan - Jun) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combined Cycle | $226.1 | $252.6 | 29.4% | 89.5% |
| Combustion Turbine | $402.1 | $529.3 | 52.4% | 76.0% |
| Diesel | $1.6 | $3.5 | 0.2% | 45.5% |
| Hydro | $0.0 | $0.1 | 0.0% | 10.6% |
| Nuclear | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Solar | $0.0 | $1.6 | 0.0% | 0.3% |
| Steam - Coal | $16.5 | $62.1 | 2.1% | 26.5% |
| Steam - Other | $120.7 | $280.3 | 15.7% | 43.0% |
| Wind | $0.8 | $2.9 | 0.1% | 28.1% |
| Total | $767.8 | $1,132.5 | 100.0% | 67.8% |

35 **See** "Winter Storm Gerri Review January 13–22, 2024," PJM presentation to the Operating Committee. (February 8, 2024). <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2024/20240208/20240208-item-11---cold-weather-update.pdf>.



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During Winter Storm Fern not all units scheduled in advance of the day-ahead market were paid uplift. Table 4-31 shows the distribution of energy uplift credits during Winter Storm Fern. Uplift was concentrated in ComEd, where 59 CT and CC units with a combined ICAP of 4,984.7 MW received $247.5 million in uplift, or 32.2 percent of Winter Storm Fern uplift. Excluding ComEd, the top ten unit recipients of uplift in total Winter Storm Fern had a combined ICAP of 5,080.8 MW and received $254.9 million, or 33.2 percent of Winter Storm Fern uplift. A total of 633 units received uplift during Winter Storm Fern.

**Table 4-31 Total energy uplift credits concentration in ComED and other Top 10 units during the 2026 Winter Storm Fern**

| Category | Units | Total ICAP | Uplift | Unit Share | ICAP Share | Uplift Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ComED CT & CC | 59 | 4,984.7 | $247.50 | 9.3% | 4.6% | 32.2% |
| Top 10 non ComED units | 10 | 5,080.8 | $254.86 | 1.6% | 4.6% | 33.2% |
| All other units | 564 | 99,308.1 | $265.43 | 89.1% | 90.8% | 34.6% |
| Total | 633 | 109,373.6 | $767.79 | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

PJM's advanced commitment process during Winter Storm Fern was successful in mitigating risk and ensuring reliability. While the uplift associated with this strategy was expected, improvements are needed to make the advance commitment process more predictable, formalized, and as market based as possible in order to limit uplift to an efficient level.

The MMU recommends that PJM improve its advanced scheduling and commitment process in order to implement a transparent process in which units are scheduled and committed economically based on the known constraints prior to the day-ahead market. The multiday advance commitment process needs to address the communication process, the offers used for commitment evaluation, the operating parameters used for commitment evaluation, the financial consequences of commitment and the appropriate uplift rules.[36]

36 **See** "Advanced Scheduling Proposal," Monitoring Analytics presentation to the Market Implementation Committee. (August 5, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/presentations/2026/IMM_MIC_Advanced_Scheduling_Proposal_20260805.pdf>.

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# 5 Capacity Market

In PJM, the capacity market exists to make the energy market work. Energy powers lights and computers and air conditioners. Capacity does not power anything. The capacity market needs to define the total MWh of energy that are needed to reliably serve load. The capacity market needs to provide the missing money. A primary reason to have a capacity market is that the energy market does not provide adequate net revenues to provide incentives for entry and for maintaining existing units. The obligation of load serving entities (LSEs) to own capacity equal to the peak demand plus a reserve margin was a longstanding feature of the PJM Operating Agreement before the creation of the PJM markets. The initial impetus to a capacity market in PJM, a request by the Pennsylvania PUC, was to support retail competition by ensuring that small new entrant competitive LSEs would have access to capacity at a competitive price in the PJM capacity market without having to build capacity or purchase capacity bilaterally from incumbent generation owners at monopoly prices. The PJM Capacity Market was created by FERC in order to prevent the exercise of market power that resulted from a bilateral market in which the ownership of capacity was concentrated. That logic continues to apply today. The first PJM Capacity Market, the daily capacity market, created in 1999, was replaced in 2007 by the current design based on the recognition that the energy market resulted in a shortfall in net revenues compared to that necessary to attract and retain adequate resources for the reliable operation of the energy market, the missing money. The exogenous reliability requirement to have a level of capacity in excess of the level that would result from the operation of an energy market alone reduces the level and volatility of energy market prices and reduces the duration of high energy market prices. This reduces net revenue to generation owners which reduces the incentive to invest. In order for the PJM markets to be self sustaining, the net revenues from PJM energy, ancillary services and capacity markets must be adequate for those resources. That adequacy requires a capacity market. The capacity market plays the essential role of equilibrating the revenues necessary to incent competitive entry and exit of the resources needed for reliability, with the revenues from the energy and ancillary services markets.

A number of PJM's recent changes to the capacity market design are antithetical to the purpose of the capacity market and serve to undermine that purpose.

The only goal of the detailed design of the capacity market is to ensure that the opportunity for that revenue equilibration exists through a competitive process. PJM's most recent filing to modify the definition of the capacity market demand curve (VRR curve) explicitly fails to recognize that equilibration logic and undercuts that revenue equilibration mechanism by failing to include a full net revenue offset in the definition of the maximum price on the demand curve.

The Capacity Performance (CP) design was a radical change to the capacity market paradigm. The CP design is a failed experiment. The fundamental mistake of the CP design was to attempt to recreate energy market incentives in the capacity market. The CP model was an explicit attempt to bring energy market shortage pricing into the capacity market design. The CP model was designed on the unfounded assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The initial CP design replaced the definition of a competitive offer, net avoidable costs or the marginal cost of capacity, with a definition equal to the scarcity price, Net CONE. PJM's initial CP design permitted the exercise of market power based on the mistaken idea that the markets needed scarcity pricing all the time and the mistaken idea that Net CONE should be the price in every auction.[1]

PJM's introduction of its significantly modified ELCC method in the 2025/2026 BRA was another radical change to the capacity market design. While it is a good idea to evaluate unit specific performance and a good idea to recognize that risk occurs in the winter as well as the summer and that risks may be correlated, ELCC was implemented before it could be fully tested and unintended consequences evaluated. The results of the 2025/2026 BRA and subsequent BRAs illustrate the extreme sensitivity of the market outcomes to

1 176 FERC ¶ 61,137 (September 2, 2021), ***order on reh'g***, 178 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2022); ***appeal denied***, Vistra Corp. v FERC, Case Nos 21-1214 et al (D.C. Cir August 15, 2023).

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a range of assumptions and decisions about market design details that were not adequately tested or reviewed with stakeholders.[2]

The challenge is to create a straightforward capacity market design that meets the simple objectives of a capacity market and that does not become a vehicle for energy market incentives or rent seeking or attempts to limit the ways in which specific types of generation participate in PJM markets. Energy market incentives should remain in the energy market.

The PJM market design is based on the must offer and must buy obligations of capacity resources. All capacity resources are required to offer into the capacity auctions. The categorical exemption for intermittent resources, capacity storage resources, and hybrid resources from the RPM must offer requirement was eliminated for all resources except demand resources in February 2025.[3] All LSEs must buy capacity equal to their peak load plus a reserve margin through the market.

Each organization serving PJM load must meet its capacity obligations through the PJM Capacity Market, where load serving entities (LSEs) must pay the locational capacity price for their zone. LSEs can also construct generation and offer it into the capacity market, enter into bilateral contracts, develop demand resources and offer them into the capacity market, or construct transmission upgrades and offer them into the capacity market.

PJM's current proposal to address the problems resulting from data center load continue on PJM's path of proposing changes to the capacity market design that are antithetical to the purpose of the capacity market and serve to undermine that purpose.[4] PJM's proposals would reverse 26 years of LSEs relying on the capacity market to cover their reliability obligations by requiring LSEs to enter into bilaterals and to hedge their positions based on PJM's view of an appropriate hedge. PJM's proposals abandon single clearing price logic. PJM's proposals abandon market power mitigation and fail to recognize and address the structural market power endemic to the capacity market.

There are significant market design issues in the PJM Capacity Market that currently prevent the market from achieving competitive results.

One of the most important issues currently facing the PJM Capacity Market is the addition of large amounts of data center load, both actual and forecast. The MMU concludes that the failure to recognize and address the role of large data center loads is a direct cause of higher prices and will continue to result in even higher prices unless the related issues are addressed. PJM should not simply permit the interconnection of large data center loads if it cannot do so reliably, with adequate generation capacity to meet those loads. Data centers should be required to directly contract for their own new generation rather than imposing their costs on other customers.

The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed market design, market structure, participant conduct and market performance in the PJM Capacity Market, including supply, demand, concentration ratios, pivotal suppliers, volumes, prices, outage rates and reliability.[5] The conclusions for 2025 and the first six months of 2026 are a result of the MMU's evaluation of the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 Base Residual Auctions.[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]

2 The MMU prepared a series of reports on the 2025/2026, 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 BRA results which can be found on the Monitoring Analytics website here: <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024.shtml>; <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025.shtml>; and <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026.shtml>.

3 FERC approved extending the RPM must offer requirement to intermittent resources, capacity storage resources, and hybrid resources but not to demand resources on February 20, 2025. 190 FERC ¶ 61,117.

4 See *Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from Large Loads*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026).

5 The values stated in this report for the RTO and LDAs refer to the aggregate level including all nested LDAs unless otherwise specified. For example, RTO values include the entire PJM market and all LDAs. Rest of RTO values are RTO values net of nested LDA values.

6 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," (September 20, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20240920.pdf>.

7 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part B," (October 15, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20241015.pdf>.

8 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part C," (October 15, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_C_20241106.pdf>.

9 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part D," (December 6, 2024) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_D_20241206.pdf>.

10 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part E," (January 31, 2025). <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_E_20250131.pdf>.

11 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part F," (February 4, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_F_20250204.pdf>.

12 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part G Revised," (June 3, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_G_20250603_Revised.pdf>.

13 See "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part H," (July 31, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_H_20250731.pdf>.

14 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," (October 1, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20251001.pdf>.

15 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part B," (March 3, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20260303.pdf>.

16 See "Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A," (January 5, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf>.

17 See "Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part B," (July 9, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20260709.pdf>.


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**Table 5-1 The capacity market results were not competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Not Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Not Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Mixed** |

- The aggregate market structure was evaluated as not competitive. For almost all auctions held from 2007 to the present, the PJM capacity market failed the three pivotal supplier test (TPS), which is conducted at the time of the auction.[18] Structural market power is endemic to the capacity market.
- The local market structure was evaluated as not competitive. For almost every auction held, all LDAs have failed the TPS test, which is conducted at the time of the auction.[19]
- Participant behavior was evaluated as not competitive in the 2026/2027 and the 2027/2028 BRA. Effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the market seller offer cap definition was modified to include unit specific standalone Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk (CPQR) and segmented unit specific offer caps.[20] The offers in the 2026/2027 BRA included those based on standalone CPQR offer caps. The offers in the 2027/2028 BRA did not include those based on standalone CPQR offer caps. Market power mitigation measures were applied when the capacity market seller failed the market power test for the auction, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, would increase the market clearing price.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive based on the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Base Residual Auctions as a result of the flaws in the Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) design including the failure to correctly define the reliability contribution of thermal resources in the winter, and the failure to recognize and address the role of large data center loads is a direct cause of higher prices and will continue to result in even higher prices unless the related issues are addressed.
- Market design was evaluated as mixed because while there are many positive features of the capacity market design and some of the MMU's recommendations were implemented in the 2026/2027 BRA, there are several features of the RPM design which still threaten competitive outcomes. These include the lack of a queue for the addition of large new data center loads, details of PJM's ELCC implementation, the definition of market seller offer caps, the failure to apply the RPM must offer requirement to demand resources, the inclusion of performance assessment interval (PAI) penalties, the use of Gross CONE as the maximum price on the VRR curve, the definition of DR which permits inferior products to substitute for capacity, the replacement capacity issue, the definition of unit offer parameters, and the inclusion of imports which are not substitutes for internal capacity resources.[21]

# Overview

## RPM Capacity Market

### Market Design

The Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) Capacity Market is a three year forward looking, annual, locational market, with a must offer requirement for Existing Generation Capacity Resources and a must buy requirement for load, with performance incentives, that includes clear market power mitigation rules and that permits the direct participation of demand side resources.[22] PJM introduced the Capacity Performance design for the 2017/2018 BRA. PJM introduced a new ELCC method for defining capacity MW offered in the 2025/2026 BRA.[23]

18 In the 2008/2009 RPM Third Incremental Auction, 18 participants in the RTO market passed the TPS test. In the 2018/2019 RPM Second Incremental Auction, 35 participants in the RTO market passed the test. In the 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction, 36 participants in the RTO passed the TPS test.

19 In the 2012/2013 RPM Base Residual Auction, six participants included in the incremental supply of EMAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction, seven participants in the incremental supply in MAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2021/2022 RPM First Incremental Auction, two participants in the incremental supply in EMAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2021/2022 RPM Second Incremental Auction, two participants in the incremental supply in EMAAC passed the TPS test. In the 2023/2024 RPM Third Incremental Auction, eight participants in MAAC passed the TPS test.

20 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (2025).

21 While PJM filed for and FERC accepted the inclusion of RMR resources Brandon Shores and Wagner plants in the 2026/2027 through 2028/2029 BRAs, that does not require that RMR resources be included in capacity market auction clearing in future auctions for these or other RMR resources. See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-682-001 (April 29, 2025). See also 193 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2025).

22 The terms *PJM Region*, *RTO Region* and *RTO* are synonymous in this report and include all capacity within the PJM footprint.

23 See 186 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2024), *reh'g order*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2024).

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Under RPM, capacity obligations are annual.[24] By design, Base Residual Auctions (BRA) are held for delivery years that are three years in the future despite recent auction delays. First, Second and Third Incremental Auctions (IA) are held for each delivery year.[25] First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions are conducted 20, 10, and three months prior to the delivery year although some incremental auctions have not been held as a result of delays in holding BRAs.[26] A Conditional Incremental Auction may be held if there is a need to procure additional capacity resulting from a delay in a planned large transmission upgrade that was modeled in the BRA for the relevant delivery year.[27] A Reliability Backstop Auction may be conducted if tariff defined criteria are met to resolve reliability criteria violations caused by lack of sufficient capacity procured through RPM auctions.[28] If the installed reserve margin resulting from the total UCAP committed through self supply or BRAs for three consecutive years is more than one percentage point lower than the approved PJM installed reserve margin, PJM will make a filing with FERC to conduct a Reliability Backstop Auction. If the total UCAP committed for all base load generation resources in BRAs for three consecutive years is less than the forecasted minimum hourly load, PJM will make a filing with FERC to conduct a Reliability Backstop Auction. PJM has proposed significant changes to the tariff to create a new set of rules for a Reliability Backstop Auction.[29]

The 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted in the first six months of 2026.

## Market Structure

- **RPM Installed Capacity.** In the first six months of 2026, RPM installed capacity decreased 347.0 MW or 0.2 percent, from 184,220.8 MW on January 1, to 183,873.8 MW on June 30. Installed capacity includes net capacity imports and exports and can vary on a daily basis.
- **Reserves.** Total reserves on June 1, 2026, were 20,843.9 MW, which is 279.2 MW (UCAP) short of the required reserve level of 21,123.1 MW (UCAP). On June 1, 2026, the target installed reserve margin was 18.6 percent, and the actual reserve margin was only 18.4 percent.
- **RPM Installed Capacity by Fuel Type.** Of the total installed capacity on June 30, 2026, 48.0 percent was gas; 20.0 percent was coal; 17.6 percent was nuclear; 4.5 percent was hydroelectric; 2.3 percent was oil; 1.9 percent was wind; 0.3 percent was solid waste; and 5.4 percent was solar.
- **Market Concentration.** In the 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction, all participants in the total PJM market as well as the LDA RPM markets failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test.[30] Offer caps were applied to all sell offers for resources which were subject to mitigation when the capacity market seller did not pass the test, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, increased the market clearing price.[31] [32] [33]
- **Imports and Exports.** Of the 1,144.8 MW of imports offered in the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, 1,005.9 MW cleared. Of the cleared imports, 695.6 MW (69.2 percent) were from MISO.
- **Demand Resources.** Committed DR was 4,805.8 MW for June 1, 2026, as a result of cleared capacity for demand resources in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year (5,710.3 MW) less replacement capacity (904.5 MW).

## Market Conduct

- 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction. Of the 985 generation resources that submitted Capacity Performance offers, unit specific offer caps were calculated for four generation resources (0.4 percent).

24 Effective for the 2020/2021 and subsequent delivery years, the RPM market design incorporated seasonal capacity resources. Summer period and winter period capacity must be matched either through commercial aggregation or through the optimization in equal MW amounts in the LDA or the lowest common parent LDA.
25 See 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 at P 86 (2009).
26 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER10-366-000 (January 22, 2010).
27 See 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 at P 88 (2009). There have been no Conditional Incremental Auctions.
28 See OATT Attachment DD § 16.
29 See *Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from Large Loads*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026).
30 There are 27 Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) identified to recognize locational constraints as defined in "Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region," Schedule 10.1. PJM determines, in advance of each BRA, whether the defined LDAs will be modeled in the given delivery year using the rules defined in OATT Attachment DD § 5.10(a)(ii).
31 See OATT Attachment DD § 6.5.
32 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE resources were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 at P 30 (2009).
33 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource and creating a new definition for Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a generation capacity resource the same in terms of mitigation as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).


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## Market Performance

- The 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted in the first six months of 2026. The weighted average capacity price for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year is $324.88 per MW-day, including all RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The weighted average capacity price for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year is $333.44 per MW-day, including all RPM auctions for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year.
- For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, RPM annual charges to load are $14.9 billion.
- In the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, the market performance was determined to be not competitive.

## Part V Reliability Service (RMR)

- Of the nine companies (28 units) that have provided service following deactivation requests, two companies (seven units) filed to be paid under the deactivation avoidable cost rate (DACR), the formula rate. The other seven companies (21 units) filed to be paid under the cost of service recovery rate.

## Generator Performance

- Forced Outage Rates. The average PJM EFORd in the first six months of 2026 was 8.4 percent, an increase from 6.2 percent in the first six months of 2025.[34]
- **Generator Performance Factors.** The PJM aggregate equivalent availability factor in the first six months of 2026 was 79.9 percent, a decrease from 81.6 percent in the first six months of 2025.

34 The generator performance analysis includes all PJM capacity resources for which there are data in the PJM generator availability data systems (GADS) database. Data was downloaded from the PJM GADS database on July 22, 2026. EFORd data presented in state of the market reports may be revised based on data submitted after the publication of the reports as generation owners may submit corrections at any time with permission from PJM GADS administrators.

# Recommendations[35]

## Definition of Capacity

- The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the enforcement of a consistent definition of capacity resources. The MMU recommends that the tariff requirement to be a physical resource be enforced and enhanced. The requirement to be a physical resource should apply at the time of auctions and should also constitute a commitment to be physical in the relevant delivery year. The requirement to be a physical resource should be applied to all resource types, including planned generation, demand resources, and imports.[36] [37] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that DR providers be required to have a signed contract with specific customers for specific facilities for specific levels of DR at least six months prior to any capacity auction in which the DR is offered. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that Energy Efficiency Resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market construct because PJM's load forecasts have accounted for EE since the 2016 load forecast for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year. EE is not a capacity resource as defined in the tariff, and there is no reason to continue to pay large subsidies to EE providers.[38] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Adopted 2024.)[39]
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market participants to meet their deliverability requirements under the same rules. PJM should end the practice of giving away winter CIRs to intermittent resources that

35 The MMU has identified serious market design issues with RPM and the MMU has made specific recommendations to address those issues. These recommendations have been made in public reports. See Table **5-2.**

36 See also Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER14-503-000 (December 20, 2013).

37 See "Analysis of Replacement Capacity for RPM Commitments: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2019," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2019/IMM_Analysis_of_Replacement_Capacity_for_RPM_Commitments_June_1_2007_to_June_1_2019_20190913.pdf> (September 13, 2019).

38 "PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis," § 3.2 Development of the Forecast, Rev. 39 (June 30, 2026).

39 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2024).

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appear to exist because other resources paid for the supporting network upgrades. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)[40]

- The MMU recommends that the must offer rule in the capacity market apply to all capacity resources. There is no reason to exempt intermittent and capacity storage resources, including hydro, and demand resources from the must offer requirement. The same rules should apply to all capacity resources in order to ensure open access to the transmission system and prevent the exercise of market power through withholding. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require all market sellers of proposed generation capacity resources, including thermal and intermittent, to submit a binding notice of intent to offer at least six months prior to the base residual auction. This is consistent with the overall MMU recommendation that all capacity resources have a must offer obligation in the capacity market auctions. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM's application of the ELCC approach be replaced with an ELCC approach that is based on the actual hourly availability of all individual generators for accreditation and for payment. The MMU recommends short term modifications to PJM's approach to include hourly data that would permit unit specific ELCC ratings, to weight summer and winter risk in a more balanced manner, to eliminate PAI risks, and to pay for actual hourly performance rather than based on inflexible class capacity accreditation ratings derived from a small number of nonrepresentative hours of poor performance from PV1 and WSE. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

## Market Design and Parameters

- The MMU recommends that PJM establish a load queue for large new data center loads to ensure that such loads are not added until there is adequate generation capacity to serve them. The MMU recommends that an expedited queue option that would permit both the load and the generation to be added without delays be available to large data centers if they bring their own new generation with locational and temporal characteristics reasonably matched to their load profile. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all forecast data center load be excluded from capacity market auctions if it is not on line on June 1, 2026. Only organic load and existing data center load as of June 1, 2026, would be included in the capacity market auctions. PJM would operate a reliability auction for forecast data center load that has not signed or committed to sign a bilateral contract for capacity.[41] (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate the shape of the VRR curve. The shape of the VRR curve directly results in load paying substantially more for capacity than load would pay with a vertical demand curve. More specifically, the MMU recommended that the VRR curve be rotated halfway towards the vertical demand curve at the reliability requirement in the 2022 Quadrennial Review. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum price on the VRR curve be defined as 1.5 times Net CONE, capped at Gross CONE. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the reference resource be a CT rather than a CC. The MMU recommends that the ELCC value used to convert the Gross CONE in ICAP terms for a CT to the Gross CONE in UCAP terms be the ELCC based on winter ratings. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Adopted 2025.)
- The MMU recommends that the test for determining modeled Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) in RPM be redefined. A detailed reliability analysis of all at risk units should be included in the redefined model including transmission constraints inside LDAs. The market design should clear and pay units that are needed for reliability per PJM's transmission

40 This recommendation was first made in the 2020/2021 BRA report in 2017. See the "Analysis of the 2020/2021 RPM Base Residual Auction," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2017/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20202021_RPM_BRA_20171117.pdf> (November 11, 2017).

41 The details of the MMU's proposed design are included in two executive summaries: See "IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf>. See also "IMM Curtailable Load Proposal," (June 30, 2026) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Connect%20and%20Manage%20proposal%20-%20V2%202026.06.19.pdf>.



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reliability analysis in order to forestall RMRs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM clear the capacity market based on nodal capacity resource locations and the characteristics of the transmission system inside and outside LDAs consistent with the actual electrical facts of the grid. Absent a fully nodal capacity market clearing process, the MMU recommends that PJM use a non-nested model with all LDAs modeled including VRR curves for all LDAs. Each LDA requirement should be met with the capacity resources located within the LDA and exchanges from neighboring LDAs up to the transmission limit. LDAs should be allowed to price separate if that is the result of the LDA supply curves and the transmission constraints between LDAs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the net revenue offset calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical net revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)[42]
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce the number of incremental auctions to a single incremental auction held three months prior to the start of the delivery year and reevaluate the triggers for holding conditional incremental auctions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not sell back any capacity in any IA procured in a BRA. If PJM continues to sell back capacity, the MMU recommends that PJM offer to sell back capacity in incremental auctions only at the BRA clearing price for the relevant delivery year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not buy any capacity in any IA if PJM has already procured excess reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends changing the RPM solution method to explicitly incorporate the cost of uplift (make whole) payments in the objective function. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) rules, including obligations and performance requirements, be revised and updated to ensure that the rules reflect current market realities and that FRR entities do not unfairly take advantage of those customers paying for capacity in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the value of CTRs be defined by the total MW cleared in the capacity market, the internal MW cleared and the imported MW cleared, and not redefined later prior to the delivery year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the market clearing results be used in settlements rather than the reallocation process currently used, or that the process of modifying the obligations to pay for capacity be reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)[43]
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve the clarity and transparency of its CETL calculations. The MMU also recommends that CETL for capacity imports into PJM be based on the ability to import capacity only where PJM capacity exists and where that capacity has a must offer requirement in the PJM Capacity Market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)

## Offer Caps, Offer Floors, and Must Offer

- The MMU recommends using the lower of the cost or price-based energy market offer to calculate energy costs in the calculation of the historical net revenues which are an offset to gross ACR in the calculation of unit specific capacity resource offer caps based on net ACR. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that modifications to existing resources, including relatively small proposed increases in the capability of a Generation

42 This recommendation was first made during the Quadrennial Review in 2014, including the PJM Capacity Senior Task Force (CSTF), the MRC and the MC. <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/closed-groups/cstf>.

43 This recommendation was first made in the 2023/2024 BRA report in 2022. See "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction Revised," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).

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Capacity Resource be treated as an existing resource and subject to the corresponding market power mitigation rules and no longer be treated as planned and exempt from offer capping. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)[44]

- The MMU recommends that the RPM market power mitigation rules be modified to apply offer caps in all cases when the three pivotal supplier test is failed and the sell offer is greater than the offer cap. This will ensure that market power does not result in an increase in uplift (make whole) payments for seasonal products. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that any combined seasonal resources be required to be in the same LDA and at the same location, in order for the energy market and capacity market to remain synchronized and reliability metrics correctly calculated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the definition of avoidable costs in the tariff be corrected to be consistent with the economic definition. Avoidable costs are costs that are neither short run marginal costs, like fuel or consumables, nor fixed costs like depreciation and rate of return. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity and therefore the competitive offer level for capacity resources and therefore the market seller offer cap. Avoidable costs are the marginal costs of capacity for both new resources and existing resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)[45]
- The MMU recommends that major maintenance costs be included in the definition of avoidable costs and removed from energy offers because such costs are avoidable costs and not short run marginal costs. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that capacity market sellers be required to explicitly request and support the use of minimum MW quantities (inflexible sell offer segments) and that the requests only be permitted for defined physical reasons. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, as part of the MOPR unit specific standard of review, all projects be required to use the same basic modeling assumptions. That is the only way to ensure that projects compete on the basis of actual costs rather than on the basis of modeling assumptions.[46] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The only function the current MOPR is serving now is to create unnecessary administrative work in the application and compliance screening and to create barriers to entry for generation resources. Absent a meaningful change to MOPR, the MMU recommends eliminating the MOPR. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Performance Incentive Requirements of RPM

- The MMU recommends that any unit not capable of supplying energy equal to its day-ahead must offer requirement (ICAP) be required to reflect an appropriate outage and associated performance penalty. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that retroactive replacement transactions associated with a failure to perform during a PAI not be allowed and that, more generally, retroactive replacement capacity transactions not be permitted. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that there be an explicit requirement that capacity resource offers in the day-ahead energy market be competitive, where competitive is defined to be the short run marginal cost of the units, including flexible operating parameters. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

44 This recommendation was first made in the 2014/2015 BRA report in 2012. See "Analysis of the 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2012/Analysis_of_2014_2015_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20120409.pdf> (April 9, 2012).

45 This recommendation was first made in the 2023/2024 BRA report in 2022. See "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction Revised," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).

46 See 143 FERC ¶ 61,090 (2013) ("We encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider, for example, whether the unit-specific review process would be more effective if PJM requires the use of common modeling assumptions for establishing unit-specific offer floors while, at the same time, allowing sellers to provide support for objective, individual cost advantages. Moreover, we encourage PJM and its stakeholders to consider these modifications to the unit-specific review process together with possible enhancements to the calculation of Net CONE."); see also, Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER13-535-001 (March 25, 2013); Complaint of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. Unnamed Participant, Docket No. EL12-63-000 (May 1, 2012); Motion for Clarification of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER11-2875-000, et al. (February 17, 2012); Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER11-2875-002 (June 2, 2011); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket Nos. EL11-20 and ER11-2875 (March 4, 2011).



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- The MMU recommends that Capacity Performance resources be required to perform without excuses. Resources that do not perform should not be paid regardless of the reason for nonperformance. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require actual seasonal tests as part of the Summer/Winter Capability Testing rules, that the number of tests be limited, and that the ambient conditions under which the tests are performed be defined to reflect seasonal extreme conditions. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM select the time and day that a unit undergoes Net Capability Verification Testing, not the unit owner, and that this information not be communicated in advance to the unit owner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)

## Capacity Imports and Exports

- The MMU recommends that all capacity imports be required to be deliverable to PJM load in an identified LDA, zonal or subzonal, or defined combinations of specific zones, e.g. MAAC, prior to the relevant delivery year to ensure that they are full substitutes for internal, physical capacity resources. Pseudo ties alone are not adequate to ensure deliverability to PJM load. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all costs incurred as a result of a pseudo tied unit be borne by the unit itself and included as appropriate in unit offers in the capacity market. (Priority: High. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the PJM Tariff be modified to explicitly state that in order to qualify, a Capacity Market Seller requesting a must offer exception based on a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity must provide a confirmed firm transmission reservation, covering the entire path from source to sink, for the full requested ICAP MW of the external sale that covers the entire delivery year, by the tariff defined deadline. The MMU recommends that this language apply to all external sales of Generation Capacity Resources, including those where an external balancing authority does not require this level of transmission service in order to consider a PJM resource as a network resource. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Deactivations/Retirements

- The MMU recommends that the notification requirement for deactivations be extended from the current one quarter prior (See Table 5-31) to 12 months prior to an auction in which the unit will not be offered due to deactivation; and no less than 12 months prior to the date of deactivation (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the same reliability standard be used in capacity auctions as is used by PJM transmission planning. One result of the current design is that a unit may fail to clear in a BRA, decide to retire as a result, but then be found to be needed for reliability by PJM planning and paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) to remain in service while transmission upgrades are made. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends elimination of both the cost of service recovery rate option and the deactivation avoidable cost rate option for providing Part V reliability service (RMR), and their replacement with clear language that provides for the recovery of 100 percent of the actual incremental costs required to operate to provide the service plus a defined incentive. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units recover all and only the incremental costs, including incremental investment costs without a cap, required to provide Part V reliability service (RMR service) that the unit owner would not have incurred if the unit owner had deactivated its unit as it proposed, plus a defined incentive payment. Customers should bear no responsibility for paying previously incurred (sunk) costs, including a return on or of prior investments. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)

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- The MMU recommends that if units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) are included in the calculation of CETO and/or reliability in the relevant LDA, the capacity of the RMR resources should also be included in capacity market supply at zero cost, but without all the obligations of a capacity resource, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that units that are paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) not be included in the calculation of CETO or reliability in the relevant LDA, in order to ensure that the capacity market price signal reflects the appropriate supply and demand conditions, until a decision is made to build transmission as a replacement, and then should be included. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all CIRs be returned to the pool of available interconnection capability on the retirement date of generation resources in order to facilitate timely and competitive entry into the PJM markets, open access to the transmission system and maintain the priority order defined by the queue process. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

## Conclusion

The analysis of the PJM Capacity Market begins with market design and market structure, which provide the framework for the actual behavior or conduct of market participants. The analysis examines participant behavior within that market design and market structure. Regardless of the ownership structure of a market, the market design can result in noncompetitive outcomes or in competitive outcomes. In a good market design and a competitive market structure, market participants are constrained to behave competitively. In a market with endemic structural market power like the PJM Capacity Market, effective market power mitigation rules are required in order to constrain market participants to behave competitively. The analysis examines market performance, measured by price and the relationship between price and marginal cost, that results from the interaction of market structure and participant behavior. The analysis also examines the impact of market design choices on market performance.

The MMU concludes that the results of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction were significantly affected by flawed market design elements including the inclusion of large new data center loads in the load forecast, the lack of a queue for the addition of large new data center loads, by the performance assessment interval (PAI) penalties that are part of the CP design, by PJM's ELCC approach, by the definition of market seller offer caps, by the failure to extend the RPM must offer requirement to demand resources, and by the product definition and lack of market power mitigation for demand resources. The BRA prices do not reflect supply and demand fundamentals but reflect, in significant part, PJM decisions about the definition of supply and demand. PJM filed changes that were approved by FERC to adopt two of the MMU's recommendations, the inclusion of specific RMR resources as supply in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year and the elimination of the categorical exemption to the RPM must offer requirement effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, although PJM failed to include elimination of the categorical exemption for demand resources.[47] [48]

The capacity market is, by design, always tight in the sense that total supply is generally only slightly larger than demand. While the market may be long at times, that is not the equilibrium state. Market power is and will remain endemic to the structure of the PJM Capacity Market. Nonetheless, a competitive outcome can be assured by appropriate market power mitigation rules within an effective market design. Detailed market power mitigation rules are included in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT or Tariff). Reliance on the RPM design for competitive outcomes means reliance on the market power mitigation rules.

The basic conclusion of Part A of the MMU's analysis of the 2027/2028 BRA is that data center load growth is the primary reason for recent and expected capacity market conditions, including total forecast load growth, the tight supply and demand balance, and high prices. But for data center growth, both actual and forecast, the PJM Capacity Market would not have seen the

47 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-682-001 (April 29, 2025). See also 193 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2025).
48 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (2025).


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same tight supply demand conditions, the same high prices observed in the 2025/2026 BRA, the 2026/2027 BRA and the 2027/2028 BRA or the currently expected tight supply conditions and high prices for subsequent capacity auctions. The combined total increase in capacity market revenues resulting from data center load, both actual and forecast, for the 2025/2026 BRA, the 2026/2027 BRA and the 2027/2028 BRA was $23,100,955,341.[49] [50] [51] This total will continue to grow until the issues associated with the additions of large data center loads are addressed.

It is misleading to assert that the capacity market results are simply just a reflection of supply and demand. The current conditions are not the result of organic load growth. The current conditions in the capacity market are almost entirely the result of large load additions from data centers, both actual historical and forecast. The growth in data center load and the expected future growth in data center load are unique and unprecedented and uncertain and require a different approach than simply asserting that it is just supply and demand.

It is equally misleading to assert that the PJM Capacity Market does not work as a result of the impact of existing and forecast large data center load additions. Despite all the issues with PJM's changes to the capacity market design, the PJM Capacity Market would have provided for reliability at prices consistent with organic load growth and the cost of new capacity were it not for the paradigm shift represented by the almost inexhaustible demand for power from data centers.

Data center load growth is the core reliability issue facing PJM markets at present. There is still time to address the issue but failure to do so effectively will result in very high costs for other PJM customers and could also result in a switch from competitive markets to cost of service regulation or other distortions of the market design. Customers are already bearing billions of dollars in higher costs as a direct result of existing and forecast data center load as the Market Monitor demonstrated in the Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part G, the Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A, and the Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A.[52] [53] With the completion of the 2028/2029 BRA, the inclusion of data center load in the capacity market auctions has resulted in an irreversible total increase in costs of $29.4 billion.[54]

PJM should not continue to interconnect large new data center load if that load cannot be served reliably. The goal should be to serve all load that can be served reliably. The MMU recommends that PJM establish a load queue for large new data center loads to ensure that such loads are not added until there is adequate generation capacity to serve them. The MMU recommends that an expedited queue option that would permit both the load and the generation to be added without delays be available to large data centers if they bring their own new generation with locational and temporal characteristics reasonably matched to their load profile.

For the first time since the introduction of the RPM capacity market design, the 2026/2027 BRA used a VRR curve with both a defined maximum price and a defined minimum price. The maximum and minimum prices were based on the Agreement between Governor Shapiro of Pennsylvania and PJM that was incorporated in a PJM filing with FERC.[55] That VRR curve with the defined maximum and minimum price is referred to in this report as the actual (or restricted) VRR curve. The VRR curve that would have been used absent the Agreement is referred in this report as the unrestricted VRR curve.

The Agreement resulted in a reduction of 2026/2027 BRA revenues of $3,169,915,210, or 16.4 percent, compared to the revenues that would have resulted from the unrestricted VRR curve, holding everything else constant.

49 See, "Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part G Revised," <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_2025 2026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_G_20250603_Revised.pdf> (June 3, 2025).

50 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," ("Part A") <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20251001.pdf> (October 1, 2025).

51 See "Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," ("Part A") <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf> (January 5, 2026).

52 Post Technical Conference Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM (July 7, 2025) *Resource Adequacy Meeting the Challenge of Resource Adequacy in Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Regions*, Docket No. AD25-7.

53 See "Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction - Part A," (October 1, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2025/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20251001.pdf>.

54 See "Market Monitor Report," (July 28, 2025) <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/presentations/2026/IMM_MC_Market_Monitor_Report_20260728.pdf>.

55 On December 30, 2024, in Docket No. EL25-46-000, Governor Josh Shapiro and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a complaint against PJM asserting that the maximum price for PJM's capacity auctions is unjust and unreasonable. The Governor and PJM reached an Agreement. On February 20, 2025, in Docket No. ER25-1357-000, pursuant to FPA section 205, PJM submitted proposed revisions to its Tariff to establish a specific maximum price and minimum price for all RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years, consistent with the Agreement.

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If the 2026/2027 BRA had been run with an unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $19,294,286,100, an increase of $3,169,915,210, or 19.7 percent, compared to the actual auction revenues of $16,124,370,889. The Agreement resulted in a reduction of 2027/2028 BRA revenues of $9,913,272,621, or 37.7 percent, compared to the revenues that would have resulted from the unrestricted VRR curve, holding everything else constant. If the 2027/2028 BRA had been run with an unrestricted VRR curve, total revenues would have been $26,324,850,846, an increase of $9,913,272,621, or 60.4 percent, compared to the actual auction revenues of $16,411,578,225. The Agreement resulted in a reduction of combined 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 BRA revenues of $13,083,187,831, or 28.7 percent, compared to the revenues that would have resulted from the unrestricted VRR curve, holding everything else constant.

The demand for capacity includes expected peak load plus a reserve margin, and points on the demand curve, called the Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve, exceed peak load plus the reserve margin. The maximum price on the VRR curve has a significant impact on market prices particularly when the market is tight. The shape of the VRR curve results in the purchase of excess capacity and higher payments by customers. The VRR curves used in the 2025/2026 BRA included a maximum price equal to Gross CONE for most LDAs that resulted in a significant increase in customer payments for load as a result of paying a price above the competitive level. Demand for capacity is almost entirely inelastic because the market rules require loads to purchase their share of the system capacity requirement. The VRR demand curve is everywhere inelastic. The result is that any supplier that owns more capacity than the typically small difference between total supply and the defined demand is individually pivotal and therefore has structural market power.

For the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, total reserves were 16,977.4 MW, which is 6,516.6 MW (UCAP) short of the required reserve level of 23,494.0 MW (UCAP). The level of committed demand resources in the 2027/2028 BRA was 7,298.6 MW, meaning the PJM markets will rely on demand resources as part of the required reserve margin, rather than as excess above the required reserve margin. This is not consistent with the defined obligations of DR compared to other capacity resources. DR capacity resources do not have a must offer obligation in the energy market. DR capacity resources do not have a must offer obligation in the capacity market. The definition of performance for DR is not to provide a defined incremental level of MW when called but is only to be at a defined level of demand. DR capacity resources have significantly under performed during recent cold weather and hot weather events. DR capacity resources do not have a defined market seller offer cap. PJM markets for the first time in the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 Delivery Years will rely on demand response resources as part of the required reserve margin, rather than as excess above the required reserve margin. PJM markets for the first time in the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 Delivery Years will experience the implications of the definition of demand resources as a purely emergency capacity resource, when demand resources are a significant share of required reserves. Nonetheless, as another significant flaw in the market design, PJM does not include DR in its definition of primary or secondary reserves in the energy market. DR, for all these reasons, is an inferior resource in the capacity market. PJM does not have clear rules defining when the operators must call on DR.

There are currently two important gaps in the market power rules for the PJM Capacity Market related to demand resources. The RPM must offer requirement is not applied to demand resources. There are no market power mitigation rules that apply to demand resources.

For the 2027/2028 BRA, all participants to which the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test was applied (in the RTO RPM market) failed the three pivotal supplier test. The result was that offer caps were applied to all sell offers for Existing Generation Capacity Resources when the capacity market seller did not pass the test, the submitted sell offer exceeded the tariff defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, would have resulted in a higher market clearing price.[56] [57]

56 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 (2009) at P 30.

57 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource and creating a new definition for Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must-offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource the same in terms of mitigation as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).



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The correct definition of a competitive offer in the capacity market is the marginal cost of capacity, net ACR, where gross ACR includes an explicit accounting for the costs of mitigating risk, including the risk associated with mitigating rational capacity market nonperformance penalties, and the relevant costs of acquiring fuel, including natural gas, and net ACR includes all energy and ancillary services net revenues as an offset against every element of gross ACR.

The MMU recommends elimination of the key remaining components of the CP model because they interfere with competitive outcomes in the capacity market and create unnecessary complexity and risk. The use of Net CONE as the basis for the PAI penalty rate is unsupported by economic logic. The use of Net CONE to establish penalties is a form of arbitrary administrative pricing that creates arbitrarily high risk for generators, creates complexity in the calculation of CPQR and increases CPQR above rational levels, and ultimately raises the price of capacity above the competitive level. Given PJM's recent decision to rely on conservative operations during tight market conditions as evidenced during Polar Vortex 2025 in January 2025, the probability of a PAI is extremely small. In addition, PJM tightened the definition of a PAI and capped the total annual penalty at 1.5 times the resource's capacity market BRA clearing price. There is no effective performance incentive remaining in the capacity market. In the absence of the EFORd design and with the absence of actual or expected regular PAI events, there is no capacity market consequence for failing to perform.

Rather than penalizing capacity resources at extremely high levels for nonperformance only during PAI events, capacity resources should be paid the daily price of capacity only to the extent that they are available to produce energy or provide reserves, as required by PJM on a daily/hourly basis, based on their cleared capacity (ICAP). This is a positive performance incentive based on the market price of capacity rather than a penalty based on an arbitrary assumption. This would mean that capacity resources are paid to provide energy and reserves based on their full ICAP and are not paid a bonus for doing so. The reduced payments for capacity would directly reduce customers' bills for capacity. This would also end the pretense that there will be penalty payments to fund bonus payments. This would also end the need for complex CPQR calculations based on the penalty rate and assumptions about the number and timing of PAI events. CP has not worked as the theory suggested. PAI events are high impact, low probability events. The failure of the PAI incentives to prevent a very high level of outages during Winter Storm Elliott illustrates the weakness of incentives based on this type of event. In addition, the actual performance standards were unacceptably weakened in the CP model. The standard of performance in the CP model is (B) * (ELCC accredited UCAP factor for a unit), where B is the balancing ratio and the ELCC accredited UCAP factor is the derating factor. For example, if B were 80 percent, the actual required performance for a unit with an 80 percent ELCC accredited UCAP factor would be only 64 percent of ICAP (.80 * .80). For units with low ELCC accredited UCAP factors, the required performance is even lower. The obligation to perform should equal the full ICAP value of a unit, consistent with the associated must offer obligation in the energy market for capacity resources.

The MMU is required to identify market issues and to report them to the Commission and to market participants. The Commission decides on any action related to the MMU's findings.

The MMU has identified serious market design issues with RPM and the MMU has made specific recommendations to address those issues.[58] In 2025 and the first six months of 2026, the MMU prepared a number of RPM related reports and testimony, shown in Table 5-2.

The PJM markets have worked to provide incentives to entry and to retain capacity. A majority of capacity investments in PJM were financed by market sources. Of the 62,666.3 MW of additional capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2007/2008 through 2025/2026 Delivery Years, 46,876.7 MW (74.8 percent) were based on market funding. Of the 3,294.6 MW of additional capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2027/2028 Delivery Years, 2,725.1 MW (82.7 percent) were based on market funding. Those investments were made based on the assumption that markets would be allowed to work and that inefficient units would exit.

58 For the complete list of RPM reports, see the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 5: Capacity Market.

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It is essential that any approach to the PJM markets incorporate a consistent view of how the preferred market design is expected to provide competitive results in a sustainable market design over the long run. A sustainable market design means a market design that results in appropriate incentives to competitive market participants to retire units and to invest in new units over time such that reliability is ensured as a result of the functioning of the market.

In order to attract and retain adequate resources for the reliable operation of the energy market, revenues from PJM energy, ancillary services and capacity markets must be adequate for those resources. That adequacy requires a capacity market. The capacity market plays the essential role of equilibrating the revenues necessary to incent competitive entry and exit of the resources needed for reliability, with the revenues from the energy market that are directly affected by nonmarket sources.

### Table 5-2 RPM related MMU reports: 2025 through June 2026

| Date | Name |
|---|---|
| January 5, 2026 | Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf |
| January 9, 2026 | IMM Comments re Economic Load Response Regulation Only Participants Docket No. ER26-846 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_Economic_Load_Response_Regulation_Only_Participants_Docket_No_ER26-846_20260109.pdf |
| January 12, 2026 | IMM Answer to PJM re Warrior Run Waiver Request Docket No. ER26-880 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_PJM_Docket_No_ER26-880_20260112.pdf |
| January 12, 2026 | RMR Matrix Issues: Scope Areas 4, 5 and 6 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_DESTF_RMR_Matrix_Issues_Scope_Areas_4_5_6_20260112.pdf |
| January 20, 2026 | IMM Answer to PJM re Quadrennial Review VRR Curve Docket No. ER26-455 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_PJM_Answer_Docket_No_ER26-455_20260120.pdf |
| January 20, 2026 | DR Nonperformance Penalties (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_MIC_DR_Nonperformance_Penalties_20260120.pdf |
| January 28, 2026 | Supply Uncertainty (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_RCSTF_Supply_Uncertainty_20260128.pdf |
| February 4, 2026 | DR Nonperformance Penalty and Performance Adjustment Factor Example (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_MIC_Nonperformance_Penalty_and_Performance_Adjustment_Factor_Examples_20260204.pdf |
| February 5, 2026 | IMM Answer to CEG re Co-located Load Docket No. EL25-49, et al (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_CEG_RFC_Docket_No_EL25-49_et_al_20260205.pdf |
| February 17, 2026 | IMM Backstop Auction Design Proposal (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_Reliability_Backstop_WS_Backstop_Auction_Design_Proposal_20260217.pdf |
| February 25, 2026 | Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal –V2 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_Reliability_Backstop_WS_%20Backstop_Auction_Design_Proposal-V2_20260224.pdf |
| March 3, 2026 | Analysis of the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part B (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20262027_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20260303.pdf |
| March 11, 2026 | DR Penalties Matrix Additions (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_MIC_DR_penalties_matrix_additions_20260311.pdf |
| March 20, 2026 | IMM Comments re PJM Price Collar Extension Docket No. ER26-1556 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Comments_Docket_No_ER26-1556_20260320.pdf |
| March 25, 2026 | IMM Reply Brief re Co-Location Order Paper Hearing Docket No. EL25-49, et al (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Reply_Brief_Docket_No_EL25-49_et_al_20250325.pdf |
| April 6, 2026 | IMM Answer to Answer re PJM Price Collar Extension Docket No. ER26-1556 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_Docket_No_ER26-1556_20260406.pdf |
| April 22, 2026 | IMM Comments on Proposed DR Penalties (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_MRC_Comments_on_Proposed_DR_Penalties_20260422.pdf |
| April 27, 2026 | IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_Backstop_Auction_Design_Proposal_20260427.pdf |
| May 8, 2026 | IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal – V4 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_Reliability_Backstop_WS_%20Backstop_Auction_Design_Proposal-V4_20260508.pdf |
| May 11, 2026 | IMM Answer re Crane CIR Waiver Request Docket No. ER26-2028 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_Answer_Docket_No_ER26-2028_20260511.pdf |
| May 11, 2026 | IMM Answer re Zimmer Bess CIR Waiver Request Docket No. ER26-2321 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_Protest_Docket_No-_ER26-2321_20260511.pdf |
| May 22, 2026 | IMM Answer to PJM Answer re CP Penalties Complaints Docket Nos. EL26-59 and EL26-60 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_to_PJM_Answer_Docket_No_EL26-59_EL26-60_20260522.pdf |
| June 2, 2026 | IMM Answer Supporting P3 Comments re Regulation Market Redesign Phase 2 Docket No. ER26-2446 (PDF)https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Answer_Supporting_P3_Comments_Docket_No_ER26-2446_20260602.pdf |
| June 10, 2026 | IMM Connect and Manage Design Proposal (PDF)https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_CIFP_Connect_and_Manage_Proposal-V1_20260610.pdf |
| June 10, 2026 | IMM Backstop Auction Design Proposal (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM_CIFP_Backstop_Auction_Design_Proposal-V5_20260610.pdf |
| June 16, 2026 | IMM Answer re Voltus/Mission:data complaint Docket No. EL26-4 (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2026/IMM_Comments_Docket_No_ER26-2738_et_al_20260626.pdf |
| June 29, 2026 | Generation Capacity Resources in PJM Region Subject to RPM Must Offer Obligation for 2027/2028 and 2028/2029 Delivery Years (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/Messages/IMM_Notice_re_RPM_Must_Offer_Obligations_20260629.pdf |
| June 30, 2026 | IMM Curtailable Load Proposal (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Connect%20and%20Manage%20proposal%20-%20V2%202026.06.19.pdf |
| June 30, 2026 | IMM Reliability Backstop Auction Design Proposal (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20proposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf |
| July 9, 2026 | Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part B (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_Part_B_20260709.pdf |
| July 10, 2026 | Data Submission Window Opening for the 2029/2030 RPM Base Residual Auction (PDF) https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/RPM_Material/IMM_Data_Submission_Window_Opening_2029-2030_Base_Residual_Auction_20260710.pdf |


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## Market Design

With the earlier introduction of the Capacity Performance model and the recent introduction of the ELCC model, combined with a tightening of the capacity supply and demand balance in ICAP terms, it is clear that PJM's choices about the details of market design have a potentially dominant impact on capacity market outcomes in PJM. The ongoing decision to allow the addition of a significant number of large new data center loads that cannot be served reliably due to inadequate capacity is the most recent and most significant example.

RPM prices are locational by LDA and may vary depending on transmission constraints into LDAs and local supply and demand conditions.[59] The capacity market is not fully locational. The capacity market locational differences exist only between and among LDAs. The capacity market design assumes that there are no transmission or operational constraints within LDAs and treats all capacity resources within an LDA as perfect substitutes even when they are not. The lack of a fully locational design is a market design flaw that has resulted in the designation of units as RMRs based on internal constraints that were not recognized in the market clearing process. Existing generation that qualifies as a capacity resource must be offered into RPM auctions, except for categorically exempt demand resources, and except for resources in a fixed resource requirement (FRR) plan. All load is required to pay for capacity. Participation by LSEs is mandatory, except for those entities that elect the FRR option. There is an administratively determined demand curve that defines scarcity pricing levels and that, with the supply curve derived from capacity offers, determines market prices in each BRA. There are explicit market power mitigation rules that define structural market power, that define offer caps based on the marginal cost of capacity, and that have flexible criteria for competitive offers by new entrants. Demand resources may be offered directly into RPM auctions but do not have a requirement to be identifiable physical resources, do not have a must offer obligation, do not have a corresponding must offer obligation in the energy market for cleared resources, do not have market seller offer caps, and receive the clearing price.

59 Transmission constraints are local capacity import capability limitations (low capacity emergency transfer limit (CETL) margin over capacity emergency transfer objective (CETO)) caused by transmission facility limitations, voltage limitations or stability limitations.

The results of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction were significantly affected by flawed market design elements including the lack of a queue for the addition of large new data center loads, by the performance assessment interval (PAI) penalties that are part of the CP design, by PJM's ELCC approach, by the definition of market seller offer caps, by the failure to extend the RPM must offer requirement to demand resources, and by the product definition and lack of market power mitigation for demand resources. The BRA prices do not reflect supply and demand fundamentals but reflect, in significant part, PJM decisions about the definition of supply and demand. PJM filed changes that were approved by FERC and included in the 2026/2027 BRA and the 2027/2028 BRA to adopt two of the MMU's recommendations, the inclusion of specific RMR resources as supply in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year and the elimination of the categorical exemption to the RPM must offer requirement, although PJM failed to include elimination of the categorical exemption for demand resources.

The fundamental mistake of the CP design was to attempt to recreate energy market incentives in the capacity market. The CP model was an explicit attempt to bring energy market shortage pricing into the capacity market design. The CP model was designed on the unsupported assumption that shortage prices in the energy market were not high enough and needed to be increased via the capacity market. The CP design focused on a small number of critical hours (performance assessment hours or PAH, translated into five minute intervals as PAI) and imposed large penalties on generators that failed to produce energy only during those hours. The use of capacity market penalties rather than energy market incentives created a new risk. While there are differences of opinion about how to value the risk, this CP risk is not risk that is fundamental to the operation of a wholesale power market. This is risk created by the CP design in order to provide an incentive to produce energy during high demand hours that is even higher than the energy market incentive, amplified by an operating reserve demand curves (ORDC). The risk created by CP is not limited to risk for individual generators, but extends to the viability of the market. If penalties create bankruptcies that threaten the viability of required energy output from the affected units, there is a risk to the market.

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The CP PAI incentives are not effective market incentives. PAI incentives are administrative and nonmarket incentives that are not compatible with an effective market design. The energy market clearing, in contrast, is transparent and efficient and timely. While there are issues with the details of energy market pricing that must be addressed, including shortage pricing, the energy market does not include or create the significant and long lasting uncertainty created by the PAI rules as exhibited most dramatically by the results of Winter Storm Elliott. The PAI design creates an administrative process that adds unacceptable uncertainty to the process and that can never approach the effectiveness of the energy market in providing price signals and timely settlement. In addition, the imposition of PAI penalties on intermittent resources when those resources cannot perform is illogical.

The MMU recommends that PJM's application of the ELCC approach be replaced with an ELCC approach that is based on the actual hourly availability of all individual generators for accreditation and for payment. The MMU recommends short term modifications to PJM's approach to include hourly data that would permit unit specific ELCC ratings, to weight summer and winter risk in a more balanced manner, to eliminate PAI risks, and to pay for actual hourly performance rather than based on inflexible class capacity accreditation ratings derived from a small number of nonrepresentative hours of poor performance from PV1 and WSE. In the short run capacity accreditation should eliminate the performance during PV1 and WSE and should recognize the winter capability of thermal resources rather than limiting such resources to summer ratings. Most of the risk recognized in the ELCC model is winter risk but the ELCC accreditation values for thermal resources are capped at the summer ratings. That unnecessarily limits supply and changes the ELCC values for all other resources and changes the system accredited unforced capacity and therefore AUCAP, the maximum level of load that can be served by the existing resources and therefore the reliability requirement. The CIRs of such resources are currently limited by the summer ratings but those rules can and should be changed given the use of the ELCC approach. There is no reason that excess winter CIRs cannot be assigned to these resources immediately.

The initial VRR curve, introduced in 2007, had a maximum price equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (Net CONE), determined annually based on the fixed cost of new generating capacity, or Gross Cost of New Entry (Gross CONE), net of the three year average energy and ancillary service revenues. That VRR curve was structured to yield auction clearing prices equal to the 1.5 times Net CONE when the amount of capacity cleared was less than 99 percent of the target reserve margin, and below 1.5 times Net CONE when the amount of capacity cleared was greater than 99 percent of the target reserve margin. The use of Net CONE was based on the logic of the capacity market, to ensure that the cost of entry was covered between the energy and capacity markets. Net CONE was the missing money that needed to be recoverable in the capacity market. Net CONE was the equilibrating factor between the capacity market and energy market. The use of Gross CONE is inconsistent with that basic capacity market logic. Gross CONE was introduced as the maximum price based on concerns that Net CONE would be too low. The maximum point on the VRR curve for the 2025/2026 BRA was the higher of Gross CONE or 1.5 times Net CONE and Gross CONE was used. For the first time since the introduction of the RPM capacity market design, the 2026/2027 BRA used a VRR curve with both a defined maximum price and a defined minimum price.[60] However, if the logic of the markets implies a low Net CONE, that is the right answer. There is nothing inherently wrong with a low Net CONE that requires abandoning the basic capacity market logic. The use of Gross CONE rather than 1.5 times Net CONE was an intervention designed to increase capacity market prices despite the fact that the basic economic logic did not support that increase. If there is an issue with the calculation of Net CONE, it should be addressed directly rather than by ignoring its central role in the design of the capacity market. As Gross CONE numbers are reasonably well defined, much more focus on the correct calculation of the net revenues used in the forward auctions is required in order to ensure that market participants have confidence in the Net CONE values used in the auctions.

PJM ended the long standing categorical exemption of intermittent resources, capacity storage resources, and hybrid resources from the RPM must offer

60 On April 21, 2025, FERC issued an order accepting PJM's proposal to establish a temporary capacity market price cap and floor for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years. 191 FERC ¶ 61,066 (April 21, 2025). On April 28, 2026, FERC issued an order accepting PJM's proposal to establish a temporary capacity market price cap and floor for the 2028/2029 and 2029/2030 Delivery Years. 195 FERC ¶ 61,076 (April 28, 2026).


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requirement. Consistent with the MMU's recommendations, that exemption was eliminated for all but demand resources. There is no reason to continue to exempt demand resources from the RPM must offer requirement. The same rules should apply to all capacity resources. The purpose of the RPM must offer rule, which has been in place since the beginning of the capacity market in 1999, is to ensure that the capacity market works, and therefore that the energy market works, based on the inclusion of all demand and all supply, to ensure competitive entry, to ensure open access to the transmission system, and to prevent the exercise of market power via withholding of capacity supply.

For these reasons, existing resources are required to return CIRs to the market within one year after retirement. The MMU recommends that resources return CIRs to the market on the day of retirement.[61] Waiving the rules for retaining CIRs to favor one resource over other suppliers in the interconnection queue that are seeking CIRs would be unduly discriminatory and cause harm to the public interest in the efficient procurement of capacity resources.

Consistent with the must offer obligation, performance penalties should not be applied to solar and wind resources when they are not capable of performing based on ambient conditions. For example, solar resources should be subject to performance penalties if they fail to perform when the sun is shining but should not be subject to performance penalties in the middle of the night. That would be the result under the incentive approach recommended by the MMU. If PAI is retained, this would be a rational application of the PAI penalties that recognizes the physical capabilities of resources and is therefore not discriminatory.

Demand resources (DR) have always been treated more favorably than generation capacity resources. Demand resources do not have an RPM must offer requirement. Demand resources, unlike all other capacity resources, are not subject to market seller offer caps to protect against the exercise of market power in the capacity market. When demand resources are pivotal, as they were for the 2026/2027 BRA, they have structural market power and can and do exercise market power. That conclusion does not depend on whether withholding directly benefits those resources through a portfolio effect. The result of the failure to offer can be a significant increase in the market price of capacity above the competitive level when that supply is pivotal. If the resources clear, it benefits the resources directly. Even if the resources do not clear, higher prices can benefit the owners of capacity portfolios that include such resources as well as resources with an RPM must offer requirement. The MMU recommends that demand resources have defined and enforced market seller offer caps in the capacity market, like all other capacity resources.

PJM filed tariff changes that transfer risk caused by the volatile ELCC ratings from generation owners to the load. ELCC ratings may increase or decrease significantly between the time a generator clears in the RPM Base Residual Auction and the final ELCC rating just prior to the start of the delivery year. Under the new tariff rules, generators will be excused from paying the Capacity Resource Deficiency Charge for a deficiency caused by a decrease in the final ELCC rating. Under the prior rules, a Capacity Market Seller was required to cover its short position by acquiring additional capacity or pay a deficiency penalty equal to 20 percent of the base residual auction clearing price for each MW of shortage. The tariff change was filed by PJM on April 18, 2025, and approved by FERC on June 17, 2025.[62] [63] The MMU opposed the change because the new rule does not mitigate the risk as asserted by PJM but simply transfers the ELCC rating volatility risk to the load.[64] The change is inconsistent with basic market logic under which investors bear the risk associated with the ownership of generation.

61 See Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER25-2162-000 (May 28, 2025); Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER25-2190-000 (May 28, 2025); and Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER25-2197-000 (May 28, 2025).

62 *Proposal to Mitigate Impacts From Updates to ELCC Accreditation between the Base Residual Auction and the Final ELCC Accreditation Values*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket ER25-2002 (April 18, 2025).

63 191 FERC ¶ 61,203 (June 17, 2025).

64 See *Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM* (May 9, 2025), *Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM* (June 9, 2025), *Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM* (June 16, 2025), Docket ER25-2002-000).

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## Installed Capacity

On January 1, 2026, RPM installed capacity was 184,220.8 MW (Table 5-3).[65] Over the next six months, new generation, unit deactivations, facility reratings, plus import and export shifts resulted in RPM installed capacity of 183,873.8 MW on June 30, 2026, a decrease of 347.0 MW or 0.2 percent from the January 1 level.[66] [67] The 347.0 MW decrease was the net result of new or reactivated generation (2,049.0 MW) and net capacity modifications (2,173.7 MW), and an increase in imports (7.1 MW), offset by an increase in exports (521.2), derates (426.4 MW), and deactivations or changes in capacity resource status (3,629.2 MW).

At the beginning of the new delivery year on June 1, 2026, RPM installed capacity was 184,662.4 MW, an increase of 2,714.5 MW or 1.5 percent from the May 31, 2026, level of 181,947.9 MW. This change occurred as a result of deactivations, derates, capacity modifications, and import/export contracts beginning and/or ending at the start of the new delivery year.

### Table 5-3 Installed capacity (By fuel source): January 1, May 31, June 1, and June 30, 2026[68] [69]

| | 01-Jan-26 | | 31-May-26 | | 01-Jun-26 | | 30-Jun-26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MW | Percent | MW | Percent | MW | Percent | MW | Percent |
| Battery | 24.0 | 0.0% | 35.7 | 0.0% | 186.4 | 0.1% | 186.4 | 0.1% |
| Coal | 37,544.6 | 20.4% | 37,394.8 | 20.6% | 36,715.9 | 19.9% | 36,715.9 | 20.0% |
| Gas | 88,888.4 | 48.3% | 88,447.9 | 48.6% | 89,008.4 | 48.2% | 88,203.4 | 48.0% |
| Hybird | 10.2 | 0.0% | 10.2 | 0.0% | 10.0 | 0.0% | 10.0 | 0.0% |
| Hydroelectric | 8,215.2 | 4.5% | 8,166.3 | 4.5% | 8,205.6 | 4.4% | 8,205.6 | 4.5% |
| Nuclear | 32,176.2 | 17.5% | 32,163.4 | 17.7% | 32,321.0 | 17.5% | 32,321.0 | 17.6% |
| Oil | 4,066.5 | 2.2% | 4,245.7 | 2.3% | 4,245.7 | 2.3% | 4,245.7 | 2.3% |
| Solar | 8,315.7 | 4.5% | 8,630.8 | 4.7% | 9,849.1 | 5.3% | 9,853.8 | 5.4% |
| Solid waste | 609.4 | 0.3% | 587.4 | 0.3% | 587.4 | 0.3% | 587.4 | 0.3% |
| Wind | 4,370.6 | 2.4% | 2,265.7 | 1.2% | 3,532.9 | 1.9% | 3,544.6 | 1.9% |
| Total | 184,220.8 | 100.0% | 181,947.9 | 100.0% | 184,662.4 | 100.0% | 183,873.8 | 100.0% |

65 Percent values shown in Table 5-3 are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

66 Unless otherwise specified, the capacity described in this section is the summer installed capacity rating of all PJM generation capacity resources, as entered into the Capacity Exchange system, regardless of whether the capacity cleared in the RPM auctions.

67 Wind resources accounted for 3,544.6 MW, and solar resources accounted for 9,853.8 MW of installed capacity in PJM on June 30, 2026. Prior to the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, PJM administratively reduced the capabilities of all wind generators to 14.7 percent for wind farms in mountainous terrain and 17.6 percent for wind farms in open terrain, and solar generators to 42.0 percent for ground mounted fixed panel, 60.0 percent for ground mounted tracking panel, and 38.0 percent for other than ground mounted solar arrays, of nameplate capacity when determining the installed capacity because wind and solar resources cannot be assumed to be available on peak and cannot respond to dispatch requests. As data became available, unforced capability of wind and solar resources was to be calculated using actual data. There are additional wind and solar resources not reflected in total capacity because they are energy only resources and do not participate in the PJM Capacity Market. See "PJM Manual 21B: PJM Rules and Procedures for Determination of Generating Capability," § 4 Calculations of ELCC Class Rating, ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment, Accredited UCAP, and Accredited UCAP Factor, Rev. 05 (Jan. 22, 2026). The derating approach has been replaced with ELCC starting in the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.

68 The data for hybrid solar/battery resources are included in the solar data for confidentiality reasons.


69 Installed capacity is based on imports, exports, and PJM's capacity modification ("capmod") database that tracks new and reactivated generation, unit uprates and derates, and deactivations/changes to capacity resource status. Demand Resources are not tracked in this way and are not included here. For analysis of Demand Resources in the capacity market, see the Demand Resources discussion later in this section.



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Figure 5-1 shows the share of installed capacity by fuel source for the first day of each delivery year, from June 1, 2007, to June 1, 2026, as well as the expected installed capacity for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years. On June 1, 2007, coal comprised 40.7 percent of the installed capacity, reached a maximum of 42.9 percent in 2012, decreased to 20.71 percent on June 1, 2025, and is projected to decrease to 17.0 percent on June 1, 2027. The share of gas increased from 29.1 percent on June 1, 2007, reached a maximum of 50.2 percent in 2024, decreased to 49.0 percent on June 1, 2025, and is projected to increase to 49.1 on June 1, 2027.

**Figure 5-1 Percent of installed capacity (By fuel source): June 1, 2007 through June 1, 2027[70] [71]**




70 Prior to the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, ICAP for thermal resources were converted to UCAP using EFORd values. Beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, ICAP for thermal resources are converted to UCAP using the marginal ELCC values.

71 Prior to June 1, 2025, PJM set ICAP equal to UCAP for solar and wind units. Starting June 1, 2025, PJM began setting ICAP equal to CIRs for solar and wind units.

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Table 5-4 shows the RPM installed capacity on January 1, 2026, through June 30, 2026, for the top five generation capacity resource owners, excluding FRR committed MW.

### Table 5-4 Installed capacity by parent company: January 1, May 31, June 1, and June 30, 2026

| | 01-Jan-26 | | | 31-May-26 | | | 01-Jun-26 | | | 30-Jun-26 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parent Company | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | Rank | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | Rank | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | Rank | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | Rank |
| Dominion Resources, Inc. | 21,947.0 | 12.8% | 1 | 21,959.4 | 13.0% | 2 | 19,280.5 | 11.2% | 2 | 19,280.5 | 11.3% | 2 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | 20,279.1 | 11.9% | 2 | 24,265.6 | 14.4% | 1 | 24,381.3 | 14.2% | 1 | 23,621.3 | 13.8% | 1 |
| Vistra Energy Corp. | 13,929.1 | 8.2% | 3 | 13,928.4 | 8.3% | 3 | 14,331.4 | 8.3% | 3 | 14,333.2 | 8.4% | 4 |
| Talen Energy Corporation | 12,673.1 | 7.4% | 4 | 12,665.7 | 7.5% | 4 | 12,716.5 | 7.4% | 4 | 16,882.3 | 9.9% | 3 |
| LS Power Equity Partners, L.P. | 10,667.9 | 6.2% | 5 | 4,409.6 | 2.6% | 8 | 4,467.3 | 2.6% | 8 | 4,467.3 | 2.6% | 7 |
| ArcLight Capital Partners, LLC | 7,167.5 | 4.2% | 7 | 8,033.1 | 4.8% | 6 | 8,033.1 | 4.7% | 6 | 9,070.1 | 5.3% | 5 |
| NRG Energy, Inc. | 1,949.0 | 1.1% | 21 | 8,335.6 | 4.9% | 5 | 8,895.7 | 5.2% | 5 | 8,895.7 | 5.2% | 6 |

The sources of funding for generation owners can be categorized as one of two types: market and nonmarket. Market funding is from private investors bearing the investment risk without guarantees or support from any public sources, subsidies or guaranteed payment by ratepayers. Providers of market funding rely entirely on market revenues. Nonmarket funding is from guaranteed revenues, including cost of service rates for a regulated utility and subsidies. Table 5-5 shows the RPM installed capacity on January 1, 2026, to June 30, 2026, by funding type.

### Table 5-5 Installed capacity by funding type: January 1, May 31, June 1, and June 30, 2026

| | 01-Jan-26 | | 31-May-26 | | 01-Jun-26 | | 30-Jun-26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Funding Type | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP | ICAP (MW) | Percent of Total ICAP |
| Market | 133,468.8 | 72.5% | 130,458.4 | 71.7% | 135,255.6 | 73.2% | 134,475.0 | 73.1% |
| Nonmarket | 50,730.0 | 27.5% | 51,489.5 | 28.3% | 49,406.8 | 26.8% | 49,398.8 | 26.9% |
| Total | 184,198.8 | 100.0% | 181,947.9 | 100.0% | 184,662.4 | 100.0% | 183,873.8 | 100.0% |

## Fuel Diversity

Figure 5-2 shows the fuel diversity index ($FDI_c$) for RPM installed capacity.[72] The $FDI_c$ is defined as $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2$, where $s_i$ is the percent share of fuel type $i$. The minimum possible value for the $FDI_c$ is zero, corresponding to all capacity from a single fuel type. The maximum possible value for the $FDI_c$ is achieved when each fuel type has an equal share of capacity. For a capacity mix of eight fuel types, the maximum achievable index is 0.875. The fuel type categories used in the calculation of the $FDI_c$ are in Table 5-3. $FDI_c$ calculations prior to June 1, 2023 included eight fuel types. Batteries were added to the resource mix on June 1, 2023, and hybrid solar resources were added on January 1, 2024. The maximum achievable index with nine fuel types is 0.889. The maximum achievable index with ten fuel types is 0.900. The $FDI_c$ is stable and does not exhibit any long-term trends. The only significant deviation occurred with the expansion of the PJM footprint. On April 1, 2002, PJM expanded with the addition of Allegheny Power System, which added about 12,000 MW of generation.[73] The

72 The MMU developed the FDI to provide an objective metric of fuel diversity. The FDI metric is similar to the HHI used to measure market concentration. The FDI is calculated separately for energy output and for installed capacity. The $FDI_c$ includes derated capacity values for intermittent capacity subject to derating.

73 On April 1, 2002, the PJM Region expanded with the addition of Allegheny Power System under a set of agreements known as "PJM-West." See page 4 in the *2002 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM* for additional details.




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reduction in the $FDI_c$ resulted from an increase in coal capacity resources. A similar but more significant reduction occurred in 2004 with the expansion into the COMED, AEP, and DAY Control Zones.[74] The $FDI_c$ on June 30, 2026, increased 1.8 percent in comparison with the $FDI_c$ on June 30, 2025. Figure 5-2 also includes the expected $FDI_c$ through June 30, 2027. The expected $FDI_c$ is indicated in Figure 5-2 by the dotted orange line.

The $FDI_c$ is used to measure the impact on fuel diversity of potential retirements in 2026 through 2030. A total of 10,963 MW of capacity are at risk of retirement, consisting of 8,330 MW currently planning to retire and 2,633 MW expected to be uneconomic.[75] The dotted green line in Figure 5-2 shows the $FDI_c$ assuming that the capacity from the expected 2026 retirements were replaced by gas fired capacity.[76] The counterfactual $FDI_c$ on June 30, 2027, under these assumptions is 0.9 percent lower than the expected $FDI_c$ on June 30, 2027. The dotted blue line in Figure 5-2 shows the $FDI_c$ assuming that the capacity from the expected retirements through 2030 were replaced by wind and solar capacity.[77] The counterfactual $FDI_c$ on March 31, 2027, in this scenario, is 1.9 percent higher.

**Figure 5-2 Fuel Diversity Index for installed capacity: January 1, 2002 through June 30, 2027**




## RPM Capacity Market

The RPM Capacity Market, implemented June 1, 2007, is a three year forward looking, annual, locational market, with a must offer requirement for existing generation capacity resources, except for demand response resources, and except for resources owned by entities that elect the fixed resource requirement (FRR) option, and mandatory participation by load, with performance incentives, that includes clear market power mitigation rules and that permits the direct participation of demand side resources.

The standard schedule is that annual base residual auctions are held in May for delivery years that are three years in the future. Effective January 31, 2010, First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions are conducted 20, 10,

74 See the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix A, "PJM Geography" for an explanation of the expansion of the PJM footprint. The integration of the COMED Control Area occurred in May 2004 and the integration of the AEP and DAY Control Zones occurred in October 2004.

75 See the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 7: Net Revenue.

76 It is assumed that all of the replacement capacity is from gas units. In previous reports, solar and wind capacity have also been used for replacement capacity with the amounts based on the expected increase in the PJM RPS obligation for the upcoming year. But the PJM RPS obligation will decrease in 2027 in comparison to 2026 due to the termination of the Ohio RPS in 2027.

77 The split between solar (79.4 percent) and wind (20.6 percent) is based on queue data. In previous reports, the replacement capacity included gas units in addition to solar and wind with the amount of solar and gas replacement capacity being based on the expected increase in the PJM RPS obligation in 2030 in comparison to current year. But the RPS increase for 2030 exceeds the expected retirements and only solar and wind are used for replacement capacity in this scenario.

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and three months prior to the delivery year.[78] In the first six months of 2026, the 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction was conducted. The auction schedule has diverged significantly from the standard schedule in recent years.

## Market Structure

### Supply

Table 5-6 shows generation capacity changes since the implementation of the Reliability Pricing Model through the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. The 18,288.5 MW increase was the result of new generation capacity resources (48,485.1 MW), reactivated generation capacity resources (1,691.2 MW), uprates (12,490.0 MW), integration of external zones (21,967.5 MW), a net decrease in capacity exports (1,516.0 MW), offset by a net decrease in capacity imports (1,500.2 MW), deactivations (59,698.1 MW) and derates (6,663.0 MW).

Table 5-7 shows the calculated RPM reserve margin and reserve in excess of, or short of, the target installed reserve margin (IRM) for June 1, 2023, through June 1, 2027, and accounts for cleared capacity, replacement capacity, and deficiency MW for all auctions held and the most recent peak load forecast for each delivery year. The completion of the replacement process using cleared buy bids from RPM incremental auctions includes two transactions. The first step is for the entity to submit and clear a buy bid in an RPM incremental auction. The next step is for the entity to complete a separate replacement transaction using the cleared buy bid capacity. Prior to the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, replacement capacity transactions can be completed only after the EFORds for the delivery year are finalized, on November 30 in the year prior to the delivery year, but before the start of the delivery day. Effective with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, replacement capacity transactions can be completed only after the accredited UCAP factors for the delivery year are finalized, but before the start of the delivery day. Early replacement transactions can be approved for defined physical replacements.

78 See Letter Order, Docket No. ER10-366-000 (January 22, 2010).

### Changes in Generation Capacity[79]

As shown in Table 5-6, for the period from the introduction of the RPM capacity market design in the 2007/2008 Delivery Year through the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, internal installed capacity decreased by 3,694.8 MW after accounting for new capacity resources, reactivations, and uprates (62,666.3 MW) and capacity deactivations and derates (66,361.1 MW).[80]

For the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, new generation capacity is defined as capacity that cleared an RPM auction for the first time for the specified delivery year. Based on expected completion rates of cleared new generation capacity (2,781.0 MW) and pending deactivations (760.9 MW), PJM capacity is expected to increase by 2,020.1 MW through the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.

79 For more details on future changes in generation capacity, see "2020 PJM Generation Capacity and Funding Sources 2007/2008 through 2021/2022 Delivery Years," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_2020_PJM_Generation_Capacity_and_Funding_Sources_20072008_through_20212022_DY_20200915.pdf> (September 15, 2020).

80 These results are for internal capacity only and do not include, for example, imports or exports or the impact of integrations of new areas.



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## Table 5-6 Generation capacity changes: 2007/2008 through 2025/2026[81]

| | ICAP (MW) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | New | Reactivations | Uprates | Integration | Net Change in Capacity Imports | Net Change in Capacity Exports | Deactivations | Derates | Net Change |
| 2007/2008 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 691.5 | 0.0 | 70.0 | 15.3 | 380.0 | 417.0 | (5.8) |
| 2008/2009 | 815.4 | 238.3 | 987.0 | 0.0 | 473.0 | (9.9) | 609.5 | 421.0 | 1,493.1 |
| 2009/2010 | 406.5 | 0.0 | 789.0 | 0.0 | 229.0 | (1,402.2) | 108.4 | 464.3 | 2,254.0 |
| 2010/2011 | 153.4 | 13.0 | 339.6 | 0.0 | 137.0 | 367.7 | 840.6 | 223.5 | (788.8) |
| 2011/2012 | 3,096.4 | 354.5 | 507.9 | 16,889.5 | (1,183.3) | (1,690.3) | 2,542.0 | 176.2 | 18,637.1 |
| 2012/2013 | 1,784.6 | 34.0 | 528.1 | 47.0 | 342.4 | 84.0 | 5,536.0 | 317.8 | (3,201.7) |
| 2013/2014 | 198.4 | 58.0 | 372.8 | 2,746.0 | 934.3 | 28.9 | 2,786.9 | 288.3 | 1,205.4 |
| 2014/2015 | 2,276.8 | 20.7 | 530.2 | 0.0 | 2,335.7 | 177.3 | 4,915.6 | 360.3 | (289.8) |
| 2015/2016 | 4,291.8 | 90.0 | 449.0 | 0.0 | 511.4 | (117.8) | 8,338.2 | 215.8 | (3,094.0) |
| 2016/2017 | 3,679.3 | 532.0 | 419.2 | 0.0 | 575.6 | 722.9 | 659.4 | 206.7 | 3,617.1 |
| 2017/2018 | 4,127.3 | 5.0 | 562.1 | 0.0 | (1,025.1) | (695.1) | 2,657.4 | 148.5 | 1,558.5 |
| 2018/2019 | 8,127.5 | 4.0 | 330.9 | 2,120.0 | (3,217.0) | 212.7 | 6,730.0 | 89.2 | 333.5 |
| 2019/2020 | 4,612.0 | 13.3 | 494.9 | 165.0 | (1,196.6) | 401.3 | 3,296.0 | 116.8 | 274.5 |
| 2020/2021 | 403.1 | 11.6 | 575.4 | 0.0 | (37.9) | (111.6) | 3,572.0 | 206.4 | (2,714.6) |
| 2021/2022 | 3,309.3 | 6.0 | 412.2 | 0.0 | 38.5 | 1,066.1 | 2,197.6 | 125.5 | 376.8 |
| 2022/2023 | 4,743.2 | 0.0 | 417.0 | 0.0 | (469.3) | (868.0) | 7,460.5 | 302.0 | (2,203.6) |
| 2023/2024 | 2,696.8 | 0.0 | 420.5 | 0.0 | (47.9) | 1,067.8 | 5,149.2 | 1,441.1 | (4,588.7) |
| 2024/2025 | 1,724.3 | 0.0 | 919.5 | 0.0 | 17.1 | 212.0 | 1,068.0 | 737.7 | 643.2 |
| 2025/2026 | 1,994.0 | 310.8 | 2,743.2 | 0.0 | 12.9 | (977.1) | 850.8 | 404.9 | 4,782.3 |
| Total | 48,485.1 | 1,691.2 | 12,490.0 | 21,967.5 | (1,500.2) | (1,516.0) | 59,698.1 | 6,663.0 | 18,288.5 |

81 The capacity changes in this report are calculated based on June 1 through May 31.

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As shown in Table 5-7, total reserves on June 1, 2026, were 20,843.9 MW, which is 279.2 MW (UCAP) short of the required reserve level of 21,123.1 MW (UCAP). In the 2027/2028 BRA, total reserves were 16,977.4 MW, which is 6,516.6 MW (UCAP) short of the required reserve level of 23,494.0 MW (UCAP). The level of committed demand resources was 7,298.6 in the 2027/2028 BRA, meaning the PJM markets will rely on demand resources as part of the required reserve margin, rather than as excess above the required reserve margin.

The fact that more than one quarter (31.1 percent of total reserves in the 2027/2028 BRA) of the PJM reserves depend on demand resources that are not subject to the RPM must offer requirement, a core part of the capacity market design, means that reliability is significantly less certain than the stated reserve margins indicate.

### Table 5-7 RPM reserve margin: June 1, 2023, to June 1, 2027[82] [83] [84]

| | 01-Jun-23 | 01-Jun-24 | 01-Jun-25 | 01-Jun-26 | 01-Jun-27 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecast peak load ICAP (MW) | 149,382.2 | 151,631.1 | 154,534.1 | 156,760.6 | 164,579.0 |
| FRR peak load ICAP (MW) | 29,554.6 | 30,431.0 | 11,720.3 | 11,668.7 | 12,201.9 |
| PRD ICAP (MW) | 235.0 | 305.0 | 224.0 | 115.0 | 115.0 |
| Installed reserve margin (IRM) | 14.9% | 17.7% | 17.8% | 18.6% | 20.0% |
| Pool wide average EFORd | 4.87% | 5.10% | | | |
| Pool wide accredited UCAP factor | | | 79.63% | 78.34% | 77.17% |
| Forecast pool requirement (FPR) | 1.093 | 1.117 | 0.938 | 0.929 | 0.926 |
| RPM committed less deficiency UCAP (MW) (generation and DR) | 136,401.8 | 138,318.6 | 133,524.1 | 134,418.8 | 134,478.1 |
| RPM committed less deficiency ICAP (MW) (generation and DR) | 143,384.6 | 145,751.9 | 167,680.6 | 171,583.9 | 174,262.1 |
| RPM peak load ICAP (MW) | 119,592.6 | 120,895.1 | 142,589.7 | 144,976.9 | 152,262.1 |
| Reserve margin ICAP (MW) | 23,792.0 | 24,856.9 | 25,090.9 | 26,607.0 | 22,000.0 |
| Reserve margin (%) | 19.9% | 20.6% | 17.6% | 18.4% | 14.4% |
| Reserve margin in excess of IRM ICAP (MW) | 5,972.7 | 3,458.4 | (290.1) | (358.7) | (8,452.4) |
| Reserve margin in excess of IRM (%) | 5.0% | 2.9% | (0.2%) | (0.2%) | (5.6%) |
| RPM peak load UCAP (MW) | 113,768.4 | 114,729.4 | 113,544.2 | 113,574.9 | 117,500.7 |
| RPM reliability requirement UCAP (MW) | 130,714.7 | 135,039.8 | 133,749.2 | 134,698.0 | 140,994.7 |
| Reserve margin UCAP (MW) | 22,633.4 | 23,589.2 | 19,979.9 | 20,843.9 | 16,977.4 |
| Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW) | 5,687.1 | 3,278.8 | (225.1) | (279.2) | (6,516.6) |
| Projected replacement capacity UCAP (MW) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Projected reserve margin | 19.9% | 20.6% | 17.6% | 18.4% | 14.4% |
| Reserve margin UCAP (MW) | 22,633.4 | 23,589.2 | 19,979.9 | 20,843.9 | 16,977.4 |
| Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW) | 5,687.1 | 3,278.8 | (225.1) | (279.2) | (6,516.6) |
| Projected replacement capacity UCAP (MW) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Projected reserve margin | 19.9% | 20.6% | 17.6% | 18.4% | 14.4% |

82 The calculated reserve margins in this table do not include EE on the supply side or the EE addback on the demand side. The EE excluded from the supply side for this calculation includes annual EE and summer EE. This is how PJM calculates the reserve margin. Effective with the 2026/2027 Deliver Year, EE resources no longer participate in the PJM capacity market. See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095 (November 5, 2024).

83 These reserve margin calculations do not consider Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) load.

84 The RPM committed less deficiency MW values (rows H and J) and resultant reserve margin calculations for June 1, 2025, were revised from the *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*.



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## Sources of Funding[85]

Developers use a variety of sources to fund their projects, including Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), cost of service rates, and private funds (from internal sources or private lenders and investors). PPAs can be used for a variety of purposes and the use of a PPA does not imply a specific source of funding.

New and reactivated generation capacity from the 2007/2008 Delivery Year through the 2025/2026 Delivery Year (Table 5-8) totaled 50,176.3 MW (80.1 percent of all additions), with 37,899.1 MW from market funding and 12,277.2 MW from nonmarket funding. Uprates to existing generation capacity from the 2007/2008 Delivery Year through the 2025/2026 Delivery Year totaled 12,490.0 MW (19.9 percent of all additions), with 8,977.6 MW from market funding and 3,512.4 MW from nonmarket funding. In summary, of the 62,666.3 MW of additional capacity from new, reactivated, and uprated generation that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2007/2008 through 2025/2026 Delivery Years, 46,876.7 MW (74.8 percent) were based on market funding.

### Table 5-8 Sources of funding: 2007/2008 through 2025/2026 Delivery Years

| | ICAP MW | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007/2008 DY through 2025/2026 DY | New and Reactivated | Percent of Grand Total | Uprate | Percent of Grand Total | Total | Percent of Grand Total |
| Market | 37,899.1 | 60.5% | 8,977.6 | 14.3% | 46,876.7 | 74.8% |
| Nonmarket | 12,277.2 | 19.6% | 3,512.4 | 5.6% | 15,789.6 | 25.2% |
| Total | 50,176.3 | 80.1% | 12,490.0 | 19.9% | 62,666.3 | 100.0% |

Of the 3,294.6 MW of the additional generation capacity (new resources, reactivated resources, and uprates) that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2027/2028 Delivery Years (Table 5-9), 658.4 MW are not yet in service, with 603.0 MW of those having market funding. Applying the historical completion rates, 65.2 percent of all the projects in development are expected to go into service, 393.3 MW of the 603.0 MW in development market funded projects, and 36.1 MW of the 55.4 MW in development non market funded projects.[86]

Of the 2,636.2 MW of the additional generation capacity that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2027/2028 Delivery Years and are already in service, 2,122.1 MW (80.5 percent) are based on market funding and 514.1 MW (19.5 percent) are based on nonmarket funding.

In summary, 2,725.1 MW (82.7 percent) of the additional generation capacity (603.0 MW not yet in service and 2,122.1 MW in service) that cleared in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 through the 2027/2028 Delivery Years are based on market funding. Capacity additions based on nonmarket funding are 569.5 MW (17.3 percent) of generation that cleared the RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years.

### Table 5-9 Sources of funding: 2026/2027 through 2027/2028 Delivery Years

| | ICAP MW | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026/2027 DY through 2027/2028 DY | Not Yet in Service | Percent | Percent of Grand Total | In Service | Percent | Percent of Grand Total | Total | Percent of Grand Total |
| Market | 603.0 | 91.6% | 18.3% | 2,122.1 | 80.5% | 64.4% | 2,725.1 | 82.7% |
| Nonmarket | 55.4 | 8.4% | 1.7% | 514.1 | 19.5% | 15.6% | 569.5 | 17.3% |
| Total | 658.4 | 100.0% | 20.0% | 2,636.2 | 100.0% | 80.0% | 3,294.6 | 100.0% |

## Demand

The MMU analyzed market sectors in the PJM Capacity Market to determine how they met their load obligations. The PJM Capacity Market was divided into the following sectors:

- **PJM EDC.** EDCs with a franchise service territory within the PJM footprint. This sector includes traditional utilities, electric cooperatives, municipalities and power agencies.
- **PJM EDC Generating Affiliate.** Affiliate companies of PJM EDCs that own generating resources.

85 For more details on sources of funding for generation capacity, see "2020 PJM Generation Capacity and Funding Sources 2007/2008 through 2021/2022 Delivery Years," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_2020_PJM_Generation_Capacity_and_Funding_Sources_20072008_through_20212022_DY_20200915.pdf> (September 15, 2020).

86 See the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 12: Generation and Transmission Planning.

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
- **PJM EDC Marketing Affiliate.** Affiliate companies of PJM EDCs that sell power and have load obligations in PJM, but do not own generating resources.
- **Non-PJM EDC.** EDCs with franchise service territories outside the PJM footprint.
- **Non-PJM EDC Generating Affiliate.** Affiliate companies of non-PJM EDCs that own generating resources.
- **Non-PJM EDC Marketing Affiliate.** Affiliate companies of non-PJM EDCs that sell power and have load obligations in PJM, but do not own generating resources.
- **Non-EDC Generating Affiliate.** Affiliate companies of non-EDCs that own generating resources.
- **Non-EDC Marketing Affiliate.** Affiliate companies of non-EDCs that sell power and have load obligations in PJM, but do not own generating resources.

On June 1, 2026, PJM EDCs and their affiliates maintained a majority market share of load obligations under RPM, together totaling 59.8 percent (Table 5-10), up from 57.8 percent on June 1, 2025. The combined market share of LSEs not affiliated with any EDC and of non-PJM EDC affiliates was 40.2 percent, down from 42.2 percent on June 1, 2025. The share of capacity market load obligation fulfilled by PJM EDCs and their affiliates, and LSEs not affiliated with any EDC and non-PJM EDC affiliates from June 1, 2007, to June 1, 2026, is shown in Figure 5-3. PJM EDCs' and their affiliates' share of load obligation has decreased from 77.5 percent on June 1, 2007, to 59.8 percent on June 1, 2026. The share of load obligation held by LSEs not affiliated with any EDC and non-PJM EDC affiliates increased from 22.5 percent on June 1, 2007, to 40.2 percent on June 1, 2026.[87]

### Table 5-10 Capacity market load obligation served: June 1, 2025 and June 1, 2026

| | 01-Jun-25 | | 01-Jun-26 | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Obligation (MW) | Percent of total obligation | Obligation (MW) | Percent of total obligation | Obligation (MW) | Percent of total obligation |
| PJM EDCs and Affiliates | 86,471.6 | 57.8% | 103,953.4 | 59.8% | 17,481.8 | 2.0% |
| LSEs not affiliated with any EDC + non EDC Affiliates | 63,166.5 | 42.2% | 69,952.0 | 40.2% | 6,785.5 | (2.0%) |
| Total | 149,638.1 | 100.0% | 173,905.4 | 100.0% | 24,267.3 | 0.0% |

### Figure 5-3 Capacity market load obligation served: June 1, 2007 through June 1, 2026




## Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)

Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs) are used to return capacity market congestion revenues to load. Load pays congestion. Capacity market congestion revenues

87 Prior to the 2012/2013 Delivery Year, obligation was defined as cleared and make whole MW in the Base Residual Auction and the Second Incremental Auction plus ILR forecast obligations. Effective with the 2012/2013 Delivery Year, obligation is defined as the sum of the unforced capacity obligations satisfied through all RPM auctions for the delivery year.



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are the difference between the total dollars paid by load for capacity and the total dollars received by capacity market sellers. The MW of CTRs available for allocation to LSEs in an LDA are equal to the Unforced Capacity imported into the LDA, less any MW of CETL paid for directly by market participants in the form of Qualifying Transmission Upgrades (QTUs) cleared in an RPM Auction, and Incremental Capacity Transfer Rights (ICTRs). There are two types of ICTRs, those allocated to a New Service Customer obligated to fund a transmission facility or upgrade and those associated with Incremental Rights-Eligible Required Transmission Enhancements.

The total required capacity in an LDA is provided by a mix of internal capacity and imported capacity. The imported capacity equals the total required capacity minus the internal capacity. The value of CTRs is based on the fact that load in an LDA pays the clearing price for all cleared capacity but that generators who provide imported capacity are paid a lower price based on the LDA in which they are located. The value of CTRs equals the imported MW times the price difference. This excess is paid by load and is returned to load using CTRs. CTRs are intended to permit customers to receive the benefit of importing cheaper capacity using transmission capability.

But PJM does not use the actual MW cleared in the BRA and three incremental auctions, the actual internal MW and the actual imported MW, when defining what customers pay and when defining the value of CTRs. Under the current rules, PJM defines the total MW needed for reliability in an LDA when clearing the BRA based on forecast demand at the time of the BRA. But PJM actually charges customers for the total MW needed for reliability based on forecast demand three years later, prior to the actual delivery year, and applies a zonal allocation. PJM also defines the internal capacity as the internal capacity after the final incremental auction conducted three years after the BRA, when auctions follow the traditional schedule. The difference between the updated MW needed for reliability and the updated internal capacity is the updated imported MW, adjusted for the final zonal allocation. In cases where the updated imported MW are smaller than the imported MW from the actual auction clearing, the total value of CTRs is lower that it would be if the actual auction clearing MW were used.

The actual load charges are allocated to each zone based on the ratio of the zonal forecast peak load to the RTO forecast peak load used for the third incremental auction conducted three months prior to the delivery year.

The CTR issue implies a broader issue with capacity market clearing and settlements. The capacity market is cleared based on a three year ahead forecast of load and offers of capacity. Payments to capacity resources in the delivery year are based on the capacity market clearing prices and quantities. But payments by customers in the delivery year are not based on market clearing prices and quantities. Payments by customers in each zone are based on the ratio of zonal forecast peak load to the RTO forecast peak load used for the Third Incremental Auction, run three months prior to the delivery year when auctions follow the traditional schedule.[88] The allocation sometimes creates significant differences between the capacity cleared to meet the reliability requirement and the capacity obligation allocated to the customers in a zone. For example, ComEd Zone, which is identical to ComEd LDA, cleared 27,932.1 MW including 5,574.0 MW of imports in the 2021/2022 RPM BRA. The ComEd Zone's capacity obligation, immediately after the clearing of the Base Residual Auction was 24,983.0 MW. The final ComEd Zone's capacity obligation for the 2021/2022 Delivery Year after the Third Incremental Auction was 22,721.2 MW.

As with CTRs, the underlying reasons for not using the market clearing results are not clear. Although not stated explicitly, the goal appears to be to reflect the fact that actual loads change between the auction and the delivery year. But the simple reallocation of capacity obligations based on changes in the load forecast does not reflect the BRA market results. The MMU recommends that the market clearing results be used in settlements rather than the reallocation process currently used or that the process of modifying the obligations to pay for capacity be reviewed.

For LDAs in which the RPM auctions for a delivery year resulted in a positive average weighted Locational Price Adder, an LSE with CTRs corresponding to the LDA is entitled to a payment or charge equal to the Locational Price Adder

88 See "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 7.2.3 Final Zonal Unforced Capacity Obligations, Rev. 62 (Dec. 17, 2025).

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multiplied by the MW of the LSEs' CTRs. The definition of the MW does not reflect auction clearing MW.

In the 2025/2026 RPM Third Incremental Auction, BGE had 5,024.2 MW of CTRs with a total value of $360.6 million and DOM had 1,752.6 MW of CTRs with a total value of $112.8 million. BGE had 65.7 MW of customer funded ICTRs with a total value of $4.7 million. BGE had 306.0 MW of ICTRs due to Incremental Rights Eligible Required Transmission Enhancements with a value of $22.0 million.

The 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction cleared at $329.17 per MW-day with no price separation and therefore the value of CTRs is $0.

The 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction cleared at $333.44 per MW-day with no price separation and therefore the value of CTRs is $0.

## Demand Curve

A central feature of PJM's Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) design is that the demand curve, or Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve, has a downward sloping segment. In the RPM market design, the supply of three year forward capacity is cleared against this VRR curve. A VRR curve is defined for each Locational Deliverability Area (LDA). This shape replaced the vertical demand curve at the reliability requirement. The downward sloping segment begins at the MW level that is approximately 1.0 percent less than the reliability requirement.[89] Figure 5-4 shows the shape of the VRR curve for the 2026/2027 RPM Base Residual Auction.

The initial VRR curve, introduced in 2007, had a maximum price equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (Net CONE), determined annually based on fixed cost of new generating capacity, which is the Gross Cost of New Entry (Gross CONE), net of the three year average historical energy and ancillary service revenues. That VRR curve was structured to yield auction clearing prices equal to 1.5 times Net CONE when the amount of capacity cleared was less than 99 percent of the target reserve margin and below 1.5 times Net CONE when the amount of capacity cleared was greater than 99 percent of the target reserve margin.

Effective for the 2018/2019 through 2021/2022 Delivery Years, a revised VRR curve was implemented after PJM conducted a triennial review.[90] [91] PJM defines the reliability requirement as the capacity needed to satisfy the one event in ten years loss of load expectation (LOLE) for the RTO and capacity needed to satisfy the one event in 25 years loss of load expectation for the each LDA. PJM increased the maximum price on the VRR curve to be the greater of Gross CONE or 1.5 times Net CONE for all unforced capacity MW between 0 and 99.8 percent of the reliability requirement. The first downward sloping segment was from 99.8 percent and 102.5 percent of the reliability requirement. The second downward sloping segment was from 102.5 percent and 107.6 percent of the reliability requirement.

Effective for the 2022/2023 through 2025/2026 Delivery Years, another revised VRR curve was implemented after PJM conducted a quadrennial review.[92] The maximum price on the VRR curve was the greater of Gross CONE or 1.5 times Net CONE for all unforced capacity MW between 0 and 98.9 percent of the reliability requirement. The first downward sloping segment was from 98.9 percent and 101.6 percent of the reliability requirement. The second downward sloping segment was from 101.6 percent and 106.8 percent of the reliability requirement (Figure 5-4).

Effective for the 2026/2027 through 2029/2030 Delivery Years, another revised VRR curve was implemented after PJM conducted a quadrennial review.[93] PJM increased the maximum price on the VRR curve to the greater of Gross CONE or 1.75 times Net CONE for all unforced capacity MW between 0 and 99.0 percent of the reliability requirement. The first downward sloping segment is from 99.0 percent and 101.5 percent of the reliability requirement. The second downward sloping segment is from 101.5 percent and 104.5 percent of the reliability requirement.

89 The formula for the MW level where the VRR curve begins the downward slope is given by *(Reliability Requirement) x [1 – 1.2% / (Installed Reserve Margin)]*.

90 "Third Triennial Review of PJM's Variable Resource Requirement Curve," The Brattle Group, (May 15, 2014), <https://www.brattle.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/7510_third_triennial_review_of_pjms_variable_resource_requirement_curve-4.pdf>.

91 153 FERC ¶ 61,035 (October 15, 2015).

92 167 FERC ¶ 61,029 (April 15, 2019).

93 182 FERC ¶ 61,073 (Feb. 14, 2023).




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The VRR curve was then changed significantly based on PJM's filing to establish the maximum price point on the VRR curve equal to "approximately" $325/MW-day in UCAP with a new MW point that is inconsistent with the tariff definition, a new minimum price point on the VRR curve of "approximately" $175/MW-day in UCAP for an unlimited number of MW that is inconsistent with the tariff, and a VRR curve shape not consistent with the tariff definition, for all Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM") Auctions, including Base Residual Auctions and Incremental Auctions, for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years.[94] The price cap and price floor was extended to apply to RPM auctions for the 2028/2029 and 2029/2030 Delivery Years.[95] The VRR curve has always had a maximum price. The VRR curve has always had a minimum price equal to zero. The proposal would set the maximum price level at somewhat higher than 1.5 times Net CONE. The MMU position is that the maximum price should be equal to the lesser of 1.5 times Net CONE or Gross CONE.[96] The MMU opposed the imposition of a completely unsupported floor price that is inconsistent with the longstanding VRR curve design.

The initial VRR curve, introduced in 2007, had a maximum price equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (Net CONE). The use of Net CONE was based on the logic of the capacity market, to ensure that between the energy and capacity markets the cost of entry was covered. Net CONE was the missing money from the energy and ancillary services markets that needed to be recoverable in the capacity market. The inclusion of the net energy and ancillary services markets revenue in the calculation of Net CONE was the equilibrating factor between the capacity market and energy market. The use of Gross CONE is inconsistent with that basic capacity market logic as is the use of 1.75 times Net CONE which is frequently greater than Gross CONE. Gross CONE was introduced as the maximum price based on PJM's unsupported assertions that Net CONE would somehow be too low. The maximum point on the VRR curve for the 2025/2026 BRA was the higher of Gross CONE or 1.5 times Net CONE, and Gross CONE was actually used. However, if the logic of the markets implies a low Net CONE, that is the right answer. There is nothing inherently wrong with a low Net CONE that requires abandoning the basic capacity market logic. Gross CONE was an intervention designed to increase capacity market prices based on a judgment about what prices should be despite the fact that the basic economic logic did not support that increase. If there is an issue with the calculation of Net CONE, it should be addressed directly rather than by ignoring its central role in the design of the capacity market. As Gross CONE numbers are reasonably well defined, much more focus on getting the net revenues used in the forward auctions is required in order to ensure that market participants have confidence in the Net CONE values used in the auctions.

Figure 5-4 shows the RTO VRR curve and RTO reliability requirement for the 2027/2028 RPM BRA.

### Figure 5-4 Shape of the VRR curve relative to the reliability requirement: 2027/2028 Delivery Year




94 PJM Filing. Proposal for Revised Price Cap and Price Floor for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 Delivery Years, and Request for a Waiver of the 60-Days' Notice Requirement to Allow for a March 31, 2025 Effective Date, Docket No. ER25-1357 (Feb. 20, 2025). The modified maximum price and the addition of a price floor were based on the Agreement between Governor Josh Shapiro of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and PJM.

95 195 FERC ¶ 61,076 (April 28, 2026).

96 See Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, (April 16, 2025), <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2025/IMM_Answer_to_Answer_Docket_No_ER25-1357_20250416.pdf>.

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## Market Concentration

### Auction Market Structure

As shown in Table 5-11, in the 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction, all participants in the total PJM market as well as the LDA RPM markets failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test.[97] Offer caps were applied to all sell offers for resources which were subject to mitigation when the capacity market seller did not pass the test, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, increased the market clearing price.[98] [99] [100]

In applying the market structure test, the relevant supply for the RTO market includes all supply offered at less than or equal to 150 percent of the RTO cost-based clearing price. The relevant supply for the constrained LDA markets includes the incremental supply inside the constrained LDAs which was offered at a price higher than the unconstrained clearing price for the parent LDA market and less than or equal to 150 percent of the cost-based clearing price for the constrained LDA. The relevant demand consists of the MW needed inside the LDA to relieve the constraint.

Table 5-11 presents the results of the TPS test. A generation owner or owners are pivotal if the capacity of the owners' generation facilities is needed to meet the demand for capacity. The results of the TPS are measured by the residual supply index ($RSI_X$). The $RSI_X$ is a general measure that can be used with any number of pivotal suppliers. The subscript denotes the number of pivotal suppliers included in the test. If the $RSI_X$ is less than or equal to 1.0, the supply owned by the specific generation owner, or owners, is needed to meet market demand and the generation owners are pivotal suppliers with a significant ability to influence market prices. If the $RSI_X$ is greater than 1.0, the supply of the specific generation owner or owners is not needed to meet market demand and those generation owners have a reduced ability to unilaterally influence market price.

97 The market definition used for the TPS test includes all offers with costs less than or equal to 1.50 times the clearing price. See *MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets,* at "Three Pivotal Supplier Test" for additional discussion.

98 See OATT Attachment DD § 6.5.

99 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE resources were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 at P 30 (2009).

100 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for planned generation capacity resource and creating a new definition for existing generation capacity resource for purposes of the must offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a generation capacity resource the same in terms of mitigation as a planned generation capacity resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).



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### Table 5-11 RSI results: 2023/2024 through 2027/2028 RPM Auctions[101]

| RPM Markets | RSI1, 1.05 | RSI3 | Total Participants | Failed RSI3 Participants |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023/2024 Base Residual Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.78 | 0.68 | 134 | 134 |
| MAAC | 0.78 | 0.40 | 11 | 11 |
| DPL South | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| BGE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | | |
| 2023/2024 Third Incremental Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.77 | 0.76 | 51 | 15 |
| MAAC | 0.41 | 0.76 | 17 | 9 |
| EMAAC | 0.45 | 0.18 | 10 | 10 |
| BGE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | | |
| 2024/2025 Base Residual Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.77 | 0.64 | 133 | 133 |
| MAAC | 0.59 | 0.11 | 9 | 9 |
| EMAAC | 0.48 | 0.00 | 2 | 2 |
| DPL South | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| BGE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| DEOK | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | | |
| 2024/2025 Third Incremental Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.88 | 0.59 | 64 | 64 |
| MAAC | 0.60 | 0.17 | 10 | 10 |
| EMAAC | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| BGE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | | |
| 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.82 | 0.62 | 128 | 128 |
| BGE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| Dominion | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | |
| 2025/2026 Third Incremental Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.60 | 0.31 | 75 | 75 |
| BGE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | |
| 2026/2027 Base Residual Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.82 | 0.64 | 153 | 153 |
| | | | | |
| 2026/2027 Third Incremental Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.82 | 0.67 | 120 | 120 |
| | | | | |
| 2027/2028 Base Residual Auction | | | | |
| RTO | 0.82 | 0.63 | 155 | 155 |

101 The RSI shown is the lowest RSI in the market.

## Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs)

Under the PJM Tariff, PJM determines, in advance of each BRA, whether defined Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) will be modeled in the auction. Effective with the 2012/2013 Delivery Year, an LDA is modeled as a potentially constrained LDA for a delivery year if the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL) is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (CETO), such LDA had a locational price adder in one or more of the three immediately preceding BRAs, or such LDA is determined by PJM in a preliminary analysis to be likely to have a locational price adder based on historic offer price levels. The rules also provide that starting with the 2012/2013 Delivery Year, EMAAC, SWMAAC, and MAAC LDAs are modeled as potentially constrained LDAs regardless of the results of the above three tests.[102] In addition, PJM may establish a constrained LDA even if it does not qualify under the above tests if PJM finds that "such is required to achieve an acceptable level of reliability."[103] A reliability requirement and a Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve are established for each modeled LDA. Effective for the 2014/2015 through 2016/2017 Delivery Years, a Minimum Annual and a Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement were established for each modeled LDA. Effective for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, Sub-Annual and Limited Resource Constraints, replacing the Minimum Annual and a Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirements, were established for each modeled LDA.[104] [105] Effective for the 2018/2019 and the 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint and a Base Capacity Resource Constraint, replacing the Sub-Annual and Limited Resource Constraints, were established for each modeled LDA.

## Imports and Exports

Units external to the metered boundaries of PJM can qualify as PJM capacity resources if they meet the requirements to be capacity resources. Generators on the PJM system that do not have a commitment to serve PJM loads in the given delivery year as a result of RPM auctions, FRR capacity plans, locational

102 Prior to the 2012/2013 Delivery Year, an LDA with a CETL less than 1.05 times CETO was modeled as a constrained LDA in RPM. No additional criteria were used in determining modeled LDAs.
103 OATT Attachment DD § 5.10 (a) (ii).
104 146 FERC ¶ 61,052 (2014).
105 Locational Deliverability Areas are shown in maps in the *2021 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 5: "Capacity Market" at "Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs)".

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UCAP transactions, and/or are not designated as a replacement resource, are eligible to export their capacity from PJM.[106]

The market rules in other balancing authorities should also not create inappropriate barriers to the import or export of capacity. The PJM market rules should ensure that the definition of capacity is enforced including physical deliverability, recallability and the obligation to make competitive offers into the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market equal to ICAP MW. Physical deliverability can only be assured by requiring that all imports are deliverable to PJM load to ensure that they are full substitutes for internal capacity resources. Selling capacity into the PJM Capacity Market but making energy offers daily of $999 per MWh would not fulfill the requirements of a capacity resource to make a competitive offer, but would constitute economic withholding. This is one of the reasons that the rules governing the obligation to make a competitive offer in the day-ahead energy market should be clarified for both internal and external resources. The PJM market rules should also not create inappropriate barriers to either the import or export of capacity.

The calculation of CETL should only include capacity imports into PJM where the capacity has an explicit must offer requirement in the PJM Capacity Market. These could include pseudo tied units or resources with a grandfathered obligation. The external capacity that does not have a must offer requirement in the PJM capacity market is not obligated to serve PJM load under all conditions and therefore should not be assumed to be a source of capacity. This capacity should not be included in PJM's power flow calculations used to deriver CETL values between PJM's LDAs. PJM has modified its CETL calculations to exclude such capacity.

The establishment of a pseudo tie is one requirement for an external resource to be eligible to participate in the PJM Capacity Market. Pseudo tied external resources, regardless of their location, are treated as only meeting the reliability requirements of the rest of RTO and not the reliability requirements of any specific locational deliverability area (LDA). All imports offered in the auction from areas external to PJM are modeled as supply in the rest of RTO and not in any specific zonal or subzonal LDA. The fact that pseudo tied external resources cannot be identified as equivalent to resources internal to specific LDAs illustrates a fundamental issue with capacity imports. Capacity imports are not equivalent to, nor substitutes for, internal resources. All internal resources are internal to a specific LDA.[107]

Effective May 9, 2017, significantly improved pseudo tie requirements for external generation capacity resources were implemented.[108] The rule changes include: defining coordination with other Balancing Authorities when conducting pseudo tie studies; establishing an electrical distance requirement; establishing a market to market flowgate test to establish limits on the number of coordinated flowgates PJM must add in order to accommodate a new pseudo tie; a model consistency requirement; the requirement for the capacity market seller to provide written acknowledgement from the external Balancing Authority Areas that such pseudo tie does not require tagging and that firm allocations associated with any coordinated flowgates applicable to the external Generation Capacity Resource under any agreed congestion management process then in effect between PJM and such Balancing Authority Area will be allocated to PJM; the requirement for the capacity market seller to obtain long-term firm point to point transmission service for transmission outside PJM with rollover rights and to obtain network external designated transmission service for transmission within PJM; establishing an operationally deliverable standard; and modifying the nonperformance penalty definition for external generation capacity resources to assess performance at subregional transmission organization granularity.

Generation external to the PJM region is eligible to be offered into an RPM auction if it meets specific requirements.[109] [110] [111] Firm transmission service must be acquired from all external transmission providers between the unit and border of PJM and generation deliverability into PJM must be demonstrated prior to the start of the delivery year. In order to demonstrate generation deliverability into PJM, external generators must obtain firm point

106 OATT Attachment DD § 5.6.6(b).

107 External resources are not assigned to any of the five global LDAs or 22 zonal and subzonal LDAs. PJM's current practice is to model external resources in the rest of RTO. The practice is not currently documented by PJM. It was previously documented in "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 2.3.4 Capacity Import Limits, Rev. 39 (Dec. 21, 2017).

108 161 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2017).

109 See "Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region," Schedule 9 & 10.

110 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 4.2.2 Existing Generation Capacity Resources – External, Rev. 62 (Dec. 17, 2025).

111 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 4.6.4 Importing an External Generation Resource, Rev. 62 (Dec. 17, 2025).



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to point transmission service on the PJM OASIS from the PJM border into the PJM transmission system or by obtaining network external designated transmission service. In the event that transmission upgrades are required to establish deliverability, those upgrades must be completed by the start of the delivery year. The following are also required: the external generating unit must be in the resource portfolio of a PJM member; 12 months of NERC/GADs unit performance data must be provided to establish an EFORd; the net capability of each unit must be verified through winter and summer testing; and a letter of non-recallability must be provided to assure PJM that the energy and capacity from the unit is not recallable to any other balancing authority.

All external generation resources that have an RPM commitment or FRR capacity plan commitment or that are designated as replacement capacity must be offered in the PJM day-ahead energy market.[112]

Planned External Generation Capacity Resources are eligible to be offered into an RPM Auction if they meet specific requirements.[113] [114] Planned External Generation Capacity Resources are proposed Generation Capacity Resources, or a proposed increase in the capability of an Existing Generation Capacity Resource, that is located outside the PJM region; participates in the generation interconnection process of a balancing authority external to PJM; is scheduled to be physically and electrically interconnected to the transmission facilities of such balancing authority on or before the first day of the delivery year for which the resource is to be committed to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM region; and is in full commercial operation prior to the first day of the delivery year.[115] An External Generation Capacity Resource becomes an Existing Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of the date that interconnection service commences or the resource has cleared an RPM Auction for a prior delivery year.[116]

As shown in Table 5-12, of the 1,144.8 MW of imports offered in the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction, 1,005.9 MW cleared. Of the cleared imports, 695.6 MW (69.2 percent) were from MISO.

### Table 5-12 RPM imports: 2007/2008 through 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auctions

| | UCAP (MW) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MISO | | Non-MISO | | Total Imports | |
| Base Residual Auction | Offered | Cleared | Offered | Cleared | Offered | Cleared |
| 2007/2008 | 1,073.0 | 1,072.9 | 547.9 | 547.9 | 1,620.9 | 1,620.8 |
| 2008/2009 | 1,149.4 | 1,109.0 | 517.6 | 516.8 | 1,667.0 | 1,625.8 |
| 2009/2010 | 1,189.2 | 1,151.0 | 518.8 | 518.1 | 1,708.0 | 1,669.1 |
| 2010/2011 | 1,194.2 | 1,186.6 | 539.8 | 539.5 | 1,734.0 | 1,726.1 |
| 2011/2012 | 1,862.7 | 1,198.6 | 3,560.0 | 3,557.5 | 5,422.7 | 4,756.1 |
| 2012/2013 | 1,415.9 | 1,298.8 | 1,036.7 | 1,036.7 | 2,452.6 | 2,335.5 |
| 2013/2014 | 1,895.1 | 1,895.1 | 1,358.9 | 1,358.9 | 3,254.0 | 3,254.0 |
| 2014/2015 | 1,067.7 | 1,067.7 | 1,948.8 | 1,948.8 | 3,016.5 | 3,016.5 |
| 2015/2016 | 1,538.7 | 1,538.7 | 2,396.6 | 2,396.6 | 3,935.3 | 3,935.3 |
| 2016/2017 | 4,723.1 | 4,723.1 | 2,770.6 | 2,759.6 | 7,493.7 | 7,482.7 |
| 2017/2018 | 2,624.3 | 2,624.3 | 2,320.4 | 1,901.2 | 4,944.7 | 4,525.5 |
| 2018/2019 | 2,879.1 | 2,509.1 | 2,256.7 | 2,178.8 | 5,135.8 | 4,687.9 |
| 2019/2020 | 2,067.3 | 1,828.6 | 2,276.1 | 2,047.3 | 4,343.4 | 3,875.9 |
| 2020/2021 | 2,511.8 | 1,671.2 | 2,450.0 | 2,326.0 | 4,961.8 | 3,997.2 |
| 2021/2022 | 2,308.4 | 1,909.9 | 2,162.0 | 2,141.9 | 4,470.4 | 4,051.8 |
| 2022/2023 | 954.9 | 954.9 | 603.1 | 603.1 | 1,558.0 | 1,558.0 |
| 2023/2024 | 967.9 | 836.5 | 560.1 | 560.1 | 1,528.0 | 1,396.6 |
| 2024/2025 | 949.9 | 820.4 | 577.2 | 577.2 | 1,527.1 | 1,397.6 |
| 2025/2026 | 700.5 | 700.5 | 568.0 | 568.0 | 1,268.5 | 1,268.5 |
| 2026/2027 | 697.4 | 697.4 | 584.3 | 584.3 | 1,281.7 | 1,281.7 |
| 2027/2028 | 695.6 | 695.6 | 449.2 | 310.3 | 1,144.8 | 1,005.9 |

One of the reasons that a Generation Capacity Resource may qualify for an exception to the RPM must offer requirement is by demonstration that it has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity.[117] Exporting a Generation Capacity Resource requires a financially and physically firm commitment to load located outside the PJM Region. The PJM Tariff states "In order to establish that a resource has a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity, the Capacity

112 OATT Schedule 1 § 1.10.1A.
113 See "Reliability Assurance Agreement among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region," Section 1.69A.
114 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 4.2.4 Planned Generation Capacity Resources – External, Rev. 62 (Dec. 17, 2025).
115 Prior to January 31, 2011, capacity modifications to existing generation capacity resources were not considered planned generation capacity resources. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).
116 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must-offer requirement and market power mitigation. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).
117 OATT Attachment DD § 6.6(g).

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Market Seller must demonstrate that it has entered into a unit-specific bilateral transaction for service to load located outside the PJM Region, by a demonstration that such resource is identified on a unit-specific basis as a network resource under the transmission tariff for the control area applicable to such external load, or by an equivalent demonstration of a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale. The Capacity Market Seller additionally shall identify the megawatt amount, export zone, and time period (in days) of the export."[118]

The MMU recommends that the PJM Tariff be modified to explicitly state that in order to qualify, a Capacity Market Seller requesting a must offer exception based on a financially and physically firm commitment to an external sale of its capacity must provide a confirmed firm transmission reservation, covering the entire path from source to sink, for the full requested ICAP MW of the external sale that covers the entire delivery year, by the tariff defined deadline. The MMU recommends that this language apply to all external sales of Generation Capacity Resources, including those where an external balancing authority does not require this level of transmission service in order to consider a PJM resource as a network resource.

## Demand Resources

The level of DR products that buy out of their positions after the BRA means that the treatment of DR has a negative impact on generation investment incentives and that the rules governing the requirement to be a physical resource should be more clearly stated and enforced.[119] If DR displaces new generation resources in BRAs, but then buys out of the position prior to the delivery year, this means potentially replacing new entry generation resources at the high end of the supply curve with other existing but uncleared capacity resources available in Incremental Auctions at reduced offer prices. This suppresses the price of capacity in the BRA compared to the competitive result because it permits the shifting of demand from the BRA to the Incremental Auctions, which is inconsistent with the must offer, must buy rules, and the requirement to be an actual, physical resource, governing the BRA. PJM's sell back of capacity in Incremental Auctions exacerbates the incentive for DR to buy out of its BRA positions in IAs.

Effective with the 2020/2021 Delivery Year, DR includes annual and summer products. Annual Demand Resources are required to be available on any day during the Delivery Year for an unlimited number of interruptions between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. EPT for the months of June through October and the following May and between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. EPT for the months of November through April unless there is a PJM approved maintenance outage during the October through April period.

Summer-Period Demand Resources are required to be available on any day from June through October and the following May of the delivery year for an unlimited number of interruptions between the hours of 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. EPT.

118 Ibid.

119 See "Analysis of Replacement Capacity for RPM Commitments: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2019," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2019/IMM_Analysis_of_Replacement_Capacity_for_RPM_Commitments_June_1_2007_to_June_1_2019_20190913.pdf> (September 13, 2019).



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As shown in Table 5-13, and Table 5-14, committed DR was 4,805.8 MW for June 1, 2026, as a result of cleared capacity for demand resources in RPM auctions for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year (5,710.3 MW) less replacement capacity (904.5 MW).

## Table 5-13 RPM load management statistics by LDA: June 1, 2023 to June 1, 2027[120] [121] [122] [123]

| | | UCAP (MW) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | RTO | MAAC | EMAAC | SWMAAC | DPL South | PSEG | PSEG North | Pepco | ATSI | ATSI Cleveland | ComEd | BGE | PPL | DAY | DEOK | Dominion | JCPL |
| | DR cleared | 8,174.1 | 2,411.4 | 975.9 | 343.6 | 52.2 | 272.7 | 126.1 | 175.2 | 916.2 | 189.4 | 1,253.2 | 168.4 | 583.4 | 209.3 | 175.4 | | |
| | EE cleared | 5,896.4 | 2,438.6 | 1,341.4 | 569.5 | 59.3 | 443.4 | 210.4 | 298.6 | 451.8 | 46.3 | 961.2 | 270.9 | 306.1 | 102.4 | 164.3 | | |
| | DR net replacements | (466.2) | (229.5) | (3.8) | (4.9) | 22.8 | 3.4 | 2.6 | (25.0) | 47.2 | (63.4) | 160.7 | 20.1 | (123.3) | (24.0) | 25.0 | | |
| | EE net replacements | (5.3) | (2.2) | (1.0) | 7.6 | 9.0 | 11.6 | 13.7 | 7.6 | (15.3) | (0.5) | (20.9) | 0.0 | (6.2) | (7.9) | 0.7 | | |
| 01-Jun-23 | RPM load management | 13,599.0 | 4,618.3 | 2,312.5 | 915.8 | 143.3 | 731.1 | 352.8 | 456.4 | 1,399.9 | 171.8 | 2,354.2 | 459.4 | 760.0 | 279.8 | 365.4 | | |
| | DR cleared | 8,064.7 | 2,497.6 | 1,004.0 | 358.5 | 46.0 | 285.7 | 98.2 | 160.4 | 682.6 | 141.6 | 1,554.0 | 198.1 | 603.4 | 192.9 | 221.9 | | |
| | EE cleared | 7,716.0 | 3,543.5 | 2,064.9 | 787.4 | 99.9 | 802.9 | 392.0 | 398.9 | 587.6 | 54.9 | 1,063.4 | 388.5 | 391.4 | 128.3 | 188.1 | | |
| | DR net replacements | (364.8) | (197.4) | 9.1 | 43.0 | 35.2 | (7.3) | (14.9) | 19.3 | 50.9 | (58.3) | (56.0) | 23.7 | (138.9) | (6.2) | (5.4) | | |
| | EE net replacements | (48.0) | (43.6) | (15.4) | 21.3 | 14.1 | (6.5) | (0.1) | 9.1 | (30.6) | 0.0 | 1.2 | 12.2 | (38.4) | (5.6) | (3.7) | | |
| 01-Jun-24 | RPM load management | 15,367.9 | 5,800.1 | 3,062.6 | 1,210.2 | 195.2 | 1,074.8 | 475.2 | 587.7 | 1,290.5 | 138.2 | 2,562.6 | 622.5 | 817.5 | 309.4 | 400.9 | | |
| | DR cleared | 6,265.9 | 1,860.8 | 784.9 | 304.0 | 65.0 | 228.9 | 65.8 | 135.7 | 712.7 | 97.3 | 1,090.5 | 168.3 | 424.9 | 141.0 | 159.6 | 673.5 | |
| | EE cleared | 1,493.2 | 674.7 | 433.5 | 154.7 | 24.0 | 184.0 | 100.0 | 80.0 | 69.1 | 6.6 | 337.6 | 74.7 | 45.7 | 18.5 | 24.9 | 154.2 | |
| | DR net replacements | (483.0) | (140.4) | (60.2) | (11.6) | (30.3) | (10.4) | (14.3) | (15.1) | (39.8) | (4.8) | (29.0) | 3.5 | (10.2) | (0.2) | (39.9) | (151.0) | |
| | EE net replacements | (11.6) | 32.8 | 25.7 | (2.6) | (1.3) | 7.5 | 3.3 | (2.6) | (6.8) | (0.1) | 1.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | (0.2) | (1.6) | (11.6) | |
| 01-Jun-25 | RPM load management | 7,264.5 | 2,427.9 | 1,183.9 | 444.5 | 57.4 | 410.0 | 154.8 | 198.0 | 735.2 | 99.0 | 1,400.1 | 246.5 | 470.4 | 159.1 | 143.0 | 665.1 | |
| | DR cleared | 5,710.3 | 1,611.1 | 620.0 | 381.5 | 33.9 | 179.1 | 45.6 | 229.3 | 597.8 | 94.4 | 970.7 | 152.2 | 327.5 | 152.0 | 116.3 | 555.1 | 59.2 |
| | DR net replacements | (904.5) | (240.0) | (69.4) | (34.5) | (12.2) | (13.9) | (9.2) | (3.6) | (150.1) | (21.4) | (34.8) | (30.9) | (64.9) | (38.4) | 6.3 | (61.1) | (12.8) |
| 01-Jun-26 | RPM load management | 4,805.8 | 1,371.1 | 550.6 | 347.0 | 21.7 | 165.2 | 36.4 | 225.7 | 447.7 | 73.0 | 935.9 | 121.3 | 262.6 | 113.6 | 122.6 | 494.0 | 46.4 |
| | DR cleared | 7,298.6 | 1,981.6 | 799.8 | 455.5 | 42.6 | 234.3 | 49.1 | 285.9 | 672.3 | 101.7 | 1,515.9 | 169.6 | 421.8 | 172.1 | 200.6 | 768.3 | 89.3 |
| | DR net replacements | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 01-Jun-27 | RPM load management | 7,298.6 | 1,981.6 | 799.8 | 455.5 | 42.6 | 234.3 | 49.1 | 285.9 | 672.3 | 101.7 | 1,515.9 | 169.6 | 421.8 | 172.1 | 200.6 | 768.3 | 89.3 |

120 See OATT Attachment DD § 8.4. The reported DR cleared MW may reflect reductions in the level of committed MW due to relief from Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges.

121 Pursuant to OA § 15.1.6(c), PJM Settlement shall attempt to close out and liquidate forward capacity commitments for PJM Members that are declared in collateral default. The reported replacement transactions may include transactions associated with PJM members that were declared in collateral default.

122 EE resources are fully reflected in PJM load forecasts starting with the 2016 load forecast for the 2019/2020 delivery year, and EE resources are not defined to be capacity resources in any way as a result. EE resources do not clear in the capacity auctions.

123 See OATT Attachment DD § 5.14E. The reported DR cleared MW for the 2016/2017, 2017/2018, and 2018/2019 Delivery Years reflect reductions in the level of committed MW due to the Demand Response Legacy Direct Load Control Transition Provision.

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**Table 5-14 RPM commitments, replacements, and registrations for demand resources: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2027**[124] [125] [126]

| | UCAP (MW) | | | | | | Registered DR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RPM Cleared | Adjustments to Cleared | Net Replacements | RPM Commitments | RPM Commitment Shortage | RPM Commitments Less Commitment Shortage | ICAP (MW) | UCAP Conversion Factor | UCAP (MW) |
| 01-Jun-07 | 127.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 127.6 | 0.0 | 127.6 | 0.0 | 1.033 | 0.0 |
| 01-Jun-08 | 559.4 | 0.0 | (40.0) | 519.4 | (58.4) | 461.0 | 488.0 | 1.034 | 504.7 |
| 01-Jun-09 | 892.9 | 0.0 | (474.7) | 418.2 | (14.3) | 403.9 | 570.3 | 1.033 | 589.2 |
| 01-Jun-10 | 962.9 | 0.0 | (516.3) | 446.6 | (7.7) | 438.9 | 572.8 | 1.035 | 592.6 |
| 01-Jun-11 | 1,826.6 | 0.0 | (1,052.4) | 774.2 | 0.0 | 774.2 | 1,117.9 | 1.035 | 1,156.5 |
| 01-Jun-12 | 8,752.6 | (11.7) | (2,253.6) | 6,487.3 | (34.9) | 6,452.4 | 7,443.7 | 1.037 | 7,718.4 |
| 01-Jun-13 | 10,779.6 | 0.0 | (3,314.4) | 7,465.2 | (30.5) | 7,434.7 | 8,240.1 | 1.042 | 8,586.8 |
| 01-Jun-14 | 14,943.0 | 0.0 | (6,731.8) | 8,211.2 | (219.4) | 7,991.8 | 8,923.4 | 1.042 | 9,301.2 |
| 01-Jun-15 | 15,774.8 | (321.1) | (4,829.7) | 10,624.0 | (61.8) | 10,562.2 | 10,946.0 | 1.038 | 11,360.0 |
| 01-Jun-16 | 13,284.7 | (19.4) | (4,800.7) | 8,464.6 | (455.4) | 8,009.2 | 8,961.2 | 1.042 | 9,333.4 |
| 01-Jun-17 | 11,870.7 | 0.0 | (3,870.8) | 7,999.9 | (30.3) | 7,969.6 | 8,681.4 | 1.039 | 9,016.3 |
| 01-Jun-18 | 11,435.4 | 0.0 | (3,182.4) | 8,253.0 | (1.0) | 8,252.0 | 8,512.0 | 1.091 | 9,282.4 |
| 01-Jun-19 | 10,703.1 | 0.0 | (2,138.8) | 8,564.3 | (0.4) | 8,563.9 | 9,229.9 | 1.090 | 10,056.0 |
| 01-Jun-20 | 9,445.7 | 0.0 | (2,399.5) | 7,046.2 | (0.1) | 7,046.1 | 7,867.6 | 1.088 | 8,561.5 |
| 01-Jun-21 | 11,427.7 | 0.0 | (4,111.0) | 7,316.7 | 0.0 | 7,316.7 | 7,754.2 | 1.087 | 8,429.6 |
| 01-Jun-22 | 8,866.2 | 0.0 | (570.0) | 8,296.2 | (52.1) | 8,244.1 | 8,518.5 | 1.091 | 9,290.2 |
| 01-Jun-23 | 8,174.1 | 0.0 | (466.2) | 7,707.9 | (161.5) | 7,546.4 | 7,383.0 | 1.093 | 8,069.6 |
| 01-Jun-24 | 8,064.7 | 0.0 | (364.8) | 7,699.9 | (507.4) | 7,192.5 | 6,758.7 | 1.117 | 7,549.5 |
| 01-Jun-25 | 6,265.9 | 0.0 | (483.0) | 5,782.9 | (209.4) | 5,573.5 | 7,748.7 | 0.770 | 5,966.5 |
| 01-Jun-26 | 5,710.3 | 0.0 | (904.5) | 4,805.8 | (31.9) | 4,773.9 | 7,228.3 | 0.720 | 5,204.4 |
| 01-Jun-27 | 7,298.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,298.6 | 0.0 | 7,298.6 | 0.0 | 0.920 | 0.0 |

## ELCC: The Capacity Value of Resources

Given that many PJM states have aggressive renewable energy targets, a core goal of a competitive market design should be to ensure that the resources required to provide reliability receive appropriate competitive market incentives for entry and for ongoing investment and for exit when uneconomic. A significant level of renewable resources, operating with zero or near zero marginal costs, will result in very low energy prices at times of high intermittent output. Since renewable resources are intermittent, the contribution of renewables to meeting reliability targets must be analyzed carefully to ensure that the capacity value of renewables is calculated correctly.

The units of measurement for the PJM capacity market auctions are unforced capacity (UCAP). PJM uses conversion factors to convert installed capacity MW (ICAP) into UCAP MW and this process is known as capacity accreditation. Prior to the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, EFORd values for thermal generators were used to convert ICAP to UCAP. Conversion factors for wind and solar generators were based on energy output during summer peak hours. Conversion factors for storage resources were equal to the maximum capability during 10 continuous hours of operation. The conversion factor for Demand Resources was equal to the forecast

124 See OATT Attachment DD § 8.4. The reported DR adjustments to cleared MW include reductions in the level of committed MW due to relief from Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges.
125 See OATT Attachment DD § 5.14C. The reported DR adjustments to cleared MW for the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 Delivery Years include reductions in the level of committed MW due to the Demand Response Operational Resource Flexibility Transition Provision.
126 See OATT Attachment DD § 5.14E. The reported DR adjustments to cleared MW for the 2016/2017, 2017/2018, and 2018/2019 Delivery Years include reductions in the level of committed MW due to the Demand Response Legacy Direct Load Control Transition Provision.


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pool requirement (FPR). On July 30, 2021, FERC approved new PJM rules for defining/derating the capacity value of intermittent and storage resources, based on PJM's interpretation of the effective load carrying capability (ELCC) method.[127] PJM's average ELCC accreditations for intermittent and storage resources relied on the average capability by resource class for the 2023/2024 and 2024/2025 Delivery Years. Revisions, filed in October 2023, changed the capacity accreditation calculation to a marginal ELCC approach, applicable to all resource types. Beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, capacity accreditations are based on the revised marginal ELCC approach. The PJM marginal ELCC approach was accepted by FERC in January 2024.[128]

PJM's approach to ELCC is based on the correct high level insight that there is a need to calculate the availability of different resource types, but the actual implementation does not do that correctly and results in a set of illogical outcomes. For example, PJM assigned penalties to solar resources during Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022 when solar resources did not generate power after dark. PJM's ELCC calculations rely on a significant overweighting of generator performance during the Polar Vortex in 2014 and Winter Storm Elliott in 2022 that results in artificially suppressed ELCC values for thermal resources and other resource types. A PJM sensitivity analysis shows that not including generator performance during the 2014 Polar Vortex and Winter Storm Elliott lowers the winter portion of loss of load hours from 78.2 percent to 20.3 percent, a decrease of 74.1 percent, and increases the average accredited UCAP factor by 14.1 percent from 0.7858 to 0.8978.[129]

Under the PJM ELCC approach a solar resource is assigned a derating factor, and the derated MW are asserted to be equivalent to a perfect resource accredited at that MW level. PJM assigned penalties to solar resources during Elliott when they did not generate power after dark. This is clearly not correct and illustrates one of the flaws in the ELCC logic. The solar resource is available for sunny hours and not for unsunny hours. A solar resource is not expected to generate at night and should not face penalties for failing to do what it obviously cannot. ELCC does not convert intermittent resources, or any resource, into a perfect resource, or even the equivalent of a perfect resource. This illogical implication of PJM's ELCC means that there is a significant flaw in the ELCC approach. The penalties were assessed because the ELCC method determined that 1 MW of solar nameplate capacity was equivalent to 0.54 MW of perfect capacity, meaning capacity that is always available at the derated level, even in the middle of the night.[130]

The MMU opposes PJM's ELCC rules because they are an administrative determination by PJM based on a black box model of the capacity value of resources, they rely on significant counterfactual behavioral assumptions for storage and demand response resources, are not unit specific, are not hourly, are not locational, introduce significant volatility to the capacity accreditations, do not recognize the winter capability of thermal resources, overweight unit performance during Winter Storm Elliott, do not recognize actual performance in the delivery year and are an ex ante approach that must assume a capacity resource fleet for determining the ELCC marginal class ratings.[131] PJM does not check the actual cleared capacity in capacity market auctions to verify if the cleared capacity is expected to provide the target reliability.

The ELCC approach is not an appropriate way to define the MW capacity value for intermittent and storage resources, or for thermal resources, in a market. ELCC was developed as, and remains, a utility planning tool rather than a market design tool. ELCC was attractive as a possible analytical basis for the derating of intermittent and storage resources to a MW level consistent with their actual availability. The impetus made sense but the actual application of the ELCC planning tool cannot work in markets that include intermittent or thermal resources. The underlying logic makes sense but PJM's implementation does not.

As a result of all these issues, the MMU has concluded that ELCC is not a viable method for determining the reliability contributions of capacity resources. The

127 See 176 FERC ¶ 61,056.

128 186 FERC ¶61,080 (January 30, 2024).

129 ELCC Accreditation Methodology: Update on Sensitivity Analyses, Item 2 in the meeting materials for the ELCC Senior Task Force (May 22, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/task-forces/elccstf/2025/20250522/20250522-item-02---elcc-accreditation-methodology-update-on-sensitivity-analyses---pjm-presentation.pdf>.

130 PJM Interconnection L.L.C., "ELCC Class Ratings for 2024-2025 BRA," (December 28, 2021) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability>.

131 See Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket ER24-99-000, et al. (November 9, 2023); Comments on Response to Deficiency Notice, Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER24-99-000 (December 21, 2023); Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER24-99-000 (January 12, 2024); Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER24-99-000 (January 24, 2024).

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MMU has proposed a replacement for the PJM ELCC approach that is based on the actual hourly availability of all individual generators.[132] [133] [134]

The ELCC ratings produced by the marginal approach in general, and by PJM's specific marginal approach specifically, are inherently volatile. PJM has calculated the marginal ELCC class ratings for the 2025/2026 delivery year on five separate occasions. Table 5-15 shows the results of each calculation. Each calculation is dependent upon the load forecast model, the combination of actual historical performance and changes in experienced weather, and the assumed forward looking resource mix. The PJM 2024 load forecast model was used to produce the February 2024, March 2024 and January 2025 ELCC ratings. The ELCC ratings posted on December 31, 2024, used an interim 2025 load forecast model. In early January, PJM removed the posted ELCC ratings from December 31, 2024, and posted recalculated ratings using the 2024 load forecast model. The modified ELCC ratings were posted on January 23, 2025. The January 23, 2025, ratings are the final ELCC ratings for 2025/2026 Delivery Year.[135] The ELCC rating changes have significant impacts on the amount of cleared capacity. Table 5-16 shows the difference between capacity that cleared the 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction and the updated capacity MW value based on the final ELCC ratings for 2025/2026 posted on January 23, 2025. In total, the capacity values decreased by 928.5 MW (UCAP) or 0.7 percent. Capacity market sellers are obligated to obtain additional capacity prior to the delivery year if they are short as a result of a reduction in ELCC rating between the BRA and the final ELCC rating from PJM's ELCC rating changes. Had PJM used the ELCC ratings posted on December 31, 2024, the capacity values would have decreased by 3,793.3 MW or 2.8 percent.

## Table 5-15 Marginal ELCC ratings for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year

| | 2025/2026 Delivery Year | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ELCC Class | December 2023 | February 2024 | March 2024 | December 2024 | January 2025 |
| Onshore Wind | 21% | 35% | 35% | 42% | 38% |
| Offshore Wind | 39% | 60% | 60% | 71% | 62% |
| Solar Fixed | 15% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 10% |
| Solar Tracking | 25% | 14% | 14% | 11% | 14% |
| Landfill Intermittent | 56% | 55% | 54% | 51% | 51% |
| Hydro Intermittent | 41% | 36% | 37% | 37% | 37% |
| 4-hr Storage | 76% | 59% | 59% | 44% | 55% |
| 6-hr Storage | 85% | 67% | 67% | 53% | 65% |
| 8-hr Storage | 89% | 69% | 68% | 58% | 68% |
| 10-hr Storage | 92% | 78% | 78% | 67% | 77% |
| Demand Response | 95% | 77% | 76% | 68% | 77% |
| Nuclear | 96% | 96% | 95% | 95% | 95% |
| Coal | 86% | 85% | 84% | 83% | 83% |
| Gas Combined Cycle | 87% | 80% | 79% | 77% | 78% |
| Gas Combustion Turbine | 74% | 62% | 62% | 59% | 63% |
| Gas Combustion Turbine Dual Fuel | 90% | 78% | 79% | 78% | 79% |
| Diesel Utility | 91% | 90% | 92% | 92% | 92% |
| Steam | 78% | 70% | 75% | 73% | 74% |

132 For additional details on the MMU proposal see "Executive Summary of the IMM Capacity Market Design Proposal: Sustainable Capacity Market (SCM)", Independent Market Monitor for PJM (August 16, 2023) <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2023/IMM_RASTF-CIFP_SCM_Executive_Summary_20230816.pdf>.

133 Any generation from a resource in excess of its CIR value is equivalent to generation from an energy only resource and should not be included in the calculation of the capacity value of the resource or in the calculation of the derated ELCC class ratings that define the capacity value of the resource. Updated rules beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year require that ELCC accreditations exclude energy in excess of a generator's CIR. See 183 FERC ¶ 61,009 (April 7, 2023).

134 New rules beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year correctly limit the delivered energy to the CIR level in the ELCC calculations. The new rules also include a complex transition process that allocates available headroom to intermittent resources with understated CIRs. The new rules apply to Delivery Year 2025/2026 BRA and subsequent delivery years. *See* 183 FERC ¶ 61,009 (April 7, 2023).

135 See Item 5 in Markets and Reliability Committee Meeting Materials, *Installed Reserve Margin (IRM), Forecast Pool Requirement (FPR), and Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) for 2025/2026 3IA* at 2, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (January 23, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/committees/mrc>.



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## Table 5-16 Impact of ratings changes on cleared capacity[136]

| | MW (UCAP) | Reduction in capacity value compared to Base Residual Auction | Percent change in capacity value compared to Base Residual Auction |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Cleared Capacity | 135,684.0 | | |
| Updated Cleared Capacity based on Jan 23, 2025 ELCC Ratings | 134,755.5 | (928.5) | (0.7%) |
| Updated Cleared Capacity based on Dec 31, 2024 ELCC Ratings | 131,890.7 | (3,793.3) | (2.8%) |

The ELCC volatility also affects the reliability requirement calculation. Table 5-17 shows the reliability requirement calculation for the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction and the update for the Third Incremental Auction for 2025/2026. The pool wide accredited UCAP factor for the Third IA is based on the January 23, 2025, ELCC ratings which use the PJM 2024 load forecast model. These updated ELCC ratings reduced the pool wide accredited UCAP factor from 0.7969 to 0.7963. The reliability requirement and the FRR obligation both increase, resulting in an increase of 395.7 MW (UCAP) to the reliability requirement adjusted for FRR. PJM needs to procure an additional 395.7 MW (UCAP) of capacity in the Third Incremental Auction.

136 PJM stated that the 2024 load forecast model was used because it is the "most recently finalized PJM load forecast." The January 23, 2025, ELCC Ratings are based on the PJM 2024 load forecast model. The December 31, 2024, ELCC Ratings are based on an interim PJM 2025 load forecast model.

## Table 5-17 PJM Reliability Requirement[137] [138] [139]

| | 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction | 2025/2026 Third Incremental Auction | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICAP | 191,693.0 | 188,920.0 | (2,773.0) |
| Solved Load | 160,624.0 | 158,357.0 | (2,267.0) |
| Installed Reserve Margin | 17.800% | 17.800% | 0.0% |
| Accredited UCAP | 152,765.0 | 150,438.0 | (2,327.0) |
| Pool Wide Accredited UCAP Factor | 0.797 | 0.796 | (0.001) |
| Forecast Pool Requirement | 0.939 | 0.938 | (0.001) |
| Preliminary Forecast Peak Load | 153,883.0 | 154,534.1 | 651.0 |
| Reliability Requirement | 144,450.0 | 144,953.0 | 503.0 |
| Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) | 10,886.4 | 10,993.7 | 107.3 |
| Reliability Requirement Adjusted for FRR | 133,563.6 | 133,959.3 | 395.7 |

PJM filed tariff changes that transfer risk caused by the volatile ELCC ratings from generation owners to the load. ELCC ratings may increase or decrease significantly between the time a generator clears in the RPM Base Residual Auction and the final ELCC rating just prior to the start of the delivery year. Under the new tariff rules, generators will be excused from paying the Capacity Resource Deficiency Charge for a deficiency caused by a decrease in the final ELCC rating. Under the prior rules, a Capacity Market Seller was required to cover its short position by acquiring additional capacity or pay a deficiency penalty equal to 20 percent of the base residual auction clearing price for each MW of shortage. The tariff change was filed by PJM on April 18, 2025, and approved by FERC on June 17, 2025.[140] [141] The MMU opposed the change because the new rule does not mitigate the risk as asserted by PJM but simply transfers the ELCC rating volatility risk to the load.[142] The change is inconsistent with basic market logic under which investors bear the

137 *2025/2026 RPM 3rd Incremental Auction Planning Parameters*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (January 31, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm>.

138 *Installed Reserve Margin (IRM), Forecast Pool Requirement (FPR), and Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) for BRA* at 15, Item 5, PJM Markets & Reliability Committee meeting, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (March 20, 2024). <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/committees/mrc>.

139 *Installed Reserve Margin (IRM), Forecast Pool Requirement (FPR), and Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) for 3IA* at 7, Item 3, PJM Members Committee meeting, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (January 23, 2025). <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/committees/mc>.

140 *Proposal to Mitigate Impacts From Updates to ELCC Accreditation between the Base Residual Auction and the Final ELCC Accreditation Values*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket ER25-2002 (April 18, 2025).

141 191 FERC ¶ 61,203 (June 17, 2025).

142 See *Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM* (May 9, 2025), *Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM* (June 9, 2025), *Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM* (June 16, 2025), Docket ER25-2002-000).

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risk associated with the ownership of generation. The new rules are effective beginning with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.

PJM has calculated and posted marginal ELCC ratings on 11 occasions for the 2025/2026 through 2028/2029 Delivery Years. Figure 5-5 shows the ELCC class ratings for intermittent resources. The horizontal axis shows the delivery year to which the ratings apply and the month the ratings were posted. The ratings change each time they are recalculated. The original rating for onshore wind for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year was 21 percent and the final rating for 2025/2026 Delivery Year was 38 percent, an 80.9 percent increase. The onshore wind rating for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year is 41 percent, a 95.2 percent increase over the initial 2025/2026 rating. Solar has decreased. Solar with tracking technology has decreased from the initial 2025/2026 rating of 25 percent to 8 percent for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, a 68.0 percent decrease. Solar with fixed panels has decreased 53.3 percent over the same period.

### Figure 5-5 Marginal ELCC Class Ratings for Intermittent Resources






Figure 5-6 shows the ELCC rating for thermal resources. Combined cycle resource and combustion turbine ratings have decreased from their initial 2025/2026 ratings. The original rating for combined cycle resources for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year was 87 percent and the final rating for 2025/2026 Delivery Year was 78 percent, a 10.3 percent decrease. The combined cycle rating for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year is 74 percent, a 14.9 percent decrease over the initial 2025/2026 rating. Combustion turbine ratings have also decreased. Ratings for combustion turbines with dual fuel capability have decreased from the initial 2025/2026 rating of 90 percent to 77 percent for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, a 14.4 percent decrease. Ratings for combustion turbines without dual fuel capability have decreased 17.6 percent over the same period. The change in UCAP for combined cycle and combustion turbine resources from the initial 2025/2026 ELCC ratings to the latest 2027/2028


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ratings is a decrease of 11.5 GW. The corresponding change in ICAP is a decrease of 1.2 GW.


PJM could partially offset this loss of capacity in the short run by recognizing the winter capability of thermal resources rather than limiting such resources to summer ratings. Most of the risk recognized in the ELCC model is winter risk but the ELCC accreditation values for thermal resources are capped at the summer ratings. That unnecessarily limits supply and changes the ELCC values for all other resources and changes the system accredited unforced capacity and therefore AUCAP, the maximum level of load that can be served by the existing resources and therefore the reliability requirement. The CIRs of such resources are currently limited by the summer ratings but those rules can and should be changed given the use of the ELCC approach. There is no reason that excess winter CIRs cannot be assigned to these resources immediately.

### Figure 5-6 Marginal ELCC Class Ratings for Thermal Resources




Marginal ELCC ratings for storage and demand response resources have also exhibited volatility. Figure 5-7 shows that the storage resource ratings have decreased. On average across all durations, storage ELCC ratings have decreased 20.4 percent from the initial 2025/2026 Delivery Year ratings to the 2027/2028 Delivery Year ratings. The initial rating for demand response for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year was 95 percent and final rating for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year was 77 percent, an 18.9 percent decrease. Due to recent rule change, the demand response rating for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year is 92 percent.[143]

### Figure 5-7 Marginal ELCC Class Ratings for Storage and Demand Resources




143 191 FERC ¶61,103 (May 5, 2025).

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# Market Conduct

## Offer Caps

Market power mitigation measures were applied to capacity resources such that the sell offer was set equal to the defined offer cap when the capacity market seller failed the market structure test for the auction, the submitted sell offer exceeded the defined offer cap, and the submitted sell offer, absent mitigation, would have increased the market clearing price.[144] [145] [146] For Capacity Performance Resources, for RPM auctions prior to September 2, 2021, offer caps were defined in the PJM Tariff as the applicable zonal Net Cost of New Entry (CONE) times (B) where B is the average of the Balancing Ratios (B) during the Performance Assessment Hours in the three consecutive calendar years that precede the base residual auction for such delivery year, unless net avoidable costs exceed this level, or opportunity costs based on the potential sale of capacity in an external market exceed this level. The Commission issued an order eliminating the prior offer cap and establishing a competitive market seller offer cap set at Net ACR, effective September 2, 2021.[147] The Commission rejected an attempt by PJM to undermine the Market Seller Offer Cap rules by order issued February 6, 2024.[148] The Commission approved changes to the Market Seller Offer Cap that allow Capacity Market Sellers to offer the higher of the net ACR and the Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk (CPQR)[149] and to submit resource specific segmented offer caps.[150] Both changes to the Market Seller Offer Cap give Capacity Market Sellers the ability to offer in excess of the competitive offer and exercise market power as a result.

For RPM Third Incremental Auctions prior to September 2, 2021, capacity market sellers may elect an offer cap equal to the greater of the Net CONE for the relevant LDA and delivery year or 1.1 times the BRA clearing price for the relevant LDA and delivery year. For RPM Third Incremental Auctions after September 2, 2021, capacity market sellers may elect an offer cap of 1.1 times the BRA clearing price for the relevant LDA and delivery year.

Avoidable costs are costs that are neither short run marginal costs, like fuel or consumables, nor fixed costs like depreciation and rate of return. Avoidable costs are the costs that a generation owner incurs as a result of operating a generating unit for one year, in particular the delivery year.[151] As a result, the tariff defines avoidable costs as the costs that a generation owner would not incur if the generating unit did not offer for one year. Although the term mothball is used in the tariff to modify the term ACR, the term mothball is not defined in the tariff. Mothball is an informal term better understood as a metaphor for the cost to operate for one year. Avoidable costs are the costs to operate the unit for one year, regardless of whether the unit plans to retire. Although the tariff includes different mothball and retirement values, the distinction is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of avoidable costs and should be eliminated. PJM never explained exactly how it calculated mothball and retirement avoidable cost levels. The MMU recommends that major maintenance costs be included in the definition of avoidable costs and removed from energy offers because such costs are avoidable costs and not short run marginal costs.[152] The tariff states that avoidable costs may also include annual capital recovery associated with investments required to maintain a unit as a Generation Capacity Resource, termed Avoidable Project Investment Recovery (APIR), despite the fact that these are not actually avoidable costs, particularly after the first year.

Avoidable cost based offer caps are defined to be net of revenues from all other PJM markets and unit-specific bilateral contracts, including RECs, and expected bonus performance payments/nonperformance charges.[153] Capacity resource owners could provide ACR data by providing their own unit-specific data or, for auctions for delivery years prior to 2020/2021 and auctions held

144 See OATT Attachment DD § 6.5.
145 Prior to November 1, 2009, existing DR and EE resources were subject to market power mitigation in RPM Auctions. See 129 FERC ¶ 61,081 at P 30 (2009).
146 Effective January 31, 2011, the RPM rules related to market power mitigation were changed, including revising the definition for Planned Generation Capacity Resource and creating a new definition for Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the must offer requirement and market power mitigation, and treating a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource the same in terms of mitigation as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. See 134 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2011).
147 176 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021), *order denying reh'g*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2022), *appeal denied*, EPSA, et al. v. FERC, Case No. 21-1214, et al. (DC Cir. October 10, 2023), *cert. denied*.
148 186 FERC ¶ 61,097, *reh'g denied*, 187 FERC ¶ 62,016 (2024).
149 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (February 20, 2025).
150 Id. at 123.
151 OATT Attachment DD § 6.8(b).
152 *PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket Nos. ER19-210-000 and EL19-8-000, Responses to Deficiency Letter re: Major Maintenance and Operating Costs Recovery* (February 14, 2019).
153 For details on the competitive offer of a capacity performance resource, see "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction," <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf> (October 28, 2022).


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after September 2, 2021, by selecting the default ACR values. The specific components of avoidable costs are defined in the PJM tariff.[154]

Effective for the 2018/2019 and subsequent delivery years, the ACR definition includes two additional components, Avoidable Fuel Availability Expenses (AFAE) and Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk (CPQR).[155] AFAE is available for Capacity Performance Resources. AFAE is defined to include expenses related to fuel availability and delivery. CPQR is available for Capacity Performance Resources and, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, Base Capacity Resources. CPQR is defined to be the quantifiable and reasonably supported cost of mitigating the risks of nonperformance associated with submission of an offer.

The opportunity cost option allows capacity market sellers to offer based on a documented price available in a market external to PJM, subject to export limits. If the relevant RPM market clears above the opportunity cost, the generation capacity resource is sold in the RPM market. If the opportunity cost is greater than the clearing price and the generation capacity resource does not clear in the RPM market, it is available to sell in the external market.

Effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the market seller offer cap definition was modified to include unit specific standalone Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk (CPQR) and segmented unit specific offer caps.[156] For standalone CPQR, the offer cap is defined as the unit specific CPQR with no net revenue offset applied. For segmented unit specific offer caps, the capacity market seller can request that the first segment of the segmented unit specific offer cap be based on either unit specific standalone CPQR or net unit specific ACR. The remaining segments from the second segment up to the tenth segment are defined to be based on standalone CPQR.[157]

Allowing offers based on gross CPQR when net revenues are greater than total gross ACR, including CPQR, permits offers greater than the competitive level by allowing resources with a competitive offer of $0 per MW-day to make positive offers equal to one component of ACR, the gross CPQR component, ignoring net revenues entirely. The rule also permits offers greater than the competitive level by allowing resources with a competitive offer greater than $0 per MW-day but less than gross CPQR to make offers equal to one standalone component of ACR, the gross CPQR component, also ignoring net revenues entirely.

The decision to allow segmented offer caps means allowing the exercise of market power. This is the case first because the segmented offer caps require that all avoidable costs be spread over a first MW segment that is smaller than the full resource, thus inflating the MSOC, and allow offer caps for all segments after the first segment based on gross CPQR with no net revenue offsets. If avoidable costs can be assigned to the first, self defined MW offer segment, and the later MW segments are not defined in the rules, MSOCs are meaningless. Assigning gross CPQRs and no net revenues to one or more undefined MW tail blocks would permit offers that exceed the correctly calculated MSOC by multiples and would permit the exercise of market power. The rule does not use any net revenue offset for the CPQR segments. The competitive level is defined as total gross avoidable costs, net of net revenues, divided by the total MW in the offer.

On October 17, 2024, the Commission issued a final rule, Order No. 904, eliminating separate payments for reactive in all jurisdictional markets, including PJM.[158] As a result, effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, reactive revenues are not included in the net revenue offset for RPM purposes including the VRR curve, market seller offer caps, and MOPR floors.[159]

## Competitive Offers

The competitive offer of a capacity resource is based, regardless of tariff requirements, on a market seller's expectations of the resource's net going forward costs (net ACR) which are the net of the resource's gross ACR and the resource's forward looking net revenues. The gross ACR includes the cost to mitigate the resource's risk of incurring performance assessment penalties (CPQR).

154 OATT Attachment DD § 6.8(a).
155 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 (2015).
156 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (2025).
157 OATT Attachment DD § 6.4(e)
158 *Compensation for Reactive Power within the Standard Power Factor Range*, Order No. 904, 189 FERC ¶ 61,034 (2024) ("Order No. 904").
159 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-682-001 (April 29, 2025).

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The competitive offer is based on a forward looking energy and ancillary services (E&AS) net revenue offset rather than the backward looking E&AS net revenue offset currently in the tariff. Forward prices for energy prices and fuel prices are a better guide to market expectations than historical energy and fuel prices but both sources of information should be incorporated. This is particularly important in years, like 2022, when there is a significant change from the historical level of energy market prices. The forward curves reflect this change, but the historical prices do not. However, the PJM method for calculating forward looking net revenues is significantly flawed and overestimates net revenues.

PJM had a forward looking net revenue calculation in the tariff that applied to RPM Auctions for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year.[160] FERC subsequently reversed its approval of that method as part of rejecting PJM's ORDC filing.[161] PJM's method for calculating forward looking E&AS net revenues was flawed for several reasons. PJM's method included an adjustment based on the prices of long term FTRs for the planning period closest in time to the delivery year which requires an adjustment for monthly average day-ahead congestion price differentials and an adjustment for loss component differentials of historical LMPs. Use of the adjustment based on the prices of long term FTRs adds unnecessary complexity, fails to make the result more accurate, makes the results less transparent, and in some cases make the results less accurate. PJM's use of long term FTRs in the forward energy market price calculation does not use the FTR auction for the desired delivery year as a result of the timing of capacity auctions and FTR auctions when PJM is on its defined three year capacity market auction schedule. It would be simpler, more accurate and more transparent to use forward LMPs calculated using real-time monthly on and off peak forward prices for the delivery year at the PJM Western Hub, adjusted to the zone and hour using the historical zonal, nodal and hourly real-time price differentials for each of the last three years. The MMU and PJM have been implementing this method for years in the calculation of the opportunity costs associated with environmental limits on the operation of generating units.[162]

More fundamentally, PJM's forward looking net revenue calculation tends to overestimate forward net revenues. The PJM method is based on a theoretical, unit by unit perfect dispatch based on unit parameters and forward fuel costs and LMPs. The PJM method fails to account for the realities of committing and dispatching units. Nonetheless, it remains correct that generation owners look forward and not backwards when calculating net revenues. The goal is an approach that retains the reality of historical commitment and dispatch while recognizing that future conditions will be different. A better approach would calculate unit forward looking expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical revenues that are scaled based on a comparison of forward prices for energy and fuel to the historical prices for energy and fuel.

The competitive offer of a capacity resource is based on a market seller's expectations of market variables during the delivery year, the impact of these variables on the resource's risk, and the cost to mitigate that risk. These market variables are: the number of performance assessment intervals (PAI) in a delivery year where the resource is located; the level of performance required to meet its capacity obligation during those performance assessment intervals, measured as the average Balancing Ratio (B); and the level of the bonus performance payment rate (CPBR) compared to the nonperformance charge rate (PPR). The total capacity revenues earned by a resource are the sum of revenues earned in the forward capacity auctions and additional bonus revenues earned (or penalties paid) during the delivery year, which are a function of unit performance during PAI (A). The level of the bonus performance payment rate depends on the level of underperforming MW net of the underperforming MW excused by PJM during performance assessment intervals for reasons defined in the PJM OATT.[163]

The September 2, 2021, Commission order addressed the definition of the market seller offer cap by eliminating the Net CONE times B offer cap

160 171 FERC ¶ 61,153 (May 21, 2020) and 173 FERC ¶ 61,134 (November 12, 2020).

161 Forward energy and ancillary services (E&AS) revenue offsets were applicable from November 12, 2020, as approved in the FERC Order on compliance in Docket Nos. EL19-58-002 and EL19-58-003 until December 22, 2021, when the Commission issued an Order on Voluntary Remand in Docket Nos. EL19-58-006 and ER19-1486-003 reversing its prior determination that PJM should use a forward looking energy E&AS revenue offset and directing PJM to submit a compliance filing restoring the tariff provisions defining the historical E&AS revenue offset.

162 *See* "PJM Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines," § 12.7 IMM Opportunity Cost Calculator, Rev. 47 (Oct. 1, 2025).

163 OATT Attachment DD § 10A (d).



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and establishing a competitive market seller offer cap of net ACR.[164] The Commission rejected a more recent attempt by PJM to undermine the Market Seller Offer Cap rules by order issued February 6, 2024.[165]

In February 2025, PJM filed, and FERC approved, changes to the Market Seller Offer Cap that allow Capacity Market Sellers to offer the higher of the net ACR and the Capacity Performance Quantifiable Risk (CPQR).[166] The changes also allow Capacity Market Sellers to submit resource specific segmented offer caps.[167] Both changes to the Market Seller Offer Cap give Capacity Market Sellers the ability to offer in excess of the competitive offer.

Allowing offers based on gross CPQR when net revenues are greater than total gross ACR, including CPQR, permits offers greater than the competitive level by allowing resources with a competitive offer of $0 per MW-day to make positive offers equal to one component of ACR, the gross CPQR component, ignoring net revenues entirely. The rule also permits offers greater than the competitive level by allowing resources with a competitive offer greater than $0 per MW-day but less than gross CPQR to make offers equal to one standalone component of ACR, the gross CPQR component, also ignoring net revenues entirely.

The decision to allow segmented offer caps means allowing the exercise of market power. This is the case first because the segmented offer caps require that all avoidable costs be spread over a first MW segment that is smaller than the full resource, thus inflating the MSOC, and allow offer caps for all segments after the first segment based on gross CPQR with no net revenue offsets. If avoidable costs can be assigned to the first, self defined MW offer segment, and the later MW segments are not defined in the rules, MSOCs are meaningless. Assigning gross CPQRs and no net revenues to one or more undefined MW tail blocks would permit offers that exceed the correctly calculated MSOC by multiples and would permit the exercise of market power. The rule does not use any net revenue offset for the CPQR segments. The competitive level is defined as total gross avoidable costs, net of net revenues, divided by the total MW in the offer.

## 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction

As shown in Table 5-18, 985 generation resources submitted Capacity Performance offers in the 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction. Unit specific offer caps were calculated for four generation resources (0.4 percent). Of the 985 generation resources, 816 generation resources elected the offer cap option of 1.1 times the BRA clearing price (82.8 percent), four generation resource had unit specific ACR based offer caps (0.4 percent), 13 Planned Generation Capacity Resources had uncapped offers (1.3 percent), and the remaining 152 generation resources were price takers (15.4 percent). Market power mitigation was applied to zero Capacity Performance sell offers.

### Table 5-18 ACR statistics: RPM auctions held through the first six months, 2026

| | 2026/2027 Third Incremental Auction | |
|---|---|---|
| Offer Cap/Mitigation Type | Number of Generation Resources | Percent of Generation Resources Offered |
| Default ACR | 0 | 0.0% |
| Unit specific ACR (APIR) | 4 | 0.4% |
| Unit specific ACR (APIR and CPQR) | 0 | 0.0% |
| Unit specific ACR (non-APIR) | 0 | 0.0% |
| Unit specific ACR (non-APIR and CPQR) | 0 | 0.0% |
| Unit specific standalone CPQR | NA | NA |
| Unit specific segmented offer caps | NA | NA |
| Opportunity cost input | 0 | 0.0% |
| Default ACR and opportunity cost | 0 | 0.0% |
| Offer cap of 1.1 times BRA clearing price elected | 816 | 82.8% |
| Uncapped planned uprate and default ACR | 0 | 0.0% |
| Uncapped planned uprate and opportunity cost | 0 | 0.0% |
| Uncapped planned uprate and price taker | 0 | 0.0% |
| Uncapped planned uprate and 1.1 times BRA clearing price elected | 0 | 0.0% |
| Uncapped planned generation resources | 13 | 1.3% |
| Existing generation resources as price takers | 152 | 15.4% |
| Total Generation Capacity Resources offered | 985 | 100.0% |

164 176 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021), *order denying reh'g*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2022), *appeal denied*, EPSA, et al. v. FERC, Case No. 21-1214, et al. (DC Cir. October 10, 2023).
165 186 FERC ¶ 61,097, *reh'g denied*, 187 FERC ¶ 62,016 (2024).
166 190 FERC ¶ 61,117 (February 20, 2025).
167 Id. at 123.

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## MOPR

By order issued December 19, 2019, the RPM Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) was modified.[168] The rules applying to natural gas fired capacity resources without state subsidies were retained. The changes included expanding the MOPR to new or existing state subsidized capacity resources; establishing a competitive exemption for new and existing resources other than natural gas fired resources while also allowing a resource specific exception process for those that do not qualify for the competitive exemption; defining limited categorical exemptions for renewable resources participating in renewable portfolio standards (RPS) programs, self supply, DR, EE, and capacity storage; defining the region subject to MOPR for capacity resources with state subsidy as the entire RTO; and defining the default offer price floor for capacity resources with state subsidies as 100 percent of the applicable Net CONE or net ACR values.

On September 29, 2021, PJM's FPA section 205 filing in Docket No. ER21-2582-000 revising the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) was made effective by operation of law.[169] The revised MOPR in OATT Attachment DD § 5.14(h-2) became effective for RPM auctions for the 2023/2024 and subsequent delivery years. Under the revised MOPR, a generation resource would be subject to an offer floor if the capacity is deemed to meet the definition of Conditioned State Support or if the capacity market seller plans to use the resource to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power as the term is defined in the tariff through either self certification or a fact specific review initiated by the MMU or PJM. Whether a state program or policy qualifies for Conditioned State Support would be the result of a Commission determination.

The PJM markets would be better off, more competitive, and more efficient with no MOPR than with PJM's approach. PJM's proposal effectively eliminated the MOPR while creating a confusing and inefficient administrative process that effectively makes it both unnecessary and impossible to prove buyer side market power as PJM has defined it.[170]

The current form of the MOPR has no meaningful impact. The only function the current MOPR is serving now is to create unnecessary administrative work in the application and compliance screening and to create barriers to entry for generation resources. Generation resources that miss a certification deadline to check a box that they are not receiving state conditioned support and will not exercise market power are then required to offer at uncompetitive Net CONE levels or are not allowed to offer because the applicable MOPR floor exceeds the offer cap or no default MOPR floor for the technology is defined. Absent a meaningful change to MOPR, the MMU recommends eliminating the MOPR.

### MOPR Statistics

Under the applicable MOPR rules, market power mitigation measures were applied to MOPR Screened Generation Resources such that the sell offer is set equal to the MOPR Floor Offer Price when the submitted sell offer is less than the MOPR Floor Offer Price and an exemption or exception was not granted, or the sell offer is set equal to the agreed upon minimum level of sell offer when the sell offer is less than the agreed upon minimum level of sell offer based on a Unit-Specific Exception or Resource-Specific Exception.

As shown in Table 5-19, there were no unit specific exception requests for MOPR under OATT Attachment DD § 5.14(h-2) for the 2025/2026 RPM Third Incremental Auction. Of the 14.7 MW offered in the 2026/2027 RPM Third Incremental Auction that were subject to MOPR, 14.6 MW cleared and 0.1 MW did not clear.

168 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019), *order denying reh'g*, 171 FERC ¶ 61,035 (2020), *aff'd* PJM Power Providers Group, et al. v. FERC, Case No. 21-3068 (3rd Cir. December 1, 2023), *cert denied*.

169 *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C*, Notice of Filing Taking Effect by Operation of Law, Docket No. ER21-2582 (September 29, 2021).

170 See Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER21-2582-000 (August 20, 2021); Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER21-2582-000 (September 22, 2021).



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### Table 5-19 MOPR statistics: RPM auctions held through the first six months, 2026

| | MOPR Type | Calculation Type | Number of Requests | ICAP (MW) Requested | ICAP (MW) MMU Agreed | ICAP (MW) Offered | UCAP (MW) Offered | UCAP (MW) Cleared |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026/2027 Third Incremental Auction | OATT Attachment DD § 5.14(h-2) | Unit Specific Exception | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | OATT Attachment DD § 5.14(h-2) | Default | NA | NA | NA | 63.8 | 14.7 | 14.6 |
| | Total | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 63.8 | 14.7 | 14.6 |

## Replacement Capacity[171]

When a capacity resource is not available for a delivery year, the owner of the capacity resource may purchase replacement capacity. Replacement capacity is the vehicle used to offset any reduction in capacity from a resource which is not available for a delivery year. But the replacement capacity mechanism may also be used to manipulate the market.

Table 5-20 shows the committed and replacement capacity for all capacity resources for June 1 of each year from 2007 through 2027.

Sellers of demand resources in RPM auctions disproportionately replace those commitments on a consistent basis compared to sellers of other resource types. External generation and internal generation not in service had high rates of replacement in some years and those are also of concern.

The dynamic that can result is that the speculative DR suppresses prices in the BRA and displaces physical generation assets. Those generation assets then have an incentive to offer at a low price, including offers at zero and below cost, in IAs in order to ensure some capacity market revenue for long lived physical resources which the owners expect to maintain for multiple years. The result is lower IA prices which permit the buyback of the speculative DR at prices below the BRA prices which encourages the greater use of speculative DR.

PJM's sale of capacity in IAs at very low prices, given that PJM announces the MW quantity and the sell offer price in advance of the auctions, further reduces IA prices and increases the incentive of DR sellers to speculate in the BRAs. The MMU recommends that if PJM sells capacity in incremental auctions, PJM should offer the capacity for sale at the BRA clearing price in order to avoid suppressing the IA price below the competitive level. If the PJM sell offer price is not the BRA clearing price, PJM should not reveal its proposed sell offer price or the MW quantity to be sold prior to the auction.

It has been asserted that selling at a high price in the BRA and buying back at a low price in the IA is just a market transaction and therefore does not constitute a problem. But permitting DR to be an option in the BRA rather than requiring DR to be a commitment to provide a physical asset gives DR an unfair advantage and creates a self fulfilling dynamic that incents more of the same behavior. Only DR is permitted to be an option in the BRA. Generation resources must have met physical milestones in order to offer in the BRA. It is not reasonable to permit DR capacity resources to have a different product definition than generation capacity resources. Even if DR is treated as an annual product, this unique treatment as an option makes DR an inferior resource and not a complete substitute for generation resources. The current approach to DR is also inconsistent with the history of the definition of capacity in PJM, which has always been that capacity is physical and unit specific. The current approach to DR effectively makes DR a virtual participant in the PJM Capacity Market. That option should be eliminated.

171 For more details on replacement capacity, see "Analysis of Replacement Capacity for RPM Commitments: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2019," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2019/IMM_Analysis_of_Replacement_Capacity_for_RPM_Commitments_June_1_2007_to_June_1_2019_20190913.pdf> (September 13, 2019).

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The definition of demand side resources in PJM capacity markets is flawed in a variety of ways. The current demand side definition should be replaced with a definition that includes demand on the demand side of the market. There are ways to ensure and enhance the vibrancy of demand side without negatively affecting markets for generation.

**Table 5-20 RPM commitments and replacements for all Capacity Resources: June 1, 2007 to June 1, 2027[172]**

| | UCAP (MW) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RPM Cleared | Adjustments to Cleared | Net Replacements | RPM Commitments | RPM Commitment Shortage | RPM Commitments Less Commitment Shortage |
| 01-Jun-07 | 129,409.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 129,409.2 | (8.1) | 129,401.1 |
| 01-Jun-08 | 130,629.8 | 0.0 | (766.5) | 129,863.3 | (246.3) | 129,617.0 |
| 01-Jun-09 | 134,030.2 | 0.0 | (2,068.2) | 131,962.0 | (14.7) | 131,947.3 |
| 01-Jun-10 | 134,036.2 | 0.0 | (4,179.0) | 129,857.2 | (8.8) | 129,848.4 |
| 01-Jun-11 | 134,182.6 | 0.0 | (6,717.6) | 127,465.0 | (79.3) | 127,385.7 |
| 01-Jun-12 | 141,295.6 | (11.7) | (9,400.6) | 131,883.3 | (157.2) | 131,726.1 |
| 01-Jun-13 | 159,844.5 | 0.0 | (12,235.3) | 147,609.2 | (65.4) | 147,543.8 |
| 01-Jun-14 | 161,214.4 | (9.4) | (13,615.9) | 147,589.1 | (1,208.9) | 146,380.2 |
| 01-Jun-15 | 173,845.5 | (326.1) | (11,849.4) | 161,670.0 | (1,822.0) | 159,848.0 |
| 01-Jun-16 | 179,773.6 | (24.6) | (16,157.5) | 163,591.5 | (924.4) | 162,667.1 |
| 01-Jun-17 | 180,590.5 | 0.0 | (13,982.7) | 166,607.8 | (625.3) | 165,982.5 |
| 01-Jun-18 | 175,996.0 | 0.0 | (12,057.8) | 163,938.2 | (150.5) | 163,787.7 |
| 01-Jun-19 | 177,064.2 | 0.0 | (12,300.3) | 164,763.9 | (9.3) | 164,754.6 |
| 01-Jun-20 | 174,023.8 | (335.3) | (10,582.7) | 163,105.8 | (5.7) | 163,100.1 |
| 01-Jun-21 | 174,713.0 | 0.0 | (12,963.3) | 161,749.7 | (316.9) | 161,432.8 |
| 01-Jun-22 | 150,465.2 | 0.0 | (5,576.9) | 144,888.3 | (1,212.7) | 143,675.6 |
| 01-Jun-23 | 150,143.9 | 0.0 | (5,517.6) | 144,626.3 | (2,363.5) | 142,262.8 |
| 01-Jun-24 | 154,362.5 | 0.0 | (4,046.2) | 150,316.3 | (4,377.2) | 145,939.1 |
| 01-Jun-25 | 137,733.6 | 0.0 | (1,812.6) | 135,921.0 | (954.8) | 134,966.2 |
| 01-Jun-26 | 137,803.1 | 0.0 | (3,283.5) | 134,519.6 | (100.8) | 134,418.8 |
| 01-Jun-27 | 134,478.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 134,478.1 | 0.0 | 134,478.1 |

## Market Performance

Figure 5-8 shows cleared MW weighted average capacity market prices on a delivery year basis including base and incremental auctions for each delivery year, and the weighted average clearing prices by LDA in each Base Residual Auction for the entire history of the PJM capacity markets.

Table 5-21 shows RPM clearing prices for the 2021/2022 through 2027/2028 Delivery Years for all RPM auctions held through the first six months of 2026, and Table 5-22 shows the RPM cleared MW for the 2021/2022 through 2027/2028 Delivery Years for all RPM auctions held through the first six months of 2026.

Figure 5-9 shows the RPM cleared MW weighted average prices for each LDA from the 2022/2023 Delivery Year to the current delivery year, and all results for auctions for future delivery years that have been held through the first six months of 2026. A summary of these weighted average prices is given in Table 5-23.

Table 5-24 shows RPM revenue by delivery year for all RPM auctions held through the first six months of 2026 based on the unforced MW cleared and the resource clearing prices. For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, RPM revenue is $14.9 billion. For the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, RPM revenue is $16.3 billion.

Table 5-25 shows RPM revenue by calendar year for all RPM auctions held through the first six months of 2026. In 2025, RPM revenue is $9.8 billion. In 2026, RPM revenue is $15.8 billion.

Table 5-26 shows the RPM annual charges to load. For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, annual charges to load are $14.8 billion. For the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, annual charges to load are $16.2 billion.

172 The RPM Commitment Shortage MW for June 1, 2025, were revised from the *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*.



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## Table 5-21 Capacity market clearing prices: 2021/2022 through 2027/2028 RPM Auctions

| | | RPM Clearing Price ($ per MW-day) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Product Type | RTO | MAAC | APS | PPL | EMAAC | SWMAAC | DPL South | PSEG | PSEG North | PEPCO | ATSI | COMED | BGE | DUKE | DOM |
| 2021/2022 BRA | Capacity Performance | $140.00 | $140.00 | $140.00 | $140.00 | $165.73 | $140.00 | $165.73 | $204.29 | $204.29 | $140.00 | $171.33 | $195.55 | $200.30 | $140.00 | $140.00 |
| 2021/2022 First Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $23.00 | $23.00 | $23.00 | $23.00 | $25.00 | $23.00 | $25.00 | $45.00 | $219.00 | $23.00 | $23.00 | $23.00 | $60.00 | $23.00 | $23.00 |
| 2021/2022 Second Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $10.26 | $10.26 | $10.26 | $10.26 | $15.37 | $10.26 | $15.37 | $125.00 | $125.00 | $10.26 | $10.26 | $10.26 | $70.00 | $10.26 | $10.26 |
| 2021/2022 Third Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $20.55 | $20.55 | $20.55 | $20.55 | $26.36 | $20.55 | $26.36 | $31.00 | $31.00 | $20.55 | $20.55 | $20.55 | $39.00 | $20.55 | $20.55 |
| 2022/2023 BRA | Capacity Performance | $50.00 | $95.79 | $50.00 | $95.79 | $97.86 | $95.79 | $97.86 | $97.86 | $97.86 | $95.79 | $50.00 | $68.96 | $126.50 | $71.69 | $50.00 |
| 2022/2023 Third Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $19.00 | $35.00 | $19.00 | $35.00 | $35.00 | $96.15 | $35.00 | $35.00 | $35.00 | $35.00 | $19.00 | $19.00 | $35.00 | $19.00 | $19.00 |
| 2023/2024 BRA | Capacity Performance | $34.13 | $49.49 | $34.13 | $49.49 | $49.49 | $49.49 | $69.95 | $49.49 | $49.49 | $49.49 | $34.13 | $34.13 | $69.95 | $34.13 | $34.13 |
| 2023/2024 Third Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $37.53 | $49.49 | $37.53 | $49.49 | $146.03 | $49.49 | $146.03 | $146.03 | $146.03 | $49.49 | $37.53 | $37.53 | $79.03 | $37.53 | $37.53 |
| 2024/2025 BRA | Capacity Performance | $28.92 | $49.49 | $28.92 | $49.49 | $53.60 | $49.49 | $426.17 | $53.60 | $53.60 | $49.49 | $28.92 | $28.92 | $73.00 | $96.24 | $28.92 |
| 2024/2025 Third Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $58.00 | $80.00 | $58.00 | $80.00 | $175.81 | $80.00 | $175.81 | $175.81 | $175.81 | $80.00 | $58.00 | $58.00 | $155.29 | $58.00 | $58.00 |
| 2025/2026 BRA | Capacity Performance | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $269.92 | $466.35 | $269.92 | $444.26 |
| 2025/2026 Third Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $323.90 | $559.64 | $323.90 | $323.90 |
| 2026/2027 BRA | Capacity Performance | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 | $329.17 |
| 2026/2027 Third Incremental Auction | Capacity Performance | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 | $164.70 |
| 2027/2028 BRA | Capacity Performance | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 | $333.44 |

## Table 5-22 Capacity market cleared MW: 2021/2022 through 2027/2028 RPM Auctions[173]

| | | UCAP (MW) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delivery Year | Auction | RTO | MAAC | APS | PPL | EMAAC | DPL South | PSEG | PSEG North | PEPCO | ATSI | COMED | BGE | DUKE | DOM | TOTAL |
| 2021/2022 | BASE | 26,552.8 | 12,565.1 | 10,136.1 | 15,368.6 | 22,286.8 | 1,673.8 | 2,237.7 | 3,134.1 | 6,013.2 | 8,010.5 | 22,358.1 | 4,200.7 | 2,746.1 | 26,343.7 | 163,627.3 |
| 2021/2022 | FIRST | 118.7 | 200.4 | 45.9 | 27.2 | 119.0 | 15.3 | 18.3 | 79.1 | 207.9 | 739.3 | 360.4 | 48.7 | 87.6 | 75.4 | 2,143.2 |
| 2021/2022 | SECOND | 1,082.0 | 335.8 | 30.3 | 55.4 | 129.9 | 39.3 | 97.0 | 98.1 | 75.7 | 1,216.8 | 205.9 | 115.5 | 65.3 | 160.5 | 3,707.5 |
| 2021/2022 | THIRD | 1,243.7 | 168.7 | 231.6 | 127.8 | 911.0 | 18.3 | 227.7 | 244.8 | 67.2 | 942.7 | 221.7 | 275.9 | 159.2 | 394.7 | 5,235.0 |
| 2022/2023 | BASE | 29,596.0 | 12,804.7 | 10,147.4 | 14,118.7 | 23,651.2 | 1,312.9 | 1,914.3 | 2,531.1 | 3,621.8 | 10,550.7 | 19,223.7 | 4,750.9 | 2,117.7 | 8,136.3 | 144,477.3 |
| 2022/2023 | THIRD | 703.3 | 338.9 | 84.2 | 105.7 | 572.2 | 9.4 | 244.3 | 402.0 | 27.4 | 358.0 | 2,292.3 | 409.7 | 44.8 | 395.7 | 5,987.9 |
| 2023/2024 | BASE | 28,642.1 | 10,098.5 | 8,145.5 | 14,352.7 | 22,912.6 | 1,412.8 | 2,497.1 | 3,344.9 | 3,521.8 | 9,535.9 | 25,368.9 | 5,001.0 | 1,966.4 | 8,266.7 | 145,066.9 |
| 2023/2024 | THIRD | 255.9 | 1,786.4 | 395.0 | 79.3 | 671.0 | 24.2 | 32.4 | 43.8 | 15.3 | 355.8 | 1,050.0 | 240.0 | 68.4 | 59.8 | 5,077.0 |
| 2024/2025 | BASE | 28,760.7 | 10,854.4 | 8,874.0 | 14,178.1 | 23,135.1 | 1,448.6 | 2,665.3 | 3,494.3 | 3,429.7 | 9,720.6 | 25,156.1 | 5,056.5 | 2,062.1 | 8,646.1 | 147,481.5 |
| 2024/2025 | THIRD | 365.3 | 744.8 | 815.6 | 665.2 | 963.0 | 33.2 | 48.7 | 60.2 | 78.7 | 245.6 | 2,370.0 | 222.5 | 90.2 | 177.9 | 6,881.0 |
| 2025/2026 | BRA | 24,573.1 | 9,490.1 | 8,481.3 | 12,368.8 | 19,043.0 | 958.7 | 1,894.3 | 2,520.1 | 2,274.4 | 7,778.5 | 21,814.2 | 2,800.6 | 1,636.7 | 20,050.2 | 135,684.0 |
| 2025/2026 | THIRD | 731.3 | 22.2 | 90.8 | 31.9 | 564.8 | 26.1 | 9.0 | 34.7 | 79.4 | 177.2 | 91.5 | 8.3 | 19.8 | 162.7 | 2,049.6 |
| 2026/2027 | BRA | 24,888.5 | 9,213.7 | 8,476.5 | 11,939.7 | 18,861.0 | 998.0 | 1,725.3 | 2,361.6 | 2,170.2 | 7,433.9 | 20,273.0 | 4,319.1 | 1,560.1 | 19,984.8 | 134,205.3 |
| 2026/2027 | THIRD | 743.4 | 197.4 | 149.4 | 332.3 | 247.8 | 31.9 | 62.4 | 75.0 | 98.6 | 298.3 | 544.6 | 89.9 | 84.9 | 641.9 | 3,597.8 |
| 2027/2028 | BRA | 24,711.5 | 9,147.3 | 8,542.9 | 12,146.5 | 18,754.7 | 959.6 | 1,777.6 | 2,379.7 | 2,222.2 | 7,603.6 | 19,567.1 | 4,334.2 | 2,416.6 | 19,914.6 | 134,478.1 |

173 The MW values in this table refer to rest of LDA or RTO values, which are net of nested LDA values.

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## Table 5-23 Weighted average clearing prices by zone: 2024/2025 through 2027/2028

| | Weighted Average Clearing Price ($ per MW-day) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LDA | 2024/2025 | 2025/2026 | 2026/2027 | 2027/2028 |
| RTO | | | | |
| AEP | $29.80 | $270.57 | $324.96 | $333.44 |
| APS | $29.80 | $270.57 | $324.96 | $333.44 |
| ATSI | $29.80 | $271.18 | $321.98 | $333.44 |
| Cleveland | $28.92 | $270.90 | $325.95 | $333.44 |
| COMED | $31.42 | $270.15 | $324.87 | $333.44 |
| DAY | $29.13 | $295.05 | $322.41 | $333.44 |
| DUKE | $94.57 | $270.57 | $320.68 | $333.44 |
| DUQ | $29.80 | $270.57 | $324.96 | $333.44 |
| DOM | $29.80 | $443.29 | $324.05 | $333.44 |
| EKPC | $29.80 | $270.57 | $324.96 | $333.44 |
| MAAC | | | | |
| EMAAC | | | | |
| ACEC | $58.47 | $271.47 | $327.72 | $333.44 |
| DPL | $58.47 | $271.47 | $327.72 | $333.44 |
| DPL South | $420.55 | $271.35 | $324.08 | $333.44 |
| JCPLC | $58.47 | $271.47 | $322.79 | $333.44 |
| PECO | $58.47 | $271.47 | $327.72 | $333.44 |
| PSEG | $55.54 | $270.17 | $323.43 | $333.44 |
| PSEG North | $55.48 | $270.65 | $324.11 | $333.44 |
| REC | $58.47 | $271.47 | $327.72 | $333.44 |
| SWMAAC | | | | |
| BGE | $77.88 | $466.64 | $324.89 | $333.44 |
| PEPCO | $50.12 | $271.74 | $322.02 | $333.44 |
| WMAAC | | | | |
| MEC | $51.07 | $270.01 | $326.00 | $333.44 |
| PE | $51.07 | $270.01 | $326.00 | $333.44 |
| PPL | $51.18 | $270.12 | $323.88 | $333.44 |

## Table 5-24 RPM revenue by delivery year: 2007/2008 through 2027/2028[174]

| Delivery Year | Weighted Average RPM Price ($ per MW-day) | Weighted Average Cleared UCAP (MW) | Days | RPM Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007/2008 | $89.78 | 129,409.2 | 366 | $4,252,287,381 |
| 2008/2009 | $127.67 | 130,629.8 | 365 | $6,087,147,586 |
| 2009/2010 | $153.37 | 134,030.2 | 365 | $7,503,218,157 |
| 2010/2011 | $172.71 | 134,036.2 | 365 | $8,449,652,496 |
| 2011/2012 | $108.63 | 134,182.6 | 366 | $5,335,087,023 |
| 2012/2013 | $75.08 | 141,283.9 | 365 | $3,871,714,635 |
| 2013/2014 | $116.55 | 159,844.5 | 365 | $6,799,778,047 |
| 2014/2015 | $126.40 | 161,205.0 | 365 | $7,437,267,646 |
| 2015/2016 | $160.01 | 173,519.4 | 366 | $10,161,726,902 |
| 2016/2017 | $121.84 | 179,749.0 | 365 | $7,993,888,695 |
| 2017/2018 | $141.19 | 180,590.5 | 365 | $9,306,676,719 |
| 2018/2019 | $172.09 | 175,996.0 | 365 | $11,054,943,851 |
| 2019/2020 | $109.82 | 177,064.2 | 366 | $7,116,815,360 |
| 2020/2021 | $111.07 | 173,688.5 | 365 | $7,041,524,517 |
| 2021/2022 | $147.33 | 174,713.0 | 365 | $9,395,567,946 |
| 2022/2023 | $72.33 | 150,465.2 | 365 | $3,972,428,671 |
| 2023/2024 | $42.01 | 150,143.9 | 366 | $2,308,670,914 |
| 2024/2025 | $45.57 | 154,362.5 | 365 | $2,567,491,013 |
| 2025/2026 | $296.98 | 137,733.6 | 365 | $14,930,072,430 |
| 2026/2027 | $324.88 | 137,803.1 | 365 | $16,340,680,278 |
| 2027/2028 | $333.44 | 134,478.1 | 366 | $16,411,578,225 |

174 The results for the ATSI Integration Auctions are not included in this table.




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## Table 5-25 RPM revenue by calendar year: 2007 through 2028[175]

| Year | Weighted Average RPM Price ($ per MW-day) | Weighted Average Cleared UCAP (MW) | Effective Days | RPM Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | $89.78 | 75,665.5 | 214 | $2,486,310,108 |
| 2008 | $111.93 | 130,332.1 | 366 | $5,334,880,241 |
| 2009 | $142.74 | 132,623.5 | 365 | $6,917,391,702 |
| 2010 | $164.71 | 134,033.7 | 365 | $8,058,113,907 |
| 2011 | $135.14 | 133,907.1 | 365 | $6,615,032,130 |
| 2012 | $89.01 | 138,561.1 | 366 | $4,485,656,150 |
| 2013 | $99.39 | 152,166.0 | 365 | $5,588,442,225 |
| 2014 | $122.32 | 160,642.2 | 365 | $7,173,539,072 |
| 2015 | $146.10 | 168,147.0 | 365 | $9,018,343,604 |
| 2016 | $137.69 | 177,449.8 | 366 | $8,906,998,628 |
| 2017 | $133.19 | 180,242.4 | 365 | $8,763,578,112 |
| 2018 | $159.31 | 177,896.7 | 365 | $10,331,688,133 |
| 2019 | $135.58 | 176,338.6 | 365 | $8,734,613,179 |
| 2020 | $110.55 | 175,368.7 | 366 | $7,084,072,778 |
| 2021 | $132.33 | 174,289.2 | 365 | $8,421,703,404 |
| 2022 | $103.36 | 160,496.5 | 365 | $6,215,973,960 |
| 2023 | $54.56 | 150,036.3 | 365 | $2,993,266,921 |
| 2024 | $44.09 | 152,857.8 | 366 | $2,464,115,790 |
| 2025 | $192.97 | 144,613.0 | 365 | $9,815,689,432 |
| 2026 | $313.34 | 137,774.3 | 365 | $15,757,113,743 |
| 2027 | $329.90 | 135,638.2 | 365 | $16,355,957,867 |
| 2028 | $333.44 | 55,848.8 | 152 | $6,815,737,405 |

175 The results for the ATSI Integration Auctions are not included in this table.


## Figure 5-8 History of capacity prices: 1999/2000 through 2027/2028[176]




176 The 1999/2000 through 2006/2007 capacity prices are CCM combined market, weighted average prices. The 2007/2008 through 2027/2028 capacity prices are RPM weighted average prices. The CCM data points plotted are cleared MW weighted average prices for the daily and monthly markets by delivery year. The RPM data points plotted are RPM LDA clearing prices. For the 2014/2015 and subsequent delivery years, only the prices for Annual Resources or Capacity Performance Resources are plotted.

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## Figure 5-9 Map of RPM capacity prices: 2024/2025 through 2027/2028






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### Table 5-26 RPM cost to load: 2021/2022 through 2027/2028 RPM Auctions[177] [178]

| | Net Load Price ($ per MW-day) | UCAP Obligation (MW) | Annual Charges |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021/2022 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $142.16 | 82,768.3 | $4,294,838,410 |
| Rest of EMAAC | $164.73 | 23,719.9 | $1,426,178,211 |
| ATSI | $160.21 | 13,995.4 | $818,411,597 |
| BGE | $163.50 | 7,491.2 | $447,049,048 |
| COMED | $198.43 | 22,721.2 | $1,645,630,168 |
| PSEG | $188.46 | 10,987.4 | $755,803,998 |
| Total | | 161,683.4 | $9,387,911,433 |
| | | | |
| 2022/2023 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $50.05 | 50,750.7 | $927,101,691 |
| EMAAC | $97.93 | 35,388.1 | $1,264,867,389 |
| WMAAC | $96.61 | 15,072.2 | $531,498,382 |
| BGE | $108.22 | 7,457.7 | $294,575,131 |
| COMED | $66.23 | 24,064.5 | $581,774,443 |
| DEOK | $59.75 | 5,090.6 | $111,011,442 |
| PEPCO | $96.15 | 6,870.5 | $241,111,291 |
| Total | | 144,694.3 | $3,951,939,768 |
| | | | |
| 2023/2024 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $34.18 | 78,896.5 | $986,982,057 |
| EMAAC | $50.96 | 30,972.7 | $577,657,195 |
| WMAAC | $49.58 | 22,401.9 | $406,535,572 |
| Rest of EMAAC | $57.19 | 4,375.0 | $91,582,753 |
| BGE | $59.38 | 7,496.6 | $162,936,916 |
| Total | | 144,142.8 | $2,225,694,492 |
| | | | |
| 2024/2025 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $29.50 | 77,398.7 | $833,520,097 |
| EMAAC | $56.56 | 32,270.3 | $666,184,144 |
| WMAAC | $50.22 | 22,872.2 | $419,263,035 |
| Rest of EMAAC | $175.22 | 4,590.0 | $293,561,344 |
| BGE | $61.53 | 7,726.0 | $173,527,700 |
| DEOK | $57.93 | 5,254.4 | $111,105,639 |
| Total | | 150,111.7 | $2,497,161,960 |
| | | | |
| 2025/2026 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $270.43 | 108,328.9 | $10,692,932,080 |
| BGE | $306.84 | 6,005.7 | $672,628,585 |
| DOM | $432.48 | 21,570.5 | $3,405,010,751 |
| Total | | 135,905.1 | $14,770,571,416 |
| | | | |
| 2026/2027 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $329.08 | 134,490.7 | $16,154,098,654 |
| Total | | 134,490.7 | $16,154,098,654 |
| | | | |
| 2027/2028 | | | |
| Rest of RTO | $333.69 | 134,478.1 | $16,379,008,974 |
| Total | | 134,478.1 | $16,379,008,974 |

177 The RPM annual charges are calculated using the rounded, net load prices as posted in the PJM RPM auction results.

178 There is no separate obligation for DPL South as the DPL South LDA is completely contained within the DPL Zone. There is no separate obligation for PSEG North as the PSEG North LDA is completely contained within the PSEG Zone. There is no separate obligation for ATSI Cleveland as the ATSI Cleveland LDA is completely contained within the ATSI Zone.

## FRR

The states have authority over their generation resources and can choose to remain in PJM capacity markets or to create FRR entities. The existing FRR approach remains an option for utilities with regulated revenues based on cost of service rates, including both privately and publicly owned (including public power entities and electric cooperatives) utilities. Such regulated utilities have had and continue to have the ability to opt out of the capacity market and provide their own capacity. The existing FRR rules were created in 2007 primarily for the specific circumstances of AEP as part of the original RPM capacity market design settlement. The MMU recommends that the FRR rules be revised and updated to ensure that the rules reflect current market realities and that FRR entities do not unfairly take advantage of those customers paying for capacity in the PJM Capacity Market.

The MMU has prepared reports with analysis of the potential impacts on states pursuing the FRR option. In separate reports for Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, the cost impacts of the state choosing the FRR option are computed under different FRR capacity price assumptions and different assumptions regarding the composition of the FRR service area.[179] [180] [181] [182] [183] [184] The reports showed that the FRR approach is likely to lead to significant increases in payments by customers if it were to replace participation in the PJM markets. The impact on the remaining PJM capacity market footprint is also computed for each scenario. In all but a few scenarios the MMU finds that the FRR leads to higher costs for load included in the FRR service area. In all scenarios the MMU finds that prices in what remains of the PJM Capacity Market would be significantly lower.

179 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Potential Impacts of the Creation of a ComEd FRR," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2019/IMM_Potential_Impacts_of_the_Creation_of_a_ComEd_FRR_20191218.pdf> (December 18, 2020).

180 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Potential Impacts of the Creation of Maryland FRRs," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_Potential_Impacts_of_the_Creation_of_Maryland_FRRs_20200416.pdf> (April 16, 2020).

181 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Potential Impacts of the Creation of New Jersey FRRs," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_Potential_Impacts_of_the_Creation_of_New_Jersey_FRRS_20200513.pdf> (May 13, 2020).

182 *In the Matter of the Investigation of Resource Adequacy Alternatives*, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Docket No. EO20030203. Monitoring Analytics, LLC Comments, <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2020/IMM_Comments_Docket_No_EO20030203_20200520.pdf> (May 20, 2020). Monitoring Analytics, LLC, Reply Comments <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2020/IMM_Reply_Comments_Docket_No_EO20030203_20200624.pdf>. (June 24, 2020). Monitoring Analytics, Answer to Exelon and PSEG, <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/filings/2020/IMM_Answer_to_Exelon_PSEG_Docket_No_EO20030203_20200715.pdf> (July 15, 2020).

183 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Potential Impacts of the Creation of Ohio FRRs," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_Potential_Impacts_of_the_Creation_of%20Ohio_FRRs_20200717.pdf> (July 17, 2020).

184 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, "Potential Impacts of the Creation of Virginia FRRs," <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2021/IMM_VA_FRR_Report_20210518.pdf> (May 18, 2021).

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Both FERC and the states have significant and overlapping authority affecting wholesale power markets. While the FERC MOPR approach was designed to ensure that subsidies did not affect the wholesale power markets, the states have ultimate authority over the generation choices made in the states. The FRR explorations by multiple states illustrated a possible path forward. Under that path, the FERC regulated markets would be unaffected by subsidies but many states would withdraw from the FERC regulated markets and create higher cost nonmarket solutions rather than be limited by MOPR. That would not be an efficient outcome and would not serve the interests of customers or generators.

With the elimination of the prior MOPR rules, the capacity market design must accommodate the choices made by states to subsidize renewable resources in a way that maximizes the role of competition to ensure that customers pay the lowest amount possible, consistent with state goals and the costs of providing the desired resources. Such an approach can take several forms, but none require the dismantling of the PJM capacity market design. The PJM capacity market design can adapt to a wide range of state supported resources and state programs. As a simple starting point, states can continue to support selected resources using a range of payment structures and those resources could participate in the capacity auctions. As a broader and more comprehensive option, PJM could create a central PJM RECs market to facilitate the competitive sale and purchase of RECs.

Dominion Energy Virginia elected the FRR option for the 2022/2023 through 2024/2025 delivery years but returned to the capacity market for the 2025/2026 BRA.

## CRF Issue[185]

As a result of the significant changes to the federal tax code in December 2017, the capital recovery factor (CRF) tables in PJM OATT Attachment DD § 6.8(a) and Schedule 6A were not correct from 2018 through June 6, 2021.[186] These tables should have been updated in 2018. Correct CRFs ensure that offer caps and offer floors in the capacity market are correct. On May 4, 2021, PJM filed updates to the OATT under FPA Section 205.[187] In the filing, PJM proposed new CRFs based on the new tax law and new financial assumptions. The new financial assumptions are identical to the assumptions used in the PJM quadrennial review for the calculation of the cost of new entry (CONE) for the PJM reference resource. The MMU, in comments to the Commission, asked that the following formula be included in the tariff as an efficient alternative to use of tables which require updates whenever tax laws or financial assumptions change:[188] [189]

$$\mathrm{CRF} = \frac{r(1+r)^N \left[1 - \frac{sB}{\sqrt{1+r}} - s(1-B)\sqrt{1+r}\sum_{j=1}^{L}\frac{m_j}{(1+r)^j}\right]}{(1-s)\sqrt{1+r}\,[(1+r)^N - 1]}$$

The MMU also proposed that PJM discontinue the practice of using an average state tax rate in the CRF calculation. The CRF formula allows for the quick and efficient calculation of a unit's CRF using the state tax rate that is applicable to a specific unit.

185 See related filing on CRF issue in black start: Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER21-1635 (April 28, 2021).

186 The federal tax code was changed in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act or TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2096, Stat. 2105 (2017).

187 "Revisions to Capital Recovery Factor for Avoidable Project Investment Cost Determinations and Request for Waiver of Sixty-Day Notice Requirement," PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER21-1844-000 (May 4, 2021).

188 See "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. ER21-1844-000 (May 25, 2021).

189 The formula was first introduced in a related Section 205 filing regarding CRFs for black start service. See "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM" (April 28, 2021) and "Answer and Motion to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM" (May 19, 2021) in Docket No. ER21-1635-000.



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FERC accepted PJM's filing but also required that the MMU's CRF formula be included in the tariff.[190] FERC rejected the MMU's unit specific state tax recommendation. Going forward, PJM will post the CRFs on their website. Table 5-28 shows the CRFs that are currently posted. The values in Table 5-28 were calculated using the formula above and the financial assumptions in Table 5-29. Bonus depreciation assumptions vary by delivery year with 100 percent bonus depreciation assumed in the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. Under the TCJA, the bonus depreciation in each subsequent delivery year is reduced by 20 percent.

### Table 5-27 Variable descriptions for the CRF formula

| Formula Symbol | Description |
|---|---|
| r | After tax weighted average cost of capital (ATWACC) |
| s | Effective tax rate |
| B | Bonus depreciation percent |
| N | Cost Recovery Period (years) |
| L | Lesser of N or 16 (years) |
| mj | Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) depreciation factor for year j = 1, ..., 16 |

On July 4, 2025, with the enactment of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act ("OBBBA"), the bonus depreciation rules changed again. Section 70301 of OBBBA (I.R.C. § 168(k)) allows 100 percent bonus depreciation for "qualified production property ("QPP") acquired and placed in service on or after January 20, 2025.[191] QPP means nonresidential real property used in manufacturing, production, or refining of tangible personal property in the United States.[192] QPP includes power production facilities. To be eligible, construction must begin after January 19, 2025, and before January 1, 2029, and the property must be placed in service before January 1, 2031.[193] Table 5-28 shows the CRF values produced by the CRF formula using the parameter assumptions in Table 5-29. The effect of the change in bonus depreciation rules from the OBBBA is reflected in the CRF for 2027/2028 Third IA. The CRF value for the five year recovery period decreases from 0.314 to 0.249, a 20.7 percent decrease.

190 176 FERC ¶61,003 (2021).
191 OBBBA § 70301(c)(1).
192 OBBBA § 70307(a)(2).
193 *Id.*

### Table 5-28 Levelized CRF values: 2023/2024 through 2028/2029 Delivery Years

| Age of Unit (Years) | Cost Recovery Period | 2023/2024 | 2024/2025 | 2025/2026 | 2026/2027 | 2027/2028 BRA | 2027/2028 3rd IA | 2028/2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Bonus Depreciation Percent | | | | | | |
| | | 80% | 60% | 40% | 20% | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| 1 to 5 | 30 | 0.091 | 0.094 | 0.096 | 0.105 | 0.107 | 0.093 | 0.099 |
| 6 to 10 | 25 | 0.096 | 0.098 | 0.101 | 0.110 | 0.113 | 0.098 | 0.103 |
| 11 to 15 | 20 | 0.104 | 0.107 | 0.110 | 0.118 | 0.121 | 0.105 | 0.110 |
| 16 to 20 | 15 | 0.119 | 0.122 | 0.126 | 0.134 | 0.138 | 0.120 | 0.124 |
| 21 to 25 | 10 | 0.152 | 0.158 | 0.164 | 0.174 | 0.180 | 0.151 | 0.155 |
| 25 Plus | 5 | 0.258 | 0.271 | 0.283 | 0.301 | 0.314 | 0.249 | 0.253 |
| Mandatory CapEx | 4 | 0.312 | 0.328 | 0.345 | 0.367 | 0.383 | 0.300 | 0.303 |
| 40 Plus Alternative | 1 | 1.100 | 1.100 | 1.100 | 1.100 | 1.100 | 1.100 | 1.100 |

### Table 5-29 Financial parameter and tax rate assumptions for CRF calculations

| | Parameter Values | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parameter | Prior to 2026/2027 | 2026/2027 | 2027/2028 | 2028/2029 |
| Equity Funding Percent | 45.000% | 45.000% | 45.000% | 45.000% |
| Debt Funding Percent | 55.000% | 55.000% | 55.000% | 55.000% |
| Equity Rate | 13.000% | 14.100% | 14.100% | 16.000% |
| Debt Interest Rate | 6.000% | 6.300% | 6.300% | 5.800% |
| Federal Income Tax Rate | 21.000% | 21.000% | 21.000% | 21.000% |
| State Income Tax Rate | 9.300% | 9.933% | 9.933% | 8.500% |
| Effective Income Tax Rate | 28.347% | 28.847% | 28.847% | 27.715% |
| After Tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital | 8.215% | 8.810% | 8.810% | 9.506% |

The 2021 update to the CRF values was calculated using the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) model. The original CRF values, prior to 2021, were calculated using a flow to equity (FTE) model. The WACC model assumes a constant debt to equity ratio during the capital recovery period and therefore assumes that debt holders are paid more quickly than is required. The FTE model recognizes that the debt is repaid according to a predetermined payment schedule with all revenue in excess of taxes and debt payments going to the equity investor. The FTE model accurately reflects the cash flows that occur during capital recovery. Table 5-30 compares CRFs calculated under the two approaches using the assumptions in Table 5-29. The difference between the WACC CRF and FTE CRF is dependent upon the capital recovery term and the level of bonus depreciation. The WACC CRF exceeds the FTE CRF by 16.4

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percent under 100 percent bonus depreciation with a 30 year cost recovery term. The FTE model is the correct approach because it accurately captures the cash flows during capital recovery over the defined financial life of the asset.

### Table 5-30 Comparison of FTE and WACC CRFs

| | WACC CRF | | | | | | FTE CRF | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Recovery | Bonus Percent | | | | | | Bonus Percent | | | | | |
| Term (years) | 100% | 80% | 60% | 40% | 20% | 0% | 100% | 80% | 60% | 40% | 20% | 0% |
| 4 | 0.296 | 0.312 | 0.328 | 0.345 | 0.361 | 0.377 | 0.289 | 0.307 | 0.324 | 0.342 | 0.360 | 0.377 |
| 5 | 0.246 | 0.258 | 0.271 | 0.283 | 0.296 | 0.308 | 0.238 | 0.252 | 0.266 | 0.280 | 0.294 | 0.308 |
| 10 | 0.147 | 0.152 | 0.158 | 0.164 | 0.169 | 0.175 | 0.138 | 0.145 | 0.153 | 0.160 | 0.168 | 0.175 |
| 15 | 0.116 | 0.119 | 0.122 | 0.126 | 0.129 | 0.132 | 0.105 | 0.111 | 0.116 | 0.122 | 0.127 | 0.133 |
| 20 | 0.101 | 0.104 | 0.107 | 0.110 | 0.113 | 0.115 | 0.090 | 0.095 | 0.100 | 0.105 | 0.110 | 0.115 |
| 25 | 0.093 | 0.096 | 0.098 | 0.101 | 0.104 | 0.106 | 0.081 | 0.086 | 0.091 | 0.096 | 0.100 | 0.105 |
| 30 | 0.088 | 0.091 | 0.094 | 0.096 | 0.099 | 0.101 | 0.076 | 0.081 | 0.085 | 0.090 | 0.095 | 0.099 |
| | Absolute Change (WACC CRF less FTE CRF) | | | | | | Relative Change | | | | | |
| Capital Recovery | Bonus Percent | | | | | | Bonus Percent | | | | | |
| Term (years) | 100% | 80% | 60% | 40% | 20% | 0% | 100% | 80% | 60% | 40% | 20% | 0% |
| 4 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.001 | -0.000 | 2.3% | 1.8% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 0.3% | (0.1%) |
| 5 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.001 | -0.000 | 3.1% | 2.3% | 1.6% | 1.0% | 0.4% | (0.1%) |
| 10 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.002 | -0.000 | 6.5% | 4.9% | 3.4% | 2.1% | 0.9% | (0.2%) |
| 15 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.002 | -0.000 | 9.5% | 7.2% | 5.0% | 3.1% | 1.3% | (0.3%) |
| 20 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 12.2% | 9.3% | 6.7% | 4.4% | 2.3% | 0.4% |
| 25 | 0.012 | 0.010 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 14.4% | 11.2% | 8.2% | 5.6% | 3.2% | 1.1% |
| 30 | 0.012 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 16.4% | 12.8% | 9.6% | 6.7% | 4.1% | 1.7% |

## Timing of Unit Retirements

Generation owners that want to deactivate a unit, either to mothball or permanently retire, must provide notice to PJM and the MMU prior to the proposed deactivation date. Prior to September 2022, generation owners were required to provide deactivation notices at least 90 days before the proposed deactivation date. Beginning in September 2022, PJM and the MMU began reviewing deactivation requests quarterly, and the desired deactivation date is now based on the quarter the request was submitted (Table 5-31). The result is no change to the effective period between the notice and the retirement if notice is provided on the last day of the submittal period, and an increase to six months notice, if notice is given on the first day of the submittal period. The MMU recommends that participants be required to provide a notice of deactivation 12 months prior to an auction in which the unit will not be offered due to the deactivation; and no less than 12 months prior to the date of deactivation.


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### Table 5-31 Earliest deactivation dates allowed based on quarterly submission

| Date Request Submitted | Earliest Deactivation Date Permitted |
|---|---|
| January 1 to March 31 | July 1 |
| April 1 to June 30 | October 1 |
| July 1 to September 30 | January 1 (following calendar year) |
| October 1 to December 31 | April 1 (following calendar year) |

Generation owners seeking a capacity market must offer exemption for a delivery year must submit their deactivation request no later than the December 1 preceding the Base Residual Auction or 120 days before the start of an Incremental Auction for that delivery year.[194] If no reliability issues are found during PJM's analysis of the retirement's impact on the transmission system, and the MMU finds no market power issues associated with the proposed deactivation, the unit may deactivate at any time thereafter.[195]

Table 5-32 shows the timing of actual deactivation dates and the initially requested deactivation date, for all deactivation requests submitted from January 2018 through June 2026. Of the 236 deactivation requests submitted from January 2018 through June 2026, totaling 50,432.4 MW, 38 units (16.1 percent) totaling 6,662.1 MW (13.2 percent) deactivated an average of 167 days earlier than their initially requested date; 38 units (16.1 percent) totaling 7,216.9 (14.3 percent) deactivated an average of 145 days later than the originally requested deactivation date; and 90 units (38.1 percent) totaling 11,241.1 (22.3 percent) deactivated on their initially requested date. Forty two (17.8 percent) of the unit deactivations totaling 17,323.3 (34.3 percent) were cancelled an average of 234 days (approximately 33 weeks) before their scheduled deactivation date, and 28 (11.9 percent) of the unit deactivations totaling 7,989.0 (15.8 percent) have not yet reached their target retirement date. Table 5-33 shows this information broken out by fuel types. Table 5-33 shows the timing of actual deactivation dates and the initially requested deactivation date, for all deactivation requests submitted from January 2018 through June 2026, by fuel type.

Due to the significant increase in the capacity price for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year in the BRA run in June 2024, several units that were scheduled to deactivate rescinded their deactivation requests. In 2024, four units that were slated to deactivate (483 MW from Middle River Power, LLC rescinding Elgin CT 1-4) announced they were rescinding their deactivations. In 2025, 18 other units that were slated to deactivate (216 MW from Gen On Energy Management, LLC rescinding Morgantown CT 3-6; 54.9 MW from Constellation Energy Co. rescinding Perryman 6 unit 1; 15 MW from Tenaska Power Services, Co. rescinding Kenilworth; 272.1 MW from NRG Business Marketing LLC rescinding Fisk CT 31- 34 and Waukegan CT 31 & 32; 223.0 MW from Heritage Power, LLC rescinding Sayreville CT 1-4; 31.0 MW from Forked River Power, LLC rescinding Forked River 2), accounting for 812.0 MW, announced they were rescinding their deactivation requests. In the first six months of 2026, four units that scheduled to deactivate (450.0 MW from Dairyland Power rescinded Elwood CT 5-7; 16.0 MW from NRG, Inc. rescinding Indian River CT 10), accounting for 466.0 MW, announced they were rescinding their deactivation requests. In total, 1,761.0 MW have stayed in the capacity market for the 2026/2027 through 2028/2029 Delivery Years by rescinding their deactivation requests as a result of the significant increase in capacity market prices starting in the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.

### Table 5-32 Timing of actual unit deactivations compared to requested deactivation date: Requests submitted January 2018 through June 2026[196]

| Status | Number of Units | Percent | Average Days Deviation from Originally Requested Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early | 37 | 15.7% | (167) |
| Late | 38 | 16.1% | 145 |
| On time | 89 | 37.7% | 0 |
| Cancelled | 42 | 17.8% | (234) |
| Pending | 30 | 12.7% | - |
| Total | 236 | 100.0% | - |

194 OATT Attachment DD § 6.6(g).
195 OATT Part V §113.
196 Negative values indicate the average number of days the action is taken prior to the requested date.

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## Table 5-33 Timing of actual unit deactivations compared to requested deactivation date by fuel type: Requests submitted January 2018 through June 2026

| Fuel Type | Status | Number of Units | Percent | Average Days Deviation from Originally Requested Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Biomass | Early | 2 | 40.0% | (4) |
| | Late | 1 | 20.0% | 14 |
| | On time | 2 | 40.0% | - |
| | Cancelled | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Pending | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| Total | | 5 | 100.0% | - |
| Coal | Early | 15 | 28.3% | (169) |
| | Late | 10 | 18.9% | 170 |
| | On time | 16 | 30.2% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 4 | 7.5% | (371) |
| | Pending | 8 | 15.1% | - |
| Total | | 53 | 100.0% | - |
| Diesel | Early | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Late | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | On time | 7 | 100.0% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Pending | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| Total | | 7 | 100.0% | - |
| Methane | Early | 6 | 21.4% | (127) |
| | Late | 7 | 25.0% | 71 |
| | On time | 11 | 39.3% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 2 | 7.1% | (190) |
| | Pending | 2 | 7.1% | - |
| Total | | 28 | 100.0% | - |
| Natural Gas | Early | 7 | 12.1% | (209) |
| | Late | 12 | 20.7% | 164 |
| | On time | 20 | 34.5% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 11 | 19.0% | (68) |
| | Pending | 8 | 13.8% | - |
| Total | | 58 | 100.0% | - |
| Nuclear | Early | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Late | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | On time | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Cancelled | 10 | 100.0% | (312) |
| | Pending | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| Total | | 10 | 100.0% | - |
| Oil | Early | 3 | 5.6% | (218) |
| | Late | 7 | 13.0% | 188 |
| | On time | 24 | 44.4% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 14 | 25.9% | (296) |
| | Pending | 6 | 11.1% | - |
| Total | | 54 | 100.0% | - |
| Solar | Early | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Late | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | On time | 1 | 1.9% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Pending | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| Total | | 1 | 1.9% | - |
| Solid Waste | Early | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Late | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | On time | 1 | 100.0% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| | Pending | 0 | 0.0% | - |
| Total | | 1 | 100.0% | - |
| Storage | Early | 4 | 21.1% | (194) |
| | Late | 1 | 5.3% | - |
| | On time | 7 | 36.8% | 0 |
| | Cancelled | 1 | 5.3% | - |
| | Pending | 6 | 31.6% | - |
| Total | | 19 | 100.0% | - |



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## Part V Reliability Service (RMR)

PJM must make out of market payments to units that want to retire (deactivate) but that PJM requires to remain in service, for limited operation, for a defined period because the unit is needed for reliability.[197] This provision has been known as Reliability Must Run (RMR) service but RMR is not defined in the PJM tariff, and the PJM market design has important distinguishing features relative to other regions where arrangements referred to as RMR are used. Here the term Part V reliability service is used. The need to retain uneconomic units in service reflects a flawed market design and/or planning process problems. The current capacity market design fails to include transmission constraints inside LDAs with the result that units needed for reliability do not clear in capacity auctions and that prices are suppressed and an RMR is then required. The current approach does not adequately look forward and attempt to address foreseeable unit retirements, whether for economic or regulatory reasons. The result is the wrong price signal for either investing in the existing resource or investing in new resources to provide locational reliability. The answer is not to artificially increase prices during the RMR while the transmission alternative is under construction but to provide an actionable price signal in advance of retirement as a signal to new generation to enter and compete with the transmission solution. It is essential that the deactivation provisions of the tariff be evaluated and modified, both to provide rules that better anticipate deactivations in the markets and rules that reasonably compensate Part V reliability service if it is still needed. Recent changes to the rules fail to address these issues.[198] It is also essential that queue processes that effectively prevent competition from new generation to replace the old generation be modified.

To improve coordination of deactivations and PJM transmission system planning, the MMU recommends that the same reliability standard be used in capacity auctions as is used by PJM transmission planning which means recognizing transmission constraints inside LDAs when they create reliability issues. One result of the current design is that a unit may fail to clear in a BRA, decide to retire as a result, but then be found to be needed for reliability by PJM planning and paid under Part V of the OATT (RMR) to remain in service while transmission upgrades are made. This result indicates a significant market design flaw.

The MMU recommends that PJM treat the inclusion of RMR resources in the capacity market consistently. PJM currently includes RMR units in the reliability analysis for RPM auctions but does not include the RMR units in the supply curves. This approach is internally inconsistent. It would be internally consistent to leave the RMR units out of the CETO/CETL analysis. It would also be internally consistent to include the RMR units in the supply of capacity and in the CETO/CETL analysis. Including RMR resources in the capacity supply curve does not mean forcing unit owners to offer or to take on PAI risk, for example. It simply means that PJM would recognize the fact that PJM treats RMR resources as a source of reliability. The goal is to ensure that the underlying supply and demand fundamentals are included in the capacity market prices. These two options have very different implications for capacity market prices. There are times early in the process when a price signal for the entry of generation is appropriate, e.g. when the goal is to allow generation to compete to replace the transmission option, in whole or in part, and there is enough time to permit such new entry. There are times later in the process when a price signal for the entry of generation is not needed or appropriate, e.g. when PJM has committed to the construction of new transmission that will eliminate the price signal when complete or when there is not enough time to permit such new entry. The relevant rules can and should be changed.[199]

The planning process should, to the extent possible, evaluate the impact of the loss of units at risk and determine in advance whether transmission upgrades are required.[200] It is essential that PJM look forward and attempt to plan

197 OATT Part V §114.

198 See Deactivation Enhancements Senior Task Force (DESTF), which can be accessed at: <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/task-forces/destf>.

199 While PJM filed for and FERC accepted the inclusion of RMR resources Brandon Shores and Wagner plants in the 2026/2027 through and 2028/2029 BRAs, that does not require that RMR resources be included in capacity market auction clearing in future auctions for these or other RMR resources. See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-682-001 (April 29, 2025). See also 193 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2025).

200 *See, e.g.*, 140 FERC ¶ 61,237 at P 36 (2012) ("The evaluation of alternatives to an SSR designation is an important step that deserves the full consideration of MISO and its stakeholders to ensure that SSR Agreements are used only as a 'limited, last-resort measure.'"); 118 FERC ¶ 61,243 at P 41 (2007) ("the market participants that pay for the agreements pay out-of-market prices for the service provided under the RMR agreements, which broadly hinders market development and performance.[footnote omitted] As a result of these factors, we have concluded that RMR agreements should be used as a last resort."); 110 FERC ¶ 61,315 at P 40 (2005) ("The Commission has stated on several occasions that it shares the concerns . . . that RMR agreements not proliferate as an alternative pricing option for generators, and that they are used strictly as a last resort so that units needed for reliability receive reasonable compensation.").

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for foreseeable unit retirements, whether for economic or regulatory reasons. While not all retirements are completely foreseeable, improvement is needed in the process for ensuring that planning is looking at the probability of retirements, especially of resources that are critical to locational reliability in order to minimize the duration of any RMR requirement.

The actual implementation of Part V of the tariff has resulted in overpayment of the RMR resources. It is essential that the compensation provisions of Part V of the tariff be modified to ensure payment of all but only the actual costs incurred by the generation owner to provide the service, plus an incentive. Generators operating in competitive markets should be required, as an obligation of receiving interconnection service and having the ability to participate in competitive markets, to provide service under Part V on an incremental cost plus incentive basis when they are needed for reliability.

When notified of an intended deactivation, the MMU performs a market power study to ensure that the deactivation is economic, not an exercise of market power through withholding, and consistent with competition.[201] If the MMU determines that expected revenues exceed avoidable costs and therefore that the deactivation is not economic, the MMU will inform the unit owner that there is a market power issue. The MMU has no authority to prevent the retirement. The MMU can pursue the matter at FERC. Part V status by itself creates market power for the retiring resource. The owners of Part V resources have threatened to shut down the resources and put the grid at risk if they do not receive their requested level of Part V payments. Such exercises of market power have been effective in increasing payments to Part V units during the settlement proceedings that have resolved all Part V filings, generally on a black box basis.

PJM performs a system study to determine whether the system can accommodate the deactivation on the desired date, and if not, when it could.[202] If PJM determines that it needs a unit for a period beyond the intended deactivation date, PJM will request a unit to remain in service for a defined period.[203] The PJM market rules do not require an owner to remain in service. Owners must provide notice of a proposed deactivation at least twelve months prior to the desired deactivation date, although the advance notice can be too short to permit new generation to enter (See Table 5-31).[204] [205] The owner of a generation capacity resource must provide notice of a proposed deactivation in order to avoid a requirement to offer in RPM auctions.[206] In order to avoid submitting an offer for a unit in the next three-year forward RPM base residual auction based on retirement, an owner must submit a preliminary RPM must offer exception request no later than September 1 preceding the BRA and a final RPM must offer exception request demonstrating "a documented plan in place to retire the resource," including a notice of deactivation filed with PJM no later than December 1 preceding the BRA.[207]

Under the current rules, a unit remaining in service at PJM's request can recover its costs of continuing to operate under either the deactivation avoidable cost rate (DACR), which is a formula rate, or the cost of service recovery rate. The deactivation avoidable cost rate is designed to permit the recovery of the costs of the unit's "continued operation," termed "avoidable costs," plus an incentive adder.[208] Avoidable costs are defined to mean "incremental expenses directly required for the operation of a generating unit." [209] The incentives escalate for each year of service (first year, 10 percent; second year, 20 percent; third year, 35 percent; fourth year, 50 percent).[210] The rules provide terms for the repayment of project investment by owners of units that choose to keep units in service after the defined period ends.[211] The amount of project investment recovered cannot exceed the actual amount of the PI.[212] The cost of service rate is designed to permit the recovery of the unit's "cost of service rate to recover the entire cost of operating the generating unit" if the generation owner files a separate rate schedule at FERC.[213]

201 OATT § 113.2; OATT Attachment M § IV.1.
202 OATT § 113.2.
203 *Id.*
204 See Letter Order, FERC Docket No. ER25-1501-000 (April 15, 2025).
205 OATT § 113.1.
206 OATT Attachment DD § 6.6(g).
207 *Id.*
208 OATT § 114 (Deactivation Avoidable Credit = ((Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate + Applicable Multiplier) * MW capability of the unit * Number of days in the month) + (APIR * First Year Multiplier) – Actual Net Revenues).
209 OATT § 115.
210 *Id.*
211 OATT § 118.
212 OATT §§ 115.
213 OATT § 119.


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The DACR is unnecessarily prescriptive about the nature of the incremental costs needed to provide service, and includes unsupported escalation to extremely high incentive rates.

Table 5-34 shows units that have provided Part V reliability service to PJM, including the Indian River 4 unit, which began providing RMR service on June 1, 2022, and ended on February 24, 2025, and Brandon Shores 1 and 2 and Wagner 3 and 4 which began providing RMR service on June 1, 2025.[214] Only two of nine owners have used the deactivation avoidable cost rate approach. The other seven owners used the cost of service recovery rate. For units using the cost of service recovery rate option, revenues have averaged about 3.4 times the corresponding market price of capacity while for units using the deactivation avoidable cost rate, revenues have averaged about 1.6 times the corresponding market price of capacity.[215]

### Table 5-34 Part V reliability service summary

| Unit Names | Owner | Fuel Type | ICAP (MW) | Cost Recovery Method | Docket Numbers | Start of Term | End of Term |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brandon Shores 1 | Talen Energy Corporation | Coal | 635.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER24-1790 | 01-Jun-25 | 31-May-29 |
| Brandon Shores 2 | Talen Energy Corporation | Coal | 638.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER24-1790 | 01-Jun-25 | 31-May-29 |
| Wagner 3 | Talen Energy Corporation | Coal | 305.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER24-1787 | 01-Jun-25 | 31-May-29 |
| Wagner 4 | Talen Energy Corporation | Oil | 397.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER24-1787 | 01-Jun-25 | 31-May-29 |
| Indian River 4 | NRG Power Marketing LLC | Coal | 410.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER22-1539 | 01-Jun-22 | 24-Feb-25 |
| B.L. England 2 | RC Cape May Holdings, LLC | Coal | 150.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER17-1083 | 01-May-17 | 01-May-19 |
| Yorktown 1 | Dominion Virginia Power | Coal | 159.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER17-750 | 06-Jan-17 | 13-Mar-18 |
| Yorktown 2 | Dominion Virginia Power | Coal | 164.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER17-750 | 06-Jan-17 | 13-Mar-18 |
| B.L. England 3 | RC Cape May Holdings, LLC | Oil | 148.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER17-1083 | 01-May-17 | 24-Jan-18 |
| Ashtabula | FirstEnergy Service Company | Coal | 210.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 11-Apr-15 |
| Eastlake 1 | FirstEnergy Service Company | Coal | 109.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Eastlake 2 | FirstEnergy Service Company | Coal | 109.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Eastlake 3 | FirstEnergy Service Company | Coal | 109.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Lakeshore | FirstEnergy Service Company | Coal | 190.0 | Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate | ER12-2710 | 01-Sep-12 | 15-Sep-14 |
| Elrama 4 | GenOn Power Midwest, LP | Coal | 171.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER12-1901 | 01-Jun-12 | 01-Oct-12 |
| Niles 1 | GenOn Power Midwest, LP | Coal | 109.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER12-1901 | 01-Jun-12 | 01-Oct-12 |
| Cromby 2 and Diesel | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | Natural gas/oil, Diesel | 203.7 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER10-1418 | 01-Jun-11 | 01-Jan-12 |
| Eddystone 2 | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | Coal | 309.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER10-1418 | 01-Jun-11 | 01-Jun-12 |
| Brunot Island CT2A, CT2B, CT3 and CC4 | Orion Power MidWest, L.P. | Natural gas | 244.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER06-993 | 16-May-06 | 05-Jul-07 |
| Hudson 1 | PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC | Natural gas | 355.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER05-644, ER11-2688 | 25-Feb-05 | 08-Dec-11 |
| Sewaren 1-4 | PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC | Natural gas | 453.0 | Cost of Service Recovery Rate | ER05-644 | 25-Feb-05 | 01-Sep-08 |

214 See PJM, "Informational Filing Regarding Formal Notice of Termination of Reliability Must-Run Service," Docket Nos. ER22-2539-000 and ER23-2688-000 (December 23, 2024); See 191 FERC ¶ 61,098 (2025); Offer of Settlement, Docket No. ER24-1787, -1790 (January 1, 2025), Exhibit 2. On June 4, 2026, in Docket No. ER26-30, Talen filed to extend the terms of and compensation for Part V service provided by Brandon Shores and Wagner from May 31, 2029, to May 31, 2031, which is now pending.

215 The final rates for Brandon Shores and Wagner have not been established.

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## Table 5-35 Part V reliability service cost summary[216] [217] [218]

| | | Initial Filing | | Actual | | Weighted Average RPM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Names | Owner | Total Cost | Cost per MW-day | Total Cost | Cost per MW-day | Clearing Price ($ per MW-day) |
| Brandon Shores 1 | Talen Energy Corporation | $327,039,342 | $307.66 | $203,330,544 | $877.28 | $318.45 |
| Brandon Shores 2 | Talen Energy Corporation | $328,584,409 | $307.66 | $204,291,161 | $877.28 | $318.45 |
| Wagner 3 | Talen Energy Corporation | $64,791,528 | $126.90 | $54,413,731 | $488.78 | $318.45 |
| Wagner 4 | Talen Energy Corporation | $84,335,202 | $126.90 | $70,827,053 | $488.78 | $318.45 |
| Indian River 4 | NRG Power Marketing LLC | $357,065,662 | $871.76 | $198,617,019 | $484.92 | $54.04 |
| B.L. England 2 | RC Cape May Holdings, LLC | $35,953,561 | $328.34 | $51,779,892 | $472.88 | $154.51 |
| Yorktown 1 | Dominion Virginia Power | $9,739,434 | $142.12 | $8,427,011 | $122.97 | $134.64 |
| Yorktown 2 | Dominion Virginia Power | $10,045,705 | $142.12 | $9,529,149 | $134.81 | $134.64 |
| B.L. England 3 | RC Cape May Holdings, LLC | $28,710,481 | $723.84 | $10,058,665 | $253.60 | $138.95 |
| Ashtabula | FirstEnergy Service Company | $35,236,541 | $176.25 | $25,177,042 | $125.94 | $107.91 |
| Eastlake 1 | FirstEnergy Service Company | $20,842,416 | $257.01 | $18,484,399 | $227.93 | $102.73 |
| Eastlake 2 | FirstEnergy Service Company | $20,182,025 | $248.87 | $17,683,994 | $218.06 | $102.73 |
| Eastlake 3 | FirstEnergy Service Company | $20,192,938 | $249.00 | $17,391,797 | $214.46 | $102.73 |
| Lakeshore | FirstEnergy Service Company | $33,993,468 | $240.47 | $20,532,969 | $145.25 | $102.73 |
| Elrama 4 | GenOn Power Midwest, LP | $15,435,472 | $739.88 | $7,576,435 | $363.17 | $75.08 |
| Niles 1 | GenOn Power Midwest, LP | $9,510,580 | $715.19 | $4,829,423 | $363.17 | $75.08 |
| Cromby 2 and Diesel | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | $20,213,406 | $463.70 | $17,776,658 | $407.80 | $108.63 |
| Eddystone 2 | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | $165,993,135 | $1,467.74 | $85,364,570 | $754.81 | $108.63 |
| Brunot Island CT2A, CT2B, CT3 and CC4 | Orion Power MidWest, L.P. | $60,933,986 | $601.76 | $23,507,795 | $232.15 | $89.78 |
| Hudson 1 | PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC | $28,934,341 | $32.90 | $62,364,359 | $70.92 | $132.72 |
| Sewaren 1-4 | PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC | $47,633,115 | $81.89 | $79,580,435 | $136.82 | $97.39 |

In each of the cost of service recovery rate filings for Part V reliability service, the scope of recovery permitted under the cost of service approach defined in Section 119 has been a significant issue. Owners have sought to recover fixed costs, incurred prior to the noticed deactivation date, in addition to the cost of operating the generating unit. Owners have cited the cost of service reference to mean that the unit is entitled to file to recover sunk costs that it was unable to recover in the competitive markets, in addition to recovery of costs of actually providing the Part V reliability service.

The cost of service recovery rate approach has been interpreted by the companies using that approach to allow the company to develop the type of rate case filing used by regulated utilities, using a test year with adjustments, to establish a rate base including investment in the existing plant and new investment necessary to remain in service and to earn a return on that rate base and receive depreciation of that rate base, plus guarantee recovery of estimated operation and maintenance expenses without verification of actual expenses. Despite the asserted reliance on traditional cost of service ratemaking principles, in practice generators seek approval of high rates that have weak or non existent support in law and fact relative to what has been traditionally required to justify

216 Actual cost data includes RMR charges through May 31, 2026.
217 The actual cost data for Indian River 4 include a refund of the difference between the filed rate that was collected pending resolution and the RMR settlement amount.
218 The data reported for Brandon Shores and Wagner are the Settlement gross costs. See 191 FERC ¶ 61,098 (2025); Offer of Settlement, Docket No. ER24-1787, -1790 (January 1, 2025), Exhibit 2.


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of cost of service rates. Companies developing the cost of service recovery rate have ignored the tariff's limitation to the costs of operating the unit during the Part V reliability service period and have included costs incurred prior to the decision to deactivate and costs associated with closing the unit that would have been incurred regardless of the Part V reliability service period.[219] In some cases, the filing included costs that already had been written off, or impaired, on the company's public books.[220] [221] In another case, the filing ignored evidence of actual book value based on market purchase of the asset.[222] The cost of service recovery rates substantially exceed the actual costs of operating to provide the reliability required by PJM. The costs are generally not subject to review, audit and verification. The Commission has approved black box settlement rates (i.e., no explicit basis for the rate is stated) that included arbitrarily inflated asset values and costs, despite protests.[223]

Because such units are needed by PJM for reliability reasons, and the provision of the service is voluntary in PJM, owners of units that PJM needs to remain in service after the desired retirement date have significant market power in establishing the terms of this reliability service which have generally been set through settlements.

This reliability service should be provided to PJM customers at reasonable rates, which reflect the relatively low risk nature of providing such service to owners, the reliability need for such service and the opportunity for owners to be guaranteed recovery of 100 percent of the actual incremental costs required to operate to provide the service plus an incentive.

The MMU recommends elimination of both the cost of service recovery rate in OATT Section 119 and the deactivation avoidable cost rate in Part V, and their replacement with clear language that provides for the recovery of 100 percent of the actual incremental costs required to operate to provide the service plus an incentive.

The MMU recommends that units recover all and only the incremental costs, including incremental investment costs without a cap, required to provide Part V reliability service (RMR service) that the unit owner would not have incurred if the unit owner had deactivated its unit as it proposed, plus a defined incentive payment. Customers should bear no responsibility for paying previously incurred (sunk) costs, including a return on or of prior investments.

The Indian River RMR was effective from June 1, 2022, through February 24, 2025. After the RMR ended, Indian River submitted additional bills until the final invoice for October 2025. Additional costs beyond February 2025 were incurred for the removal of remaining coal inventory and chemicals. The MMU was unable to review all costs charged to the project because NRG refused to provide supporting documentation after several requests from the MMU. NRG only provided invoices over $10,000 starting January 2024. NRG did not provide supporting documentation for costs prior to January 2024 and for costs under $10,000. As a result, the MMU was unable to determine if all costs charged to the project were reasonable. On February 20, 2026, the MMU filed a Petition with FERC to require NRG to produce the requested cost documentation.[224]

## Department of Energy (DOE) 202(c) Orders

### Eddystone

On May 30, 2025, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an order under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act stating that the operational availability and economic dispatch of Eddystone units 3 and 4 is necessary to meet an emergency and serve the public interest.[225] The order requires that Constellation Energy, LLC and PJM take measures to ensure that Eddystone units 3 and 4 are available to operate from May 30, 2025, initially through 5:03 PM EDT on August 28, 2025.[226] The term of operation was extended,

219 See, e.g., FERC Dockets Nos. ER10-1418-000, ER12-1901-000 and ER17-1083-000.
220 See GenOn Filing, Docket No. ER12-1901-000 (May 31, 2012) at Exh. No. GPM-1 at 9:16–21.
221 See NRG Filing, Docket No. ER22- 1539-000 (April 1, 2022).
222 See Brandon Shores, H.A. Wagner, Docket No. ER24-1787-000, et al. (April 18, 2024); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM in Opposition to Settlement, Docket No. ER24-1787-000, et al. (February 18, 2025).
223 See 190 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2025), ***reh'g denied***, 191 FERC ¶ 61,170 (2025), ***appeal pending*** (D.C. Cir. Case No. 25-1260); 191 FERC ¶ 61,098 (2025), ***reh'g denied***, 191 FERC ¶ 62,189 (2025).

224 See *Petition of Monitoring Analytics, LLC, LLC for Order Directing Production of Information*, Docket No. EL26-54-00 (February 20, 2026).
225 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
226 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-4 (May 30, 2025) <https://www.energy.gov/ceser/federal-power-act-section-202c-pjm-interconnection> .

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including to August 22, 2026, in subsequent orders.[227] [228] Eddystone Units 3 and 4 were previously scheduled to retire on May 31, 2025.

PJM and Constellation notified the Commission by letter dated June 26, 2025, that they had agreed to a rate for service under Section 202(c) based on a modified version of the Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit method included in Section 114 of the OATT. The modified approach ensure rates based on the actual fuel costs for operating the units and a reasonable approximation of actual avoidable costs rather than the arbitrary regulated cost of service model in recent RMR cases.

Table 5-36 shows the cost information for units subject to DOE orders under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act requiring resources to operate beyond their requested deactivation dates.

## Wagner

On July 28, 2025, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an order under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act stating that the operational availability and economic dispatch of H.A. Wagner Unit 4 is necessary to meet an emergency and serve the public interest.[229] The order required that PJM take measures in coordination with Talen Energy, the owner, to ensure that H.A. Wagner Unit 4 remain available to operate from July 28, 2025, initially through October 26, 2025.[230] The term of operation was extended to January 1, 2026, in a subsequent order.[231] On May 21, 2026, the DOE issued another order under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act for H.A. Wagner Unit 4 in effect from May 22, 2026, until August 19, 2026.[232]

227 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-8 (August 28, 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/202c%20Order%20No.%20202-25-8.pdf>; Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-10 (November 26, 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/Order%20No.%20202-25-10.pdf>; Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-17 (February 23, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/eddystone-202c-order-no-202-26-17>; Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-24 (May 21, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-emergency-order-202-26-24>.

228 On June 9, 2025, the PJM Board of Managers initiated a Critical Issue Fast Path (CIFP) stakeholder process to address the allocation of costs associated with the payments to Constellation for continuing to operate Eddystone units 3 and 4. On August 15, 2025, FERC issued an order accepting PJM's cost allocation methodology related to the retention of Eddystone units 3 and 4. 192 FERC ¶ 61,159 (2025).

229 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-6 (July 28, 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/PJM%27s%202202%28c%29%20Order%20No.%20202-25-6.pdf>.

230 *Id.*

231 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-6A (October 24, 2025), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-10/202c%20Order%20No.%20202-25-6A_0.pdf>

232 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-25 (May 21, 2026), <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-emergency-order-no-202-26-25>.

## Other 202(c) Orders

### Operation in Excess of Operational Limits, Permit Restrictions, and Other Causes

On January 25 and January 29, 2026, in response to an application filed by PJM, the DOE issued an emergency order and a subsequent order pursuant to section 202(c) allowing PJM to run all electric generating units located within the PJM Region up to their maximum generation output levels, notwithstanding air quality or other permit limitations or fuel shortages, from January 25 to February 2, 2026.[233]

### Backup Generation Resources at Data Centers and Other Large Load Customers

On January 26 and January 29, 2026, in response to an application filed by PJM, the DOE issued an emergency order and a subsequent order pursuant to section 202(c) authorizing PJM to direct backup generation resources at data centers and other large load customers to operate as a last resort before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 or during an EEA 3 effective January 26 to February 2, 2026.[234]

On May 18, 2026, in response to an application filed by PJM, the DOE issued an emergency order authorizing PJM to deploy backup generation resources at data centers and other major facilities.[235]

On June 30, July 3, 2026, and July 14, 2026, in response to applications filed by PJM, DOE issued an emergency order and subsequent orders pursuant to section 202(c) authorizing PJM to direct backup generation resources at data centers and other large load customers to operate as a last resort before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 or during an EEA 3 effective June 30 to July 21, 2026.[236]

233 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-02, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/order-no-202-26-2-pjm>; Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-02A, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-02a-pjm>.

234 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-06, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-06-pjm> Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-06A, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/order-no-202-26-06-pjm-backup-generators>;

235 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-23, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-emergency-order-no-202-26-23pdf>.

236 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-33, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-33>; Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-33A, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-33a>. Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-35, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-35>.


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### Dispatch of Specified Units as Needed to Maintain Reliability

On June 30 and July 2, 2026, in response to an application filed by PJM, DOE issued an emergency order and a subsequent order pursuant to section 202(c) directing PJM to dispatch specified units and to order their operation as needed to maintain reliability effective June 30 to July 6, 2026.[237]

On July 14, 2026, in response to an application filed by PJM, DOE issued an emergency order pursuant to section 202(c) directing PJM to dispatch specified units and to order their operation as needed to maintain reliability effective July 14 to July 21, 2026.[238]

## 202(c) Cost Information

**Table 5-36 DOE 202(c) cost summary[239]**

| Unit Names | Owner | Fuel Type | ICAP (MW) | Start of Term | End of Term | Total Cost | Cost per MW-day |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eddystone 3 | Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Oil | 380.0 | 01-Jun-25 | 22-Aug-26 | $6,525,722 | $47.05 |
| Eddystone 4 | Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Oil | 380.0 | 01-Jun-25 | 22-Aug-26 | $6,525,722 | $47.05 |

# Generator Performance

Generator performance results from the interaction between the physical characteristics of the units and the level of expenditures made to maintain the capability of the units, which in turn is a function of incentives from energy, ancillary services and capacity markets. Generator performance indices include those based on total hours in a period (generator performance factors) and those based on hours when units are needed to operate by the system operator (generator forced outage rates).

## Capacity Factor

Capacity factor measures the actual output of a power plant over a period of time compared to the potential output of the unit had it been running at full nameplate capacity for every hour during that period. Table 5-37 shows the capacity factors by unit type for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2026, nuclear units had a capacity factor of 95.2 percent, compared to a capacity factor of 94.6 percent in the first six months of 2025; combined cycle units had a capacity factor of 62.1 percent in the first six months of 2026, compared to a capacity factor of 61.6 percent in the first six months of 2025; coal units had a capacity factor of 42.3 percent in the first six months of 2026, compared to a capacity factor of 43.1 percent in the first six months of 2025.

237 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-32, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-32>; Department of Energy, Order No. Order No. 202-26-32A, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-32a>.

238 Department of Energy, Order No. 202-26-35, <https://www.energy.gov/documents/doe-order-no-202-26-35>.

239 PJM Manual 33 states that cost information "related to DOE 202(c) orders requiring resources to run beyond their requested deactivation dates" may be publicly posted. As the DOE 202(c) orders for Wagner Unit 4 differ from the type of DOE 202(c) order described in Manual 33, the cost information for Wagner Unit 4 is not included in this table. See "PJM Manual 33: Administrative Services for the PJM Interconnection Operating Agreement," § 6 Market Data Postings, Rev. 21 (Apr. 22, 2026).

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### Table 5-37 Capacity factor (By unit type (GWh)): January through June, 2025 and 2026[240] [241] [242]


| | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor | Change in Capacity Factor |
| Battery | 32.5 | 2.0% | 80.5 | 4.0% | 2.0% |
| Combined Cycle | 154,609.2 | 61.6% | 158,068.8 | 62.1% | 0.4% |
| Single Fuel | 134,639.4 | 67.0% | 137,103.0 | 65.6% | (1.4%) |
| Dual Fuel | 19,969.8 | 40.0% | 20,965.8 | 45.7% | 5.8% |
| Combustion Turbine | 10,378.1 | 8.4% | 11,952.4 | 9.7% | 1.3% |
| Single Fuel | 6,367.7 | 7.4% | 7,351.9 | 8.6% | 1.2% |
| Dual Fuel | 4,010.4 | 10.5% | 4,600.6 | 12.0% | 1.6% |
| Diesel | 195.7 | 12.4% | 173.8 | 11.5% | (0.9%) |
| Single Fuel | 172.3 | 12.1% | 148.5 | 10.9% | (1.2%) |
| Dual Fuel | 23.4 | 15.6% | 25.3 | 16.9% | 1.3% |
| Diesel (Landfill gas) | 378.0 | 43.3% | 379.8 | 46.2% | 2.9% |
| Fuel Cell | 107.9 | 93.9% | 106.4 | 92.6% | (1.3%) |
| Nuclear | 133,994.6 | 94.6% | 134,859.1 | 95.2% | 0.6% |
| Pumped Storage Hydro | 3,960.0 | 16.8% | 4,066.0 | 17.3% | 0.5% |
| Run of River Hydro | 4,899.1 | 54.9% | 4,013.7 | 45.0% | (9.9%) |
| Solar | 12,254.8 | 22.5% | 15,019.6 | 22.8% | 0.3% |
| Steam | 78,828.8 | 39.1% | 79,052.4 | 39.4% | 0.3% |
| Biomass | 2,456.0 | 64.6% | 2,498.7 | 66.2% | 1.6% |
| Coal | 70,250.3 | 43.1% | 68,549.9 | 42.3% | (0.9%) |
| Single Fuel | 70,250.3 | 43.9% | 68,549.9 | 43.0% | (0.9%) |
| Dual Fuel | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Natural Gas | 5,558.1 | 43.1% | 7,165.1 | 44.4% | 1.4% |
| Single Fuel | 247.2 | 51.1% | 107.1 | 50.9% | (0.2%) |
| Dual Fuel | 5,310.9 | 24.5% | 7,058.0 | 28.4% | 3.9% |
| Oil | 564.4 | 4.3% | 838.7 | 6.6% | 2.3% |
| Wind | 18,939.8 | 16.1% | 19,341.3 | 22.0% | 5.9% |
| Total | 418,578.4 | 48.5% | 427,114.0 | 48.6% | 0.1% |

## Generator Performance Factors

Generator outages fall into three categories: planned, maintenance, and forced. The scheduling of planned and maintenance outages must be approved by PJM. The approval may be withdrawn in order to maintain system reliability.[243] The PJM Market Rules do not specify any consequences if the planned outage continues after PJM withdraws approval. If PJM withdraws approval for a maintenance outage during the outage and the unit cannot operate, the outage is defined to be a forced outage.[244] Outages that are approved by PJM may be extended. An extension to a planned outage that enters the peak period is treated as a forced outage. A maintenance outage that is extended to more than nine days during the peak period is treated as a forced outage.

The MW on outage vary during the year. For example, the MW on planned outage are generally highest in the spring and fall, as shown in Figure 5-10, as a result of restrictions on planned outages during the winter and summer. The Peak Period Maintenance Season, shown in Figure 5-10 as the peak season, runs from the weeks containing the twenty-fourth through thirty-sixth Wednesdays of the year. Planned outages cannot start in nor extend into this period. In 2026, the period runs from Monday, June 15 through Friday, September 11. The effect of the seasonal variation in outages can be seen in the monthly generator performance metrics in Figure 5-13.

### Figure 5-10 Outages (MW): 2012 through June 2026




240 The capacity factors in this table are based on nameplate capacity values, and are calculated based on when the units come on line.

241 The subcategories of steam units are consolidated consistent with confidentiality rules. Coal is comprised of coal and waste coal. Natural gas is comprised of natural gas and propane. Oil is comprised of both heavy and light oil. Biomass is comprised of biomass, landfill gas, and municipal solid waste.

242 Hours in which batteries have net negative generation do not count toward their runtime.

243 "PJM Manual 10: Pre-Scheduling Operations," § 2.3.2 Maintenance Outage Rules, Rev. 65 (July 23, 2025).

244 OATT, Attachment K (Appendix) § 1.9.3 (b).



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Table 5-38 shows the total MWh by outage type. In the first six months of 2026, forced outage MWh were 38.1 percent higher, planned outage MWh were 2.9 percent lower, and maintenance outage MWh were 5.9 percent lower than in the first six months of 2025.


### Table 5-38 Outages (MWh): January through June, 2012 through 2026

| Jan-Jun | Forced MWh | Planned MWh | Maintenance MWh |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 1,292,060 | 2,665,013 | 1,199,959 |
| 2013 | 1,587,665 | 3,032,253 | 896,719 |
| 2014 | 2,249,995 | 2,984,012 | 990,748 |
| 2015 | 1,584,622 | 2,877,497 | 825,914 |
| 2016 | 1,168,978 | 3,102,343 | 912,005 |
| 2017 | 1,182,860 | 2,592,417 | 985,338 |
| 2018 | 1,295,062 | 2,752,757 | 934,979 |
| 2019 | 907,884 | 2,515,435 | 1,016,714 |
| 2020 | 911,469 | 1,702,312 | 1,129,011 |
| 2021 | 1,242,658 | 2,135,115 | 1,208,302 |
| 2022 | 1,138,626 | 2,376,361 | 1,196,745 |
| 2023 | 998,303 | 2,382,515 | 1,042,008 |
| 2024 | 599,783 | 1,969,323 | 796,319 |
| 2025 | 810,465 | 2,109,949 | 674,158 |
| 2026 | 1,118,964 | 2,170,726 | 634,198 |
| Change in 2026 from 2025 | 38.1% | 2.9% | (5.9%) |

Performance factors include the equivalent availability factor (EAF), the equivalent maintenance outage factor (EMOF), the equivalent planned outage factor (EPOF) and the equivalent forced outage factor (EFOF). These four factors add to 100 percent for any generating unit. The EAF is the proportion of hours in a year when a unit is available to generate at full capacity while the three outage factors include all the hours when a unit is unavailable. The EMOF is the proportion of hours in a year when a unit is unavailable because of maintenance outages and maintenance deratings. The EPOF is the proportion of hours in a year when a unit is unavailable because of planned outages and planned deratings. The EFOF is the proportion of hours in a year when a unit is unavailable because of forced outages and forced deratings.

The PJM aggregate EAF, EFOF, EPOF, and EMOF are shown in Figure 5-11. Metrics by unit type are shown in Table 5-39.

### Figure 5-11 Equivalent outage and availability factors: January through June, 2007 through 2026




The PJM aggregate equivalent availability factor in the first six months of 2026 was 79.9 percent, a decrease from 81.6 percent in the first six months of 2025.

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### Table 5-39 EFOF, EPOF, EMOF and EAF by unit type: January through June, 2007 through 2026

| | Coal | | | | Combined Cycle | | | | Combustion Turbine | | | | Diesel | | | | Hydroelectric | | | | Nuclear | | | | Other | | | | Total | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF | EFOF | EPOF | EMOF | EAF |
| 2007 | 6% | 10% | 3% | 81% | 1% | 7% | 2% | 89% | 5% | 3% | 3% | 88% | 9% | 1% | 2% | 88% | 2% | 6% | 2% | 90% | 1% | 5% | 0% | 94% | 6% | 11% | 2% | 80% | 4% | 8% | 2% | 86% |
| 2008 | 8% | 10% | 3% | 80% | 2% | 7% | 2% | 90% | 3% | 6% | 2% | 88% | 9% | 2% | 1% | 87% | 1% | 7% | 2% | 89% | 1% | 7% | 1% | 92% | 4% | 13% | 3% | 81% | 4% | 8% | 2% | 85% |
| 2009 | 8% | 9% | 3% | 80% | 4% | 6% | 3% | 87% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 92% | 7% | 0% | 2% | 91% | 2% | 10% | 3% | 84% | 4% | 6% | 1% | 90% | 4% | 11% | 6% | 79% | 5% | 7% | 3% | 85% |
| 2010 | 8% | 11% | 4% | 78% | 3% | 9% | 1% | 87% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 94% | 4% | 1% | 1% | 94% | 1% | 10% | 2% | 87% | 1% | 6% | 1% | 92% | 3% | 11% | 3% | 83% | 4% | 8% | 3% | 85% |
| 2011 | 9% | 12% | 4% | 75% | 3% | 8% | 2% | 87% | 1% | 3% | 2% | 93% | 2% | 0% | 3% | 95% | 1% | 14% | 2% | 84% | 2% | 7% | 2% | 89% | 4% | 12% | 3% | 82% | 5% | 9% | 3% | 83% |
| 2012 | 7% | 11% | 8% | 74% | 2% | 8% | 2% | 88% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 93% | 4% | 0% | 2% | 94% | 4% | 4% | 2% | 91% | 1% | 8% | 1% | 90% | 5% | 12% | 3% | 80% | 4% | 9% | 4% | 83% |
| 2013 | 8% | 14% | 5% | 74% | 1% | 10% | 3% | 86% | 5% | 4% | 1% | 90% | 4% | 0% | 2% | 94% | 0% | 8% | 2% | 90% | 1% | 7% | 0% | 92% | 7% | 13% | 4% | 76% | 5% | 10% | 3% | 82% |
| 2014 | 11% | 12% | 6% | 72% | 3% | 12% | 2% | 83% | 9% | 5% | 2% | 84% | 15% | 1% | 2% | 82% | 2% | 11% | 4% | 83% | 2% | 7% | 1% | 90% | 8% | 15% | 6% | 71% | 7% | 10% | 3% | 80% |
| 2015 | 9% | 11% | 4% | 76% | 2% | 12% | 2% | 84% | 3% | 5% | 2% | 90% | 10% | 1% | 3% | 87% | 2% | 10% | 2% | 86% | 1% | 6% | 1% | 92% | 7% | 22% | 5% | 67% | 5% | 10% | 3% | 82% |
| 2016 | 8% | 11% | 5% | 75% | 3% | 12% | 2% | 83% | 2% | 6% | 2% | 89% | 6% | 0% | 4% | 90% | 2% | 8% | 4% | 86% | 1% | 6% | 1% | 92% | 3% | 24% | 4% | 69% | 4% | 10% | 3% | 82% |
| 2017 | 10% | 13% | 7% | 70% | 3% | 13% | 1% | 83% | 1% | 5% | 2% | 91% | 6% | 0% | 2% | 92% | 2% | 7% | 3% | 88% | 0% | 6% | 1% | 93% | 3% | 11% | 5% | 81% | 4% | 10% | 4% | 83% |
| 2018 | 11% | 13% | 6% | 70% | 2% | 11% | 1% | 87% | 2% | 5% | 2% | 91% | 6% | 1% | 3% | 90% | 2% | 6% | 3% | 89% | 0% | 6% | 0% | 93% | 4% | 12% | 8% | 76% | 5% | 9% | 3% | 83% |
| 2019 | 7% | 10% | 7% | 75% | 2% | 11% | 2% | 86% | 1% | 8% | 1% | 89% | 7% | 1% | 3% | 89% | 1% | 5% | 4% | 90% | 0% | 6% | 1% | 92% | 3% | 15% | 7% | 75% | 3% | 9% | 4% | 84% |
| 2020 | 4% | 8% | 10% | 78% | 5% | 7% | 1% | 86% | 2% | 4% | 2% | 92% | 6% | 0% | 3% | 91% | 5% | 2% | 3% | 90% | 2% | 5% | 1% | 92% | 4% | 9% | 4% | 83% | 4% | 6% | 4% | 86% |
| 2021 | 8% | 10% | 10% | 72% | 2% | 11% | 2% | 85% | 2% | 7% | 3% | 89% | 7% | 1% | 4% | 88% | 10% | 4% | 3% | 83% | 1% | 6% | 1% | 92% | 9% | 8% | 6% | 76% | 4% | 8% | 4% | 83% |
| 2022 | 10% | 12% | 11% | 67% | 3% | 14% | 2% | 81% | 2% | 7% | 2% | 89% | 9% | 1% | 5% | 85% | 3% | 7% | 3% | 87% | 1% | 6% | 1% | 92% | 5% | 9% | 7% | 79% | 5% | 9% | 5% | 81% |
| 2023 | 8% | 16% | 8% | 68% | 4% | 14% | 2% | 80% | 2% | 7% | 2% | 88% | 13% | 0% | 4% | 83% | 2% | 14% | 6% | 78% | 0% | 5% | 2% | 93% | 5% | 10% | 8% | 76% | 4% | 10% | 4% | 81% |
| 2024 | 4% | 12% | 7% | 77% | 3% | 13% | 2% | 82% | 2% | 6% | 2% | 90% | 8% | 0% | 2% | 89% | 3% | 17% | 3% | 77% | 1% | 7% | 2% | 91% | 4% | 11% | 3% | 82% | 2% | 10% | 3% | 85% |
| 2025 | 8% | 15% | 7% | 71% | 4% | 15% | 2% | 80% | 4% | 7% | 2% | 87% | 13% | 2% | 2% | 83% | 2% | 13% | 5% | 81% | 1% | 7% | 2% | 91% | 7% | 14% | 4% | 75% | 4% | 11% | 3% | 82% |
| 2026 | 12% | 18% | 5% | 65% | 4% | 14% | 2% | 80% | 6% | 7% | 2% | 85% | 15% | 4% | 5% | 77% | 2% | 9% | 4% | 86% | 1% | 5% | 3% | 92% | 13% | 16% | 5% | 65% | 6% | 11% | 3% | 80% |

## Generator Outage Rates

The most fundamental forced outage rate metric is the equivalent demand forced outage rate (EFORd). EFORd is a measure of the probability that a generating unit will fail, either partially or totally, to perform when it is needed to operate. EFORd measures the forced outage rate during periods of demand, and does not include planned or maintenance outages. A period of demand is a period during which a generator is running or needed to run. EFORd calculations use historical performance data, including equivalent forced outage hours, service hours, average forced outage duration, average run time, average time between unit starts, available hours and period hours.[245] The EFORd metric includes all forced outages, regardless of the reason for those outages.

The average PJM EFORd in the first six months of 2026 was 8.4 percent, an increase from 6.2 percent in the first six months of 2025. Figure 5-12 shows the average EFORd since 1999 for all units in PJM.[246]

245 Equivalent forced outage hours are the sum of all forced outage hours in which a generating unit is fully inoperable and all partial forced outage hours in which a generating unit is partially inoperable, prorated to full hours.
246 The universe of units in PJM changed as the PJM footprint expanded and as units retired from and entered PJM markets. See the *2019 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix A: "PJM Overview" for details.


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## Figure 5-12 Equivalent demand forced outage rates (EFORd): 1999 through June, 2026





Table 5-40 shows the class average EFORd by unit type.

## Table 5-40 EFORd by unit type: January through June, 2007 through 2026

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Coal | 7.5% | 9.1% | 9.6% | 9.7% | 11.4% | 10.7% | 10.5% | 14.0% | 10.9% | 10.6% | 12.9% | 14.3% | 10.7% | 7.8% | 10.8% | 14.5% | 14.2% | 6.1% | 11.2% | 17.1% |
| Combined Cycle | 3.4% | 3.7% | 5.8% | 3.6% | 3.6% | 2.8% | 1.6% | 5.1% | 2.7% | 3.8% | 3.4% | 2.8% | 2.4% | 7.0% | 3.1% | 4.7% | 4.7% | 3.5% | 5.7% | 5.0% |
| Combustion Turbine | 19.9% | 15.6% | 9.5% | 15.1% | 9.0% | 7.8% | 14.1% | 22.8% | 13.9% | 7.2% | 6.4% | 7.8% | 6.6% | 5.9% | 5.1% | 5.8% | 6.1% | 6.3% | 8.2% | 10.7% |
| Diesel | 10.9% | 10.2% | 8.7% | 5.9% | 6.2% | 5.3% | 4.5% | 16.2% | 10.7% | 7.8% | 6.5% | 6.3% | 7.8% | 8.4% | 8.3% | 12.9% | 16.0% | 11.4% | 15.6% | 17.6% |
| Hydroelectric | 2.1% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 1.0% | 1.4% | 5.2% | 0.8% | 3.2% | 2.6% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.3% | 1.2% | 5.7% | 11.6% | 4.9% | 3.2% | 3.3% | 2.2% | 2.8% |
| Nuclear | 1.3% | 1.1% | 4.0% | 1.5% | 2.3% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 2.2% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.5% |
| Other | 11.6% | 10.7% | 10.2% | 7.2% | 10.2% | 8.6% | 12.9% | 16.7% | 13.9% | 6.9% | 14.2% | 11.3% | 7.5% | 12.5% | 17.9% | 18.2% | 9.3% | 6.5% | 10.0% | 19.2% |
| Total | 7.6% | 7.6% | 7.8% | 7.6% | 7.8% | 7.0% | 7.9% | 11.6% | 8.1% | 6.1% | 7.2% | 7.5% | 5.5% | 6.3% | 6.7% | 7.8% | 6.6% | 4.1% | 6.2% | 8.4% |

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## EFORd vs EAF

EFORd is not an adequate measure of unit availability because EFORd measures only forced outages and does not account for planned or maintenance outages. Forced outage rates can be managed under the existing outage rules. The EAF (Equivalent Availability Factor), which reflects all forced, planned, and maintenance outages, is a more accurate measure of the capacity actually available to meet load.

Table 5-41 shows the differences between EFORd and EAF by unit type.

### Table 5-41 EFORd and EAF by unit type: January through June, 2012 through 2026

| | Unit Types | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coal | | Combined Cycle | | Combustion Turbine | | Diesel | | Hydroelectric | | Nuclear | | Other | | All | |
| Jan-Jun | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF | EFORd | 1-EAF |
| 2012 | 10.7% | 26.0% | 2.8% | 12.1% | 7.8% | 6.6% | 5.3% | 6.0% | 5.2% | 9.4% | 1.3% | 10.0% | 8.6% | 19.6% | 7.0% | 16.9% |
| 2013 | 10.5% | 26.2% | 1.6% | 14.3% | 14.1% | 9.7% | 4.5% | 6.5% | 0.8% | 10.2% | 1.3% | 8.2% | 12.9% | 24.3% | 7.9% | 17.5% |
| 2014 | 14.0% | 28.0% | 5.1% | 17.0% | 22.8% | 15.8% | 16.2% | 18.4% | 3.2% | 16.8% | 2.2% | 9.5% | 16.7% | 29.0% | 11.6% | 20.3% |
| 2015 | 10.9% | 23.6% | 2.7% | 16.2% | 13.9% | 10.5% | 10.7% | 12.9% | 2.6% | 14.0% | 1.2% | 8.3% | 13.9% | 33.0% | 8.1% | 17.7% |
| 2016 | 10.6% | 24.8% | 3.8% | 16.9% | 7.2% | 10.5% | 7.8% | 9.8% | 3.1% | 13.9% | 1.1% | 8.4% | 6.9% | 31.2% | 6.1% | 17.8% |
| 2017 | 12.9% | 29.7% | 3.4% | 16.5% | 6.4% | 8.8% | 6.5% | 8.0% | 2.9% | 12.1% | 0.4% | 7.3% | 14.2% | 18.6% | 7.2% | 17.2% |
| 2018 | 14.3% | 30.0% | 2.8% | 13.3% | 7.8% | 9.4% | 6.3% | 10.1% | 3.3% | 11.3% | 0.6% | 7.2% | 11.3% | 23.8% | 7.5% | 17.4% |
| 2019 | 10.7% | 25.0% | 2.4% | 14.3% | 6.6% | 10.6% | 7.8% | 11.4% | 1.2% | 9.7% | 0.6% | 7.8% | 7.5% | 25.0% | 5.5% | 16.0% |
| 2020 | 7.8% | 21.9% | 7.0% | 14.3% | 5.9% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 9.2% | 5.7% | 9.6% | 2.0% | 7.6% | 12.5% | 17.1% | 6.3% | 13.8% |
| 2021 | 10.8% | 27.9% | 3.1% | 15.4% | 5.1% | 11.1% | 8.3% | 12.3% | 11.6% | 17.2% | 0.9% | 7.8% | 17.9% | 23.8% | 6.7% | 17.1% |
| 2022 | 14.5% | 32.8% | 4.7% | 19.2% | 5.8% | 11.4% | 12.9% | 15.1% | 4.9% | 13.2% | 0.9% | 7.9% | 18.2% | 21.1% | 7.8% | 18.7% |
| 2023 | 14.2% | 31.9% | 4.7% | 19.7% | 6.1% | 11.5% | 16.0% | 17.2% | 3.2% | 22.4% | 0.4% | 7.3% | 9.3% | 23.6% | 6.6% | 18.7% |
| 2024 | 6.1% | 22.5% | 3.5% | 17.6% | 6.3% | 10.2% | 11.4% | 10.9% | 3.3% | 23.0% | 0.8% | 9.2% | 6.5% | 17.9% | 4.1% | 15.4% |
| 2025 | 11.2% | 29.4% | 5.7% | 20.3% | 8.2% | 12.8% | 15.6% | 16.7% | 2.2% | 19.4% | 0.7% | 9.2% | 10.0% | 25.0% | 6.2% | 18.4% |
| 2026 | 17.1% | 35.5% | 5.0% | 19.6% | 10.7% | 15.0% | 17.6% | 23.4% | 2.8% | 14.2% | 0.5% | 8.3% | 19.2% | 34.6% | 8.4% | 20.1% |
| Average | 11.8% | 27.7% | 3.9% | 16.4% | 9.0% | 10.8% | 10.4% | 12.5% | 3.7% | 14.4% | 1.0% | 8.3% | 12.4% | 24.5% | 7.1% | 17.5% |

## Outage Analysis

The MMU analyzed the causes of outages for the PJM system. The metric used was lost generation, which is the product of the duration of the outage and the size of the outage reduction. Lost generation can be converted into lost system equivalent availability.[247] On a system wide basis, the resultant lost equivalent availability from forced outages is equal to the equivalent forced outage factor (EFOF), the resultant lost equivalent availability from maintenance outages is equal to the equivalent maintenance outage factor (EMOF), and the resultant lost equivalent availability from planned outages is equal to the equivalent planned outage factor (EPOF).

The PJM EFOF was 5.9 percent in the first six months of 2026. Table 5-42 shows the causes of EFOF by unit type. Forced outages for boiler tube leaks, 12.7 percent of the system EFOF, were the largest single contributor to average system EFOF across all unit types.

247 For any unit, lost generation can be converted to lost equivalent availability by dividing lost generation by the product of the generating units' capacity and period hours. This can also be done on a system basis.


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## Table 5-42 Contribution to PJM EFOF by unit type by cause: January through June, 2026

| | Coal | Combined Cycle | Combustion Turbine | Diesel | Hydroelectric | Nuclear | Other | System |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boiler Tube Leaks | 19.3% | 4.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 14.2% | 12.7% |
| Wet Scrubbers | 21.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.3% |
| Boiler Air and Gas Systems | 7.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 40.5% | 9.5% |
| Miscellaneous (Gas Turbine) | 0.0% | 25.1% | 21.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 6.4% |
| Personnel or Procedure Errors | 9.6% | 1.0% | 2.0% | 2.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.5% |
| Electrical | 2.0% | 6.8% | 3.3% | 1.4% | 3.8% | 61.0% | 1.1% | 4.3% |
| Economic | 0.0% | 0.5% | 18.6% | 10.3% | 19.5% | 4.4% | 0.3% | 3.6% |
| High Pressure Turbine | 5.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 3.1% |
| Boiler Piping System | 1.9% | 12.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 2.6% |
| Circulating Water Systems | 3.6% | 2.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 0.8% | 2.3% |
| Auxiliary Systems | 1.2% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 2.2% |
| Stack Emission | 2.6% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.8% | 2.1% |
| Exciter | 0.5% | 1.4% | 6.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 4.7% | 2.1% |
| Miscellaneous (Generator) | 0.1% | 2.3% | 1.5% | 22.4% | 4.0% | 0.0% | 8.5% | 2.0% |
| Miscellaneous (Jet Engine) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 12.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.9% |
| Low Pressure Turbine | 2.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 6.1% | 1.9% |
| Fuel, Ignition and Combustion Systems | 0.0% | 5.3% | 7.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.8% |
| Turbine | 0.0% | 2.4% | 6.7% | 0.0% | 9.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% |
| Valves | 2.6% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 1.5% |
| All Other Causes | 19.5% | 29.3% | 14.9% | 63.3% | 63.4% | 33.0% | 18.4% | 21.5% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

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The PJM EMOF was 3.3 percent in the first six months of 2026. Table 5-43 shows the causes of EMOF by unit type. Maintenance outages for boiler tube leaks, 9.5 percent of the system EMOF, were the largest single contributor to average system EMOF across all unit types, although miscellaneous gas turbine issues were the largest contributors to EMOF for combustion turbines.

### Table 5-43 Contribution to EMOF by unit type by cause: January through June, 2026

| | Coal | Combined Cycle | Combustion Turbine | Diesel | Hydroelectric | Nuclear | Other | System |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boiler Tube Leaks | 14.9% | 19.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 17.4% | 9.5% |
| Core/Fuel | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 8.9% |
| Miscellaneous (Reactor) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 37.0% | 0.0% | 8.2% |
| Miscellaneous (Balance of Plant) | 13.0% | 3.2% | 2.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 12.0% | 6.8% |
| Miscellaneous (Gas Turbine) | 0.0% | 12.2% | 42.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 6.1% |
| Valves | 13.3% | 1.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 5.5% |
| Reactor Coolant System | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 20.5% | 0.0% | 4.5% |
| Boiler Air and Gas Systems | 10.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.9% | 4.5% |
| Turbine | 0.0% | 10.0% | 4.3% | 0.0% | 40.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.2% |
| Electrical | 0.4% | 5.2% | 9.4% | 21.9% | 27.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 3.7% |
| Feedwater System | 5.0% | 4.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 5.9% | 3.1% |
| Slag and Ash Removal | 4.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 9.0% | 2.7% |
| Boiler Tube Fireside Slagging or Fouling | 5.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.9% | 2.7% |
| Boiler Overhaul and Inspections | 3.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.1% | 2.2% |
| Fuel, Ignition and Combustion Systems | 0.0% | 10.7% | 8.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.1% |
| Cooling System | 5.2% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.1% |
| Miscellaneous (Boiler) | 3.5% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 1.6% |
| Inlet Air System and Compressors | 0.0% | 2.7% | 9.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.4% |
| NOx Reduction Systems | 3.2% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.4% |
| All Other Causes | 17.4% | 31.1% | 22.2% | 78.0% | 31.8% | 2.0% | 33.1% | 18.6% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |


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PJM EPOF was 11.0 percent in the first six months of 2026. Table 5-44 shows the causes of EPOF by unit type. Planned outages for miscellaneous balance of plant, 25.6 percent of the system EPOF, were the largest single contributor to average system EPOF across all unit types, although miscellaneous gas turbine issues were the largest contributors to EPOF for combustion turbines.

### Table 5-44 Contribution to EPOF by unit type and cause: January through June, 2026


| | Coal | Combined Cycle | Combustion Turbine | Diesel | Hydroelectric | Nuclear | Other | System |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Miscellaneous (Balance of Plant) | 19.4% | 41.2% | 11.1% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 77.9% | 25.6% |
| Miscellaneous (Gas Turbine) | 0.0% | 40.5% | 64.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 17.2% |
| Core/Fuel | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 98.4% | 0.0% | 11.8% |
| Boiler Overhaul and Inspections | 26.1% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 10.4% | 11.4% |
| Miscellaneous (Steam Turbine) | 21.1% | 8.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.6% | 10.8% |
| Miscellaneous (Inspection) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 89.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.3% |
| Generator | 8.9% | 0.0% | 1.8% | 7.0% | 7.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.0% |
| Wet Scrubbers | 10.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.9% |
| Feedwater System | 5.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.2% |
| Miscellaneous (Pollution Control Equipment) | 4.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.8% |
| Stack Emission | 3.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.2% |
| Fuel, Ignition and Combustion Systems | 0.0% | 0.1% | 10.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.2% |
| Miscellaneous (Generator) | 0.0% | 3.7% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% |
| Turbine | 0.0% | 2.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.6% |
| Power Station Switchyard | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.5% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% |
| Boiler Piping System | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% |
| Exhaust Systems | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% |
| Inlet Air System and Compressors | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% |
| Miscellaneous (Jet Engine) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% |
| All Other Causes | 0.0% | 1.2% | 2.2% | 92.4% | 0.7% | 1.6% | 7.1% | 1.5% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

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## Performance by Month

Monthly values for EAF, EFOF, EMOF and EPOF are shown in Figure 5-13.

**Figure 5-13 Monthly generator performance factors: 2025 through June 2026**




## Generator Testing Issues

PJM Manual 21: Rules and Procedures for Determination of Generating Capability describes how generators are to be tested. PJM's testing requirements are not well designed, permit excessive generator discretion, and do not require adequate winter testing. As a result of the introduction of ELCC, winter capability is much more significant in defining the value of capacity that can be sold in the capacity market, especially for thermal resources. That fact makes it even more essential that PJM require winter testing and include the results of that testing in the calculation of ELCC values.

Net Capability Verification Testing data, meant to demonstrate that a unit has the ICAP claimed, are submitted for the summer and winter testing periods.[248] These periods run from the start of June until September and the start of December until March. If a unit is on a planned or maintenance outage for the entire testing period, it is expected to perform an out of period test once the outage ends. Out of period tests can be performed from the start of September until December for summer tests and from the start of March until June for winter tests. Hydroelectric generators only perform summer tests.[249] Wind and solar resources do not perform verification tests to prove capability.[250]

While data must be submitted for the winter testing period, PJM permits the use of summer test data adjusted for ambient winter conditions in lieu of actual winter test data. The MMU recommends that PJM require actual seasonal tests as part of the Summer/Winter Capability Testing rules and that the ambient conditions under which the tests are performed be defined.

Results, including failed test results, must be submitted to PJM via eGADS. Failing to submit data before the deadline can result in a Data Submission Charge of $500 per day late.[251]

Failure to demonstrate the claimed net capability results in a forced outage or derating effective from the beginning of the testing period and lasting until either a reduced claimed ICAP is in effect, the beginning of the next testing period, or, except for failures due to environmental constraints or a lack of resources, a successful out of period test.

Failed test results must be accompanied by a derating or outage in eGADS and in eDART. Failure to report failed tests and failure to derate the unit can result in a Generation Resource Rating Test Failure Charge, equal to the Daily Deficiency Rate multiplied by: the daily ICAP shortfall multiplied by one minus the effective EFORd for unlimited resources; the UCAP for the daily ICAP shortfall, for limited duration resources and combination resources.[252] Five resources were assessed for generation resource rating test failure charges

248 PJM. "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.5 Summer/Winter Capability Testing, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
249 PJM. "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.5 Summer/Winter Capability Testing, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
250 PJM. "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," Appendix B: Calculating Capacity Values for Wind and Solar Capacity Resources, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
251 "Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region," Schedule 12, Section A.
252 PJM. "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 9.1.5 Generation Resource Rating Test Failure Charge, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).


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in 2024. There were 207 resources assessed for generation resource rating test failure charges in 2025. There were 157 resources assessed for generation resource rating test failure charges in the first six months of 2026.

The Daily Deficiency Rate in dollars per MW-day is equal to the weighted average capacity resource clearing price from the RPM auction that resulted in the resource's commitment plus the greater of 20 percent of that clearing price or 20 dollars per MW-day.[253]

While generation owners are required to report failed tests and to derate their unit in eGADS, owners can perform an unlimited number of tests before submitting a successful result. The MMU recommends that PJM limit the number of tests that can be made before submitting final results and that the data be collected by PJM's Power Meter instead of being submitted in eGADS. The MMU recommends that PJM select the time and day for testing a unit, not the unit owner, and that this testing not be communicated in advance. Instead, a unit would be tested by how well it follows its dispatch signal. Under the current testing rules, generation owners have the opportunity to perform tests during more favorable conditions to achieve better performance.

Generator output is also assessed during Performance Assessment Intervals (PAIs), which occur when PJM declares an emergency action as listed in Manual 18, Section 8.4A. If a unit fails to perform as expected, generators may incur a Non-Performance Charge, which is equal to the performance shortfall multiplied by the Non-Performance Charge Rate.[254] In 2022, PAIs occurred on June 13, June 14, June 15, December 23, and December 24. For the December 23 and 24 PAIs, PJM total nonperformance charges were approximately $1.796 billion, reduced to $1.226 billion in a settlement agreement.[255] There were no such charges assessed in 2023, 2024, 2025, or the first six months of 2026.

For each day of a delivery year, generators are required to meet their daily unforced capacity commitments. Generation owners have the option to buy replacement capacity that satisfies the same locational requirements.[256] [257] Failure to meet this commitment can result in a Daily Capacity Resource Deficiency Charge.[258] [259] This charge is equal to the Daily Deficiency Rate multiplied by the difference between a resource's daily commitments and daily position. Thirty resources were assessed for deficiency charges in 2021, 65 resources were assessed for deficiency charges in 2022, 176 resources were assessed for deficiency charges in 2023, 432 resources were assessed for deficiency charges in 2024, 577 resources were assessed for deficiency charges in 2025, and 358 resources were assessed for deficiency charges in the first six months of 2026. The increase in the number of resources subject to deficiency charges is a result of the implementation of class average ELCC in the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and marginal ELCC starting in the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.

## Changing Outage Types

Capacity resource owners have an incentive to modify the categorization of their outages in order to maximize capacity revenue and minimize penalties. Generation owners have had the ability to change the designation of the outage type after the initial submission to the eGADS database since 2014. Table 5-45 shows all the changes in outage status from 2014 through June 2026. Generation owners' incentives to categorize outages in specific ways changed with two recent significant changes in the capacity market design. The two changes were the full implementation of the Capacity Performance design in the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and the implementation of ELCC to replace EFORd to determine unforced capacity in the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.[260] [261]

The full implementation of the Capacity Performance design in the 2020/2021 Delivery Year increased the incentive for units on outage to categorize outages

253 OATT, Attachment DD (Reliability Pricing Model) § 7.
254 OATT, Attachment DD (Reliability Pricing Model) § 10A.
255 See Settlement Agreement, Docket No. ER23-2975-000 (September 29, 2023), which can be accessed at: <https://pjm.com/-/media/documents/ferc/filings/2023/20230929-er23-2975-000.ashx>.
256 "PJM Manual 21: Rules and Procedures for Determination of Generating Capability," § 1.3.6 Impacts of Test Results, Rev. 19 (June 27, 2024).
257 OATT, Attachment DD (Reliability Pricing Model) § 7 (a).
258 PJM. "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.2 RPM Commitment Compliance, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
259 OATT, Attachment DD (Reliability Pricing Model) § 8.
260 CP transition auctions were held for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years. Both Base and CP products existed for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years. The 2020/2021 Delivery Year was the first delivery year in which all capacity was Capacity Performance.
261 ELCC rates were used starting with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. See BRA Class Ratings <https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability>.

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as planned outages because units on planned outages are exempt from paying Non-Performance Charges during Performance Assessment Intervals. From 2014 through 2020, of all the changes in outage status, 3.9 percent of outages and 32.9 percent of outage MW were changed to planned outage status. From 2021 through the first six months of 2026, of all the changes in outage status, 19.6 percent of outages and 61.6 percent of outage MW were changed to planned outage status.

The implementation of ELCC in the 2025/2026 Delivery Year meant that if a unit was on outage, the unit was indifferent between being on forced, planned, or maintenance outage for the purposes of determining the unit's unforced capacity. When EFORd was the metric, there was a disincentive to be on forced outage because only forced outages affect EFORd. From 2014 through 2024, of all the changes in outage status, 10.0 percent of outages and 17.7 percent of outage MW were changed from forced outage status. From 2025 through the first six months of 2026, of all the changes in outage status, 13.4 percent of outages and 2.7 percent of outage MW were changed from forced outage status.


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## Table 5-45 Changed outages by unit type: 2014 through June 2026[262] [263] [264]

| | | Forced to Maintenance or Planned | | Maintenance to Planned or Forced | | Planned to Maintenance or Forced | | Maintenance or Forced to Planned | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Year | No. Outages | MWh | No. Outages | MWh | No. Outages | MWh | No. Outages | MWh |
| Coal | 2014 | 3 | 183,698 | 1 | 2,794 | 1 | 6,794 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2015 | 11 | 176,739 | 41 | 692,950 | 5 | 5,621 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2016 | 9 | 79,852 | 71 | 1,355,363 | 2 | 8,171 | 3 | 809,759 |
| | 2017 | 5 | 154,446 | 41 | 553,575 | 13 | 14,608 | 1 | 211,688 |
| | 2018 | 5 | 86,024 | 43 | 566,736 | 5 | 15,458 | 1 | 33,310 |
| | 2019 | 1 | 22,952 | 94 | 557,361 | 4 | 85,146 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2020 | 5 | 79,162 | 39 | 212,285 | 9 | 144,677 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2021 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8,310 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2022 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2,018,520 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2,012,296 |
| | 2023 | 1 | 13,211 | 1 | 744,576 | 2 | 456,160 | 1 | 744,576 |
| | 2024 | 1 | 18,908 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 34,968 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 81,302 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total | 41 | 814,992 | 338 | 6,712,469 | 43 | 852,905 | 11 | 3,811,630 |
| Combined Cycle | 2014 | 7 | 5,711 | 2 | 87,161 | 3 | 77,027 | 6 | 88,526 |
| | 2015 | 2 | 43,414 | 11 | 45,348 | 5 | 37,570 | 1 | 3,068 |
| | 2016 | 13 | 240,506 | 29 | 251,830 | 20 | 137,030 | 5 | 284,199 |
| | 2017 | 17 | 96,805 | 40 | 617,749 | 6 | 36,614 | 8 | 305,925 |
| | 2018 | 7 | 66,065 | 18 | 58,148 | 12 | 32,392 | 3 | 12,915 |
| | 2019 | 14 | 22,610 | 21 | 344,996 | 10 | 230,173 | 11 | 245,271 |
| | 2020 | 14 | 93,001 | 33 | 737,663 | 22 | 480,618 | 15 | 797,848 |
| | 2021 | 14 | 636,121 | 17 | 1,169,417 | 2 | 14,810 | 26 | 1,782,678 |
| | 2022 | 9 | 185,326 | 4 | 793,030 | 10 | 37,104 | 7 | 550,032 |
| | 2023 | 4 | 123,264 | 5 | 267,475 | 7 | 331,057 | 2 | 111,229 |
| | 2024 | 7 | 395,783 | 7 | 1,064,214 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1,453,698 |
| | 2025 | 2 | 3,751 | 13 | 460,194 | 3 | 611,697 | 6 | 58,395 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 4 | 27,198 | 20 | 131,668 | 9 | 20,627 | 3 | 117,822 |
| | Total | 114 | 1,939,555 | 220 | 6,028,893 | 109 | 2,046,719 | 102 | 5,811,605 |
| Combustion Turbine | 2014 | 4 | 15,186 | 8 | 30,993 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 40,893 |
| | 2015 | 3 | 17,872 | 10 | 11,854 | 12 | 141,679 | 2 | 10,370 |
| | 2016 | 7 | 135,979 | 75 | 452,987 | 17 | 36,715 | 21 | 468,584 |
| | 2017 | 2 | 43,095 | 22 | 25,517 | 8 | 22,143 | 2 | 43,175 |
| | 2018 | 5 | 64,317 | 32 | 25,755 | 2 | 6,092 | 3 | 63,700 |
| | 2019 | 3 | 30,748 | 29 | 22,457 | 10 | 67,742 | 3 | 27,609 |
| | 2020 | 4 | 10,147 | 38 | 44,895 | 30 | 16,143 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2021 | 3 | 133 | 6 | 46,241 | 5 | 44,407 | 1 | 21,147 |
| | 2022 | 1 | 985 | 4 | 17,597 | 11 | 41,887 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2023 | 4 | 53,922 | 7 | 292,895 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 76,480 |
| | 2024 | 8 | 19,494 | 10 | 287,119 | 1 | 255 | 2 | 20,667 |
| | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 275,332 | 2 | 520,190 | 1 | 17,552 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 0 | 0 | 8 | 137,909 | 1 | 36,439 | 5 | 102,968 |
| | Total | 44 | 391,877 | 255 | 1,671,551 | 99 | 933,692 | 52 | 893,144 |
| Diesel | 2014 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 3,559 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2015 | 4 | 12 | 162 | 3,141 | 19 | 51,146 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2016 | 7 | 2,276 | 188 | 4,114 | 11 | 389 | 2 | 410 |
| | 2017 | 0 | 0 | 222 | 7,653 | 224 | 8,162 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2018 | 2 | 59 | 292 | 5,004 | 63 | 1,992 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2019 | 2 | 32 | 224 | 7,365 | 48 | 6,195 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2020 | 13 | 3,578 | 121 | 5,921 | 70 | 1,575 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2021 | 30 | 1,356 | 2 | 195 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2022 | 3 | 1,537 | 2 | 3,866 | 59 | 1,609 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2023 | 2 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2024 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 140 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total | 63 | 8,875 | 1,247 | 40,959 | 494 | 71,068 | 2 | 410 |
| Hydroelectric | 2014 | 38 | 817,089 | 123 | 1,626,516 | 2 | 284 | 34 | 816,953 |
| | 2015 | 6 | 18,336 | 250 | 981,999 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 23,984 |
| | 2016 | 16 | 148,285 | 373 | 1,558,527 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 33,611 |
| | 2017 | 2 | 52,080 | 121 | 597,753 | 13 | 212,758 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2018 | 5 | 82,438 | 82 | 1,709,513 | 2 | 38,275 | 4 | 1,299,056 |
| | 2019 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 152,449 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2020 | 0 | 0 | 62 | 281,999 | 1 | 4,046 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2021 | 1 | 261 | 33 | 263,525 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2022 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4,887 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2023 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 196,512 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2024 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total | 68 | 1,118,489 | 1,096 | 7,373,680 | 18 | 255,363 | 43 | 2,173,604 |
| Nuclear | 2014 | 5 | 192,712 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 278,160 | 3 | 188,554 |
| | 2015 | 9 | 178,056 | 14 | 79,149 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 57,197 |
| | 2016 | 5 | 84,435 | 18 | 88,462 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2017 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 35,260 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2018 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 19,517 | 1 | 16 | 1 | 823 |
| | 2019 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 703 | 2 | 3,225 | 2 | 168 |
| | 2020 | 3 | 5,782 | 18 | 313,678 | 9 | 32,198 | 4 | 9,144 |
| | 2021 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1,134,618 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1,134,553 |
| | 2022 | 12 | 15,541 | 2 | 960 | 2 | 300,314 | 3 | 58 |
| | 2023 | 7 | 87,630 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 83,620 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2024 | 2 | 168,615 | 1 | 553,435 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 722,050 |
| | 2025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 1 | 1,660 | 1 | 7,170 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1,660 |
| | Total | 44 | 734,432 | 88 | 2,232,955 | 22 | 697,533 | 22 | 2,114,208 |
| Other | 2014 | 9 | 130,402 | 5 | 22,515 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 19,487 |
| | 2015 | 7 | 30,064 | 12 | 179,670 | 3 | 5,368 | 1 | 9,833 |
| | 2016 | 4 | 24,869 | 24 | 232,507 | 16 | 81,464 | 2 | 5,874 |
| | 2017 | 6 | 319,884 | 20 | 84,853 | 13 | 55,109 | 1 | 28,636 |
| | 2018 | 27 | 424,540 | 14 | 115,939 | 3 | 7,831 | 4 | 399,203 |
| | 2019 | 18 | 152,809 | 41 | 1,282,610 | 9 | 5,887 | 4 | 1,216,374 |
| | 2020 | 14 | 26,821 | 31 | 125,046 | 5 | 22,760 | 2 | 4,678 |
| | 2021 | 6 | 9,403 | 2 | 601,218 | 1 | 2,392 | 2 | 601,218 |
| | 2022 | 1 | 397 | 3 | 1,702 | 1 | 1,485 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2023 | 4 | 251,874 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 93,080 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2024 | 1 | 272 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 272 |
| | 2025 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 212,495 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 2 | 39,169 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 58,162 | 1 | 39,168 |
| | Total | 101 | 1,410,508 | 152 | 2,646,059 | 59 | 546,032 | 21 | 2,324,742 |
| All Units | 2014 | 66 | 1,344,797 | 169 | 1,773,537 | 7 | 362,265 | 51 | 1,154,413 |
| | 2015 | 42 | 464,493 | 500 | 1,994,111 | 44 | 241,383 | 11 | 104,451 |
| | 2016 | 61 | 716,202 | 778 | 3,943,790 | 66 | 263,769 | 35 | 1,602,436 |
| | 2017 | 32 | 666,310 | 470 | 1,922,360 | 278 | 349,395 | 12 | 589,424 |
| | 2018 | 51 | 723,443 | 495 | 2,500,613 | 88 | 102,056 | 16 | 1,809,007 |
| | 2019 | 38 | 229,150 | 462 | 2,367,942 | 83 | 398,368 | 20 | 1,489,422 |
| | 2020 | 53 | 218,491 | 342 | 1,721,487 | 146 | 702,016 | 21 | 811,671 |
| | 2021 | 54 | 647,273 | 64 | 3,223,524 | 8 | 61,609 | 30 | 3,539,596 |
| | 2022 | 26 | 203,786 | 22 | 2,840,562 | 83 | 382,399 | 15 | 2,562,386 |
| | 2023 | 22 | 529,925 | 24 | 1,501,460 | 17 | 963,917 | 10 | 932,285 |
| | 2024 | 19 | 603,072 | 22 | 1,904,907 | 1 | 255 | 15 | 2,196,688 |
| | 2025 | 4 | 3,756 | 19 | 735,525 | 7 | 1,379,350 | 7 | 75,947 |
| | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | 7 | 68,028 | 29 | 276,748 | 16 | 196,530 | 10 | 261,618 |
| | Total | 475 | 6,418,728 | 3,396 | 26,706,566 | 844 | 5,403,311 | 253 | 17,129,343 |

Cont'd

262 Year describes the year in which the outage started and not the year in which the outage designation was changed.
263 Table has been significantly updated using a more accurate unit mapping to account for ownership changes over time.
264 The first three column groupings, Forced to Maintenance or Planned, Maintenance to Planned or Forced, and Planned to Maintenance or Forced are the universe of outages that have been changed since first entered in the GADS database.

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# 6 Demand Response

Markets require both a supply side and a demand side to function effectively. The demand side of wholesale electricity markets is underdeveloped. Wholesale power markets will be more efficient when the demand side of the electricity market becomes fully functional without depending on special programs as a proxy for full participation. The current PJM demand side programs do not result in a functional demand side of the electricity market.

## Overview

- **Demand Response Activity.** Demand response resources include economic demand response (energy market demand resources), emergency demand response, pre-emergency demand response and price responsive demand (PRD) (capacity market demand resources), synchronized reserves and regulation.[1]
- Total demand response revenue increased by $232.2 million, 149.3 percent, from $155.6 million in the first six months of 2025 to $387.8 million in the first six months of 2026, primarily due to increases in capacity market revenue. Emergency demand response revenue accounted for 85.0 percent of all demand response revenue, economic demand response for 4.8 percent, demand response in the synchronized reserve market for 2.5 percent and demand response in the regulation market for 7.7 percent.
- Total emergency demand response revenue increased by $208.6 million, 172.3 percent, from $121.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $329.7 million in the first six months of 2026.[2] This increase was primarily a result of higher capacity market prices and capacity market revenue.
- Economic demand response revenue increased by $2.2 million, 13.7 percent, from $16.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $18.4 million in the first six months of 2026.[3] Demand response revenue in the synchronized reserve market increased by $0.6 million, 5.7 percent, from $9.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $9.7 million in the first six months of 2026. Demand response revenue in the regulation market increased by $20.9 million, 228.4 percent, from $9.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $30.0 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Demand Response Energy Payments are Uplift.** Energy payments to emergency and economic demand response resources are uplift. LMP does not cover energy payments to demand response resources although emergency demand response and economic demand response can and do set LMP. Energy payments to emergency demand resources are paid by PJM market participants in proportion to their net purchases in the real-time energy market. Energy payments to economic demand resources are paid by real-time exports from PJM and real-time loads in each zone for which the load-weighted, average real-time LMP for the hour during which the reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the net benefits test price for that month.[4]
- **Demand Response Market Concentration.** The ownership of economic demand response resources was highly concentrated in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The HHI for economic demand response resource reductions increased by 148 points from 8631 in the first six months of 2025 to 8779 in the first six months of 2026.
- The ownership of emergency demand response resources is highly concentrated. The HHI for emergency demand response resources committed MW was 2517 for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. In the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, the four largest CSPs owned 86.7 percent of all committed emergency demand response UCAP MW. The HHI for emergency demand response committed MW is 3131 for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. In the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the four largest CSPs own 89.2 percent of all committed demand response UCAP MW.
- **Limited Locational Dispatch of Demand Resources.** PJM should be able to individually dispatch any capacity performance resource, including demand resources. PJM cannot dispatch demand resources by node with the current rules because demand resources are not registered to a node. In addition, aggregation rules allow a demand resource that incorporates many small End Use Customers to span an entire zone, which is inconsistent with nodal dispatch.

1 Emergency demand response refers to both emergency and pre-emergency demand response.
2 The total credits and MWh numbers for demand resources were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.
3 Economic credits are synonymous with revenue received for reductions under the economic load response program.
4 "PJM Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting," § 11.2.2, Rev. 104 (March 1, 2026).

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- **Energy Efficiency.** Energy efficiency payments were eliminated from PJM markets effective June 1, 2026.

## Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that PJM report the response of emergency demand response resources to dispatch by PJM as the actual change in load rather than simply the difference between the amount of capacity purchased by the customer and the actual metered load. The performance metric should be (CBL – Metered load)/(CBL – FSL). The current approach significantly overstates the expected response to PJM dispatch. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that FSL registrations be required to reduce to their FSL and GLD registrations be required to reduce by their committed amount in every event hour. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources offering as supply in the capacity market be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) below their PLC to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends, as an alternative to including emergency demand response resources as supply in the capacity market, that demand resources have the option to be on the demand side of the markets, that customers be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion, that customer payments be determined only by metered load, and that PJM forecasts immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior. (Priority: High. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the option to specify a minimum dispatch price (strike price) for emergency demand response resources be eliminated and that participating resources receive the hourly real-time LMP less any generation component of their retail rate.[5] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the maximum offer for emergency demand response resources and price response demand resources be the same as the maximum offer for generation resources and that the same cost verification rules applied to generation resources apply to demand resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the emergency demand response resources be treated as economic resources, responding to economic price signals like other capacity resources. The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources not be treated as emergency resources. The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources be available for every hour of the year. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Emergency Program Energy Only option be eliminated because the opportunity to receive the appropriate energy market prices is already provided in the economic program. (Priority: Low. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, if emergency demand response resources remain in the capacity market, a daily energy market must offer requirement apply to emergency demand response resources, comparable to the rule applicable to generation capacity resources.[6] (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that emergency demand response resources be required to provide their nodal location, comparable to generation resources. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM require nodal dispatch of emergency demand response resources with no advance notice required or, if nodal location is not required, subzonal dispatch of demand resources with no advance notice required. The MMU recommends that, if PJM continues to use subzones for any purpose, PJM clearly define the role of subzones in the dispatch of demand response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

5 See "Complaint and Motion to Consolidate of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL14-20-000 (January 28, 2014), "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. ER15-852-000 (February 13, 2015).

6 See "Complaint and Motion to Consolidate of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL14-20-000 (January 27, 2014) at 1.



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- The MMU recommends that PJM not remove any defined subzones and maintain a public record of all created and removed subzones. (Priority: Low. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the measurement of compliance across zones within a compliance aggregation area (CAA). The multiple zone approach is less locational than the zonal and subzonal approach and creates larger mismatches between the locational need for the resources and the actual response. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that measurement and verification methods for all demand resources be modified to reflect compliance more accurately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that compliance rules be revised to include submittal of all necessary hourly load data, and that negative values be included when calculating event compliance across hours and registrations. Compliance by demand resources with PJM dispatch instructions should include both increases and decreases in load. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM adopt the ISO-NE five-minute metering requirements in order to ensure that operators have the necessary information for reliability and that market payments to demand resources be calculated based on interval meter data at the site of the demand reductions.[7] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends demand response event compliance be calculated on a five minute basis for all emergency demand response resources and that the penalty structure reflect five minute compliance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that demand response testing be initiated by PJM with advance notice to CSPs identical to the actual lead time required in an emergency in order to accurately represent the conditions of an emergency event. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that shutdown cost be defined as the cost to curtail load for a given period that does not vary with the measured reduction or, for behind the meter generators, be the start cost defined in Manual 15 for generators. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Net Benefits Test be eliminated and that economic demand response resources be paid LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the tariff rules for emergency demand response resources clarify that a resource and its CSP, if any, must notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and must terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at defined levels because load has been reduced or eliminated, as in the case of bankrupt and/or out of service facilities. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that there be only one demand response product in the capacity market, with an obligation to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported 2011. Status: Partially adopted.[8])
- The MMU recommends that all demand resources register as Pre-Emergency and that the Emergency Program be eliminated. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the lead times for emergency demand response resources be shortened to 30 minutes with a one hour minimum dispatch for all resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends setting the baseline for measuring capacity compliance under winter compliance at the customers' PLC, similar

7 See ISO-NE Tariff, Section III, Market Rule 1, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2, "Demand Response," <https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/rules-procedures/tariff/market-rule-1>. (Accessed October 17, 2017) ISO-NE requires that DR have an interval meter with five-minute data reported to the ISO and each behind the meter generator is required to have a separate interval meter. After June 1, 2017, demand response resources in ISO-NE must also be registered at a single node.

8 PJM's Capacity Performance design requires resources to respond when called for any hour of the delivery year, but demand resources still have a limited mandatory compliance window.

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to GLD, to avoid double counting. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)

- The MMU recommends the Relative Root Mean Squared Test be required for all demand resources with a CBL. (Priority: Low. First reported 2017. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that 30 minute pre-emergency and emergency demand response be considered to be 30 minute reserves. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that energy efficiency resources (EE) not be included in the capacity market mechanism and that PJM should ensure that the impact of EE measures on the load forecast is incorporated immediately. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Adopted 2024.)[9] [10]
- The MMU recommends that demand reductions based entirely on behind the meter generation be capped at the lower of economic maximum or actual generation output. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that DER aggregations that clear in a capacity auction not be permitted to change status from homogeneous demand response to any other status for any additional auctions for the same delivery year, or for the delivery year. (Priority: High. First reported Q3, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that EDCs not be allowed to participate in markets as DER aggregators in addition to their EDC role. (Priority: High. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM include a 5.0 MW maximum size cap on DER aggregations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM use a nodal approach for DER participation in PJM markets that excludes multinodal aggregation. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Commission require PJM to include in OATT Attachment M the explicit statement that the Market Monitor's role includes the right to collect information from EDCs and DERA related to actions taken on the distribution system related to DERs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that net metering resources be prohibited from participating in wholesale ancillary services markets if they are compensated for the service at the retail level. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM revise the requirements for reporting expected real-time energy load reductions by CSPs to PJM to improve the accuracy and usefulness to PJM's system operators. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI. The MMU recommends that PJM revise the performance requirements for demand resources to include an event specific measurement for dispatch occurring outside of Performance Assessment Events and penalties for nonperformance. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PRD be required to respond during a PAI, regardless of whether the real-time LMP at the applicable location meet or exceeds the PRD strike price, to be consistent with all CP resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that CSPs be required to provide metered data to PJM within 24 hours following the dispatch of economic or emergency DR. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

## Conclusion

A fully functional demand side of the electricity market means that End Use Customers or their designated intermediaries will have the ability to see real-time energy price signals in real time, will have the ability to react to real-time prices in real time and will have the ability to receive the direct benefits or costs of changes in real-time energy use. In addition, customers or their

9 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095.

10 Originally incorporated with auctions conducted in 2016 for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and forward. The mechanics of the EE addback mechanism were modified beginning with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.



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designated intermediaries will have the ability to see current capacity prices, will have the ability to react to capacity prices and will have the ability to receive the direct benefits or costs of changes in the demand for capacity in the same year in which demand for capacity changes. A functional demand side of these markets means that customers will have the ability to make decisions about levels of power consumption based both on how customers value the power and on the actual cost of that power.

In the energy market, if there is to be a demand side program, demand resources should be paid the value of energy, which is LMP less any generation component of the applicable retail rate. There is no reason to have the net benefits test. The necessity for the net benefits test is an illustration of the illogical approach to demand side compensation embodied in paying full LMP to demand resources. The benefit of demand side resources is not that they suppress market prices, but that customers can choose not to consume at the current price of power, that individual customers benefit from their choices and that the choices of all customers are reflected in market prices. If customers face the market price, customers should have the ability to not purchase power and the market impact of that choice does not require a test for appropriateness.

If demand resources are to continue competing directly with generation capacity resources in the PJM Capacity Market, the product must be defined such that it can actually serve as a substitute for generation. This is a prerequisite to a functional market design. Demand resources do not have a must offer requirement in the day-ahead energy market, are able to offer above $1,000 per MWh without providing a fuel cost policy or any rationale for the offer. Demand resources do not have telemetry requirements similar to other Capacity Performance resources.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources offering as supply in the capacity market should be required to offer a guaranteed load drop (GLD) below their PLC to ensure that demand resources provide an identifiable MW resource to PJM when called.

In order to be a substitute for generation, the ELCC for demand resources should be based on data about actual reductions in demand during high expected loss of load hours, like other capacity resources. The current DR ELCC is significantly overstated because the DR ELCC value is based on the unsupported assumption that the full amount of capacity sold will respond when called rather than on actual response data. In other words, the actual response is assumed to be perfect. The amount of capacity sold equals the PLC minus the FSL for the resource. PJM has proposed to make this problem worse rather than to correct it, by increasing the ELCC of demand resources based on assumptions rather than actual performance data.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should be defined in PJM rules as an economic resource, as generation is defined. Demand resources should be required to offer in the day-ahead energy market and should be called when the resources are required and prior to the declaration of an emergency. Demand resources should be available for every hour of the year. The fact that demand resources are only obligated to respond for defined time periods meant that PJM could not fully use demand resources during Winter Storm Elliott (Elliott). Demand resources should be treated as economic resources like any other capacity resource. Demand resources should be called whenever economic and paid the LMP rather than an inflated strike price up to $1,849 per MWh that is set by the seller.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should be subject to robust measurement and verification techniques to ensure that transitional DR programs incent the desired behavior. The methods used in PJM programs today are not adequate to determine and quantify deliberate actions taken to reduce consumption.

In order to be a substitute for generation, demand resources should provide a nodal location and should be dispatched nodally to enhance the effectiveness of demand resources and to permit the efficient functioning of the energy market. Both subzonal and multi-zone compliance should be eliminated because they are inconsistent with an efficient nodal market.

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In order to be a substitute for generation, compliance by demand resources with PJM dispatch instructions should include both increases and decreases in load. Compliance of demand resources for capacity purposes is measured relative to either Peak Load Contribution (PLC) or Winter Peak Load (WPL), which are static values. If a demand resource's metered load increases above these reference values during a PAI, the current method applied by PJM simply ignores increases in load and thus artificially overstates compliance.[11]

In order to be a substitute for generation, Actual Performance of demand resources during a Performance Assessment Event should be determined consistent with that of generation and should not be netted across the Emergency Action Area (EAA). The Capacity Market Seller's Performance Shortfalls for Demand Resources in the EAA are netted to determine a net EAA Performance Shortfall for the Performance Assessment Interval. Any net positive EAA Performance Shortfall is allocated to the Capacity Market Seller's demand resources that under complied within the EAA on a prorata basis based on the under compliance MW, and such seller's demand resources will be assessed a Performance Shortfall for the Performance Assessment Interval. Any net negative EAA Performance Shortfall is allocated to the Market Seller's Demand Resources that over complied within the EAA on a prorata basis based on over compliance MW, and such Market Seller's Demand Resources will be assessed Bonus Performance. Netting of performance of Demand Resources across the EAA is inconsistent with the performance measurement of other Capacity Performance resources.

In order to be a substitute for generation, any demand resource and its Curtailment Service Provider (CSP), should be required to notify PJM of material changes affecting the capability of the resource to perform as registered and to terminate or modify registrations that are no longer capable of responding to PJM dispatch directives at the specified level, such as in the case of bankrupt and out of service facilities. Generation resources are required to inform PJM of any change in availability status, including outages and shutdown status.

As an alternative to being a substitute for generation in the capacity market, demand response resources should have the option to be on the demand side of the capacity market rather than on the supply side. Rather than detailed demand response programs with their attendant complex and difficult to administer rules, customers would be able to avoid capacity and energy charges by not using capacity and energy at their discretion and the level of usage paid for would be defined by metered usage rather than a complex and inaccurate measurement protocol, and PJM forecasts would immediately incorporate the impacts of demand side behavior.

Under the MMU's recommended approach, participating load would inform PJM prior to an RPM auction of the MW participating, the months and hours of participation and the temperature humidity index (THI) threshold at which load would be reduced. [12] [13] [14] PJM would reduce the load forecast used in the RPM auction based on the designated reductions. Load would agree to curtail demand to at or below a defined FSL, less than the customer PLC, when the THI exceeds a defined level or load exceeds a specified threshold. By relying on metered load and the PLC, load can reduce its demand for capacity and that reduction can be verified without complicated and inaccurate metrics to estimate load reductions. Under PJM's weakened version of the program, performance is measured under the current economic demand response CBL rules which means relying on load estimates rather than actual metered load.[15] PJM's proposal includes only a THI curtailment trigger and not an overall load curtailment trigger.

The long term appropriate end state for demand resources in the PJM markets should be comparable to the demand side of any market. Customers should use energy as they wish, accounting for market prices in any way they like, and that usage will determine the amount of capacity and energy for

11 See PJM. MC Webinar, Market Monitor Report <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2023/20230620-webinar/item-04---imm-report.ashx> (June 20, 2023).

12 The MMU peak shaving proposal at the Summer-Only Demand Response Senior Task Force (SODRSTF) is an example of how to create a demand side product that is on the demand side of the market and not on the supply side. See the MMU package within the *SODRSTF Matrix*, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/task-forces/sodrstf/20180815/20180815-item-04-sodrstf-matrix.xls>.

13 The MMU proposal was based on the concepts defined in the BGE load forecasting program and the Pennsylvania Act 129 Utility Program. *Advance signals that can be used to foresee demand response days*, BGE, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/sodrstf/20180309/20180309-item-05-bge-load-curtailment-programs.ashx> (March 9, 2018).

14 *Pennsylvania ACT 129 Utility Program*, CPower, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/sodrstf/20180413/20180413-item-03-pa-act-129-program.ashx> (April 13, 2018).

15 The PJM proposal from the SODRSTF weakened the proposal but was approved at the October 25, 2018 Members Committee meeting and PJM filed Tariff changes on December 7, 2018. See "Peak Shaving Adjustment Proposal," Docket No. ER19-511-000 (December 7, 2018).



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which each customer pays. There would be no counterfactual measurement and verification.

Under this approach, customers that wish to avoid capacity payments would reduce their load during expected high load hours, not limited to a small number of peak hours. Capacity costs would be assigned to LSEs and by LSEs to customers, based on actual load on the system during these hours. Customers wishing to avoid high energy prices would reduce their load during high price hours. Customers would pay for what they actually use, as measured by meters, rather than relying on flawed measurement and verification methods. No measurement and verification estimates are required. No promises of future reductions which can only be verified by inaccurate and biased measurement and verification methods are required. To the extent that customers enter into contracts with CSPs or LSEs to manage their payments, measurement and verification can be negotiated as part of a bilateral commercial contract between a customer and its CSP or LSE. But the system would be paid for actual, metered usage, regardless of which contractual party takes that obligation.

This approach provides more flexibility to customers to limit usage at their discretion. There is no requirement to be available year round or every hour of every day. There is no 30 minute notice requirement. There is no requirement to offer energy into the day-ahead market. All decisions about interrupting are up to the customers only and they may enter into bilateral commercial arrangements with CSPs at their sole discretion. Customers would pay for capacity and energy depending solely on metered load.

A transition to this end state should be defined in order to ensure that appropriate levels of demand side response are incorporated in PJM's load forecasts and thus in the demand curve in the capacity market. That transition should be defined by the rules proposed by the MMU.

This approach would work under the CP design in the capacity market. This approach is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court decision in *EPSA* as it does not depend on whether FERC has jurisdiction over the demand side.[16]

This approach would allow FERC to more fully realize its overriding policy objective to create competitive and efficient wholesale energy markets. The decision of the Supreme Court addressed jurisdictional issues and did not address the merits of FERC's approach. The Supreme Court's decision has removed the uncertainty surrounding the jurisdictional issues and created the opportunity for FERC to revisit its approach to demand side.

Any discussion of demand resource performance during a PAI, or at any time demand resources are called on, must recognize the significant problems with the definition of performance for demand resources. As defined by PJM rules, performance, contrary to intuition, does not mean actually reducing load in response to a PJM request for demand resources. Performance means only that, on a net portfolio basis, the amount of capacity paid for in the capacity market (PLC) minus actual metered load is equal to the amount of demand side capacity sold in the capacity market (ICAP). If a demand resource location was already at a reduced load level when PJM called a PAI, the demand resource would be deemed to have performed at a level equal to the PLC minus the metered load even though it took no action. If the load at a demand resource location actually increased above the PLC when called to reduce its demand, that increase would be set to zero and ignored. If the load at a demand resource location increased when called to reduce but remained below the PLC, the resources would be credited with a reduction from the PLC to that increased MWh level. The standard reporting of demand side response is therefore misleading because it includes loads that were already lower for any reason as a response, because it credits increases in load as a response, and because it ignores and zeros out increases in load above the PLC. That is exactly what happened during Elliott. In addition, PRD is not required to respond if the LMP is less than the PRD strike price. This flawed rule meant that PRD did not fully respond during Winter Storm Elliott because PRD offered at the maximum price of $1,849 per MWh.

16 577 U.S. 260 (2016).

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# PJM Demand Response Programs

All PJM demand response programs can be grouped into economic demand response (energy market demand resources), emergency demand response, pre-emergency demand response and price responsive demand (PRD) (capacity market demand resources), synchronized reserves and regulation.[17] Table 6-1 provides an overview of the key features of PJM demand response programs.

## Table 6-1 Overview of demand response programs

| | Emergency and Pre-Emergency Demand Response Program | | | Economic Demand Response Program | Price Responsive Demand |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Capacity Market Demand Response | | | Economic Demand Response | |
| Product Types | Capacity Performance, Summer-Period Capacity Performance OATT Attachment DD § 5.5A | Capacity Performance,Summer-Period Capacity Performance OATT Attachment DD § 5.5A | | OATT Attachment K § 1.5A | |
| | | | | | |
| Market | Capacity Only OATT Attachment K § 8.1 | Full Program Option (Capacity and Energy) OATT Attachment K § 8.1 | Energy Only OATT Attachment K § 8.1 | Energy Only | Capacity Only |
| Capacity Market | DR cleared in RPM | DR cleared in RPM | Not included in RPM | Not included in RPM | PRD cleared in RPM |
| Dispatch Requirement | Mandatory Curtailment | Mandatory Curtailment | Voluntary Curtailment | Dispatched Curtailment | Price Threshold |
| Capacity Payments | Capacity payments based on RPM clearing price | Capacity payments based on RPM clearing price | NA | NA | LSE PRD Credit RAA Schedule 6.1.G |
| Capacity Measurement and Verification | Firm Service Level Guaranteed Load Drop | Firm Service Level Guaranteed Load Drop | NA | NA | Firm Service Level |
| CBL | NA | Yes, as described OATT Attachment K § 3.3A | Yes, as described OATT Attachment K § 3.3A | Yes, as described OATT Attachment K § 3.3A | NA |
| Energy Payments | No energy payment | Energy payment based on submitted higher of "minimum dispatch price" and LMP. Energy payment during PJM declared Emergency Event mandatory curtailments. | Energy payment based on submitted higher of "minimum dispatch price" and LMP. Energy payment only for voluntary curtailments. | Energy payment based on full LMP. Energy payment for hours of dispatched curtailment. OATT Attachment K § 3.3A | NA |
| Penalties | Non-Performance Assessment OATT Attachment DD § 10A RAA Schedule 6.K Test compliance penalties OATT Attachment DD § 11A | Non-Performance Assessment OATT Attachment DD § 10A RAA Schedule 6.K Test compliance penalties OATT Attachment DD § 11A | NA | NA | Non-Performance Assessment RAA Schedule 6.1.G Test compliance penalties RAA Schedule 6.1.L |
| Associate Manuals | Manual 18 | Manual 11 Manual 18 | Manual 11 Manual 18 | Manual 11 | Manual 18 |

17 Emergency demand response refers to both emergency and pre-emergency demand response.



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## Non-PJM Demand Response Programs


Within the PJM footprint, states may have additional demand response programs as part of a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) or a separate program. Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania (e.g. Pennsylvania ACT 129 Utility Program) and North Carolina include demand response in their RPS. If demand response is dispatched by a state run program, the demand response resources are ineligible to receive payments from PJM during the state dispatch.[18] Based on FERC Order No. 719 PJM implemented rules that require PJM to verify with EDCs that no law or regulation of a RERRA prohibits End Use Customers' participation in PJM programs. [19] [20]

## PJM Demand Response Programs

Figure 6-1 shows all revenue from PJM demand response programs by market for each year, 2008 through June 2026. Since the implementation of the RPM Capacity Market on June 1, 2007, the capacity market has been the primary source of demand response revenue.[21] In the first six months of 2026, total demand response revenue increased by $232.2 million, 149.3 percent, from $155.6 million in the first six months of 2025 to $387.8 million in the first six months of 2026, primarily due to increases in capacity market prices and revenue. Total emergency demand response revenue increased by $208.6 million, 172.3 percent, from $121.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $329.7 million in the first six months of 2026. This increase was a result of higher capacity market prices and capacity market revenue.[22] In the first six months of 2026, emergency demand response revenue, which includes capacity and emergency energy revenue, accounted for 85.0 percent of all revenue received by demand response providers, the economic program for 4.8 percent, synchronized reserve for 2.5 percent and the regulation market for 7.7 percent.

Economic demand response revenue increased by $2.2 million, 13.7 percent, from $16.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $18.4 million in the first six months of 2026.[23] Demand response revenue in the synchronized reserve market increased by $0.6 million, 5.7 percent, from $9.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $9.7 million in the first six months of 2026. Demand response revenue in the regulation market increased by $20.9 million, 228.4 percent, from $9.1 million in the first six months of 2025 to $30.0 million in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 6-1 Demand response revenue by market: January through June, 2008 to 2026




18 "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 10.1, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).

19 *Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets*, Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 at P 154 (2008), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 719-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,292, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009).

20 The evidence supplied by LDCs must take the form of an order, resolution or ordinance of the RERRA, an opinion of the RERRA's legal counsel attesting to existence of an order, resolution, or ordinance, or an opinion of the state attorney general on behalf of the RERRA attesting to existence of an order, resolution or ordinance.

21 This includes both capacity market revenue and emergency energy revenue for capacity resources.

22 The total credits and MWh for demand resources were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.

23 Economic credits are synonymous with revenue received for reductions under the economic load response program.

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Table 6-2 shows the monthly demand response cleared volumes and revenues in the synchronized reserve market.

### Table 6-2 Demand response synchronized reserve market MWh and revenue: January 2025 through June 2026

| | MWh | | | Revenue | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change |
| Jan | 188,234 | 317,918 | 68.9% | $528,551.11 | $2,101,212.23 | 297.5% |
| Feb | 192,247 | 314,841 | 63.8% | $569,852.48 | $1,357,402.93 | 138.2% |
| Mar | 339,478 | 379,593 | 11.8% | $2,228,065.08 | $2,719,030.47 | 22.0% |
| Apr | 226,206 | 300,474 | 32.8% | $2,013,303.75 | $1,054,282.74 | (47.6%) |
| May | 404,918 | 389,418 | (3.8%) | $1,673,752.10 | $1,377,980.14 | (17.7%) |
| Jun | 415,556 | 286,499 | (31.1%) | $2,119,535.48 | $1,047,664.26 | (50.6%) |
| Jul | 393,494 | | | $2,362,323.88 | | |
| Aug | 396,407 | | | $1,146,787.69 | | |
| Sep | 393,198 | | | $1,600,803.08 | | |
| Oct | 440,636 | | | $2,196,860.17 | | |
| Nov | 450,039 | | | $1,620,857.94 | | |
| Dec | 359,957 | | | $1,355,664.28 | | |
| Total (Jan-Jun) | 1,766,638 | 1,988,743 | 12.6% | $9,133,060.00 | $9,657,572.77 | 5.7% |

Table 6-3 shows the monthly demand response cleared volumes and revenues in the regulation market.

### Table 6-3 Demand response regulation market MWh and revenue: January 2025 through June 2026

| | MWh | | | Revenue | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change |
| Jan | 36,051 | 40,676 | 12.8% | $2,201,687.59 | $5,029,880.80 | 128.5% |
| Feb | 33,520 | 42,350 | 26.3% | $1,435,956.43 | $7,248,158.87 | 404.8% |
| Mar | 36,455 | 47,140 | 29.3% | $1,608,850.18 | $4,651,747.15 | 189.1% |
| Apr | 34,413 | 43,600 | 26.7% | $1,107,759.21 | $4,285,014.96 | 286.8% |
| May | 35,331 | 41,381 | 17.1% | $1,148,378.85 | $3,679,069.14 | 220.4% |
| Jun | 34,489 | 40,019 | 16.0% | $1,643,056.35 | $5,142,131.47 | 213.0% |
| Jul | 30,291 | | | $1,280,184.34 | | |
| Aug | 31,657 | | | $1,067,364.48 | | |
| Sep | 29,092 | | | $1,278,466.14 | | |
| Oct | 28,089 | | | $3,200,499.94 | | |
| Nov | 28,716 | | | $1,548,962.74 | | |
| Dec | 37,632 | | | $2,317,751.60 | | |
| Total (Jan-Jun) | 210,259 | 255,167 | 21.4% | $9,145,688.61 | $30,036,002.39 | 228.4% |

CSPs provide for each registered location the load reduction method and the associated load reduction capability. Load reduction methods indicate the type of electrical equipment that is controlled to provide the demand response activity and include: heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), lighting, refrigeration, manufacturing, water heaters, batteries, plug load, computing and generation. The computing category includes data center and crypto mining while plug load represents an electronic device that is plugged into a socket, which is not already represented by the methods described above. Examples of plug load include IT peripherals such as large computers, monitors, printers, routers, copiers and scanners or appliances such as washers, dryers or dishwashers.[24]

Table 6-4 shows the demand response capability registered to provide synchronized reserves by load reduction method.

### Table 6-4 Demand response synchronized reserve load reduction methods: January through June, 2026

| Method | MW | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Generator | 124.2 | 5.8% |
| HVAC | 73.8 | 3.4% |
| Lighting | 158.3 | 7.4% |
| Refrigeration | 14.9 | 0.7% |
| Manufacturing | 1,049.7 | 48.8% |
| Water Heaters | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Batteries | 14.1 | 0.7% |
| Plug Load | 3.9 | 0.2% |
| Computing | 712.9 | 33.1% |
| Total | 2,151.8 | 100.0% |

Table 6-5 shows the demand response capability registered to provide regulation by load reduction method.

### Table 6-5 Demand response regulation load reduction methods: January through June, 2026

| Method | MW | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Water Heaters | 146.3 | 54.4% |
| Batteries | 122.6 | 45.6% |
| Total | 268.9 | 100.0% |

24 "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 10.2.2, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).



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## Emergency and Pre-Emergency Demand Response Programs

Pre-Emergency is the default status for capacity market demand response resources. Emergency status is only for resources that use behind the meter generation that has environmental restrictions that restrict the number of hours the generator can operate to a defined number of hours, generally only 100 hours.[25] All demand resources must register as pre-emergency unless the participant qualifies for emergency. PJM also uses the term Load Management Program to refer to the emergency and pre-emergency demand response resources.

Capacity demand response resources may be dispatched both as part of, and absent, a PAI. While demand resources dispatched during a PAI continue to be subject to Non-Performance Assessment charges, demand resources dispatched outside of a PAI are not subject to any event specific penalties.[26] If a demand resource is dispatched only outside of Performance Assessment Events for the delivery year, its performance for the delivery year is determined based on the better of actual performance or a test.[27] There are no penalties or consequences for demand response nonperformance.

For example, if a demand resource is called upon five times during the delivery year only outside of Performance Assessment events and fails to perform each time, its delivery year performance will be based only on a test. If the performance under the test is better than the actual performance, no penalties would be levied even though the resource failed to perform each time it was needed.

The MMU recommends that PJM define when operators can and should call on demand resources, given that a call on demand resources no longer triggers a PAI. The MMU recommends that PJM revise the performance requirements for demand resources to include an event specific measurement for dispatch occurring outside of Performance Assessment Events and penalties for nonperformance.

25 OA Schedule 1 § 8.5.
26 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.6, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
27 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.7, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025). Load Management Test.

In all demand response programs, CSPs are companies that sign up end use retail customers that have the ability to reduce load. CSPs satisfy cleared RPM commitments by registering end use retail customers as Nominated MW.[28] After a demand response event occurs, PJM compensates CSPs for their participants' load reductions and CSPs in turn compensate their participants. Only CSPs are eligible to participate in the PJM demand response programs, but a participant can register as a PJM special member and become a CSP without any additional cost.

All emergency or pre-emergency demand resources must be registered as annual capacity resources. Summer period demand response resources are allowed to aggregate with winter period capacity resources to fulfill the annual requirement.[29]

The rules applied to demand resources (DR) in the current market design do not treat demand resources in a manner comparable to generation capacity resources, even though demand resources are sold in the same capacity market, are treated as a substitute for other capacity resources and displace other capacity resources in RPM auctions. PJM will not measure compliance for DR, and the resources will not face penalties, unless the product type and lead time type are dispatched by PJM. PJM does not dispatch DR nodally like other capacity resources. DR can only be dispatched on a zonal or subzonal basis. PJM will not measure compliance for DR, and the resources will not face penalties, if the area dispatched is not a defined subzone or control zone. With the dispatch of DR no longer triggering a PAI, demand resources dispatched outside of a PAI are no longer subject to any event specific penalties or consequences for nonperformance.

Demand resources are not subject to the same rules as other capacity resources related to the definition of response. Increases in load are ignored when calculating the response of DR to a PJM dispatch.

28 See RAA Schedule 6. Since 2010, the PJM tariff definition of "End User Customer" limits the scope of the term to mean only PJM Members. Letter Order, Docket No. ER11-1909-000 (December 20, 2010). PJM has asserted that the reference in RAA Schedule 6 § L.1 and OATT Attachment DD-1 § L.1 to the defined term, "End Use Customer," was a mistake, and proposed to discontinue use of the defined term in the February 8, 2024, meeting of the PJM Governing Document Enhancement and Clarification Subcommittee (GDECS). The proposed change would remove the current requirement in the filed tariff that End Use Customers be PJM Members. The proposed change is substantive and not a correction of a typographical error. The change was endorsed at the April 25, 2024, Markets and Reliability Committee meeting <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2024/20240425/20240425-mrc-summarized-voting-report---updated.pdf>.
29 Summer period demand response must be available for June through October and the following May between 10:00AM and 10:00PM EPT. See PJM OATT RAA Article 1.

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Demand resources are not required to meet the same must offer requirements as other capacity resources. All other capacity resources must offer in the capacity market and all other capacity resources must offer their ICAP MW daily in the day-ahead energy market.

The MMU has made recommendations that would provide a capacity market supply side and a demand side option and that would result in treating demand resources in a manner comparable to other capacity and energy resources and in a way that would ensure that the demand side contribution to reliability is accurately measured.

## Market Structure

The HHI for demand resources shows that ownership was highly concentrated for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, with an HHI value of 2517. In the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, the four largest companies contributed 86.7 percent of all committed demand response UCAP MW. The HHI for demand resources shows that ownership is highly concentrated for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, with an HHI value of 3131. In the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the four largest companies own 89.2 percent of all committed demand response UCAP MW.

Table 6-6 shows the HHI value for committed Demand Response UCAP MW and the market share of the four largest suppliers by delivery year.

### Table 6-6 Demand Response HHI: 2019/2020 through 2026/2027

| Delivery Year | HHI | Structure | Top 4 Market Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019/2020 | 1840 | Highly Concentrated | 79.1% |
| 2020/2021 | 2523 | Highly Concentrated | 88.4% |
| 2021/2022 | 2070 | Highly Concentrated | 85.3% |
| 2022/2023 | 2051 | Highly Concentrated | 82.8% |
| 2023/2024 | 2295 | Highly Concentrated | 85.6% |
| 2024/2025 | 2387 | Highly Concentrated | 88.5% |
| 2025/2026 | 2517 | Highly Concentrated | 86.7% |
| 2026/2027 | 3131 | Highly Concentrated | 89.2% |

Table 6-7 shows the HHI value for committed UCAP MW by LDA by delivery year. The HHI values are calculated by the committed UCAP MW in each delivery year for demand resources.

### Table 6-7 HHI value for committed UCAP MW by LDA by delivery year: 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 Delivery Years[30]

| Delivery Year | LDA | Committed UCAP MW | HHI Value | HHI Concentration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025/2026 | ATSI | 615.4 | 2255 | High |
| | ATSI-CLEVELAND | 97.3 | 3262 | High |
| | BGE | 168.3 | 3679 | High |
| | COMED | 1,090.5 | 3119 | High |
| | DAY | 141.0 | 3899 | High |
| | DEOK | 159.6 | 4581 | High |
| | DOM | 673.5 | 3003 | High |
| | DPL-SOUTH | 65.0 | 3876 | High |
| | EMAAC | 491.0 | 3156 | High |
| | MAAC | 347.0 | 2747 | High |
| | PEPCO | 135.7 | 2568 | High |
| | PPL | 424.9 | 2513 | High |
| | PS-NORTH | 65.8 | 2613 | High |
| | PSEG | 163.1 | 2615 | High |
| | RTO | 1,627.8 | 2282 | High |
| 2026/2027 | ATSI | 503.4 | 2956 | High |
| | ATSI-CLEVELAND | 94.4 | 3620 | High |
| | BGE | 152.2 | 4022 | High |
| | COMED | 970.7 | 3885 | High |
| | DAY | 152.0 | 5341 | High |
| | DEOK | 116.3 | 6340 | High |
| | DOM | 555.1 | 2759 | High |
| | DPL-SOUTH | 33.9 | 6072 | High |
| | EMAAC | 347.8 | 4532 | High |
| | JCPL | 59.2 | 3829 | High |
| | MAAC | 282.1 | 3858 | High |
| | PEPCO | 229.3 | 3947 | High |
| | PPL | 327.5 | 3669 | High |
| | PS-NORTH | 45.6 | 3582 | High |
| | PSEG | 133.5 | 4788 | High |
| | RTO | 1,707.3 | 2888 | High |

30 The RTO LDA refers to the rest of RTO.



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## Market Performance

Table 6-8 shows the cleared Demand Resource UCAP MW by delivery year. Total cleared demand response UCAP MW in PJM decreased by 555.6 MW, or 8.9 percent, from 6,265.9 MW in the 2025/2026 Delivery Year to 5710.3 MW in the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The DR percent of capacity decreased by 0.4 percentage points, from 4.5 percent in the 2025/2026 Delivery Year to 4.1 percent in the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.

### Table 6-8 Cleared Demand Resource UCAP MW: 2007/2008 through 2026/2027 Delivery Year

| | UCAP (MW) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | DR RPM Cleared | Total RPM Cleared | DR Percent Cleared |
| 2007/2008 | 127.6 | 129,409.2 | 0.1% |
| 2008/2009 | 559.4 | 130,629.8 | 0.4% |
| 2009/2010 | 892.9 | 134,030.2 | 0.7% |
| 2010/2011 | 962.9 | 134,036.2 | 0.7% |
| 2011/2012 | 1,826.6 | 134,182.6 | 1.4% |
| 2012/2013 | 8,740.9 | 141,295.6 | 6.2% |
| 2013/2014 | 10,779.6 | 159,844.5 | 6.7% |
| 2014/2015 | 14,943.0 | 161,214.4 | 9.3% |
| 2015/2016 | 15,453.7 | 173,845.5 | 8.9% |
| 2016/2017 | 13,265.3 | 179,773.6 | 7.4% |
| 2017/2018 | 11,870.5 | 180,590.5 | 6.6% |
| 2018/2019 | 11,435.4 | 175,996.0 | 6.5% |
| 2019/2020 | 10,703.1 | 177,064.2 | 6.0% |
| 2020/2021 | 9,445.7 | 174,023.8 | 5.4% |
| 2021/2022 | 11,427.7 | 174,713.0 | 6.5% |
| 2022/2023 | 8,866.2 | 150,465.2 | 5.9% |
| 2023/2024 | 8,174.1 | 150,143.9 | 5.4% |
| 2024/2025 | 8,064.7 | 154,362.5 | 5.2% |
| 2025/2026 | 6,265.9 | 137,733.6 | 4.5% |
| 2026/2027 | 5,710.3 | 137,803.1 | 4.1% |

Table 6-9 shows zonal monthly capacity market revenue to demand resources for 2025. Capacity market revenue increased in the first six months of 2026 by $225.2 million, 218.1 percent, from $103.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $328.4 million in the first six months of 2026. RPM revenues in the first six months of 2026 differed from the same period in 2025 due to the significant increase in capacity market clearing prices across the delivery years. Revenues during the first five months of 2025 were associated with the 2024/2025 Delivery Year while the same period in 2026 was associated with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. The RTO clearing price in the 2024/2025 BRA was $28.92/MW-Day, $269.92/MW-Day in the 2025/2026 BRA, and $329.17/MW-Day in the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. Revenues in June 2025 were the result the 2025/2026 Delivery Year clearing prices while revenues in June 2026 were the result of the 2026/2027 Delivery Year clearing prices.

### Table 6-9 Zonal monthly demand resource capacity revenue: January through June, 2026

| Zone | January | February | March | April | May | June | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACEC | $342,232 | $309,113 | $342,232 | $331,192 | $342,232 | $311,066 | $1,978,067 |
| AEP, EKPC | $8,730,837 | $7,885,917 | $8,730,837 | $8,449,197 | $8,730,837 | $10,906,112 | $53,433,738 |
| APS | $4,102,594 | $3,705,569 | $4,102,594 | $3,970,252 | $4,102,594 | $4,960,263 | $24,943,865 |
| ATSI | $6,242,317 | $5,638,222 | $6,242,317 | $6,040,952 | $6,242,317 | $5,470,121 | $35,876,245 |
| BGE | $2,446,970 | $2,210,167 | $2,446,970 | $2,368,036 | $2,446,970 | $1,487,690 | $13,406,803 |
| COMED | $8,268,950 | $7,468,729 | $8,268,950 | $8,002,210 | $8,268,950 | $8,855,990 | $49,133,780 |
| DAY | $1,181,327 | $1,067,005 | $1,181,327 | $1,143,220 | $1,181,327 | $1,490,160 | $7,244,365 |
| DOM | $9,275,482 | $8,377,855 | $9,275,482 | $8,976,273 | $9,275,482 | $5,479,693 | $50,660,269 |
| DPL | $981,511 | $886,526 | $981,511 | $949,849 | $981,511 | $1,039,848 | $5,820,754 |
| DUKE | $1,335,456 | $1,206,219 | $1,335,456 | $1,292,377 | $1,335,456 | $1,134,649 | $7,639,614 |
| DUQ | $738,183 | $666,746 | $738,183 | $714,370 | $738,183 | $845,854 | $4,441,518 |
| JCPLC | $842,610 | $761,067 | $842,610 | $815,429 | $842,610 | $584,606 | $4,688,931 |
| MEC | $1,137,983 | $1,027,855 | $1,137,983 | $1,101,274 | $1,137,983 | $1,209,700 | $6,752,777 |
| PE | $1,770,232 | $1,598,920 | $1,770,232 | $1,713,128 | $1,770,232 | $1,566,691 | $10,189,436 |
| PECO | $2,470,426 | $2,231,352 | $2,470,426 | $2,390,735 | $2,470,426 | $2,241,161 | $14,274,526 |
| PEPCO | $1,052,969 | $951,068 | $1,052,969 | $1,019,002 | $1,052,969 | $1,033,927 | $6,162,903 |
| PPL | $3,559,375 | $3,214,920 | $3,559,375 | $3,444,557 | $3,559,375 | $3,196,103 | $20,533,706 |
| PSEG | $1,915,325 | $1,729,971 | $1,915,325 | $1,853,541 | $1,915,325 | $1,766,656 | $11,096,144 |
| REC | $19,245 | $17,383 | $19,245 | $18,625 | $19,245 | $11,850 | $105,594 |
| TOTAL | $56,414,025 | $50,954,603 | $56,414,025 | $54,594,218 | $56,414,025 | $53,592,140 | $328,383,035 |

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## Product Definition

Pre-Emergency and Emergency Load Response resources must register all resources with a specific response time. The options are to respond within 30, 60 or 120 minutes of a PJM dispatched event. The 30 minute prior notification is the default and applies unless a CSP obtains an exception from PJM due to physical operational limitations that prevent the Demand Resource Registration from reducing load within that timeframe.

Table 6-10 shows the amount of nominated MW and locations by product type and lead time for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. Nominated MW are Pre-Emergency or Emergency Load Response registrations used to satisfy a CSP's committed MW position for a delivery year. PJM approved 4,926 locations, or 23.4 percent of all locations, which have 4,357.8 nominated MW, or 54.5 percent of all nominated MW, for exceptions to the 30 minute lead time rule for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.

### Table 6-10 Nominated MW and locations by product type and lead time: 2025/2026 Delivery Year

| | Pre-Emergency | | Emergency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lead Type | MW | Percent | MW | Percent | Total | Percent of Total |
| 30 Minutes | 3,528.5 | 96.9% | 113.3 | 3.1% | 3,641.8 | 45.5% |
| 60 Minutes | 462.0 | 92.6% | 37.0 | 7.4% | 499.1 | 6.2% |
| 120 Minutes | 3,755.5 | 97.3% | 103.2 | 2.7% | 3,858.8 | 48.2% |
| Total | 7,746.1 | 96.8% | 253.5 | 3.2% | 7,999.6 | 100.0% |

| | Pre-Emergency | | Emergency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lead Type | Locations | Percent | Locations | Percent | Total | Percent of Total |
| 30 Minutes | 15,990 | 99.1% | 141 | 0.9% | 16,131 | 76.6% |
| 60 Minutes | 435 | 97.1% | 13 | 2.9% | 448 | 2.1% |
| 120 Minutes | 4,436 | 99.1% | 42 | 0.9% | 4,478 | 21.3% |
| Total | 20,861 | 99.1% | 196 | 0.9% | 21,057 | 100.0% |

Table 6-11 shows the amount of nominated MW and locations by product type and lead time for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. PJM approved 3,601 locations, or 12.9 percent of all locations, which have 3,418.1 nominated MW, or 47.1 percent of all nominated MW, for exceptions to the 30 minute lead time rule for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.

### Table 6-11 Nominated MW and locations by product type and lead time: 2026/2027 Delivery Year

| | Pre-Emergency | | Emergency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lead Type | MW | Percent | MW | Percent | Total | Percent of Total |
| 30 Minutes | 3,684.4 | 95.9% | 157.7 | 4.1% | 3,842.1 | 52.9% |
| 60 Minutes | 391.3 | 90.3% | 42.0 | 9.7% | 433.3 | 6.0% |
| 120 Minutes | 2,761.2 | 92.5% | 223.6 | 7.5% | 2,984.8 | 41.1% |
| Total | 6,836.9 | 94.2% | 423.2 | 5.8% | 7,260.2 | 100.0% |

| | Pre-Emergency | | Emergency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lead Type | Locations | Percent | Locations | Percent | Total | Percent of Total |
| 30 Minutes | 24,104 | 99.1% | 207 | 0.9% | 24,311 | 87.1% |
| 60 Minutes | 479 | 93.0% | 36 | 7.0% | 515 | 1.8% |
| 120 Minutes | 3,007 | 97.4% | 79 | 2.6% | 3,086 | 11.1% |
| Total | 27,590 | 98.8% | 322 | 1.2% | 27,912 | 100.0% |

The alternative notification times are 60 minutes and 120 minutes. The CSP must request an exception in writing, including the reason(s) for the requested exception. Once a location is granted a longer lead time, the resource does not need to resubmit for a longer lead time each delivery year.

The request for an exception must demonstrate one of four defined reasons:[31]

- The manufacturing processes for the Demand Resource Registration require gradual reduction to avoid damaging major industrial equipment used in the manufacturing process, or damage to the product generated or feedstock used in the manufacturing process;
- Transfer of load to backup generation requires time intensive manual process taking more than 30 minutes;
- Onsite safety concerns prevent location from implementing reduction plan in less than 30 minutes; or,

31 OATT Attachment DD-1, Section A.2(a).



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- The Demand Resource Registration is comprised of mass market residential customers or Small Commercial Customers which collectively cannot be notified of a Load Management Event within 30 minutes due to unavoidable communications latency, in which case the requested notification time shall be no longer than 120 minutes.

Table 6-12 shows the nominated MW and locations by product type and lead time of granted lead time exceptions for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.[32]

### Table 6-12 Nominated MW and locations of granted lead time exceptions: 2026/2027 Delivery Year

| | 60 Minutes | | 120 Minutes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reason | MW | Percent | MW | Percent | Total | Percent |
| Generation Start Time | 54.5 | 1.6% | 427.8 | 12.5% | 482.4 | 14.1% |
| Manufacturing Damage | 163.2 | 4.8% | 1,557.5 | 45.6% | 1,720.7 | 50.3% |
| Safety Problem | 215.6 | 6.3% | 999.5 | 29.2% | 1,215.1 | 35.5% |
| Total | 433.3 | 12.7% | 2,984.8 | 87.3% | 3,418.1 | 100.0% |

| | 60 Minutes | | 120 Minutes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reason | Locations | Percent | Locations | Percent | Total | Percent |
| Generation Start Time | 46 | 1.3% | 189 | 5.2% | 235 | 6.5% |
| Manufacturing Damage | 253 | 7.0% | 955 | 26.5% | 1,208 | 33.5% |
| Safety Problem | 216 | 6.0% | 1,942 | 53.9% | 2,158 | 59.9% |
| Total | 515 | 14.3% | 3,086 | 85.7% | 3,601 | 100.0% |

Prior to participating in the PJM Markets, CSPs must complete a registration in DR Hub which identifies the specific location(s) based on the unique EDC account number that will participate and their associated load reduction capability. Locations are identified by zone, street address and zip code and are not nodal. CSPs must maintain the accuracy of the registration information provided to PJM for each demand resource and each time the CSP registers the location or extends the registration, the CSP must review all information to ensure it is accurate and update as necessary. In order to register demand resources, the CSPs must classify locations according to the location's primary purpose or business use. CSPs first determine if the location's business use falls under one of the following primary categories: Hospitals, Industrial / Manufacturing, Multiple Dwelling Unit, Office Building, Residential, Retail Service, Correctional Facilities, Data Center, Data Center with Crypto Mining, or Schools. In cases where the location does not fit into one of the primary categories, the CSP selects from one of the following categories: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Mining, Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services or Services.[33] PJM had previously not been explicitly identifying demand response associated with data center load in the registration process. PJM was instead including nominated capacity and load reductions from data centers with crypto mining as a load reduction method under the plug load category. At the April 23, 2025, Markets and Reliability Committee, PJM members endorsed changes to Manual 11 to discontinue this practice. The adopted changes relocated the reference to data centers in the registration process from the load reduction method/plug load section to the business segment section and separately identifies data centers and data centers with crypto mining.[34]

Table 6-13 shows the nominated MW and locations by business segment for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.

### Table 6-13 Nominated MW and locations by business segment: 2026/2027 Delivery Year

| Business Segment | Nominated MW (ICAP) | Percent of Total | Locations | Percent of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial/Manufacturing | 3,142.7 | 43.3% | 3,515 | 12.6% |
| Schools | 755.2 | 10.4% | 4,249 | 15.2% |
| Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services | 609.8 | 8.4% | 572 | 2.0% |
| Office Building | 530.2 | 7.3% | 1,387 | 5.0% |
| Services | 386.7 | 5.3% | 827 | 3.0% |
| Hospitals | 361.7 | 5.0% | 393 | 1.4% |
| Residential | 357.7 | 4.9% | 9,040 | 32.4% |
| Retail Service | 336.7 | 4.6% | 7,200 | 25.8% |
| Data Center | 242.0 | 3.3% | 37 | 0.1% |
| Mining | 239.5 | 3.3% | 149 | 0.5% |
| Data Center with Crypto Mining | 135.8 | 1.9% | 24 | 0.1% |
| Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing | 94.9 | 1.3% | 260 | 0.9% |
| Multiple Dwelling Unit | 35.4 | 0.5% | 209 | 0.7% |
| Correctional Facilities | 31.7 | 0.4% | 50 | 0.2% |
| Total | 7,260.2 | 100.0% | 27,912 | 100.0% |

32 Data for generation start time and mass market communication categories were combined based on confidentiality rules.

33 "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 10.2.2, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).

34 See PJM, Consent Agenda B – 1 Manual 11 Revisions - Presentation, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2025/20250423/20250423-consent-agenda-b---1--manual-11-revisions---presentation.pdf> (April 23, 2025).

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There are two ways to measure the load reductions of emergency demand response resources. The Firm Service Level (FSL) method for the summer period, measures the difference between a customer's peak load contribution (PLC) and its real-time load, multiplied by the loss factor (LF) to account for transmission and distribution line losses.[35] The Guaranteed Load Drop (GLD) method measures the minimum of: the comparison load minus real-time load multiplied by the loss factor; or the PLC minus the real-time load multiplied by the loss factor. The comparison load estimates what the load would have been if PJM did not declare a Load Management Event, similar to a CBL, by using a comparable day, same day, customer baseline, regression analysis or backup generation method. Limiting the GLD method to the minimum of the two calculations ensures reductions occur below the PLC, thus avoiding double counting of load reductions.[36]

With the introduction of the Winter Peak Load (WPL) concept, effective for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, both the FSL and GLD methods are modified for the non-summer period. The FSL method measures compliance during the non-summer period as the difference between a customer's WPL multiplied by the Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor (ZWWAF) and the loss factor (LF), rather than the PLC, and real-time load, multiplied by the LF. PJM calculates and posts on the PJM website the ZWWAF as the zonal winter weather normalized peak divided by the zonal average of the five coincident peak loads in December through February.[37] The Winter Peak Load is determined based on the average of the Demand Resource customer's specific peak hourly load between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on the PJM defined five coincident peak days from December through February two delivery years prior to the delivery year for which the registration is submitted. The Winter Peak Load is adjusted up for transmission and distribution line loss factors (LF) because one MW of load would be served by more than one MW of generation to account for transmission losses. The Winter Peak Load is normalized based on the winter conditions during the five coincident peak loads in winter using the ZWWAF to account for an extreme temperatures or a mild winter. The GLD method measures compliance during the non-summer period as the minimum of: the comparison load minus real-time load multiplied by the loss factor; or the WPL multiplied by the ZWWAF and the LF, rather than the PLC, minus the real-time load multiplied by the LF.[38]

The capacity market is an annual market. A Capacity Performance resource has an annual commitment. Effective with the 2020/2021 Delivery Year, the capacity market design also includes the ability to offer Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources directly into the RPM Auction as an alternative to entering into a commercial arrangement to establish and offer an Aggregate Resource.[39] Capacity Market Sellers may submit sell offers of either Summer Period Capacity Performance Resources or Winter Period Capacity Performance Resources and the auction clearing optimization algorithm is designed to clear equal quantities of offsetting seasonal capacity sell offers thereby creating an annual capacity commitment by matching a Summer Period Capacity Performance Resource with a Winter Period Capacity Performance Resource. Load is allocated capacity obligations based on the annual peak load which is a summer load. The amount of capacity MW allocated to load does not vary based on winter demand. The principle is that a customer's actual use of capacity should be compared to the level of capacity that a customer is required to pay for. Capacity costs are allocated to LSEs by PJM based on the single coincident peak load method. In PJM, the single coincident peak occurs in the summer.[40] LSEs generally allocate capacity costs to customers based on the five coincident peak method.[41] The allocation of capacity costs to customers uses each customer's PLC. Customers pay for capacity based on the PLC, not the WPL. If an end customer has 3 MW of load during the coincident peak load hour, but only 1 MW during the coincident winter peak load hour, the End Use Customer must pay for 3 MW of capacity for the entire delivery year, but can only participate as a 1 MW demand response resource. Using PLC to measure compliance for the entire delivery year would allow the customer to fully participate as a 3 MW demand response resource. FERC allowed the use of the WPL for calculating compliance for non-summer

35 Real-time load is hourly metered load.
36 See 135 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2011).
37 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 4.3.7, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
38 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.7A, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
39 An Aggregate Resource is created by a Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls one or more Capacity Storage Resources, Intermittent Resources, Demand Resources or Environmentally Limited Resources by submitting a Sell Offer which represents the aggregated Unforced Capacity value of such resources, where such Sell Offer is considered to be located in the smallest modeled LDA common to the aggregated resources.
40 OATT Attachment DD § 5.11.
41 OATT Attachment M-2.


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months effective June 1, 2017.[42] The MMU recommends setting the baseline for measuring capacity compliance under summer and winter compliance at the customer's PLC, similar to GLD, to avoid double counting, to avoid under counting and to ensure that a customer's purchase of capacity is calculated correctly. The FSL and GLD equations for calculating load reductions are:

$$FSL\ Compliance_{Summer} = PLC - (Load \cdot LF)$$

$$FSL\ Compliance_{Non-Summer} = (WPL \cdot ZWWAF \cdot LF) - (Load \cdot LF)$$

$$GLD\ Compliance_{Summer} = Minimum\{(comparison\ load - Load) \cdot LF; PLC - (Load \cdot LF)\}$$

$$GLD\ Compliance_{Non-Summer} = Minimum\{(comparison\ load - Load) \cdot LF; (WPL \cdot ZWWAF \cdot LF) - (Load \cdot LF)\}$$

For Demand Resources prior to the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, PJM calculated UCAP as the product of the FPR and the Demand Resource's Nominated Value, which depends on the peak load contribution of customers on the Demand Resource registration and their committed Firm Service Level or Guaranteed Load Drop.[43]

The current accreditation practice for Demand Resources assumes they provide 100 percent performance at any time they are required to perform. Beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, PJM instituted an ELCC approach for generation and emergency demand response resources. For Demand Resources, PJM calculates Accredited UCAP as the product of the resource's Nominated Value and its ELCC Class Rating. Unlike generation, PJM does not apply a resource specific performance adjustment for Demand Resources. The Demand Resource availability window, defined in the RAA for Annual Demand Resources and Summer-Period Demand Resources, does not align with the projected hours with a loss of load risk in the winter period.[44] The ELCC class rating for Demand Resources for the 2025/2026 BRA was 77 percent.[45] The ELCC class rating for Demand Resources for the 2026/2027 BRA was 69 percent.[46]

PJM makes several unsupported assumptions when calculating ELCC for demand response resources. The PJM ELCC calculations do not account for the actual historical performance of DR in same way as thermal resources. PJM analysis showed that the ELCC reduction capability is overstated compared to the metered DR reduction capability.[47] This overstatement of performance occurred during Winter Storm Elliott and continues through the first six months of 2026. There was a significant disparity between the reported expected reduction capability provided by the CSPs and the actual observed energy reduction during Winter Storm Elliott. As a general matter, these resources are rarely used.

PJM proposed a set of significant changes to the treatment of demand side resources that were accepted by FERC.[48] Demand response capacity availability hours now includes all hours rather than a limited number of hours. The level of demand resources is now based on the coincident peak demand of the resources rather than the sum of noncoincident peak demands. The extension of demand resource availability to all hours, consistent with all other capacity resources is logical. Defining all DR MW for the same coincident peak demand hour is a more logical measure of the level of actual DR potential. The prior practice of adding together all the DR from individual non coincident peak hours resulted in an overstatement of demand resources.

PJM increased the ELCC derating factor from 76 percent to 94 percent, an increase of 24 percent in the value of demand resource MW. PJM's ELCC value for DR is not consistent with the method PJM uses for generation resources. PJM's ELCC for DR is based on assumed behavior and not based on the actual performance of demand resources during the same high EUE (expected

42 162 FERC ¶ 61,159 (2018).
43 See PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, RAA, Schedule 6 (18.0.0), § 6.I.
44 See "Responses to Deficiency Letter – Capacity Market Reforms to Accommodate the Energy Transition," ER24-99-001. (December 1, 2023), at p 28.
45 See "*BRA ELCC Class Rating for 2025/2026,*" <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/2025-26-3ia-elcc-class-ratings.pdf> (March 12, 2025).
46 See "*2025 PJM Effective Load Carrying Capability and Reserve Requirement Study (ELCC/RRS),*" <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/2025-pjm-elcc-rrs.pdf> (January 30, 2026).
47 See PJM, DR Availability Window: Additional DR ELCC Information, <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2024/20240807/20240807-item-08b---pjm-dr-education.ashx> (August 7, 2024).
48 See *Approved Minutes from the Markets & Reliability Committee,* <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2024/20240627/20240627-consent-agenda-a---draft-mrc-minutes---05222024.ashx>.

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unserved energy) hours used for other capacity resources. The current ELCC value for demand response is already overstated.

As currently defined, demand resources are inferior resources in the capacity market and the ELCC values, both existing and proposed, significantly overstate their contribution to reliability. The demand resources are rarely used. While PJM may call on demand resources as part of its emergency actions, there are no PJM rules governing the overall commitment and dispatch of demand resources as there are for all other capacity resources.[49] Demand resources do not have a must offer obligation in the energy market as all other capacity resources do. PJM rules do not indicate if, when and how demand resources should be called on for nonemergency events. PJM rules do not require the use of demand resources under defined conditions. PJM rules do not require that demand resources be called on during emergency events but leave all emergency actions to the discretion of PJM dispatchers.

PJM's changes will increase the value of demand resources by almost a billion dollars ($880.7 M) without any actual change in the physical reality and without the type of detailed analysis applied to other capacity resources.[50] The changes simply pay demand response more for capacity without any increase in use and without any rules governing when demand response can or will be used for economic reasons and without a must offer obligation in the energy or capacity markets, and without any market power mitigation rules, without resource specific performance adjustments, and without addressing the fact that demand side performance metrics simply ignore increases in load above the WPL when called. PJM did not make consistent changes to the treatment of demand resources in the summer. PJM made these changes to the ELCC value of demand response resources while ignoring significant issues with the treatment of other resource technologies. The result of this administrative change also affects the ELCC of other classes and makes PJM appear to be more reliable than it is.

PJM filed these changes on March 6, 2025, in Docket No. ER25-1525-000.[51] The MMU filed an answer and motion for leave to answer on April 14, 2025.[52] On May 5, 2025, in Docket No. ER25-1525-000, FERC accepted PJM's filing to revise the RAA, effective with the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, that extends the Demand Resource availability window to 24 hours a day throughout the year and revises the definition of Winter Peak Load used in calculating Demand Resources' Winter Nominated Value in PJM's ELCC method, effective May 6, 2025.[53]

49 See PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations, §2.3.2. Rev. 98 (June 24, 2026).
50 See PJM, DR Availability Window – IMM Proposal, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2025/20250205/20250205-item-02-2---dr-availability-window---imm-proposal.pdf> (February 5, 2025).
51 See "Proposal to Extend Demand Resource Availability Window and Revise Calculation of Demand Resource Winter Nominated Value," Docket No. ER25-1525-000 (March 6, 2025).
52 See "Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer," Docket No. ER25-1525-000 (April 14, 2025).
53 191 FERC ¶ 61,103


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Table 6-14 shows the MW registered by measurement and verification method and by technology type for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. For the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, 99.77 percent of the MW use the FSL method and 0.23 percent of the MW use the GLD measurement and verification method.

### Table 6-14 Nominated MW by each demand response method: 2026/2027 Delivery Year

| Measurement and Verification Method | On-site Generation MW | Technology Type HVAC MW | Refrigeration MW | Lighting MW | Manufacturing MW | Water Heating MW | Batteries or Plug Load MW | Computing MW | Total | Percent by type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firm Service Level | 1,305.8 | 1,913.9 | 172.6 | 656.8 | 3,007.2 | 16.1 | 62.0 | 109.4 | 7,243.8 | 99.77% |
| Guaranteed Load Drop | 15.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.4 | 0.23% |
| Total | 1,321.3 | 1,914.7 | 172.6 | 656.8 | 3,007.3 | 16.1 | 62.0 | 109.4 | 7,260.2 | 100.0% |
| Percent by method | 18.2% | 26.4% | 2.4% | 9.0% | 41.4% | 0.2% | 0.9% | 1.5% | 100.0% | |

Table 6-15 shows the fuel type used in the onsite generators for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year in the emergency and pre-emergency programs. For the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, 1,321.3 MW of the 7,260.2 nominated MW, 18.2 percent, used onsite generation. Of the 1,321.3 MW, 79.3 percent used diesel and 20.7 percent used natural gas, gasoline, oil, propane or waste products. These 1,321.3 MW of DR registrations rely on behind the meter generation with environmental restrictions that limit the resource's ability to operate to 100 hours per year. Demand resources relying on behind the meter generation with environmental restrictions that limit the resource's ability to operate must register as emergency DR. EPA regulations require that Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines (RICE) that do not meet EPA emissions standards may operate for only 100 hours per year and only to provide emergency DR during an Energy Emergency Alert 2 (EEA2), or if there are five percent voltage/frequency deviations. There is no reason to believe that PJM emergency conditions will always be less than 100 hours per year. PJM does not prevent stationary RICE that does not meet emissions standards from participating in PJM markets as DR. Some emergency stationary RICE that does not meet emissions standards are now included in DR portfolios. PJM's DR Hub does not identify Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines (RICE) generators, only whether it is an internal combustion engine. Stationary emergency RICE should be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet its capacity market obligations because its available hours are limited as a result of emissions standards.

### Table 6-15 Onsite generation fuel type (MW): 2026/2027 Delivery Year

| | 2026/2027 | |
|---|---|---|
| Fuel Type | MW | Percent |
| Diesel | 1,047.8 | 79.3% |
| Natural Gas, Gasoline, Oil, Propane, Waste Products | 273.5 | 20.7% |
| Total | 1,321.3 | 100.0% |

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Table 6-16 shows the MW registered by measurement and verification method and by technology type for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, 99.75 percent use the FSL method and 0.25 percent use the GLD measurement and verification method.

### Table 6-16 Nominated MW by each demand response method: 2025/2026 Delivery Year

| | | Technology Type | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Measurement and Verification Method | On-site Generation MW | HVAC MW | Refrigeration MW | Lighting MW | Manufacturing MW | Water Heating MW | Batteries and Plug Load MW | Computing MW | Total | Percent by type |
| Firm Service Level | 1,265.6 | 1,896.2 | 202.6 | 791.3 | 3,659.6 | 22.0 | 39.1 | 102.8 | 7,979.2 | 99.75% |
| Guaranteed Load Drop | 5.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.3 | 0.25% |
| Total | 1,270.7 | 1,897.3 | 202.6 | 791.3 | 3,673.7 | 22.0 | 39.1 | 102.8 | 7,999.6 | 100.0% |
| Percent by method | 15.9% | 23.7% | 2.5% | 9.9% | 45.9% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 1.3% | 100.0% | |

Table 6-17 shows the fuel type used in the onsite generators for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year in the emergency and pre-emergency programs. For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, 1,270.7 MW of the 7,999.6 nominated MW, 15.9 percent, use onsite generation. Of the 1,270.7 MW, 83.4 percent use diesel and 16.6 percent use natural gas, gasoline, oil, propane or waste products.

### Table 6-17 Onsite generation fuel type (MW): 2025/2026 Delivery Year

| | 2025/2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Fuel Type | MW | Percent |
| Diesel | 1,059.2 | 83.4% |
| Natural Gas, Gasoline, Oil, Propane, Waste Products | 211.5 | 16.6% |
| Total | 1,270.7 | 100.0% |

## Emergency and Pre-Emergency Event Reported Compliance

Capacity resources measure performance nodally, except for demand resources. PJM cannot dispatch demand resources by node with the current rules because demand resources are not registered to a node. Demand resources can be dispatched by subzone only if the subzone is defined before dispatch. Aggregation rules allow a demand resource that incorporates many small End Use Customers to span an entire zone, which is inconsistent with nodal dispatch.

Subzonal dispatch became mandatory for emergency demand resources in the 2014/2015 Delivery Year.[54] A subzone is defined by zip code, not by nodal location. If a registration has any location in the dispatched subzone, as defined by the zip code of the enrolled End Use Customer's address, the entire registration must respond. There are currently nine defined dispatchable subzones in PJM: APS_EAST, DOM_CHES, DOM_YORKTOWN, AECO_ENGLAND, JCPL_REDBANK, DOM_ASHBURN, DOM_DCA, DOM_PRINWILM and AEP_MARION.[55] The AEP_MARION subzone was added as a result of the June 14-16, 2022, performance assessment event in the Columbus, Ohio area of the AEP Zone.

PJM can remove a defined subzone, and make changes to the subzone, at their discretion. Subzones should not be removed once defined, as the subzone may need to be dispatched again in the future. The METED_EAST, PENELEC_EAST, PPL_EAST and DOM_NORFOLK Subzones were removed by PJM. The MMU recommends that, if PJM continues to use subzones for any purpose, PJM clearly define the role of subzones in the dispatch of demand response.

54 OATT Attachment DD, § 11.
55 See "Load Management Subzones," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/demand-response/subzone-definition-workbook.ashx> (Accessed January 13, 2023).


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The subzone design and closed loop interfaces are related. PJM implemented closed loop interfaces with the stated purpose of improving the incorporation of reactive constraints into energy prices and to allow emergency DR to set price.[56] PJM applies closed loop interfaces so that it can use units needed for reactive support to set the energy price when they would not otherwise set price under the LMP algorithm. PJM also applies closed loop interfaces so that it can use emergency DR resources to set the real-time LMP when DR would not otherwise set price under the fundamental LMP logic. Of the 20 closed loop interface definitions, 11 (55 percent) were created for the purpose of allowing emergency DR to set price.[57] The closed loop interfaces created for the purpose of allowing emergency DR to set price are located in the Rest of RTO, MAAC, EMAAC, SWMAAC, DPL-SOUTH, ATSI, ATSI-CLEVELAND and BGE LDAs. These interfaces correspond to LDAs as defined in RPM.[58]

Demand resources can be dispatched for voluntary compliance during any hour of any day, but dispatched resources are not measured for compliance outside of the mandatory compliance window for each demand product. This will change beginning in the 2027/2028 Delivery Year when the mandatory compliance window will expand to 24 hours per day. A demand response event during a product's mandatory compliance window also may not result in a compliance score. When demand response events occur for partial hours under 30 minutes, the event is not measured for compliance.

Demand resources currently estimate five minute compliance with an hourly interval meter during PAIs. To accurately measure compliance on a five minute basis, a five minute interval meter is required. All other capacity resources require five minute interval meters, and demand resources should be no different. Demand resources are paid based on the average performance by registration for the duration of a demand response event. Demand response should measure compliance on a five minute basis to accurately report reductions during demand response events. Measuring compliance on a five minute basis would provide accurate information to the PJM system. The MMU recommends demand response event compliance be calculated on a five minute basis for all capacity resources and that the penalty structure reflect five minute compliance.[59]

Under the capacity performance design of the capacity market, compliance for potential penalties is measured for DR only during performance assessment intervals (PAI).[60]

The MMU recommended that demand response resources be treated as economic resources like all other capacity resources and therefore that the dispatch of demand response resources not automatically trigger a performance assessment interval (PAI) for CP compliance. Emergencies should be triggered only when PJM has exhausted all economic resources including demand response resources. For the first seven months of 2023, PJM declared an emergency if pre-emergency or emergency demand response were dispatched. But in an order issued July 28, 2023, effective July 30, 2023, FERC approved proposed revisions to PJM's Tariff to eliminate the dispatch of demand response as a trigger for calling an emergency and for defining a Performance Assessment Interval (PAI).[61]

Table 6-18 shows the amount of nominated demand response MW, the required reserve margin and actual reserve margin for the 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 Delivery Years. There are 8,275.8 nominated MW of demand response for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, 30.7 percent of the required reserve margin and 31.1 percent of the actual reserve margin for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.[62]

### Table 6-18 Demand response nominated MW compared to reserve margin: 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 Delivery Years[63]

| Delivery Year | Demand Response Nominated MW | Required Reserve Margin | Demand Response Percent of Required Reserve Margin | Actual Reserve Margin | Demand Response Percent of Actual Reserve Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025/2026 | 8,137.5 | 25,381.0 | 32.1% | 25,090.8 | 32.4% |
| 2026/2027 | 8,275.8 | 26,965.7 | 30.7% | 26,607.0 | 31.1% |

56 See PJM/Alstom. "Approaches to Reduce Energy Uplift and PJM Experiences," presented at the FERC Technical Conference: Increasing Real-Time and Day-Ahead Market Efficiency Through Improved Software, Docket No. AD10-12-006 (June 23, 2015) <https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/M2-3-XIAO.pdf> .

57 See the *2018 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 4, Energy Uplift, for additional information regarding all closed loop interfaces and the impacts to the PJM markets.

58 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 2.3.1, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

59 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.7A, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

60 OATT § 1 (Performance Assessment Hour).

61 See "Order Accepting Tariff Revisions Subject to Condition," Docket No. ER23-1996-000 (July 28, 2023).

62 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 5: Capacity Market, Table 5-7.

63 Nominated MW totals are Demand Response ICAP corresponding to Demand Response UCAP cleared in RPM auctions for each delivery year. The total nominated MW values do not reflect replacement transactions.

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PJM will dispatch demand resources by zone or subzone, or within a PAI area. When PJM dispatches all demand resources in multiple connecting zones, PJM further degrades the nodal design of electricity markets. In that case, PJM allows compliance to be measured across zones within a compliance aggregation area (CAA).[64] [65] A CAA is an electrically connected area that has the same capacity market price. This changes the way CSPs dispatch resources when multiple electrically contiguous areas with the same RPM clearing prices are dispatched. The compliance rules determine how CSPs are paid and thus create incentives that CSPs will incorporate in their decisions about how to respond to PJM dispatch. The multiple zone approach is even less locational than the zonal and subzonal approaches and creates larger mismatches between the locational need for the resources and the actual response. If multiple zones within a CAA are called by PJM, a CSP will dispatch the least cost resources across the zones to cover the CSP's obligation. This can result in more MW dispatched in one zone that are locationally distant from the relief needed and no MW dispatched in another zone, yet the CSP could be considered 100 percent compliant and pay no penalties. More locational deployment of load management resources would improve efficiency. With full implementation of capacity performance, demand response will be dispatched by registrations within an area for which an Emergency Action is declared by PJM. PJM does not have the nodal location of each registration, meaning PJM will need to guess as to the useful demand response registration by registered location. The MMU recommends that demand resources be required to provide their nodal location. Nodal dispatch of demand resources would be consistent with the nodal dispatch of generation.

## Definition of Compliance

PJM's reporting of load management events overstates the performance of demand side capacity resources. Limiting reported compliance to only positive values incorrectly reports compliance. Settlement locations with a negative load reduction value (load increase) are not included in compliance reporting by PJM within registrations or within demand response portfolios. A resource that has load above their PLC during a demand response event has a negative performance value. But PJM does not include the negative performance values in the net performance calculation. PJM limits reported compliance shortfall values to zero MW.

The MMU recommends that PJM correctly report compliance for demand side capacity resources to include negative values above PLC when calculating event compliance across hours and registrations.[66]

Emergency demand response resources that are also registered as economic resources have a calculated CBL for the emergency event days. Demand resources that are not registered as economic resources use the three day CBL type with the symmetrical additive adjustment for measuring energy reductions without the requirements of a Relative Root Mean Squared Error (RRMSE) Test required for all economic resources.[67] The CBL must use the RRMSE test to verify that it is a good approximation for real-time load usage.

The MMU recommends that PJM Manual 11 be revised to require, rather than recommend, that the RRMSE test be applied to all demand resources with a CBL.[68]

The CBL for a customer is an estimate of what load would have been if the customer had not responded to LMP and reduced load. The difference between the CBL and real-time load is the energy reduction. When load responds to LMP by using a behind the meter generator, the energy reduction should be capped at the generation output. Any additional energy reduction is a result of inaccuracy in the CBL estimate rather than an actual reduction. The MMU recommends capping demand reductions based entirely on behind the meter generation at the lower of the generator's economic maximum or actual generation output.

An extreme example makes clear the fundamental problems with the use of measurement and verification methods to define the level of power that would have been used but for the DR actions, and the payments to DR customers that

64 CAA is "a geographic area of Zones or sub-Zones that are electrically contiguous and experience for the relevant Delivery Year, based on Resource Clearing Prices of, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, Annual Resources and for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, Capacity Performance Resources, the same locational price separation in the Base Residual Auction, the same locational price separation in the First Incremental Auction, the same locational price separation in the Second Incremental Auction, or the same locational price separation in the Third Incremental Auction." OATT § 1.

65 PJM. "Manual 18: Capacity Market," § 8.7.2, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

66 See "Market Monitor Report," MC Webinar <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2023/20230620-webinar/item-04---imm-report.ashx> (Accessed July 6, 2023).

67 157 FERC ¶ 61,067 (2016).

68 PJM. "Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 10.2.5, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).



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result from these methods. The current rules for measurement and verification for demand resources make a bankrupt company, a customer that no longer exists due to closing of a facility or a permanently shut down company, or a company with a permanent reduction in peak load due to a partial closing of a facility, an acceptable demand response customer as long as the location has an active EDC account and a meter. This is a violation of the logic of demand side resources and such customers should not be permitted to be included as registered demand resources. In addition, companies that remain in business, but with a substantially reduced load, can maintain their pre-bankruptcy FSL (firm service level to which the customer agrees to reduce in an event) commitment, which can be greater than or equal to the post-bankruptcy peak load. The customer agrees to reduce to a level which is greater than or equal to its new peak load after bankruptcy. When demand response events occur such a customer would receive credit for 100 percent reduction, even though the customer took no action and could take no action to reduce load. This problem exists regardless of whether the customer is still paying for capacity.

This inclusion of resources violates the definition of demand resources which requires that the customer must have the ability to reduce load. "A participant that has the ability to reduce a measurable and verifiable portion of its load, as metered on an EDC account basis."[69] Such customers no longer have the ability to reduce load in response to price or a PJM demand response event. CSPs in PJM have and continue to register bankrupt customers as emergency or pre-emergency load response customers. PJM finds acceptable the practice of CSPs maintaining the registration of customers with a bankruptcy related reduction in demand that are unable, as a result, to respond to emergency events. Three proposals that included language to remove bankrupt customers from a CSP's portfolio failed at the June 7, 2017, Market Implementation Committee.[70] The registered customers that are bankrupt and the amount of registered MW cannot be released for reasons of confidentiality.

The metering requirement for demand resources is outdated, and has not kept up with the changes to PJM's market design. PJM moved to five minute settlements, but the metering requirement for demand resources remained at an hourly interval meter. It is impossible to measure energy usage on a five minute basis using an hourly interval meter. PJM will estimate real-time usage by prorating the hourly interval meter and assume if load is less than the CBL, that the reduction occurred during the required dispatch window. The meter reading is not telemetered to PJM in real time. The resource is allowed up to 60 days to report the data to PJM.[71] The MMU recommends that PJM adopt the ISO-NE five-minute metering requirements in order to ensure that dispatchers have the necessary information for reliability and that market payments to demand resources be calculated based on interval meter data at the site of the demand reductions so that they can accurately measure compliance and that data be provided to PJM within 24 hours.[72]

On September 19, 2024, the Commission issued an order denying the complaint by Enerwise Global Technologies seeking to use statistical sampling for measuring demand response performance when interval metering is available.[73] Commissioner Chang concurred with the Commission's determination and agreed that using actual metered interval data is the ideal method to measure and verify performance for demand-side resources. Commissioner Chang further noted that it is essential that resources that are procured and compensated in the markets actually deliver on their reliability and economic commitments.[74]

On October 8, 2025, a complaint was filed by Voltus, Inc. and Mission:data requesting the Commission require that PJM allow CSPs to use statistical sampling for residential customers that have interval meters.[75] On October 28, 2025, the MMU filed comments pointing out that using statistical sampling when actual interval meter data is available would degrade PJM's ability to accurately measure the MW of capacity available and the actual performance of that capacity and therefore degrade PJM's ability to maintain resource

69 OA Schedule 1 § 8.2.

70 There was one proposal from PJM, one proposal from a market participant and one proposal from the MMU. See *Draft Minutes from the Market Implementation Committee,* <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/20170712/20170712-item-02-draft-minutes-20170607.pdf> .

71 "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 10.4.1, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).

72 See ISO-NE Tariff, Section III, Market Rule 1, Appendix E1 and Appendix E2, "Demand Response," <*http://www.iso-ne.com/regulatory/tariff/sect_3/mr1_append-e.pdf*>. (Accessed October 17, 2017) ISO-NE requires that DR have an interval meter with five-minute data reported to the ISO and each behind the meter generator is required to have a separate interval meter. After June 1, 2017, demand response resources in ISO-NE must also be registered at a single node.

73 See "Order Denying Complaint re Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC v. PJM Interconnection," EL23-104-000 (July 28, 2023).

74 *Id,* Commissioner Chang Statement Concurring at 1.

75 Voltus, Inc. and Mission:data v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Complaint of Voltus, Inc. and Mission:data, Docket No. EL26-4-000 (Oct. 8, 2025).

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adequacy and to correctly determine efficient capacity market prices through supply and demand in the market. [76]

When demand resources are not dispatched during a mandatory response window, each CSP must test their portfolio to the levels of capacity commitment, but the testing requirements have been inadequate.[77]

For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent delivery years, if a Demand Resource registration is not dispatched by PJM for a Load Management event in a delivery year, then the registration must be tested for a two-hour period between the hours of 11:00 EPT and 18:00 EPT of a non-NERC holiday weekday during June through October or November through March of the relevant delivery year, where the date and time are selected by PJM.[78] All registrations in a zone are tested simultaneously for two hours for each product type. Registration performance is calculated as the two hour average reduction.

If less than 25 percent (by MW) of a CSP's total Demand Resources in a zone fail the test, the CSP may conduct retests limited to all registrations that failed to meet their seasonal nominated ICAP in the prior test, provided that such re-test(s) must be during the same season, at the same time of day and under approximately the same weather conditions as the prior test. If 25 percent or more (by MW) of a CSP's Demand Resources fail the test, the CSP may request PJM to schedule a one time retest limited to all registrations that failed to meet their seasonal nominated ICAP in the prior test. The request must be made before the 46th day after the test. PJM will select the date and time of the retest during the same season. For the initial PJM scheduled test, PJM schedules, on an alternating basis, one test during June through October or November through March for each delivery year that a test is required. On the first business day of a week, PJM provides notice of all zones to be tested during the following two week test window. The test window opens the first business day of the week following the notice. By 10:00 EPT the day before the test, PJM posts on its website, and notifies the CSPs directly, the test date and zones.[79] On the test date, CSPs are notified of the start time of the test through the same notification protocol used for an actual event. For any scheduled retest by PJM, by 10:00 EPT the day before the retest, PJM will posts on its website, and notifies the CSPs directly, the retest date. On the retest date, CSPs are notified of the start time of the retest through the same notification protocol used for an event.

While the testing revisions implemented with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year are an improvement, the MMU recommends that load management testing be initiated by PJM with advance notice to CSPs identical to the actual lead time required in an emergency in order to accurately represent the conditions of an emergency event.

Beginning in the 2024/2025 Delivery Year and subsequent delivery years, CSPs may elect to use performance data from a Load Management event that was not subject to a Non-Performance Assessment (a non-PAI LM event) as performance data for a PJM zonal test event.[80] Elections are made on or after June 1 and no later than July 14 after the delivery year in the DR Hub system. Data required for compliance evaluation must be submitted no later than July 14 after the delivery year. Only one event result (either test event or non-PAI LM event) for each end-use customer site will be used in the zonal test evaluation. The duration of the non-PAI LM event must be at least 30 minutes of a clock hour. The election of non-PAI LM events to be used as zonal test performance will be done at registration lead time level. The non-PAI LM event must have occurred in the same season as the PJM scheduled test. For purposes of this election, the calculated reduction value for a registration in the non-PAI LM event is the average of the registration's hourly reductions within the product period hourly window.

The ability for test performance to be a substitute for event performance, coupled with the absence of nonperformance penalties, weakens the incentive to perform during non-PAI events. Emergency demand response resources

76 See "Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL26-4-000 (October 28, 2025).

77 The mandatory response time for Capacity Performance DR is June through October and the following May between 10:00AM to 10:00PM EPT and November through April between 6:00AM through 9:00PM EPT. *See* PJM. "Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

78 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.7, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

79 See "Demand Response Test Schedule," <https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/demand-response/m/demand-response-test-schedule> (Accessed July 22, 2026).

80 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 8.7, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).



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have the same obligation to perform when called upon, regardless of whether the dispatch event occurs as part of a PAI or not.[81] There is no reason therefore to allow CSPs the optionality of testing in lieu of using non-PAI event performance.

Table 6-19 shows the test penalties by delivery year by product type for the 2021/2022 Delivery Year through the 2024/2025 Delivery Year. The shortfall MW are calculated for each CSP by zone. The weighted rate per MW is the average penalty rate paid per MW. Testing shortfalls increased dramatically beginning with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. The testing shortfall for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year increased by 134 percent compared to the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. Total Load Management Test Compliance penalties were 15.5 percent of total DR capacity revenues in the 2024/2025 Delivery Year.

The daily load management test failure charge rate for a zonal testing shortfall is equal to the provider's weighted daily revenue rate in such zone plus the greater of 0.20 times the provider's weighted daily revenue rate in such zone, or $20/MW-day. A daily load management test failure charge, equal to the net testing shortfall in the zone times the daily load management test failure charge rate, is applied for each day in the delivery year that the resource was committed. The load management test failure charge is assessed in the August monthly bill, issued in September, after the conclusion of the delivery year.[82] The ex-post nature of the load management test penalty, coupled with a high test failure rate, creates the potential for credit issues. Planned demand resource positions in RPM have a collateral requirement only until such time that a nominated MW quantity of customers are registered in DRHUB sufficient to cover the RPM zonal MW quantity committed.[83] These registrations occur prior to the start of the delivery year. Following the delivery year, at the time the testing penalty is levied, these resources are no longer collateralized. Providers subject to test failure penalties would nonetheless be subject to a retroactive disgorgement of revenues proportional to the shortfall quantity plus the higher of 20 percent of their weighted daily revenue rate or $20/MW-day.

### Table 6-19 Test penalties by delivery year: 2021/2022 through 2024/2025 Delivery Years

| | 2021/2022 | | | 2022/2023 | | | 2023/2024 | | | 2024/2025 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Product Type | Shortfall MW | Weighted Rate per MW | Total Penalty | Shortfall MW | Weighted Rate per MW | Total Penalty | Shortfall MW | Weighted Rate per MW | Total Penalty | Shortfall MW | Weighted Rate per MW | Total Penalty |
| Capacity Performance | 23.1 | $176.79 | $1,487,430 | 7.1 | $97.07 | $250,346 | 391.4 | $56.45 | $8,087,631 | 933.4 | $53.50 | $18,225,318 |

When describing overall test performance, PJM nets the over and under performance of all resources. Netting overstates the performance and capability of the underlying resources. A resource that tests short of its RPM commitment is subject to a penalty. That penalty is offset neither by the over performance of the provider's other resources nor that of other provider's resources. Additionally, during an actual dispatch event, a resource is only required to perform up to its RPM commitment to avoid penalties. While a resource may demonstrate excess capability during testing, there is no obligation for that capability to be provided during an actual event.

Test results for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year when netted, demonstrate an overall capability of 103 percent of the RPM commitment. Underlying this are 933 MW UCAP of testing deficiencies assessed to individual resources. Testing results for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year also showed a marked difference in performance between CSP and EDC or utility-operated programs. As a general matter, the overall over performance of the EDC program resources offset the overall under performance of non-utility providers in the 2024/2025 Delivery Year. Table 6-20 contrasts the testing performance of resources from utility versus non-utility providers for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year.

81 OATT Attachment K, § 8.5.
82 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 9.1.6, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).
83 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 4.8.2, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

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Table 6-20 Testing Performance: CSP vs EDC Providers

| Provider Type | RPM Commitment MW UCAP | Test Performance MW UCAP | Percent |
|---|---|---|---|
| CSP | 6,782.6 | 6,396.5 | 94% |
| EDC | 920.4 | 1,540.8 | 167% |
| Overall | 7,703.1 | 7,937.3 | 103% |

## Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response Energy Payments

Emergency and pre-emergency demand response dispatched during a load management event by PJM are eligible to receive emergency energy payments if registered under the full program option. The full program option includes an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event for demand response events and capacity payments.[84] There are 98.9 percent of nominated MW for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year registered under the full program option. There are 1.1 percent of nominated MW for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year registered as capacity only option. The strike price is set by the CSP before the delivery year starts and cannot be changed during the delivery year. The demand resource energy payments are equal to the higher of hourly zonal LMP or the strike price energy offer made by the participant, including a dollar per MWh minimum dispatch price and an associated shutdown cost. Demand resources should not be permitted to offer above $1,000 per MWh without cost justification or to include a shortage penalty in the offer. FERC has stated clearly that demand resources in the capacity market must verify costs above $1,000 per MWh, unless they are capacity only: "We clarify, however, that reforms adopted in this Final Rule, which provide that resources are eligible to submit cost-based incremental energy offers in excess of $1,000/MWh and require that those offers be verified, do not apply to capacity-only demand response resources that do not submit incremental energy offers in energy markets."[85] PJM interprets the scarcity pricing rules to allow a maximum DR energy price of $1,849 per MWh for the 2021/2022 Delivery Year.[86] [87] Demand resources registered with the full option should be required to verify energy offers in excess of $1,000 per MWh. PJM does not require such verification.[88] The MMU recommends that the maximum offer for demand resources be the same as the maximum offer for generation resources and that the same cost verification rules applied to generation resources apply to demand resources.

Shutdown costs for demand response resources are not adequately defined in Manual 15. PJM's Cost Development Subcommittee (CDS) approved changes to Manual 15 to eliminate shutdown costs for demand response resources participating in the synchronized reserve market, but not demand resources or economic resources.[89]

84 *Id.*
85 161 FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 8 (2017).

86 139 FERC ¶ 61,057 (2012).
87 FERC accepted proposed changes to have the maximum strike price for 30 minute demand response to be $1,000/MWh + 1*Shortage penalty - $1.00, for 60 minute demand response to be $1,000/MWh + (Shortage Penalty/2) and for 120 minute demand response to be $1,100/MWh from ER14-822-000.
88 OATT Attachment K Appendix § 1.10.1A Day-Ahead Energy Market Scheduling (d) (x).
89 "PJM Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines," § 8.1, Rev. 47 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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Table 6-21 shows the distribution of registrations and associated MW in the emergency full option across ranges of minimum dispatch prices for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. The majority of participants, 76.0 percent of locations and 43.8 percent of nominated MW, had a minimum dispatch price between $1,550 and $1,849 per MWh, the maximum price allowed for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. Almost all registrations, 99.7 percent of locations and 98.0 percent of nominated MW have a dispatch price above $1,000 per MWh. The shutdown cost of resources with $0 to $1,000 per MWh strike prices had the highest average at $175.34 per location, while the shutdown cost of resources with $1,000 to $1,275 per MWh strike prices had the highest average at $87.63 per nominated MW .

**Table 6-21 Distribution of registrations and associated MW in the full option across ranges of minimum dispatch: 2025/2026 Delivery Year**

| Ranges of Strike Prices ($/MWh) | Locations | Percent of Total | Nominated MW (ICAP) | Percent of Total | Shutdown Cost per Location | Shutdown Cost Per Nominated MW (ICAP) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $0-$1,000 | 59 | 0.3% | 156.1 | 2.0% | $175.34 | $66.25 |
| $1,000-$1,275 | 4,461 | 21.5% | 3,789.2 | 47.9% | $74.44 | $87.63 |
| $1,275-$1,550 | 447 | 2.2% | 497.1 | 6.3% | $0.21 | $0.19 |
| $1,550-$1,849 | 15,740 | 76.0% | 3,460.8 | 43.8% | $11.15 | $50.69 |
| Total | 20,707 | 100.0% | 7,903.3 | 100.0% | $25.01 | $65.53 |

Table 6-22 shows the distribution of registrations and associated MW in the emergency full option across ranges of minimum dispatch prices for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The majority of participants, 86.8 percent of locations and 51.2 percent of nominated MW, have a minimum dispatch price between $1,550 and $1,849 per MWh, the maximum price allowed for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. Almost all registrations, 99.9 percent of locations and 98.9 percent of nominated MW have a dispatch price above $1,000 per MWh. The shutdown cost of resources with $1,000 to $1,275 per MWh strike prices have the highest average at $98.28 per location and $101.26 per nominated MW.

**Table 6-22 Distribution of registrations and associated MW in the full option across ranges of minimum dispatch: 2026/2027 Delivery Year**

| Ranges of Strike Prices ($/MWh) | Locations | Percent of Total | Nominated MW (ICAP) | Percent of Total | Shutdown Cost per Location | Shutdown Cost Per Nominated MW (ICAP) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $0-$1,000 | 30 | 0.1% | 77.5 | 1.1% | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| $1,000-$1,275 | 3,088 | 11.2% | 2,997.0 | 41.7% | $98.28 | $101.26 |
| $1,275-$1,550 | 514 | 1.9% | 431.4 | 6.0% | $0.18 | $0.21 |
| $1,550-$1,849 | 23,949 | 86.8% | 3,673.5 | 51.2% | $6.75 | $44.02 |
| Total | 27,581 | 100.0% | 7,179.5 | 100.0% | $16.87 | $64.81 |

## PRD

Price Responsive Demand, or PRD, in the capacity market is capacity based on a firm commitment to reduce load in response to a defined level of real-time energy prices. A PRD offer is a commitment to reduce energy usage by a defined amount in response to real time energy prices during the delivery year. A PRD offer includes MW quantities that the seller will reduce at defined capacity market reservation prices ($/MW-day). PRD offers change the shape of the VRR Curves used in the capacity market auctions.

PRD is provided by a PJM member that represents retail customers that have the ability to reduce load in response to price. In order to be eligible as PRD, the End Use Customer load must be served under a dynamic retail rate or contractual arrangement linked to, or based upon, a PJM real-time LMP trigger at a substation as electrically close as practical to the applicable load. In order for load to be eligible to be considered as PRD, the end-use customer load must be subject to Supervisory Control as defined in the RAA.[90] End Use Customer loads identified may not sell any other form of demand side management in PJM markets.

PRD must also be curtailed once PJM has declared a Performance Assessment Interval but only if the real-time LMP at the applicable location meets or exceeds the price on the submitted PRD curve at which the load has committed to curtail. The high PRD strike prices mean that PRD could avoid a performance requirement even during a PAI.

90 "PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market," § 3A.3, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

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In order to commit PRD for a delivery year, a PRD Provider must submit a PRD Plan in advance of the Base Residual Auction which indicates the Nominal PRD Value in MW that the PRD Provider is willing to commit at different reservation prices expressed in ($/MW-day). Additional PRD may participate in the Third Incremental Auction only if the LDA final peak load forecast for the delivery year increases relative to the LDA preliminary peak load forecast used for the Base Residual Auction.

Unlike other capacity resources, once committed, PRD may not be uncommitted or replaced by available capacity resources or Excess Commitment Credits. A PRD Provider may transfer the PRD obligation to another PRD Provider bilaterally. The PRD Provider will receive a Daily PRD Credit ($/MW-day) during the delivery year. A PRD Provider under the FRR Alternative will not be eligible to receive a Daily PRD Credit ($/MW-day) during the delivery year. PRD first cleared the capacity market in the BRA for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year.[91] Table 6-23 shows the Nominated MW of Price Responsive Demand for the 2020/2021 through 2026/2027 Delivery Years.

### Table 6-23 Nominated MW of price responsive demand: 2020/2021 through 2026/2027 Delivery Years

| Delivery Year | RTO | MAAC | EMAAC | SWMAAC | DPL SOUTH | PEPCO | BGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020/2021 | 558.0 | 558.0 | 58.0 | 500.0 | 27.0 | 170.0 | 330.0 |
| 2021/2022 | 510.0 | 510.0 | 75.0 | 435.0 | 35.7 | 195.0 | 240.0 |
| 2022/2023 | 230.0 | 230.0 | 40.0 | 190.0 | 19.6 | 110.0 | 80.0 |
| 2023/2024 | 235.0 | 235.0 | 38.0 | 197.0 | 15.4 | 110.0 | 87.0 |
| 2024/2025 | 305.0 | 305.0 | 35.0 | 270.0 | 13.0 | 110.0 | 160.0 |
| 2025/2026 | 224.0 | 224.0 | 14.0 | 210.0 | 0.0 | 75.0 | 135.0 |
| 2026/2027 | 115.0 | 115.0 | 0.0 | 115.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 115.0 |

The cleared PRD is credited the adjusted zonal clearing price of the LDA in which they cleared. The PRD credits are charged to the load of those LDAs by inclusion in the RPM net load price A PRD Provider receives a PRD Credit for each approved Price Responsive Demand registration on a given day. PRD Credits are determined as:[92]

*PRD Credit*
*= [(Share of Zonal Nominal PRD Value committed in Base Residual Auction*
** (Zonal Weather*
*– Normalized Peak Load for the summer concluding prior to the commencement of the Delivery Year*
*/ Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year)*
** Final Zonal RPM Scaling Factor * FPR * Final Zonal Capacity Price)*

*plus*

*(Share of Zonal Nominal PRD Value committed in Third Incremental Auction*
** (Zonal Weather*
*– Normalized Peak Load for the summer concluding prior to the commencement of the Delivery Year*
*/ Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year)*
** Final Zonal RPM Scaling Factor * FPR * Final Zonal Capacity Price*
** Third Incremental Auction Component of Final Zonal Capacity Price stated as a Percentage)]*

Effective with the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, the factor equal to (Zonal Weather-Normalized Peak Load for the summer concluding prior to the commencement of the Delivery Year / Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast for the delivery year) is eliminated in the calculation of the PRD Credit.

Table 6-24 shows the PRD Credits for the 2020/2021 through 2026/2027 Delivery Years.[93]

### Table 6-24 PRD Credits for 2020/2021 through 2026/2027 Delivery Years

| Delivery Year | PRD Credit |
|---|---|
| 2020/2021 | $23,649,865.05 |
| 2021/2022 | $38,282,769.14 |
| 2022/2023 | $10,702,158.12 |
| 2023/2024 | $6,169,725.27 |
| 2024/2025 | $10,782,581.08 |
| 2025/2026 | $30,460,192.15 |
| 2026/2027 | $1,101,918.87 |

A PRD Provider with a daily commitment compliance shortfall in a subzone/zone for RPM or FRR is assessed a Daily PRD Commitment Compliance Penalty. The Daily PRD Commitment Compliance Penalty is determined as:

*PRD Commitment Compliance Penalty*
*= MW shortfall in the Sub – zone/ Zone*
** Delivery Year Forecast Pool Requirement*
** PRD Commitment Compliance Penalty Rate*

91 There were a total of 558 MW of cleared PRD in the 2020/2021 Delivery Year. See PJM Auction Results, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2020-2021-base-residual-auction-results.ashx?la=en>.

92 PJM. "Manual 18: Capacity Market," § 9.4.4, Rev. 62 (December 17, 2025).

93 The total credits for PRD were downloaded as of July 8, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.



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The revenue collected from assessment of the PRD Commitment Compliance Penalty is distributed to all entities that committed Capacity Resources in the RPM Auctions for the relevant delivery year, based on each entity's prorata share of daily revenues from Capacity Market Clearing Prices in such auctions, net of any daily compliance charges incurred by such entity.

PRD committed in RPM for the current delivery year bids in the PJM Energy Market. PRD Curves may be submitted by PRD Providers in the PJM Energy Market by 1100 at the closing of the day-ahead bid period. PRD Curves submitted by PRD Providers are identified in the day-ahead market software and user interface. PRD bids are modeled in the real-time energy market only, and are modeled in the real-time dispatch algorithms. PRD curves are not modeled in the day-ahead market clearing process. PRD Curves in the energy market are modeled in the real-time dispatch algorithms and can set real-time LMP. PRD Providers with committed PRD are required to have automation of PRD that is needed to respond to real-time LMPs for the PRD Curves that are submitted. The maximum bid price of the PRD Curve is the applicable energy market offer cap plus the shortage penalty, or $1,849 per MWh. When PRD sellers offer at the cap, they limit the number of times that PRD is called on to respond. The ability to use the strike price which is above the maximum offer for generation resources and above the energy market price for most intervals permits PRD to economically withhold and renders the PRD resources effectively worthless under almost all circumstances.

On February 7, 2019, PJM filed revisions to its Open Access Transmission Tariff and the Reliability Assurance Agreement to update the rules and requirements for PRD to conform to those for Capacity Performance Resources.[94] PJM's filing sought to change the calculation of the Nominal PRD Value used for determining the PRD Credit from the reduction in load during PJM's annual peak to the lesser of summer and winter load reductions. The proposed changes were intended to ensure that PRD will be available to curtail the same quantity of MW in either the summer or the winter consistent with the requirements of Capacity Performance Resources. In an order issued June 27, 2019, the Commission rejected PJM's proposal finding that it was unjust and unreasonable to calculate the Nominal PRD Value in a manner inconsistent with how an LSE's capacity obligation is determined, and therefore saw no need for consistency between the PRD requirements and the requirements for capacity resources.[95] While treated as an annual product, PRD resources are largely comprised of utility retail programs designed to reduce electric load during periods of high load and/or high wholesale energy prices during the summer season. PRD resources consequently performed poorly when called upon during Winter Storm Elliott for the small number of intervals in which LMP exceeded the strike price.[96]

The PRD rules fall short of defining an effective and efficient product that is aligned with the definition of a capacity resource.[97] PJM's initial filing was rejected by the Commission based on the MMU's comments and PJM's modified filing was accepted.[98] PJM's final filing adopted the MMU's recommendation to exclude the use of Winter Peak Load (WPL) when calculating the nominated MW for PRD resources used to satisfy RPM commitments. Load is allocated capacity obligations based on the annual peak load within PJM. The amount of capacity allocated to load is a function solely of summer coincident peak demand and is unaffected by winter demand. Use of the WPL to calculate the nominated MW for PRD resources to satisfy RPM commitments, would incorrectly restrict PRD to less than the total capacity the customer is required to buy. PJM's adoption of the MMU recommendation correctly values PRD nominated MW. FERC required and PJM's filing also adopted the MMU's recommendation that PRD should be eligible for bonus performance payments during Performance Assessment Intervals (PAI) only when PRD resources respond above their nominated MW value. Allowing PRD resources to collect bonus payments at times when they are not even required to meet their basic obligation would be inconsistent with the basic CP construct as it applies to all other CP resources.[99]

PJM's filing still fell short of completely aligning PRD with the definition of capacity. PRD resources do not have to respond during a PAI if the PRD's trigger price is above LMP during the PAI. All other CP resources have the obligation to perform during a PAI, regardless of the real-time LMP, subject

94 See "Proposed Amendments to Price Response Demand Rules", Docket No. ER19-1012-000 (Feb. 7, 2019).

95 167 FERC ¶ 61,268

96 See the *2023 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 6: Demand Response, Table 6--49.

97 See "Compliance Filing Regarding Price Responsive Demand Rules," Docket No. ER20-271-001 (February 28, 2020).

98 See "Order Rejecting Tariff Revisions," Docket No. ER19-1012-000 (June 27, 2019).

99 October 31 Filing, Attachment B, Proposed Revised OATT § 10A (c).

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to instructions from PJM. PRD should be held to the same standard during a PAI event. The MMU recommends that PRD be required to respond during a PAI, regardless of whether the real-time LMP at the applicable location meet or exceeds the PRD strike price, to be consistent with all CP resources.

## Load Management Event – Winter Storm Fern

PJM dispatched pre-emergency load management in the BGE, DOM and PEPCO zones during Winter Storm Fern on January 25, 2026. Long lead time (120 minute), short lead-time (60 minute) and quick lead time (30 minute) pre-emergency resources were dispatched. PJM never declared a level EEA2 emergency, the requirement for deployment of emergency demand response resources, and therefore only dispatched pre-emergency demand resources.[100]

Table 6-25 shows the deployment and release times, by lead time, for January 25, 2026.

### Table 6-25 Demand Resource Deployment and Release Times: January 25, 2026

| Deploy Time (EPT) | Release Time ( EPT) | Resource Type | Lead Time | Zones |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1430 | 1900 | Pre-emergency | 120 minute | BGE, DOM, PEPCO |
| 1530 | 1900 | Pre-emergency | 60 minute | BGE, DOM, PEPCO |
| 1500 | 1900 | Pre-emergency | 30 minute | BGE, DOM, PEPCO |

The emergency procedures employed during January 25, 2026, did not trigger a PAI. There are no penalties for demand resources failing to perform outside of a PAI.

Load management resources overall failed to perform to their committed ICAP level during the January 25, 2026, dispatch event. Load management resources were evaluated based on whether they were successful in reducing their metered load to their nominated Firm Service Level (FSL). The Customer Base Line (CBL) is an hourly estimate of what the load level of a demand resource would have been in the absence of a demand response event. The expected hourly reduction of each resource is defined as the difference between the CBL and the FSL, to which they are required to reduce. The actual hourly reduction is defined as the difference between the CBL and the metered load of the resource adjusted for losses. The performance metric is the actual reduction divided by the required reduction from actual load to FSL:

$$MMU\ Performance\ Metric = \frac{(CBL - Meter)}{(CBL - FSL)}$$

*where*

$$Actual\ reduction = CBL - Meter$$
$$Expected\ reduction = CBL - FSL$$

The metric is (CBL – Metered Load) / (CBL – FSL), adjusted for losses. If a resource reduces to its FSL, then its actual reduction equals its expected reduction. This metric provides a better assessment of actual demand response performance than simply comparing metered load to FSL.

In contrast, PJM defines the actual hourly reduction as the difference between the PLC and the metered load. PLC is the defined peak load and not the actual load. PJM defines the actual hourly reduction using the PLC rather than the actual load level (CBL). PJM's metric is (PLC – Metered Load)/(PLC – FSL). PJM's metric does not measure the actual load reduction or the target load reduction correctly. The PJM performance metric is the difference between the peak load and the actual load divided by the difference between the peak load and the level to which the load agreed to reduce:

$$Simplified\ PJM\ Performance\ Metric = \frac{(PLC - Meter)}{(PLC - FSL)}$$

*where*

$$ICAP = PLC - FSL$$

During Winter Storm Elliott, demand resource loads were already at a reduced level when dispatched. While deemed to have generally met their ICAP commitments, there was very little incremental reduction provided in order to reach their FSL. The difference between CBL and FSL provides a better estimate of the expected and actual incremental reduction. If a dispatched registration has a CBL equal to or less than the FSL, the expected incremental reduction is zero. Based on this metric, demand resources provided 58.1 percent

100 OATT Attachment K, Section 8.5.


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
of their expected reduction on January 25, 2026.[101] Table 6-26 summarizes these results.

### Table 6-26 Demand Resource Expected and Actual Performance: January 25, 2026

| Date | Actual Reduction (MWh) | Expected Reduction (MWh) | Percent Performance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 25-Jan-26 | 1,538 | 2,649 | 58.1% |
| Total | 1,538 | 2,649 | 58.1% |


Figure 6-2 shows the hourly expected and actual reduction values for January 25, 2026.

### Figure 6-2 Hourly demand resource expected and actual performance: January 25, 2026




The failure of demand resources overall to perform to their committed ICAP level is further evidenced by comparing the metered load relative to the Peak Load Contribution (PLC) and Firm Service Level (FSL). Figure 6-3 shows the aggregate load, FSL, and PLC of the dispatched demand resources on the day of the event. The green and red vertical lines correspond to the deploy and release times indicated in Table 6-25. There are three start times reflecting the fact that PJM called on the resources by lead time, while all resources were released at 19:00. The group's aggregate load was below its PLC before the event began and load was relatively flat in the hours preceding the event. While there was a reduction in load in response to the dispatch signal, demand resources overall failed to reduce load to their FSL during the period they were dispatched. Demand resources are expected to reduce to their FSL when dispatched. failed

### Figure 6-3 Demand resource metered load compared to PLC and FSL: January 25, 2026




101 The MMU assumes a CBL equivalent to the metered load for hours when a registration did not request an energy settlement.

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Load management demand resources are compensated at real-time LMP for their defined load reduction. Load management demand resources are paid an emergency load response energy credit equal to their defined load reduction multiplied by the real-time LMP. Load management demand resources are also paid the difference between LMP and their strike price plus shutdown costs, the euphemistically titled emergency load response make whole credit:

*Total Emergency Energy Revenue*
*= Daily Load Response Emergency Credits*
*+ Emergency Load Response Make Whole Credit*

*where,*

*Emergency Load Response Make Whole Credit*
*= Emergency Bid cost + Emergency Shutdown cost*
*− Daily Load Response Emergency Credits*

Table 6-27 shows the daily emergency energy payments to load management demand resources for January 25, 2026.[102] Real-time LMP was sufficient to cover 68 percent of the total emergency energy payments with the remainder compensated through make whole credits. These energy payments are in addition to the capacity market revenues received by load management demand resources. For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, capacity market revenues paid to load management demand resources average $55.5 million per month.

**Table 6-27 Demand resource emergency energy payments: January 25, 2026**

| Date | Real-Time Actual Relief (MWh) | Average Emergency Bid Price ($/MWh) | Average Emergency Shutdown Cost | Average LMP ($/MWh) | Emergency Load Response Energy Credit | Emergency Load Response Energy Make-Whole Credit | Total Emergency Energy Revenue | Average Total Payment ($/MWh) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25-Jan-26 | 1,794 | $1,644 | $15 | $725 | $1,301,011 | $609,075 | $1,910,086 | $1,065 |

PJM stated that the demand side performance issues in the summer of 2025 required modifications to the nonperformance penalties applicable to demand side resources.[103] PJM's proposed solution was to institute Tariff and RAA changes to assess nonperformance penalties to demand resources when they are dispatched during non-Performance Assessment Interval (non-PAI) events at a rate equal to 50 percent of the existing Performance Assessment Interval (PAI) penalty rate.[104] FERC approved PJM's proposed changes on June 26, 2026, effective June 27, 2026, ahead of the 2028/2029 BRA.[105]

PJM's proposed penalty rate of 50 percent of the PAI penalty rate is ineffective at incenting performance. Demand resources that completely fail to perform are profitable under PJM's penalty. This non-PAI penalty structure also makes little sense when considering the aim of penalizing poor performing resources. PJM's proposed non-PAI penalty structure for demand response resources imposes significantly higher penalties for failing a test event than for failing to perform during an actual emergency dispatch. It is irrational to assign greater financial consequences to a test failure in a simulated environment than to a failure during a real reliability event.

PJM's approach allocates the penalty charges collected during non-PAI events as bonus payments to defined overperforming demand resources. If penalty charges from underperforming demand resources are greater than the bonus payments to overperformers, the residual amount would be allocated to load on a pro-rata basis. The MMU recommends paying the penalty payments to the customers who paid for the demand resources and therefore bore the cost of the nonperformance.

PJM's performance metric and penalty approach are both incorrect and together do not function as an effective incentive for demand resources to perform.

PJM's performance metric relies on the peak load contribution (PLC) as the counterfactual value to represent what demand would have been in absence of the event. The PLC is a static value that is not based on conditions specific to or load trends prior to the event. This can lead to an incorrectly estimated counterfactual, registrations may be compensated for demand reductions that did not occur, and is in direct conflict with the tariff's requirement that

102 Actual relief (MWh) and revenues reflect performance beginning at the time the demand response registration is dispatched, adjusted for its applicable lead time, and continuing through the conclusion of the event.

103 See PJM. MIC. *Approved Minutes from the Market Implementation Committee,* (December 3, 2025). <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2025/20251203/20251203-minutes.pdf>.

104 See PJM. MIC. "*Options & Packages Matrix – Load Management & Price Responsive Demand Event Performance,*" (March 3, 2026). <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2026/20260311/20260311-item-02-4---options--packages-matrix---load-management--price-responsive-demand-event-performance.xls>.

105 195 FERC ¶ 61,253 (2026).



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dispatched registrations reduce their demand.[106] [107] For example, a resource that actually increases its demand during an event would be assessed as a positive performer as long as their demand stays below the PLC. The MMU recommends using the customer baseline (CBL) in place of the PLC. PJM already relies on the CBL for economic settlements. The CBL is intended to be an estimate of counterfactual demand, what demand would have been but for the reduction. The PLC is not an estimate of counterfactual demand. The CBL takes into account the impact of time, demand prior to the event, and other relevant external conditions.

PJM's performance metric zeroes out negative performance. PJM considers a registration that increases its demand during an event to have a zero percent performance, regardless of the impact. Registrations with a negative performance should be penalized for increasing their demand in response for a PJM dispatch call to reduce demand. An actual increase in demand is worse than a simple failure to reduce, during the tight system conditions that lead to the dispatch of pre-emergency and emergency load management resources. It is impossible to assess the performance of the group if registrations whose increases in demand would have cancelled out the positive performance of other registrations are not fully accounted for.

PJM allows curtailment service providers (CSPs) to net the performance of their registrations across the entire PJM footprint. Netting masks poor performers and local impacts, which can vary by location.

Together, PJM's proposal combines a flawed penalty structure with the incorrectly defined performance metric to create a paradigm in which PJM customers both pay for a demand reduction service that is not delivered and are denied compensation for that failure when penalty revenues are paid to demand resources rather than load.

## Economic Demand Response

The Economic Demand Response Program is for demand response customers that offer into the day-ahead or real-time energy market.[108] The estimated load reduction is paid the zonal LMP, as long as the zonal LMP is greater than the monthly Net Benefits Test threshold.

## Market Structure

Table 6-28 shows the average hourly HHI for each month and the average hourly HHI for January 1, 2025, through June 30, 2026.[109] The ownership of economic demand response resources was highly concentrated in the first six months of 2025 and 2026.[110] Table 6-28 lists the share of reported reductions provided by, and the share of credits claimed by the four largest CSPs in each year. The HHI for economic demand response was highly concentrated in the first six months of 2026. The HHI for economic demand response in the first six months of 2026 increased by 148, 1.7 percent, from 8631 in the first six months of 2025 to 8779 in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 6-28 Average hourly MWh HHI and market concentration in the economic program: January 2025 through June 2026[111]

| | Average Hourly MWh HHI | | | Top Four CSPs Share of Reduction | | | Top Four CSPs Share of Credit | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change in Percent | 2025 | 2026 | Change in Percent |
| Jan | 8382 | 8849 | 5.6% | | 100.0% | | | 100.0% | |
| Feb | 8017 | 7965 | (0.7%) | | 100.0% | | | 100.0% | |
| Mar | 8510 | 7960 | (6.5%) | | 100.0% | | | 100.0% | |
| Apr | 8547 | 9385 | 9.8% | | 100.0% | | | 100.0% | |
| May | 8944 | 8512 | (4.8%) | | 100.0% | | | 100.0% | |
| Jun | 9383 | 10000 | 6.6% | | | | | | |
| Jul | 9142 | | | | | | | | |
| Aug | 9198 | | | | | | | | |
| Sep | 9195 | | | | | | | | |
| Oct | 9400 | | | | | | | | |
| Nov | 8121 | | | | | | | | |
| Dec | 7745 | | | 100.0% | | | 100.0% | | |
| Total | 8969 | 8526 | (4.9%) | 100.0% | 100.0% | | 100.0% | 0.0% | |

106 See PJM OATT, Attachment K, Section 8.5.
107 See PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, RAA, Definition of "Firm Service Level".
108 Also known in the PJM Market Rules as the Economic Load Response Program.
109 Load response credits and reductions were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.
110 All HHI calculations in this section are at the parent company level.
111 Omitted reduction and credit share values are based on confidentiality rules that require published data to include more than four owners.

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## Market Performance

Table 6-29 shows the total MW reported reductions made by participants in the economic program and the total credits paid for these reported reductions in January through June, 2010 through 2026.[112] The average credits per MWh paid increased by $125.33 per MWh, 213.2 percent, from $58.79 per MWh in the first six months of 2025 to $184.11 per MWh in the first six months of 2026. Curtailed energy for the economic program was 100,055 MWh in the first six months of 2026, a decrease of 175,604 MWh, 63.7 percent, as compared to curtailed energy for the economic program in the first six months of 2025. Total credits paid for the economic load response program in the first six months of 2026 were $18,421,569, an increase of $2,216,843, 13.7 percent, compared to the total credits paid for the economic load response program in the first six months of 2025.


### Table 6-29 Credits paid to economic program participants: January through June, 2010 through 2026

| (Jan-Jun) | Total MWh | Total Credits | $/MWh |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 20,225 | $761,854 | $37.67 |
| 2011 | 9,055 | $1,456,324 | $160.84 |
| 2012 | 38,692 | $2,172,454 | $56.15 |
| 2013 | 48,711 | $2,559,831 | $52.55 |
| 2014 | 82,273 | $14,298,502 | $173.79 |
| 2015 | 65,653 | $5,576,152 | $84.93 |
| 2016 | 35,559 | $1,381,972 | $38.86 |
| 2017 | 30,954 | $1,281,762 | $41.41 |
| 2018 | 29,155 | $1,566,879 | $53.74 |
| 2019 | 12,964 | $548,988 | $42.35 |
| 2020 | 2,342 | $57,078 | $24.37 |
| 2021 | 5,876 | $318,723 | $54.24 |
| 2022 | 16,633 | $1,416,246 | $85.14 |
| 2023 | 17,610 | $882,334 | $50.10 |
| 2024 | 66,227 | $4,355,242 | $65.76 |
| 2025 | 275,659 | $16,204,726 | $58.79 |
| 2026 | 100,055 | $18,421,569 | $184.11 |

Economic demand response resources that are dispatched by PJM in both the economic and emergency programs are paid the higher price defined in the emergency rules.[113] For example, assume a demand resource has an economic offer price of $100 per MWh and an emergency strike price of $1,800 per MWh. If this resource were scheduled to reduce in the day-ahead energy market, the demand resource would receive $100 per MWh, but if an emergency event were called during the economic dispatch, the demand resource would receive its emergency strike price of $1,800 per MWh instead. The rationale for this rule is not clear.[114] All other resources that clear in the day-ahead market are financially firm at the clearing price. Payment at a guaranteed strike price and the ability to set energy market prices at the strike price effectively grant the seller the right to exercise market power.

Figure 6-4 shows monthly economic demand response credits and MWh, from 2010 through June 30, 2026.

### Figure 6-4 Economic program credits and MWh by month: 2010 through June 2026




112 Load response credits were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.

113 "PJM. Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 10.4.5, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).

114 *Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, Order No. 831, 157 FERC ¶ 61,115 (2016) ("Order No. 831").



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Table 6-30 shows performance for January through June, 2025 and 2026 in the economic program by control zone. Total reported reductions under the economic program decreased by 175,604 MWh, 63.7 percent, from 275,659 MWh in the first six months of 2025 to 100,055 MWh in the first six months of 2026. Total revenue under the economic program increased by $2.2 million, 13.7 percent, from $16.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $18.4 million in the first six months of 2026.[115]

Emergency and economic demand response energy payments are uplift and not compensated by LMP revenues. Economic demand response energy costs are assigned to real-time exports from the PJM Region and real-time loads in each zone for which the load-weighted average real-time LMP for the hour during which the reduction occurred is greater than the price determined under the net benefits test for that month.[116] The zonal allocation is shown in Table 6-30.

### Table 6-30 Economic program participation by zone: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Credits | | | MWh Reductions | | | Credits per MWh Reduction | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change |
| AECO | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| AEP | $6,342,943.37 | $6,237,136.55 | (1.7%) | 111,573 | 53,276 | (52.3%) | $56.85 | $117.07 | 105.9% |
| APS | $592,420.94 | $9,245,052.98 | 1,460.6% | 14,142 | 19,617 | 38.7% | $41.89 | $471.27 | 1,025.0% |
| ATSI | $2,797,136.08 | $2,330,725.65 | (16.7%) | 21,554 | 20,550 | (4.7%) | $129.77 | $113.42 | (12.6%) |
| BGE | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| COMED | $26,466.37 | ($2.62) | (100.0%) | 764 | 0 | (100.0%) | $34.66 | ($58.61) | (269.1%) |
| DAY | ($4,695.51) | $823.95 | (117.5%) | 0 | 4 | NA | NA | $192.50 | NA |
| DEOK | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| DUQ | $6,302,458.42 | $420,819.69 | (93.3%) | 126,508 | 5,011 | (96.0%) | $49.82 | $83.98 | 68.6% |
| DOM | $62,955.91 | $72,929.46 | 15.8% | 254 | 143 | (43.6%) | $247.86 | $509.25 | 105.5% |
| DPL | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| JCPL | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| METED | $0.00 | $13,143.80 | NA | 0 | 74 | NA | NA | $177.55 | NA |
| OVEC | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| PECO | $19,649.29 | $12,730.75 | (35.2%) | 323 | 148 | (54.3%) | $60.76 | $86.19 | 41.8% |
| PENELEC | $0.00 | $45,933.07 | NA | 0 | 771 | NA | NA | $59.54 | NA |
| PEPCO | $2,064.47 | $2,118.98 | 2.6% | 28 | 28 | 0.5% | $73.75 | $75.33 | 2.1% |
| PPL | $4,322.54 | $0.00 | NA | 22 | 0 | NA | $196.74 | NA | NA |
| PSEG | $59,004.58 | $40,156.76 | (31.9%) | 491 | 432 | (12.1%) | $120.19 | $93.03 | (22.6%) |
| REC | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Total | $16,204,726.47 | $18,421,569.04 | 13.7% | 275,659 | 100,055 | (63.7%) | $58.79 | $184.11 | 213.2% |

115 Economic demand response reductions that are submitted to PJM for payment but have not received payment are not included in Table 6-42. Payments for Economic demand response reductions are settled monthly.
116 "PJM Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting," § 11.2.2, Rev. 104 (March 1, 2026).

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Table 6-31 shows average reported MWh reductions and credits by hour for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The average LMP during Load Response is the reduction weighted average hourly DA or RT load-weighted LMP during the economic load response hour. In the first six months of 2025, 60.7 percent of the reported reductions and 60.5 percent of credits occurred in hours ending 0900 EPT to 2100 EPT, and in the first six months of 2026, 53.6 percent of the reported reductions and 52.3 percent of credits occurred in hours ending 0900 EPT to 2100 EPT. The average LMP during load response increased by $89.47 per MWh, 159.0 percent, from $56.25 per MWh in the first six months of 2025 to $145.72 per MWh in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 6-31 Hourly frequency distribution of economic program reported MWh reductions and credits: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | MWh Reductions | | | Program Credits | | | Average LMP during Load Response | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hour Ending (EPT) | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change |
| 1 through 6 | 40,128 | 21,620 | (46%) | $2,225,218 | $4,242,984 | 91% | $49.80 | $145.63 | 192% |
| 7 | 13,844 | 5,538 | (60%) | $919,457 | $1,038,512 | 13% | $63.61 | $164.86 | 159% |
| 8 | 14,691 | 5,498 | (63%) | $1,039,228 | $1,090,986 | 5% | $70.74 | $173.01 | 145% |
| 9 | 12,789 | 4,707 | (63%) | $746,275 | $843,536 | 13% | $52.52 | $140.14 | 167% |
| 10 | 11,127 | 3,840 | (65%) | $579,404 | $633,603 | 9% | $47.68 | $117.99 | 147% |
| 11 | 11,312 | 4,140 | (63%) | $603,779 | $709,394 | 17% | $49.72 | $127.14 | 156% |
| 12 | 11,166 | 3,866 | (65%) | $584,900 | $691,502 | 18% | $47.10 | $127.39 | 170% |
| 13 | 11,220 | 3,665 | (67%) | $588,288 | $618,357 | 5% | $46.84 | $121.72 | 160% |
| 14 | 10,933 | 3,229 | (70%) | $588,256 | $596,719 | 1% | $47.06 | $121.91 | 159% |
| 15 | 10,024 | 3,270 | (67%) | $499,739 | $581,226 | 16% | $47.93 | $120.70 | 152% |
| 16 | 10,068 | 3,189 | (68%) | $521,186 | $581,426 | 12% | $52.04 | $125.81 | 142% |
| 17 | 11,534 | 3,585 | (69%) | $634,637 | $627,179 | (1%) | $54.87 | $128.74 | 135% |
| 18 | 14,938 | 4,959 | (67%) | $930,984 | $882,195 | (5%) | $65.45 | $141.74 | 117% |
| 19 | 16,796 | 5,010 | (70%) | $1,093,858 | $962,378 | (12%) | $68.20 | $155.55 | 128% |
| 20 | 17,950 | 5,277 | (71%) | $1,231,226 | $1,013,284 | (18%) | $73.68 | $155.90 | 112% |
| 21 | 17,350 | 4,925 | (72%) | $1,193,788 | $896,440 | (25%) | $69.28 | $144.14 | 108% |
| 22 | 15,484 | 4,764 | (69%) | $915,958 | $894,912 | (2%) | $56.90 | $146.31 | 157% |
| 23 through 24 | 24,305 | 8,971 | (63%) | $1,308,546 | $1,516,936 | 16% | $49.13 | $264.28 | 438% |
| Total | 275,659 | 100,055 | (64%) | $16,204,726 | $18,421,569 | 14% | $56.25 | $145.72 | 164% |


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Table 6-32 shows the distribution of economic program reported MWh reductions and credits by ranges of real-time zonal load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2026, 37.0 percent of reported MWh reductions and 79.2 percent of program credits occurred during hours when the applicable zonal LMP was higher than $175 per MWh.

### Table 6-32 Frequency distribution of economic program zonal load-weighted average LMP (By hours): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | MWh Reductions | | | Program Credits | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMP | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change |
| $0 to $25 | 371 | 4 | (99%) | $6,659 | ($147) | (102%) |
| $25 to $50 | 156,439 | 31,950 | (80%) | $6,017,730 | $1,268,722 | (79%) |
| $50 to $75 | 70,207 | 17,182 | (76%) | $4,237,026 | $1,038,799 | (75%) |
| $75 to $100 | 22,119 | 3,134 | (86%) | $1,908,672 | $214,804 | (89%) |
| $100 to $125 | 10,784 | 3,380 | (69%) | $1,194,192 | $267,537 | (78%) |
| $125 to $150 | 5,593 | 3,820 | (32%) | $705,417 | $466,084 | (34%) |
| $150 to $175 | 2,830 | 3,543 | 25% | $443,965 | $576,449 | 30% |
| > $175 | 7,317 | 37,041 | 406% | $1,691,066 | $14,589,322 | 763% |
| Total | 275,659 | 100,055 | (64%) | $16,204,726 | $18,421,569 | 14% |

Economic Load Response revenues are paid by real-time loads and real-time scheduled exports as an uplift charge. Table 6-33 shows the sum of real-time and day-ahead Economic Load Response charges paid in each zone and paid by exports. In the first five months of 2026, DOM Zone has paid the highest Economic Load Response charges.

### Table 6-33 Zonal Economic Load Response charge: January through May, 2026[117]

| Zone | January | February | March | April | May | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AECO | $162,742 | $18,667 | $7,854 | $2,573 | $159 | $191,995 |
| AEP | $2,589,033 | $276,918 | $194,990 | $55,898 | $1,874 | $3,118,713 |
| APS | $996,376 | $106,650 | $69,430 | $18,821 | $669 | $1,191,946 |
| ATSI | $1,116,548 | $118,559 | $87,880 | $24,938 | $893 | $1,348,818 |
| BGE | $629,191 | $68,398 | $45,635 | $11,352 | $471 | $755,048 |
| COMED | $721,302 | $89,212 | $76,538 | $16,846 | $488 | $904,385 |
| DAY | $326,068 | $32,271 | $24,961 | $7,544 | $227 | $391,072 |
| DUKE | $498,030 | $48,468 | $35,539 | $11,372 | $350 | $593,759 |
| DUQ | $212,957 | $23,239 | $16,026 | $4,836 | $186 | $257,244 |
| DOM | $2,611,733 | $286,446 | $187,000 | $55,992 | $1,969 | $3,143,140 |
| DPL | $404,295 | $45,900 | $14,720 | $4,911 | $289 | $470,115 |
| EKPC | $348,404 | $33,003 | $19,806 | $4,918 | $175 | $406,306 |
| JCPLC | $380,822 | $42,307 | $20,408 | $6,210 | $426 | $450,173 |
| MEC | $284,322 | $30,346 | $17,036 | $3,603 | $223 | $335,530 |
| OVEC | $2,122 | $231 | $165 | $45 | $1 | $2,564 |
| PECO | $722,747 | $80,235 | $28,568 | $10,699 | $621 | $842,870 |
| PE | $304,591 | $32,586 | $20,819 | $6,043 | $216 | $364,255 |
| PEPCO | $575,963 | $61,981 | $40,307 | $10,448 | $434 | $689,133 |
| PPL | $807,233 | $85,826 | $40,018 | $9,912 | $559 | $943,548 |
| PSEG | $725,637 | $80,599 | $40,956 | $12,759 | $756 | $860,707 |
| REC | $22,198 | $2,454 | $1,671 | $457 | $27 | $26,808 |
| Exports | $939,078 | $87,414 | $82,211 | $24,377 | $360 | $1,133,440 |
| Total | $15,381,392 | $1,651,712 | $1,072,537 | $304,553 | $11,374 | $18,421,569 |

117 Load response charges were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.

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Table 6-34 shows the total zonal Economic Load Response charge per GWh of real-time load and exports in the first five months of 2026.[118]

### Table 6-34 Zonal economic load response charge per GWh of load and exports: January through May, 2026

| Zone | January | February | March | April | May | Zonal Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AECO | $0.190 | $0.024 | $0.011 | $0.004 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| AEP | $0.187 | $0.023 | $0.017 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.047 |
| APS | $0.195 | $0.024 | $0.018 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.049 |
| ATSI | $0.179 | $0.022 | $0.017 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.045 |
| BGE | $0.204 | $0.025 | $0.020 | $0.006 | $0.000 | $0.051 |
| COMED | $0.084 | $0.013 | $0.011 | $0.003 | $0.000 | $0.022 |
| DAY | $0.193 | $0.023 | $0.018 | $0.006 | $0.000 | $0.048 |
| DUKE | $0.198 | $0.023 | $0.018 | $0.006 | $0.000 | $0.049 |
| DUQ | $0.180 | $0.023 | $0.016 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.045 |
| DOM | $0.200 | $0.025 | $0.018 | $0.006 | $0.000 | $0.050 |
| DPL | $0.208 | $0.026 | $0.010 | $0.004 | $0.000 | $0.050 |
| EKPC | $0.213 | $0.025 | $0.019 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.052 |
| JCPLC | $0.189 | $0.023 | $0.013 | $0.004 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| MEC | $0.189 | $0.023 | $0.014 | $0.003 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| OVEC | $0.175 | $0.021 | $0.017 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.044 |
| PECO | $0.192 | $0.024 | $0.010 | $0.004 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| PE | $0.190 | $0.023 | $0.015 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.047 |
| PEPCO | $0.207 | $0.025 | $0.019 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.051 |
| PPL | $0.193 | $0.023 | $0.012 | $0.003 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| PSEG | $0.189 | $0.023 | $0.013 | $0.004 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| REC | $0.185 | $0.023 | $0.016 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.046 |
| Exports | $0.182 | $0.023 | $0.022 | $0.008 | $0.000 | $0.047 |
| Monthly Average | $0.187 | $0.023 | $0.016 | $0.005 | $0.000 | $0.046 |

Table 6-35 shows the monthly day-ahead and real-time Economic Load Response charges for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. The day-ahead Economic Load Response charges increased by $2.4 million, 14.7 percent, from $16.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to $18.4 million in the first six months of 2026. The real-time Economic Load Response charges decreased $0.14 million, 84.6 percent, from $0.16 million in the first six months of 2025 to $0.02 million in the first six months of 2026.[119]

### Table 6-35 Monthly day-ahead and real-time economic load response charge: January 2025 through June 2026

| | Day-ahead Economic Load Response Charge | | | Real-time Economic Load Response Charge | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change |
| Jan | $4,606,507.89 | $15,360,176.94 | 233.4% | $24,927.49 | $21,215.43 | (14.9%) |
| Feb | $3,044,896.16 | $1,650,544.56 | (45.8%) | $106,924.73 | $1,167.47 | (98.9%) |
| Mar | $2,490,134.89 | $1,071,937 | (57.0%) | $12,265.71 | $600 | (95.1%) |
| Apr | $2,490,668.50 | $303,569 | (87.8%) | $7,972 | $984 | (87.7%) |
| May | $1,289,551.02 | $10,517 | (99.2%) | $6,550 | $858 | (86.9%) |
| Jun | $2,121,483.73 | $0 | (100.0%) | $2,845 | $0 | (100.0%) |
| Jul | $2,739,664.11 | | | | | |
| Aug | $1,233,124.11 | | | | | |
| Sep | $1,145,099.85 | | | | | |
| Oct | $1,708,020.71 | | | | | |
| Nov | $1,461,705.46 | | | | | |
| Dec | $2,054,421.06 | | | | | |
| Total (Jan-Jun) | $16,043,242.18 | $18,396,744.10 | 14.7% | $161,484.28 | $24,824.94 | (84.6%) |

118 Load response charges were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.

119 Load response charges were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates. Economic demand response reductions that are submitted to PJM for payment but have not received payment are not included. Payments for Economic demand response reductions are settled monthly.



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Table 6-36 shows registered sites and MW for the last day of each month for the period January 1, 2022, through June 30, 2026. Registration is a prerequisite for CSPs to participate in the economic program. Average monthly registrations decreased by 21, 3.5 percent, from 579 in the first six months of 2025 to 558 in the first six months of 2026. Average monthly registered MW decreased by 74 MW, 2.4 percent, from 3,123 MW in the first six months of 2025 to 3,049 MW in the first six months of 2026.

Most economic demand response resources are registered in the emergency demand response program. Resources registered in both programs do not need to register for the same amount of MW. There are 165 economic registrations and 171 capacity registrations in the emergency program that share the same location IDs in both programs. There are 1,614.6 nominated economic MW, 53.0 percent of all economic MW and 1461.1 nominated capacity MW, 20.1 percent of all nominated capacity MW in the emergency program that share the same location IDs in both programs.

### Table 6-36 Economic program registrations on the last day of the month: 2022 through June 2026[120]

| | 2022 | | 2023 | | 2024 | | 2025 | | 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Registrations | Registered MW | Registrations | Registered MW | Registrations | Registered MW | Registrations | Registered MW | Registrations | Registered MW |
| Jan | 323 | 2,233 | 347 | 2,874 | 462 | 3,176 | 563 | 2,981 | 575 | 3,063 |
| Feb | 323 | 2,256 | 354 | 2,870 | 472 | 3,299 | 576 | 3,013 | 574 | 3,125 |
| Mar | 330 | 2,377 | 361 | 2,930 | 476 | 3,244 | 587 | 3,166 | 565 | 3,033 |
| Apr | 330 | 2,382 | 373 | 2,932 | 481 | 3,207 | 580 | 3,157 | 571 | 3,133 |
| May | 326 | 2,377 | 378 | 3,006 | 487 | 3,230 | 585 | 3,275 | 547 | 3,088 |
| Jun | 315 | 2,323 | 396 | 2,929 | 501 | 2,942 | 581 | 3,147 | 517 | 2,851 |
| Jul | 310 | 2,412 | 412 | 3,096 | 524 | 3,266 | 581 | 3,139 | | |
| Aug | 318 | 2,451 | 428 | 3,163 | 528 | 3,027 | 576 | 3,157 | | |
| Sep | 329 | 2,565 | 440 | 3,335 | 531 | 3,017 | 582 | 3,246 | | |
| Oct | 333 | 2,575 | 453 | 3,362 | 543 | 2,922 | 597 | 3,260 | | |
| Nov | 338 | 2,593 | 478 | 3,499 | 560 | 2,948 | 586 | 3,223 | | |
| Dec | 359 | 2,640 | 487 | 3,493 | 570 | 2,989 | 576 | 3,095 | | |
| Avg | 328 | 2,432 | 409 | 3,124 | 511 | 3,106 | 581 | 3,155 | 558 | 3,049 |

120 Data for years 2010 through 2017 are available in the *2017 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM.*

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The registered MW in the economic load response program are not a good measure of the MW available for dispatch in the energy market. Economic resources can dispatch up to the amount of MW registered in the program, but are not required to offer any MW. Table 6-37 shows the sum of maximum economic MW dispatched by registration each month from January 1, 2014, through June 30, 2026. The monthly maximum is the sum of each registration's monthly noncoincident maximum dispatched MW and annual maximum is the sum of each registration's annual noncoincident maximum dispatched MW. The monthly maximum dispatched MW decreased 29.5 MW, 9.7 percent, in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.[121]

### Table 6-37 Sum of maximum MW reported reductions for all registrations per month: 2014 through June 2026

| | Sum of Peak MW Reductions for all Registrations per Month | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Jan | 446 | 169 | 139 | 123 | 142 | 88 | 28 | 21 | 34 | 50 | 281 | 404 | 447 |
| Feb | 307 | 336 | 128 | 83 | 70 | 58 | 11 | 86 | 34 | 18 | 102 | 409 | 417 |
| Mar | 369 | 198 | 120 | 111 | 71 | 38 | 12 | 20 | 30 | 53 | 102 | 271 | 295 |
| Apr | 146 | 143 | 118 | 54 | 71 | 41 | 3 | 22 | 43 | 70 | 84 | 245 | 142 |
| May | 151 | 161 | 131 | 169 | 70 | 22 | 12 | 9 | 53 | 141 | 247 | 152 | 263 |
| Jun | 483 | 833 | 121 | 240 | 105 | 26 | 38 | 125 | 110 | 96 | 213 | 342 | 84 |
| Jul | 665 | 1,362 | 1,316 | 936 | 518 | 770 | 135 | 134 | 150 | 309 | 469 | 370 | |
| Aug | 358 | 272 | 249 | 141 | 581 | 33 | 99 | 827 | 162 | 191 | 376 | 198 | |
| Sep | 795 | 816 | 263 | 140 | 112 | 76 | 31 | 35 | 88 | 392 | 223 | 281 | |
| Oct | 214 | 136 | 150 | 88 | 69 | 29 | 9 | 31 | 67 | 80 | 344 | 337 | |
| Nov | 166 | 127 | 116 | 81 | 54 | 35 | 12 | 31 | 58 | 88 | 138 | 289 | |
| Dec | 155 | 122 | 147 | 83 | 11 | 31 | 14 | 19 | 116 | 77 | 315 | 270 | |
| Annual | 1,739 | 1,858 | 1,451 | 1,217 | 758 | 830 | 196 | 921 | 263 | 735 | 616 | 705 | 563 |

Table 6-38 shows total settlements submitted for 2014 through 2026. A settlement is counted for every day on which a registration is dispatched in the economic program.

### Table 6-38 Settlements submitted in the economic program: January through June, 2014 through 2026

| (Jan-Jun) | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Settlements | 1,806 | 1,091 | 652 | 800 | 737 | 426 | 193 | 289 | 849 | 243 | 644 | 1,757 | 1,210 |

Table 6-39 shows the number of CSPs, and the number of participants in their portfolios, submitting settlements for 2014 through 2026. The number of active participants increased by 9, 20.9 percent, from 43 in the first six months of 2025 to 52 in the first six months of 2026. All participants must be registered through a CSP.

### Table 6-39 Participants and CSPs submitting settlements in the economic program by year: January through June, 2014 through 2026

| (Jan-Jun) | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active CSPs | 17 | 12 | 6 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Active Participants | 144 | 68 | 20 | 42 | 30 | 24 | 17 | 30 | 23 | 12 | 28 | 43 | 52 |

121 Maximum MW reductions were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.


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## Issues

FERC Order No. 831 requires that each RTO/ISO market monitoring unit verify all energy offers above $1,000 per MWh.[122] Economic resources offer into the energy market and must provide supporting documentation to offer above $1,000 per MWh. FERC stated, "[t]he offer cap reforms, however, do not apply to capacity-only demand response resources that do not submit incremental energy offers into energy markets."[123] Demand resources participate in both the capacity and energy markets and are not capacity only resources. It is not clear whether FERC intended to exclude demand resources with high strike prices from the requirements of FERC Order No. 831. Demand resources should not be permitted to make offers above $1,000 per MWh without the same verification requirements applied to economic resources or generation resources. The MMU recommends that the rules for maximum offer for the emergency and pre-emergency program match the maximum offer for generation resources.

On April 1, 2012, FERC Order No. 745 was implemented in the PJM economic program, requiring payment of full LMP for dispatched demand resources when a net benefits test (NBT) price threshold is exceeded. This approach replaced the payment of LMP minus the charges for wholesale power and transmission included in customers' tariff rates. Following FERC Order No. 745, all ISO/RTOs are required to calculate an NBT threshold price each month above which the net benefits of DR are deemed to exceed the cost to load.

PJM calculates the NBT price threshold by first retrieving generation offers from the same month of the prior calendar year for which the calculation is being performed. PJM then adjusts a portion of each prior year offer, representing the typical share of fuel costs in energy offers in the PJM Region, for changes in fuel prices based on the ratio of the reference month spot fuel price to the study month forward fuel price. To accomplish this adjustment, the ratio of forward prices for the study month to the spot fuel prices for the reference month is used as a scaling factor. If the forward price for the study month was $7.08 and the spot fuel price from the reference month was $6.75, then the ratio is 1.05. The offers of generation units are then adjusted by this scaling factor. The price of fuel typically represents 80 to 90 percent of a generator's offer with the remainder being variable operations and maintenance costs. Where generators offer multiple points on a curve, each point on the curve is adjusted in this manner. The offers are then combined to create daily supply curves for each day in the period. The daily curves are then averaged to form an average supply curve for the study month. PJM then uses a non-linear least squares estimation technique to determine an equation that approximates and smooths this average supply curve. The NBT threshold price is the price at the point where the price elasticity of supply is equal to 1.0 for this estimated supply curve equation.[124] PJM publishes the details of the equation and parameters each month along with the NBT results.

The NBT test is a crude tool that is not based in market logic. The NBT threshold price is a monthly estimate calculated from a monthly supply curve that does not incorporate real-time or day-ahead prices. In addition, it is a single threshold price used to trigger payments to economic demand response resources throughout the entire RTO, regardless of their location and regardless of locational prices.

The necessity for the NBT test is an illustration of the illogical approach to demand side compensation embodied in paying full LMP to demand resources. The benefit of demand side resources is not that they suppress market prices, but that customers can choose not to consume at the current price of power, that individual customers benefit from their choices and that the choices of all customers are reflected in market prices. If customers face the market price, customers should have the ability to not purchase power and the market impact of that choice does not require a test for appropriateness nor does it require a payment from PJM markets.

When the zonal LMP is above the NBT threshold price, economic demand response resources that reduce their power consumption are paid the full zonal LMP. When the zonal LMP is below the NBT threshold price, economic demand response resources are not paid for any load reductions.[125]

122 157 FERC ¶ 61,115 at P 139 (2016).
123 *Id.* at 8.
124 "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," §10.3.1, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025)
125 "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," §10.3.4, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025)

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Table 6-40 shows the NBT threshold price for the historical test from August 2010 through July 2011, and April 2012, when FERC Order No. 745 was implemented in PJM, through June 2026. The historical test was used as justification for the method of calculating the NBT for future months. From 2012 through 2021, the NBT threshold price exceeded the lowest historical test result of $34.07 per MWh one time, in March 2014 when the NBT threshold price was $34.93. The NBT threshold price exceeded the lowest historical test result of $34.07 per MWh in 10 of 12 months of 2022. In the first six months of 2026, the NBT threshold price did not exceed the lowest historical test result of $34.07 per MWh.

## Table 6-40 Net benefits test threshold prices: August 2010 through June 2026

| | Historical Test ($/MWh) | | Net Benefits Test Threshold Price ($/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Jan | $42.03 | $42.03 | | $25.72 | $29.51 | $29.63 | $23.67 | $32.60 | $26.27 | $29.44 | $20.04 | $18.11 | $26.93 | $40.25 | $20.53 | $24.35 | $31.65 |
| Feb | $41.48 | $40.49 | | $26.27 | | $26.52 | $26.71 | $31.57 | $24.65 | $23.49 | $19.29 | $18.70 | $34.59 | $29.79 | $22.28 | $25.94 | $26.71 |
| Mar | $38.36 | $38.48 | $28.43 | $24.73 | $34.93 | $24.99 | $22.10 | $30.56 | $25.50 | $22.15 | $17.44 | $20.82 | $30.00 | $23.75 | $18.70 | $25.63 | $25.00 |
| Apr | $38.07 | $36.76 | $27.92 | $27.94 | $32.59 | $24.92 | $19.93 | $30.45 | $25.56 | $22.36 | $15.91 | $23.47 | $35.14 | $23.68 | $17.17 | $30.31 | $24.05 |
| May | $35.82 | $34.68 | $23.46 | $27.73 | $32.08 | $23.71 | $20.69 | $29.65 | $25.52 | $21.01 | $14.69 | $21.40 | $42.94 | $23.43 | $16.82 | $27.76 | $21.79 |
| Jun | $36.12 | $35.09 | $23.86 | $28.44 | $31.62 | $23.80 | $20.62 | $27.14 | $23.59 | $20.20 | $15.56 | $22.35 | $44.29 | $22.33 | $18.41 | $22.48 | $21.52 |
| Jul | $37.68 | $27.92 | $22.99 | $29.42 | $31.62 | $23.03 | $20.73 | $24.42 | $23.57 | $19.76 | $14.66 | $21.59 | $48.67 | $22.66 | $21.15 | $25.54 | |
| Aug | $35.57 | $33.86 | $24.47 | $28.58 | $29.85 | $23.17 | $23.24 | $22.75 | $23.53 | $19.57 | $14.58 | $20.52 | $44.08 | $24.89 | $17.48 | $25.38 | |
| Sep | $34.07 | $31.07 | $24.33 | $28.80 | $29.83 | $21.69 | $24.70 | $21.51 | $22.23 | $18.19 | $15.16 | $23.06 | $55.39 | $25.04 | $14.71 | $20.92 | |
| Oct | $38.10 | | $25.96 | $29.13 | $30.20 | $21.48 | $26.50 | $21.70 | $23.84 | $20.20 | $17.25 | $24.24 | $55.97 | $21.73 | $14.22 | $22.20 | |
| Nov | $36.83 | | $25.63 | $31.63 | $29.17 | $22.28 | $29.27 | $26.41 | $23.89 | $21.11 | $18.35 | $29.20 | $49.57 | $23.12 | $19.81 | $28.34 | |
| Dec | $37.04 | | $25.97 | $28.82 | $29.01 | $22.31 | $29.71 | $29.16 | $26.35 | $22.24 | $19.47 | $32.85 | $42.75 | $24.43 | $20.13 | $31.56 | |
| Average | $37.60 | $35.60 | $25.30 | $28.10 | $30.95 | $23.96 | $23.99 | $27.33 | $24.54 | $21.64 | $16.87 | $23.03 | $42.53 | $25.42 | $18.45 | $25.87 | $25.12 |


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Table 6-41 shows the number of hours that at least one zone in PJM had day-ahead LMP or real-time LMP higher than the NBT threshold price.[126] In the first six months of 2026, the highest zonal LMP in PJM was higher than the NBT threshold price 4,226 hours out of 4,343 hours, or 97.3 percent of all hours. Reductions occurred in 3,037 hours, 71.9 percent, of those 4,226 hours in the first six months of 2026. The last three columns illustrate how often economic demand response activity occurred when LMPs exceeded NBT threshold prices for January 1, 2024, through June 30, 2026. There are no economic payments when demand response occurs and zonal LMP is below the NBT threshold. Demand response reported reductions occurred in none of the hours in which LMP was below the NBT threshold price in the first six months of 2025, and none of the hours in which LMP was below the NBT threshold price in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 6-41 Hours with price higher than NBT and economic load response occurrences in those hours: January 2025 through June 2026**

| | Number of Hours | | Number of Hours with LMP Higher than NBT | | | Percent of NBT Hours with Economic Load Response | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | 2025 | 2026 | 2025 | 2026 | Percent Change | 2025 | 2026 | Percentage Change |
| Jan | 744 | 744 | 737 | 668 | (9.4%) | 97.4% | 85.6% | (11.8%) |
| Feb | 672 | 672 | 672 | 661 | (1.6%) | 95.5% | 89.9% | (5.7%) |
| Mar | 743 | 743 | 742 | 742 | 0.0% | 97.7% | 91.6% | (6.1%) |
| Apr | 720 | 720 | 662 | 714 | 7.9% | 94.7% | 82.6% | (12.1%) |
| May | 744 | 744 | 580 | 733 | 26.4% | 82.4% | 78.7% | (3.7%) |
| Jun | 720 | 720 | 685 | 708 | 3.4% | 77.2% | 3.4% | (73.8%) |
| Jul | 744 | | 718 | | | 91.8% | | |
| Aug | 744 | | 603 | | | 78.4% | | |
| Sep | 720 | | 708 | | | 74.6% | | |
| Oct | 744 | | 744 | | | 99.1% | | |
| Nov | 721 | | 721 | | | 96.9% | | |
| Dec | 744 | | 735 | | | 88.0% | | |
| Total | 8,760 | 4,343 | 8,307 | 4,226 | (49.1%) | 89.8% | 71.9% | (18.0%) |

126 The MWh for demand resources were downloaded as of July 14, 2026, and may change as a result of continued PJM billing updates.

## Energy Efficiency

Energy Efficiency Resources (EE) are not capacity resources and do not contribute to reliability. FERC ruled on November 5, 2024, that EE should no longer be paid the capacity market clearing price effective with the 2026/2027 Delivery Year.[127] See the *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM* for detailed information on the EE program and its impacts.

## Peak Shaving Adjustment

A Peak Shaving Adjustment (PSA) plan provides an alternative means for demand response to participate in the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM). Rather than being on the supply side of the capacity market, a PSA participates on the demand side through a modified peak load forecast for the zone in which the Peak Shaving Adjustment resources are located. The peak shaving adjusted load forecast is included in the VRR curve. An important issue is that the resultant reduction in capacity obligation is socialized across all loads in the zone rather than directly benefitting the resources providing the Peak Shaving Adjustment.[128] This eliminates the incentive for individual customers to participate in peak shaving. The solution is a retail rate design that directly assigns the benefits of peak shaving to individual customers. The retail rate design is within the authority of state regulators and not the authority of FERC which has jurisdiction over the wholesale markets.

A PSA plan must include: the basis for the planned reductions; a THI trigger for interruption; the duration of the interruption in hours; the MW value of the curtailment; the months of the offer; all historical addbacks for the nominated programs.[129] Any resource selling a PSA must reduce load on any day in which its trigger is met or exceeded. The trigger is based on the actual maximum daily temperature humidity index (THI) for the relevant PJM zone. When the trigger is met, the PSA must comply with its defined offer parameters including number of hours of interruption. Failure to operate to these parameters will lead to a reduction in the peak shaving adjustment value in future delivery years. Performance is measured based on the aggregated

127 See 189 FERC ¶ 61,095, *reh'g denied*, 190 FERC ¶ 62,005 (2025).
128 See "Peak Shaving Adjustment Proposal," Docket No. ER19-511-000 (December 7, 2018).
129 "PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis," Attachment D, Rev. 39 (June 30, 2026).

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Customer Baseline (CBL). PJM applies a three year rolling average of the annual peak shaving performance ratings to the program's total participating MW in order to determine its peak shaving adjustment.

## Distributed Energy Resources

Distributed Energy Resources (DER) include generation connected to distribution level facilities, behind the meter generation, and energy storage facilities connected to the distribution grid or to load. FERC issued Order No. 2222 on September 17, 2020, with the goal of removing barriers for small distributed resources to enter the wholesale market by allowing them to aggregate in order to encourage competition, but larger resources, up to 5 MW, can participate.[130] On May 1, 2025, FERC issued an order accepting all of the final elements of PJM's compliance filing including delaying the effective date for the DER Aggregation Participation Model to February 2, 2028. PJM is currently developing implementation details for DER Aggregation Resources (DERAs) at the Distributed Resources Subcommittee (DISRS).

PJM proposed Manual 18 updates for Planned DER Capacity Resource's participation in the 2028/2029 BRA.[131] The changes include detailed business rules for DER Capacity Aggregation Resources, DER plan requirements, RPM commitment compliance, and test failure charges. All DER will be planned resources for the 2028/2029 auction, meaning PJM will not require the CSP to register an actual physical resource prior to the auction. The MMU identified a loophole in the market power mitigation rules applicable to planned DER in PJM's proposed Manual 18 language. The loophole exists because a DER aggregation can change resource types between the time of clearing in an auction and the actual delivery year. For example, a DER aggregation can offer as a homogeneous demand resource and then change to a heterogeneous DER resource in the actual delivery year. This would allow a DER aggregation to avoid market power mitigation rules in the capacity market. Under the proposed rules, if a planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource consists of only demand response resources (homogeneous DR), it is exempt from the market power mitigation rules. Planned resources can change types between BRAs and IAs, or between capacity auctions and delivery years. The rules allow a planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource solely comprised of demand response resources that was not subject to market power mitigation rules in a capacity auction to add generation after the auction. This would allow the added generation to avoid market power mitigation rules. This loophole should be closed with a simple rule change to prevent the behavior.

The MMU recommends that DER aggregations that clear in a capacity auction not be permitted to change status from homogeneous demand response to any other status for any additional auctions for the same delivery year, or for the delivery year.

Getting the rules right at the beginning of DER development is essential to the active and effective participation of DER in the wholesale power markets in a manner that enhances rather than undermines the efficiency and competitiveness of the power markets. In addition, getting the implementation details right is critical in keeping the original intention of Order No. 2222 to enhance competition in wholesale markets while removing barriers for small distributed resources. To date, PJM is not meeting these objectives.

On June 2, 2026, Google LLC ("Google") and Voltus, Inc. ("Voltus") announced that they signed a three year agreement to aggregate up to 100 MW of new DER capacity each year into a "Google-funded VPP in PJM" as part of a Bring Your Own New Generation ("BYONG") framework for large load additions.[132] The structure of the Google and Voltus' DER aggregation is not yet clear. However, this agreement shows that DER Aggregation Resources may play a significant role in the PJM market, as data centers try to find new capacity. This potential role makes it even more critical that DERs should be held to the same standards of performance that apply to generation resources.

### Nodal Aggregation and Size

The PJM market is a nodal market. Nodal markets provide efficient price signals to resources in an economically dispatched, security constrained

130 See 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 at PP 6–7.

131 See "Manual 18 Revisions - Redline," from the October 9, 2025 meeting of the MIC <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2025/20251009/20251009-item-01-1---manual-18-revisions---redline.pdf>.

132 *See Voltus Inc.* Voltus and Google to Deliver Grid Capacity and Local Economic Benefits Through Bring Your Own Capacity Agreement (June 2, 2026) <*https://www.voltus.co/press/voltus-google-bring-your-own-capacity-pjm*>; *See also Google LLC.* We've signed a first-of-its-kind agreement with Voltus to create a smart capacity solution for the grid. (June 2, 2026) <*https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/sustainability/voltus-agreement/*> .



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market. Aggregation behind a single node is feasible, is consistent with the nodal market principle, and will encourage competition. The current DER Aggregation Participation Model allows multinodal aggregation for small resources that satisfy defined conditions. Energy injection from DERs across multiple nodes, even if it is small, will change congestion patterns that PJM would not have the ability to predict and control. Allowing DER aggregation across nodes even for small resources is not necessary and will distort the nodal market signals that indicate where capacity and energy are needed and their impacts on congestion. The MMU recommends that PJM use a nodal approach for DER participation in PJM markets that does not permit multinodal aggregation.

The current DER Aggregation Participation Model does not include a maximum size requirement for DER Aggregation Resources. This loophole would allow larger DERs to divide one larger resource into multiple DERs less than 5 MW and then register them as one DER Aggregation Resource, undermining the intent of the DER approach. To avoid this loophole, there should be a maximum size requirement on DER Aggregation Resources. The MMU recommends that PJM include a 5.0 MW maximum size cap on DER aggregations.

## EDC Role

The EDCs' dual role as the distribution system operator and as a DER Aggregator is a threat to PJM's competitive market. When an EDC, acting in its proposed role as a market participant, controls its competitors' access to the market, the result is not structurally competitive. The result will be to create barriers to competition, exactly the opposite of FERC's intent. EDCs have a very significant role to play as designers, builders and managers of the local grids, without competing with DER providers. The current DER Aggregation Participation Model does not prevent EDCs from serving as DER aggregators or address the market power issues, based on a reference to the provision of Order No. 2222 that prohibits RTOs/ISOs from limiting the business models under which DER aggregators can operate. FERC, however, stated that it could revisit the EDCs' role in the PJM markets, if "evidence of undue discrimination regarding the participation of DER aggregations in RTO/ISO markets" is discovered.[133] The MMU continues to recommend that EDCs not be allowed to participate in markets as DER aggregators in addition to their EDC role.

Cases where EDCs override PJM dispatch instructions should be communicated to PJM and recorded in the PJM market systems for operations and market monitoring purposes. When DER Aggregation Resources update bidding parameters due to override instructions from the EDC, the MMU should be able to check whether the update is due to an override or other operational or economic reasons. When the EDC itself is the DER Aggregator and it overrides its PJM dispatch instruction, it should also be communicated to PJM and recorded. FERC clarified that if an EDC's override actions are discriminatory or involve the exercise of market power such behavior would violate the terms of PJM's tariff and that such actions can be monitored and addressed through existing mechanisms such as Attachment M.[134] However, the tariff language does not explicitly define the MMU's role in monitoring or mitigating the potential exercise of market power by EDCs. To enable efficient and effective market monitoring, EDCs and DERAs should be explicitly required to provide information requested by the MMU. The MMU recommends that the Commission require PJM to include in OATT Attachment M a statement explicitly affirming that the Market Monitor's role includes the right to collect information from EDCs and DERA related to actions taken on the distribution system related to DER Aggregation Resources.

## Net Metering Resources

A net metering resource is a retail resource at a single electric customer location that has both generation and load, where the generation can exceed the load, and the customer pays for energy or receives compensation for energy based on the net energy output measured at the customer meter. In seven of the 13 states in PJM and Washington DC, retail customers on a net metering tariff with their distribution utility pay the retail rate when consuming and are paid the full retail rate when selling energy.[135] That full retail rate compensation

133 182 FERC ¶ 61,143 at P 334.

134 See 188 FERC ¶ 61,076 at P 169.

135 *See S&P Global*, PJM Solar and Battery Forecast 2025 at 13, presented at Load Analysis Subcommittee on October 1, 2025, <*https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/subcommittees/las/2025/20251028/20251028-reference---spglobal---pjm-dg-solar-battery-forecast.pdf*>. The seven states that compensate NEM resources at the full retail rate are Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Michigan and Virginia. Two states are transitioning from the full retail rate compensation to less than full retail rate compensation: Indiana and North Carolina.

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includes credits for energy, capacity and ancillary services charges. These resources receive double compensation if they participate in the PJM energy, capacity or ancillary services markets with injections, because they already receive full compensation for their output through the retail rate arrangement.

However, according to PJM's interpretation, as no net metering resources in the PJM footprint provide ancillary services, like reserves or regulation, as part of a retail program, all net metering resources in its territory are eligible to participate in its ancillary services markets under the DER Aggregation Participation Model.[136] From PJM's perspective, this means all net metering resources are eligible to participate in its ancillary services market.[137] PJM argues that even if a resource is compensated for the same service at the retail and the wholesale level, it should not be considered double counting as long as it does not provide the same service. Under this proposal, a net metered resource that receives credits through its retail rate for reducing its ancillary services purchase can also receive payment from PJM for providing the same ancillary services. Double payment is double counting. The DER Aggregation Participation Model allows EDCs to raise concerns about double counting but neither PJM nor an EDC may preclude a Component DER from providing ancillary services based on the resources being compensated for ancillary services at the retail level. No resource should be paid more than once for its services. If the net energy metering resources receive credits at a rate that includes compensation for ancillary services, that means they are providing the service and being compensated for it. The MMU recommends that net metering resources be prohibited from participating in wholesale ancillary services markets if they are compensated for the service at the retail level.

On December 19, 2025, PJM submitted a filing at FERC proposing to create a new participation model called Economic Load Response Regulation Only Participants.[138] PJM proposes to permit economic demand response to sell regulation by injecting power onto the grid without the rules that govern such injections. The PJM tariff prohibits demand side resources from injecting power in any PJM market. PJM proposes a new and inappropriate and unsupported form of participation for demand resources. A new form of market participation must be supported with a logical argument, not simply by creating special and unduly discriminatory exceptions to existing rules. PJM would create a new category of economic demand response that violates the current demand response rules and the current rules about injecting power onto the grid. This is a fundamental change to the PJM market demand response model, which was specifically designed for resources that do not inject power onto the grid. The proposal creates discriminatory preferences for a small group of potential participants, who are on retail Net Energy Metering ("NEM") tariffs and want to participate in the regulation market, and undercuts PJM demand response rules without justification or evidence. The December 19th Filing is not simply an acceleration of the implementation of the Order No. 2222 rules for Distributed Energy Resources ("DERs"), but creates a permanent exception to those rules without any detailed support or analysis. Under the December 19th Filing, Economic Load Response Regulation Only Participants would operate under a new set of rules that do not include the protections established and approved in PJM's Order No. 2222 compliance proceedings. Those protective rules include a maximum size requirement, a standard of review in the registration process, and nodal modelling. The MMU opposed the proposal during the stakeholder processes and submitted comments in the docket.[139] [140] FERC issued a deficiency letter to PJM on February 13, 2026.[141] FERC approved the proposal on May 5, 2026.[142]

## Behind The Meter Generation

Behind the meter generation ("BTMG") refers to DERs that are co-located with retail load behind a customer meter. These generators may participate in wholesale or in retail markets. Retail BTMG participates only in retail, reducing retail load and retail load charges. Non-Retail BTMG ("NRBTMG") is used by EDCs, municipalities or co-operatives to reduce their wholesale load and wholesale load charges. NRBTMG can be located behind the meter with retail load or located in front of the meter but still on the distribution system. NRBTMG has a PJM system wide cap of 3,000 MW.[143] If a BTMG

136 See Order No. 2222 Compliance Filing of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER22-962 (February 1, 2022) at 41.
137 FERC Docket No. ER22-962-005 at 15.
138 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Economic Load Response Regulation Only Participants, Docket No. ER26-846-000, (December 19, 2025).
139 Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-846 (January 9, 2026).
140 Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, ER26-846 (February 11, 2026).
141 FERC Deficiency Letter, Docket No. ER26-846 (February 13, 2026).
142 195 FERC ¶ 61,090 (May 5, 2026).
143 See BTMG Business rules, PJM Manual 14D – Appendix A.


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wants to participate in PJM but not as a NRBTMG, it may participate as a generation resource (with injection capability) after going through the PJM interconnection process, or participate as DR (with load reduction) under the DR or the DER aggregation model.

FERC accepted the PJM proposal to set the materiality threshold for BTMG at 50 MW, although FERC directed PJM to change the proposal to permit "Network Customers to net from their Network Load up to 50 MW of load served by using BTMG at a single electrical location" instead of the capacity nameplate limit of 50 MW.[144] This threshold would not apply to existing BTMG with a contractual arrangement that was in effect as of December 18, 2025.

144 *See* 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 207-220.

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# 7 Net Revenue

The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of PJM energy market structure, participant conduct and market performance. As part of the review of market performance, the analysis includes the theoretical new entrant net revenues for combustion turbine (CT), combined cycle (CC), coal plant (CP), diesel (DS), nuclear, solar, and wind generating units.

## Overview

### Net Revenue

- Energy market net revenues are significantly affected by energy prices and fuel prices. Energy prices, gas prices and coal prices increased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The net effects were that in the first six months of 2026, average energy market theoretical net revenues increased by 108 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT), increased by 76 percent for a new combined cycle (CC), increased by 125 percent for a new coal plant (CP), increased by 40 percent for a new nuclear plant, increased by 198 percent for a new diesel (DS), increased by 25 percent for a new onshore wind installation, increased by 40 percent for a new offshore wind installation and increased by 13 percent for a new solar installation.
- The price of natural gas and coal increased in the first six months of 2026. The marginal costs of a new CT and CC were greater than the marginal costs of a new CP in January and February, and lower in March through June 2026.
- In the first six months of 2026, spark spreads in BGE, PSEG and Western Hub increased and spark spreads in COMED decreased compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, dark and quark spreads increased in BGE, PSEG and Western Hub and dark and quark spreads decreased in COMED compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, the volatility of spark, dark and quark spreads increased in BGE, and Western Hub, decreased in PSEG, and were mixed in COMED compared to the first six months of 2025.
- Of the 16 PJM nuclear plants analyzed, all are expected to cover their avoidable costs from energy and capacity market revenues in 2026, 2027 and 2028, without any subsidies.

### Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that the net revenue calculation used by PJM to calculate the net Cost of New Entry (CONE) and net ACR be based on a forward looking calculation of expected energy and ancillary services net revenues using historical revenues that are scaled based on forward prices for energy and fuel. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

### Conclusion

Wholesale electric power markets are affected by externally imposed reliability requirements. A regulatory authority external to the market makes a determination as to the acceptable level of reliability which is enforced through a requirement to maintain a target level of installed or unforced capacity. The requirement to maintain a target level of installed capacity can be enforced via a variety of mechanisms, including government construction of generation, full requirement contracts with developers to construct and operate generation, state utility commission mandates to construct capacity, or capacity markets of various types. Regardless of the enforcement mechanism, the exogenous requirement to construct capacity in excess of what is constructed in response to energy market signals alone has an impact on energy markets. The reliability requirement results in maintaining a level of capacity in excess of the level that would result from the operation of an energy market alone. The result of that additional capacity is to reduce the level and volatility of energy market prices and to reduce the duration of high energy market prices. This, in turn, reduces net revenue to generation owners which reduces the incentive to invest. The exact level of both aggregate and locational excess capacity is a function of the calculation methods used by RTOs and ISOs. A basic purpose of the capacity market is to allow all cleared capacity resources the opportunity to cover their net avoidable costs on an annual basis to ensure the economic sustainability of the reliable energy market. PJM's recent change to the definition of the VRR curve in the capacity

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market weakens the connection between the energy and capacity markets by discounting the net revenue offset, overstating net CONE and creating an arbitrary floor price and, as a result, undermines an important part of the fundamental PJM market design.[1]

PJM's introduction of a flawed form of ELCC for defining available unforced capacity has made the definition of reliability less clear. The ELCC derate factors are volatile and subject to changes for reasons that are not clear to generation owners or other market participants. There are significant issues with PJM's implementation of its approach to ELCC that result, among other things, in the undervaluing of gas fired generation capacity and overvaluing DR and battery storage.

## Net Revenue

When compared to annualized fixed costs and avoidable costs, net revenue is an indicator of generation investment profitability, and thus is a measure of overall market performance as well as a measure of the incentive to invest in new generation and to maintain existing generation in PJM markets. Net revenue equals total revenue received by generators from PJM energy, capacity and ancillary service markets including uplift payments, and from the provision of black start, and from subsidies like RECs, less the short run marginal costs of energy production. In other words, net revenue is the amount that remains, after the short run marginal costs of energy production have been subtracted from gross revenue. Net revenue is the contribution to fixed costs, which include a return on investment, depreciation and income taxes, and to avoidable costs, which include long term and intermediate term operation and maintenance expenses.[2] Net revenue is the contribution to total fixed and avoidable costs received by generators from all PJM markets.


In a perfectly competitive, energy only market in long run equilibrium, net revenue from the energy market would be expected to equal the annualized fixed and avoidable costs for the marginal unit, including a competitive return on investment. The PJM market design includes other markets that contribute to the payment of fixed and avoidable costs. In PJM, the energy, capacity and ancillary service markets are all significant sources of revenue to cover the fixed and avoidable costs of generators, as are payments for the provision of black start and reactive services. Thus, in a perfectly competitive market in long run equilibrium, with energy, capacity and ancillary service markets, net revenue from all sources would be expected to equal the annualized fixed and avoidable costs of generation for the marginal unit. Net revenue is a measure of whether generators are receiving competitive returns on invested capital and of whether market prices are high enough to encourage entry of new capacity and to encourage maintaining existing capacity. In actual wholesale power markets, where equilibrium seldom occurs, net revenue is expected to fluctuate above and below the equilibrium level based on actual conditions in all relevant markets. The current definition of net revenue is not fully accurate as the FERC ordered definition uses price-based offers at times and does not include revenue from opportunity cost adders for environmentally constrained resources.

Net revenues are significantly affected by energy prices, fuel prices and capacity prices. The real-time load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 increased 40.2 percent from the first six months of 2025, from $51.75 per MWh to $72.54 per MWh. Gas prices and coal prices increased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025. The price of eastern natural gas was 28.7 percent higher, the price of western natural gas was 10.7 percent higher; the price of Northern Appalachian coal was 12.9 percent higher; the price of Central Appalachian coal was 7.1 percent higher; and the price of Powder River Basin coal was 5.4 percent higher (Figure 7-1). The price of ULSD NY Harbor Barge (ultra low sulfur diesel) was 45.9 percent higher in the first six months of 2026 than in the first three six of 2025.

1 See Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER26-455-000 (December 8, 2025); 194 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2026).
2 Avoidable costs are sometimes referred to as going forward costs.


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Figure 7-1 Energy market net revenue factor trends: 2014 through June 2026




## Spark, Dark, and Quark Spreads

The spark, dark, and quark spreads are defined as the difference between the LMP received for selling power and the cost of fuel used to generate power, converted to a cost per MWh. The spark spread compares power prices to the cost of gas, the dark spread compares power prices to the cost of coal, and the quark spread compares power prices to the cost of uranium. The spread is a measure of the approximate difference between revenues and marginal costs and is an indicator of net revenue and profitability.

$$Spread\left(\frac{\$}{MWh}\right) = LMP\left(\frac{\$}{MWh}\right) - Fuel\ Price\left(\frac{\$}{MMBtu}\right) * Heat\ Rate\left(\frac{MMBtu}{MWh}\right)$$

Spread volatility is a result of fluctuations in LMP and the price of fuel. Spreads can be positive or negative.

In the first six months of 2026, spark spreads in BGE, PSEG and Western Hub increased and spark spreads in COMED decreased compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, dark and quark spreads increased in BGE, PSEG and Western Hub and dark and quark spreads decreased in COMED compared to the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, the volatility of spark, dark and quark spreads increased in BGE, and Western Hub, decreased in PSEG, and were mixed in COMED compared to the first six months of 2025.[3]

3 Spark spreads use a combined cycle heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh. Dark and quark spreads use a heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kWh

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Table 7-1 shows average peak hour spreads by year and Table 7-2 shows the associated standard deviations.

### Table 7-1 Peak hour spark, dark, and quark spreads ($/MWh)

| | BGE | | | COMED | | | PSEG | | | Western Hub | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Spark | Dark | Quark | Spark | Dark | Quark | Spark | Dark | Quark | Spark | Dark | Quark |
| 2025 | $37.01 | $34.92 | $49.52 | $18.51 | $22.81 | $25.61 | $12.35 | $17.16 | $35.07 | $27.63 | $26.82 | $41.42 |
| 2026 | $57.29 | $62.23 | $77.92 | $12.68 | $18.66 | $20.94 | $16.23 | $25.13 | $42.86 | $36.73 | $41.96 | $57.65 |
| Percent change | 55% | 78% | 57% | (32%) | (18%) | (18%) | 31% | 46% | 22% | 33% | 56% | 39% |

### Table 7-2 Peak hour spark, dark, and quark spread standard deviation ($/MWh)


| | BGE | | | COMED | | | PSEG | | | Western Hub | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun | Spark | Dark | Quark | Spark | Dark | Quark | Spark | Dark | Quark | Spark | Dark | Quark |
| 2025 | $96.5 | $99.0 | $98.9 | $70.9 | $71.4 | $71.4 | $107.3 | $85.3 | $85.1 | $88.7 | $85.0 | $84.9 |
| 2026 | $141.6 | $153.0 | $152.9 | $76.7 | $56.8 | $56.7 | $93.2 | $84.0 | $83.7 | $110.0 | $105.2 | $105.0 |
| Percent change | 47% | 55% | 55% | 8% | (21%) | (21%) | (13%) | (1%) | (2%) | 24% | 24% | 24% |



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
Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 show the hourly spark and dark spread for peak hours for BGE, COMED, PSEG, and Western Hub.

### Figure 7-2 Hourly spark spread (gas) for peak hours ($/MWh): 2021 through June 2026[4]




4 Spark spreads use a combined cycle heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh, zonal hourly LMPs and daily gas prices; Chicago City Gate for COMED, Zone 6 non-NY for BGE, Zone 6 NY for PSEG, and Texas Eastern M3 for Western Hub.

### Figure 7-3 Hourly dark spread (coal) for peak hours ($/MWh): 2021 through June 2026[5]




## Theoretical Energy Market Net Revenue

The net revenues presented in this section are theoretical as they are based on explicitly stated assumptions about how a new unit with specific characteristics would operate under economic dispatch. The economic dispatch uses technology specific operating constraints in the calculation of a new unit's operations and potential net revenue in PJM markets.

Analysis of energy market net revenues for a new unit includes eight power plant configurations:

- The CT plant is a single GE Frame 7HA.03 CT with an installed capacity of 409.3 MW, equipped with evaporative coolers, and selective catalytic reduction (SCR) for NOx reduction, and dual fuel capability

5 Dark spreads use a heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kWh, zonal hourly LMPs, daily coal prices, and average transportation costs by coal type; Powder River Basin coal for COMED, Northern Appalachian coal for BGE and Western Hub, and Central Appalachian coal for PSEG.

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- The CC plant includes two single shaft 1x1 GE Frame 7HA.02 CTs, each with a single combustion turbine, heat recovery steam generator, and steam turbine with a total installed capacity of 1,362 MW, equipped with SCR for NOx reduction, dry cooling, duct burners, and dual fuel capability.
- The CP is a subcritical steam unit with an installed capacity of 600.0 MW, equipped with selective catalytic reduction system (SCR) for NOx control, a flue gas desulphurization (FGD) system with chemical injection for SOx and mercury control, and a baghouse for particulate control.
- The DS plant is a single oil fired CAT 2 MW unit with an installed capacity of 2.0 MW using New York Harbor ultra low sulfur diesel.
- The nuclear plant includes two units and related facilities using the Westinghouse AP1000 technology with an installed capacity of 2,200 MW.
- The onshore wind installation includes 94 Siemens 3.2 MW wind turbines with an installed capacity of 300.8 MW.
- The offshore wind installation includes of 37 Siemens 11.0 MW wind turbines with an installed capacity of 406.0 MW.
- The solar installation is a 1,120 acre ground mounted tracking solar farm with an installed AC capacity of 200 MW.
- The battery storage unit is a 200 MW, 4 hour battery capable of providing 200 MW for 4 hours, or 800 MWh.

Net revenue calculations for the CT, CC and CP include the hourly effect of actual local ambient air temperature on plant heat rates and generator output for each of the three plant configurations.[6] [7] Plant heat rates account for the efficiency changes and corresponding cost changes resulting from ambient air temperatures.

CO2, NOx and SO2 emission allowance costs are included in the hourly plant dispatch cost, the short run marginal cost[8] CO2, NOx and SO2 emission allowance costs were obtained from daily spot cash prices.[9]

The class average equivalent availability factor for each type of plant was calculated from PJM data and incorporated into all revenue calculations.[10]

Zonal net revenues reflect average zonal LMP, and fuel costs based on locational fuel indices and zone specific fuel delivery charges.[11] The delivered fuel cost for natural gas reflects the zonal, daily delivered price of natural gas from a specific pipeline and is from published commodity daily cash prices, with a basis adjustment for transportation costs.[12] The delivered cost of coal reflects the zone specific, delivered price of coal and was developed from the published prompt month prices, adjusted for rail transportation costs.[13] Net revenues are calculated for all zones except OVEC.[14]

Short run marginal cost includes fuel costs, emissions costs, and the short run marginal component of VOM costs.[15] [16] Starting in 2025, energy market offers include major maintenance costs. For the CT unit, the unit is dispatched with a start cost of $36,699/start. For the CC and CP unit, major maintenance is included as a cost per MWh. Unit costs used to dispatch the unit are shown, including all components, in Table 7-3.

**Table 7-3 Average operating costs: January through June, 2026**


| Unit Type | Operating Costs ($/MWh) | Heat Rate (Btu/kWh) | VOM ($/MWh) | Major Maintenance ($/MWh) | Start Costs ($/Start) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CT | $53.94 | 9,241 | $0.43 | $0.00 | $36,669 |
| CC | $43.10 | 6,369 | $0.64 | $2.88 | $0 |
| CP | $46.63 | 9,250 | $5.09 | $1.01 | $0 |
| DS | $257.56 | 9,660 | $0.25 | $0.00 | $0 |
| Nuclear | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| Wind | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| Wind (off shore) | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| Solar | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |

6 Hourly ambient conditions supplied by DTN.
7 Heat rates provided by Pasteris Energy, Inc. No load costs are included in the dispatch price since each unit type is dispatched at full load for every economic hour resulting in a single offer point.
8 $CO_2$ emission allowance costs only included for states participating in RGGI.
9 $CO_2$, NOx and SO2 emission daily prompt prices obtained from Evolution Markets, Inc.
10 Outage figures obtained from the PJM eGADS database.
11 Startup fuel burns and emission rates provided by Pasteris Energy, Inc. Startup station power consumption costs were obtained from the station service rates published quarterly by PJM and netted against the MW produced during startup at the preceding applicable hourly LMP. All starts associated with combined cycle units are assumed to be warm starts.
12 Gas daily cash prices obtained from Platts.
13 Coal prompt month prices obtained from Platts.
14 The Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) includes a generating plant in Ohio and a generating plant in Indiana, and high voltage transmission lines, but does not occupy a single geographic footprint like the other control zones.
15 Fuel costs are calculated using the daily spot price and may not equal what individual participants actually paid.
16 VOM rates provided by Pasteris Energy, Inc.


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A comparison of the monthly average operating cost of the theoretical CT, CC and CP plants since 2014 shows that, on average, the short run marginal costs of the CT plant and the CC plant have been less than those of the CP plant but the costs of the CT plant and the CC plant have been more volatile than the costs of the CP plant as a result of the higher volatility of gas prices compared to coal prices (Figure 7-4). The average monthly operating costs of a new CC and CT were greater than the marginal cost of a new CP in January and February 2026, but not in March through June. Marginal costs are based on spot fuel costs. Individual generation plants may have contracts for coal that differ significantly from spot prices.

Figure 7-4 Average short run marginal costs: 2014 through June 2026




The net revenue measure does not include the potentially significant contribution from the explicit or implicit sale of the option value of physical units or from bilateral agreements to sell output at a price other than the PJM day-ahead or real-time energy market prices, e.g., a forward price.

Gas prices, coal prices, and energy prices are reflected in new unit capacity factors. Table 7-4 shows the average capacity factor for new units. The capacity factors for a new CT and a new CC increased in the first six months of 2026 compared to the first six months of 2025.

Table 7-4 Average capacity factor: January through June, 2014 through 2026

| Jan-Jun | CT | CC | CP | DS | Nuclear | On Shore Wind | Solar |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 44% | 73% | 68% | 6% | 91% | 28% | 16% |
| 2015 | 64% | 75% | 60% | 5% | 91% | 28% | 17% |
| 2016 | 73% | 78% | 44% | 1% | 91% | 27% | 18% |
| 2017 | 51% | 72% | 40% | 1% | 93% | 31% | 18% |
| 2018 | 61% | 81% | 42% | 4% | 93% | 30% | 17% |
| 2019 | 48% | 79% | 20% | 0% | 92% | 31% | 17% |
| 2020 | 50% | 79% | 5% | 0% | 92% | 29% | 17% |
| 2021 | 41% | 78% | 33% | 1% | 93% | 27% | 17% |
| 2022 | 37% | 75% | 37% | 1% | 92% | 29% | 17% |
| 2023 | 48% | 71% | 7% | 0% | 93% | 28% | 16% |
| 2024 | 59% | 78% | 30% | 1% | 92% | 27% | 19% |
| 2025 | 56% | 67% | 43% | 2% | 91% | 30% | 19% |
| 2026 | 62% | 68% | 41% | 8% | 91% | 27% | 20% |

## New Entrant Combustion Turbine

Energy market net revenue was calculated for a new CT plant economically dispatched by PJM. It was assumed that the CT plant had a minimum run time of two hours. The unit was first committed day ahead in profitable blocks of at least two hours, including start costs. If the unit was not already committed day ahead, it was run in real time in standalone profitable blocks of at least two hours, or any additional profitable hours bordering the profitable day-ahead or real-time block.

The new entrant CT is larger and more efficient than most CTs currently operating in PJM. The new entrant CT energy market net revenue results must

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therefore be interpreted carefully when comparing to existing CTs which are generally smaller and less efficient than the newest CT technology used by the new entrant CT.

New entrant CT plant energy market net revenues were higher in all zones in the first six months of 2026 as a result of higher spark spreads (Table 7-5).

### Table 7-5 Energy net revenue for a new entrant gas fired CT under economic dispatch: January through June, 2014 through 2026 (Dollars per installed MW-year)[17]

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $51,479 | $26,005 | $23,746 | $12,124 | $15,705 | $11,586 | $2,430 | $5,134 | $15,250 | $3,142 | $9,854 | $10,039 | $19,929 | 99% |
| AEP | $62,250 | $42,653 | $32,990 | $15,429 | $49,925 | $18,287 | $16,225 | $19,483 | $46,222 | $29,749 | $36,729 | $45,360 | $87,320 | 93% |
| APS | $77,468 | $66,162 | $26,197 | $13,892 | $53,671 | $9,176 | $5,274 | $13,577 | $29,851 | $12,181 | $43,659 | $61,801 | $160,797 | 160% |
| ATSI | $43,857 | $36,924 | $29,695 | $16,281 | $59,503 | $19,174 | $16,436 | $19,458 | $42,371 | $25,420 | $44,963 | $47,802 | $90,027 | 88% |
| BGE | $61,495 | $38,350 | $43,159 | $16,980 | $33,675 | $12,140 | $7,875 | $20,657 | $46,150 | $19,195 | $33,634 | $41,651 | $125,661 | 202% |
| COMED | $27,876 | $17,159 | $17,212 | $10,209 | $18,727 | $8,739 | $8,040 | $10,470 | $28,506 | $16,580 | $26,056 | $21,514 | $31,785 | 48% |
| DAY | $39,225 | $33,094 | $29,593 | $14,867 | $55,365 | $20,595 | $18,965 | $28,051 | $50,339 | $31,222 | $50,099 | $48,672 | $108,438 | 123% |
| DOM | $50,208 | $35,840 | $37,800 | $16,537 | $36,928 | $15,356 | $12,237 | $21,669 | $56,623 | $32,522 | $40,371 | $69,145 | $148,965 | 115% |
| DPL | $46,937 | $19,150 | $8,613 | $6,051 | $12,651 | $5,848 | $1,247 | $14,753 | $22,492 | $5,495 | $14,420 | $18,688 | $32,344 | 73% |
| DUKE | $35,780 | $30,718 | $27,633 | $12,647 | $63,049 | $17,926 | $16,284 | $26,804 | $47,578 | $29,562 | $46,140 | $43,514 | $105,958 | 144% |
| DUQ | $25,207 | $36,035 | $31,440 | $13,360 | $30,735 | $9,497 | $10,554 | $15,428 | $32,460 | $31,275 | $36,898 | $33,137 | $54,447 | 64% |
| EKPC | $55,492 | $32,527 | $29,305 | $13,006 | $36,197 | $15,150 | $14,392 | $18,617 | $44,493 | $26,425 | $30,796 | $32,462 | $56,613 | 74% |
| JCPLC | $54,318 | $26,878 | $20,974 | $14,647 | $16,763 | $10,532 | $3,218 | $4,900 | $14,574 | $2,897 | $9,384 | $9,415 | $20,021 | 113% |
| MEC | $53,343 | $46,578 | $29,477 | $19,969 | $22,832 | $10,980 | $11,571 | $17,673 | $42,079 | $22,427 | $30,263 | $30,102 | $32,536 | 8% |
| PE | $99,087 | $88,025 | $43,327 | $19,656 | $57,431 | $16,612 | $14,917 | $23,338 | $53,566 | $36,021 | $52,245 | $67,705 | $102,629 | 52% |
| PECO | $54,579 | $44,710 | $27,284 | $15,780 | $21,488 | $9,561 | $8,883 | $9,718 | $21,064 | $10,481 | $19,887 | $18,557 | $35,952 | 94% |
| PEPCO | $56,325 | $28,133 | $25,534 | $11,650 | $27,918 | $8,266 | $4,586 | $12,044 | $29,923 | $11,270 | $21,806 | $31,047 | $112,947 | 264% |
| PPL | $168,505 | $112,259 | $34,885 | $19,740 | $63,060 | $11,728 | $8,042 | $22,031 | $46,389 | $24,550 | $34,737 | $42,059 | $82,892 | 97% |
| PSEG | $69,311 | $53,948 | $31,736 | $19,066 | $24,585 | $11,108 | $2,589 | $8,549 | $18,108 | $2,825 | $10,076 | $9,695 | $19,959 | 106% |
| REC | $46,017 | $29,502 | $23,026 | $14,601 | $17,078 | $10,506 | $2,690 | $15,415 | $21,212 | $4,359 | $12,503 | $12,556 | $18,854 | 50% |
| PJM | $58,381 | $42,233 | $28,681 | $14,825 | $35,864 | $12,638 | $9,323 | $16,388 | $35,463 | $18,880 | $30,226 | $34,746 | $72,404 | 108% |

17 The energy net revenues presented for the PJM area in this section are calculated using the zonal average LMP.



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## New Entrant Combined Cycle

Energy market net revenue was calculated for a new CC plant economically dispatched by PJM. It was assumed that the CC plant had a minimum run time of four hours. The unit was first committed day ahead in profitable blocks of at least four hours, including start costs.[18] The unit was allowed to extend its run in real time if it was profitable to do so.

New entrant CC plant energy market net revenues were higher in all zones in the first six months of 2026 as a result of higher spark spreads (Table 7-6).

**Table 7-6 Energy net revenue for a new entrant CC under economic dispatch: January through June, 2014 through 2026 (Dollars per installed MW-year)[19]**

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $77,910 | $41,482 | $31,979 | $24,589 | $30,979 | $26,578 | $12,475 | $14,693 | $20,993 | $5,760 | $14,233 | $21,021 | $31,503 | 50% |
| AEP | $80,667 | $58,043 | $42,244 | $28,036 | $66,703 | $35,189 | $26,679 | $35,206 | $88,424 | $49,305 | $51,225 | $60,882 | $101,831 | 67% |
| APS | $104,178 | $87,007 | $47,376 | $29,989 | $75,987 | $28,932 | $20,930 | $34,749 | $65,624 | $27,245 | $60,753 | $73,855 | $166,823 | 126% |
| ATSI | $57,323 | $53,578 | $40,087 | $28,503 | $74,616 | $35,947 | $26,984 | $35,929 | $84,050 | $45,043 | $59,256 | $62,812 | $101,514 | 62% |
| BGE | $91,855 | $60,469 | $63,095 | $33,489 | $56,746 | $32,937 | $24,825 | $43,093 | $78,281 | $36,621 | $48,682 | $59,613 | $150,476 | 152% |
| COMED | $34,099 | $28,538 | $27,354 | $18,715 | $28,545 | $20,406 | $16,210 | $20,133 | $53,834 | $29,291 | $35,552 | $33,360 | $44,739 | 34% |
| DAY | $51,222 | $50,146 | $40,077 | $27,717 | $71,699 | $37,730 | $29,649 | $45,245 | $93,663 | $51,662 | $64,412 | $63,786 | $118,741 | 86% |
| DOM | $71,328 | $53,013 | $47,832 | $29,620 | $52,076 | $32,290 | $23,522 | $37,590 | $95,793 | $53,031 | $53,416 | $84,796 | $158,813 | 87% |
| DPL | $67,969 | $31,170 | $18,750 | $10,594 | $20,437 | $7,713 | $2,471 | $18,036 | $30,450 | $8,396 | $19,807 | $31,254 | $47,586 | 52% |
| DUKE | $45,485 | $46,921 | $38,033 | $24,761 | $78,100 | $34,678 | $26,924 | $42,860 | $89,950 | $49,617 | $60,204 | $58,909 | $116,379 | 98% |
| DUQ | $39,767 | $43,861 | $40,020 | $25,555 | $48,213 | $24,069 | $21,854 | $29,895 | $67,061 | $49,890 | $50,807 | $45,110 | $63,651 | 41% |
| EKPC | $71,520 | $48,587 | $38,818 | $25,152 | $53,811 | $31,439 | $25,183 | $34,615 | $84,402 | $46,357 | $45,309 | $48,626 | $77,319 | 59% |
| JCPLC | $82,534 | $42,377 | $29,333 | $26,977 | $32,182 | $25,892 | $13,174 | $15,323 | $20,656 | $5,856 | $14,786 | $21,511 | $31,429 | 46% |
| MEC | $76,482 | $59,458 | $36,630 | $31,426 | $38,973 | $26,752 | $21,890 | $32,429 | $71,325 | $40,416 | $44,291 | $44,105 | $52,345 | 19% |
| PE | $121,100 | $91,427 | $48,581 | $31,696 | $72,200 | $33,494 | $25,054 | $40,009 | $96,104 | $53,906 | $65,637 | $79,856 | $114,128 | 43% |
| PECO | $80,280 | $59,612 | $34,590 | $27,836 | $39,705 | $24,302 | $18,969 | $23,579 | $36,969 | $23,721 | $32,555 | $32,371 | $49,466 | 53% |
| PEPCO | $81,839 | $51,074 | $46,260 | $26,783 | $48,646 | $27,027 | $17,893 | $27,532 | $55,175 | $22,546 | $31,529 | $50,427 | $131,808 | 161% |
| PPL | $175,856 | $108,381 | $40,752 | $31,196 | $73,559 | $26,176 | $18,474 | $36,385 | $86,518 | $41,835 | $47,237 | $54,318 | $97,233 | 79% |
| PSEG | $102,122 | $69,749 | $39,136 | $31,203 | $43,334 | $27,399 | $13,802 | $19,456 | $22,919 | $5,513 | $15,765 | $20,618 | $31,073 | 51% |
| REC | $74,533 | $43,573 | $30,982 | $26,899 | $31,720 | $26,414 | $14,104 | $24,617 | $31,618 | $7,760 | $19,558 | $25,624 | $29,630 | 16% |
| PJM | $100,026 | $56,423 | $39,096 | $27,037 | $51,912 | $28,268 | $20,053 | $30,569 | $63,691 | $32,689 | $41,751 | $48,643 | $85,824 | 76% |

18 All starts associated with combined cycle units are assumed to be warm starts.

19 The energy net revenues presented for the PJM area in this section represent the zonal average energy net revenues.

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## New Entrant Coal Plant

Energy market net revenue was calculated for a new CP plant economically dispatched by PJM. It was assumed that the CP plant had a minimum run time of eight hours. The unit was first committed day ahead in profitable blocks of at least eight hours, including start costs. The unit was allowed to extend its run in real time if it was profitable to do so.

New entrant CP plant energy market net revenues were higher in all zones in the first six months of 2026 as a result of higher dark spreads (Table 7-7).

**Table 7-7 Energy net revenue for a new entrant CP: January through June, 2014 through 2026 (Dollars per installed MW-year)[20]**

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $110,016 | $42,712 | $4,765 | $1,541 | $28,655 | $3,223 | $0 | $3,722 | $8,742 | $1,201 | $4,598 | $15,770 | $62,565 | 297% |
| AEP | $91,742 | $34,849 | $15,249 | $16,732 | $41,247 | $7,238 | $701 | $23,041 | $28,288 | $627 | $19,807 | $54,305 | $85,717 | 58% |
| APS | $96,402 | $36,188 | $4,518 | $7,785 | $34,342 | $3,177 | $472 | $8,118 | $13,658 | $644 | $12,446 | $52,374 | $129,188 | 147% |
| ATSI | $101,926 | $37,524 | $12,466 | $17,299 | $41,408 | $6,331 | $821 | $16,264 | $31,891 | $737 | $17,479 | $49,016 | $73,253 | 49% |
| BGE | $147,786 | $63,487 | $21,418 | $7,201 | $42,829 | $4,664 | $600 | $13,429 | $32,548 | $2,573 | $13,518 | $32,041 | $137,382 | 329% |
| COMED | $86,470 | $25,335 | $7,945 | $14,209 | $15,456 | $7,121 | $313 | $16,481 | $93,584 | $19,703 | $29,250 | $48,837 | $69,304 | 42% |
| DAY | $93,750 | $34,970 | $11,662 | $15,480 | $39,980 | $6,677 | $530 | $26,328 | $27,557 | $1,091 | $22,362 | $53,699 | $89,190 | 66% |
| DOM | $131,449 | $67,614 | $24,370 | $10,276 | $49,477 | $7,354 | $1,630 | $22,191 | $71,413 | $8,241 | $32,533 | $88,201 | $175,734 | 99% |
| DPL | $145,222 | $60,730 | $7,811 | $5,227 | $37,638 | $4,958 | $6 | $13,166 | $19,742 | $2,625 | $8,554 | $25,579 | $76,532 | 199% |
| DUKE | $85,996 | $31,792 | $10,020 | $12,563 | $45,745 | $5,164 | $326 | $24,365 | $25,954 | $1,243 | $20,613 | $49,455 | $86,835 | 76% |
| DUQ | $80,681 | $28,093 | $10,780 | $15,380 | $41,021 | $5,159 | $1,081 | $15,588 | $28,517 | $709 | $16,802 | $44,048 | $68,549 | 56% |
| EKPC | $84,338 | $27,269 | $8,731 | $11,623 | $27,688 | $3,736 | $370 | $20,170 | $25,426 | $681 | $18,831 | $48,587 | $77,909 | 60% |
| JCPLC | $115,034 | $42,984 | $3,186 | $1,956 | $29,442 | $2,994 | $292 | $3,624 | $10,076 | $1,123 | $4,610 | $14,923 | $63,635 | 326% |
| MEC | $138,008 | $57,486 | $6,811 | $7,991 | $37,564 | $5,199 | $1,131 | $13,012 | $43,919 | $2,879 | $16,317 | $47,283 | $85,484 | 81% |
| PE | $112,398 | $47,624 | $10,013 | $5,951 | $32,203 | $4,373 | $469 | $12,646 | $37,167 | $1,580 | $19,488 | $56,373 | $81,557 | 45% |
| PECO | $107,549 | $41,133 | $2,890 | $1,569 | $28,614 | $2,862 | $0 | $5,440 | $15,407 | $1,478 | $7,340 | $25,025 | $71,939 | 187% |
| PEPCO | $111,094 | $36,225 | $5,616 | $1,480 | $28,469 | $2,108 | $200 | $7,237 | $14,616 | $1,853 | $9,410 | $26,809 | $131,299 | 390% |
| PPL | $106,670 | $40,128 | $2,923 | $1,807 | $28,058 | $1,754 | $0 | $6,506 | $17,040 | $1,511 | $7,957 | $22,695 | $75,712 | 234% |
| PSEG | $156,341 | $66,278 | $6,066 | $5,086 | $33,847 | $4,364 | $0 | $4,983 | $17,809 | $1,102 | $5,089 | $15,596 | $64,403 | 313% |
| REC | $152,005 | $66,876 | $5,755 | $5,017 | $32,201 | $5,092 | $0 | $9,233 | $21,161 | $1,312 | $6,026 | $16,492 | $63,443 | 285% |
| PJM | $112,744 | $44,465 | $9,150 | $8,309 | $34,794 | $4,677 | $447 | $13,277 | $29,226 | $2,646 | $14,651 | $39,356 | $88,482 | 125% |

20 The energy net revenues presented for the PJM area in this section represent the zonal average energy net revenues.



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## New Entrant Nuclear Plant

Energy market net revenue was calculated assuming that the nuclear plant was dispatched day ahead by PJM for all available plant hours. The unit runs for all hours and output reflects the class average equivalent availability factor.[21]

New entrant nuclear plant energy market net revenues were higher in all zones in the first six months of 2026 as a result of higher quark spreads (Table 7-8).

**Table 7-8 Energy net revenue for a new entrant nuclear plant: January through June, 2014 through 2026 (Dollars per installed MW-year)[22]**

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $291,903 | $172,604 | $94,039 | $112,950 | $150,493 | $104,009 | $68,807 | $103,763 | $225,936 | $98,494 | $103,590 | $166,434 | $226,418 | 36% |
| AEP | $219,655 | $143,288 | $104,839 | $117,268 | $150,899 | $108,947 | $77,798 | $121,635 | $255,178 | $123,231 | $119,364 | $179,573 | $234,006 | 30% |
| APS | $241,956 | $163,260 | $108,416 | $119,009 | $161,430 | $109,819 | $77,653 | $119,250 | $259,695 | $126,233 | $122,438 | $184,072 | $295,006 | 60% |
| ATSI | $230,792 | $146,504 | $105,198 | $120,297 | $157,947 | $110,870 | $78,768 | $119,022 | $252,311 | $122,572 | $120,444 | $179,416 | $222,445 | 24% |
| BGE | $314,365 | $200,861 | $139,198 | $129,188 | $182,670 | $118,718 | $82,967 | $136,796 | $296,312 | $144,917 | $144,163 | $217,580 | $378,983 | 74% |
| COMED | $195,097 | $118,244 | $94,979 | $110,771 | $110,502 | $98,594 | $70,455 | $112,402 | $215,093 | $100,529 | $98,067 | $131,893 | $159,960 | 21% |
| DAY | $220,842 | $142,586 | $105,296 | $119,311 | $154,673 | $112,862 | $81,786 | $129,650 | $262,692 | $129,889 | $125,892 | $180,492 | $241,339 | 34% |
| DOM | $277,170 | $184,228 | $119,020 | $124,737 | $177,476 | $114,364 | $78,456 | $129,938 | $301,968 | $140,167 | $142,469 | $229,835 | $361,578 | 57% |
| DPL | $310,128 | $188,601 | $107,363 | $119,242 | $162,082 | $105,652 | $70,275 | $120,844 | $236,084 | $98,807 | $108,607 | $176,421 | $246,356 | 40% |
| DUKE | $211,557 | $138,819 | $103,047 | $115,571 | $161,868 | $109,398 | $78,710 | $126,925 | $258,752 | $127,692 | $121,487 | $174,908 | $238,496 | 36% |
| DUQ | $205,396 | $135,212 | $103,024 | $117,900 | $157,284 | $108,584 | $79,153 | $117,284 | $246,970 | $121,110 | $118,353 | $173,057 | $215,808 | 25% |
| EKPC | $209,562 | $133,500 | $101,485 | $114,339 | $138,300 | $106,788 | $77,581 | $121,150 | $257,540 | $124,062 | $118,184 | $173,712 | $226,655 | 30% |
| JCPLC | $297,424 | $172,994 | $90,785 | $115,975 | $151,690 | $103,222 | $69,725 | $104,379 | $233,311 | $101,517 | $105,004 | $168,565 | $230,378 | 37% |
| MEC | $284,391 | $168,312 | $90,886 | $117,468 | $149,789 | $104,233 | $71,096 | $112,128 | $261,734 | $112,687 | $113,686 | $178,193 | $227,668 | 28% |
| PE | $254,203 | $159,652 | $100,433 | $116,219 | $151,515 | $107,207 | $74,385 | $113,910 | $253,602 | $118,572 | $123,651 | $190,782 | $237,400 | 24% |
| PECO | $287,466 | $169,441 | $88,661 | $112,915 | $150,482 | $101,467 | $67,727 | $102,277 | $222,174 | $94,310 | $100,721 | $162,242 | $222,779 | 37% |
| PEPCO | $307,444 | $190,801 | $126,466 | $126,128 | $178,183 | $116,051 | $79,873 | $129,251 | $287,602 | $139,901 | $140,270 | $213,964 | $370,172 | 73% |
| PPL | $285,412 | $168,746 | $90,878 | $114,532 | $146,136 | $99,342 | $67,845 | $106,484 | $242,362 | $104,189 | $102,604 | $161,954 | $221,813 | 37% |
| PSEG | $316,811 | $181,357 | $93,735 | $117,175 | $155,462 | $105,298 | $69,789 | $109,383 | $239,575 | $102,704 | $106,178 | $169,237 | $233,751 | 38% |
| REC | $311,648 | $182,253 | $93,272 | $117,435 | $154,317 | $106,997 | $71,176 | $118,247 | $251,304 | $108,714 | $114,487 | $181,430 | $240,627 | 33% |
| PJM | $263,661 | $163,063 | $103,051 | $117,921 | $155,160 | $107,621 | $74,701 | $117,736 | $253,010 | $117,015 | $117,483 | $179,688 | $251,582 | 40% |

21 The annual class average equivalent availability factor was used in the calculation of energy market net revenues.

22 The energy net revenues presented for the PJM area in this section represent the zonal average energy net revenues because fuel costs for nuclear units are included in the NEI nuclear costs.

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## New Entrant Diesel

Energy market net revenue was calculated for a DS plant economically dispatched by PJM in real time.

New entrant DS plant energy market net revenues were higher in all zones except COMED in the first six months of 2026 as a result of higher and more volatile energy prices (Table 7-9).

**Table 7-9 Energy market net revenue for a new entrant DS: January through June, 2014 through 2026 (Dollars per installed MW-year)**

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $32,410 | $11,338 | $2,081 | $288 | $9,957 | $1,359 | $183 | $864 | $7,883 | $209 | $770 | $9,326 | $21,565 | 131% |
| AEP | $14,425 | $2,986 | $492 | $93 | $3,909 | $801 | $336 | $1,522 | $4,197 | $275 | $838 | $7,901 | $18,189 | 130% |
| APS | $17,985 | $6,292 | $580 | $184 | $6,358 | $780 | $491 | $1,271 | $4,454 | $284 | $963 | $10,356 | $54,420 | 425% |
| ATSI | $14,091 | $2,731 | $458 | $298 | $6,617 | $746 | $422 | $1,118 | $4,184 | $307 | $2,066 | $7,835 | $10,513 | 34% |
| BGE | $49,408 | $12,649 | $4,557 | $987 | $12,227 | $1,351 | $767 | $4,154 | $9,317 | $402 | $2,344 | $17,129 | $84,942 | 396% |
| COMED | $11,311 | $1,685 | $242 | $0 | $609 | $686 | $239 | $1,648 | $2,818 | $217 | $399 | $6,805 | $5,548 | (18%) |
| DAY | $14,235 | $2,832 | $454 | $80 | $3,469 | $856 | $382 | $2,659 | $4,336 | $283 | $1,013 | $7,481 | $15,138 | 102% |
| DOM | $42,515 | $9,746 | $1,765 | $662 | $14,172 | $1,172 | $771 | $4,654 | $9,012 | $1,100 | $4,737 | $29,996 | $104,781 | 249% |
| DPL | $36,404 | $13,289 | $1,679 | $965 | $11,609 | $1,764 | $114 | $10,841 | $8,746 | $786 | $2,014 | $11,724 | $32,904 | 181% |
| DUKE | $13,404 | $2,256 | $561 | $122 | $5,860 | $789 | $327 | $2,351 | $4,134 | $268 | $756 | $7,059 | $14,800 | 110% |
| DUQ | $12,963 | $2,211 | $423 | $286 | $7,435 | $713 | $1,110 | $1,425 | $4,159 | $288 | $4,332 | $7,484 | $9,169 | 23% |
| EKPC | $14,441 | $2,182 | $664 | $34 | $1,701 | $787 | $372 | $2,254 | $4,213 | $270 | $746 | $7,740 | $15,980 | 106% |
| JCPLC | $32,656 | $11,922 | $553 | $433 | $11,080 | $1,360 | $659 | $742 | $7,657 | $221 | $763 | $8,907 | $20,800 | 134% |
| MEC | $31,729 | $11,759 | $529 | $376 | $10,929 | $741 | $408 | $1,631 | $9,079 | $299 | $876 | $9,148 | $26,793 | 193% |
| PE | $15,964 | $5,425 | $407 | $331 | $5,355 | $487 | $269 | $915 | $3,995 | $253 | $958 | $8,205 | $17,495 | 113% |
| PECO | $31,976 | $11,253 | $553 | $526 | $9,794 | $1,307 | $123 | $886 | $7,661 | $202 | $849 | $9,713 | $24,936 | 157% |
| PEPCO | $51,102 | $9,734 | $2,227 | $516 | $11,950 | $1,199 | $490 | $2,352 | $8,089 | $316 | $2,582 | $18,946 | $88,892 | 369% |
| PPL | $32,671 | $11,908 | $470 | $455 | $8,756 | $373 | $140 | $1,107 | $5,760 | $243 | $738 | $8,551 | $24,849 | 191% |
| PSEG | $32,232 | $11,410 | $629 | $427 | $10,267 | $1,710 | $117 | $1,264 | $7,980 | $219 | $746 | $8,912 | $20,698 | 132% |
| REC | $29,776 | $12,635 | $663 | $378 | $9,466 | $1,632 | $120 | $5,629 | $7,996 | $220 | $802 | $9,203 | $19,763 | 115% |
| PJM | $29,787 | $7,812 | $999 | $372 | $8,076 | $1,031 | $392 | $2,464 | $6,284 | $333 | $1,465 | $10,621 | $31,609 | 198% |

## New Entrant Onshore Wind Installation

Energy market net revenues for an onshore wind installation were calculated hourly by zone assuming the unit generated at the average hourly capacity factor of all operating wind units in the zone with an installed capacity greater than 3 MW.[23]

Onshore wind energy market net revenues excluding RECs in the AEP, APS, and PE were higher in the first six months of 2026 as a result of increases in energy prices.

23 Net revenues are calculated for zones in which there are sufficient operating units to determine capacity factor for a new entrant unit.



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### Table 7-10 Energy market net revenue for an onshore wind installation (Dollars per installed MW-year): January through June, 2014 through 2026

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| AEP | $71,059 | $45,467 | $37,474 | $41,392 | $58,702 | $40,125 | $24,558 | $32,726 | $80,649 | $37,926 | $40,256 | $62,542 | $79,558 | 27% |
| APS | $73,063 | $47,789 | $31,619 | $42,647 | $59,279 | $34,603 | $25,860 | $29,577 | $68,658 | $36,002 | $34,464 | $63,688 | $104,485 | 64% |
| COMED | $62,869 | $37,130 | $29,490 | $40,419 | $36,688 | $35,376 | $20,066 | $32,378 | $68,717 | $29,112 | $32,532 | $44,386 | $42,769 | (4%) |
| PE | $89,239 | $59,522 | $32,895 | $43,425 | $59,833 | $34,277 | $22,726 | $27,715 | $67,083 | $29,740 | $28,926 | $55,318 | $63,166 | 14% |

Wind units in the four zones were assumed to receive the higher of the MD or PA Tier I REC for the purposes of calculating RECs revenue.[24] Renewable energy credits were between 33 and 92 percent of the total energy market net revenue of an onshore wind installation.

### Table 7-11 RECs revenue for an onshore wind installation (Dollars per installed MW-year): January through June, 2014 through 2026

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| AEP | $21,238 | $21,607 | $17,906 | $7,318 | $9,049 | $10,284 | $12,824 | $18,617 | $33,662 | $42,617 | $48,757 | $39,203 | $35,834 | (9%) |
| APS | $19,684 | $18,766 | $14,150 | $7,264 | $8,493 | $8,623 | $12,989 | $17,275 | $27,515 | $39,271 | $41,431 | $39,217 | $34,556 | (12%) |
| COMED | $23,383 | $21,127 | $15,820 | $7,863 | $8,653 | $10,417 | $12,695 | $21,271 | $36,372 | $44,589 | $55,002 | $43,394 | $39,201 | (10%) |
| PE | $22,504 | $22,720 | $15,768 | $7,496 | $8,858 | $8,795 | $12,276 | $17,444 | $27,758 | $33,916 | $34,432 | $33,830 | $27,263 | (19%) |

## New Entrant Offshore Wind Installation

Energy market net revenues for an offshore wind installation were calculated hourly for relevant zones assuming the unit generated at a 40 percent capacity factor.

Offshore wind energy market net revenues excluding RECs were higher in the first six months of 2026 as a result of higher energy prices.

### Table 7-12 Energy market net revenue for an offshore wind installation (Dollars per installed MW-year): January through June, 2014 through 2026

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $119,483 | $72,240 | $41,102 | $47,679 | $64,245 | $44,856 | $30,237 | $43,365 | $100,185 | $40,278 | $44,852 | $72,708 | $92,968 | 28% |
| DOM | $125,813 | $75,542 | $50,481 | $52,400 | $77,040 | $47,975 | $34,138 | $56,252 | $138,546 | $59,389 | $61,164 | $106,458 | $169,542 | 59% |
| DPL | $127,961 | $78,095 | $44,495 | $50,419 | $69,535 | $45,566 | $30,355 | $54,583 | $105,921 | $40,953 | $46,085 | $75,712 | $101,158 | 34% |

24 RECs prices obtained from Evolution Markets, Inc.

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The offshore wind unit in ACEC was assumed to receive NJ wind RECs. The offshore wind unit in DOM and DPL was assumed to receive the higher of the MD or PA Tier I REC for the purposes of calculating RECs revenue.[25] Renewable energy credits were between 25 and 49 percent of the total energy market net revenue of an offshore wind installation.

**Table 7-13 RECs revenue for an offshore wind installation (Dollars per installed MW-year): January through June, 2014 through 2026**

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $27,799 | $28,156 | $20,907 | $8,891 | $10,944 | $11,567 | $16,859 | $26,997 | $40,764 | $55,772 | $62,978 | $49,344 | $45,747 | (7%) |
| DOM | $27,594 | $27,590 | $20,364 | $8,472 | $10,546 | $11,496 | $16,755 | $26,993 | $40,916 | $54,904 | $60,606 | $47,554 | $42,432 | (11%) |
| DPL | $27,594 | $27,590 | $20,364 | $8,472 | $10,546 | $11,496 | $16,755 | $26,993 | $40,916 | $54,904 | $60,606 | $47,554 | $42,432 | (11%) |

## New Entrant Solar Installation

Energy market net revenues for a solar installation were calculated hourly assuming the unit was generating at the average hourly capacity factor of operating solar units in the zone with an installed capacity greater than 3 MW.[26]

Solar energy market net revenues excluding RECs in the first six months of 2026 were higher in ACEC, DOM, and DPL as a result of higher energy prices. Solar energy market net revenues excluding RECs in the first six months of 2026 were lower in JCPLC and PSEG as a result of lower capacity factors.

**Table 7-14 Energy market net revenue for a solar installation (Dollars per installed MW-year): January through June, 2014 through 2026**

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $41,502 | $28,041 | $16,764 | $18,900 | $22,066 | $16,681 | $11,376 | $15,530 | $38,901 | $14,048 | $16,120 | $25,859 | $28,106 | 9% |
| DOM | - | - | $32,557 | $35,050 | $43,202 | $27,655 | $20,529 | $34,028 | $105,314 | $36,390 | $36,001 | $73,725 | $103,477 | 40% |
| DPL | - | - | $19,854 | $26,389 | $29,708 | $21,191 | $13,800 | $19,318 | $43,919 | $18,268 | $22,240 | $34,235 | $42,077 | 23% |
| JCPLC | $39,801 | $23,113 | $14,984 | $17,766 | $20,413 | $15,354 | $10,866 | $15,329 | $36,825 | $13,495 | $14,273 | $22,255 | $21,909 | (2%) |
| PSEG | $37,132 | $27,390 | $17,632 | $19,751 | $22,610 | $17,487 | $12,133 | $18,899 | $41,984 | $14,656 | $15,535 | $24,689 | $23,969 | (3%) |

The solar installation was assumed to receive the highest of the DC, MD or NJ Solar REC, based on locational eligibility, for the purposes of calculating RECs revenue.[27] Renewable energy credits were between 50 and 516 percent of the total energy market net revenue of a solar installation.

25 RECs prices obtained from Evolution Markets, Inc.
26 Net revenues are calculated for zones in which there are sufficient operating units to determine capacity factor for a new entrant unit.
27 RECs prices obtained from Evolution Markets, Inc.


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Table 7-15 RECs revenue for a solar installation (Dollars per installed MW-year): January through June, 2014 through 2026

| | Jan-Jun | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Change in 2026 from 2025 |
| ACEC | $121,784 | $167,303 | $186,181 | $147,558 | $148,449 | $162,439 | $156,691 | $156,270 | $164,705 | $156,551 | $146,976 | $140,618 | $134,567 | (4%) |
| DOM | - | - | $51,672 | $11,519 | $9,759 | $50,380 | $79,466 | $75,843 | $67,393 | $58,741 | $63,781 | $63,685 | $51,806 | (19%) |
| DPL | - | - | $38,542 | $9,488 | $8,043 | $44,102 | $65,399 | $61,812 | $47,253 | $55,688 | $52,034 | $47,053 | $39,821 | (15%) |
| JCPLC | $120,312 | $136,440 | $165,226 | $132,684 | $135,091 | $148,811 | $143,935 | $152,667 | $150,378 | $144,067 | $130,941 | $121,668 | $112,998 | (7%) |
| PSEG | $103,538 | $149,515 | $192,233 | $147,355 | $145,454 | $165,634 | $164,376 | $169,079 | $166,969 | $153,854 | $139,605 | $130,570 | $115,988 | (11%) |

## Historical New Entrant CC Revenue Adequacy

Total unit net revenues include energy and capacity market revenues. Analysis of the total unit revenues of theoretical new entrant CCs for three representative locations shows that CC units that entered the PJM markets in 2007 have covered 94 percent of their total costs in the BGE Zone, 82 percent of their total costs in the PSEG Zone, and 53 percent of their total costs in the COMED Zone, including the return on and of capital, on a cumulative basis through June 2026. The analysis also shows that theoretical new entrant CCs that entered the PJM markets in 2012 have covered over 100 percent of their total costs on a cumulative basis in the BGE Zone, 93 percent of their total costs in PSEG Zone, and 66 percent of their total costs in the COMED Zone. Energy market revenues alone were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario, which demonstrates the critical role of the capacity market revenue in covering total costs. Covering 100 percent of total costs in this analysis includes earning the assumed rate of return. It is equivalent to being paid gross CONE, calculated using the defined parameters including the cost of capital. Units earned a positive rate of return even when earning less than the rate of return used in the gross CONE calculation.

Under cost of service regulation, units are guaranteed that they will cover their total costs, assuming that the costs were determined to be reasonable. To the extent that units built in the PJM markets did not cover their total costs, investors were worse off and customers were better off than under cost of service regulation, ignoring the benefits of competition on increasing efficiency, reducing costs and improving technology and ignoring the possibility of over earning under cost of service regulation.

Figure 7-5 compares cumulative energy market net revenues and energy market net revenues plus capacity market revenues to cumulative levelized costs for a new entrant CC that began operation on January 1, 2007, and a new entrant CC that began operation on January 1, 2012. The solid black line shows the total net revenue required to cover total costs. The solid colored lines show net energy revenue by zone. The dashed colored lines show the sum of net energy and capacity revenue by zone.

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### Figure 7-5 Historical new entrant CC revenue adequacy: 2007 through June 2026 and 2012 through June 2026 [28]





Table 7-16 shows the percent of levelized total costs recovered from the start date through June 2026. Table 7-16 also shows the return (IRR) earned from the start date through June 2026. For example, for a CC built in BGE in 2012, the resource would have earned a 14 percent IRR compared to the 12 percent used in the gross CONE calculation. In contrast, for a CC built in ComEd in 2012, the resource would have earned a 2 percent IRR compared to the 12 percent used in the gross CONE calculation.

### Table 7-16 Percent of levelized total costs recovered

| 2007 through June 2026 and 2012 through June 2026 | 2007 CC | 2012 CC |
|---|---|---|
| Percent of levelized costs covered at 12% IRR | | |
| BGE | 97% | 116% |
| COMED | 53% | 66% |
| PSEG | 82% | 93% |
| | | |
| IRR at which levelized costs are covered | | |
| BGE | 9% | 14% |
| COMED | 0% | 2% |
| PSEG | 7% | 11% |

The assumptions used for this analysis are shown in Table 7-17.

### Table 7-17 Assumptions for analysis of new entry in 2007 and 2012

| | 2007 CC | 2012 CC |
|---|---|---|
| Project Cost | $658,598,000 | $665,995,000 |
| Fixed O&M ($/MW-Year) | $20,016 | $20,126 |
| End of Life Value | $0 | $0 |
| Loan Term | 20 years | 20 years |
| Percent Equity (%) | 50% | 50% |
| Percent Debt (%) | 50% | 50% |
| Loan Interest Rate (%) | 7% | 7% |
| Cost of Equity (%) | 12.0% | 12.0% |
| Federal Income Tax Rate (%) | 35% | 35% |
| State Income Tax Rate (%) | 9% | 9% |
| General Escalation (%) | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Technology | GE Frame 7FA.04 | GE Frame 7FA.05 |
| ICAP (MW) | 601 | 655 |
| Depreciation MACRS 150% declining balance | 20 years | 20 years |
| IRR (%) | 12.0% | 12.0% |

28 The gas pipeline pricing points used in this analysis are Zone 6 non-NY for BGE, Chicago City Gate for COMED, and Texas Eastern M3 for PSEG.



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## Cost to Build vs Cost to Acquire

The MMU presented the cost to buy a new CT and a new CC during the Quadrennial Review process in 2025. (See Table 7-18.)

### Table 7-18 Capital cost build up of a new EMAAC CT and CC[29]

| Capital Costs ($ in 000s) | Combustion Turbine | Combined Cycle |
|---|---|---|
| Plant Proper EPC | $424,390 | $1,610,970 |
| Electric Interconnect/System Upgrades | $13,616 | $39,672 |
| Gas Interconnect | $20,228 | $28,216 |
| Water and Sewer Connection | $0 | $7,771 |
| Equipment Spares | $6,567 | $11,943 |
| Initial Fuel and Other Inventory | $4,988 | $9,977 |
| Mobilization and Startup | $2,837 | $7,041 |
| Land Purchase/Land Reservation Payment | $2,866 | $9,171 |
| Construction Period/Upfront Land Lease | $0 | $0 |
| Decommissioning Bond Costs | $0 | $0 |
| Development Expenses | $8,208 | $10,944 |
| Legal Fees | $2,551 | $3,279 |
| Permits | $2,760 | $3,690 |
| Emission Reduction Credits | $43,122 | $105,459 |
| Financing Fees | $5,667 | $20,175 |
| Interest During Construction | $0 | $0 |
| Owner's Contingency | $10,610 | $40,274 |
| Sales Tax | $549 | $1,910 |
| Other | $0 | $0 |
| Total Project Overnight Cost-No IDC ($ in 000s) | $548,960 | $1,910,493 |
| Total Project Cost ($/kW) | $1,253 | $1,345 |

Buying an existing resource is an alternative to buying a new unit. Selected recent transactions including gas plants or primarily thermal generation portfolios in the US with announced prices are shown in Table 7-19. Not all transactions are in PJM. Recent transactions for new combined cycles are close to or at a premium to the MMU estimate of total project cost in $/kW.

29 The MMU retained Pasteris Energy, Inc. to develop the revenue requirements of a new entrant ("Gross CONE") combustion turbine ("CT") and combined cycle ("CC") power plant located in five PJM Locational Deliverability Areas ("LDA") on a 2028 dollar basis for commercial operation in the 2028/2029 Delivery Year as part of the Quadrennial Review. Stantec Consulting Services, Inc. ("Stantec") a power plant design and engineering firm with CT and CC plant design experience was contracted by Pasteris Energy, Inc. to determine the plant proper capital cost estimate for the CONE CT and CC power plant at the five locations within PJM. The power plant construction estimates were developed based on data from recent actual construction proposals by Stantec and input obtained from multiple construction contractors. For these estimates, labor rates and labor productivity for each CONE Area were verified and used to develop the direct and indirect construction costs.

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## Table 7-19 Selected recent transactions[30]

| Date Announced | Date Closed | Buyer | Seller | Description of Assets | Unit Type | Fuel | Location | Price ($ in millions) | MW | $/kW |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/18/2026 | - | LS Power | Constellation | Bethlehem, York 1, York 2, Hay Road, Edge Moor | 2 Combustion Turbines<br>3 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | DE, PA | $5,000 | 4,400 | $1,142 |
| 1/15/2026 | 6/15/2026 | Talen Energy | Energy Capital Partners | Waterford (OH)<br>Darby (OH)<br>Lawrenceburg (IN) | 1 Combustion Turbine<br>2 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | IN, OH | $3,450 | 2,600 | $1,327 |
| 1/5/2026 | - | Vistra | Cogentrix (Quantum Capital Group) | 10 units | 2 Combustion Turbine<br>7 Combined Cycles<br>1 Cogeneration Unit | Natural Gas | CT, MD, ME, NH, NJ, PA, RI, TX | $4,000 | 5,500 | $727 |
| 9/15/2025 | - | Blackstone | Ardian | Hill Top Energy Center | 1 Combined Cycle | Natural Gas | PA | $1,000 | 620 | $1,613 |
| 9/15/2025 | 9/24/2025 | CPS Energy | PROENERGY | 4 units | 4 Combustion Turbines | Natural Gas | TX | $1,387 | 1,632 | $850 |
| 9/11/2025 | 9/11/2025 | PowerTransitions (Partners Group) | Talen Energy | Camden Power Plant (NJ)<br>Dartmouth Power Plant (MA) | 2 Combustion Turbines | Natural Gas | NJ, MA | $450 | 226 | $1,991 |
| 7/17/2025 | 11/25/2025 | Talen Energy | Caithness, BlackRock | Guernsey Power Station (OH)<br>Moxie Freedom Energy Center (PA) | 2 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | OH, PA | $3,500 | 2,941 | $1,190 |
| 5/15/2025 | 10/22/2025 | Vistra | Lotus Infrastructure Partners | 7 units<br>Greenleaf (CA)<br>Garrison (DE)<br>Beaver Falls (NY)<br>Fairless (PA)<br>Manchester (RI) | 2 Combustion Turbines<br>5 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | CA, DE, NY, PA, RI | $1,900 | 2,600 | $731 |
| 5/12/2025 | 1/30/2026 | NRG Energy | LS Power | 18 units | 18 units | Natural Gas | 9 states in Northeast, TX | $12,000 | 13,000 | $923 |
| 4/14/2025 | 6/9/2025 | Capital Power | LS Power | Rolling Hills (OH)<br>Hummel (PA) | 2 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | OH, PA | $2,200 | 2,147 | $1,025 |
| 3/18/2025 | 6/16/2025 | Partners Group | Middle River | Middle River portfolio<br>11 units | 9 Combustion Turbines<br>2 Combined Cycle | Natural Gas | CA | $2,200 | 1,900 | $1,158 |
| 3/12/2025 | 4/10/2025 | NRG | Rockland Capital | 6 units<br>Victoria, Victoria Port II, SJRR, Port Comfort, Chamon, Wharton | 5 Combustion Turbines<br>1 Combined Cycle | Natural Gas | TX | $560 | 738 | $759 |
| 1/24/2025 | 8/5/2025 | Blackstone | Ares Management | Potomac Energy Center | 1 Combined Cycle | Natural Gas | VA | $1,000 | 774 | $1,292 |
| 1/10/2025 | 1/7/2026 | Constellation | Calpine | Calpine portfolio<br>79 units | 79 units | Natural Gas<br>Geothermal | USA | $26,600 | 27,000 | $985 |
| 8/5/2024 | 1/31/2025 | Quantum Capital Group | Carlyle | Cogentrix Energy<br>11 units | 11 units | Natural Gas | MA, MD, ME, NH<br>NJ, PA, RI, TX | $3,000 | 5,300 | $566 |
| 6/28/2024 | 6/30/2025 | AEP | J-Power USA | Green Country Power Plant | 1 Combined Cycle | Natural Gas | OK | $730 | 795 | $918 |
| 3/27/2024 | 5/1/2024 | CPS Energy | Talen | Barney Davis, Nueces Bay, Laredo | 1 Combustion Turbine<br>2 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | TX | $785 | 1,710 | $459 |
| 11/20/2023 | 2/9/2024 and 2/16/2024 | Capital Power Corporation | CSG Investments | Harquahala (AZ)<br>La Paloma (CA) | 2 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | AZ, CA | $1,100 | 1,608 | $684 |
| 11/13/2023 | 9/29/2025 | TotalEnergies | TexGen | Wolf Hollow I, Colorado Bend I, La Porte | 1 Combustion Turbine<br>2 Combined Cycles | Natural Gas | TX | $635 | 1,500 | $423 |
| 9/23/2021 | 9/30/2022 | Alabama Power | Harbert Power Fund V | Calhoun Generating Facility | 4 Combustion Turbines | Natural Gas | AL | $179 | 743 | $241 |
| 8/13/2021 | 2/18/2022 and 2/23/2022 | ArcLight Energy Partners Fund VII | PSEG | PSEG Fossil portfolio<br>13 units | 13 units | Coal<br>Natural Gas | NJ, CT, MD, NY | $1,920 | 6,750 | $284 |
| 2/28/2021 | 12/1/2021 | Generation Bridge (ArcLight Energy Partners Fund VII) | NRG Energy | 8 units<br>Sunrise, Long Beach (CA)<br>Middletown, Montville, Devon, CT Jets (CT)<br>Arthur Kill, Oswego (NY) | 1 Combined Cycle<br>7 CT/Oil | Natural Gas, Oil | CA, CT, NY | $620 | 4,900 | $127 |

30 All transaction information is public.



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The average transaction price paid in $/kW has been generally increasing as shown in Table 7-20. There is a range in the data as a result of the variation in location, ages, types, and number of the acquired resources.

**Table 7-20 Selected recent transactions price trends**

| Year Announced | Natural Gas Average $/kW |
|---|---|
| 2026 | $1,065 |
| 2025 | $1,138 |
| 2024 | $648 |
| 2023 | $554 |

## Nuclear Net Revenue Analysis

The analysis of nuclear plants includes annual avoidable costs and incremental capital expenditures from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) based on NEI's calculations of average costs for all U.S. nuclear plants.[31] [32] The analysis includes the most recent operating cost data and incremental capital expenditure data for single unit plants and multi unit plants published by NEI, which is for 2024.[33] NEI average operating costs have decreased since their peak in 2012 (a 2.2 percent decrease from 2012 through 2024 for all plants including single and multiple unit plants in nominal dollars; a 30.9 percent decrease in 2024 dollars).[34] [35] NEI average incremental capital expenditures have decreased since their peak in 2012 (a 27.5 percent decrease from 2012 through 2024 for all plants including single and multiple unit plants in nominal dollars; a 48.6 percent decrease in real 2024 dollars).[36] NEI's incremental capital expenditures peaked in 2012 as a result of regulatory requirements following the 2011 accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan.

The results for nuclear plants are sensitive to small changes in PJM energy and capacity prices, both actual and forward prices.[37] When gas prices are high and LMPs are high as a result, net revenues to nuclear plants increase. In 2014, the polar vortex resulted in a significant increase in net revenues to nuclear plants. When gas prices are low and LMPs are low as a result, net revenues to nuclear plants decrease. In 2016, PJM energy prices were then at the lowest level since the introduction of competitive markets on April 1, 1999, and remained low in 2017. As a result, in 2016 and 2017, a significant proportion of nuclear plants did not cover annual avoidable costs based on current year prices.[38] In 2018, high gas prices and high LMPs resulted in a significant increase in net revenues for nuclear plants in PJM. Energy prices in 2018 were significantly higher than in 2017. Although energy prices in 2019 were lower than in 2016, higher capacity market revenues more than offset the difference. In 2020, PJM energy prices were at the lowest level since the introduction of competitive markets, even lower than in 2016. Average energy prices in 2022 were higher than energy prices in any year since the inception of PJM markets in 1999. Since 2024, energy prices have been increasing and capacity prices beginning with the 2025/2026 delivery year capacity prices have been high. As a result, all nuclear units beginning in 2025 and looking forward through 2028 have received a surplus through a combination of energy and capacity revenue and are expected to continue to receive surplus revenues going forward. Based on forward prices as of June 30, 2026, expected nuclear plant energy revenues for 2026, 2027 and 2028 are higher than the actual revenues in all years since 2014, with the exception of 2022. The actual net revenue results for individual nuclear plants are a function of the degree to which actual unit costs are less than or greater than the benchmark NEI data.

31 Operating costs from: Nuclear Energy Institute (March 2026). "Nuclear Costs in Context," <https://www.nei.org/resources/reports-briefs/nuclear-costs-in-context>. Individual plants may vary from the average due to factors such as geographic location, local labor costs, the timing of refueling outages and other unit specific factors. This is the most current NEI data available.

32 The NEI costs for Hope Creek were treated as that of a two unit configuration because the unit is located in the same area as Salem 1 & 2. The net surplus of Hope Creek is sensitive to the accuracy of this assumption.

33 NEI also provides average costs by plant run by operators with one plant or multiple plants, by market, and by type of nuclear reactor. Plants run by operators with multiple plants have lower average costs than plants run by operators with a single plant. Plants participating in wholesale markets have lower average costs than plants in regulated markets. PWR reactors have lower average generating costs than BWR reactors.

34 Operating costs in this paragraph are operating costs as specified by NEI and do not include fuel costs or capital expenditures. Operating costs for single unit plants increased by 2.4 percent from 2023 to 2024 in nominal dollars. Operating costs for multiple unit plants increased by 6.6 percent from 2023 to 2024 in nominal dollars.

35 Inflation adjusted numbers are from NEI.

36 Capital expenditures have decreased 28.8 percent from 2012 to 2024 for single unit plants and 25.4 percent for multiple unit plants in nominal dollars.

37 A change in the capacity market price of $24 per MW-day translates into a change in capacity revenue of $1.00 per MWh for a nuclear power plant operating at a capacity factor of 100 percent. A change in the capacity market price of $24 per MW-day translates into a change in capacity revenue of $1.05 per MWh for a nuclear power plant operating at a capacity factor of 0.951 percent

38 The MMU submitted testimony in New Jersey on the same issues of nuclear economics. *Establishing Nuclear Diversity Certificate Program. Bill No. S-877 New Jersey Senate Environment and Energy Committee. (2018). Revised Statement of Joseph Bowring.*

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Table 7-21 shows energy market prices, Table 7-22 and Table 7-23 show capacity market prices and Table 7-24 shows nuclear cost data for the 16 nuclear plants in PJM in addition to Oyster Creek, which retired September 17, 2018, and Three Mile Island, which retired September 20, 2019.[39] [40] The analysis excludes the Catawba 1 nuclear unit. Partial data is provided for the Cook, North Anna, and Surry nuclear units.[41] The AEP Cook nuclear units are designated FRR. North Anna 1 and 2 and Surry 1 and 2 were part of the Dominion FRR for the 2022/2023 and 2023/2024 and 2024/2025 Delivery Years.[42] [43] [44] FRR units receive cost of service revenues and are not subject to PJM market revenues. Duke's Catawba 1 is not in PJM but is pseudo tied to PJM.

For nuclear plants, all calculations are based on publicly available data in order to avoid revealing confidential information. Historical nuclear unit revenue is based on day-ahead LMP at the relevant node. Nuclear unit capacity revenue assumes that the unit cleared its full unforced capacity at the BRA locational clearing price. Unforced capacity is determined using the annual class average EFORd or ELCC rate.[45]

### Table 7-21 Nuclear unit day-ahead LMP: 2008 through 2025

| | ICAP | Average DA LMP ($/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $49.46 | $31.51 | $35.59 | $37.43 | $30.34 | $34.24 | $41.86 | $30.35 | $27.07 | $29.11 | $36.35 | $26.22 | $20.33 | $37.07 | $67.02 | $29.63 | $30.28 | $43.49 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $48.10 | $27.76 | $31.48 | $32.02 | $27.51 | $30.26 | $37.34 | $25.97 | $24.30 | $24.99 | $27.11 | $22.88 | $18.23 | $33.74 | $58.20 | $25.78 | $23.31 | $33.71 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $47.61 | $23.98 | $28.49 | $28.09 | $24.25 | $29.22 | $35.05 | $21.00 | $17.94 | $23.79 | $26.96 | $22.19 | $17.66 | $32.81 | $57.70 | $25.36 | $23.74 | $33.96 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $78.63 | $41.05 | $51.27 | $46.53 | $35.19 | $40.27 | $57.88 | $40.30 | $32.64 | $31.57 | $38.79 | $28.00 | $21.88 | $41.24 | $78.11 | $35.45 | $37.05 | $54.51 |
| Cook | 2,177 | $52.26 | $32.20 | $36.52 | $37.41 | $30.09 | $34.14 | $40.49 | $29.94 | $26.93 | $28.03 | $31.44 | $25.07 | $19.59 | $34.81 | $63.46 | $28.88 | $28.28 | $42.50 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | - | - | - | $39.68 | $31.68 | $36.10 | $47.21 | $31.94 | $27.80 | $28.85 | $34.44 | $26.33 | $20.54 | $37.34 | $68.07 | $29.63 | $30.46 | $45.69 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $48.76 | $28.27 | $32.73 | $33.07 | $28.42 | $31.82 | $39.22 | $27.45 | $25.89 | $26.35 | $28.25 | $23.41 | $18.73 | $34.32 | $59.35 | $25.11 | $24.36 | $33.93 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $73.34 | $39.43 | $48.03 | $45.52 | $33.07 | $37.43 | $51.99 | $32.41 | $23.20 | $26.78 | $32.93 | $22.45 | $17.32 | $30.16 | $60.64 | $22.97 | $26.42 | $40.08 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $47.96 | $27.71 | $31.53 | $31.93 | $27.56 | $30.94 | $37.88 | $26.28 | $23.95 | $24.71 | $27.19 | $22.75 | $18.14 | $33.54 | $57.90 | $25.55 | $23.05 | $33.92 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $73.49 | $39.49 | $48.23 | $45.27 | $33.09 | $37.28 | $51.71 | $32.65 | $23.37 | $26.99 | $33.08 | $22.68 | $17.31 | $31.05 | $61.25 | $23.16 | $26.06 | $39.97 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $75.14 | $39.89 | $50.59 | $45.47 | $33.87 | $38.55 | $53.37 | $38.05 | $30.50 | $31.27 | $38.44 | $27.39 | $21.06 | $39.99 | $76.51 | $33.75 | $35.11 | $52.50 |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | $75.49 | $40.43 | $49.29 | $46.74 | $33.69 | $38.62 | $52.85 | $33.10 | $23.79 | $27.52 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $73.09 | $39.32 | $47.70 | $44.73 | $32.81 | $37.37 | $51.52 | $31.98 | $23.07 | $26.76 | $32.63 | $21.58 | $16.93 | $30.77 | $61.29 | $23.01 | $26.08 | $39.97 |
| Perry | 1,240 | - | - | $36.99 | $38.76 | $31.68 | $36.69 | $46.14 | $32.77 | $27.84 | $29.91 | $37.24 | $26.76 | $20.49 | $37.76 | $68.56 | $30.39 | $31.23 | $45.36 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $47.28 | $24.81 | $27.53 | $26.79 | $20.43 | $25.94 | $30.71 | $19.47 | $18.04 | $23.09 | $25.54 | $21.13 | $15.95 | $31.39 | $57.82 | $25.01 | $23.42 | $34.53 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $73.41 | $39.51 | $48.02 | $45.50 | $33.06 | $37.40 | $51.96 | $32.37 | $23.18 | $26.76 | $32.90 | $22.43 | $17.32 | $30.12 | $60.59 | $22.95 | $26.40 | $40.04 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $71.96 | $39.02 | $49.30 | $45.01 | $33.62 | $37.98 | $51.75 | $37.91 | $30.08 | $31.08 | $38.50 | $26.65 | $20.41 | $39.30 | $74.21 | $32.74 | $33.65 | $49.76 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $69.96 | $38.24 | $45.95 | $44.78 | $32.10 | $36.76 | $50.93 | $32.47 | $23.66 | $27.14 | $32.42 | $21.08 | $16.03 | $30.36 | $59.60 | $23.77 | $24.13 | $36.03 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | $72.46 | $39.11 | $46.72 | $44.15 | $32.43 | $36.83 | $50.47 | $30.94 | $22.96 | $27.12 | $31.76 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

39 Installed capacity is from NEI fact sheets accessed April 23, 2025 <https://www.nei.org/resources/fact-sheets/u-s-nuclear-plants>.

40 Constellation plans to restore TMI Unit 1 to service. Exelon. "Constellation to Launch Crane Clean Energy Center, Restoring Jobs and Carbon-Free Power to The Grid," (September 20, 2024) <https://www.constellationenergy.com/newsroom/2024/Constellation-to-Launch-Crane-Clean-Energy-Center-Restoring-Jobs-and-Carbon-Free-Power-to-The-Grid.html>.

41 Capacity market revenues are not included for the FRR units because the units were not in the capacity market.

42 See "Resources Designated in 2022/2023 FRR Capacity Plans as of April 23, 2021," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2022-2023/2022-2023-resources-designated-in-frr-plans.ashx>.

43 See "Resources Designated in 2023/2024 FRR Capacity Plans as of May 19, 2021," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2023-2024/2023-2024-resources-designated-in-frr-plans.pdf>.

44 See "Resources Designated in 2024/2025 FRR Capacity Plans as of November 8, 2022," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2024-2025/2024-2025-resources-designated-in-frr-plans.pdf>.

45 ELCC rates used starting with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. See BRA Class Ratings <https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability>.



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## Table 7-22 BRA capacity market clearing prices ($/MW-Day): 2007/2008 through 2028/2029 [46] [47]

| | ICAP | BRA Capacity Price ($/MW-Day) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 07/08 | 08/09 | 09/10 | 10/11 | 11/12 | 12/13 | 13/14 | 14/15 | 15/16 | 16/17 | 17/18 | 18/19 | 19/20 | 20/21 | 21/22 | 22/23 | 23/24 | 24/25 | 25/26 | 26/27 | 27/28 | 28/29 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $77 | $140 | $50 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $215 | $203 | $188 | $196 | $69 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $215 | $203 | $188 | $196 | $69 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $189 | $210 | $237 | $174 | $110 | $133 | $226 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $86 | $140 | $96 | $49 | $49 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Cook | 2,177 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Davis Besse | 894 | - | - | - | - | $109 | $20 | $28 | $126 | $357 | $114 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $77 | $171 | $50 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $215 | $203 | $188 | $196 | $69 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $198 | $149 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $140 | $245 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $225 | $120 | $188 | $166 | $98 | $49 | $54 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $215 | $203 | $188 | $196 | $69 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $198 | $149 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $140 | $245 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $225 | $120 | $188 | $166 | $98 | $49 | $54 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $77 | $140 | NA | NA | NA | $444 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | $198 | $149 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $140 | $245 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $225 | $120 | $188 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $198 | $149 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $140 | $245 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $225 | $120 | $188 | $166 | $98 | $49 | $54 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Perry | 1,240 | - | - | - | - | $109 | $20 | $28 | $126 | $357 | $114 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $77 | $171 | $50 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $215 | $203 | $188 | $196 | $69 | $34 | $29 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $198 | $149 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $140 | $245 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $225 | $120 | $188 | $166 | $98 | $49 | $54 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $41 | $112 | $102 | $174 | $110 | $16 | $28 | $126 | $136 | $59 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $77 | $140 | NA | NA | NA | $444 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $41 | $112 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $133 | $226 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $86 | $140 | $96 | $49 | $49 | $270 | $329 | $333 | $325 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | $41 | $112 | $191 | $174 | $110 | $133 | $226 | $137 | $167 | $119 | $120 | $165 | $100 | $86 | $140 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

46 Oyster Creek retired September 17, 2018. EIA. "America's oldest operating nuclear power plant to retire on Monday," (September 14, 2018) <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37055>. Three Mile Island retired September 20, 2019. Constellation. "Three Mile Island Generating Station Unit 1 Retires from Service After 45 Years," (September 20, 2019) <https://www.constellationenergy.com/news/2019/three-mile-island-generating-station-unit-1-retires.html>. For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, Surry is part of Dominion FRR.

47 Cook is designated FRR. North Anna and Surry are in Dominion FRR beginning with the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. North Anna and Surry are in the PJM Capacity Market beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.

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## Table 7-23 Nuclear unit capacity market revenue ($/MWh): 2008 through 2028[48] [49]

| | ICAP | Capacity Revenue ($/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $6.42 | $5.61 | $3.81 | $4.93 | $3.80 | $1.76 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $7.71 | $9.20 | $8.58 | $8.35 | $5.28 | $2.10 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $7.71 | $9.20 | $8.58 | $8.35 | $5.28 | $2.10 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $8.73 | $9.59 | $8.64 | $5.87 | $5.38 | $8.21 | $7.53 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $6.42 | $5.62 | $4.07 | $5.10 | $4.97 | $2.97 | $2.15 | $7.77 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Cook | 2,177 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Davis Besse | 894 | NA | NA | NA | NA | $2.49 | $1.08 | $3.70 | $11.40 | $9.33 | $5.17 | $6.42 | $5.61 | $3.81 | $5.73 | $4.36 | $1.76 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $7.71 | $9.20 | $8.58 | $8.35 | $5.28 | $2.10 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $7.33 | $7.37 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.54 | $8.81 | $7.87 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $7.98 | $7.24 | $7.05 | $7.59 | $5.48 | $3.00 | $2.26 | $7.84 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $7.71 | $9.20 | $8.58 | $8.35 | $5.28 | $2.10 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $7.33 | $7.37 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.54 | $8.81 | $7.87 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $7.98 | $7.24 | $7.05 | $7.59 | $5.48 | $3.00 | $2.26 | $7.84 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $6.42 | $5.61 | $3.81 | $4.93 | $2.52 | NA | NA | $11.32 | $16.38 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | $7.33 | $7.37 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.54 | $8.81 | $7.87 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $7.33 | $7.37 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.54 | $8.81 | $7.87 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $7.98 | $7.24 | $7.05 | $7.59 | $5.48 | $3.00 | $2.26 | $7.84 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Perry | 1,240 | NA | NA | NA | NA | $2.49 | $1.08 | $3.70 | $11.40 | $9.33 | $5.17 | $6.42 | $5.61 | $3.81 | $5.73 | $4.36 | $1.76 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $7.71 | $9.20 | $8.58 | $8.35 | $5.28 | $2.10 | $1.35 | $7.40 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $7.33 | $7.37 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.54 | $8.81 | $7.87 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $7.98 | $7.24 | $7.05 | $7.59 | $5.48 | $3.00 | $2.26 | $7.84 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $3.57 | $4.50 | $6.23 | $5.87 | $2.41 | $1.01 | $3.70 | $5.75 | $3.96 | $4.17 | $6.42 | $5.61 | $3.81 | $4.93 | $2.52 | NA | NA | $11.32 | $16.38 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $3.57 | $6.72 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.38 | $8.21 | $7.53 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $6.42 | $5.61 | $4.06 | $5.10 | $4.97 | $2.97 | $2.15 | $7.77 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | $3.57 | $6.72 | $7.82 | $5.87 | $5.38 | $8.21 | $7.53 | $6.74 | $6.04 | $5.26 | $6.42 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

48 Capacity revenue through the 2024/2025 Delivery Year is calculated by adjusting the BRA Capacity Price for calendar year, by the class average EFORd, and by the annual class average capacity factor. Class average EFORd and capacity factor is from *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 5: Capacity Market. Capacity revenue beginning the 2025/2026 Delivery Year is calculated by adjusting the BRA Capacity Price for calendar year, by the class average ELCC. See BRA Class Ratings <https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability>.

49 Oyster Creek retired September 17, 2018. EIA. "America's oldest operating nuclear power plant to retire on Monday," (September 14, 2018) <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37055>. Three Mile Island retired September 20, 2019. Constellation. "Three Mile Island Generating Station Unit 1 Retires from Service After 45 Years," (September 20, 2019) <https://www.constellationenergy.com/news/2019/three-mile-island-generating-station-unit-1-retires.html>. Constellation is planning to restart Three Mile Island Unit 1. Constellation. "Constellation to Launch Crane Clean Energy Center, Restoring Jobs and Carbon-Free Power to The Grid," (September 20, 2024) <https://www.constellationenergy.com/newsroom/2024/Constellation-to-Launch-Crane-Clean-Energy-Center-Restoring-Jobs-and-Carbon-Free-Power-to-The-Grid.html>.



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## Table 7-24 Nuclear unit costs: 2008 through 2024[50] [51]

| | ICAP | NEI Costs ($/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Cook | 2,177 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | $35.31 | $39.36 | $41.23 | $45.45 | $47.41 | $44.16 | $44.32 | $44.51 | $41.39 | $42.66 | $42.00 | $38.40 | $39.64 | $37.42 | $41.08 | $41.62 | $41.88 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | $35.31 | $39.36 | $41.23 | $45.45 | $47.41 | $44.16 | $44.32 | $44.51 | $41.39 | $42.66 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Perry | 1,240 | $35.31 | $39.36 | $41.23 | $45.45 | $47.41 | $44.16 | $44.32 | $44.51 | $41.39 | $42.66 | $42.00 | $38.40 | $39.64 | $37.42 | $41.08 | $41.62 | $41.88 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $26.73 | $29.76 | $31.34 | $34.51 | $36.06 | $33.84 | $33.84 | $32.90 | $31.63 | $30.89 | $29.07 | $28.38 | $27.03 | $27.18 | $28.63 | $29.53 | $31.88 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | $35.31 | $39.36 | $41.23 | $45.45 | $47.41 | $44.16 | $44.32 | $44.51 | $41.39 | $42.66 | $42.00 | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Hope Creek, Quad Cities, and Salem have all received state subsidies since 2019.[52] [53] The NJ Board of Public Utilities, having received no applications as of December 1, 2023, closed the third eligibility period of the ZEC program for the period beginning June 1, 2025.[54] This was a result of the introduction of a new federal nuclear subsidy under the Inflation Reduction Act. Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, and LaSalle will receive a state subsidy if necessary to meet a target net revenue value, in dollars per MWh, from the energy and capacity markets.[55] All existing nuclear plants will receive a federal subsidy if necessary to meet a target revenue value, in dollars per MWh, from the energy market.[56]

The Inflation Reduction Act added a significant new federal subsidy for existing nuclear power plants.[57] All existing nuclear plants will receive the Zero Emission Nuclear Power Production Credit (Nuclear PTC) if revenues from energy, ancillary, capacity markets, and any state subsidies are between $25.00/MWh and $43.75/

50 Operating costs from: Nuclear Energy Institute (March 2026). "Nuclear Costs in Context," <https://www.nei.org/resources/reports-briefs/nuclear-costs-in-context>. Operating Costs for 2025 and beyond are set equal to 2024 costs.

51 Oyster Creek retired September 17, 2018. EIA. "America's oldest operating nuclear power plant to retire on Monday," (September 14, 2018) <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37055>. Three Mile Island retired September 20, 2019. Constellation. "Three Mile Island Generating Station Unit 1 Retires from Service After 45 Years," (September 20, 2019) <https://www.constellationenergy.com/news/2019/three-mile-island-generating-station-unit-1-retires.html>.

52 Illinois Commerce Commission, Report to the General Assembly in Compliance with Section 1-75(d-5) of the [CEJA, Public Act 102-0662,] 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(F)(2) (August 2019). The report finds that while total ZECs payments are limited by rate impact caps and volume caps, the law's limitation does not unduly constrain the procurement of ZECs.

53 *Application of PSEG Nuclear, LLC for the Zero Emission Certificate Program – Hope Creek, Order Determining the Eligibility of Hope Creek Nuclear Generator to Receive ZECs, BPU Docket No. ER20080559 (April 27, 2021). Application of PSEG Nuclear, LLC for the Zero Emission Certificate Program – Salem 1, Order Determining the Eligibility of Salem Unit 1 Nuclear Generator to Receive ZECs, BPU Docket No. ER20080557 (April 27, 201). Application of PSEG Nuclear, LLC for the Zero Emission Certificate Program – Salem 2, Order Determining the Eligibility of Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generator to Receive ZECs. BPU Docket No. ER20080557 (April 27, 2021).*

54 See *New Jersey BPU, In the Matter of the Third Eligibility Period for the Zero Emission Certificate Program Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:3-87.3 TO 87.7, Order Closing the Third Eligibility Period of the Zero Emission Certificate Program, Docket No. EO23080548 (February 14, 2024).*

55 CEJA, Public Act 102-0662, 20 ILCS 3855/1-75.

56 See Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117-169 (August 16, 2022).

57 See Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117-169 (August 16, 2022).

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MWh, adjusted for inflation. The Nuclear PTC of $3.00/MWh is increased by a factor of five to $15.00/MWh if certain prevailing wage requirements are met. The Nuclear PTC creates a revenue floor of $40.00/MWh and does not create a revenue ceiling. If nuclear revenues are greater than $43.75/MWh, the Nuclear PTC subsidy does not apply and units keep all profits.

Table 7-25 shows the subsidy received by nuclear units in PJM in $/MWh since 2019.

**Table 7-25 Nuclear unit subsidies in $/MWh: 2019 through 2026**[58]

| | Subsidy ($) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Beaver Valley | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $146.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Braidwood | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $292.8 | $41.1 | $0.0 |
| Byron | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $286.8 | $36.6 | $0.0 |
| Calvert Cliffs | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $52.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Cook | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Davis Besse | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $71.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Dresden | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $216.6 | $29.0 | $0.0 |
| Hope Creek | $67.4 | $95.6 | $97.5 | $97.1 | $98.3 | $118.0 | $40.7 | $0.0 |
| LaSalle | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $283.8 | $36.7 | $0.0 |
| Limerick | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $231.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| North Anna | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $109.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Oyster Creek | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Peach Bottom | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $262.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Perry | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $92.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Quad Cities | $245.3 | $244.9 | $249.8 | $209.2 | $79.0 | $85.0 | $69.6 | $17.7 |
| Salem | $131.5 | $186.5 | $190.2 | $189.4 | $191.6 | $230.5 | $66.1 | $0.0 |
| Surry | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $113.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Susquehanna | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $291.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Three Mile Island | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |

Table 7-26 shows the surplus or shortfall in $/MWh for the 16 nuclear plants in PJM, and Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island, calculated using historic LMP and cost data. In 2020, no nuclear plants covered their fuel costs, operating costs, and incremental capital expenditures as a result of lower energy prices. In 2021 and 2022, all nuclear plants more than covered their fuel costs, operating costs, and capital expenditures as a result of higher energy prices. In 2023, only two nuclear plants covered their fuel costs, operating costs, and incremental capital expenditures as a result of lower energy and capacity prices. In 2024, all nuclear plants with the exception of Davis Besse covered their fuel costs, operating costs, and incremental capital expenditures. The surplus or shortfall assumes that the unit receives the DA LMP, reactive capability revenue, cleared its full unforced capacity at the BRA locational clearing price, receives a subsidy if qualified, and has costs equal to the NEI average costs.[59] Unforced capacity is determined using the annual class average EFORd or ELCC rate.[60]

The market revenues are based in part on the sale of capacity. Some nuclear plants did not clear the capacity market in some years as a result of decisions by plant owners about how to offer the plants in the capacity market auctions. When nuclear plants do not clear in the capacity market, it is a result of the offer behavior of the plants and does not accurately reflect the economic viability of the plants. This analysis is intended to define whether the plants are receiving a retirement signal from the PJM markets. If the plants are viable including both energy and capacity market revenues based on actual clearing prices, then the PJM markets indicate that the plant is economically viable. If plant owners decide to offer so as to not clear in the capacity market, that does not change the market signals to the plants. Such decisions may reflect a variety of considerations. Quad Cities and a portion of Byron's capacity did not clear in the 2019/2020 Auction. Quad Cities did not clear in the 2020/2021 Auction. Dresden and most of Byron did not clear in the 2021/2022 Auction. Beaver Valley, Davis Besse, and Perry did not clear in the 2021/2022 Auction.[61] Byron, Dresden, and Quad Cities did not clear in the 2022/2023 Auction.[62]

Nuclear unit revenue is a combination of energy market revenue, ancillary services market revenue and capacity market revenue. Negative energy market prices do not have a significant impact on nuclear unit revenue. Since 2014,

58 Quad Cities ZECS prices by delivery year are from the Illinois Power Agency final payment calculation notices. Quad Cities subsidies for calendar year 2025 include five months of capacity revenue from the 2024/2025 Delivery Year subsidies and seven months of subsidies revenue for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.

59 Installed capacity is from NEI. "Maps of U.S. Nuclear Plants," <https://www.nei.org/resources/map-of-us-nuclear-plants>.

60 ELCC rates used starting with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. See BRA Class Ratings <https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability>.

61 PRNewswire. "FirstEnergy Solutions Comments on Results of PJM Capacity Auction," (May 24, 2018) <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/firstenergy-solutions-comments-on-results-of-pjm-capacity-auction-300654549.html>.

62 NuclearNewswire. "Byron, Dresden, Quad Cities Fail to Clear in PJM Capacity Auction," (June 8, 2021) <https://www.ans.org/news/article-2967/byron-dresden-quad-cities-fail-to-clear-in-pjm-capacity-auction/>.



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negative energy market prices have affected nuclear plants' annual total revenues by an average of 0.1 percent. Negative LMPs reduced nuclear plant total revenues by an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.6 percent in 2014, an average of 0.2 percent and a maximum of 1.2 percent in 2015, an average of 0.1 percent and a maximum of 0.7 percent in 2016, an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.6 percent in 2017, an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.0 percent in 2018, an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.2 percent in 2019, an average of 0.1 percent and a maximum of 1.7 percent in 2020, an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.3 percent in 2021, an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.0 percent in 2022, an average of 0.0 percent and a maximum of 0.1 percent in 2023, an average of 0.6 percent and a maximum of 4.9 percent in 2024, an average of 0.1 percent and a maximum of 0.8 percent in 2025, and an average of 0.1 percent and a maximum of 0.4 percent in the first six months of 2026.[63]

Table 7-26 shows the surplus or shortfall for the 16 nuclear plants in PJM in $/MWh, including subsidies.

### Table 7-26 Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall) based on public data in $/MWh: 2008 through 2025

| | ICAP | Surplus (Shortfall) ($/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $26.3 | $6.3 | $10.5 | $8.8 | ($3.3) | $1.4 | $11.7 | $3.2 | ($0.4) | $2.6 | $13.9 | $3.7 | ($2.7) | $15.0 | $42.4 | $2.1 | $9.7 | $19.2 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $24.9 | $2.5 | $6.4 | $3.4 | ($6.1) | ($2.6) | $7.2 | ($1.2) | ($3.2) | ($1.6) | $5.9 | $3.9 | ($0.0) | $15.1 | $35.0 | ($1.5) | $8.0 | $11.5 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $24.5 | ($1.3) | $3.4 | ($0.6) | ($9.4) | ($3.6) | $4.9 | ($6.1) | ($9.6) | ($2.8) | $5.8 | $3.2 | ($0.6) | $14.1 | $34.5 | ($1.9) | $8.3 | $11.5 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $60.6 | $20.9 | $28.6 | $17.9 | $4.5 | $14.6 | $31.6 | $14.1 | $7.2 | $6.1 | $16.3 | $5.4 | ($0.9) | $19.4 | $54.6 | $9.1 | $11.1 | $30.6 |
| Cook | 2,177 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Davis Besse | 894 | NA | NA | NA | NA | ($13.2) | ($7.0) | $6.6 | ($1.2) | ($4.0) | ($8.4) | ($0.9) | ($6.3) | ($15.1) | $5.9 | $31.6 | ($10.0) | ($0.3) | $11.4 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $25.6 | $3.0 | $7.6 | $4.4 | ($5.2) | ($1.0) | $9.1 | $0.3 | ($1.6) | ($0.1) | $7.1 | $4.5 | $0.5 | $15.7 | $36.2 | ($2.1) | $8.5 | $11.6 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $54.0 | $17.0 | $24.5 | $16.9 | $2.6 | $12.4 | $26.0 | $6.3 | ($1.9) | $1.6 | $12.3 | $8.8 | $7.8 | $21.0 | $48.0 | $6.9 | $9.3 | $20.7 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $24.8 | $2.5 | $6.4 | $3.3 | ($6.1) | ($1.9) | $7.7 | ($0.9) | ($3.6) | ($1.9) | $6.0 | $3.7 | ($0.2) | $14.8 | $34.7 | ($1.8) | $7.7 | $11.5 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $54.1 | $17.1 | $24.7 | $16.6 | $2.6 | $12.2 | $25.7 | $6.5 | ($2.1) | $1.5 | $12.1 | $1.6 | ($2.6) | $11.6 | $38.2 | ($3.3) | $8.9 | $16.0 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $52.0 | $14.6 | $25.5 | $16.8 | $0.2 | $5.7 | $23.2 | $10.9 | $3.0 | $4.7 | $16.0 | $4.8 | ($2.0) | $17.9 | NA | NA | NA | $32.1 |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | $47.5 | $8.4 | $15.9 | $7.2 | ($8.2) | $3.3 | $16.4 | ($4.7) | ($11.6) | ($9.9) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $53.7 | $16.9 | $24.2 | $16.1 | $2.3 | $12.3 | $25.5 | $5.8 | ($2.2) | $1.4 | $11.9 | $0.6 | ($2.8) | $11.4 | $38.3 | ($3.3) | $9.0 | $16.1 |
| Perry | 1,240 | NA | NA | NA | NA | ($13.2) | ($6.4) | $5.5 | ($0.3) | ($4.0) | ($7.4) | $1.9 | ($5.9) | ($15.2) | $6.2 | $32.0 | ($9.3) | ($0.2) | $11.0 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $24.1 | ($0.4) | $2.4 | ($1.8) | ($13.2) | ($6.9) | $0.6 | ($7.7) | ($9.5) | ($3.5) | $4.3 | $18.8 | $14.4 | $29.4 | $48.7 | $3.1 | ($1.2) | $15.0 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $54.0 | $17.1 | $24.5 | $16.9 | $2.6 | $12.4 | $26.0 | $6.2 | ($2.1) | $1.5 | $12.2 | $8.5 | $7.5 | $20.7 | $47.6 | $6.6 | $9.0 | $20.3 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $48.8 | $13.8 | $24.2 | $16.4 | ($0.0) | $5.1 | $21.6 | $10.8 | $2.6 | $4.5 | $16.0 | $4.2 | ($2.5) | $17.4 | NA | NA | NA | $29.5 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $46.8 | $15.2 | $22.4 | $16.1 | $1.4 | $11.1 | $24.6 | $6.3 | ($1.6) | $1.8 | $10.1 | ($1.7) | ($6.9) | $8.3 | $35.9 | ($2.8) | $8.4 | $11.9 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | $40.7 | $6.5 | $13.3 | $4.6 | ($9.6) | $0.9 | $13.7 | ($6.8) | ($12.4) | ($10.3) | ($3.8) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

63 Analysis is based on actual unit generation and energy market and capacity market revenues. Negative prices in the DA and RT market were set to zero for comparison. Results round to 0.0 percent.

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Table 7-27 shows the surplus or shortfall for the 16 nuclear plants in PJM in dollars, including subsidies.

### Table 7-27 Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall) based on public data ($M): 2008 through 2025

| | ICAP | Surplus (Shortfall) ($ in millions) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $393.5 | $93.3 | $156.3 | $131.1 | ($49.4) | $21.0 | $174.8 | $47.7 | ($8.9) | $35.7 | $204.3 | $51.0 | ($42.5) | $223.0 | $632.2 | $28.2 | $142.7 | $286.3 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $482.3 | $48.3 | $122.8 | $65.2 | ($118.7) | ($49.6) | $138.9 | ($22.7) | ($65.2) | ($33.3) | $110.8 | $70.7 | ($4.2) | $290.0 | $674.9 | ($32.4) | $151.8 | $220.8 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $465.5 | ($24.2) | $64.1 | ($10.5) | ($178.9) | ($68.6) | $93.2 | ($116.7) | ($185.2) | ($55.5) | $106.4 | $56.6 | ($14.8) | $267.5 | $654.7 | ($40.0) | $156.4 | $218.3 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $865.9 | $297.3 | $406.9 | $254.8 | $64.5 | $208.4 | $449.6 | $201.4 | $100.7 | $84.7 | $229.8 | $74.0 | ($15.3) | $275.3 | $778.7 | $128.6 | $158.0 | $437.1 |
| Cook | 2,177 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Davis Besse | 894 | NA | NA | NA | NA | ($98.0) | ($51.4) | $48.6 | ($8.6) | ($31.5) | ($63.7) | ($8.4) | ($47.2) | ($111.5) | $42.1 | $232.3 | ($76.7) | ($3.9) | $83.5 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $380.7 | $44.6 | $112.9 | $65.7 | ($77.7) | ($15.0) | $134.6 | $4.4 | ($26.5) | ($5.5) | $102.2 | $62.2 | $4.1 | $231.7 | $536.2 | ($34.9) | $124.0 | $170.4 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $523.2 | $164.8 | $237.0 | $163.2 | $24.8 | $119.9 | $251.6 | $60.5 | ($23.2) | $11.2 | $114.5 | $79.9 | $70.3 | $200.6 | $461.3 | $63.3 | $86.7 | $197.3 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $464.9 | $45.9 | $119.9 | $61.5 | ($114.1) | ($35.3) | $144.7 | ($16.3) | ($69.8) | ($37.5) | $109.0 | $66.1 | ($5.6) | $277.3 | $648.5 | ($35.8) | $142.3 | $214.8 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $1,003.7 | $316.3 | $457.2 | $307.6 | $47.8 | $226.5 | $476.3 | $120.1 | ($41.1) | $25.3 | $221.7 | $28.2 | ($48.7) | $213.8 | $707.9 | ($63.4) | $164.5 | $297.7 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $813.9 | $228.5 | $397.7 | $262.7 | $3.5 | $89.3 | $362.6 | $170.2 | $44.3 | $71.2 | $246.5 | $71.4 | ($33.3) | $279.3 | NA | NA | NA | $503.6 |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | $239.0 | $42.4 | $79.7 | $35.9 | ($41.1) | $16.4 | $82.3 | ($23.4) | ($58.2) | ($49.6) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $1,133.0 | $356.3 | $508.8 | $338.5 | $48.4 | $259.6 | $537.6 | $122.6 | ($53.0) | $23.7 | $242.9 | $9.1 | ($63.3) | $237.2 | $805.9 | ($75.2) | $187.2 | $338.5 |
| Perry | 1,240 | NA | NA | NA | NA | ($135.8) | ($65.3) | $56.6 | ($3.5) | ($43.2) | ($77.5) | $16.9 | ($61.1) | ($155.2) | $62.6 | $327.2 | ($98.4) | ($3.8) | $112.4 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $363.1 | ($6.7) | $36.3 | ($27.7) | ($199.0) | ($103.5) | $8.6 | ($115.3) | ($145.0) | ($54.5) | $62.7 | $274.3 | $207.9 | $439.8 | $728.9 | $42.0 | ($23.0) | $221.8 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $1,021.3 | $322.8 | $461.9 | $317.9 | $48.2 | $233.1 | $490.0 | $117.1 | ($45.5) | $21.3 | $222.5 | $155.5 | $136.9 | $390.3 | $898.3 | $123.0 | $168.9 | $370.7 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $676.9 | $190.3 | $334.4 | $226.4 | ($0.4) | $71.2 | $298.9 | $148.8 | $33.5 | $60.4 | $219.1 | $53.2 | ($38.4) | $237.8 | NA | NA | NA | $407.8 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $965.9 | $312.8 | $461.6 | $332.2 | $29.4 | $229.0 | $506.6 | $129.9 | ($39.7) | $31.2 | $201.0 | ($34.4) | ($141.3) | $172.0 | $742.6 | ($58.4) | $174.5 | $247.8 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | $270.5 | $42.9 | $88.2 | $30.2 | ($63.7) | $5.9 | $90.7 | ($45.2) | ($82.3) | ($68.1) | ($25.3) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

In order to evaluate the expected viability of nuclear plants, analysis was based on forward energy market prices for 2026, 2027, and 2028 and known capacity market prices for 2026, 2027, and 2028. The purpose of the forward analysis is to evaluate whether current forward prices are consistent with nuclear plants covering their annual avoidable costs over the next three years. While the forward capacity market prices are known through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, actual energy prices will vary from forward values. Nuclear plants may choose to sell their output at a range of forward prices and for a range of future years.

Table 7-28 shows PJM energy prices (LMP), annual fuel, and operating and capital expenditures used for the analysis of the period 2026 through 2028. Delivery year capacity revenues are adjusted and shown in calendar years. For example, calendar year 2026 includes five months of capacity revenue from the 2025/2026 Delivery Year and seven months of capacity revenue for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The LMPs are based on forward prices with a basis adjustment for the specific plant locations.[64] Forward prices are as of June 30, 2026. The capacity prices are known through May 31, 2029, based on PJM capacity auction results.

64 Forward prices are reported for PJM trading hubs which are adjusted to reflect the historical differences between prices at the trading hub and prices at the relevant plant locations. The basis adjustment is based on 2025 data.


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## Table 7-28 Forward prices in PJM energy markets, capacity revenue, and annual costs

| | ICAP | Average Forward LMP ($/MWh) | | | Ancillary Revenue ($/MWh) | Capacity Revenue ($/MWh) | | | 2024 NEI Costs ($/MWh) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | Reactive | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | Fuel | Operating | Capital |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $54.67 | $61.13 | $61.00 | $0.21 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $39.27 | $45.65 | $45.81 | $0.17 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $43.20 | $48.09 | $48.19 | $0.15 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $79.11 | $70.55 | $70.28 | $0.19 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Cook | 2,177 | $51.02 | $57.04 | $56.82 | $0.13 | NA | NA | NA | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | $57.15 | $61.56 | $61.48 | $0.21 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $6.24 | $26.02 | $9.62 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $44.61 | $48.95 | $49.09 | $0.23 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $53.52 | $56.67 | $56.59 | $0.47 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $39.96 | $46.18 | $46.35 | $0.13 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $53.26 | $56.21 | $56.14 | $0.10 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $72.50 | $70.46 | $70.20 | $0.18 | $16.38 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $53.26 | $56.17 | $56.11 | $0.31 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Perry | 1,240 | $56.83 | $63.13 | $63.01 | $0.21 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $6.24 | $26.02 | $9.62 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $43.64 | $48.84 | $48.91 | $0.13 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $53.47 | $56.64 | $56.56 | $0.35 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $68.35 | $67.07 | $66.84 | $0.16 | $16.38 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $48.09 | $51.17 | $51.00 | $0.32 | $13.24 | $14.42 | $14.28 | $5.51 | $19.22 | $7.15 |

The MMU also calculates the capacity price that would be required to cover the net avoidable costs for each nuclear plant.

Based on the FERC order allowing the inclusion of major maintenance in energy offers, major maintenance costs can no longer be included in gross ACR values offered in the capacity market.[65] The MMU calculates the capacity price that would be required to cover the net avoidable costs for each nuclear plant with major maintenance included in avoidable costs and with major maintenance excluded from avoidable costs. For the case including major maintenance, gross ACR is NEI total cost including fuel, operating cost, and incremental capital expenditures. For the case excluding major maintenance, gross ACR is NEI total cost including fuel and operating cost, excluding capital expenditures as a proxy for fixed VOM, given that NEI does not provide a breakout of major maintenance. NEI incremental capital expenditures are likely to be a conservatively low estimate of major maintenance expense.

All generating plants including nuclear plants must cover their gross avoidable costs, including major maintenance, to remain economically viable. All of the MMU analysis of nuclear plant economics includes gross avoidable costs as reported by NEI unless explicitly stated otherwise.

In Table 7-29, the capacity price required to cover avoidable costs in $/MWh is calculated by taking the total NEI costs in $/MWh and subtracting the total expected energy and ancillary services revenues in $/MWh. Total expected energy revenue is the unit's ICAP multiplied by the average forward LMP multiplied by the class average capacity factor. Total expected ancillary services revenue is unit specific reactive capability revenue.66 The capacity price required to cover

65 See 167 FERC ¶ 61,030 at P 41 (2019).
66 Reactive Supply & Voltage Control Revenue Requirements available from PJM <https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/billing-settlements-and-credit.aspx>.

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avoidable costs in $/MW-day is calculated by multiplying the required price in $/MWh by 24. Plants may have actual operating costs higher or lower than the NEI average.

In Table 7-29, the capacity price required to cover avoidable costs is $0/MW-day for all units in 2026, 2027 and 2028 using NEI data as reported including capital expenditures, and is $0/MW-day for all plants, excluding capital expenditures as a proxy for major maintenance, in 2026, 2027 and 2028.[67] Net revenues based on forward energy prices alone are greater than or equal to avoidable costs in 2026, 2027 and 2028 without any contribution from capacity market revenues for all plants. The result is that net ACR values for 2026, 2027 and 2028 in Table 7-29 are zero.

### Table 7-29 Net ACR

| | ICAP | Net ACR ($/MWh) | | | Net ACR ($/MW-Day) | | | Net ACR Excluding Capital ($/MW-Day) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (MW) | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Byron | 2,300 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Cook | 2,177 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Perry | 1,240 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Salem | 2,285 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Surry | 1,676 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |

Table 7-30 shows the surplus or shortfall that would be received net of avoidable costs and incremental capital expenditures by year, based on forward prices, on a per MWh basis. The fuel and operating costs are the 2024 NEI fuel, operating, and capital costs. Plants may have operating costs higher or lower than the NEI average. Table 7-30 shows the total dollar surplus or shortfall and adjusts energy revenues and operating costs using the annual class average capacity factor.

67 PJM's tariff definition of avoidable costs excludes major maintenance. PJM includes major maintenance costs in the definition of short run marginal costs in energy offers.



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The 2026 nuclear unit surplus values are shown in Table 7-30 based on forward prices as of June 30, 2026, NEI average costs, and expected subsidy values.[68] The current analysis, based on forward prices for energy and known forward prices for capacity, shows that all PJM nuclear plants analyzed are expected to have a surplus without any subsidy amount in 2026, 2027 and 2028.[69]

### Table 7-30 Nuclear unit forward annual surplus (shortfall) for 2026, 2027 and 2028[70] [71] [72]

| | Surplus (Shortfall) ($/MWh) | | | Subsidy ($/MWh) | | | Surplus (Shortfall) Excluding Subsidy ($ in millions) | | | Surplus (Shortfall) Including Subsidy ($ in millions) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
| Beaver Valley | $36.12 | $43.67 | $43.41 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $456.1 | $640.01 | $657.06 | $456.1 | $640.0 | $657.1 |
| Braidwood | $20.71 | $28.19 | $28.21 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $289.3 | $525.88 | $552.69 | $289.3 | $525.9 | $552.7 |
| Byron | $24.63 | $30.62 | $30.59 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $360.0 | $564.29 | $589.68 | $360.0 | $564.3 | $589.7 |
| Calvert Cliffs | $60.55 | $53.09 | $52.68 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $792.0 | $746.47 | $761.02 | $792.0 | $746.5 | $761.0 |
| Cook | NA | NA | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Davis Besse | $28.60 | $34.10 | $33.88 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $169.5 | $245.24 | $253.76 | $169.5 | $245.2 | $253.8 |
| Dresden | $26.08 | $31.49 | $31.49 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $302.9 | $453.78 | $474.23 | $302.9 | $453.8 | $474.2 |
| Hope Creek | $35.08 | $39.21 | $38.99 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $289.7 | $371.35 | $382.74 | $289.7 | $371.3 | $382.7 |
| LaSalle | $21.38 | $28.72 | $28.75 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $293.2 | $519.80 | $545.81 | $293.2 | $519.8 | $545.8 |
| Limerick | $34.67 | $38.75 | $38.54 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $546.7 | $701.89 | $723.65 | $546.7 | $701.9 | $723.6 |
| North Anna | $57.07 | $52.99 | $52.61 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $819.8 | $866.20 | $832.98 | $819.8 | $866.2 | $833.0 |
| Peach Bottom | $34.75 | $38.71 | $38.51 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $623.5 | $797.42 | $822.39 | $623.5 | $797.4 | $822.4 |
| Perry | $28.29 | $35.67 | $35.41 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $231.8 | $356.32 | $367.79 | $231.8 | $356.3 | $367.8 |
| Quad Cities | $25.06 | $31.38 | $31.31 | $1.17 | $1.17 | $0.00 | $291.1 | $457.78 | $477.26 | $308.9 | $475.5 | $477.3 |
| Salem | $34.98 | $39.18 | $38.96 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $563.0 | $723.39 | $745.59 | $563.0 | $723.4 | $745.6 |
| Surry | $52.92 | $49.61 | $49.24 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $668.3 | $720.02 | $690.77 | $668.3 | $720.0 | $690.8 |
| Susquehanna | $29.59 | $33.71 | $33.40 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $501.0 | $675.96 | $697.92 | $501.0 | $676.0 | $697.9 |

68 Gross receipts used to calculate the unit subsidy include energy revenue, ancillary services revenue, capacity revenue, and state ZECs subsidies, and assumes the unit meets prevailing wage requirements and receives the Zero Emission Nuclear Power Production Credit 5 times multiplier. Effectively, nuclear power plants will receive the higher of the state or federal subsidy amount.

69 On February 20, 2025, PJM filed with FERC to establish a maximum price of approximately $325/MW-day in unforced capacity and a minimum price of approximately $175/MW-day, both in unforced capacity (UCAP) terms for all capacity auctions for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years. See Docket No. ER25-1357.

70 The state subsidy value for Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, and LaSalle is calculated by taking the applicable Baseline Cost less forward energy prices and known capacity prices.

71 The federal subsidy value for nuclear plants is defined in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117-169 (August 16, 2022).

72 North Anna and Surry are in Dominion FRR beginning with the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. North Anna and Surry rejoined the PJM Capacity Market beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year.

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# 8 Environmental and Renewable Energy Regulations

Environmental requirements and renewable energy mandates have a significant impact on PJM markets. State and federal environmental regulatory requirements affect the economic viability of resources. State and federal environmental policies also affect the viability of new resources and the cost of entry. State and federal subsidies for renewable generation have made new solar resources cost competitive with existing coal resources and contributed to the significant level of wind and solar resources entering the market. State and federal subsidies for nuclear generation have increased net revenue for some nuclear plants. Longstanding subsidies for nuclear, coal and oil generation have also significantly affected the economic viability of generation resources using those fuels.

## Overview

### Federal Environmental Regulation

- **MATS.** The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule (MATS) applies the Clean Air Act (CAA) maximum achievable control technology (MACT) requirement to new or modified sources of emissions of mercury and arsenic, acid gas, nickel, selenium and cyanide.[1] On February 19, 2026, the EPA finalized repeal of the core changes of the 2024 amendments to the rule, including the revised filterable particulate matter (fPM) emission standard, restoring the 0.030 lbs/MMBtu standard that became effective in 2012, and eliminating the requirement to use PM Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS).[2]
- **Air Quality Standards ($NO_X$ and $SO_2$ Emissions).** The CAA requires each state to attain and maintain compliance with fine particulate matter (PM) and ozone national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). The CAA also requires that each state prohibit emissions that significantly interfere with the ability of another state to meet NAAQS.[3] (Transport Rule) On March 15, 2021, the EPA finalized decreases to allowable emissions under the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and the 2008 ozone NAAQS for 10 PJM states.[4] On February 28, 2022, the EPA issued a federal implementation plan for implementation of CSAPR (also known as the Good Neighbor Plan),[5] which applies when no state implementation plan has been approved. On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a stay of the federal implementation plan pending judicial review.[6] The effect of the stay is to eliminate the ozone season $NO_X$ emissions budgets for electric generating units in the PJM states. Unless and until the stay is lifted, no federal implementation plan is effective in PJM states and the state emissions budgets are not effective. On January 27, 2026, the EPA proposed approving state implementation plan submissions from eight states, including PJM states Kentucky and Tennessee, for the 2015 ozone NAAQS.[7] Upon becoming final, these states' interstate transport obligations would be resolved without the federal Good Neighbor Plan requirements.
- **NSR/NSPS.** The CAA's NSR program is a preconstruction permitting program that requires certain stationary sources of air pollution to obtain permits prior to beginning construction. Parts C and D of Title I of the CAA provide for New Source Review (NSR) in order to prevent new projects and projects receiving major modifications from increasing emissions in areas currently meeting NAAQS or from inhibiting progress in areas that do not.[8] NSR requires permits before construction commences. NSR review applies a two part analysis to projects at facilities such as power plants, some of which involve multiple units and combinations of new and existing units.[9]

  New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) set uniform, technology-based emission limits for specific source categories nationwide, pursuant to

1 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil Fuel Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units*, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012).
2 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units: Final Repeal*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794; FRL-6716.4-02-OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 9088 (February 24, 2026).
3 CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
4 *Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0272; FRL-10013-42-OAR, 85 Fed. Reg. 23054 (Apr. 30, 2021).
5 See *Federal Implementation Plan Addressing Regional Ozone Transport for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0668; FRL 8670-01-OAR, 87 Fed. Reg. 20036 (April 6, 2022).
6 Ohio v. EPA, Slip Op. No. 23A349. (S. Ct. June 27, 2024); Utah v. EPA, D.C. Cir. Case No. Case No. 23-1157, et al.
7 See *Interstate Transport Plan Review for the 2015 Ozone NAAQS*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-0192; FRL-12716-01-OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 4026 (January 30, 2026).
8 42 U.S.C § 7470 et seq.
9 40 CFR § 52.21.

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Section 111 of the CAA. Numeric emission limits based on the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER). On January 9, 2026, the EPA finalized amendments to NSPS for stationary combustion turbines and stationary gas turbines establishing subcategories for new, modified, or reconstructed stationary combustion turbines based on size, rates of utilization, design efficiency, and fuel type. The EPA determined that combustion controls are BSER for NOX emissions for most new, modified, or reconstructed stationary combustion turbines. For one subcategory, new large turbines with high capacity factors, the BSER for NOX is combustion controls with the addition of selective catalytic reduction (SCR).

- **RICE.** Stationary reciprocating internal combustion engines (RICE) are electrical generation facilities like diesel engines typically used for backup, emergency or supplemental power. RICE must be tested annually.[10] Environmental regulations allow stationary emergency RICE that do not meet the emissions limits and are participating in demand response programs to operate for up to 100 hours per calendar year when providing emergency demand response when there is a PJM declared NERC Energy Emergency Alert Level 2 or there are five percent voltage/frequency deviations.

  PJM should but does not prevent stationary emergency RICE that cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of EPA emissions standards from participating in PJM markets as DR. Some stationary emergency RICE that cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of emissions standards are now included in DR portfolios. Stationary emergency RICE should be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet its capacity market obligations as a result of emissions standards.

- **Greenhouse Gas Emissions.** The EPA has for years regulated $CO_2$ as a pollutant using CAA provisions that apply to pollutants not subject to NAAQS.[11] [12] On February 12, 2026, the EPA rescinded the 2009 finding that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g., $CO_2$, methane) endanger public health and welfare, removing the legal foundation for the EPA GHG regulation.[13] The EPA concluded it lacks statutory authority under CAA Section 202(a) to regulate GHGs for climate change purposes (citing West Virginia v. EPA, Loper Bright, and arguments about "major questions").[14]

- **Cooling Water Intakes.** An EPA rule implementing Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires that cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts.[15]

- **Waters of the United States.** On November 17, 2025, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a rule revising the definition of Waters of the United States in the CWA to fully implement *Sackett v. EPA*'s narrowed requirement that wetlands have a "continuous surface connection" to relatively permanent waters in to be jurisdictional.[16]

- **Effluents.** Under the CWA, the EPA regulates (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)) discharges from and intakes to power plants, including water cooling systems at steam electric power generating stations. Since 2015, the EPA has been strengthening certain discharge limits applicable to steam generating units, and some plant owners have already indicated an intent to close certain generating units as a result. In May 2024, the EPA finalized a rule strengthening regulation of effluent discharges.[17] On December 23, 2025, EPA extended the deadlines promulgated in the 2024 rule.[18]

- **Coal Ash.** The EPA administers the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which governs the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.[19]

10 See 40 CFR § 63.6640(f).

11 See CAA § 111.

12 On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the EPA's determination that it was not authorized to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA and remanded the matter to the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases endanger public health and welfare. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497. On December 7, 2009, the EPA determined that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, endanger public health and welfare. See *Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act*, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66497 (Dec. 15, 2009). In a decision dated June 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the endangerment finding, rejecting challenges brought by industry groups and a number of states. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No 09-1322.

13 See *Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards under the Clean Air Act*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-0194; FRL-12715-02- OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 7686 (February 18, 2026).

14 See *id.* at 7702-7710.

15 See EPA, *National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities*, EPA-HQ-OW-2008-0667, 79 Fed. Reg. 48300 (August 15, 2014).

16 See Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023); *Updated Definition of "Waters of the United States,"* EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0322; FRL 11132.1-01- OW, 90 Fed. Reg. 52498 (November 20, 2025).

17 See *Supplemental Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category*, Final Rule, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819; FRL-8794-01- OW, 89 Fed. Reg. 40199 (May 9, 2024).

18 See *Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category—Deadline Extensions*, EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819, 90 Fed. Reg. 61328 (December 31, 2025).

19 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 *et seq.*



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The EPA has adopted significant changes to the implementing regulations that will require closing noncompliant impoundments, and, as a result, the host power plant. The EPA is implementing a process for extensions to as late as October 17, 2028. The EPA is reviewing applications received from PJM plant owners for extensions of the deadline for compliance with the revised Coal Combustion Residuals Rule.

## State Environmental Regulation

- **Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).** The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a $CO_2$ emissions cap and trade agreement among Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia (as of July 1, 2026) that applies to power generation facilities. The most recent RGGI auction, held on June 3, 2026, cleared at $35.00 per short ton, or $38.58 per metric tonne.
- **Illinois Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA).** On September 16, 2021, the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA) became effective. CEJA created an expanded nuclear subsidy program. CEJA mandated that all fossil fuel plants close by 2045. CEJA established emissions caps for investor owned, gas-fired units with three years of operating history, effective October 1, 2021, on a rolling 12 month basis. More than 10,000 MW of capacity are currently affected. The CEJA operating hour limits have resulted in significant opportunity cost adders to cost-based energy market offers for affected units. CEJA mandated that all fossil fuel plants "permanently reduce all CO2e and copollutant emissions to zero" by the end of 2045.1 CEJA included more specific dates for closure depending on public versus private ownership, NOx and SO2 emission rates, commercial operation date, heat rate and location relative to environmental justice communities.[2021]
- **Carbon Price.** If the price of carbon were $50.00 per metric tonne, short run marginal costs would have increased by $24.45 per MWh or 45.3 percent for a new combustion turbine (CT) unit, $16.85 per MWh or 39.1 percent for a new combined cycle (CC) unit and $43.12 per MWh or 92.5 percent for a new coal plant (CP).
- **Offshore Wind.** New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia have taken significant steps to promote offshore wind. New Jersey and Maryland enacted legislation for offshore wind renewable energy credits (ORECs) in 2010.[22] On January 20, 2025, the Trump Administration issued a Presidential Memorandum withdrawing "from disposition for wind energy leasing all areas within the Offshore Continental Shelf."[23] The withdrawal effectively puts on hold indefinitely the offshore wind projects in New Jersey and Maryland. On May 5, 2025, the Attorneys General of New Jersey and Maryland, along with the 16 other states, filed suit against the withdrawal of offshore leasing.[24]

## State Renewable Portfolio Standards

- **RPS.** In PJM, ten of 14 jurisdictions have enacted legislation requiring that a defined percentage of retail suppliers' load be served by renewable resources, for which definitions vary. These are typically known as renewable portfolio standards, or RPS. As of June 30, 2026, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, DC have renewable portfolio standards. Indiana has a voluntary renewable portfolio standard. Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia do not have renewable portfolio standards.
- **RPS Cost.** The cost of complying with RPS, as reported by the states, is $17.8 billion over the 11 year period from 2014 through 2024, an average annual RPS compliance cost of $1.6 billion. The compliance cost for 2024, the most recent year with almost complete data, was $3.2 billion.[25]

20 Climate and Equitable Jobs Act, P.A. 102-0662, at Section 9.15 (g) – (k).
21 Climate and Equitable Jobs Act, P.A. 102-0662, at Section 9.15 (g) – (k).

22 See Offshore Wind Economic Development Act of 2010, P.L. 2010, c. 57, as amended, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 to -87.2.
23 *Temporary Withdrawal of all Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government's Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects*, Presidential Memorandum (January 20, 2025) <*https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/temporary-withdrawal-of-all-areas-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-from-offshore-wind-leasing-and-review-of-the-federal-governments-leasing-and-permitting-practices-for-wind-projects/*>.
24 State of New York v. Trump, Case No. 1:25-cv-11221 (Dist. of Mass. May 5, 2025).
25 The 2024 compliance cost value for PJM states does not include Delaware, Michigan or North Carolina. Based on past data these states generally account for approximately 2.0 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states.

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## Emissions Controls in PJM Markets

- **Regulations.** Environmental regulations affect decisions about emission control investments in existing units, investment in new units and decisions to retire units. As a result of environmental regulations and agreements to limit emissions, many PJM units burning fossil fuels have installed emission control technology.
- **Emissions Controls.** In PJM, as of June 30, 2026, 98.0 percent of coal steam MW had some type of flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) technology to reduce $SO_2$ emissions, 99.8 percent of coal steam MW had some type of particulate matter (PM) control, and 99.8 percent of coal steam MW had $NO_x$ emission control technology. All coal steam units in PJM are compliant with the state and federal emissions limits established by MATS.

## Renewable Generation

- **Renewable Generation.** Wind and solar generation was 8.0 percent of total generation in PJM in the first six months of 2026. RPS Tier I generation was 9.3 percent of total generation in PJM and RPS Tier II generation was 2.0 percent of total generation in PJM in the first six months of 2026. Only Tier I generation is defined to be renewable but Tier I includes some carbon emitting generation.
- PJM states with RPS rely heavily on imports and generation from behind the meter resources for RPS compliance. In the first six months of 2026, Tier I generation from PJM generators met only 53.6 percent of the Tier I RPS requirements.

## Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that renewable energy credit markets based on state renewable portfolio standards be brought into PJM markets as they are an increasingly important component of the wholesale energy market. The MMU recommends that there be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that jurisdictions with a renewable portfolio standard make the price and quantity data on supply and demand more transparent. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Commission reconsider its disclaimer of jurisdiction over RECs markets because, given market changes since that decision, it is clear that RECs materially affect jurisdictional rates. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that load and generation located at separate nodes be treated as separate resources in order to ensure that load and generation face consistent incentives throughout the markets. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that stationary emergency RICE be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet the capacity market requirements to be DR as a result of emissions standards that impose environmental run hour limitations. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)

## Conclusion

Environmental requirements and renewable energy mandates at both the federal and state levels have a significant impact on the cost of energy and capacity in PJM markets.

Environmental requirements and initiatives at both the federal and state levels, and state renewable energy mandates and associated subsidies have resulted in the construction of substantial amounts of renewable capacity in the PJM footprint, especially wind and solar resources, and the retirement of emitting resources. Renewable energy credit (REC) markets created by state programs, federal subsidies, and federal tax credits have significant impacts


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on PJM wholesale markets. However, state renewables programs in PJM are not coordinated with one another, are generally not consistent with the PJM market design or PJM prices, have widely differing objectives, including supporting some emitting resources, have widely differing implied prices of carbon and are not transparent on pricing and quantities. The effectiveness of state renewables programs would be enhanced if they were coordinated with one another and with PJM markets, and if they increased transparency. States could evaluate the impacts of a range of carbon prices if PJM would provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. A single carbon price across PJM, established by the states, would be the most efficient way to reduce carbon output, if that is the goal. These are state decisions.

In the absence of a PJM market carbon price, a single PJM market for RECs would contribute significantly to market efficiency and to the procurement of renewable resources in a least cost manner. Ideally, there would be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real-time delivery. States would continue to have the option to create separate RECs for additional products that did not fit the product definition, e.g. waste coal, trash incinerators, or black liquor. This is a state decision.

RECs are an important mechanism used by PJM states to implement environmental policy. RECs clearly affect prices in the PJM wholesale power market. Some resources are not economic except for the ability to purchase or sell RECs. RECs provide out of market payments to qualifying renewable resources, primarily wind and solar. The credits provide an incentive to make negative energy offers and more generally provide an incentive to enter the market, to remain in the market and to operate whenever possible. These subsidies affect the offer behavior and the operational behavior of these resources in PJM markets and in some cases the existence of these resources and thus the market prices and the mix of clearing resources.

RECs markets are, as an economic fact, integrated with PJM markets including energy and capacity markets, but are not formally recognized as part of PJM markets. If elected by the relevant states, it would be preferable to have a single, transparent market for RECs operated by the PJM RTO on behalf of the states that would meet the standards and requirements of all states in the PJM footprint. This would provide better information for market participants about supply and demand and prices and contribute to a more efficient and competitive market and to better price formation. This could also facilitate entry by qualifying renewable resources by reducing the risks associated with lack of transparent market data.

Existing REC markets are not consistently or adequately transparent. Data on REC prices, clearing quantities and markets are not publicly available for all PJM states. The economic logic of RPS programs and the associated REC and SREC prices are not always clear. The price of carbon implied by REC prices ranges from $8.71 per tonne in Ohio to $64.11 per tonne in Virginia. The price of carbon implied by SREC prices ranges from $65.84 per tonne in Pennsylvania to $836.43 per tonne in Washington, DC. The effective prices for carbon compare to the average RGGI auction clearing price of $32.10 per tonne in the first six month of 2026 and to the social cost of carbon which is estimated in the range of $50 per tonne.[26] [27] The impact on the cost of generation from a new combined cycle unit of a $50 per tonne carbon price would be $16.85 per MWh.[28] The impact of an $800 per tonne carbon price would be $269.59 per MWh. This wide range of implied carbon prices is not consistent with an efficient, competitive, least cost approach to the reduction of carbon emissions.

In addition, even the explicit environmental goals of RPS programs are not clear. While RPS is frequently considered to target carbon emissions, Tier

26 "Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis – Under Executive Order 12899," Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government, (Aug. 2016), <*https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf*>.

27 A recent update by the EPA estimates the social cost of carbon emissions for 2030 to be between $140 and $380 per metric ton (2020 dollars). See Table ES.1 in Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (November 2023) "Supplementary Material for the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Rulemaking, "Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review"<*https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-12/epa_scghg_2023_report_final.pdf*>.

28 The cost impact calculation assumes a heat rate of 6.296 MMBtu per MWh and a carbon emissions rate of 52.91 kg per MMBtu. The $800 per tonne carbon price represents the approximate upper end of the carbon prices implied by the 2026 REC and SREC prices in the PJM jurisdictions with RPS. Additional cost impacts are provided in Table 8-9.

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1 resources include some carbon emitting generation and Tier 2 resources include additional carbon emitting generation.

PJM markets provide a flexible mechanism for incorporating the costs of environmental controls and meeting environmental requirements in a cost effective manner. Costs for environmental controls are part of offers for capacity resources in the PJM Capacity Market. The costs of emissions credits are included in energy offers. PJM markets also provide a flexible mechanism that incorporates renewable resources and the impacts of renewable energy credit markets, and ensures that renewable resources have access to a broad market. PJM markets provide efficient price signals that permit valuation of resources with very different characteristics when they provide the same product.

If the states chose this policy option, PJM markets could also provide a flexible mechanism to limit carbon output, for example by incorporating a consistent carbon price in unit offers which would be reflected in PJM's economic dispatch. If there is a social decision to limit carbon output, a consistent carbon price would be the most efficient way to implement that decision. The states in PJM could agree, if they decided it was in their interests, with the appropriate information, on a carbon price and on how to allocate the revenues from a carbon price that would make all states better off. A mechanism like RGGI leaves all decision making with the states. The carbon price would not be FERC jurisdictional or subject to PJM decisions. The MMU continues to recommend that PJM provide a full analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on PJM generating units and carbon pricing revenues to the PJM states in order to permit the states to consider a potential agreement on the development of a multistate framework for carbon pricing and the distribution of carbon revenues. The results of the analysis would include the impact on the dispatch of every unit, the impact on energy prices and the carbon pricing revenues that would flow to each state.

For example, states receiving high levels of revenue could shift revenue to states disproportionately hurt by a carbon price if they believed that all states would be better off as a result. A carbon price would also be an alternative to specific subsidies to individual nuclear power plants and to the current wide range of implied carbon prices embedded in RPS programs and instead provide a market signal to which any resource could respond. The imposition of specific and prescriptive environmental dispatch rules would, in contrast, pose a threat to economic dispatch and efficient markets and create very difficult market power monitoring and mitigation issues. The provision of subsidies to individual units creates a discriminatory regime that is not consistent with competition. The use of inconsistent implied carbon prices by state is also inconsistent with an efficient market and inconsistent with the least cost approach to meeting state environmental goals.

The annual average cost of complying with RPS over the 11 year period from 2014 through 2024 for the ten jurisdictions that had RPS was $1.6 billion, or a total of $17.8 billion over 11 years. The RPS compliance cost for 2024, the most recent year for which there is almost complete data, was $3.2 billion.[29] RPS costs are payments by customers to the sellers of qualifying resources. The revenues from carbon pricing flow to the states.

If all the PJM states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances would be approximately $12.5 billion per year if the carbon price were $35.00 per short ton and emissions levels were five percent below 2025 emission levels. If all the PJM states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances would be approximately $17.8 billion if the carbon price were $50 per short ton and emission levels were five percent below 2025 levels. If only the current RPS states participated in a regional carbon market, the estimated revenue returned to the states/customers from selling carbon allowances at $35.00 per short ton would be about $8.3 billion. The costs of a carbon price are the impact on energy market prices, net of the revenue returned to states/customers.

29 The 2024 compliance cost value for PJM states does not include Delaware, Michigan or North Carolina. Based on past data these states generally account for approximately 2.0 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states.



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## Federal Environmental Regulation

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), all of which address pollution created by electric power production. The administration of these statutes is relevant to the operation of PJM markets.

The CAA regulates air emissions by providing for the establishment of acceptable levels of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The EPA issues technology based standards for major sources and area sources of emissions.[30]

The CWA regulates discharges from point sources that affect water quality and temperature.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.[31] Regulation of coal ash or coal combustion residuals affects coal fired power plants.

The EPA's actions have affected and will continue to affect the cost to build and operate generating units in PJM, which in turn affects wholesale energy prices and capacity prices.

### CAA: NESHAP/MATS

Section 112 of the CAA requires the EPA to promulgate emissions control standards, known as the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), from both new and existing area and major sources. On December 21, 2011, the EPA issued its Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule (MATS), which applies the CAA maximum achievable control technology (MACT) requirement to new or modified sources of emissions of mercury and antimony, arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, lead, manganese, acid gas, nickel, selenium and cyanide.

The EPA's MATS rule applies the CAA maximum achievable control technology (MACT) requirement to new or modified sources of emissions of mercury and arsenic, acid gas, nickel, selenium and cyanide.[32] On February 13, 2023, the EPA issued a final rule reaffirming that it remains appropriate and necessary to regulate hazardous air pollutants (HAP), including mercury, from power plants after considering cost.[33] This action revokes a 2020 finding that it was not appropriate and necessary to regulate coal and oil fired power plants under CAA § 112, and would restore the basis for the MATS rule.

On April 24, 2024, the EPA finalized a strengthened and updated MATS rule reflecting recent developments in control technologies and the performance of coal fired plants.[34] The core proposal revised the (non Hg) fPM emission standard, from 0.030 to 0.010 lbs/MMBtu.[35]

The new administration has taken steps to weaken the enforcement of the MATS rule. In April 2025, in an administrative decision by the EPA under Administrator Lee Zeldin, citing Section 112(i)(4) of the CAA, 47 coal-fired power plants were exempted from MATS compliance for two years. The decision was based on a determination of a need to prolong the life of aging coal plants and support national energy interests. This action is temporary and does not repeal the MATS rule. Repeal of the MATS has been identified as an EPA regulatory goal.[36]

Potentially 16,661 MW of generation in PJM is covered by the two year exemption. Most of the units have either not indicated plans to retire or have repowered, so the impact of the extension alone may not be direct and immediate.

On February 19, 2026, the EPA finalized repeal of the core changes of the 2024 amendments, including the revised filterable particulate matter (fPM)

30 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000).
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 *et seq.*
29 The EPA defines a "major source" as a stationary source or group of stationary sources that emit or have the potential to emit 10 tons per year or more of a hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of a combination of hazardous air pollutants. An "area source" is any stationary source that is not a major source.

32 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil Fuel Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units*, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012).
33 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units—Revocation of the 2020 Reconsideration, and Affirmation of the Appropriate and Necessary Supplemental Finding*, Final Action, EPA–HQ–OAR–2018–0794, 88 Fed. Reg. 13959 (March 6, 2023).
34 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units Review of the Residual Risk and Technology Review*, Final Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794, 89 Fed. Reg. 38508 (May 7, 2024).
35 *Id.* at 38518.
36 See EPA, EPA Launches Biggest Deregulatory Action in U.S. History (March 12, 2025) ("March 12th EPA Deregulation Notice"), which can be accessed at: <*https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-launches-biggest-deregulatory-action-us-history*>.

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emission standard, restoring the 0.030 lbs/MMBtu standard that became effective in 2012, and eliminating the requirement to use PM Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS).[37]

## CAA: NAAQS/CSAPR

The CAA requires each state to attain and maintain compliance with particulate matter (PM) and ozone national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).[38] Under NAAQS, the EPA establishes emission standards for six air pollutants, including $NO_X$, $SO_2$, $O_3$ at ground level, PM, CO, and Pb, and approves state plans to implement these standards, known as State Implementation Plans (SIPs).

In January 2015, the EPA began implementation of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) to address the CAA's requirement that each state prohibit emissions that significantly interfere with the ability of another state to meet NAAQS. CSAPR requires specific states in the eastern and central United States to reduce power plant emissions of $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ that cross state lines and contribute to ozone and fine particle pollution in other states. CSPAR requires reductions to levels consistent with the 1997 ozone and fine particle emissions and 2006 fine particle emission NAAQS. CSAPR covers 28 states, including all of the PJM states except Delaware, and also excluding the District of Columbia.

On March 15, 2021, in response to a court holding in *Wisconsin v. EPA*,[39] the EPA finalized decreases to allowable emissions under the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and the 2008 ozone NAAQS for 10 PJM states.[40] On February 28, 2022, the EPA proposed a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) (at that time termed the Transport Rule) for 26 states that addresses the contribution of those states to problems in other states in attaining and maintaining the 2015 Ozone NAAQS.[41] The proposed FIP requirements would establish ozone season $NO_X$ emissions budgets for electric generating units in the PJM states, excluding North Carolina and the District of Columbia.

On March 15, 2023, the EPA finalized Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) requirements for 23 states that addresses the contribution of those states to problems in other states in attaining and maintaining the 2015 Ozone NAAQS.[42] The FIP, also known as the Good Neighbor Plan, resolves the CAA good neighbor obligations of the affected states and applies when no state implementation plan has been approved. The FIP requirements establish ozone season $NO_X$ emissions budgets for electric generating units in the following PJM states: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia. The list of PJM jurisdictions excludes North Carolina, the District of Columbia, Tennessee and Delaware. Electric generating units in the indicated states would be required to participate in a revised version of the CSAPR $NO_X$ Ozone Season Group 3 Trading Program that was previously established in the 2021 CSAPR Update.

The EPA's emissions budgets for each PJM state for each ozone season for 2023 through 2029, and beyond are shown in Table 8-1.

### Table 8-1 CSAPR $NO_X$ ozone season group 3 state budgets: 2023 through 2029[43]

| | Emissions Budget (Tons) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PJM State | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030+ |
| Illinois | 7,474 | 7,325 | 7,325 | 5,889* | 5,363* | 4,555* | 4,050* | * |
| Indiana | 12,440 | 11,413 | 11,413 | 8,410* | 8,135* | 7,280* | 5,808* | * |
| Kentucky | 13,601 | 12,999 | 12,472 | 10,190* | 7,908* | 7,837* | 7,392* | * |
| Maryland | 1,206 | 1,206 | 1,206 | 842* | 842* | 842* | 842* | * |
| Michigan | 10,727 | 10,275 | 10,275 | 6,743* | 5,691* | 5,691* | 4,656* | * |
| New Jersey | 773 | 773 | 773 | 773* | 773* | 773* | 773* | * |
| Ohio | 9,110 | 7,929 | 7,929 | 7929* | 7,929* | 6,911* | 6,409* | * |
| Pennsylvania | 8,138 | 8,138 | 8,138 | 7,512* | 7,158* | 7,158* | 4,828* | * |
| Virginia | 3,143 | 2,756 | 2,756 | 2,565* | 2,373* | 2,373* | 1,951* | * |
| West Virginia | 13,791 | 11,958 | 11,958 | 10,818* | 9,678* | 9,678* | 9,678* | * |

*The budget for these years will be subsequently determined and equal the greater of the value above or that derived from the dynamic budget method.

37 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units: Final Repeal*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794; FRL-6716.4-02-OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 9088 (February 24, 2026).

38 The particulate matter (PM) regulated under the CAA is classified as either $PM_{10}$, which refers to PM less than 10 microns, and $PM_{2.5}$, which refers PM less than 2.5 microns. $PM_{2.5}$ is referred to as fine particular matter and poses the greatest risk to health. Examples of $PM_{2.5}$ include combustion particles, metals, and organic compounds.

39 Wisconsin v. EPA, 938 F.3d 303, 318-20 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

40 *Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0272; FRL-10013-42-OAR, 85 Fed. Reg. 23054 (Apr. 30, 2021).

41 See *Federal Implementation Plan Addressing Regional Ozone Transport for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0668; FRL 8670-01-OAR, 87 Fed. Reg. 20036 (April 6, 2022).

42 See *Federal "Good Neighbor Plan" for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality*, Final Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0668.

43 *Id.* at 35 (Table I.B-1).



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On February 7, 2024, the EPA issued a final rule reducing the primary annual $PM_{2.5}$ standard to 9.0 µg/$m^3$ from 12.0 µg/$m^3$.[44] The rule does not change other $PM_{2.5}$ standards. The proposal responds to the directive in Executive Order 13990 for review of a 2020 Particulate Matter NAAQS Decision that left $PM_{2.5}$ standards unchanged.

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a stay of the FIP and therefore the EPA's enforcement of CSAPR pending judicial review.[45] The effect of the stay is to eliminate the ozone season $NO_X$ emissions budgets for electric generating units in the PJM states. Unless and until the stay is lifted, no federal implementation plan is effective in PJM states and the emissions budgets described in Table 8--1 are not effective. The EPA had previously rejected all proposed state implementation plans for PJM states.

The new EPA Administrator has indicated plans to terminate the Good Neighbor Plan and revive negotiation of state implementation plans with the affected states.[46] The Court proceeding reviewing the Good Neighbor Plan is currently in abeyance, and the EPA has informed the D.C. Circuit that it is preparing a proposed rulemaking as part of reconsideration of the Good Neighbor Plan.[47]


On January 27, 2026, the EPA proposed approving state implementation plan submissions from eight states, including PJM states Kentucky and Tennessee, for the 2015 ozone NAAQS.[48] Upon becoming final, these states' interstate transport obligations would be resolved without the federal Good Neighbor Plan requirements.

Figure 8-1 shows average, monthly settled prices for $NO_X$ and $SO_2$ emissions allowances including CSAPR related allowances for 2020 through June 2026. Figure 8-1 also shows the average, monthly settled price for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) $CO_2$ allowances.

44 *See Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter.* Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0072; FRL-8635-01- OAR, 89 Fed. Reg. 16202 (March 6, 2024).
45 Ohio v. EPA, Slip Op. No. 23A349. (S. Ct. June 27, 2024).
46 March 12th EPA Deregulation Notice; Fact Sheet, Good Neighbor Plan (GNP) Powering the Great American Comeback Fact Sheet (March 12, 2025), which can be accessed at:<https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2025-03/good-neighbor-plan_powering-the-great-american-comeback_fact-sheet.pdf>.
47 Utah v. EPA, Status Report, D.C. Cir Case No. 23-1157, et al. (November 24, 2025).
48 See *Interstate Transport Plan Review for the 2015 Ozone NAAQS*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-0192; FRL-12716-01-OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 4026 (January 30, 2026).

The RGGI $CO_2$ allowance price averaged $32.14 in the first six months of 2026, a 54.1 percent increase in comparison with the average price in the first six months of 2025. The CSAPR annual $NO_X$ allowance price averaged $3.50 in the first six months of 2026, a 17.8 percent increase in comparison with the average price in the first six months of 2025. The group 2 CSAPR Seasonal $NO_X$ allowance price averaged $989.21 in the first six months of 2026, a 21.4 percent increase in comparison with the average price in the first six months of 2025.[49] The components of real-time LMP analysis shows that $NO_x$ cost contributed $0.16 to the load-weighted average real-time LMP in the first six months of 2025, compared to $0.02 in the first six months of 2025.[50] $CO_2$ cost (RGGI) contributed $2.34 to the load-weighted average real-time LMP in the first six months of 2026, compared to $1.93 in the first six months of 2025.[51]

### Figure 8-1 Spot monthly average emission price comparison: 2020 through June 2026[52]




49 Tennessee is the only PJM state that remains in the CSAPR $NO_X$ Ozone Season Group 2 Trading Program.
50 See Components of LMP in the *2026 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM January through June*, Section 3: Energy Market.
51 Id.
52 The CSAPR Seasonal NOx Group 3 price peaked at an average price of $44,826 in March, 2022.

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## CAA: NSR/NSPS

The CAA's NSR program is a preconstruction permitting program that requires certain stationary sources of air pollution to obtain permits prior to beginning construction. Parts C and D of Title I of the CAA provide for New Source Review (NSR) in order to prevent new projects and projects receiving major modifications from increasing emissions in areas currently meeting NAAQS or from inhibiting progress in areas that do not.[53] NSR requires permits before construction commences. In PJM, permits are issued by state environmental regulators, or in a process involving state and regional EPA regulators.[54]

NSR review applies a two part analysis to projects at facilities such as power plants, some of which involve multiple units and combinations of new and existing units.[55] The first part considers whether a modification would cause a significant emission increase of a regulated NSR pollutant. The second part considers whether any identified increase is also a significant net emission increase.[56]

New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) sets uniform, technology-based emission limits for specific source categories nationwide, pursuant to Section 111 of the CAA. Numeric emission limits based on the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER) apply to specific listed source categories (e.g., combustion turbines, boilers) that are new, modified, or reconstructed after a certain date.

On January 9, 2026, EPA finalized amendments to NSPS for stationary combustion turbines and stationary gas turbines establishing subcategories for new, modified, or reconstructed stationary combustion turbines based on size, rates of utilization, design efficiency, and fuel type. The EPA determined that combustion controls are BSER for NOX emissions for most new, modified, or reconstructed stationary combustion turbines. For one subcategory, new large turbines with high capacity factors (12 calendar month capacity factors greater than 45 percent), the BSER for NOX is combustion controls with the addition of selective catalytic reduction (SCR).[57]

## CAA: RICE

On January 14, 2013, the EPA signed a final rule amending its rules regulating emissions from a wide variety of stationary reciprocating internal combustion engines (RICE). RICE include certain types of electrical generation facilities like diesel engines typically used for backup, emergency or supplemental power, including facilities located behind the meter.[58] These rules include: National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines (RICE); New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) of Performance for Stationary Spark Ignition Internal Combustion Engines; and Standards of Performance for Stationary Compression Ignition Internal Combustion Engines (collectively RICE Rules). The RICE Rules apply to emissions such as formaldehyde, acrolein, acetaldehyde, methanol, CO, $NO_X$, volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and PM.

EPA regulations require that RICE that do not meet the EPA emissions standards (stationary emergency RICE) may operate for only 100 hours per year and only to provide emergency DR during an Energy Emergency Alert 2 (EEA2), or if there are five percent voltage/frequency deviations.[59] Demand resources that rely on RICE to provide load reductions are constrained to a maximum of 100 hours despite the fact that this limitation is not consistent with the definition of a capacity resource in PJM.

Up to 50 hours of the maximum 100 hours can be operated in limited non emergency conditions.[60] By letter issued February 27, 2025, the EPA indicated,

53 42 U.S.C § 7470 et seq.

54 CAA permitting in EPA Region 2 (New Jersey) is the responsibility of the state's environmental regulatory authority; CAA permitting in Region 3 (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia) is the shared responsibility of each state's environmental regulatory authority and EPA Region 3; CAA permitting in Region 4 (Kentucky and North Carolina) is the shared responsibility of each state's environmental regulatory authority and EPA Region 4; CAA permitting in EPA Region 5 (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio) is the responsibility of each state's environmental regulatory authority.

55 40 CFR § 52.21.

56 *Id.*

57 See *New Source Performance Standards Review for Stationary Combustion Turbines and Stationary Gas Turbines*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0419; FRL-11542-02- OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 1910 (2026).

58 See *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines; New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal Combustion Engines*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0708, 78 Fed. Reg. 6674 (January 30, 2013); 40 CFR Parts 60 and 63.

59 Emergency Operations, EOP-011-1, North American Electric Reliability Corporation, <*https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nerc.com%2Fglobalassets%2Fprograms%2Fcompliance%2Frsaws%2Frsaw-eop-011-1_2016_v3.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK*> (November 2016).

60 See 40 CFR 63.6640(f)(4)(ii) (RICE located at area sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAP)1 can operate for up to 50 hours per year in non-emergency situations to supply power as part of a financial arrangement with another entity). The following conditions must be met: (i) The engine is dispatched by the local balancing authority or local transmission and distribution system operator. (ii) The dispatch is intended to mitigate local transmission and/or distribution limitations so as to avert potential voltage collapse or line overloads that could lead to the interruption of power supply in a local area or region. (iii) The dispatch follows reliability, emergency operation or similar protocols that follow specific North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), regional, state, public utility commission or local standards or guidelines. (iv) The power is provided only to the facility itself or to support the local transmission and distribution system. (v) The owner or operator identifies and records the entity that dispatches the engine and the specific NERC, regional, state,



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in response to an inquiry from Duke Energy, that RICE can be operated for up to 50 hours per year to prevent the interruption of power supply in a local area when under an EEA1 and transition to EEA2 is likely without further action.[61]

PJM does not prevent emergency stationary RICE that does not meet emissions standards from participating in PJM markets as DR. Some emergency stationary RICE that does not meet emissions standards are now included in DR portfolios. Some DR registrations reflect a participant's reliance on behind the meter generation having environmental restrictions that limit the resource's ability to operate only in emergency conditions. PJM's DRHUB does not explicitly identify RICE generators, only whether it is an internal combustion engine. Emergency stationary RICE should be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it does not meet emissions standards. Emergency RICE with a limit of 100 hours per year cannot comply with the requirement to be available during the entire delivery year to be a capacity resource. PJM should not allow locations that rely upon emergency stationary RICE to register as DR individually or in portfolios. Registration of DR should be based on a finding that registered locations are capable of providing load reductions without an hourly limit. Reliance on the prospect of penalties to deter registration of ineligible resources as DR in lieu of a substantive ex ante review is not appropriate. The MMU recommends that emergency stationary RICE be prohibited from participation as DR either when registered individually or as part of a portfolio if it cannot meet the capacity market requirements to be DR as a result of emissions standards that impose environmental run hour limitations.

## CAA: Greenhouse Gas Emissions

The EPA has for years regulated $CO_2$ as a pollutant using CAA provisions that apply to pollutants not subject to NAAQS.[62] [63] On February 12, 2026, the EPA rescinded the 2009 finding that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g., $CO_2$, methane) endanger public health and welfare, removing the legal foundation for the EPA GHG regulation.[64] The EPA concluded it lacks statutory authority under CAA Section 202(a) to regulate GHGs for climate change purposes (citing West Virginia v. EPA, Loper Bright, and arguments about "major questions").[65]

## CWA: WOTUS Definition

The Clean Water Act (CWA) applies to navigable waters, which are defined as waters of the United States (WOTUS).[66] [67] The definition of WOTUS is a threshold issue that determines the hydrological scope of the CWA's applicability. Over the past decade, attempts to define WOTUS have been repeatedly addressed by the Courts, and no durable definition has resulted.[68] Establishing a durable definition is important to the electric industry, which needs to plan for compliance with the CWA and related regulations.

The scope of the CWA expanded as a result of an April 23, 2020, decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in *County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund*, which held that the discharge of pollutants via groundwater requires a CWA permit.[69] Groundwater is not itself WOTUS. However, if pollutants pass through groundwater from a point source to WOTUS, a permit may be required.[70] The Court held that discharge into groundwater "is the functional equivalent of a

public utility commission or local standards or guidelines that are being followed for dispatching the engine. The local balancing authority or local transmission and distribution system operator may keep these records on behalf of the engine owner or operator.

61 EPA letter to Duke Energy <*https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2025-05/response-to-duke-energy.pdf*>. The EPA describes Duke's program: "the Mandatory 50 program is deployed when forecasted grid reserves fall below Duke Energy's thresholds for maintaining reliable service—specifically, under Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Level 1 when transition to EEA Level 2 is imminent without further action. The program would fall below other emergency demand response programs in Duke Energy's resource stack and is constrained to 50 hours per calendar year. The letter states that the program prevents the need for rotating load shed, which would create local disturbances that could result in use of all generators throughout the affected areas."

62 See CAA § 111.

63 On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the EPA's determination that it was not authorized to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA and remanded the matter to the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases endanger public health and welfare. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497. On December 7, 2009, the EPA determined that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, endanger public health and welfare. See *Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act*, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66497 (Dec. 15, 2009). In a decision dated June 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the endangerment finding, rejecting challenges brought by industry groups and a number of states. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No 09-1322.

64 See *Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards under the Clean Air Act*, EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-0194; FRL-12715-02- OAR, 91 Fed. Reg. 7686 (February 18, 2026).

65 See *id.* at 7702-7710.

66 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) ("The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.").

67 For more details, see the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix H: "Environmental and Renewable Energy Regulations."

68 See, e.g., Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).

69 590 U.S. 165 (April 23, 2020).

70 *Id.*

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direct discharge."[71] The existence of a functional discharge will depend on an analysis including time and distance, and other factors.[72] Additional litigation or administrative action may clarify the functional discharge analysis.[73] *County of Maui* reduces the importance of the precise definition of WOTUS because WOTUS is generally part of the watershed.[74]

On May 25, 2023, a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court held that "jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland under the CWA" requires "first, ... a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters ... and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."[75] The Court's definition of adjacent wetlands significantly reduced the range of waters meeting that definition compared to the range covered in the 2022 rule.[76]

On March 24, 2025, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers issued a memorandum in response to requests for further clarification on the definition of adjacent wetlands, stating: "[A]n interpretation of 'continuous surface connection' which allows for wetlands far removed from and not directly abutting covered waters to be jurisdictional as adjacent wetlands has the potential to violate the direct abutment requirement for 'adjacent wetlands' under the plurality's standard and now *Sackett's* endorsement of that standard.[footnote omitted] Therefore, any components of guidance or training materials that assumed a discrete feature established a continuous surface connection are rescinded."[77]

On November 17, 2025, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a rule revising the definition of WOTUS to fully implement *Sackett v. EPA*'s narrowed requirement that wetlands have a "continuous surface connection" to relatively permanent waters in to be jurisdictional.[78]

## CWA: Effluents

The EPA regulates under its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authority discharges from and intakes to power plants, including water cooling systems at steam electric power generating stations, under the CWA.[79] The regulations, Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards (ELGs), are national industry-specific wastewater regulations based on the performance of demonstrated wastewater treatment technologies.

On June 9, 2022, the EPA proposed the Water Quality Certification Improvement Rule (WQCIR), which would expand the grounds on which states may condition or block, projects in federal permit proceedings.[80] The WQCIR would provide each state certifying agency a role in determining the "reasonable period of time" to review the request and encourage their adoption of an "activity as a whole" analytical approach that would consider the impacts of the entire project rather than just the specific discharge needing certification.[81]

The EPA has been implementing ELGs established in its 2015 and 2020 rules.[82] [83] The 2015 Rule established limitations and standards applicable to discharges from steam electric generating units from bottom ash (BA) transport water, flue gas desulfurization (FGD) wastewater, fly ash (FA) transport water, flue gas mercury control wastewater, gasification wastewater, combustion residual leachate, and non chemical metal cleaning wastes. The 2020 Rule revised the limitations and standards for BA transport water and FGD wastewater, leaving the other limitations and standards in place. The 2020 Rule applied less stringent effluent limits to three new subcategories of units: High FGD

71 *Id.* at 1.
72 *Id.* at 16 ("The difficulty with this approach, we recognize, is that it does not, on its own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances. But there are too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court now to use more specific language. Consider, for example, just some of the factors that may prove relevant (depending upon the circumstances of a particular case): (1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity. Time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.").
73 *Id.*
74 See *id.* at 5 ("Virtually all water, polluted or not, eventually makes its way to navigable water. This is just as true for groundwater.").
75 See Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023).
76 See *Revised Definition of "Waters of the United States,"* Final Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0602; FRL-6027.4-01-OW, 88 Fed. Reg. 3004 (January 18, 2023).
77 See *WOTUS Notice: The Final Response to SCOTUS; Establishment of a Public Docket; Request for Recommendations*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0093; FRL-12683-01-OW, 90 Fed. Reg. 13428.
78 See *Updated Definition of "Waters of the United States,"* EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0322; FRL 11132.1-01- OW, 90 Fed. Reg. 52498 (November 20, 2025).
79 See 40 CFR Part 423. For more details, see the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix H: "Environmental and Renewable Energy Regulations."
80 See *Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification Improvement Rule*, Proposed Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. 35318 (June 9, 2022).
81 *Id.* at 35343-35349.
82 See *Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819; FRL-9930-48- OW, 80 Fed. Reg. 67838 (November 3, 2015).
83 See *Steam Electric Reconsideration Rule*, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819; FRL-10014-41-OW, 85 Fed. Reg. 64650 (October 13, 2020).


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flow plants, low utilization generating units, and generating units that will permanently cease the combustion of coal by 2028.

Units subject to the generally applicable limits had to comply with the 2020 Rule as soon as possible on or after October 13, 2021, but no later than December 31, 2025.[84]

Plants are required to inform regulators of their plans to comply with the new rule by upgrading their plants with pollution control equipment or committing to retiring their units by 2028.[85]

Executive Order 13990 called for review and improvement of the 2020 Rule.

On April 25, 2024, pursuant to CWA, the EPA issued a rule strengthening the 2015 and 2020 ELGs for coal-fired power plants ("2024 Effluents Rule").[86] The 2024 Effluents Rule would reduce discharges by an estimated 660–672 million pounds per year, including toxic and bio accumulative pollutants, such as arsenic, lead, mercury, selenium, chromium, and cadmium.[87]

This 2024 Effluents Rule establishes a zero discharge of pollutants limitation for three wastewaters generated at coal-fired power plants: flue gas desulfurization wastewater, bottom ash transport water, and combustion residual leachate.[88] The regulation also establishes numeric discharge limitations for mercury and arsenic for combustion residual leachate (CRL) that is discharged through groundwater and for a fourth waste stream, called legacy wastewater, that is discharged from certain surface impoundments.[89] The regulation also eliminates less stringent requirements for two subcategories of facilities (high flow facilities and low utilization energy generating units) that were contained in the 2020 regulation.[90]

The 2024 Effluents Rule allows additional time for compliance for some plants that have installed, or are in the process of installing, additional treatment technologies to meet the 2015 and 2020 ELGs.[91] The rule allows some plants to continue to meet the 2015 and 2020 ELGs while they are in the process of closing and converting to use other fuels such as natural gas.[92] On December 23, 2025, EPA finalized a rule extending the deadlines promulgated in the 2024 Effluents Rules, updating the rule's transfer provisions to allow facilities to switch between compliance alternatives, and creating authority for alternative applicability dates and paperwork submission dates, based on site-specific factors.[93] The rule extends implementation dates by: (i) providing six more years (to December 31, 2031) for existing steam electric power plants to assess potential compliance pathways for their continued operations; (ii) extending compliance deadlines by five years (to December 31, 2034) related to zero-discharge limitations for flue gas desulfurization wastewater, bottom ash transport water, and combustion residual leachate; and (iii) providing more time for compliance with three zero-discharge limitations for power plants that send wastewater to wastewater treatment plants for processing. The agency's proposal would align these deadlines with the deadlines for power plants that discharge directly to waterways.

## RCRA: Coal Ash

The EPA administers the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which governs the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.[94] Solid waste is regulated under subtitle D. Subtitle D criteria are not directly enforced by the EPA. Subtitle C governs the disposal of hazardous waste. Hazardous waste is subject to direct regulatory control by the EPA from the time it is generated until its ultimate disposal.

On April 17 2015, the EPA published a rule under Subtitle D of RCRA, the Coal Combustion Residuals rule (2015 CCRR), which sets criteria for the disposal of coal combustion residues (CCRs), or coal ash, produced by electric utilities and independent power producers.[95] CCRs include fly ash (trapped by air filters), bottom ash (scooped out of boilers) and scrubber sludge (filtered using

84 *Id.* at 64652.
85 85 Fed. Reg. 64650, 64679–82; 88 Fed. Reg. 18440 (March 29, 2023); 40 CFR § 423.19(f)(1).
86 See *Supplemental Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category*, EPA Docket No. EPA–HQ–OW–2009–0819; FRL–8794–01– OW, Final Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 40198 (May 9, 2024) ("2024 Effluents Rule"); CWA §§ 301, 304, 306, 307, 308, 402 & 501.
87 *Id.* at 40198, 40203.
88 *Id.* at 40198.
89 *Id.* at 40252.
90 *Id.* at 40200.
91 *Id.*
92 *Id.* at 40246.
93 See *Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category—Deadline Extensions*, EPA–HQ–OW–2009–0819, 90 Fed. Reg. 61328 (December 31, 2025).
94 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 *et seq.*
95 *See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities*, 80 Fed. Reg. 21302 (April 17, 2015).

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wet limestone scrubbers). These residues are typically stored on site in ponds (surface impoundments) or sent to landfills.

In 2016, RCRA was amended to establish a permitting scheme allowing states to apply to the EPA for approval to operate a permit program that implements the CCR rule. Such state programs could include alternative state standards, provided that the EPA determines that they are "at least as protective as" the EPA CCR regulations.[96]Effective August 9, 2018, the EPA approved certain revisions to the 2015 CCRR ("2018 CCRR Revisions") partly in response to the 2016 amendments.[97]

The 2018 CCRR Revisions provide for two types of alternative performance standards. The first type of standards allows a state director (if a state has an EPA approved CCR permit program) or the EPA (if no state program) to suspend groundwater monitoring requirements if there is evidence that there is no potential for migration of hazardous constituents to the uppermost aquifer during the active life of the unit and during post closure care. The second type allows issuance of technical certifications by a state director in lieu of a professional engineer.

The 2018 CCRR Revisions revised the groundwater protection standards for health-based levels for four contaminants: cobalt at 6 mg/L; lithium at 40 mg/L; molybdenum at 100 mg/L and lead at 15 mg/L. Standards for other monitored contaminants follow the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) established under the Safe Water Drinking Act.

The 2018 CCRR Revisions extended the deadline for closing coal ash units in two situations: (i) detection of a statistically significant increase above a groundwater protection standard from an unlined surface impoundment; or (ii) inability to comply with the location restriction regarding placement above the uppermost aquifer. The exceptions in the 2018 CCRR to the standards in the 2015 CCRR and relaxation of the deadlines create a less stringent federal rule.

96 The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act).

97 See *Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum Criteria (Phase One, Part One)*, EPA Docket No. EPA–HQ–OLEM–2017–0286, 83 Fed. Reg. 36435 (July 30, 2018).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated certain provisions of the 2015 CCRR and remanded it to the EPA.[98]

On July 29, 2020, the EPA finalized revisions to the CCR rule in compliance with the court orders ("Revised CCRR").[99] The Revised CCRR requires (i) unlined surface impoundments (ponds) and ponds failing restrictions on the minimum depth to or interaction with an aquifer to cease receiving waste as soon as technically feasible and no later than April 11, 2021; and (ii) removal of compacted soil lined and clay lined ponds from classification as lined and exempt from CCRR.[100]

In response to the RCRA amendments, the EPA proposed a new rule to implement a federal CCR permit program in nonparticipating states, noticed February 20, 2020.[101] This proposal includes requirements for federal CCR permit applications, content and modification, as well as procedural requirements. The EPA would implement this permit program at CCR units located in states that have not submitted their own CCR permit program for approval.

The new EPA Administrator has indicated plans to prioritize expeditious state permit reviews and update the CCR permit program.[102] On June 26, 2025, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") submitted its CCR permit program application to EPA.[103] The EPA has recommended approval of the Virginia program.[104] On April 30, 2026, the EPA proposed to approve Virginia's program.[105] No other PJM state has yet applied for the EPA approval of its own CCR permit program.

98 Utility Solid Waste Activities Group, et al. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. August 21, 2018); Waterkeeper Alliance Inc. et al. v. EPA, No. 18–1289 (D.C. Cir. March 13, 2019).

99 See *Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities; A Holistic Approach to Closure Part A: Deadline to Initiate Closure*, EPA–HQ–OLEM–2019–0172; FRL–10002– 02–OLEM, 85 Fed. Reg. 53516 (August 28, 2020).

100 *Id.* at 53516–53517, 53536.

101 *See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities; Federal CCR Permit Program*, EPA-HQ-OLEM-2019-0361, 85 Fed. Reg. 9940 (February 20, 2020).

102 March 12th EPA Deregulation Notice.

103 Revised, March 4, 2026.

104 See *Virginia: Approval of State Coal Combustion Residuals Permit Program*, EPA-HQ-OLEM-2025-3325FRL-12983-01-OLEM, 91 Fed. Reg. 23924 (May 4, 2028)

105 *Id.*



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On February 20, 2020, the EPA proposed to establish a federal CCR permit program.[106] The proposed federal permit program is pending.

# State Environmental Regulation

## State Coal Ash Regulations

In Virginia, the Waste Management Board amended the Virginia Solid Waste Management Regulations in December 2015, to incorporate the EPA's 2015 CCRR, and did not adopt the less stringent 2018 CCRR Revisions. On July 1, 2019, Virginia enacted legislation directing the closure of coal ash ponds located in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed and owned by Dominion Energy.[107] Dominion is developing plans to remove coal ash ponds at power stations in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed. The removed coal ash must be recycled (at least 6.8 million cubic yards) or disposed of in a modern, lined landfill. The Virginia DEQ is addressing closing ash ponds under two types of environmental permits: wastewater discharge permits covering the removal of treated water from the ponds; or solid waste permits covering the permanent closure of the ponds.

Table 8-2 shows the compliance status of affected units with Virginia Solid Waste Management Regulations:[108]

**Table 8-2 Compliance status of affected units with Virginia Solid Waste Management Regulations**

| Plant | CCR Compliance Status |
|---|---|
| Bremo Bluff Power Station | As of April 2020, ash has been removed from the East and West Ponds. Plans for closure by removal of ash from the remaining North Pond impoundment are under development and will be addressed by the Virginia DEQ in a separate future permitting action. |
| Chesapeake Energy Center | The facility filed a proposed modification of its permit in March 2025 for removal of ash from the landfill, historical area, and impoundment. Administrative review of the permit is pending. |
| Chesterfield Power Station | Dominion Energy Virginia submitted the required solid waste permit application for closure by removal and groundwater monitoring of the Upper and Lower Ash Ponds in February 2020, and it is currently under review. The application outlines the removal of ash to either an offsite permitted landfill or offsite beneficial reuse. The application estimates that it will take approximately 13 years to complete closure by removal activities. |
| Clinch River Power Station | The ash pond was closed and capped prior to January 1, 2019. Clinch River Plant ceased burning coal in 2015 and no longer produces CCR material. The Plant now uses natural gas as fuel. All units are currently being monitored and maintained in post-closure care. |
| Clover Power Station | The station also has had a permitted CCR landfill since 1993. The permit has been modified to incorporate EPA CCR Rule requirements applicable to existing landfills. |
| Possum Point | The impoundments at this facility (coal ash ponds) are subject to the EPA CCR Rule and the requirements of Virginia Waste Management Act. |

Effective April 21, 2021, in response to a statutory mandate,[109] the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Illinois EPA) promulgated rules for coal combustion residual surface impoundments with the Illinois Pollution Control Board.[110] The proposed rules contain standards for the storage and disposal of coal combustion residuals in surface impoundments. The rules include a permitting program intended to meet federal standards.[111] The Illinois EPA identified 73 coal combustion residuals surface impoundments at power stations, some lined with impermeable materials and some not.[112] The Illinois EPA believes that as many as six lined surface impoundments may comply with the federal liner standards.[113]

106 See *Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities; Federal CCR Permit Program; Reopening of Comment Period*, EPA–HQ–OLEM–2019–0361; FRL–7080– 06–OLEM, Fed. Reg. (May 28, 2026).
107 Va. Code § 10.1-1402.03.
108 Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, "Coal Ash,": <*https://www.deq.virginia.gov/news-info/shortcuts/permits/waste/coal-ash*>.
109 Ill. Public Act 101-171 (a.k.a. SB 09).
110 The proposed rule amends the Illinois Administrative Code to create a new Part 845 in Title 35.
111 See *In the Matter of Standards for the Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals in Surface Impoundments*, No. R 2020-019 (March 30, 2020) at 1 (Proposed New 35 Ill. Adm. Code 845).
112 In the Matter of Standards for the Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals in Surface Impoundments, No. R 2020-019 (March 30, 2020) at 3 (Proposed New 35 Ill. Adm. Code 845z0.
113 *Id.*

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## State Emissions Regulations

States have in some cases enacted emissions regulations more stringent or potentially more stringent than federal requirements:[114]

- **Illinois Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA).** On September 16, 2021, the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA) became law. CEJA created an expanded nuclear subsidy program. CEJA mandates that all fossil fuel plants close by 2045. CEJA mandated that all fossil fuel plants "permanently reduce all CO2e and copollutant emissions to zero" by the end of 2045.2 CEJA included more specific dates for closure depending on public versus private ownership, NOx and SO2 emission rates, commercial operation date, heat rate and location relative to environmental justice communities.[115] .

  CEJA established emissions caps for investor owned, gas-fired units with three years of operating history, effective October 1, 2021, on a rolling 12 month basis. The emissions caps are based on average emissions over a three year period from 2018 through 2020. The capped emissions are $CO_2e$ and co-pollutants.[116] [117] New investor owned, gas fired units will have emissions caps after three years of operation. The resultant emissions caps are very low for some units and higher for others. More than 10,000 MW of capacity are currently affected, most of which have requested that the MMU calculate a unit specific opportunity cost. The MMU calculates opportunity costs for units that make requests and provide required data.

  CEJA includes provisions promoting the development of batteries and utility scale solar at the sites of up to five closed coal plants, two of which may be located in PJM. CEJA grants a subsidy of $110,000/MW for battery projects with at least 37 MW of capacity, capped at $28 million per year. A solar resource at a defined site may elect to receive either the battery subsidies or to sell premium RECs for $30 each.

- **New Jersey HEDD.** Units that run only during peak demand periods have relatively low annual emissions, and have less reason to make investments in emissions reductions under the EPA transport rules. New Jersey addressed the issue of $NO_X$ emissions on peak energy demand days with a rule that defines peak energy usage days, referred to as high electric demand days or HEDD, and imposes operational restrictions and emissions control requirements on units responsible for significant $NO_X$ emissions on such high energy demand days. New Jersey's HEDD rule, which became effective May 19, 2009, applies to HEDD units, which include units that have a $NO_X$ emissions rate on HEDD equal to or exceeding 0.15 lbs/MMBtu and lack identified emission control technologies.
- **New Jersey Control and Prohibition of Carbon Dioxide Emissions.** On December 2, 2022, New Jersey implemented rules restricting new power plants to $CO_2$ emissions less than 860 pounds per megawatt hour, and banning sales of No. 4 and No. 6 fuel oil.[118] The rule limits existing electric generating units to no more than 1,700 lbs of $CO_2$ per megawatt hour of the gross energy input, by January 1, 2024, to no more than 1,300 pounds per megawatt hour by 2027, and to no more than 1,000 pounds per megawatt hour by 2035.
- **Climate Solutions Now Act of 2022.** One April 8, 2022, Maryland enacted a requirement for reduction of statewide greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent from 2006 levels by 2031 and net-zero emissions by 2045.[119]
- **Illinois Air Quality Standards ($NO_X$, $SO_2$ and Hg).** The State of Illinois has promulgated its own standards for $NO_X$, $SO_2$ and Hg (mercury) known as Multi-Pollutant Standards (MPS) and Combined Pollutants Standards (CPS). MPS and CPS establish standards that are more stringent and take effect earlier than comparable Federal regulations, such as the EPA's MATS.

114 For more details, see the *2019 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix H: "Environmental and Renewable Energy Regulations."
115 *Id.* At 9.15(j).
116 Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions means the total emissions of six greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride). Co-pollutants mean the six criteria pollutants identified by the US EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act: Carbon Monoxide, Lead, Nitrogen Dioxide, Ozone, Particle Pollution, and Sulfur Dioxide.
117 See Energy Transition Act, Public Act 102-0662, Section 90-55, which amends section 9.15 (k-5) FOR the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.
118 See N.J.A.C. 7:27F.
119 See Maryland SB 528.


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Some states proposed legislation in 2024 designed to reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas and other emissions. The proposed legislation is summarized in Table 8-3.

### Table 8-3 Summary of proposed environmental regulatory activity affecting PJM resources by jurisdiction

| Jurisdiction | Bill/Docket No. | Environmental Regulatory Activity |
|---|---|---|
| Delaware | SB 205 | 153rd Gen. Assembly: Would require any entity seeking to begin the business of using 30 MW of electricity or greater to first obtain a Certificate to Operate (COP) from the PSC. |
| | HB 233 | 153rd Gen. Assembly: Act requires regulated utilities to establish a separate rate for data centers to avoid cost shifts to other customers. |
| | HCR 94 | 153rd Gen. Assembly: Resolution urging PJM to maintain price collars at the current rate and encouraging reforms to the interconnection queue. |
| Illinois | | No current activity. |
| Indiana | | No current activity. |
| Kentucky | | No current activity. |
| Maryland | | No current activity. |
| Michigan | | No current activity. |
| New Jersey | A 2938/S 2462 | 2026-2027 Reg. Sess.: "Grid Reliability Protection Act" prohibits State agencies from decommissioning electric generation facilities under certain circumstances. |
| | A 4710 | 2026-2027: "Clean Energy AI Incentivization Act" directs BPU to incentivize artificial intelligence centers to bring their own self-sufficient, clean energy. |
| | S 4062/A 4801 | 2026-2027 Reg. Sess.: Establishes certain protections against demand by large-load addition customers in State. |
| North Carolina | S 1026 | 2025-2026 Reg. Sess.: Creates large load tariff. |
| Ohio | SB 381 | 136th Gen. Assembly: Requires PUCO approval to connect data centers to electrical grid. |
| Pennsylvania | HB 782 | 2025-2026 Reg. Sess.: Requires public utilities to report lobbying and political activities expenses to exclude them from rates; requires electric distribution companies to be in an RTO and to report voting in PJM processes. |
| | SB 1068 | 2025-2026 Reg. Sess.: An Act providing for the abrogation of regulations relating to the CO2 Budget Trading Program. |
| | SR 188 | 2025-2026 Reg. Sess.: Directs the Joint State Government Commission to study the costs and benefits of continued membership in PJM, with specific reference to the upcoming December 2025 capacity auction for 2027-2028 and broader reliability/price issues. |
| | HB 1834 | 2025-2026 Reg. Sess.: Provides for PUC regulation of commercial data centers, including impacts on the PJM grid (e.g., requiring assessments of effects on PJM's regional transmission system from large loads). |
| | SB 991 | 2025-2026 Reg. Sess.: Streamlines permitting for data centers (often at former power sites) to accelerate development amid PJM demand pressure. |
| Tennessee | | No current activity. |
| Virginia | | No current activity. |
| Washington, D.C. | | No current activity. |
| West Virginia | | No current activity. |

## Clean Energy Standards

- In April 2020, Virginia enacted the Virginia Clean Economy Act, which orders the closure of most coal generation in state by 2024, most fossil fuel generation by 2045, and adopts a 100 percent clean energy standard by 2045.[120] The legislation mandates Chesterfield Power Station Units 5 & 6 and Yorktown Power Station Unit 3 to be retired by the end of 2024, Altavista, Southampton and Hopewell to be retired by the end of 2028 and Virginia Power's remaining fossil fuel units to be retired by the end of 2045, unless the retirement of such generating units will compromise grid reliability or security.[121] The legislation also imposes a temporary moratorium on Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for fossil fuel generation, unless the resources are needed for grid reliability.[122]

## Opportunity Cost

- PJM generators are subject to environmental constraints that limit generation. These constraints are specified in the operating permits issued by the jurisdictional environmental authority. Schedule 2 of the PJM Operating Agreement provides that the opportunity cost associated with the environmental constraints may be included in a generator's cost-based offer.[123] Opportunity cost associated with a physical equipment limitation or a fuel supply limitation, under certain circumstances, may also qualify for inclusion in the cost-based offer.[124]
- More than 10,000 MW of capacity are currently affected by CEJA, most of which have requested that the MMU calculate a unit specific opportunity cost. The CEJA operating limits have resulted in significant opportunity cost adders to cost-based energy market offers for affected units.

120 Va. HB 1526/SB 851.
121 See Dominion Energy, Inc., et al., SEC Form 10-Q (Quarter ending June 30, 2020).
122 *Id.*
123 PJM Operating Agreement, Schedule 2,
124 *Id.* at 5(b).

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- The MMU calculates opportunity costs for units that make requests and provide the required data. The MMU calculated opportunity cost adders for 172 generators in the first six months of 2026. The calculations are generally done one time per week and the resulting opportunity cost is effective for a seven day period. More frequent calculations are done in cases where the constraints are tight and the opportunity cost is expected to vary significantly from day to day.

## RGGI

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative effort by Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey (as of January 1, 2020), New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia (2021–2023, and effective July 1, 2026) to cap $CO_2$ emissions from power generation facilities.[125] Virginia withdrew from RGGI effective January 1, 2024 and rejoined effective July 1, 2026.

Delaware, Maryland and New Jersey are members of RGGI, and Virginia was a member from January 1, 2021 through 2023. New Jersey, a founding member of RGGI, opted out in 2011 but rejoined RGGI in 2020.[126] Virginia joined RGGI on January 1, 2021, and left RGGI on December 31, 2023. A decision issued November 18, 2024, by the Floyd County Circuit Court of Virginia determined that the Governor lacked the authority to remove Virginia from RGGI.[127] Virginia is rejoining RGGI effective July 1, 2026. Pennsylvania took action to join RGGI on April 23, 2022, but such action was enjoined by court order on appeal.[128] [129] After Pennsylvania legislation explicitly removed the RGGI regulation from the Pennsylvania Code in November 12, 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot without a decision on the merits.[130] [131]

Table 8-4 shows the RGGI $CO_2$ auction clearing prices and quantities, in short tons and metric tonnes, for the 3rd control period through the 6th control period.[132] The clearing price for the auction held June 3, 2026, was $35.00 per allowance (equal to one short ton of $CO_2$).[133] The June auction cleared above the 2026 Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) trigger price of $18.22.[134] All RGGI auctions held since March 2024 have cleared above the CCR trigger price. The June 2026 auction clearing price decreased 40.1 percent from the last auction clearing price of $24.99 in March 2026. The auction clearing price in June 2026 was 75.6 percent higher than the auction clearing price in June 2025.

125 RGGI provides a link on its website to state statutes and regulations authorizing its activities, which can be accessed at: <*https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/state-regulations*> .

126 RGGI Inc., "RGGI States Welcome New Jersey as Its CO2 Regulation Is Finalized," RGGI Inc. (June 17, 2019) <*https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Press-Releases/2019_06_17_NJ_Announcement_Release.pdf*>.

127 See Association of Energy Conservation Professionals v. Virginia State Air Pollution Control Board, Case No. CL23000173-00.

128 CO2 Budget Trading Program, 52 Pa.B. 2471 (April 23, 2022), codified 25 Pa. Code Ch. 145; ***see also*** Executive Order–2019-07. (June 22, 2020) .

129 See ***Bowfin KeyCon Holdings, LLC v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection***, 347 M.D. 2022 (November 1, 2023) ("held that the Pennsylvania [DEP]'s CO2 Budget Trading Program Regulation is an unconstitutional tax, declared the rule to be void, and enjoined DEP from enforcing it"); ***Ramez Ziadeh, et al. v. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau***, Memorandum Opinion, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Case No. No. 41 M.D. 2022 (July 8, 2022); ***Ramez Ziadeh, et al. v. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference*** Bureau, Order Granting Application to Vacate, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Case No. No. 41 M.D. 2022 (July 25, 2022).

130 See Pennsylvania Act 45 of 2025, HB 416.

131 See ***Shirley v. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau*** (No. 247 M.D. 2022); Supreme Court Docket Nos. 81 MAP 2022, 83 MAP 2022, or 85 MAP 2022 (January 6, 2026).

132 Each control period is three years in duration. The 3rd control period covers 2015 through 2017. The 4th control period covers 2018 through 2020. The 5th control period covers 2021 through 2023. The 6th control period covers 2024 through 2026.

133 RGGI measures carbon in short tons (short ton equals 2,000 pounds) while world carbon markets measure carbon in metric tonnes (metric tonne equals 1,000 kilograms or 2,204.6 pounds).

134 RGGI auctions employ a price cap called the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) trigger price. When demand for allowances exceeds the supply at the CCR trigger price, the auction is cleared by setting the price equal to the CCR trigger price and drawing on allowances that are held in reserve. In the March 2026 auction, the reserve allowances were not sufficient to meet the demand at the CCR trigger price and the auction cleared above the CCR trigger price. Since the CCR allowances for 2026 have been exhausted, the CCR trigger price of $18.22 will not affect the remaining RGGI auctions in 2026.



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## Table 8-4 RGGI $CO_2$ allowance auction prices and quantities in short tons and metric tonnes: 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Control Periods[135]

| | Short Tons | | | | Metric Tonnes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auction Date | Clearing Price | Quantity Offered | Cost Containment Reserve | Quantity Sold | Clearing Price | Quantity Offered | Cost Containment Reserve | Quantity Sold |
| March 11, 2015 | $5.41 | 15,272,670 | | 15,272,670 | $5.96 | 13,855,137 | | 13,855,137 |
| June 3, 2015 | $5.50 | 15,507,571 | | 15,507,571 | $6.06 | 14,068,236 | | 14,068,236 |
| September 9, 2015 | $6.02 | 15,374,294 | 10,000,000 | 25,374,294 | $6.64 | 13,947,329 | 9,071,850 | 23,019,179 |
| December 2, 2015 | $7.50 | 15,374,274 | | 15,374,274 | $8.27 | 13,947,311 | | 13,947,311 |
| March 9, 2016 | $5.25 | 14,838,732 | | 14,838,732 | $5.79 | 13,461,475 | | 13,461,475 |
| June 1, 2016 | $4.53 | 15,089,652 | | 15,089,652 | $4.99 | 13,689,106 | | 13,689,106 |
| September 7, 2016 | $4.54 | 14,911,315 | | 14,911,315 | $5.00 | 13,527,321 | | 13,527,321 |
| December 7, 2016 | $3.55 | 14,791,315 | | 14,791,315 | $3.91 | 13,418,459 | | 13,418,459 |
| March 8, 2017 | $3.00 | 14,371,300 | | 14,371,300 | $3.31 | 13,037,428 | | 13,037,428 |
| June 7, 2017 | $2.53 | 14,597,470 | | 14,597,470 | $2.79 | 13,242,606 | | 13,242,606 |
| September 8, 2017 | $4.35 | 14,371,585 | | 14,371,585 | $4.80 | 13,037,686 | | 13,037,686 |
| December 8, 2017 | $3.80 | 14,687,989 | | 14,687,989 | $4.19 | 13,324,723 | | 13,324,723 |
| March 14, 2018 | $3.79 | 13,553,767 | | 13,553,767 | $4.18 | 12,295,774 | | 12,295,774 |
| June 13, 2018 | $4.02 | 13,771,025 | | 13,771,025 | $4.43 | 12,492,867 | | 12,492,867 |
| September 9, 2018 | $4.50 | 13,590,107 | | 13,590,107 | $4.96 | 12,328,741 | | 12,328,741 |
| December 5, 2018 | $5.35 | 13,360,649 | | 13,360,649 | $5.90 | 12,120,580 | | 12,120,580 |
| March 13, 2019 | $5.27 | 12,883,436 | | 12,883,436 | $5.81 | 11,687,660 | | 11,687,660 |
| June 5, 2019 | $5.62 | 13,221,453 | | 13,221,453 | $6.19 | 11,994,304 | | 11,994,304 |
| September 4, 2019 | $5.20 | 13,116,447 | | 13,116,447 | $5.73 | 11,899,044 | | 11,899,044 |
| December 4, 2019 | $5.61 | 13,116,444 | | 13,116,444 | $6.18 | 11,899,041 | | 11,899,041 |
| March 11, 2020 | $5.65 | 16,208,347 | | 16,208,347 | $6.23 | 14,703,969 | | 14,703,969 |
| June 3, 2020 | $5.75 | 16,336,298 | | 16,336,298 | $6.34 | 14,820,045 | | 14,820,045 |
| September 2, 2020 | $6.82 | 16,192,785 | | 16,192,785 | $7.52 | 14,689,852 | | 14,689,852 |
| December 2, 2020 | $7.41 | 16,237,495 | | 16,237,495 | $8.17 | 14,730,412 | | 14,730,412 |
| March 3, 2021 | $7.60 | 23,467,261 | | 23,467,261 | $8.38 | 21,289,147 | | 21,289,147 |
| June 2, 2021 | $7.97 | 22,987,719 | | 22,987,719 | $8.79 | 20,854,114 | | 20,854,114 |
| September 8, 2021 | $9.30 | 22,911,423 | | 22,911,423 | $10.25 | 20,784,899 | | 20,784,899 |
| December 1, 2021 | $13.00 | 23,121,518 | 3,919,482 | 27,041,000 | $14.33 | 20,975,494 | 3,555,695 | 24,531,190 |
| March 9, 2022 | $13.50 | 21,761,269 | | 21,761,269 | $14.88 | 19,741,497 | | 19,741,497 |
| June 1, 2022 | $13.90 | 22,280,473 | | 22,280,473 | $15.32 | 20,212,511 | | 20,212,511 |
| September 7, 2022 | $13.45 | 22,404,023 | | 22,404,023 | $14.83 | 20,324,594 | | 20,324,594 |
| December 7, 2022 | $12.99 | 22,233,203 | | 22,233,203 | $14.32 | 20,169,628 | | 20,169,628 |
| March 8, 2023 | $12.50 | 21,522,877 | | 21,522,877 | $13.78 | 19,525,231 | | 19,525,231 |
| June 7, 2023 | $12.73 | 22,026,639 | | 22,026,639 | $14.03 | 19,982,237 | | 19,982,237 |
| September 6, 2023 | $13.85 | 21,948,358 | | 21,948,358 | $15.27 | 19,911,221 | | 19,911,221 |
| December 6, 2023 | $14.88 | 22,090,709 | 5,565,291 | 27,656,000 | $16.40 | 20,040,360 | 5,048,749 | 25,089,108 |
| March 13, 2024 | $16.00 | 15,855,879 | 8,416,278 | 24,272,157 | $17.64 | 14,384,216 | 7,635,121 | 22,019,337 |
| June 5, 2024 | $21.03 | 16,053,188 | | 16,053,188 | $23.18 | 14,563,211 | | 14,563,211 |
| September 4, 2024 | $25.75 | 15,943,608 | | 15,943,608 | $28.38 | 14,463,802 | | 14,463,802 |
| December 4, 2024 | $20.05 | 15,943,608 | | 15,943,608 | $22.10 | 14,463,802 | | 14,463,802 |
| March 12, 2025 | $19.76 | 15,392,222 | 8,134,778 | 23,527,000 | $21.78 | 13,963,593 | 7,379,749 | 21,343,341 |
| June 4, 2025 | $19.93 | 15,244,479 | | 15,244,479 | $21.97 | 13,829,563 | | 13,829,563 |
| September 3, 2025 | $22.25 | 15,177,783 | | 15,177,783 | $24.53 | 13,769,057 | | 13,769,057 |
| December 4, 2025 | $26.73 | 15,230,235 | | 15,230,235 | $29.46 | 13,816,641 | | 13,816,641 |
| March 11, 2026 | $24.99 | 18,234,876 | 7,853,278 | 26,088,154 | $27.55 | 16,542,406 | 7,124,376 | 23,666,782 |
| June 3, 2026 | $35.00 | 18,349,699 | | 18,349,699 | $38.58 | 16,646,572 | | 16,646,572 |

135 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, "Auction Results," (2026) <https://www. rggi.org/auctions/auction-results>.

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The RGGI auction held on June 3, 2026, generated $642.2 million in auction revenue. RGGI auctions have generated $11.4 billion in auction revenue since 2008.[136] RGGI auction revenue is returned to the states. RGGI reported that the RGGI states, cumulative through the 2023 reporting year, have invested $5.7 billion, 66.5 percent of auction revenues.[137] RGGI reports that 54 percent of the $5.7 billion was invested in energy efficiency, 11 percent on clean and renewable energy, six percent on greenhouse gas abatement, 16 percent on direct bill assistance, six percent on beneficial electrification, five percent on administration and one percent on RGGI, Inc.[138]

If all PJM states joined RGGI, the total RGGI revenue to the PJM states would be significant. The estimated allowance revenue for PJM states based on 2025 $CO_2$ emission levels and the RGGI clearing price for the June 2026 auction ranges from $6.7 billion per year to $12.5 billion per year depending on associated reductions in carbon emission levels (Table 8-5).[139] Table 8-5 shows the estimated carbon allowance revenue for each PJM state based on the latest RGGI auction price and reductions below 2025 $CO_2$ emission levels ranging from five to 50 percent. A power plant owner must acquire an allowance for each ton of $CO_2$ emissions and the revenue values in Table 8-5 are computed by multiplying the carbon price by the emission cap level which is expressed as a reduction below the 2025 actual emissions level. States that participate in RGGI choose their emission cap. For example, New Jersey chose an emission cap of 18,000,000 short tons for reentry into RGGI in 2020, 5.3 percent below New Jersey's 2018 $CO_2$ emissions level; the New Jersey emission cap will be reduced by 540,000 short tons each year through 2030.

### Table 8-5 Estimated $CO_2$ allowance revenue at June 2026 RGGI price level[140] [141]

| | Estimated CO2 allowance revenue ($ millions), carbon price $35.00 per short ton | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction | 2025 power generation CO2 emissions (million short tons) | 5 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 10 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 15 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 20 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 25 percent reduction below 2025emission levels | 50 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels |
| Delaware | 2.4 | $80.1 | $75.9 | $71.6 | $67.4 | $63.2 | $42.1 |
| Illinois | 33.9 | $1,128.8 | $1,069.3 | $1,009.9 | $950.5 | $891.1 | $594.1 |
| Indiana | 41.3 | $1,374.5 | $1,302.2 | $1,229.9 | $1,157.5 | $1,085.2 | $723.4 |
| Kentucky | 32.0 | $1,065.6 | $1,009.5 | $953.4 | $897.3 | $841.2 | $560.8 |
| Maryland | 10.4 | $347.0 | $328.8 | $310.5 | $292.2 | $274.0 | $182.7 |
| Michigan | 2.3 | $76.6 | $72.6 | $68.6 | $64.5 | $60.5 | $40.3 |
| New Jersey | 10.1 | $334.2 | $316.6 | $299.1 | $281.5 | $263.9 | $175.9 |
| North Carolina | 0.1 | $4.9 | $4.6 | $4.4 | $4.1 | $3.9 | $2.6 |
| Ohio | 78.7 | $2,617.5 | $2,479.7 | $2,341.9 | $2,204.2 | $2,066.4 | $1,377.6 |
| Pennsylvania | 79.7 | $2,649.8 | $2,510.4 | $2,370.9 | $2,231.4 | $2,092.0 | $1,394.7 |
| Tennessee | 0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Virginia | 33.3 | $1,108.5 | $1,050.1 | $991.8 | $933.4 | $875.1 | $583.4 |
| Washington, D.C. | 0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| West Virginia | 50.9 | $1,694.1 | $1,604.9 | $1,515.7 | $1,426.6 | $1,337.4 | $891.6 |
| Total | 375.4 | $12,481.6 | $11,824.6 | $11,167.7 | $10,510.8 | $9,853.9 | $6,569.2 |

136 See RGGI Auction Results (2026) at <https://www.rggi.org/>.
137 *The Investment of RGGI Proceeds in 2024*, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) at 17, (July 2026), <https://www.rggi.org/investments/proceeds-investments>.
138 *Id.* at 15.
139 This assumes that the PJM states would implement their RGGI rules consistent with the current RGGI states where owners of fossil fuel generators are required to purchase emission allowances in a regional centralized auction or purchase allowances in a secondary market.
140 The 2025 $CO_2$ emissions data is from the EPA Continuous Emission Monitoring System (CEMS) from PJM generators.
141 Power generation companies subject to a RGGI emission cap can offset up to 3.3 percent of their allowance obligation by undertaking certain greenhouse gas emission reduction projects. The allowance revenue values in Table 8-5 do not reflect offset allowances.


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The RGGI emissions cap (carbon budget) is the sum of $CO_2$ allowances issued by each state. Table 8-6 shows the RGGI emission cap history. Compliance with the RGGI allowance obligation is evaluated at the end of each three year period which is called the control period. The first control period began in 2009. The 2026 compliance year is the third year of the sixth control period.

In 2021, RGGI announced a third adjustment to the RGGI emissions cap to account for banked allowances from previous control periods.[142] [143] The first adjustment removed 57.4 million allowances that were banked or unused from the first control period. The reduction to the RGGI emissions cap was spread over a seven year period beginning in 2014 and ending with 2020.[144] A second cap adjustment, corresponding to banked allowances for 2012 and 2013, began in 2015 with an adjustment of 13.7 million allowances per year and was in place through 2020.[145] The third adjustment of 95.5 million allowances was spread over a five year period beginning in 2021.[146] The base emissions cap for each of the next five years was reduced by 19.1 million allowances. There are no adjustments in place beginning with the 2026 compliance year. The percent change columns in Table 8-6 show the year to year percent changes in the base RGGI cap and the adjusted RGGI cap.[147] The budget for increased 17.9 percent in comparison to the 2025 adjusted budget. Figure 8-2 shows that the carbon budgets ($CO_2$ emissions caps) for all RGGI states increased in comparison to the 2025 adjusted budgets.

## Table 8-6 RGGI emissions cap history[148] [149]

| | Control Period | RGGI Average Clearing Price ($ per short ton) | RGGI Cap (short tons) | Percent Change in RGGI Cap | RGGI Adjusted Cap (short tons) | Percent Change in Adjusted Cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | | $2.77 | 188,076,976 | | 188,076,976 | |
| 2010 | 1st | $1.93 | 188,076,976 | 0.0% | 188,076,976 | 0.0% |
| 2011 | | $1.89 | 188,076,976 | 0.0% | 188,076,976 | 0.0% |
| 2012 | | $1.93 | 165,184,246 | 0.0% | 165,184,246 | 0.0% |
| 2013 | 2nd | $2.92 | 165,184,246 | 0.0% | 165,184,246 | 0.0% |
| 2014 | | $4.72 | 91,000,000 | (44.9%) | 82,792,336 | (49.9%) |
| 2015 | | $6.10 | 88,725,000 | (2.5%) | 66,833,592 | (19.3%) |
| 2016 | 3rd | $4.47 | 86,506,875 | (2.5%) | 64,615,467 | (3.3%) |
| 2017 | | $3.42 | 84,344,203 | (2.5%) | 62,452,795 | (3.3%) |
| 2018 | | $4.41 | 82,235,598 | (2.5%) | 60,344,190 | (3.4%) |
| 2019 | 4th | $5.43 | 80,363,945 | (2.3%) | 58,472,538 | (3.1%) |
| 2020 | | $6.41 | 96,354,847 | (2.5%) | 74,463,439 | (3.4%) |
| 2021 | | $9.61 | 119,767,784 | (3.9%) | 100,677,454 | 4.5% |
| 2022 | 5th | $13.46 | 116,112,784 | (3.1%) | 97,022,454 | (3.6%) |
| 2023 | | $13.58 | 112,457,784 | (3.1%) | 93,367,454 | (3.8%) |
| 2024 | 6th | $20.17 | 84,162,784 | (3.2%) | 69,401,609 | (3.9%) |
| 2025 | | $21.88 | 81,347,784 | (3.3%) | 66,586,609 | (4.1%) |
| 2026 | | $29.12 | 78,532,784 | (3.5%) | 78,532,784 | 17.9% |

142 "Third Adjustment for Banked Allowances Announcement," Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (March 15, 2021) <*https://www.rggi.org/news-releases/rggi-releases*>.

143 A banked allowance is an allowance acquired during a previous control period that was not used to fulfill a RGGI allowance obligation.

144 "Second Control Period Interim Adjustment for Banked Allowances Announcement," Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (March 17, 2014) at 2. Due to rounding, the adjustment is 8,207,664 allowances for years 2014 through 2018, and 8,207,663 allowances for the remaining two years <*https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Design-Archive/2012-Review/Adjustments/2014_03_17_SCP_Adjustment.pdf*>.

145 Id.

146 "Third Adjustment for Banked Allowances Announcement," Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (March 15, 2021) <*https://www.rggi.org/news-releases/rggi-releases*>.

147 Percent changes for years with membership changes do not reflect the impacts of changes in membership. For example, the RGGI cap for 2020 reflects the impact of New Jersey rejoining RGGI in 2020 but the percent change from 2019 to 2020 does not include New Jersey's allowance budget. Virginia's adoption of RGGI in 2021 to 2023 and Virginia's withdrawal at the end of 2023 through 2025 are treated analogously.

148 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, "Allowance Distribution" <*https://www.rggi.org/allowance-tracking/allowance-distribution*> (Accessed April 21, 2025).

149 The increase in the RGGI Cap and the RGGI Adjusted Cap in 2020 is due to the reentry of New Jersey. The new cap is 18 million short tons higher than the previously published 2020 caps.

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### Figure 8-2 RGGI adjusted carbon budgets by state[150]





Table 8-7 shows the type of fuel and technology by marginal resources subjected to RGGI regulations and other marginal resources in the real-time energy market in the first six months of 2026 and 2025. In the first six months of 2026, marginal resources subjected to RGGI regulations accounted for 12.5 percent of all marginal resources. In the first six months of 2025, marginal resources subjected to RGGI regulations accounted for 14.6 percent of all marginal resources.

### Table 8-7 Type of fuel used and technology (Real-time marginal units and RGGI marginal units): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel | Technology | RGGI | Other | Total | RGGI | Other | Total |
| Gas | CC | 12.31% | 50.35% | 62.66% | 11.01% | 44.74% | 55.75% |
| Gas | CT | 0.76% | 7.98% | 8.74% | 0.86% | 7.80% | 8.66% |
| Coal | Steam | 0.14% | 7.41% | 7.55% | 0.29% | 9.29% | 9.57% |
| Oil | CT | 0.08% | 1.28% | 1.36% | 0.21% | 1.55% | 1.77% |
| Oil | Steam | 0.03% | 0.02% | 0.05% | 0.07% | 0.05% | 0.11% |
| Gas | Steam | 0.07% | 1.77% | 1.83% | 0.02% | 1.97% | 1.98% |
| Oil | RICE | 1.19% | 0.15% | 1.33% | 0.01% | 0.07% | 0.08% |
| Oil | CC | 0.04% | 0.05% | 0.10% | 0.01% | 0.02% | 0.03% |
| Other | Solar | 0.00% | 1.38% | 1.38% | 0.00% | 3.65% | 3.65% |
| Landfill Gas | CT | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Other | Battery | 0.00% | 0.01% | 0.01% | 0.00% | 0.04% | 0.04% |
| Municipal Waste | RICE | 0.00% | 0.08% | 0.08% | 0.00% | 0.06% | 0.06% |
| Other | Steam | 0.00% | 0.06% | 0.06% | 0.00% | 0.06% | 0.06% |
| Wind | Wind | 0.00% | 13.79% | 13.79% | 0.00% | 17.01% | 17.01% |
| Gas | RICE | 0.00% | 0.82% | 0.82% | 0.00% | 0.92% | 0.92% |
| Municipal Waste | Steam | 0.00% | 0.09% | 0.09% | 0.00% | 0.10% | 0.10% |
| Uranium | Steam | 0.00% | 0.13% | 0.13% | 0.00% | 0.21% | 0.21% |
| All Marginal Units | | 14.62% | 85.38% | 100.00% | 12.47% | 87.53% | 100.00% |

## Carbon Pricing, State Revenues and Energy Market Prices

Table 8-8 shows the estimated allowance revenue for PJM states for carbon prices ranging from $20 per short ton to $50 per short ton and for emissions reductions ranging from five percent to 50 percent. Allowance revenues to states would be $17.8 billion if the carbon price were $50 per short ton and emission levels were five percent below 2025 levels. Allowance revenues to states would be $3.8 billion if the carbon price were $20 per short ton and emission levels were 50 percent below 2025.

150 Data for the figure was collected from allowance distribution reports available on the RGGI website <*https://www.rggi.org/allowance-tracking/allowance-distribution*>



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## Table 8-8 Estimated $CO_2$ allowance revenue at various carbon prices

| Jurisdiction | Estimated CO2 allowance revenue ($ millions) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 5 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 10 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 15 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 20 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 25 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels | 50 percent reduction below 2025 emission levels |
| | Carbon Price ($ per short ton) | | | $20.00 | | |
| Delaware | $45.8 | $43.3 | $40.9 | $38.5 | $36.1 | $24.1 |
| Illinois | $645.0 | $611.1 | $577.1 | $543.2 | $509.2 | $339.5 |
| Indiana | $785.5 | $744.1 | $702.8 | $661.4 | $620.1 | $413.4 |
| Kentucky | $608.9 | $576.9 | $544.8 | $512.8 | $480.7 | $320.5 |
| Maryland | $198.3 | $187.9 | $177.4 | $167.0 | $156.6 | $104.4 |
| Michigan | $43.8 | $41.5 | $39.2 | $36.9 | $34.6 | $23.0 |
| New Jersey | $191.0 | $180.9 | $170.9 | $160.8 | $150.8 | $100.5 |
| North Carolina | $2.8 | $2.7 | $2.5 | $2.4 | $2.2 | $1.5 |
| Ohio | $1,495.7 | $1,417.0 | $1,338.3 | $1,259.5 | $1,180.8 | $787.2 |
| Pennsylvania | $1,514.2 | $1,434.5 | $1,354.8 | $1,275.1 | $1,195.4 | $796.9 |
| Tennessee | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Virginia | $633.4 | $600.1 | $566.7 | $533.4 | $500.1 | $333.4 |
| Washington, D.C. | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| West Virginia | $968.0 | $917.1 | $866.1 | $815.2 | $764.2 | $509.5 |
| Total | $7,132.3 | $6,756.9 | $6,381.5 | $6,006.2 | $5,630.8 | $3,753.9 |
| | Carbon Price ($ per short ton) | | | $25.00 | | |
| Delaware | $57.2 | $54.2 | $51.2 | $48.2 | $45.2 | $30.1 |
| Illinois | $806.3 | $763.8 | $721.4 | $678.9 | $636.5 | $424.3 |
| Indiana | $981.8 | $930.1 | $878.5 | $826.8 | $775.1 | $516.7 |
| Kentucky | $761.1 | $721.1 | $681.0 | $640.9 | $600.9 | $400.6 |
| Maryland | $247.9 | $234.8 | $221.8 | $208.7 | $195.7 | $130.5 |
| Michigan | $54.7 | $51.8 | $49.0 | $46.1 | $43.2 | $28.8 |
| New Jersey | $238.7 | $226.2 | $213.6 | $201.0 | $188.5 | $125.7 |
| North Carolina | $3.5 | $3.3 | $3.1 | $2.9 | $2.8 | $1.8 |
| Ohio | $1,869.6 | $1,771.2 | $1,672.8 | $1,574.4 | $1,476.0 | $984.0 |
| Pennsylvania | $1,892.7 | $1,793.1 | $1,693.5 | $1,593.9 | $1,494.3 | $996.2 |
| Tennessee | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Virginia | $791.8 | $750.1 | $708.4 | $666.7 | $625.1 | $416.7 |
| Washington, D.C. | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| West Virginia | $1,210.0 | $1,146.4 | $1,082.7 | $1,019.0 | $955.3 | $636.9 |
| Total | $8,915.4 | $8,446.2 | $7,976.9 | $7,507.7 | $7,038.5 | $4,692.3 |
| | Carbon Price ($ per short ton) | | | $50.00 | | |
| Delaware | $114.4 | $108.4 | $102.3 | $96.3 | $90.3 | $60.2 |
| Illinois | $1,612.5 | $1,527.6 | $1,442.8 | $1,357.9 | $1,273.0 | $848.7 |
| Indiana | $1,963.6 | $1,860.3 | $1,756.9 | $1,653.6 | $1,550.2 | $1,033.5 |
| Kentucky | $1,522.3 | $1,442.1 | $1,362.0 | $1,281.9 | $1,201.8 | $801.2 |
| Maryland | $495.8 | $469.7 | $443.6 | $417.5 | $391.4 | $260.9 |
| Michigan | $109.5 | $103.7 | $97.9 | $92.2 | $86.4 | $57.6 |
| New Jersey | $477.5 | $452.3 | $427.2 | $402.1 | $377.0 | $251.3 |
| North Carolina | $7.0 | $6.6 | $6.3 | $5.9 | $5.5 | $3.7 |
| Ohio | $3,739.2 | $3,542.4 | $3,345.6 | $3,148.8 | $2,952.0 | $1,968.0 |
| Pennsylvania | $3,785.5 | $3,586.3 | $3,387.0 | $3,187.8 | $2,988.5 | $1,992.4 |
| Tennessee | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Virginia | $1,583.5 | $1,500.2 | $1,416.8 | $1,333.5 | $1,250.1 | $833.4 |
| Washington, D.C. | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| West Virginia | $2,420.1 | $2,292.7 | $2,165.3 | $2,038.0 | $1,910.6 | $1,273.7 |
| Total | $17,830.8 | $16,892.3 | $15,953.9 | $15,015.4 | $14,076.9 | $9,384.6 |

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Table 8-9 shows the estimated impact of five different carbon prices on PJM load-weighted LMP. For example, if the carbon price were $15.00 per tonne, the PJM load-weighted average LMP in the first six months of 2026 would have decreased by 1.6 percent.[151]

### Table 8-9 Estimated impact of carbon price on LMP: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scenario | Carbon Price ($/Metric Ton) | Actual LMP ($/MWh) | Estimated LMP ($/MWh) | Percent Change | Actual LMP ($/MWh) | Estimated LMP ($/MWh) | Percent Change |
| Scenario 1 | $5.00 | $51.75 | $48.85 | (5.6%) | $72.54 | $70.62 | (2.6%) |
| Scenario 2 | $10.00 | $51.75 | $49.78 | (3.8%) | $72.54 | $71.00 | (2.1%) |
| Scenario 3 | $15.00 | $51.75 | $50.70 | (2.0%) | $72.54 | $71.37 | (1.6%) |
| Scenario 4 | $25.00 | $51.75 | $52.54 | 1.5% | $72.54 | $72.13 | (0.6%) |
| Scenario 5 | $50.00 | $51.75 | $57.15 | 10.4% | $72.54 | $74.01 | 2.0% |

Table 8-10 shows the impact of a range of carbon prices on the cost per MWh of producing energy from three basic unit types.[152] [153] For example, if the price of carbon were $50.00 per tonne, the short run marginal costs would increase by $24.45 per MWh for a new combustion turbine (CT) unit, $16.85 per MWh for a new combined cycle (CC) unit and $43.12 per MWh for a new coal plant (CP). Table 8-12 and Table 8-13 show the carbon price impact ($ per MWh) for a range of heat rates and carbon prices for natural gas and coal fired generation.

### Table 8-10 Carbon price per MWh by unit type

| | Carbon Price per MWh | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Carbon $5/ tonne | Carbon $10/ tonne | Carbon $15/ tonne | Carbon $50/ tonne | Carbon $100/tonne | Carbon $200/tonne | Carbon $400/tonne |
| CT | $2.44 | $4.89 | $7.33 | $24.45 | $48.89 | $97.79 | $195.58 |
| CC | $1.68 | $3.37 | $5.05 | $16.85 | $33.70 | $67.40 | $134.79 |
| CP | $4.31 | $8.62 | $12.94 | $43.12 | $86.25 | $172.49 | $344.99 |

Table 8-10 also illustrates the effective cost of carbon included in the price of a REC or SREC. For example, the average price of an SREC in New Jersey was $184.83 per credit in the first six months of 2026. The SREC price is paid in addition to the energy price paid at the time the solar energy is produced. The carbon price implied by the SREC price is slightly less than $400 per tonne. Table 8-10 shows that if the MWh produced by the solar resource resulted in avoiding the production of one MWh from a CT, the value of carbon reduction implied by an SREC price of $195.58 is a carbon price of $400 per tonne. This result also assumes that the entire value of the SREC was based on reduced carbon emissions. The SREC price consistent with a carbon price of $50.00 per tonne, assuming that a MWh from a CT is avoided, is $24.45 per MWh.

Applying this method to Tier I and Class I REC, and SREC price histories yields the implied carbon prices in Table 8-11. The carbon price implied by the average REC price in the first six months in Ohio is $8.71 per tonne. The average RGGI clearing price in 2026 is $32.10 per tonne, 3.7 times larger than the carbon price implied by Ohio REC prices. The implied carbon prices for RECs in the other jurisdictions in Table 8-11 range from $50.92 per tonne in Maryland to $64.11 per ton in Virginia. The implied carbon price for Virginia RECs is $2.0 times the average RGGI clearing price in 2026. The social cost of carbon is estimated to be in the range of $50 per tonne.[154] [155] The carbon prices implied by SREC prices have no apparent relationship to carbon prices implied by the REC clearing prices. The carbon prices implied by the SREC prices all exceed the carbon prices implied by the corresponding REC prices.

151 LMPs are recalculated to account for the defined cost of carbon emissions on marginal units' offer prices. The LMP calculation is not based on a counterfactual redispatch of the system to determine the marginal units and the marginal costs that would have occurred if all units had made all offers at short run marginal cost. See Technical Reference for PJM Markets, "Calculation and Use of Generator Sensitivity/Unit Participation Factors," <*http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml*>.

152 Heat rates from: *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 7: Net Revenue, Table 7-3.

153 Prices reflect carbon emissions rates from *Table A.3. Carbon Dioxide Uncontrolled Emission Factors*, EIA, <*https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_a_03.html*> (Accessed May 27, 2026).

154 "Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis – Under Executive Order 12899," Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government, (Aug. 2016), <*https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf*>.

155 A recent update by the EPA estimates the social cost of carbon emissions for 2030 to be between $140 and $380 per metric ton (2020 dollars). See Table ES.1 in Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (November 2023) <*https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-12/epa_scghg_2023_report_final.pdf*>.



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## Table 8-11 Implied carbon price based on REC and SREC prices: 2015 through June 2026

| | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Jurisdiction with Tier I or Class I REC** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Maryland | $29.27 | $26.17 | $23.19 | $21.35 | $17.81 | $19.98 | $34.29 | $37.82 | $46.80 | $50.02 | $50.77 | $50.92 |
| New Jersey | $25.37 | $27.01 | $24.08 | $22.08 | $19.25 | $20.54 | $31.62 | $36.23 | $48.37 | $53.60 | $59.25 | $63.25 |
| Ohio | $8.54 | $5.30 | $6.29 | $11.21 | $14.04 | $16.33 | $14.93 | $14.98 | $13.04 | $11.32 | $9.57 | $8.71 |
| Pennsylvania | $28.96 | $26.43 | $23.42 | $21.53 | $17.96 | $20.06 | $33.58 | $37.76 | $46.68 | $51.93 | $55.30 | $56.48 |
| Virginia | | | | | | | $35.53 | $36.02 | $51.93 | $62.11 | $61.99 | $64.11 |
| Washington, D.C. | $3.20 | $4.05 | $4.90 | $4.69 | $5.52 | $20.25 | $24.28 | $27.49 | $33.95 | $47.41 | $49.32 | $56.80 |
| **Jurisdiction with Solar REC** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Maryland | $251.99 | $183.64 | $128.05 | $87.27 | $84.19 | $101.68 | $121.11 | $111.74 | $104.44 | $108.19 | $105.61 | $89.30 |
| New Jersey | $389.91 | $425.49 | $460.60 | $446.35 | $410.31 | $394.18 | $413.80 | $424.70 | $399.25 | $396.71 | $384.67 | $378.02 |
| Ohio | $45.25 | $36.26 | $31.92 | $21.73 | $26.65 | | | | | | | |
| Pennsylvania | $67.09 | $55.22 | $43.97 | $28.16 | $51.65 | $63.80 | $74.20 | $83.02 | $78.95 | $72.14 | $66.82 | $65.84 |
| Washington, D.C. | $997.05 | $996.49 | $868.78 | $842.89 | $851.39 | $869.41 | $851.78 | $856.50 | $867.74 | $794.05 | $824.16 | $836.43 |
| Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RGGI clearing price | $6.72 | $4.93 | $3.77 | $4.86 | $5.98 | $7.06 | $10.59 | $14.84 | $14.97 | $22.23 | $24.12 | $32.10 |

## Table 8-12 Carbon price for natural gas fired generators[156]

| | Carbon Price ($ per MWh) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Carbon ($ per tonne) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Heat Rate (Btu per kWh) | $10.00 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $25.00 | $30.00 | $35.00 | $40.00 | $45.00 | $50.00 | $55.00 | $60.00 |
| 6,000 | $3.17 | $4.76 | $6.35 | $7.94 | $9.52 | $11.11 | $12.70 | $14.29 | $15.87 | $17.46 | $19.05 |
| 6,500 | $3.44 | $5.16 | $6.88 | $8.60 | $10.32 | $12.04 | $13.76 | $15.48 | $17.20 | $18.92 | $20.63 |
| 7,000 | $3.70 | $5.56 | $7.41 | $9.26 | $11.11 | $12.96 | $14.81 | $16.67 | $18.52 | $20.37 | $22.22 |
| 7,500 | $3.97 | $5.95 | $7.94 | $9.92 | $11.90 | $13.89 | $15.87 | $17.86 | $19.84 | $21.83 | $23.81 |
| 8,000 | $4.23 | $6.35 | $8.47 | $10.58 | $12.70 | $14.81 | $16.93 | $19.05 | $21.16 | $23.28 | $25.40 |
| 8,500 | $4.50 | $6.75 | $8.99 | $11.24 | $13.49 | $15.74 | $17.99 | $20.24 | $22.49 | $24.74 | $26.98 |
| 9,000 | $4.76 | $7.14 | $9.52 | $11.90 | $14.29 | $16.67 | $19.05 | $21.43 | $23.81 | $26.19 | $28.57 |
| 9,500 | $5.03 | $7.54 | $10.05 | $12.57 | $15.08 | $17.59 | $20.11 | $22.62 | $25.13 | $27.65 | $30.16 |
| 10,000 | $5.29 | $7.94 | $10.58 | $13.23 | $15.87 | $18.52 | $21.16 | $23.81 | $26.45 | $29.10 | $31.75 |
| 10,500 | $5.56 | $8.33 | $11.11 | $13.89 | $16.67 | $19.44 | $22.22 | $25.00 | $27.78 | $30.56 | $33.33 |
| 11,000 | $5.82 | $8.73 | $11.64 | $14.55 | $17.46 | $20.37 | $23.28 | $26.19 | $29.10 | $32.01 | $34.92 |
| 11,500 | $6.08 | $9.13 | $12.17 | $15.21 | $18.25 | $21.30 | $24.34 | $27.38 | $30.42 | $33.47 | $36.51 |
| 12,000 | $6.35 | $9.52 | $12.70 | $15.87 | $19.05 | $22.22 | $25.40 | $28.57 | $31.75 | $34.92 | $38.10 |
| 12,500 | $6.61 | $9.92 | $13.23 | $16.53 | $19.84 | $23.15 | $26.45 | $29.76 | $33.07 | $36.38 | $39.68 |
| 13,000 | $6.88 | $10.32 | $13.76 | $17.20 | $20.63 | $24.07 | $27.51 | $30.95 | $34.39 | $37.83 | $41.27 |
| 13,500 | $7.14 | $10.71 | $14.29 | $17.86 | $21.43 | $25.00 | $28.57 | $32.14 | $35.71 | $39.29 | $42.86 |
| 14,000 | $7.41 | $11.11 | $14.81 | $18.52 | $22.22 | $25.93 | $29.63 | $33.33 | $37.04 | $40.74 | $44.44 |
| 14,500 | $7.67 | $11.51 | $15.34 | $19.18 | $23.02 | $26.85 | $30.69 | $34.52 | $38.36 | $42.20 | $46.03 |
| 15,000 | $7.94 | $11.90 | $15.87 | $19.84 | $23.81 | $27.78 | $31.75 | $35.71 | $39.68 | $43.65 | $47.62 |

156 Prices reflect uncontrolled carbon emission rates from Table A.3 in *Electric Power Annual*, EIA (October 19, 2023) <*https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/*>.

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### Table 8-13 Carbon price for coal fired generators[157]

| | Carbon Price ($ per MWh) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Carbon ($ per tonne) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Heat Rate (Btu per kWh) | $10.00 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $25.00 | $30.00 | $35.00 | $40.00 | $45.00 | $50.00 | $55.00 | $60.00 |
| 9,000 | $8.39 | $12.59 | $16.78 | $20.98 | $25.17 | $29.37 | $33.57 | $37.76 | $41.96 | $46.15 | $50.35 |
| 9,500 | $8.86 | $13.29 | $17.72 | $22.14 | $26.57 | $31.00 | $35.43 | $39.86 | $44.29 | $48.72 | $53.15 |
| 10,000 | $9.32 | $13.99 | $18.65 | $23.31 | $27.97 | $32.63 | $37.30 | $41.96 | $46.62 | $51.28 | $55.94 |
| 10,500 | $9.79 | $14.69 | $19.58 | $24.48 | $29.37 | $34.27 | $39.16 | $44.06 | $48.95 | $53.85 | $58.74 |
| 11,000 | $10.26 | $15.38 | $20.51 | $25.64 | $30.77 | $35.90 | $41.03 | $46.15 | $51.28 | $56.41 | $61.54 |
| 11,500 | $10.72 | $16.08 | $21.45 | $26.81 | $32.17 | $37.53 | $42.89 | $48.25 | $53.61 | $58.97 | $64.34 |
| 12,000 | $11.19 | $16.78 | $22.38 | $27.97 | $33.57 | $39.16 | $44.76 | $50.35 | $55.94 | $61.54 | $67.13 |
| 12,500 | $11.65 | $17.48 | $23.31 | $29.14 | $34.96 | $40.79 | $46.62 | $52.45 | $58.27 | $64.10 | $69.93 |
| 13,000 | $12.12 | $18.18 | $24.24 | $30.30 | $36.36 | $42.42 | $48.48 | $54.55 | $60.61 | $66.67 | $72.73 |
| 13,500 | $12.59 | $18.88 | $25.17 | $31.47 | $37.76 | $44.06 | $50.35 | $56.64 | $62.94 | $69.23 | $75.52 |
| 14,000 | $13.05 | $19.58 | $26.11 | $32.63 | $39.16 | $45.69 | $52.21 | $58.74 | $65.27 | $71.79 | $78.32 |
| 14,500 | $13.52 | $20.28 | $27.04 | $33.80 | $40.56 | $47.32 | $54.08 | $60.84 | $67.60 | $74.36 | $81.12 |
| 15,000 | $13.99 | $20.98 | $27.97 | $34.96 | $41.96 | $48.95 | $55.94 | $62.94 | $69.93 | $76.92 | $83.92 |
| 15,500 | $14.45 | $21.68 | $28.90 | $36.13 | $43.36 | $50.58 | $57.81 | $65.03 | $72.26 | $79.49 | $86.71 |
| 16,000 | $14.92 | $22.38 | $29.84 | $37.30 | $44.76 | $52.21 | $59.67 | $67.13 | $74.59 | $82.05 | $89.51 |
| 16,500 | $15.38 | $23.08 | $30.77 | $38.46 | $46.15 | $53.85 | $61.54 | $69.23 | $76.92 | $84.62 | $92.31 |
| 17,000 | $15.85 | $23.78 | $31.70 | $39.63 | $47.55 | $55.48 | $63.40 | $71.33 | $79.25 | $87.18 | $95.10 |
| 17,500 | $16.32 | $24.48 | $32.63 | $40.79 | $48.95 | $57.11 | $65.27 | $73.43 | $81.58 | $89.74 | $97.90 |
| 18,000 | $16.78 | $25.17 | $33.57 | $41.96 | $50.35 | $58.74 | $67.13 | $75.52 | $83.92 | $92.31 | $100.70 |

## State Renewables Regulation

### State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)

Ten of 14 PJM jurisdictions have enacted legislation that requires that a defined percentage of retail load be served by renewable resources, for which there are many standards and definitions. These requirements are known as renewable portfolio standards, or RPS. In PJM jurisdictions that have adopted an RPS, load serving entities are required by law to meet defined shares of load using specific renewable and/or alternative energy sources commonly called eligible technologies. Load serving entities may generally fulfill these obligations in one of two ways: they may use their own generation resources classified as eligible technologies to produce power or they may purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) that represent a known quantity of power produced with eligible technologies by other market participants or in other geographical locations. Load serving entities that fail to meet the percent goals set in their jurisdiction's RPS must pay penalties (alternative compliance payments).

Renewable energy sources replenish naturally in a short period of time but are flow limited and include solar, geothermal, wind, biomass and hydropower from flowing water. Renewable energy sources are virtually inexhaustible in duration but limited in the amount of energy that is available per unit of time. Nonrenewable energy sources do not replenish in a short period of time and include crude oil, natural gas, coal and uranium (nuclear energy).[158] Some state rules allow nonrenewable energy sources as part of their Renewable Portfolio Standard.

As of June 30, 2026, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, DC had mandatory renewable portfolio standards that include penalties.

As of June 30, 2026, Indiana had voluntary renewable portfolio standards that do not require participation and do not include noncompliance penalties. Incentives are offered to load serving entities to develop renewable generation or, to a more limited extent, purchase RECs. The voluntary standard was enacted by the Indiana legislature in 2011, but no load serving entities have volunteered to participate in the program.[159]

As of June 30, 2026, Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia had no renewable portfolio standards.

How each state satisfies its renewable portfolio standard requirements should be more transparent. While some jurisdictions publish transparent information regarding total REC generation, how the standard is fulfilled and the total cost to the state, some jurisdictions do not provide the same level of detail and there can be a significant lag from the end of the compliance year to the publication of the information. Some states provide adequate information

157 Prices reflect carbon emission rates for refined coal in *Table A.3. Carbon Dioxide Uncontrolled Emission Factors*, EIA, <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_a_03.html>.

158 *Renewable Energy Explained*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Last updated: September 13, 2024, with data from the Monthly Energy Review, April 2024, and the Annual Energy Outlook 2023, March 2023; data for 2022 are preliminary, <https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=renewable_home>.

159 See the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission's "2021 Annual Report," at 37 (Oct. 2021) at 37 <https://www.in.gov/iurc/2981.htm>.



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with respect to the total cost for the RPS, where the RECs originated that fulfill the RPS requirements, and if the state fulfilled the RPS goals. Pennsylvania and Maryland both provide more information than other states and serve as a model for other states. The MMU recommends that jurisdictions with a renewable portfolio standard make the compliance data and cost data available in a more complete and transparent manner.

Since a REC may be applied in years other than the year in which it was generated, each vintage of RECs for each state has a different price. For example, the Pennsylvania Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard allows an electric distribution company or generation supplier to retain RECs from the current reporting year for use toward satisfying their REC obligation in either of the two subsequent reporting years.[160]

Beginning in March 2023, RECs for GATS generators are hourly time stamped certificates.[161] Prior to March 2023, PJM EIS issued RECs based on how much a generator produced in a month.

Table 8-14 shows the percent of retail electric load that must be served by renewable and/or alternative energy resources under each PJM jurisdictions' RPS by year.

**Table 8-14 Renewable and alternative energy standards of PJM jurisdictions: 2025 to 2035**[162] [163] [164]

| Jurisdiction with RPS | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware | 25.00% | 25.50% | 26.00% | 26.50% | 27.00% | 28.00% | 30.00% | 32.00% | 34.00% | 37.00% | 40.00% |
| Illinois | 25.00% | 28.00% | 31.00% | 34.00% | 37.00% | 40.00% | 40.00% | 40.00% | 40.00% | 40.00% | 40.00% |
| Maryland | 38.00% | 40.50% | 44.00% | 45.50% | 52.00% | 52.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% |
| Michigan | 15.00% | 15.00% | 15.00% | 15.00% | 15.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 60.00% |
| New Jersey | 40.50% | 43.50% | 46.50% | 49.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% | 52.50% | | | |
| North Carolina | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% | 12.50% |
| Ohio | 8.00% | 8.50% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Pennsylvania | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% | 18.00% |
| Virginia (Phase I utilities) | 14.00% | 17.00% | 20.00% | 24.00% | 27.00% | 30.00% | 33.00% | 36.00% | 39.00% | 42.00% | 45.00% |
| Virginia (Phase II utilities) | 26.00% | 29.00% | 32.00% | 35.00% | 38.00% | 41.00% | 45.00% | 49.00% | 52.00% | 55.00% | 59.00% |
| Washington, DC | 52.00% | 59.00% | 66.00% | 73.00% | 80.00% | 87.00% | 94.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |

The Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA), which became effective on September 15, 2021, in Illinois, increased the RPS target percent from 25 percent by 2025 to 40 percent by 2030. CEJA also increased the quotas for RECs sourced from new wind and new photovoltaic resources and made changes to eligible technologies and geographic restrictions. See Table 8-15 for details.

Updates to the Maryland RPS became effective on June 1, 2021. Maryland Senate Bill 65 changed the intermediate RPS target levels while maintaining the target of 50 percent renewable by 2030.[165] Part of the legislation was to eliminate resources fueled by black liquor as a Tier 1 eligible technology. Senate Bill

160 Pennsylvania General Assembly, "Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act – Enactment Act of Nov. 30, 2004, P.L. 1672, No. 213," Section (e)(6).
161 "PJM EIS to Produce Energy Certificates Hourly," PJM Environmental Information Services (February 13, 2023) <https://www.pjm-eis.com/>.
162 This shows the total standard of alternative resources in all PJM jurisdictions, including Tier I and Tier II
163 The table reflects calendar year standards for Maryland, Michigan, Washington, DC, Ohio, and North Carolina. The standards for the remaining jurisdictions are for compliance years that begin on June 1, CCYY and end on May 31 of the following year.
164 New Jersey Administrative Code, Section 14:8-2.3 does not specify standards beyond compliance year 2032/2033.
165 *Senate Bill 65 Electricity – Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard – Tier 2 Renewable Sources, Qualifying Biomass, and Compliance Fees*, Maryland General Assemble (2021) <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/sb0065?ys=2021RS>.

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65 reduced the penalty for solar noncompliance from $100 per credit to $80 per credit, and extended the Tier 2 standard which was scheduled to expire with the 2020 compliance year.

The Delaware General Assembly passed new RPS legislation on February 10, 2021. The new law updates the Delaware RPS targets from 25 percent in 2025 to 40 percent in 2035.[166] Additional details are provided in Table 8-15.

On April 11, 2020, the Virginia legislature passed a new law that replaced Virginia's current voluntary RPS with a mandatory RPS.[167] The new law requires by 2050 that 100 percent of energy sold by phase I utilities must come from RPS eligible resources; and 100 percent of energy sold by phase II utilities must come from RPS eligible resources by 2045.[168] [169] Intermediate RPS targets begin in 2021 with a 6.0 percent standard for phase I utilities and a 14.0 percent standard for phase II utilities. Eligible RPS resources include wind, solar, hydroelectric, landfill gas and biomass resources.

In 2018, New Jersey passed legislation that included provisions promoting the development of solar power in the state.[170] The Board of Public Utilities is directed to develop and provide an orderly transition to a new or modified program to support distributed solar. The Board must also design a Community Solar Energy Pilot Program that would "permit customers of an electric public utility to participate in a solar energy project that is remotely located from their properties but is within their electric public utility service territory to allow for a credit to the customer's utility bill equal to the electricity generated that is attributed to the customer's participation in the solar energy project." The pilot program would convert into a permanent program within three years. The statute targets the development of 600 MW of electric storage by 2021 and 2,000 MW by 2030.

On May 18, 2021, Maryland enacted legislation doubling the limit on net metered capacity from 1,500 to 3,000 MW.[171] The legislation is expected to boost the installation of distribution level solar power.

On July 9, 2021, New Jersey enacted legislation establishing a new program for SRECs under the BPU.172 Through the SREC-II program, the BPU distribute solar renewable certificates to qualifying solar power facilities. The legislation includes incentives for at least 1,500 MW of behind the meter solar facilities and 750 MW of community solar by 2026. It also includes a new competitive solicitation process to incentivize at least 1,500 MW of large-scale solar power facilities by 2026, and develops siting criteria for large-scale solar projects.

166 See Senate Bill 33, Delaware General Assembly (February 10, 2021) <*https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=48278*>.
167 See "Virginia Clean Economy Act," (April 12, 2020) <https://legacylis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+ful+HB1526ER>.
168 A phase I utility is an investor-owned incumbent electric utility that was, as of July 1, 1999, not bound by a rate case settlement adopted by the Commission that extended in its application beyond January 1, 2002, and a phase II utility is an investor-owned incumbent electric utility that was bound by such a settlement (§ 56-585.1 of the Virginia Code).
169 APCO (AEP) is a phase I utility and Dominion Energy Virginia is a phase II utility. Cooperatives are not subject to the RPS
170 N.J. S. 2314/A. 3723.
171 Md. Code Ann § 7-306(d) & 7-306.2(g) (HB 569).
172 N.J. P.L.2021 (S. 2605/A 4554).


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Table 8-15 summarizes rules changes in PJM states since 2020. Michigan, Illinois, Maryland, and Delaware updated their RPS targets, and Virginia changed from a voluntary RPS to a mandatory RPS beginning in 2021.

### Table 8-15 Recent changes in RPS rules[173] [174] [175] [176] [177]

| Jurisdiction | Legislation | Effective Date | Summary of changes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Michigan | Public Act 235 of 2023 | February 27, 2024 | Updated the RPS target to 60 percent by 2035. The current 15 percent standard remains in place through 2029 and then increases to 50 percent for 2030 through 2034. |
| Illinois | Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (Public Act 102-0662) | September 15, 2021 | Updated the RPS target to 40.0 percent by 2030. The previous target of 25.0 percent by 2025 is still required. Updated the requirement for RECs from new wind generation from 2,000 GWH annually to 4,500 GWH beginning in the 2021/2022 delivery year; increasing to 20,250 GWH in 2030/2031. Updated the requirement for RECs from new photovoltaic generation from 2,000 GWH annually to 5,500 GWH beginning in the 2021/2022 delivery year; increasing to 24,750 GWH in 2030/2031. Removed tree waste as an energy source for eligible resources and added waste heat to power systems and qualified combined heat and power systems as eligible resources. Updated the geographic restrictions to allow RECs from utility scale wind or photovoltaic resources that are deliverable via high voltage direct current transmission. |
| Maryland | Senate Bill 65 | June 1, 2021 | Maintains theTier 1 target of 50.0 percent in 2030 with 14.5 percent solar carve out, but changes the intermediary target levels beginning in 2022. The alternative compliance payment for solar was reduced and the definition of Tier 1 resource now excludes generators fueled by black liquor. Extends indefinitely the Tier 2 target of 2.5 percent which was set to expire in 2020. Tier 2 resources are defined as hydroelectric power other than pumped storage. |
| Delaware | 151st General Assembly Senate Bill 33 | February 1, 2021 | Increases the RPS target from 25.0 percent in 2025 to 40.0 percent in 2035. Sets the solar carve out requirement to 10.0 percent in 2035. Establishes intermediary target levels for total RPS and the solar carve out for compliance years 2026 through 2034. Lowered the solar alternative compliance payment (SACP) from $400 per credit to $150 per credit. |
| Virginia | Virginia Clean Economy Act | April 11, 2020 | Replaces the voluntary RPS with a mandatory RPS beginning in January 2021. The legislation requires 100 percent clean energy by 2050 for phase I utilities and 100 percent clean energy by 2045 for phase II utilities. Intermediate target levels begin in 2021 with 6 percent for phase I utilities and 14 percent for phase II utilities. |

Each PJM jurisdiction with an RPS identifies the type of generation resources that may be used for compliance. These resources are often called eligible technologies. Some PJM jurisdictions with RPS group different eligible technologies into tiers based on the magnitude of their environmental impact. Of the ten PJM jurisdictions with mandatory RPS, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC group the eligible technologies that must be used to comply with their RPS programs into Tier I and Tier II resources.[178] Although there are minor differences across these four jurisdictions' definitions of Tier I resources, technologies that use solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, ocean, tidal, biomass, low-impact hydro, and geothermal sources to produce electricity are classified as Tier I resources. Table 8-16 shows the Tier I standards for PJM states.[179] All eligible technologies for the RPS standards in Table 8-16 satisfy the EIA definition of renewable energy.[180]

173 Michigan Public Act 235 of 2023, Sec. 28.
174 Illinois Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (Public Act 102-0662), Section 90-30 (September 15, 2021).
175 See "Virginia Clean Economy Act," (April 12, 2020).
176 See Senate Bill 33, Delaware General Assembly (February 10, 2021) <*https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=48278*>.
177 *Senate Bill 65 Electricity – Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard – Tier 2 Renewable Sources, Qualifying Biomass, and Compliance Fees*, Maryland General Assemble (2021) <*https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/sb0065?ys=2021RS*>.
178 New Jersey separates technologies into Class I/Class II resources in a manner that is consistent with the other jurisdictions' Tier I/Tier II categorizations.
179 This includes New Jersey's Class I renewable standard.
180 *Renewable Energy Explained*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, <*https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=renewable_home*>.

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### Table 8-16 Tier I / Class I renewable standards of PJM jurisdictions: 2025 to 2035[181]

| Jurisdiction with RPS | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maryland | 35.50% | 38.00% | 41.50% | 43.00% | 49.50% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% |
| New Jersey | 38.00% | 41.00% | 44.00% | 47.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | 50.00% | | | |
| Pennsylvania | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% | 8.00% |
| Washington, DC | 52.00% | 59.00% | 66.00% | 73.00% | 80.00% | 87.00% | 94.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |

Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia and Ohio do not classify the resources eligible for their RPS standards by tiers. In these states eligible technologies are largely but not completely renewable resources.[182]


RECs do not need to be used during the year in which they are generated. The result is that there may be multiple prices for a REC based on the year in which it was generated. RECs typically have a shelf life of five years during which they can be used to satisfy a state's RPS requirement. For example if a load serving entity (LSE) owns renewable generation and the renewable generation exceeds the LSE's RECs purchase obligation for the current year, the LSE can either sell the REC to another LSE or hold the REC for use in a subsequent year.

PJM GATS makes data available for the amount of eligible RECs by jurisdiction. Eligible RECs are not the amount of actual RECs generated for that timeframe. A REC that is created may be eligible in multiple jurisdictions resulting in an over representation of generated RECs. This means if one REC is retired in Pennsylvania, the total amount of eligible RECs will reduce by more than one REC.

The REC prices are the average price for each vintage of REC, defined by the year in which the associated power was generated, regardless of when the REC is consumed. REC prices are required to be publicly disclosed in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC, but in the other states REC prices are not publicly available.

Figure 8-3 shows the annual average Tier I REC price by jurisdiction from 2009 through June 2026. Tier I REC prices are lower than SREC prices. Several states have more stringent geographical restrictions for SRECs and higher alternative compliance payments (ACP) for SRECs than for RECs. For example, the average SREC price in the first six months of 2026 in Washington, DC was $408.97 and the average Tier I REC price in the first six months of 2026 in Washington, DC was $27.77. The DC RPS requires SRECs to be sourced from within DC while Tier I RECs may be sourced from anywhere within the PJM footprint. The DC solar ACP is $440 per SREC compared to $50 per REC for Tier I compliance.

### Figure 8-3 Average Tier I REC price by jurisdiction: 2009 through June 2026




181 New Jersey Administrative Code, Section 14:8-2.3 does not specify standards beyond compliance year 2032/2033.


182 Michigan's Public Act 342, effective April 20, 2017, removed nonrenewable technologies (e.g. coal gasification, industrial cogeneration, and coal with carbon capture) from the list of RPS eligible technologies.



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Figure 8-4 and Table 8-17 shows the fulfillment of Tier I equivalent RPS requirement for 2021 through 2025 by state and by carbon producing and noncarbon producing RECs.[183] Depending on the state, the RPS requirement can be fulfilled by wind, solar, hydro ("Carbon Free REC") or with landfill gas, captured methane, wood, black liquor, and other fuels. ("Carbon Producing REC"). States' Tier I requirements are not all carbon free. The Delaware and Illinois RPS are fulfilled by noncarbon RECs, but all other state Tier I equivalent RPS requirements allow carbon producing RECs to fulfill the RPS requirements. Figure 8-4 shows the use of in state, other PJM state and out of state carbon producing RECs and in state, other PJM state and out of state carbon free RECs by state to meet the RPS requirements. In Table 8-17 the retired RECs are summarized by in state, other PJM state and non PJM state, and carbon producing RECs and carbon free RECs. For example, Virginia met its 2024 RPS target using 4.1 percent carbon free RECs from Virginia, 82.3 percent carbon free RECs from other PJM states and 13.5 percent carbon producing RECs from Virginia and other PJM states. Ohio met its 2024 RPS target using 1.0 percent carbon free RECs from Ohio, 48.7 percent carbon free RECs from other PJM states, 15.5 percent carbon free RECs from non PJM states, 17.2 percent carbon producing RECs from Ohio and 17.6 percent carbon producing RECs from other PJM states. Illinois met its 2024 RPS target using 80.3 percent carbon free RECs from Illinois and 19.7 percent carbon free RECs from other PJM states. Illinois met its RPS target using 100.0 percent carbon free RECs for the 2019 through 2025 compliance years.

**Figure 8-4 State fulfillment of Tier I equivalent RPS: 2021 through 2025**




183 Retired REC information obtained through PJM GATS <*https://gats.pjm-eis.com/gats2/PublicReports/RPSRetiredCertificatesReportingYear*>. The timing of the REC retirement reports varies by state and the 2025 reporting year data may be incomplete for some states.

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## Table 8-17 State fulfillment of Tier I equivalent RPS: 2021 through 2025

| | | Carbon Free REC | | | | Carbon Producing REC | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | REC Type | In State | Other PJM State | Non PJM State | Total | In State | Other PJM State | Non PJM State | Total |
| 2021 | DE New Eligible | 0.3% | 99.0% | 0.0% | 99.3% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.7% |
| | DC Tier I | 0.0% | 27.0% | 45.9% | 72.9% | 7.4% | 1.7% | 17.9% | 27.1% |
| | IL Renewable | 81.0% | 19.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Tier I | 1.0% | 66.2% | 0.5% | 67.7% | 6.1% | 26.1% | 0.0% | 32.3% |
| | NJ Class I | 0.1% | 91.0% | 1.4% | 92.4% | 2.0% | 5.5% | 0.0% | 7.6% |
| | OH Renewable Energy Source | 9.6% | 58.3% | 7.0% | 74.9% | 4.4% | 20.7% | 0.0% | 25.1% |
| | PA Tier I | 14.4% | 62.0% | 0.0% | 76.4% | 4.6% | 19.1% | 0.0% | 23.6% |
| | VA Renewable | 10.0% | 70.6% | 0.0% | 80.6% | 9.7% | 9.7% | 0.0% | 19.4% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2022 | DE New Eligible | 0.9% | 99.1% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | DC Tier I | 0.0% | 26.0% | 54.8% | 80.8% | 3.7% | 6.8% | 8.7% | 19.2% |
| | IL Renewable | 81.3% | 18.7% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Tier I | 1.0% | 64.7% | 0.2% | 65.9% | 4.4% | 29.7% | 0.0% | 34.1% |
| | NJ Class I | 0.2% | 90.7% | 1.0% | 92.0% | 0.7% | 7.4% | 0.0% | 8.0% |
| | OH Renewable Energy Source | 9.3% | 35.6% | 23.0% | 67.9% | 10.5% | 21.6% | 0.0% | 32.1% |
| | PA Tier I | 12.7% | 60.4% | 0.0% | 73.1% | 7.4% | 19.4% | 0.0% | 26.9% |
| | VA Renewable | 13.1% | 68.8% | 0.0% | 81.9% | 3.4% | 14.7% | 0.0% | 18.1% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2023 | DE New Eligible | 0.9% | 99.1% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | DC Tier I | 0.0% | 29.1% | 53.9% | 83.0% | 2.2% | 6.4% | 8.5% | 17.0% |
| | IL Renewable | 81.6% | 18.4% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Tier I | 1.2% | 36.9% | 0.2% | 38.3% | 13.9% | 47.8% | 0.0% | 61.7% |
| | NJ Class I | 0.1% | 95.5% | 1.4% | 97.0% | 0.5% | 2.5% | 0.0% | 3.0% |
| | OH Renewable Energy Source | 1.4% | 37.5% | 6.8% | 45.7% | 20.8% | 33.5% | 0.0% | 54.3% |
| | PA Tier I | 8.6% | 50.2% | 0.0% | 58.8% | 24.5% | 16.8% | 0.0% | 41.2% |
| | VA Renewable | 5.0% | 88.7% | 0.0% | 93.7% | 0.0% | 6.3% | 0.0% | 6.3% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2024 | DE New Eligible | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | DC Tier I | 0.0% | 33.3% | 49.7% | 82.9% | 2.0% | 5.4% | 9.7% | 17.1% |
| | IL Renewable | 80.3% | 19.7% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Tier I | 2.3% | 32.3% | 1.9% | 36.5% | 15.7% | 47.8% | 0.0% | 63.5% |
| | NJ Class I | 0.2% | 96.3% | 0.8% | 97.3% | 0.7% | 2.0% | 0.0% | 2.7% |
| | OH Renewable Energy Source | 1.0% | 48.7% | 15.5% | 65.3% | 17.2% | 17.6% | 0.0% | 34.7% |
| | PA Tier I | 7.3% | 46.5% | 0.0% | 53.8% | 40.2% | 6.0% | 0.0% | 46.2% |
| | VA Renewable | 4.1% | 82.3% | 0.0% | 86.5% | 7.6% | 5.9% | 0.0% | 13.5% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2025 | DE New Eligible | | | | | | | | |
| | DC Tier I | 0.0% | 27.5% | 57.7% | 85.2% | 1.0% | 2.2% | 11.6% | 14.8% |
| | IL Renewable | 81.6% | 18.4% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Tier I | 3.8% | 33.4% | 16.7% | 54.0% | 5.2% | 40.8% | 0.0% | 46.0% |
| | NJ Class I | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | OH Renewable Energy Source | 0.5% | 27.6% | 12.0% | 40.0% | 22.5% | 37.5% | 0.0% | 60.0% |
| | PA Tier I | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | VA Renewable | 43.6% | 39.7% | 0.0% | 83.3% | 16.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.7% |



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Table 8-18 shows the percent of retail electric load that must be served by Tier II or a specific type of resource under each PJM jurisdiction's RPS by year. Tier II resources are generally not renewable resources. Table 8-18 also shows specific technology requirements that PJM jurisdictions have added to their renewable portfolio standards. The standards shown in Table 8-18 are included in the total RPS requirements presented in Table 8-14. Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania have Tier II or Class II standards, which allow specific nonrenewable technology types, such as waste coal units located in Pennsylvania, to qualify for renewable energy credits. Washington, DC previously had Tier II standards. The Washington, DC tier II standard was discontinued at the end of the 2019 compliance year. By 2024, North Carolina's RPS requires that 0.2 percent of power be generated using swine waste and that 900 GWh of power be produced by poultry waste in 2020. Maryland established a minimum standard for offshore wind in 2017 that took effect in 2021 with an original requirement that 1.37 percent of load be served by offshore wind.[184] The standard was revised to 1.66 percent for 2025, 2.61 for 2026 and 13.02 percent beginning 2027.[185] The offshore wind requirement is only applicable if the Maryland offshore wind projects are producing RECs. [186]

### Table 8-18 Additional renewable standards of PJM jurisdictions: 2025 to 2035[187]


| Jurisdiction | Type of Standard | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maryland | Off Shore Wind | 1.66% | 2.61% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% | 13.02% |
| Maryland | Geothermal | 0.25% | 0.50% | 0.75% | 1.00% | 1.00% | 1.00% | 1.00% | 1.00% | 1.00% | 1.00% | 1.00% |
| Maryland | Tier 2 | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% |
| New Jersey | Class II | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | 2.50% | | | |
| North Carolina | Swine Waste | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% |
| North Carolina | Poultry Waste (GWh) | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 |
| Pennsylvania | Tier II | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% |

184 Public Service Commission of Maryland, Offshore Wind Projects, Order No. 88192 (May 11, 2017) at 8, Table 2 <*https://www.psc.state.md.us/wp-content/uploads/Order-No.-88192-Case-No.-9431-Offshore-Wind.pdf*>.
185 See *Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard Report for Calendar Year 2024* at 6, Maryland Public Service Commissions (November 25, 2025) < *https://psc.maryland.gov/about/reports/*>.
186 Id. at footnote 13.
187 New Jersey Administrative Code, Section 14:8-2.3 does not specify standards beyond compliance year 2032/2033.

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Figure 8-5 shows the annual average Tier II REC price by jurisdiction for 2009 through March 2026. Tier II prices have been lower than Tier I REC prices in the past, but in recent years Pennsylvania and New Jersey Tier II REC prices are higher than their corresponding Tier I REC prices. Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are the only states with a Tier II standard in 2026.[188] The average Pennsylvania Tier II REC price in the first six months of 2026 was $31.41, 1.4 percent higher than the average price for the first six months of 2025. The average New Jersey Class II REC price in the first six months of 2026 was $33.66, 4.8 percent higher than the average price for the first six months of 2025. The average Maryland Tier II REC price in the first six months of 2026 was $12.71, 2.1 percent higher than the average price in the first six months of 2025.[189]

### Figure 8-5 Average Tier II REC price by jurisdiction: 2009 through June 2026




188 The District of Columbia dropped Tier II RECs from their RPS in 2021.
189 Tier II REC price information obtained through Evolution Markets, Inc.

Some PJM jurisdictions have specific solar resource RPS requirements. These solar requirements are included in the total requirements shown in Table 8-14 and Table 8-16 but must be met by solar RECs (SRECs). Table 8-19 shows the percent of retail electric load that must be served by solar energy resources under each PJM jurisdiction's RPS by year. Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC have requirements for the proportion of load to be served by solar. The Illinois RPS specifies the number of RECs that must be sourced from photovoltaic resources energized after June 1, 2017. Recent legislation increased the SREC requirement from 2,000,000 RECs to 5,500,000 RECs beginning with the 2021/2022 Delivery Year.[190] New Jersey closed registration for new SRECs on April 30, 2020, having met its milestone that solar power equal or exceed 5.1 percent of New Jersey electricity sales.[191] On December 6, 2019, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities announced a transitional program for solar generators not eligible for New Jersey SRECs.[192] The new program establishes a 15 year fixed priced Transition REC (TREC). On July 28, 2021, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities approved the Successor Solar Incentive (SuSI) Program which will provide incentives for 3,750 MW of new solar generation by 2026.[193] Pennsylvania allows only solar photovoltaic resources to fulfill their solar requirements. Solar thermal units like solar hot water heaters that do not generate electricity are Tier I resources in Pennsylvania. Ohio, Michigan and Virginia have no specific solar standards. The New Jersey legislature in May 2018 increased the solar standard from 3.2 percent to 4.3 percent for 2018, 5.1 percent for 2020 through 2022 and the solar standard decreases to 1.1 percent for 2032.[194] Maryland legislation in 2019 increased the solar carve out percentages from 2.5 percent to 14.5 percent in 2030. Ohio HB 6 removed the solar carve out from the Ohio RPS.[195] The Delaware General Assembly passed new RPS legislation on February 10, 2021, that increased the solar carve out target from 3.5 percent in 2025 to 10.0 percent in 2035.[196]

190 See amendments to Sec. 1-75(c)(1)(C) of the Illinois Power Agency Act contained in Section 90-30 of Public Act 102-0662.
191 See Clean Energy Act of 2019 (NJ AB-2723); N.J.A.C. 14:82.4(b)6; BPU, Monthly Report on Status toward Attainment of the 5.1 percent Milestone for Closure of the SREC Program (March 31, 2020).
192 "New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Approves Solar Transition Program, Initiates a Cost Cap Proceeding," New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Press Release (December 6, 2019) <https://www.bpu.state.nj.us/bpu/newsroom/2019/approved/20191206.html>.
193 "NJBPU Approves 3,750 MW Successor Solar Incentive Program", New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Press Release (July 28, 2021) .
194 "Assembly, No. 3723," State of New Jersey, 218th Legislature (March 22, 2018), <http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/A4000/3723_I1.PDF>.
195 Ohio Legislature House, 133rd Assembly, Bill No. 6, "Ohio Clean Air Program," effective Date October 22, 2019, <https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA133-HB-6>.
196 See Senate Bill 33, Delaware General Assembly (February 10, 2021) <https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=48278>.



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## Table 8-19 Solar renewable standards by percent of electric load for PJM jurisdictions: 2025 to 2035[197] [198]

| Jurisdiction with RPS | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware | 3.50% | 3.75% | 4.00% | 4.25% | 4.50% | 5.00% | 5.80% | 6.60% | 7.40% | 8.40% | 10.00% |
| Illinois (GWh) | 5,500 | 5,500 | 5,500 | 5,500 | 5,500 | 24,750 | 24,750 | 24,750 | 24,750 | 24,750 | 24,750 |
| Maryland | 7.00% | 8.00% | 9.50% | 11.00% | 12.50% | 14.50% | 14.50% | 14.50% | 14.50% | 14.50% | 14.50% |
| New Jersey | 4.50% | 4.35% | 3.74% | 3.07% | 2.21% | 1.58% | 1.40% | 1.10% | | | |
| North Carolina | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.20% |
| Pennsylvania | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% | 0.50% |
| Washington, DC | 3.45% | 3.75% | 4.10% | 4.50% | 4.75% | 5.00% | 5.25% | 5.50% | 6.00% | 6.50% | 7.00% |

Figure 8-6 shows the annual average solar REC (SREC) price by jurisdiction for 2009 through June 2026. The average NJ SREC price was $184.83 in the first six months of 2026. The limited supply of solar facilities in Washington, DC compared to the RPS requirement results in higher SREC prices. The average Washington, DC SREC price was $408.97 in the first six months of 2026, a 0.6 percent increase compared to the average DC SREC price in the first six months of 2025.[199]

## Figure 8-6 Average SREC price by jurisdiction: 2009 through June 2026




197 The Illinois solar standard currently requires 5.5 million RECs from solar photovoltaic projects energized after June 1, 2017. Illinois Public Act 102-0662, September 15, 2021.


198 New Jersey Administrative Code, Section 14:8-2.3 does not specify standards beyond compliance year 2032/2033.

199 Solar REC average price information obtained through Evolution Markets, Inc. <http://www.evomarkets.com>.

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Figure 8-7 and Table 8-20 show where the SRECs originated that are used to satisfy the states' solar requirement for 2021 through 2025.[200] Depending on the state, the solar RPS requirement can be fulfilled by in state or out of state SRECs. The SRECs purchased in some states are imported from other PJM states and from non PJM states. Table 8-20 shows the percent of local SRECs, SRECs from other PJM states and SRECs from non PJM states used to meet the RPS requirements. Since 2020, all SRECs used for RPS compliance in Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania and New Jersey have been sourced from in state solar generators.

## Figure 8-7 State fulfillment of Solar RPS: 2021 through 2025




## Table 8-20 State fulfillment of Solar RPS: 2021 through 2025

| | | In State | Other PJM State | Non PJM State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | DC Solar | 78.0% | 21.6% | 0.3% |
| | DE Solar Eligible | 62.3% | 37.7% | 0.0% |
| | IL Solar Renewable | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | NJ Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | OH Solar Renewable Energy Source | 40.2% | 59.8% | 0.0% |
| | PA Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | VA Distributed | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2022 | DC Solar | 81.9% | 17.9% | 0.2% |
| | DE Solar Eligible | 65.8% | 34.2% | 0.0% |
| | IL Solar Renewable | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | NJ Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | OH Solar Renewable Energy Source | 17.3% | 82.7% | 0.0% |
| | PA Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | VA Distributed | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2023 | DC Solar | 82.2% | 17.6% | 0.3% |
| | DE Solar Eligible | 67.0% | 33.0% | 0.0% |
| | IL Solar Renewable | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | NJ Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | OH Solar Renewable Energy Source | 6.2% | 93.8% | 0.0% |
| | PA Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | VA Distributed | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2024 | DC Solar | 78.0% | 21.8% | 0.2% |
| | DE Solar Eligible | 56.5% | 43.5% | 0.0% |
| | IL Solar Renewable | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | NJ Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | OH Solar Renewable Energy Source | 10.7% | 89.3% | 0.0% |
| | PA Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | VA Distributed | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2025 | DC Solar | 81.1% | 18.9% | 0.1% |
| | DE Solar Eligible | | | |
| | IL Solar Renewable | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | MD Solar | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | NJ Solar | | | |
| | OH Solar Renewable Energy Source | 8.8% | 91.2% | 0.0% |
| | PA Solar | | | |
| | VA Distributed | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |


200 Retired REC information obtained through PJM GATS <*https://gats.pjm-eis.com/gats2/PublicReports/RPSRetiredCertificatesReportingYear*>. The timing of the REC retirement reports varies by state and the 2025 reporting year data is incomplete for some states.



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Figure 8-8 shows the percent of retail electric load that must be served by Tier I resources and Tier 2 resources in each PJM jurisdiction with a mandatory RPS. For each state in Figure 8-8, the first number represents the RPS percent for Tier I where defined, or renewable energy resources where tiers are not defined; the second number represents the RPS percent for all eligible technologies which includes both renewable and alternative energy resources. States with higher percent requirements for renewable energy resources are shaded darker. Jurisdictions with no standards or with only voluntary RPS are shaded gray. Pennsylvania's RPS illustrates the need to differentiate between percent requirements for renewable and alternative energy resources. The Pennsylvania RPS identifies solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, geothermal, biomass, and low-impact hydropower as Tier I resources. The Pennsylvania RPS identifies waste coal, demand side management, large-scale hydropower, integrated gasification combined cycle, clean coal and municipal solid waste as eligible Tier II resources. As a result, the 18.0 percent number in Figure 8-8 overstates the percent of retail electric load in Pennsylvania that must be served by renewable energy resources. The 8.0 percent number in Figure 8-8 is a more accurate measure of the percent of retail electric load in Pennsylvania that must be served by renewable energy resources.

**Figure 8-8 Map of retail electric load shares under RPS – Renewable / Alternative Energy resources: January through June, 2026**[201]




201 The standards in this chart include the Tier I standards used by some states in the PJM footprint, as well as the total alternative energy standard for states that do not classify eligible technologies into tiers.

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Under the existing state renewable portfolio standards, 20.9 percent of PJM load should have been served by Tier I and Tier II renewable and alternative energy resources in the first six months of 2026. Tier I resources include landfill gas, run of river hydro, wind and solar resources. Tier II resources include pumped storage, large scale hydro, solid waste and waste coal resources. In the first six months of 2026, only 11.3 percent of PJM generation was produced by renewable and alternative energy resources, including carbon producing and noncarbon producing Tier I and Tier II generation as shown in Table 8-21. If the proportion of load among states remains constant, 25.5 percent of PJM load must be served by Tier I and Tier II renewable and alternative energy resources in 2030 under currently defined RPS rules.

Approximately 18.6 percent of PJM load should have been served by Tier I or renewable energy resources in the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, only 9.3 percent of PJM generation was Tier I or renewable energy. If the proportion of load among states remains constant, 23.2 percent of PJM load must be served by Tier I or renewable energy resources in 2030 under defined RPS rules.

The current REC production from PJM generation resources was not enough to meet the state renewable requirements in the first six months of 2026, and LSEs purchased RECs from non PJM resources (e.g. behind the meter rooftop solar) and RECs from resources outside the PJM footprint (Table 8-22). In jurisdictions with an RPS, load serving entities must either generate power from eligible technologies identified in each jurisdiction's RPS, purchase RECs from resources classified as eligible technologies or make alternative compliance payments for unmet goals based on each state's requirements. Table 8-21 shows generation by jurisdiction and resource type in the first six months of 2026. Wind generation accounted for 19,343.1 GWh of the 40,401.7 Tier I GWh, or 47.9 percent. As shown in Table 8-21, 48,927.6 GWh were generated by Tier I and Tier II resources, of which Tier I resources accounted for 82.6 percent. Wind and solar generation (noncarbon producing) was 8.0 percent of total generation in PJM in the first six months of 2026. Tier I generation was 9.3 percent of total generation in PJM and Tier II was 2.0 percent of total generation in PJM in the first six months of 2026. Biofuel, landfill gas, pumped storage hydro, solid waste and waste coal (carbon producing) accounted for 8,832.8 GWh, or 18.1 percent of the total Tier I and Tier II generation.

### Table 8-21 Tier I and Tier II generation by jurisdiction and renewable resource type (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Tier I | | | | | | | | | Tier II | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction | Biofuel | Landfill Gas | Run of River | Pumped-Storage Hydro | Other Hydro | Solar | Solid Waste | Wind | Total Tier I Credit | Pumped-Storage Hydro | Other Hydro | Solid Waste | Waste Coal | Total Tier II Credit | Total Credit GWh |
| Delaware | 0.0 | 21.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 53.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 75.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 75.5 |
| Illinois | 0.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 81.4 | 0.0 | 9,549.0 | 9,655.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,655.4 |
| Indiana | 0.0 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.7 | 1,488.0 | 0.0 | 4,033.1 | 5,547.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,547.1 |
| Kentucky | 0.0 | 0.0 | 141.5 | 0.0 | 26.4 | 344.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 512.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 512.2 |
| Maryland | 0.0 | 15.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 822.9 | 558.4 | 539.2 | 1,935.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,935.6 |
| Michigan | 0.0 | 26.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 32.9 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 62.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 62.3 |
| New Jersey | 0.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 469.6 | 0.0 | 6.1 | 492.4 | 259.4 | 0.0 | 632.1 | 0.0 | 891.5 | 1,383.9 |
| North Carolina | 0.0 | 0.0 | 93.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,517.3 | 0.0 | 488.0 | 2,098.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,098.9 |
| Ohio | 0.0 | 41.9 | 525.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,709.2 | 0.0 | 1,805.0 | 7,081.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,081.6 |
| Pennsylvania | 92.2 | 96.5 | 2,500.7 | 0.0 | 13.2 | 1,029.0 | 0.0 | 2,055.9 | 5,787.5 | 1,438.9 | 0.0 | 625.0 | 3,155.7 | 5,219.6 | 11,007.1 |
| Tennessee | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Virginia | 591.1 | 195.5 | 208.3 | 204.8 | 21.5 | 4,508.9 | 0.0 | 40.8 | 5,770.9 | 1,331.0 | 832.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,162.9 | 7,933.9 |
| Washington, D.C. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| West Virginia | 0.0 | 10.7 | 430.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 115.0 | 0.0 | 826.1 | 1,382.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 252.0 | 252.0 | 1,634.2 |
| Total | 683.3 | 455.5 | 3,900.0 | 204.8 | 113.7 | 15,142.9 | 558.4 | 19,343.1 | 40,401.7 | 3,029.3 | 832.0 | 1,257.0 | 3,407.7 | 8,526.0 | 48,927.6 |


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PJM states with RPS rely heavily on imports and generation from behind the meter resources for RPS compliance. In the first six months of 2026, Tier I generation in PJM met only 53.6 percent of the Tier I RPS requirements. Table 8-22 compares each state's RPS requirement in the first six months of 2026 with generation by RPS eligible PJM generators. Illinois had sufficient in state generation to cover 85.4 percent of the RPS requirement and Pennsylvania generation was sufficient to cover 97.2 percent of the Tier I RPS requirement and 70.1 percent of the Tier II RPS requirement. North Carolina generation was 7.3 times higher than the RPS requirement in the first six months of 2026; but a relatively small portion of the North Carolina load is in PJM. Overall, there was sufficient generation by PJM generators to meet 53.6 percent of the Tier I RPS requirement and 93.6 percent of the Tier II RPS requirement in the first six months of 2026. RPS compliance reports indicate that almost all of the RPS requirement is met with the purchase or acquisition of RECs, with only a very small amount of the requirement fulfilled through alternative compliance payments. A large portion of the Tier I RPS requirement is satisfied by behind the meter generation in the PJM states and to a lesser extent, through the purchase of RECs from non PJM states.

## Table 8-22 RPS Requirements and Generation by RPS Eligible Resources: January through June, 2026

| | Tier I | | | Tier II | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction | PJM Generation (GWh) | RPS Requirement (GWh) | Generation as Percent of RPS Requirement | PJM Generation (GWh) | RPS Requirement (GWh) | Generation as Percent of RPS Requirement |
| Delaware | 75.5 | 1,536.5 | 4.9% | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Illinois | 9,655.4 | 11,300.4 | 85.4% | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Indiana | 5,547.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Kentucky | 512.2 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Maryland | 1,935.6 | 11,473.1 | 16.9% | 0.0 | 754.8 | 0.0% |
| Michigan | 62.3 | 316.7 | 19.7% | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| New Jersey | 492.4 | 13,960.9 | 3.5% | 891.5 | 904.9 | 98.5% |
| North Carolina | 2,098.9 | 287.0 | 731.3% | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Ohio | 7,081.6 | 7,159.3 | 98.9% | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Pennsylvania | 5,787.5 | 5,957.2 | 97.2% | 5,219.6 | 7,446.5 | 70.1% |
| Tennessee | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Virginia | 5,770.9 | 20,535.3 | 28.1% | 2,162.9 | 0.0 | |
| Washington, D.C. | 0.0 | 2,866.1 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| West Virginia | 1,382.2 | 0.0 | | 252.0 | 0.0 | |
| Total | 40,401.7 | 75,392.5 | 53.6% | 8,526.0 | 9,106.2 | 93.6% |

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Table 8-23 shows the summer installed capacity rating of Tier I and Tier II generators in PJM, by jurisdiction and primary fuel type, that are registered to provide RECs to one or more PJM states. This capacity includes coal, natural gas and oil units that qualify as Tier II because they have a secondary fuel capability that satisfies the alternative energy standards of a PJM state or jurisdiction. For example, a coal generator that can also burn biofuel to generate power could list the alternative fuel as biofuel. A REC is only generated when the unit is operating using the fuel listed as Tier I or Tier II. Ohio has the largest amount of solar capacity in PJM, 5,494.4 MW, or 30.3 percent of the total solar capacity. Wind resources located in Illinois, Indiana and Ohio account for 8,876.1 MW, or 72.8 percent of the total wind capacity.

### Table 8-23 Renewable capacity by jurisdiction (MW): April 1, 2026[202]

| Jurisdiction | Biofuel | Coal / Biofuel | Hydro | Landfill Gas | Natural Gas / CMG | Natural Gas / Landfill Gas | Oil / Biofuel | Oil / Landfill Gas | Pumped-Storage Hydro | Solar | Solid Waste | Waste Coal | Waste Heat | Wind | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 0.0 | 1,797.0 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,868.1 |
| Illinois | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 136.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,339.7 | 5,491.0 |
| Indiana | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,780.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,350.5 | 4,142.2 |
| Kentucky | 0.0 | 0.0 | 132.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 425.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 558.3 |
| Maryland | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 69.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,041.0 | 191.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 298.6 | 1,619.7 |
| Michigan | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.9 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.5 |
| Missouri | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 146.0 | 146.0 |
| New Jersey | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 19.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 453.0 | 809.6 | 204.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 1,502.1 |
| North Carolina | 0.0 | 0.0 | 325.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,854.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 397.0 | 2,576.7 |
| Ohio | 0.0 | 1,020.0 | 194.4 | 14.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,494.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 134.0 | 1,185.9 | 8,179.0 |
| Pennsylvania | 54.0 | 0.0 | 1,387.3 | 111.0 | 1,105.0 | 1,300.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,269.0 | 1,385.0 | 209.3 | 1,347.0 | 0.0 | 1,659.2 | 9,826.8 |
| Tennessee | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Virginia | 202.9 | 585.0 | 436.4 | 115.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,386.0 | 4,968.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 11,706.1 |
| Washington, D.C. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| West Virginia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 209.9 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 155.4 | 0.0 | 96.0 | 0.0 | 802.3 | 1,271.5 |
| PJM Total | 256.9 | 1,605.0 | 2,718.7 | 326.7 | 1,105.0 | 3,097.0 | 205.0 | 13.0 | 7,108.0 | 18,105.1 | 605.0 | 1,443.0 | 134.0 | 12,195.7 | 48,918.1 |

202 "Renewable Generators Registered in GATS", PJM EIS <https://www.pjm-eis.com/reports-and-events/public-reports>. Capacity in ICAP.



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Table 8-24 shows non PJM renewable capacity registered in the PJM generation attribute tracking system (GATS).[203] These resources are not PJM wholesale market resources even though most are located in PJM states. For example, roof top solar panels within the PJM footprint generate SRECs but are not PJM wholesale market units. These nonwholesale resources include solar capacity of 15,906.7 MW of which 4,339.2 MW are in New Jersey. These nonwholesale resources can earn renewable energy credits, and can be used to fulfill the renewable portfolio standards in PJM jurisdictions. There are also 3,822.0 MW of GATS capacity located in jurisdictions outside PJM that are eligible to sell RECs in at least one PJM jurisdiction.

**Table 8-24 Renewable capacity by jurisdiction, non-PJM units registered in GATS (MW):April 1, 2026[204]**

| Jurisdiction | Biofuel | Coal / Biofuel | Fuel Cell | Geothermal | Hydro | Landfill Gas | Natural Gas / Distributed Generation | Other Gas | Solar | Solid Waste | Waste Coal | Waste Heat | Wind | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 54.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 54.0 |
| Delaware | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 232.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 238.8 |
| Georgia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 152.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 179.3 |
| Illinois | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 20.0 | 43.8 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 3,170.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 849.6 | 4,088.0 |
| Indiana | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 53.7 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 491.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 184.6 | 180.0 | 953.5 |
| Iowa | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 664.6 | 668.3 |
| Kentucky | 93.0 | 600.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 167.9 | 21.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 926.8 |
| Maryland | 18.5 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 111.4 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 2,078.7 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 2,223.6 |
| Michigan | 31.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.2 | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 163.0 |
| Minnesota | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,504.0 | 1,540.0 |
| Missouri | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 61.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 693.0 | 759.8 |
| New Jersey | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.5 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 4,339.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 4,370.2 |
| North Carolina | 151.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 430.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,307.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,889.4 |
| North Dakota | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 360.0 | 360.0 |
| Ohio | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 3.0 | 22.9 | 0.0 | 36.2 | 424.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 34.0 | 56.6 | 577.4 |
| Pennsylvania | 62.2 | 109.7 | 9.3 | 1.7 | 56.5 | 39.2 | 42.5 | 99.4 | 1,459.4 | 0.2 | 680.2 | 57.6 | 3.2 | 2,621.2 |
| South Carolina | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 63.0 | 26.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 91.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 180.9 |
| Tennessee | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Virginia | 287.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 30.8 | 4.8 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1,512.1 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 121.3 | 0.0 | 1,978.6 |
| Washington, D.C. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 49.4 | 331.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 28.5 | 0.0 | 409.4 |
| West Virginia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 102.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 202.3 |
| Wisconsin | 44.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 260.6 |
| Total | 742.3 | 709.7 | 12.3 | 115.2 | 1,060.4 | 259.9 | 42.5 | 205.3 | 15,906.7 | 30.2 | 680.2 | 426.0 | 4,454.2 | 24,644.8 |

The capacity values in Table 8-23 and Table 8-24 are nameplate capacity or maximum facility output (MFO) values. The unit of measurement for PJM's reliability standards and PJM capacity market auctions is unforced capacity (UCAP). PJM uses conversion factors to convert ICAP into UCAP and this process is known as capacity accreditation. Prior to the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, a generator's capacity value was derated from MFO to UCAP by multiplying the generator's net maximum capability by a derating factor. The derating factors for solar and wind resources were based on either the generator's historical performance during summer peak hours or a class average value calculated by PJM. The intent of this approach was to obtain a MW value the generator can reliably

203 PJM Environmental Information Services (EIS), an unregulated subsidiary of PJM, operates the generation attribute tracking system (GATS), which is used by many jurisdictions to track these renewable energy credits. GATS publishes details on every renewable generator registered within the PJM footprint and aggregate emissions of renewable generation, but does not publish generation data by unit and does not make unit data available to the MMU.

204 See PJM-EIS (Environmental Information Services), Generation Attribute Tracking System, "Renewable Generators Registered in GATS," <*https://gats.pjm-eis.com/gats2/PublicReports/RenewableGeneratorsRegisteredinGATS*>.

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produce during the summer peak hours. An average ELCC method was used to determine the capacity values for intermittent and storage resources for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and the 2024/2025 Delivery Year.[205] Beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, PJM uses a marginal ELCC method to determine capacity values for all resources. PJM defines installed capacity (ICAP) for wind and solar generators as the generator's capacity interconnection rights (CIRs). As of June 30, 2026, there are 13,270.5 MW of nameplate wind capacity, 3,607.6 MW of ICAP wind capacity, and 3,261.6 MW of UCAP wind capacity.[206] As of June 30, 2026, there are 16,795.6 MW of nameplate solar capacity, 9,879.8 MW of ICAP solar capacity, and 1,976.4 MW of UCAP solar capacity.

Wind generators have higher ICAP values during the winter months (November through April) because PJM rules make winter capacity interconnection rights (CIRs) available. The deliverable wind capacity on March 31, 2026, was 4,549.9 MW. The increase in the deliverable wind capacity from March 31, 2026, to June 30, 2026, is primarily the result of winter CIRs that are provided to wind without charge for the winter months. PJM's practice of giving away winter CIRs that appear to be available because other resources paid for the supporting network upgrades requires annual capacity resources to subsidize the interconnection costs of intermittent resources and artificially increases the capacity value of the winter resources. PJM should ensure that the winter capacity value of thermal resources is not inefficiently constrained by the failure to assign winter CIRs to thermal resources.

There were two pre ELCC classes of wind based on location with class average capacity factors of 14.7 percent and 17.6 percent. There were three pre ELCC classes of solar generators with capacity factors ranging from 38.0 percent to 60.0 percent.[207] For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, the ELCC rating for solar generators with fixed panels was 50.0 percent, the ELCC rating for solar generators with tracking panels was 61.0 percent, and the ELCC rating for onshore wind generators was 15.0 percent.[208] For the 2024/2025 Delivery Year, the ELCC rating for solar generators with fixed panels was 33.0 percent, the ELCC rating for solar generators with tracking panels was 50.0 percent, and the ELCC rating for onshore wind generators was 21.0 percent. PJM implemented a new marginal ELCC approach for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year. For the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, the ELCC rating for solar generators with fixed panels was 10.0 percent, the ELCC rating for solar generators with tracking panels was 14.0 percent, and the ELCC rating for onshore wind generators was 38.0 percent. For the 2026/2027 Delivery Year, the ELCC rating for solar generators with fixed panels is 10.0 percent, the ELCC rating for solar generators with tracking panels is 13.0 percent, and the ELCC rating for onshore wind generators is 38.0 percent.[209]

Renewable energy credits are related to the production and purchase of wholesale power, but are not, when they constitute a transaction separate from a wholesale sale of power, subject to FERC regulation.[210] RECs markets are, as an economic fact, integrated with PJM markets including energy and capacity markets, but are not formally recognized as part of PJM markets. Revenues from RECs markets are revenues for PJM resources earned in addition to revenues earned from the sale of the same MWh in PJM markets. RECs revenues are included in net revenues in unit offers in the capacity market and the treatment of RECs in unit cost-based offers is included in unit fuel cost policies.

Delaware, North Carolina, Michigan and Virginia allow various types of resources to earn multiple RECs per MWh, though typically one REC is equal to one MWh. For example, Delaware provided a three MWh REC for each MWh produced by in state customer sited photovoltaic generation and fuel cells using renewable fuels that are installed on or before December 31, 2014.[211] This is equivalent to providing a REC price equal to three times its stated value per MWh.

205 See Capacity Value of Intermittent Resources (ELCC) in *2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*, Section 5: Capacity Market.

206 Deliverable capacity is the level of capacity interconnection rights (CIRs) held by the capacity resource.

207 Id.

208 PJM. PJM Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) <*https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability*>.

209 For additional information on ELCC ratings see the *2026 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March, Section 5, ELCC: The Capacity Value Resources.*

210 See ***WSPP, Inc.***, 139 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 18 (2012)("we conclude that unbundled REC transactions fall outside of the Commission's jurisdiction under sections 201, 205 and 206 of the FPA. We further conclude that bundled REC transactions fall within the Commission's jurisdiction under sections 201, 205 and 206 of the FPA"); citing ***American Ref-Fuel Company, et al.***, 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 at PP 23–24 (2003) ("American Ref-Fuel, 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 at PP 23-24 ("RECs are created by the States. They exist outside the confines of PURPA… And the contracts for sales of QF capacity and energy, entered into pursuant to PURPA, … do not control the ownership of RECs"); see also ***Williams Solar LLC and Allco Finance Limited***, 156 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2016).

211 Delaware Code, Title 26, Chapter 1, Subchapter III-A, Section 356(a).



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In addition to GATS, there are several other REC tracking systems used by states in the PJM footprint. Illinois, Indiana and Ohio use both GATS and M-RETS, the REC tracking system for resources located in the Midcontinent ISO, to track the sales of RECs used to fulfill their RPS requirements. Michigan and North Carolina have created their own state tracking systems, MIRECS and NC-RETS, through which all RECs used to satisfy these states' RPS requirements must ultimately be traded. Table 8-25 shows the REC tracking systems used by each state within the PJM footprint. To ensure a REC is only used one time, REC tracking systems must keep an account of a REC from its creation until its retirement. A REC is considered to be retired when it has been used to satisfy an obligation associated with an RPS.

### Table 8-25 REC tracking systems in PJM states with renewable portfolio standards

| Jurisdiction with RPS | REC Tracking System Used | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware | PJM-GATS | | | |
| Illinois | PJM-GATS | M-RETS | | |
| Maryland | PJM-GATS | | | |
| Michigan | | | MIRECS | |
| New Jersey | PJM-GATS | | | |
| North Carolina | | | | NC-RETS |
| Ohio | PJM-GATS | M-RETS | | |
| Pennsylvania | PJM-GATS | | | |
| Virginia | PJM-GATS | | | |
| Washington, D.C. | PJM-GATS | | | |
| **Jurisdiction with Voluntary Standard** | | | | |
| Indiana | PJM-GATS | M-RETS | | |

All PJM states with renewable portfolio standards have established geographical restrictions governing the source of RECs to satisfy states' standards. Table 8-26 describes these restrictions. Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio all have provisions in their renewables standards that require all or a portion of RECs used to comply with each state's standards to be generated by in-state resources. Illinois recently relaxed the geographic restrictions to allow RECs sourced from wind or photovoltaic resources that are deliverable to Illinois or an adjacent state via high voltage direct current transmission. North Carolina has provisions that require RECs to be purchased from in state resources but Dominion, the only utility located in both North Carolina and PJM, is exempt from these provisions. Pennsylvania added a provision in 2017 that requires SRECs used to comply with Pennsylvania's solar photovoltaics carve out standard to be sourced from resources located in Pennsylvania.

In addition, Pennsylvania and Virginia require that RECs used for RPS compliance be produced from resources located within the PJM footprint. Delaware requires that RECs used for compliance with its RPS are produced from resources located within the PJM footprint or resources located elsewhere if these resources can demonstrate that the power they produce is directly deliverable to Delaware. The District of Columbia, Maryland and New Jersey allow RECs to be purchased from resources located within PJM in addition to large areas that adjoin PJM for compliance with their standards.

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## Table 8-26 Geographic restrictions on REC purchases for renewable portfolio standard compliance in PJM states

| State with RPS | RPS Contains In-state Provision | Geographical Requirements for RPS Compliance |
|---|---|---|
| Delaware | No | RECs must be purchased from resources located either within PJM or from resources outside of PJM that are directly deliverable into Delaware. |
| Illinois | Yes | All RECs must be purchased from resources located within Illinois or from resources located in adjacent states that meet certain public interest criteria or from utility scale wind or photovoltaic resources that are deliverable to Illinois or an adjacent state via high voltage direct current transmission. |
| Maryland | No | RECs must come from within PJM, 10-30 miles offshore the coast of Maryland or from a control area adjacent to PJM that is capable of delivering power into PJM. |
| Michigan | Yes | RECs must either come from resources located within Michigan or anywhere in the service territory of retail electric provider in Michigan that is not an alternative electric supplier. There are many exceptions to these requirements (see Michigan S.B. 213). |
| New Jersey | No | RECs must either be purchased from resources located within PJM or from resources located outside of PJM for which the energy associated with the REC is delivered to PJM via dynamic scheduling. |
| North Carolina | Yes | Dominion, the only utility located in both the state of North Carolina and PJM, may purchase RECs from anywhere. Other utilities in North Carolina not located in PJM are subject to different REC requirements (see G.S. 62-113.8). |
| Ohio | Yes | All RECs must be generated from resources that are located in the state of Ohio or have the capability to deliver power directly into Ohio. Any renewable facility located in a state contiguous to Ohio has been deemed deliverable into the state of Ohio. For renewable resources in noncontiguous states, deliverabilty must be demonstrated to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. |
| Pennsylvania | Yes | RECs must be purchased from resources located within PJM. All SRECs used for compliance with the Solar PV standard must source from solar PV resources within the state of Pennsylvania. |
| Virginia | Yes | RECs must be purchased from resources located within PJM. An additional stipulation, applicable to Dominion, requires that 75 percent of RECs originate from resources located in Virginia. RECs qualifying as Distributed RECs must originate in Virginia. |
| Washington, D.C. | No | RECs must be purchased from either a PJM state or a state adjacent with PJM. A PJM state is defined as any state with a portion of their geographical boundary within the footprint of PJM. An adjacent state is defined as a state that lies next to a PJM state, i.e. SC, GA, AL, AR, IA, NY, MO, MS, and WI. |

PJM jurisdictions have various methods for enforcing compliance with required renewable portfolio standards. If a retail supplier is unable to comply with the renewable portfolio standards required by the jurisdiction, suppliers may make alternative compliance payments (ACPs), with varying standards, to cover any shortfall between the RECs required by the state and those the retail supplier actually purchased. The ACPs, which are penalties, generally function as a cap on the market value of RECs, although in Pennsylvania the solar ACP is dependent upon the price of solar RECs retired during the year. In New Jersey, solar ACPs are currently $188 per MWh.[212] In Pennsylvania, the ACP for tier I and tier II RECs is $45 per MWh and the solar ACPs is 200 percent of the average credit price of Pennsylvania solar RECs sold during the reporting year plus the value of any solar rebates in other PJM states. The most recent ACP for Pennsylvania solar is $66.40.[213] Delaware reduced the solar ACP from $400 per credit to $150 per credit in 2021.[214] The Maryland solar ACP is $45 per credit in 2026. The Washington DC solar ACP was reduced from $460 per credit to $440 per credit for 2026.[215]

Figure 8-9 shows the historical relationship between SREC prices and ACP levels. The SREC price is represented by a solid line in the figure and the corresponding ACP level is represented by a dashed line. For each jurisdiction, the ACP is an upper bound for the price level. In Michigan and North Carolina, there are no defined values for ACPs. The public utility commissions in Michigan and North Carolina have discretionary power to assess what a load serving entity must pay for any RPS shortfalls.

212 N.J. S. 2314/A. 3723.
213 See AEPS History Pricing report at the AEPS website <*https://pennaeps.com/reports/*>.
214 See Senate Bill 33, Delaware General Assembly (February 10, 2021) <*https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=48278*>.
215 DC Code: § 34-1434.


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
Table 8-27 shows the alternative compliance standards for RPS in PJM jurisdictions.

### Table 8-27 Tier I, Tier II, and Solar alternative compliance payments in PJM jurisdictions: January through June, 2026[216] [217]

| Jurisdiction with RPS | Standard Alternative Compliance ($/MWh) | Tier II Alternative Compliance ($/MWh) | Solar Alternative Compliance ($/MWh) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware | $25.00 | | $150.00 |
| Illinois | $0.35 | | |
| Maryland | $24.75 | $15.00 | $45.00 |
| Michigan | No specific penalties | | |
| New Jersey | $50.00 | $50.00 | $188.00 |
| North Carolina | No specific penalties: At the discretion of the NC Utility Commission | | |
| Ohio | $66.01 | | |
| Pennsylvania | $45.00 | $45.00 | $66.40 |
| Washington, D.C. | $50.00 | $10.00 | $440.00 |
| **Jurisdiction with Voluntary Standard** | | | |
| Indiana | Voluntary standard - No Penalties | | |
| **Jurisdiction with No Standard** | | | |
| Kentucky | No standard | | |
| Tennessee | No standard | | |
| West Virginia | No standard | | |

Load serving entities participating in mandatory RPS programs in PJM jurisdictions must submit compliance reports to the relevant jurisdiction's public utility commission.

### Figure 8-9 Comparison of SREC price and solar ACP: 2009 through June 2026




In their submitted compliance reports, load serving entities must indicate the quantity of MWh that they have generated using eligible renewable or alternative energy resources. They must also identify the quantity of RECs they may have purchased to make up for renewable energy generation shortfalls or to comply with RPS provisions requiring that they purchase RECs. The public utility commissions then release RPS compliance reports to the public.

The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission issued the 2024/2025 compliance report for the Pennsylvania Alternative Energy Standards Act of 2004 in February 2026.[218] Pennsylvania reported that the 682,693 SRECs, 10,638,582 Tier I RECs and 24,975,510 Tier II RECs were retired during the 2024/2025 reporting year (June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025). Supplier obligations for 61 SRECs, 873 Tier I RECs and 1,225 Tier II RECs required ACPs. The total cost

216 The Ohio standard alternative compliance payment (ACP) is updated annually <https://puco.ohio.gov/utilities/electricity/resources/acp-annual-adjustment-of-the-non-solar-alternative-compliance-payment>. The Illinois Commerce Commission periodically publishes updates to the effective ACP amount <https://www.icc.illinois.gov/electricity/RPSCompliancePaymentNotices.aspx>. For updated Maryland ACPs, see Table 3 of the 2024 Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard Report <https://www.psc.state.md.us/commission-reports/>.

217 The entry for Pennsylvania reflects the solar ACP for 2025. See "Pricing," <https://www.pennaeps.com/reports/>.

218 "Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act of 2004 Compliance for Reporting Year 2024–25," (February 5, 2026) <https://www.puc.pa.gov/filing-resources/reports/alternative-energy-portfolio-standards-aeps-reports/>

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for the 2024/2025 reporting year was $702.0 million, a 0.3 percent decrease from 2023/2024.

The Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia reported that 307,793 SRECs and 34,005,495 Tier I RECs were retired during the 2024 compliance year. The average price for solar RECs was $421. ACPs increased from $1.8 million for 2023 to $3.9 million for 2024.[219]

The Public Service Commission of Maryland reported that 63.9 percent of the 2024 REC obligation was satisfied by ACPs.[220] The report notes that the "ACP prices were in many instances less expensive than REC prices, and as a result suppliers chose to pay the ACP."[221] The total cost of compliance for 2024 was $616.9 million, a 9.3 percent increase over 2023.

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio reported that 9,164,867 RECs were retired in the 2024 compliance year, which is 21.7 percent higher than the number of RECs retired in 2023.[222] Compliance costs for 2024 were $75.8 million, 4.8 percent lower than 2023.

Delmarva Power is the only retail electric supplier that must file a compliance report with the Delaware Public Service Commission. The Delmarva report provides limited public information on RPS compliance cost.[223] Delmarva reports $13.0 million in ACPs but no other compliance cost information is available.

The Illinois Power Agency (IPA) reported delivery of ComEd RECs totaling 5,386,612. The ComEd compliance cost for the 2024/2025 RPS compliance year was $132.1 million, a 40.1 percent increase over 2023/2024.[224]

The North Carolina Utilities Commission reported that Dominion North Carolina Power submitted its 2020 compliance report on August 10, 2021. The compliance report stated that Dominion met its general RPS requirement by purchasing 427,657 credits that consisted of wind and biomass RECs and energy efficiency credits (EECs).[225] Dominion met its solar requirement of 8,562 RECs, poultry waste requirement of 22,311 RECs, and swine waste requirement of 2,997 RECs through REC purchases. Dominion North Carolina's total REC requirements for 2020 increased 4.9 percent over 2019.

The Michigan Public Service Commission reported that Indiana Michigan Power Company met the 2020 standard by generating or acquiring 315,384 RECs.[226]

New Jersey's Office of Clean Energy posted a summary of RPS compliance through the energy year ending May 31, 2025.[227] Electric power suppliers retired 20,235,908 class I RECs and 1,818,589 class II RECs. Suppliers submitted 382 class I ACPs and 540 class II ACPs at a cost of $50 per MWh. Electric power suppliers retired 3,129,171 solar RECs and 362,526 SACPs were submitted at a cost of $208 per MWh. Additionally, 1,049,856 transition RECs were retired and 682,984 SREC II were retired.[228] [229]

Table 8-28 shows the RPS compliance cost incurred by PJM jurisdictions as reported by the jurisdictions.[230] The compliance costs are the cost of acquiring RECs plus the cost of any alternative compliance payments. The cost of complying with RPS, as reported by the states, was $17.8 billion over the 11 year period from 2014 through 2024 for the seven jurisdictions that had RPS and reported compliance costs.[231] The average RPS compliance cost per

219 "Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, A Report for Compliance Year 2024," Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia (May 1, 2025), <*https://dcpsc.org/Orders-and-Regulations/PSC-Reports-to-the-DC-Council/Renewable-Energy-Portfolio-Standard.aspx*>.

220 "Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard Report with Data for Calendar Year 2024," Public Service Commission of Maryland (November 25, 2025) at 9, <*https://www.psc.state.md.us/commission-reports/*>.

221 *Id.* at 8.

222 "Renewable Portfolio Standard Report to the General Assembly for Compliance Year 2024," Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (February 19, 2026), <*https://puco.ohio.gov/utilities/electricity/resources/ohio-renewable-energy-portfolio-standard/puco-annual-rps-reports*>.

223 "Retail Electricity Supplier's RPS Compliance Report, Compliance Period: June 1, 2022–May 31, 2023," Delmarva Power, (Sept. 29, 2023) <*https://depsc.delaware.gov/rps-and-green-power-product-compliance/*>.

224 "Annual Report Fiscal Year 2025" at 131, Illinois Power Agency (Feb. 17, 2026) <*https://ipa.illinois.gov/about-ipa/ipa-publications.html*>.

225 "Annual Report Regarding Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard in North Carolina," North Carolina Utilities Commission (Oct. 1, 2021) at 41, <*https://www.ncuc.gov/newsroom.html*>.

226 "Report on the Implementation and Cost-Effectiveness of the P.A. 295 Renewable Energy Standard," Michigan Public Service Commission (Feb. 15, 2022) <*https://www.michigan.gov/mpsc/regulatory/reports/prior-renewable-reports*>.

227 See EY25 RPS Compliance Results (2004 to 2025), New Jersey's Clean Energy Program (2026) <https://cleanenergy.nj.gov/resources/rps-compliance-reports>.

228 "New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Approves Solar Transition Program, Initiates a Cost Cap Proceeding," New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Press Release (December 6, 2019) <*https://www.bpu.state.nj.us/bpu/newsroom/2019/approved/20191206.html*>.

229 "NJBPU Approves 3,750 MW Successor Solar Incentive Program," New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Press Release (July 28, 2021) <*https://www.nj.gov/bpu/newsroom/2021/approved/20210728.html*>.

230 RPS compliance cost totals for Illinois reflect the RPS compliance cost attributable to PJM load in Illinois.

231 The actual PJM RPS compliance cost exceeds the reported $17.8 billion due to incomplete data. The compliance cost data for Delaware, Michigan and North Carolina are not available for some years. Based on past data these states generally account for approximately 2 percent of the total RPS compliance cost of PJM states. The $17.8 billion cost also does not fully reflect the overhead and administrative costs associated with RPS programs.



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year based on the reported compliance cost for the 11 year period from 2014 through 2024 was $1.6 billion. The compliance cost for 2024, the most recent year with almost complete data, was $3.2 billion.

## Table 8-28 RPS Compliance Cost ($ million)[232] [233] [234] [235] [236] [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242]

| Jurisdiction with RPS | | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware | Total RPS | | $16.0 | $18.4 | $18.8 | $18.3 | $19.4 | $21.1 | $25.6 | | | |
| | Solar | | $7.1 | $7.7 | $7.1 | $6.6 | $8.1 | $9.1 | $9.6 | | | |
| | Non-Solar | | $8.9 | $10.7 | $11.7 | $11.8 | $11.3 | $12.0 | $16.0 | | | |
| Illinois | Total RPS | $19.9 | $19.9 | $23.5 | $25.9 | $25.8 | $27.0 | $34.7 | $52.6 | $73.2 | $88.9 | $116.4 |
| Maryland | Total RPS | $104.1 | $126.8 | $135.2 | $72.1 | $84.9 | $142.3 | $223.2 | $409.8 | $438.8 | $564.2 | $616.9 |
| | Solar | $29.4 | $39.1 | $45.6 | $21.3 | $27.4 | $57.8 | $123.0 | $221.3 | $187.2 | $165.5 | $187.6 |
| | Tier I | $70.7 | $85.1 | $88.2 | $50.1 | $56.5 | $84.3 | $99.8 | $187.6 | $247.2 | $387.3 | $409.4 |
| | Tier II | $4.0 | $2.6 | $1.4 | $0.7 | $1.0 | $0.1 | $0.4 | $1.0 | $4.4 | $9.7 | $13.3 |
| | Geothermal | | | | | | | | | | $1.7 | $6.6 |
| New Jersey | Total RPS | $395.8 | $524.8 | $593.4 | $606.3 | $653.8 | $763.1 | $970.2 | $1,140.7 | $1,236.0 | $1,346.5 | $1,471.6 |
| | Solar | $322.5 | $417.4 | $481.5 | $503.8 | $560.5 | $668.0 | $822.2 | $946.4 | $960.0 | $911.0 | $901.4 |
| | Class I | $66.1 | $98.2 | $100.9 | $91.9 | $83.5 | $85.5 | $130.3 | $171.8 | $241.8 | $386.6 | $513.4 |
| | Class II | $7.2 | $9.2 | $11.0 | $10.6 | $9.8 | $9.6 | $17.7 | $22.4 | $34.2 | $49.0 | $56.7 |
| Ohio | Total RPS | $42.6 | $42.6 | $37.6 | $39.9 | $50.2 | $69.8 | $81.8 | $82.7 | $67.7 | $79.8 | $75.8 |
| | Solar | $17.7 | $14.8 | $11.6 | $9.4 | $9.4 | $9.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| | Non-Solar | $24.9 | $27.7 | $26.1 | $30.5 | $40.8 | $60.2 | $81.8 | $82.7 | $67.7 | $79.8 | $75.8 |
| Pennsylvania | Total RPS | $86.2 | $114.6 | $125.0 | $115.6 | $99.7 | $112.7 | $183.0 | $307.8 | $461.4 | $630.5 | $702.8 |
| | Solar | $14.2 | $19.2 | $21.9 | $18.0 | $16.6 | $20.6 | $24.8 | $27.7 | $28.5 | $26.3 | $23.6 |
| | Tier I | $70.9 | $94.3 | $101.7 | $95.4 | $77.9 | $74.8 | $100.5 | $159.5 | $224.8 | $292.3 | $316.5 |
| | Tier II | $1.1 | $1.0 | $1.5 | $2.2 | $5.2 | $17.3 | $57.7 | $120.6 | $208.2 | $312.0 | $362.7 |
| Washington D.C. | Total RPS | $27.4 | $38.5 | $47.2 | $42.7 | $50.6 | $57.3 | $65.0 | $99.1 | $129.2 | $168.6 | $221.2 |
| | Solar | $25.1 | $36.5 | $44.9 | $31.8 | $42.8 | $50.6 | $59.2 | $84.0 | $106.6 | $116.8 | $131.8 |
| | Tier I | $2.1 | $1.9 | $2.1 | $10.5 | $7.6 | $6.7 | $5.8 | $15.1 | $22.6 | $51.8 | $89.4 |
| | Tier II | $0.1 | $0.1 | $0.1 | $0.4 | $0.2 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| PJM | Total RPS | $676.7 | $883.5 | $984.0 | $925.5 | $987.0 | $1,194.9 | $1,584.4 | $2,118.1 | $2,406.4 | $2,878.6 | $3,204.7 |

232 Several states have not released compliance reports for 2024.
233 "Retail Electricity Supplier's RPS Compliance Report," Delmarva Power (Sept. 28, 2022), <*https://depsc.delaware.gov/rps-and-green-power-product-compliance/*>
234 "Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report," February 18, 2024, Illinois Power Agency (IPA), <*https://ipa.illinois.gov/about-ipa/ipa-publications.html*>.
235 "Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard Report," Public Service Commission of Maryland (December 2, 2024) at 9, <*https://www.psc.state.md.us/commission-reports/*>.
236 Appendix C in "Report on the Implementation and Cost-Effectiveness of the P.A. 295 Renewable Energy Standard," Michigan Public Service Commission, February 15, 2022, <https://www.michigan.gov/mpsc/regulatory/reports/prior-renewable-reports>. The compliance cost entry reflects the compliance cost of the Indiana Michigan Power Company, which is the only investor owned utilities whose service area is in the PJM footprint.
237 "RPS Report Summary 2005-2025," New Jersey's Clean Energy Program, 2026, <*https://cleanenergy.nj.gov/resources/rps-compliance-reports*>.
238 "Renewable Portfolio Standard Report to the General Assembly for Compliance Year 2024," Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, February 19, 2026, <https://puco.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/puco/utilities/electricity/resources/ohio-renewable-energy-portfolio-standard/puco-annual-rps-reports>.
239 "Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act of 2004 Compliance for Reporting Year 2023-24," Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, June 2025 <*https://www.puc.pa.gov/filing-resources/reports/alternative-energy-portfolio-standards-aeps-reports/*>.
240 "Report on the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard for Compliance Year 2023," Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia, Executive Summary, May 1, 2024, <*https://dcpsc.org/Orders-and-Regulations/PSC-Reports-to-the-DC-Council/Renewable-Energy-Portfolio-Standard.aspx*>.
241 "Application of Dominion Energy North Carolina for Approval of Cost Recovery for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard Compliance and Related Costs," Docket No. E-22, Sub 557, Sub 558, August 30, 2018 <*https://www.ncuc.net/*>. The North Carolina compliance cost entries reflects the compliance cost of Dominion Energy North Carolina.
242 The reporting period for RPS compliance in Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania corresponds to PJM capacity market delivery years, June 1 through May 31. The compliance cost amounts reported by these states were converted to calendar year by assuming the compliance cost was evenly spread across the months in the compliance year.

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## Offshore Wind Development

New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia have taken significant steps to promote offshore wind. New Jersey and Maryland enacted legislation for offshore wind renewable energy credits (ORECs) in 2010.[243] On November 1, 2013, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), part of the U.S. Department of the Interior, awarded Dominion Energy a lease for development of the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) project. CVOW is a wind farm project consisting of 176 turbines in federal waters 23 to 27 miles off Virginia Beach.[244] Dominion expects to complete the project in 2026.

On May 24, 2018, New Jersey enacted a statute directing the Board of Public Utilities (NJPBU) to create an OREC program targeting installation of at least 3,500 MW of offshore wind capacity by 2030 (plus 2,000 MW of energy storage capacity).[245] The New Jersey statute also reinstates certain tax incentives for offshore wind manufacturing activities. Governor Murphy has issued Executive Order No. 8, which calls for full implementation of the statute. The offshore wind target 3,500 MW by 2030 has since been replaced by a target of 7,500 MW by 2035.[246] The BPU opened a 100 day application window for qualified offshore wind projects on September 20, 2018, and on June, 21, 2019, the first award for a 1,100 MW offshore wind project was granted to Danish wind power developer Ørsted.[247] [248] Two more projects were approved on June 30, 2021. Ørsted was awarded a second project for offshore wind capacity of 1,148 MW and Atlantic Shores Offshore Wind was awarded a project for 1,510 MW.[249] On October 31, 2023, Ørsted announced that it was canceling two major offshore wind projects, Ocean Wind 1 (1,100 MW) and Ocean Wind 2 (1,148 MW), that were planned off the coast of New Jersey.[250]

The Associated Press reported in May 2024 that the New Jersey and Ørsted reached a settlement that required Ørsted to pay New Jersey $125 million.[251]

On January 24, 2024, the NJBPU awarded 2,400 MW of offshore wind capacity to the Leading Light Wind project and 1,342 to Attentive Energy LLC.[252] The Leading Light Wind project is a partnership between Invenergy and energyRE.

On December 17, 2021, the Maryland Public Service Commission awarded ORECs in its Round 2 solicitation to the 846 MW Skipjack Wind 2 offshore project, owned by Skipjack Offshore Energy LLC, an Ørsted subsidiary, and to the 808.5 MW Momentum Wind offshore project, owned by US Wind Inc.[253] ORECs for Skipjack Wind 2 have a levelized price of $71.61; ORECs for Momentum Wind have a levelized price of $54.17.[254] Both projects are expected to become operational before the end of 2026.[255] In 2017, Round 1 ORECs were awarded to Deepwater Wind's 120-MW Skipjack Wind Farm, later acquired by Ørsted, and U.S. Wind's 248 MW project.[256] On January 25, 2024, Ørsted announced it "has withdrawn from the Maryland Public Service Commission Orders approving the Skipjack 1 and 2 projects," noting that the OREC prices in the orders "are no longer commercially viable."[257]

On July 1, 2019, Dominion Energy announced the beginning of construction on an offshore wind demonstration project. The project consists of two 6 MW offshore wind turbines. The pilot project became operational in October 2020.[258] In September 2019, Dominion filed an interconnection agreement with PJM associated with its CVOW proposal to develop a 2,600 MW offshore wind farm.[259]

On January 20, 2025, the Trump Administration issued a Presidential Memorandum withdrawing "from disposition for wind energy leasing all areas

243 See Offshore Wind Economic Development Act of 2010, P.L. 2010, c. 57, as amended, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 to -87.2.
244 See Dominion Energy, <*https://www.dominionenergy.com/about/delivering-energy/wind-power-projects/coastal-virginia-offshore-wind*>.
245 N.J. S. 2314/A. 3723.
246 Executive Order 92, Philip D. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey (November 19, 2019) <*https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/approved/eo_archive.html*>.
247 BPU Docket No. QO18080851.
248 "New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Awards Historic 1,100 MW Offshore Wind Solicitation to Orsted's Ocean Wind Project," New Jersey BPU Press Release (June 21, 2019) <*https://nj.gov/bpu/newsroom/2019/approved/20190621.html*>.
249 "NJPBU Approves Nation's Largest Combined Offshore Wind Award to Atlantic Shores and Ocean Wind II," New Jersey BPU Press Release (June 30, 2021) <*https://www.nj.gov/bpu/newsroom/2021/approved/20210630.html*>.
250 "Ørsted ceases development of its US offshore wind projects Ocean Wind 1 and 2, takes final investment decision on Revolution Wind, and recognises DKK 28.4 billion impairments" (October 31, 2023) <*https://orsted.com/en/company-announcement-list/2023/10/oersted-ceases-development-of-its-us-offshore-wind-73751*> .
251 "New Jersey and wind farm developer Ørsted settle claims for $125M over scrapped offshore projects", Associated Press (May 28, 2024).
252 "NJBPU Approves Over 3,700 MW of Offshore Wind Capacity in Combined Award", New Jersey BPU Press Release (January 24, 2024) <*https://www.nj.gov/bpu/newsroom/2024/approved/20240124.html*>.
253 "Ørsted, US Wind Triumph with 1.6 GW in Maryland Offshore Tender," Renewables Now (December 20, 2021) <*https://renewablesnow.com/news/rsted-us-wind-triumph-with-1-6-gw-in-maryland-offshore-tender-766237/*>.
254 *Id.*
255 *Id.*
256 "Orsted Acquires Deepwater Wind and creates leading US Offshore Wind Platform," ORSTED Press Release (August 10, 2018).
257 Skipjack Wind to be Repositioned for Future Offtake Opportunities, Ørsted (January 25, 2024) <*https://orsted.com/en/media/news/2024/01/skipjack-wind-to-be-repositioned-for-future-offtak-815811*>.
258 Dominion Energy (2026) <https://coastalvawind.com/about/the-project>.
259 "Dominion Energy Announces Largest Offshore Wind Project in US," Dominion Energy News Release (September 19, 2019) <https://news.dominionenergy.com/2019-09-19-Dominion-Energy-Announces-Largest-Offshore-Wind-Project-in-US>.


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within the Offshore Continental Shelf."[260] The withdrawal applies to the wind projects in New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia. The withdrawal effectively puts on hold indefinitely the offshore wind projects in New Jersey and Maryland. On May 5, 2025, the Attorneys General of New Jersey and Maryland, along with the 16 other states, filed suit against the Trump Administration over the withdrawal of offshore leasing.[261] [262]

On December 22, 2025, citing national security concerns, the Department of the Interior announced it was pausing, effective immediately, the federal leases for all large scale offshore wind projects currently under construction, including Dominion Energy's CVOW.[263] The CVOW resumed construction in January 2026 after a federal judge temporarily lifted the Trump administration suspension.[264] CVOW delivered power to the PJM grid for the first time on March 23, 2026.[265]

# Natural Gas Pipeline Infrastructure

## FERC Rules

By order issued October 7, 2025, the Commission repealed Section 157.23 of its rules stating that it sought to "advance the Commission's principal statutory mission under the Natural Gas Act 'to encourage the orderly development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at reasonable prices.'"[266] Section 157.23 prevented the start of construction of projects approved under NGA section 3 or section 7 for a period of time during the pendency of a rehearing request. Removal of section 157.23 allows the construction of projects to proceed upon approval.[267]

260 *Temporary Withdrawal of all Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government's Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects*, Presidential Memorandum (January 20, 2025) <*https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/temporary-withdrawal-of-all-areas-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-from-offshore-wind-leasing-and-review-of-the-federal-governments-leasing-and-permitting-practices-for-wind-projects/*>.

261 See Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia, et al. v. United States Department of the Interior, et al., (E.D. Va. No. 2:25-cv-00830) (granting a preliminary injunction, staying a December 22, 2025, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management stop-work order and allowing construction on the CVOW project to resume while the case proceeds).

262 *Attorney General Platkin Sues Trump Administration for Halting Development of Wind Energy*, New Release of the Attorney General for the State of New Jersey (May 5, 2025).

263 See Department of the Interior, <*https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/trump-administration-protects-us-national-security-pausing-offshore-wind-leases*>.

264 *Biggest offshore wind project in U.S. to resume construction after judge lifts Trump suspension*, CNBC (January 16, 2026) <https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/16/biggest-offshore-wind-project-in-us-to-resume-construction-after-judge-lifts-trump-suspension.html>.

265 See the project timeline at <https://coastalvawind.com/about/the-project/timeline>.

266 *See Removal of Regulations Limiting Authorizations*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,014 (October 7, 2025).

267 *Id.* at P 31.

## Transco Regional Energy Access Expansion Project

By order issued January 11, 2023, FERC authorized a request filed by Transco to modify its gas pipeline system to increase its capacity by 829,400 Dth/day (.8 BCF/day) from its Leidy line to points in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland. Transco signed binding precedent agreements for 100 percent of the capacity with PECO Energy Company, Elizabethtown Gas Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, South Jersey Gas Company, PSEG Power, LLC, South Jersey Resources Group LLC, Williams Energy Resources LLC, and New Jersey Natural Gas Company.[268] Transco planned to have service available at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023.[269] In order to increase the capacity on the pipeline for this project Transco installed about 36 miles of new pipe, a new electric compressor station and modified five existing compressor stations. By letter dated July 26, 2024, FERC authorized Transco to commence service with facilities associated with the Regional Energy Expansion Project.[270] The 829,400 Dth/d is enough to supply about three combined cycle power plants.[271] On March 13, 2023, the New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel and New Jersey Conservation Foundation, et al., sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.[272] The appeal primarily argues that FERC ignored evidence that "clearly demonstrated that the state of New Jersey does not need and will not benefit from the Project's capacity."[273] On July 30, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded the Certificate Orders.[274] On September 6, 2024, Transco filed an Application for Temporary Emergency Certificate so they could continue to provide service while this matter is resolved on remand.[275] Both PJM and the MMU submitted comments supporting the application.[276] On January 24, 2025, FERC issued an order reinstating authorization for Transco's Regional Energy Access Expansion Project.[277]

268 See FERC Docket No. CP21-94-004.

269 See 182 FERC ¶ 61,006 (2023), *order on reh'g*, 182 FERC ¶ 61,148 (2023), *order on reh'g*, 183 FERC ¶ 61,071 (2023).

270 See Letter: Authorization to Commence Service, FERC Docket No. CP21-94-000.

271 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, "Table 7-59 Gas pipeline capacity need to replace units at risk of retirement." New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.

272 Case No. 23-1064, et al.

273 New Jersey Conservation Foundation, et al. v. FERC, Proof Opening Brief of Petitioners, Case No. 23-1064 (D.C. Cir July 26, 2023).

274 N.J. Conservation Foundation, et. al v. FERC, No. 23-1064 (July 30, 2024).

275 See FERC Docket No. CP21-94-004.

276 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.'s Comments in Support of the Application of Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC for a Temporary Emergency Certificate, FERC Docket No. CP21-94-004 (October 7, 2024); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. CP21-94-004 (October 8, 2024).

277 See FERC Docket No. CP21-94-004.

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## Mountain Valley Pipeline

On October 23, 2015, Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) filed an application with FERC for approval to construct, own and operate MVP.[278] On October 13, 2017, MVP received a certificate of convenience and necessity from FERC. The pipeline is approximately 303 miles long stretching from the Equitrans Transmission system in Wentzel County West Virginia to Transco Zone 5 station 165 in Pittsylvania County Virginia. The capacity of the pipeline is approximately 2 BCF per day. MVP has signed binding precedent agreements for 100 percent of the capacity with EQT Energy, LLC; Roanoke Gas; USG Properties Marcellus Holdings, LLC; and WGL Midstream, Inc.[279] On June 14, 2024, MVP entered service.[280] The 2 BCF per day is enough to supply about nine combined cycle power plants.[281]

## Mountain Valley Pipeline MVP Boost Expansion Project

On October 23, 2025, Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) filed an abbreviated application for a certificate of convenience and necessity with FERC for the MVP Boost Expansion Project. This project would increase the capacity of the MVP pipeline by 600,000 Dth/day. Precedent agreements were signed for one hundred percent of the capacity with Duke Energy Carolinas, Public Service Company of North Carolina, Inc and Virginia Power Services Corp., Inc. The increased capacity will be achieved by increasing compression at three existing compressor stations in West Virginia and construction of a new compressor station in Virginia. The expected completion of the project is mid-2028.[282] The increase in the MVP pipelines capacity by 600,000 Dth/d would be enough to supply three combined cycle power plants.[283]

## Transco Southeast Supply Enhancement

On October 29, 2024, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC (Transco) filed an application for certificate of public convenience for the Southeast Supply Enhancement Project. This project is an expansion of the Transco system in southern Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama. The total capacity will be 1,596,900 Dth/d from Transco Station 165 Zone 5 and the interconnection with Mountain Valley and points south to North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama. Transco has precedent agreements executed for one hundred percent of the capacity. The precedent agreements have confidential information, so they were not made public in the filing. The proposal includes about 55 miles of new pipe and the addition of seven new compressors at existing compressor stations. The expected completion of the project is June 2028.[284] The 1,596,900 Dth/d would be enough to supply about seven combined cycle power plants.[285]

## Transco Commonwealth Energy Connector Project

On August 24, 2022, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC (Transco) filed a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct the Commonwealth Energy Connector Project.[286] The new capacity will be 105,000 Dth/day which Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. (VNG) has contracted for. This project is an expansion of the Transco system from Zone 5 Pooling point through Transco's South Virginia Lateral which interconnects between Transco and Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC. Additional compression, about 3.6 miles of additional pipe and modifications and installation of new facilities at the Emporia M&R station will be completed to increase the capacity. The project was approved by FERC on October 23, 2025, to go into service.[287] The 105,000 Dth/day would not be enough supply to run one combined cycle power plant [288]

## Columbia Gas Transmission Virginia Reliability Project

On August 24, 2022, Columbia Gas Transmission LLC (Columbia) filed an abbreviated application for the authority necessary to construct and operate its Virginia Reliability project. The new capacity will be 100,000 Dth/day which Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. (VNG) has contracted for. This project will

278 Mountain Valley Pipeline <*https://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/*>.
279 See FERC Docket No. CP16-10-000.
280 Mountain Valley Pipeline <*https://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/*>.
281 See 194 FERC ¶ 61,078 (2026), order on reh'g, 195 FERC ¶ 61,217.
282 See FERC Docket No. CP26-14.
283 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue: Table 7-59" New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
284 See Docket CP25-10
285 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue: Table 7-59" New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
286 See FERC Docket No. CP22-502.
287 See FERC Docket No. CP22-502 Filed October 23, 2025.
288 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.


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replace 49 miles of existing pipe, modifications at two compressor stations, modifications to one receipt point and delivery point increasing service to Market Area 34. This will allow VNG to receive gas at the Transco Columbia interconnection and deliver to VNG. This capacity was approved by FERC October 28, 2025, to go into service.[289] The 100,000 Dth/day would not be enough supply to run one combined cycle power plant.[290]

## Columbia Gulf Transmission Pulaski Expansion Project

On October 15, 2025, Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC (Columbia Gulf) filed an abbreviated application for certificate of convenience and necessity with FERC for the Pulaski Expansion Project. The new capacity will be 260,000 Dth/day which EKPC entered into a 20 year precedent agreement. This project will be constructed with approximately 41 miles of 30 inch pipeline to one new delivery point, EKPC's Cooper Station. The projected in service date is February 1, 2029.[291] The 260,000 Dth/day would be enough to supply about one combined cycle power plant.[292]

## Columbia Gulf Transmission Maysville Expansion Project

On November 17, 2025, Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC (Columbia Gulf) filed an abbreviated application for certificate of convenience and necessity with FERC for the Maysville Project. The new capacity will be 340,000 Dth/d which EKPC entered into a 20 year precedent agreement. This project will constructed with approximately 42 miles of 30 inch pipeline to one new delivery point EKPC's Spurlock Station. The projected in service date is February 1, 2029.[293] The 340,000 Dth/d would be enough to supply about one combined cycle power plant.[294]

## Texas Eastern Transmission Appalachia to Market II Project

On July 7, 2022, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (Texas Eastern) filed an abbreviated application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to develop the Appalachia to Market II Project. Prior to the filing, Texas Eastern conducted a binding open season for 55,000 Dth/d that will be made available based on improvements to the Texas Eastern system. The additional capacity will run from Appalachia supply basin in southwest Pennsylvania to New Jersey. Two compressor stations (reducing air emissions with upgraded compression equipment) will be replaced and two miles of looping of pipe will be added. PSEG Power LLC and Elizabethtown Gas signed up for the 55,000 Dth/day. The project is expected to be completed by Jun 30, 2027.[295] The 55,000 Dth/day would not be enough supply to run one combined cycle power plant.[296]

## Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage Inc. Capital Area Project

On December 11, 2024, Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage (EGTS) filed an abbreviated application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to develop the Capital Area Project. The new capacity will be 67,500 Dth/day which Washington Gas Light Company (WGL) has contracted for. This project will increase EGTS capacity from the Leidy Area in Pennsylvania to points in Maryland and Virginia. Additional compression will be added at four compressor stations: Centre Compression Station, Chambersburg Compression Station, Leesburg Compression Station and Finnerfrock Compression Station. The expected completion date is November 1, 2027.[297] The 67,500 Dth/day would not be enough supply to run one combined cycle power plant.[298]

289 See FERC Docket No. CP22-503.
290 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
291 See FERC Docket No. CP26-11.
292 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
293 See FERC Docket No. CP26-25.
294 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
295 See FERC Docket No. CP22-486-000.
296 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
297 See FERC Docket No. CP25-29-000.
298 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.

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## Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage Appalachian Reliability Project

On July 24, 2025, Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage, Inc. (EGTS) filed an abbreviated application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct the Appalachian Reliability Project. The new capacity will be approximately 550,000 Dth/d of capacity. EGTS signed a precedent agreement with CNX Gas Company, LLC. for 100 percent of the capacity. The capacity will be from western Pennsylvania for delivery to Texas Eastern Transmission LP in Westmoreland County Pennsylvania and Rockies Express Pipeline LLC in Monroe County Ohio. This project will install approximately 3.9 miles of pipeline, install one new compressor station and modify two other compressor stations. The project in service date is projected to be in June of 2028.[299] The 550,000 Dth/d would be enough supply to run two combined cycle power plants.[300]

# Emission Controlled Capacity and Emissions

## Emission Controlled Capacity

Environmental regulations affect decisions about emission control investments in existing units, investment in new units and decisions to retire units lacking emission controls.[301] Most PJM units burning fossil fuels have installed emission control technology. All coal steam units in PJM are compliant with the state and federal emissions limits established by MATS.[302] [303]

Table 8-29 shows $SO_2$ emission controls by fossil fuel fired units in PJM.[304] [305] [306] Coal has the highest $SO_2$ emission rate, while natural gas and diesel oil have lower $SO_2$ emission rates.[307] Of the current 39,377.9 MW of coal capacity in PJM, 38,608.9 MW of capacity, 98.0 percent, has some form of FGD (flue-gas desulfurization) technology to reduce $SO_2$ emissions.

### Table 8-29 $SO_2$ emission controls by fuel type (MW): June 30, 2026[308]

| | SO2 Controlled | No SO2 Controls | Total | Percent Controlled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coal | 38,608.9 | 769.0 | 39,377.9 | 98.0% |
| Diesel Oil | 0.0 | 2,060.8 | 2,060.8 | 0.0% |
| Natural Gas | 0.0 | 78,150.8 | 78,150.8 | 0.0% |
| Other | 325.0 | 1,000.0 | 1,325.0 | 24.5% |
| Total | 38,933.9 | 81,980.6 | 120,914.5 | 32.2% |

Table 8-30 shows $NO_X$ emission controls by fossil fuel fired units in PJM. Coal has the highest $NO_X$ emission rate, while natural gas and diesel oil have lower $NO_X$ emission rates. Of the current 39,377.9 MW of coal capacity in PJM, 39,291.9 MW of capacity, 99.8 percent, has some form of emissions controls to reduce $NO_X$ emissions. Most units in PJM have $NO_X$ emission controls in order to meet each state's emission compliance standards, based on whether a state is part of CSAPR, Acid Rain Program (ARP) or a combination of the three. The $NO_X$ compliance standards of MATS require the use of selective catalytic reduction (SCRs) or selective non-catalytic reduction (SCNRs) for coal steam units, as well as SCRs or water injection technology for peaking combustion turbine units.[309]

### Table 8-30 $NO_X$ emission controls by fuel type (MW): As of June 30, 2026

| | NOx Controlled | No NOx Controls | Total | Percent Controlled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coal | 39,291.9 | 86.0 | 39,377.9 | 99.8% |
| Diesel Oil | 952.7 | 1,108.1 | 2,060.8 | 46.2% |
| Natural Gas | 76,333.8 | 1,817.0 | 78,150.8 | 97.7% |
| Other | 775.0 | 550.0 | 1,325.0 | 58.5% |
| Total | 117,353.4 | 3,561.1 | 120,914.5 | 97.1% |

299 See FERC Docket No. CP25-528.
300 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2: Section 7, Net Revenue, Table 7-59. New combined cycle unit ICAP 1,362 MW and fuel rate of 6.543 MMBtu/MWh.
301 See EPA, "National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)," <*https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table*>.
302 On April 16, 2020, the EPA issued a revised final finding regarding the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards. See EPA. "Regulatory Actions," <https://www.epa.gov/mats/regulatory-actions-final-mercury-and-air-toxics-standards-mats-power-plants>.
303 On April 9, 2020, the EPA created a new subcategory of six coal refuse power plants in Pennsylvania and West Virginia with reduced limits of HCl and $SO_2$ emissions under MATS. These units were all compliant with the previous MATS rules. "Mercury and Air Toxics Standards,"<*https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/frn_mats_coal_refuse_2060-au48_final_rule.pdf*>
304 See EPA, "Clean Air Markets Programs Data,"<*https://campd.epa.gov/*>.
305 Air Markets Programs Data is submitted quarterly. Generators have 30 days after the end of the quarter to submit data, and all data is considered preliminary and subject to change until it is finalized in June of the following year. The most recent complete set of emissions data is from 2025.
306 The total MW are less than the 184,201.9 reported in Section 5: Capacity Market of this report, because EPA data on controls could not be matched to some PJM units. "Air Markets Program Data," <*https://campd.epa.gov/data/custom-data-download*>.
307 Diesel oil includes number 1, number 2, and ultra-low sulfur diesel. See 40 CFR § 72.2.
308 The "other" category includes petroleum coke, wood, process gas, residual oil, other gas, and other oil. The EPA's "other" category does not have strict definitions for inclusion.
309 See EPA, "Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, <*https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/mercury-and-air-toxics-standards*>.


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Table 8-31 shows particulate emission controls by fossil fuel units in PJM. Almost all coal units (99.8 percent) in PJM have particulate controls, as well as a few natural gas units (1.5 percent) and units with other fuel sources (88.5 percent). Typically, technologies such as electrostatic precipitators (ESP) or fabric filters (baghouses) are used to reduce particulate matter from coal steam units.[310] Fabric filters work by allowing the flue gas to pass through a tightly woven fabric which filters out the particulates. Of the current 39,377.9 MW of coal capacity in PJM, 39,292.9 MW of capacity, 99.8 percent, have some type of particulate emissions control technology.

### Table 8-31 Particulate emission controls by fuel type (MW): As of June 30, 2026

| | Particulate Controlled | No Particulate Controls | Total | Percent Controlled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coal | 39,292.9 | 85.0 | 39,377.9 | 99.8% |
| Diesel Oil | 0.0 | 2,060.8 | 2,060.8 | 0.0% |
| Natural Gas | 1,168.0 | 76,982.8 | 78,150.8 | 1.5% |
| Other | 1,172.0 | 153.0 | 1,325.0 | 88.5% |
| Total | 41,632.9 | 79,281.6 | 120,914.5 | 34.4% |

In order to achieve compliance with MATS, most coal steam units in PJM have particulate emission controls in the form of ESPs, but many units have also installed baghouse technology, or a combination of an FGD and SCR. Currently, all of the 94 coal steam units have some combination of ESP, baghouse, or FGD and SCR technology installed to achieve MATS compliance for either $SO_2$ or particulate emissions control, representing all of the 39,377.9 MW total coal capacity.

310 See *id.*

## Emissions

Figure 8-10 shows the total $CO_2$ emissions in short tons, the $CO_2$ emission rate in short tons per MWh within PJM for all $CO_2$ emitting units, for each quarter from 1999 to the first quarter of 2026, and the $CO_2$ emission rate in short tons per MWh of total generation within PJM for each quarter from the third quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2026.[311] [312]

Figure 8-11 shows the total $CO_2$ emission in short tons on peak and off peak and the $CO_2$ emission rate in short tons per MWh for all $CO_2$ emitting units.

Table 8-32 shows the minimum and maximum $CO_2$ emission rates in short tons per MWh for all $CO_2$ emitting units, for all hours, as well as on and off peak hours, from the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2026.

Total PJM generation increased from 223,485.3 GWh in the first quarter of 2025 to 227,611.8 GWh in the first quarter of 2026, while $CO_2$ produced increased from 97.9 million short tons in the first quarter of 2025 to 99.6 million short tons in the first quarter of 2026.[313] The $CO_2$ emission rate averaged 0.63 short tons per MWh for all $CO_2$ emitting units in 2024, and 0.66 short tons per MWh for all $CO_2$ emitting units in 2025.


311 Unless otherwise noted, emissions are measured in short tons. A short ton is 2,000 pounds.

312 At the time of this report, EPA emissions data for the second quarter of 2026 was not yet available. As a result, the data and results in this section include only the first three months of 2026.

313 See the *2024 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM: Volume 2*, Section 3: Energy Market, Table 3-51.


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### Figure 8-10 $CO_2$ emissions by quarter (millions of short tons), by PJM units: January 1999 through March 2026[314] [315]




In the first quarter of 2026, $CO_2$ emission rates were 0.66 short tons per MWh for all $CO_2$ emitting units for off peak hours, and 0.66 short tons per MWh for on peak hours. Of the top 10 largest $CO_2$ emitting units in the United States, three (Gavin, Prairie State, and Amos) are located in the PJM footprint.[316]

### Figure 8-11 Total $CO_2$ emissions during on and off peak hours by quarter (millions of short tons), by PJM units: January 1999 through March 2026[317]




### Table 8-32 Minimum and maximum $CO_2$ emissions per MWh: January 1999 through March 2026

| | | Short Tons per MWh | Year | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minimum | All hours | 0.63 | 2024 | 4 |
| | On Peak | 0.63 | 2024 | 4 |
| | Off Peak | 0.63 | 2024 | 4 |
| Maximum | All hours | 0.96 | 2010 | 1 |
| | On Peak | 0.94 | 2010 | 1 |
| | Off Peak | 0.97 | 2010 | 2 |

314 The emissions are calculated from the continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) data from generators located within the PJM footprint.

315 In 2004 and 2005, PJM integrated the American Electric Power (AEP), ComEd, Dayton Power & Light Company (DAY), Dominion, and Duquesne Light Company (DLCO) Control Zones. The large increase in total emissions from 2004 to 2005 was a result of these integrations. In June 2011, PJM integrated the American Transmission Systems, Inc. (ATSI) Control Zone. In January 2012, PJM integrated the Duke Energy Ohio/Kentucky (DEOK) Control Zone. In June 2013, PJM integrated the Eastern Kentucky Power Cooperative (EKPC). In December 2018, PJM integrated the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC).

316 "The top 10 emitting power plants in America," <*https://www.eenews.net/articles/the-top-10-emitting-power-plants-in-america/*>.

317 The emissions are calculated from the continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) data from generators located within the PJM footprint.



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
Figure 8-12 shows the total $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emissions and the emission rate in short tons per MWh for all $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emitting units, and the $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emission rate in short tons per MWh of total PJM generation. In the first quarter of 2026, the $SO_2$ emission rate was 0.000356 short tons per MWh for all $SO_2$ emitting units, and the NOx emission rate was 0.000308 short tons per MWh for all $NO_X$ emitting units.

Figure 8-13 shows the total on peak hour and off peak hour $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emissions and the emission rate in short tons per MWh for all $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emitting units. In the first quarter of 2026, $SO_2$ emission rates were 0.000356 short tons per MWh and 0.000357 short tons per MWh for all $SO_2$ units, for off and on peak hours. In the first quarter of 2026, $NO_X$ emission rates were 0.000306 short tons per MWh and 0.000309 short tons per MWh for all $NO_X$ emitting units, for off and on peak hours.

Table 8-33 shows the minimum and maximum SO2 and NOx emission rate in short tons per MWh for all $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emitting units, for all hours, as well as on and off peak hours, from the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2026.

The consistent decline in $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emissions starting in 2006 is the result of a decline in the use of coal, an increase in the use of natural gas, and the installation of environmental controls from 2006 to 2026.[318] [319]

**Figure 8-12 $SO_2$ and $NO_X$ emissions by quarter (thousands of short tons), by PJM units: January 1999 through March 2026[320]**




318 See EIA, "Changes in coal sector led to less $SO_2$ and $NO_x$ emissions from electric power industry," <*https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37752*>.

319 See EIA, "Sulfur dioxide emissions from U.S. power plants have fallen faster than coal generation," <*https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29812*>.

320 The emissions are calculated from the continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) data from generators located within the PJM footprint.

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Figure 8-13 $SO_2$ and $NO_x$ emissions during on and off peak hours by quarter (thousands of short tons), by PJM units: January 1999 through March 2026[321]





Table 8-33 Minimum and maximum $SO_2$ and NOx emissions per MWh: January 1999 through March 2026

| Emission Type | | | Short Tons per MWh | Year | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SO2 | Minimum | All hours | 0.000 | 2024 | 4 |
| | | On Peak | 0.000 | 2024 | 4 |
| | | Off Peak | 0.000 | 2024 | 3 |
| | Maximum | All hours | 0.008 | 2003 | 4 |
| | | On Peak | 0.008 | 2003 | 4 |
| | | Off Peak | 0.008 | 2003 | 4 |
| NOx | Minimum | All hours | 0.000 | 2023 | 3 |
| | | On Peak | 0.000 | 2023 | 2 |
| | | Off Peak | 0.000 | 2023 | 3 |
| | Maximum | All hours | 0.002 | 2005 | 1 |
| | | On Peak | 0.002 | 2005 | 1 |
| | | Off Peak | 0.002 | 2005 | 1 |

# Renewable Energy Output

## Wind and Solar Peak Hour Output

Three different measures of capacity are applicable to wind and solar resources. The effective nameplate capacity is the maximum facility output (MFO).[322] [323] The installed capacity (ICAP) for wind and solar generators is equal to the lower of the effective nameplate and the capacity interconnection rights (CIRs).[324] The capacity measure for the PJM capacity market is unforced capacity (UCAP). The UCAP values for solar and wind generators are derated from the ICAP value based on expected performance during hours with high risk of loss of load (unserved energy). Until June 1, 2023, PJM used average unit performance over 360 summer peak hours to determine the derating factors for wind and solar resources. For the 2023/2024 and the 2024/2025 Delivery Years, PJM used an average ELCC approach to determine the capacity derating factor.[325] Beginning with the 2025/2026 Delivery Year, PJM changed to a marginal ELCC approach.[326] [327] [328]

321 The emissions are calculated from the continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) data from generators located within the PJM footprint.

322 *PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement*, Article 1.
323 MFO is defined in the *PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff*, Section I.1.
324 *PJM Manual 21: PJM Rules and Procedures for Determination of Generating Capability*, Section 6.1.1.
325 See Capacity Value of Intermittent Resources (ELCC) in *2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March*, Section 5: Capacity Market.
326 *Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM*, ER24-99-000 (November 9, 2023).
327 Order 186 FERC ¶ 61,080 accepting PJM's marginal ELCC approach (January 30, 2024).
328 ELCC rates and data are available on the PJM website <*https://www.pjm.com/planning/resource-adequacy-planning/effective-load-carrying-capability*>.



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To illustrate the relationship among actual output, deliverable output and derating factors, Figure 8-14 shows wind and solar output and the three corresponding capacity measures, during the top 100 load hours in PJM in the first six months of 2026. Figure 8-15 shows wind and solar output for all hours in the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, 82 of the top 100 load hours in PJM are PJM defined peak load hours. The hours in Figure 8-14 are in descending order by load and the hours in Figure 8-15 are in chronological order. The solid lines represent the nameplate, ICAP and output of the wind or solar PJM generators. The dashed lines represent the UCAP for PJM wind and solar generators.

As shown in Figure 8-14, the actual output of the wind and solar generators during the top 100 load hours varied both above and below the ICAP and UCAP. Wind output was above the UCAP for 56 hours and below the UCAP for 44 hours of the top 100 load hours in the first six months of 2026. Wind output was above the ICAP for 49 hours and below the ICAP for 51 hours of the top 100 load hours in the first six months of 2026.

Solar output was above the UCAP for 55 hours and below the UCAP for 45 hours of the top 100 load hours in the first six months of 2026. Solar output was above the ICAP for 24 hours and below the ICAP for 76 hours of the top 100 load hours in the first six months of 2026. The solar capacity factor for the top 100 load hours in the first six months of 2026 was 27.7 percent.

**Figure 8-14 Wind and solar output during the top 100 load hours: January through June, 2026[329]**





As shown in Figure 8-15, the wind capacity factor for the top 100 load hours in the first six months of 2026 was 30.7 percent. Wind output was above the UCAP for 2,514 hours and below the UCAP for 1,829 hours in the first six months of 2026. Wind output was above the ICAP for 2,383 hours and below the ICAP for 1,960 hours in the first six months of 2026. The wind capacity factor in the first six months of 2026 was 34.2 percent.

Solar output was above the UCAP for 1,859 hours and below the UCAP for 2,484 hours in the first six months of 2026. Solar output was above the ICAP for 793 hours and below the ICAP for 3,550 hours in the first six months of 2026. The solar capacity factor in the first six months of 2026 was 21.4 percent.

329 The derated capacity (UCAP) includes energy only resources with the derating factors that would apply if the resources were capacity resources. The ICAP includes capacity resources only and represents the deliverable capacity.

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Figure 8-15 Wind and solar output: January through June, 2026[330]




As shown in Figure 8-15 includes the impacts of the ELCC rules and winter CIR rules on the derated capacity values. The UCAP for wind units includes winter CIRs. Winter CIRs are effective from November 1 through April 30 of the following year. The effect of the winter CIRs is reflected in Figure 8-15 by a decrease in the ICAP and UCAP for wind on May 1. On June 1, the ELCC ratings were updated for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The onshore wind ELCC rating remained unchanged at 38 percent. The tracking panel solar ELCC rating changed from 14 percent for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year to 13 percent for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year. The fixed panel solar ELCC rating remained unchanged at 10 percent. The changes on June 1 reflect changes in the ELCC ratings, changes to CIRs, new capacity additions and capacity retirements. The increases in the solar nameplate line and the wind nameplate line reflect new generators coming online.

330 The derated capacity (UCAP) includes energy only resources with the derating factors that would apply if the resources were capacity resources. The ICAP includes capacity resources only and represents the deliverable capacity.

## Wind Units

Table 8-34 shows the capacity factors of wind units in PJM. In the first six months of 2026, the capacity factor of wind units in PJM was 34.2 percent. Wind units that were capacity resources had a capacity factor of 24.2 percent and a nameplate capacity of 11,967.9 MW. Wind units that were energy only had a capacity factor of 34.5 percent and a nameplate capacity of 1,057.7 MW. Wind capacity resources were derated to 14.7 or 17.6 percent of nameplate capacity for the capacity market prior to June 1, 2023, based on the wind farm terrain.

Table 8-34 Capacity factor of wind units: January through June, 2026

| Type of Resource | Capacity Factor | Nameplate Capacity (MW) |
|---|---|---|
| Energy-Only Resource | 34.5% | 1,057.7 |
| Capacity Resource | 34.2% | 11,967.9 |
| All Units | 34.2% | 13,025.6 |


Wind units that are capacity resources are required, like all capacity resources except demand resources, to offer the energy associated with their cleared capacity in the day-ahead energy market and in the real-time energy market. Figure 8-16 shows the average hourly real-time generation and day-ahead commitment of wind units in PJM, by month and hour of the day for the first six months of 2026. The hour with the highest average output in the first six months of 2026 was hour 3 in March with an average output of 5,728.2 MWh. The hour with the lowest average output in the first six months of 2026 was hour 10 in June with an average output of 2,313.2 MWh. Wind output in PJM is generally higher during off peak hours and lower during on peak hours. Wind output is generally highest during the months from November through March and lowest during the months from May through September.

Wind resources' day-ahead commitments are lower than real-time generation for most hours. Table 8-35 provides a summary of the deviations between wind resources' real-time generation and day-ahead commitments. In March 2026, hourly real-time generation exceeded day-ahead commitments by 1,163.5 MWh on average, the highest average monthly deviation in the first six months of 2026. The lowest monthly average deviation occurred in June


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with hourly real-time generation exceeding day-ahead commitments by 430.4 MWh on average. Wind generation exceeded day-ahead commitments in 82.3 percent of hours in the first six months of 2026. June had 191 hours, 26.5 percent, with day-ahead commitments exceeding real-time generation.

### Figure 8-16 Average hourly real-time generation and day-ahead commitments of wind units: January through June, 2026




### Table 8-35 Deviations between real-time wind generation and day-ahead commitments by month: January through June, 2026[331]

| Month | Average Hourly Deviation | Minimum Hourly Deviation | Maximum Hourly Deviation | Hours with Negative Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| January | 1,023.8 | (2,045.1) | 3,727.5 | 14.7% |
| February | 896.7 | (1,408.2) | 3,325.9 | 14.4% |
| March | 1,163.5 | (1,432.1) | 3,933.4 | 14.3% |
| April | 1,071.0 | (1,799.3) | 2,993.4 | 14.9% |
| May | 753.8 | (2,022.3) | 3,001.6 | 21.1% |
| June | 430.4 | (1,899.6) | 2,511.7 | 26.5% |

Table 8-36 shows the generation and capacity factor of wind units by month for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 8-36 Capacity factor of wind units in PJM by month: January through June, 2025 and 2026


| | 2025 | | 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor |
| January | 3,907.9 | 41.6% | 3,865.8 | 40.3% |
| February | 3,084.0 | 36.2% | 2,906.7 | 33.5% |
| March | 4,261.9 | 45.1% | 3,964.4 | 40.9% |
| April | 3,259.4 | 35.6% | 3,787.9 | 40.3% |
| May | 2,660.4 | 28.1% | 2,619.1 | 27.0% |
| June | 1,780.2 | 19.5% | 2,197.8 | 23.1% |

331 Hourly deviations are equal to the real-time generation less day-ahead commitments.

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Output from wind turbines displaces output from other generation types because, in general, wind turbines generate power when the wind is blowing, regardless of the price. This displacement affects the output of marginal units in PJM. The magnitude and type of effect on marginal unit output depends on the level of wind turbine output, its location, time and duration. One measure of this displacement is based on the mix of marginal units when wind is producing output.[332] Figure 8-17 and Table 8-37 show the hourly average proportion of marginal units by fuel type mapped to the hourly average MW of real-time wind generation in the first six months of 2026. This is not an exact measure of displacement because it is not based on a redispatch of the system without wind resources. In the first six months of 2026, the SCED dispatch instruction for marginal wind resources was to reduce output for 62.8 percent of the marginal wind unit intervals. When wind appears as the displaced fuel at times when wind resources were on the margin this means that there was no displacement for those hours, if the dispatch instruction was to lower the generation. The level of wind displaced by wind is thus overstated by this metric.

**Figure 8-17 Marginal fuel at time of wind generation: January through June, 2026**




332 The measure is based on the principle that any incremental change in the wind output is balanced by the change in the output of marginal generators, while holding everything else equal.



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### Table 8-37 Marginal fuel MW at time of wind generation: January through June, 2026

| Hour | Battery | Coal | Diesel | Heavy Oil | LFG | Light Oil | MSW | Misc | Natural Gas | Nuclear | Waste Coal | Wind | Kerosene | Solar | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 3.2 | 854.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 5.3 | 41.6 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 2,809.7 | 18.1 | 1.8 | 1,028.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,778.5 |
| 1 | 7.2 | 805.7 | 0.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 39.2 | 4.2 | 6.7 | 2,851.2 | 20.5 | 5.4 | 1,001.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,744.6 |
| 2 | 2.8 | 693.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 36.3 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 2,940.8 | 28.2 | 4.6 | 976.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,686.8 |
| 3 | 3.2 | 663.7 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 37.5 | 12.6 | 1.9 | 2,888.8 | 28.3 | 3.6 | 957.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,607.8 |
| 4 | 0.0 | 736.1 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 4.7 | 60.5 | 8.3 | 9.0 | 2,722.3 | 40.7 | 3.2 | 948.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,536.1 |
| 5 | 0.0 | 719.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 7.7 | 88.3 | 13.7 | 0.5 | 2,689.7 | 24.8 | 1.2 | 948.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 4,499.1 |
| 6 | 1.9 | 649.9 | 1.3 | 9.2 | 4.3 | 75.5 | 12.8 | 0.9 | 2,730.5 | 16.4 | 4.4 | 984.4 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 4,492.2 |
| 7 | 1.9 | 721.2 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 5.4 | 88.1 | 9.3 | 3.9 | 2,725.6 | 20.0 | 11.2 | 882.6 | 0.8 | 11.1 | 4,471.4 |
| 8 | 4.9 | 590.2 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 94.9 | 3.9 | 8.4 | 2,560.2 | 9.6 | 11.4 | 851.6 | 0.0 | 119.6 | 4,142.8 |
| 9 | 2.8 | 550.2 | 0.7 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 65.4 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 2,338.4 | 15.6 | 6.7 | 761.9 | 0.0 | 302.2 | 3,758.5 |
| 10 | 0.2 | 536.0 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 47.2 | 6.7 | 5.5 | 2,251.5 | 16.7 | 2.5 | 703.3 | 0.0 | 450.8 | 3,574.9 |
| 11 | 3.4 | 553.5 | 1.7 | 3.8 | 0.6 | 40.6 | 9.8 | 0.5 | 2,078.6 | 15.9 | 5.4 | 687.8 | 0.0 | 606.9 | 3,401.5 |
| 12 | 1.0 | 495.3 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 54.2 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 2,106.8 | 12.2 | 2.7 | 809.1 | 0.0 | 579.6 | 3,492.9 |
| 13 | 1.7 | 505.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 39.0 | 7.8 | 4.3 | 2,168.4 | 14.7 | 4.9 | 907.3 | 0.0 | 545.5 | 3,656.5 |
| 14 | 1.9 | 540.2 | 1.7 | 0.5 | 3.2 | 69.5 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 2,223.6 | 14.5 | 6.5 | 1,000.4 | 0.0 | 458.0 | 3,876.9 |
| 15 | 0.0 | 528.1 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 6.2 | 97.3 | 4.3 | 0.9 | 2,267.6 | 11.3 | 6.6 | 1,031.2 | 0.0 | 466.6 | 3,954.5 |
| 16 | 3.1 | 536.2 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 141.2 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 2,317.6 | 15.8 | 3.4 | 1,136.2 | 0.0 | 319.4 | 4,177.1 |
| 17 | 10.1 | 546.6 | 2.4 | 7.1 | 5.6 | 155.8 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2,397.4 | 10.1 | 9.2 | 1,151.2 | 1.2 | 184.9 | 4,302.8 |
| 18 | 1.0 | 598.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 8.0 | 180.0 | 5.4 | 6.8 | 2,503.1 | 12.5 | 6.2 | 1,102.9 | 0.0 | 93.9 | 4,429.7 |
| 19 | 8.1 | 542.5 | 10.2 | 8.1 | 9.9 | 210.3 | 12.7 | 1.1 | 2,559.5 | 5.3 | 6.9 | 1,132.1 | 0.0 | 45.2 | 4,506.6 |
| 20 | 0.0 | 603.4 | 5.3 | 7.2 | 8.6 | 189.3 | 14.2 | 4.9 | 2,607.6 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 1,084.7 | 2.9 | 7.0 | 4,534.2 |
| 21 | 0.0 | 729.2 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 5.1 | 178.5 | 12.7 | 1.6 | 2,654.9 | 9.0 | 6.4 | 1,015.9 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 4,628.3 |
| 22 | 0.0 | 785.5 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 3.6 | 149.2 | 13.4 | 4.0 | 2,705.4 | 13.3 | 2.7 | 1,060.5 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 4,741.4 |
| 23 | 0.0 | 826.3 | 1.1 | 7.8 | 2.1 | 113.9 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 2,683.2 | 19.9 | 2.8 | 1,128.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,792.1 |
| Average | 2.4 | 637.9 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 95.6 | 7.7 | 4.0 | 2,532.6 | 16.5 | 5.1 | 970.5 | 0.5 | 174.7 | 4,282.8 |

## Solar Units

Solar units in PJM may be in front of or behind the meter. The data reported include all and only PJM solar units that are in front of the meter. As shown in Table 8-23, there are 18,105.1 MW of solar capacity registered in GATS that are PJM units. As shown in Table 8-24, there are 15,906.7 MW capacity of solar registered in GATS that are not PJM units. Some behind the meter generation exists in clusters, such as community solar farms. The customers of these clusters may or may not be located at the same node on the transmission system as the solar farm. When behind the meter generation and its associated load are at separate nodes, loads should pay for the appropriate level of transmission service, and should not be permitted to avoid paying appropriate costs as a result of badly designed rules, such as rules for netting. The MMU recommends that load and generation located at separate nodes be treated as separate resources.

Table 8-38 shows the capacity factor of solar units in PJM. The capacity factor of solar units in PJM was 21.4 percent for the first six months of 2026. Solar units that were capacity resources had a capacity factor of 22.0 percent and a nameplate capacity of 14,688.5 MW. Solar units that were energy only had a capacity factor of 15.8 percent and a nameplate capacity of 1,604.0 MW.

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
### Table 8-38 Capacity factor of solar units: January through June, 2026

| Type of Resource | Capacity Factor | Nameplate Capacity (MW) |
|---|---|---|
| Energy-Only Resource | 15.8% | 1,604.0 |
| Capacity Resource | 22.0% | 14,688.5 |
| All Units | 21.4% | 16,292.5 |

Solar units that are capacity resources are required, like all capacity resources except demand resources, to offer the energy associated with their cleared capacity in the day-ahead energy market and in the real-time energy market. Figure 8-18 shows the average real-time generation and day-ahead commitments of solar units in PJM, by month and hour of day.[333] The hour with the highest average output in the first six months of 2026, was hour 13 in June with an average of 11,385.5 MW. January had the lowest solar output in the first six months of 2026. The hour in January with the highest average output was hour 13 with an average of 6,274.2 MW. Solar output in PJM is generally higher during peak hours and lower during off peak hours. Solar output is generally highest during the months from May through August and lowest during the months from November through February.

Solar unit day-ahead commitments are lower than real-time generation for most hours between sunrise and sunset. Table 8-39 provides a summary of the deviations between solar unit real-time generation and day-ahead commitments. In January 2026, hourly real-time solar unit generation exceeded day-ahead solar unit commitments by 638.5 MWh on average, the highest average monthly deviation. The lowest monthly average deviation occurred in April with hourly real-time solar unit generation exceeding day-ahead commitments by 276.6 MWh on average. Solar generation exceeded day-ahead commitments in 63.6 percent of hours between sunrise and sunset in the first six months of 2026. May had the highest number of hours, 38.7 percent, with day-ahead commitments exceeding real-time generation.

### Figure 8-18 Average hourly real-time generation and day-ahead commitments of solar units: January through June, 2026




333 The average day-ahead generation of solar units in PJM is greater than 0 for hours when the sun is down due to some solar units being paired with landfill units.



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### Table 8-39 Deviations between real-time solar generation and day-ahead commitments by month: January through June, 2026[334]

| Month | Average Hourly Deviation | Minimum Hourly Deviation | Maximum Hourly Deviation | Hours with Negative Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| January | 638.5 | (1,365.9) | 3,213.4 | 30.8% |
| February | 544.1 | (2,021.8) | 3,150.2 | 31.8% |
| March | 548.2 | (3,552.4) | 4,340.4 | 34.8% |
| April | 276.6 | (3,172.9) | 2,749.1 | 41.8% |
| May | 381.1 | (2,339.3) | 2,303.8 | 38.7% |
| June | 363.7 | (2,079.9) | 2,468.0 | 37.1% |


Table 8-40 shows the generation and capacity factor of solar units by month for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 8-40 Capacity factor of solar units by month: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 | | 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor | Generation (GWh) | Capacity Factor |
| January | 1,261.4 | 12.8% | 1,334.6 | 11.2% |
| February | 1,315.6 | 14.6% | 1,686.2 | 15.7% |
| March | 2,136.4 | 21.2% | 2,376.0 | 19.8% |
| April | 2,407.6 | 24.2% | 2,998.1 | 25.4% |
| May | 2,433.7 | 23.6% | 3,249.0 | 26.4% |
| June | 2,812.0 | 27.9% | 3,500.6 | 29.2% |

Output from solar generators displaces output from other generation types because, in general, solar photovoltaic cells generate power when the sun is shining, regardless of the price. This displacement affects the output of marginal units in PJM. The magnitude and type of effect on marginal unit output depends on the level of solar photovoltaic cell output, its location, time and duration. One measure of this displacement is based on the mix of marginal units when a solar unit is producing output.[335] Figure 8-19 and Table 8-41 show the hourly average proportion of marginal units by fuel type mapped to the hourly average MW of real-time solar generation in the first six months of 2026. This is not an exact measure of displacement because it is not based on a redispatch of the system without solar resources. In the first six months of 2026, the SCED dispatch instruction for marginal solar resources was to reduce output for 93.2 percent of the marginal solar unit intervals. When solar appears as the displaced fuel at times when solar resources were on the margin this means that there was no displacement for those hours, if the dispatch instruction was to lower the generation. The level of solar displaced by solar is thus overstated by this metric.

### Figure 8-19 Marginal fuel at time of solar generation: January through June, 2026




334 Hourly deviations are equal to the real-time generation less day-ahead commitments.

335 The measure is based on the principle that any incremental change in the solar output is balanced by the change in the output of marginal generators, while holding everything else equal.

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## Table 8-41 Marginal fuel MW at time of solar generation: January through June, 2026

| Hour | Battery | Coal | Diesel | Heavy Oil | LFG | Light Oil | Misc | Natural Gas | Nuclear | Waste Coal | Wind | MSW | Kerosene | Solar | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 5 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 |
| 6 | 0.2 | 26.7 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 157.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 21.2 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 207.3 |
| 7 | 6.1 | 239.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 13.2 | 0.1 | 1,236.8 | 11.7 | 2.5 | 153.3 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 1,679.1 |
| 8 | 2.5 | 567.8 | 2.5 | 0.2 | 2.7 | 91.9 | 15.1 | 3,209.7 | 8.8 | 8.3 | 543.8 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 309.4 | 4,765.7 |
| 9 | 6.9 | 984.2 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 134.8 | 8.7 | 4,715.1 | 28.9 | 10.9 | 842.5 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 636.7 | 7,386.2 |
| 10 | 2.4 | 1,125.5 | 9.0 | 4.3 | 0.0 | 126.3 | 10.8 | 5,256.6 | 23.1 | 2.6 | 924.7 | 11.5 | 0.0 | 1,146.7 | 8,643.4 |
| 11 | 8.2 | 1,264.9 | 6.6 | 7.7 | 1.7 | 112.0 | 3.0 | 5,174.7 | 30.3 | 7.9 | 1,037.1 | 18.9 | 0.0 | 1,570.8 | 9,243.8 |
| 12 | 2.9 | 1,264.5 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 142.5 | 10.2 | 5,341.1 | 17.3 | 7.9 | 1,154.7 | 7.2 | 0.0 | 1,527.2 | 9,485.1 |
| 13 | 4.2 | 1,241.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 108.1 | 7.9 | 5,363.8 | 20.2 | 18.4 | 1,282.6 | 15.1 | 0.0 | 1,367.3 | 9,436.9 |
| 14 | 3.8 | 1,133.7 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 6.6 | 159.0 | 15.1 | 5,274.1 | 25.2 | 20.3 | 1,354.3 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 1,111.8 | 9,132.5 |
| 15 | 0.0 | 1,006.7 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 19.2 | 217.5 | 2.5 | 4,763.2 | 12.6 | 14.5 | 1,310.9 | 12.2 | 0.0 | 1,027.4 | 8,389.1 |
| 16 | 8.2 | 811.9 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 6.5 | 236.7 | 8.9 | 3,933.3 | 19.9 | 6.2 | 1,190.6 | 16.3 | 0.0 | 642.8 | 6,893.4 |
| 17 | 22.1 | 623.5 | 4.7 | 13.1 | 5.0 | 233.4 | 4.0 | 2,911.5 | 14.4 | 1.7 | 856.7 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 355.3 | 5,052.0 |
| 18 | 1.9 | 394.1 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 11.3 | 163.2 | 5.1 | 1,824.5 | 10.2 | 2.0 | 496.0 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 108.7 | 3,025.3 |
| 19 | 4.3 | 96.6 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 74.7 | 0.2 | 648.5 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 148.4 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 19.5 | 1,002.8 |
| 20 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 6.9 | 0.1 | 77.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 10.6 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 107.9 |
| 21 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.3 |
| 22 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.4 |
| 23 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.4 |
| Average | 3.1 | 449.7 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 75.9 | 3.8 | 2,078.9 | 9.3 | 4.4 | 472.0 | 5.4 | 0.1 | 409.9 | 3,519.1 |


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# 9 Interchange Transactions

PJM market participants import energy from, and export energy to, external regions continuously. The transactions involved may fulfill long-term or short-term bilateral contracts or respond to price differentials. The external regions include both market and nonmarket balancing authorities.

## Overview

### Interchange Transaction Activity

- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the real-time energy market in all months.[1] In the first six months of 2026, the real-time net interchange was -11,826.5 GWh. The real-time net interchange in the first six months of 2025 was -17,194.6 GWh.
- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the day-ahead energy market in all months. In the first six months of 2026, the total day-ahead net interchange was -13,028.4 GWh. The day-ahead net interchange in the first six months of 2025 was -16,895.4 GWh.
- **Aggregate Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead and the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, gross imports in the day-ahead energy market were 51.9 percent of gross imports in the real-time energy market (58.0 percent in the first six months of 2025). In the first six months of 2026, gross exports in the day-ahead energy market were 81.5 percent of the gross exports in the real-time energy market (84.6 percent in the first six months of 2025).
- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at 12 of PJM's 19 interfaces in the real-time energy market.
- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Real-Time Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for real-time transactions in the real-time energy market.
- **Interface Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at 13 of PJM's 19 interfaces in the day-ahead energy market.
- **Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions in the day-ahead energy market.
- **Up To Congestion Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.** In the first six months of 2026, up to congestion transactions were net exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions in the day-ahead energy market.
- **Inadvertent Interchange.** In the first six months of 2026, net scheduled interchange was -11,826.5 GWh and net actual interchange was -11,986.3 GWh, a difference of 159.9 GWh. In the first six months of 2025, the difference was 182.1 GWh. This difference is inadvertent interchange.
- **Loop Flows.** In the first six months of 2026, the Northern Indiana Public Service (NIPS) Interface had the largest loop flows of any interface with -360.1 GWh of net scheduled interchange and -6,323.0 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 5,962.9 GWh. In the first six months of 2026, the SOUTH interface pricing point had the largest loop flows of any interface pricing point with 4,603.4 GWh of net scheduled interchange and 9,720.1 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 5,116.7 GWh.

## Interactions with Bordering Areas

### PJM Interface Pricing with Organized Markets

- **PJM and MISO Interface Prices.** In the first six months of 2026, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface in 53.6 percent of the hours.

1 Calculated values shown in Section 9, "Interchange Transactions," are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

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- **PJM and New York ISO Interface Prices.** In the first six months of 2026, the direction of the hourly flow was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM/NYIS Interface and the NYISO/PJM proxy bus in 61.7 percent of the hours.
- **Neptune Underwater Transmission Line to Long Island, New York.** In the first six months of 2026, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Neptune Interface and the NYISO Neptune bus in 82.7 percent of the hours.
- **Linden Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT) Facility.** In the first six months of 2026, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Linden Interface and the NYISO Linden bus in 77.7 percent of the hours.
- **Hudson DC Line.** In the first six months of 2026, the hourly flow (PJM to NYISO) was consistent with the real-time hourly price differences between the PJM Hudson Interface and the NYISO Hudson bus in 77.5 percent of the hours.

## Interchange Transaction Issues

- **PJM Transmission Loading Relief Procedures (TLRs).** PJM issued three TLRs of level 3a or higher in the first six months of 2026, and two such TLRs in the first six months of 2025.
- **Up To Congestion.** The average number of up to congestion bids submitted in the day-ahead energy market increased by 14.6 percent, from 47,825 bids per day in the first six months of 2025 to 54,791 bids per day in the first six months of 2026. The average cleared volume of up to congestion bids submitted in the day-ahead energy market decreased by 23.5 percent, from 242,420 MWh per day in the first six months of 2025, to 185,501 MWh per day in the first six months of 2026.

## Recommendations

- The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU recommends that PJM apply after the fact market settlement adjustments to identified sham scheduling segments to ensure that market participants cannot benefit from sham scheduling. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule by concealing the true source or sink of the transaction. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would require market participants to submit transactions on paths that reflect the expected actual power flow in order to reduce unscheduled loop flows. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the locational price impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the MISO interface pricing point. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM review the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual interface pricing points to reflect changes to the impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines as a result of system topology changes. The MMU recommends that this review occur at least annually. (Priority: Low. First reported 2009. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, in order to permit a complete analysis of loop flow, FERC and NERC ensure that the identified data are made available to market monitors as well as other industry entities determined appropriate by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2003. Status: Not adopted.)


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- The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that would remove the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams. Such a solution would include an optimized, but limited, joint dispatch approach that uses supply curves and treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to other constraints within an LMP market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports as well as unlimited nonfirm point to point willing to pay congestion imports and exports at all PJM interfaces in order to improve the efficiency of the market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the emergency interchange cap be replaced with a market based solution. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1800 on the day prior, to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes. These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be used to meet load in the most economic manner. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted, 2015.)
- The MMU recommends eliminating the mechanism that defines FFE and M2M payments. These mechanisms are not consistent with markets and are not needed for efficient interface pricing. The MMU recommends that PJM file with the Commission to eliminate the FFE calculation and M2M payment of the PJM and MISO joint operating agreement. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends clear, explicit and detailed rules that define the conditions under which PJM will and will not recall energy from PJM capacity resources and prohibit new energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends that those rules define the conditions under which PJM will purchase emergency energy while at the same time not recalling energy exports from PJM capacity resources. The MMU recommends clear rules governing when PJM may recall capacity backed exports. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Partially adopted.)

## Conclusion

Transactions between PJM and multiple balancing authorities in the Eastern Interconnection are part of a single energy market. While some of these balancing authorities are termed market areas and some are termed nonmarket areas, all electricity transactions are part of a single energy market. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between market and nonmarket areas. Market areas, like PJM, include essential features of an energy market including locational marginal pricing, financial congestion offsets (FTRs and ARRs in PJM) and transparent, least cost, security constrained economic dispatch for all available generation. Nonmarket areas do not include these features. Pricing in the market areas is transparent and pricing in the nonmarket areas is not transparent.

The MMU's recommendations related to transactions with external balancing authorities all share the goal of improving the economic efficiency of interchange transactions. The standard of comparison is an LMP market. In an LMP market, redispatch based on LMP and competitive generator offers results in an efficient dispatch and efficient prices. The goal of designing interface transaction rules should be to match the outcomes that would exist in an LMP market across the interfaces.

It is not appropriate to have special pricing agreements between PJM and any external entity. The same market pricing should apply to all transactions. External entities wishing to receive the benefits of the PJM LMP market should join PJM.

In 2020, PJM terminated a number of interface pricing points, consistent with longstanding MMU recommendations. Following the termination of the Northwest pricing point on October 1, 2020, PJM failed to correctly map the pricing points to transactions that had been mapped to the Northwest pricing point to pricing points that are consistent with electrical impacts on the PJM system. The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point

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or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the electrical impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM. The MMU continues to recommend the termination of the Ontario interface pricing point. The Ontario interface pricing point is noncontiguous to the PJM footprint that creates opportunities for market participants to engage in sham scheduling activities.

# Interchange Transaction Activity

## Charges and Credits Applied to Interchange Transactions

Interchange transactions are subject to various charges and credits. These charges and credits are dependent on whether the interchange transaction is submitted in the real-time or day-ahead energy market, the type of transaction, the transmission service used and whether the transaction is an import, export or wheel. Table 9-1 shows the billing line items that represent the charges and credits applied to real-time and day-ahead interchange transactions.[2]

### Table 9-1 Charges and credits applied to interchange transactions

| | Real-Time Transactions | | | | Day-Ahead Transactions | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Billing Item | Import (Firm or Non Firm) | Import (Spot in) | Export | Wheel | Import (Firm or Non Firm) | Import (Spot in) | Export | Wheel | Up to Congestion |
| Firm or Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service | X | | X[1] | X[1] | X | | X[1] | X[1] | |
| Spot Import Service | | X[2] | | | | X[2] | | | |
| Day-ahead Spot Market Energy | | | | | X | X | X | | |
| Balancing Spot Market Energy | X | X | X | | | | | | |
| Day-ahead Transmission Congestion | | | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Balancing Transmission Congestion | X | X | X | X | | | | | X |
| Day-ahead Transmission Losses | | | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Balancing Transmission Losses | X | X | X | X | | | | | X |
| PJM Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service - Control Area Administration | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| PJM Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service - Market Support | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X |
| PJM Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service - Advanced Second Control Center | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| PJM Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service - Market Support Offset | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X |
| PJM Settlement, Inc. | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X |
| Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) Funding | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | X |
| FERC Annual Recovery | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI) Funding | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| Synchronous Condensing | | | X | | | | X | | |
| Transmission Owner Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| Reactive Supply and Voltage Control from Generation and Other Sources Service | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| Day-ahead Operating Reserve | | | | | X | X | X | | X |
| Balancing Operating Reserve | X | X | X | | | | | | X |
| Black Start Service | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation (for those paying for transmission service only) | | | X | | | | X | | |

1 No charge if Point of Delivery is MISO
2 No charge for spot in transmission

2 For an explanation and current rate for each billing line item, see "*Quick Reference Guide to Market Settlements By Type of Business*" (February 1, 2023) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/training/core-curriculum/ip-ms-301/ms-301-quick-reference-guide-to-markets-settlements-by-type-of-business.pdf>. Access to this document requires logging into pjm.com with a user account.


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## Aggregate Imports and Exports

Table 9-2 shows the real-time and day-ahead scheduled interchange totals in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2026, gross imports in the day-ahead energy market were 51.9 percent of gross imports in the real-time energy market (58.0 percent in the first six months of 2025). In the first six months of 2026, gross exports in the day-ahead energy market were 81.5 percent of gross exports in the real-time energy market (84.6 percent in the first six months of 2025).

### Table 9-2 Real-time and day-ahead scheduled interchange volumes (GWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Category | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Real-Time Gross Imports | 8,800.0 | 11,459.0 | 30.2% |
| Real-Time Gross Exports | 25,994.6 | 23,285.4 | (10.4%) |
| Real-Time Net Interchange | (17,194.6) | (11,826.5) | (31.2%) |
| Day-Ahead Gross Imports | 5,101.1 | 5,948.2 | 16.6% |
| Day-Ahead Gross Exports | 21,996.5 | 18,976.6 | (13.7%) |
| Day-Ahead Net Interchange | (16,895.4) | (13,028.4) | (22.9%) |
| Monthly Average Real-Time Gross Exports | 4,332.4 | 3,880.9 | (10.4%) |
| Monthly Average Real-Time Gross Imports | 1,466.7 | 1,909.8 | 30.2% |
| Monthly Average Day-Ahead Gross Exports | 3,666.1 | 3,162.8 | (13.7%) |
| Monthly Average Day-Ahead Gross Imports | 850.2 | 991.4 | 16.6% |

In the first six months of 2026, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the real-time energy market in all months. In the first six months of 2026, PJM was a monthly net exporter of energy in the day-ahead energy market in all months (Figure 9-1).[3]

Figure 9-1 shows real-time and day-ahead import, export and net interchange volumes. The day-ahead totals include fixed, dispatchable and up to congestion transaction totals. The net interchange of up to congestion transactions are represented by the orange line.

Transactions in the day-ahead energy market create financial obligations to deliver in the real-time energy market and to pay operating reserve charges based on differences between the transaction MWh in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets times the applicable operating reserve rates. Up to congestion transactions also create financial obligations to deliver in real time, but did not pay operating reserve charges until November 1, 2020.

### Figure 9-1 Scheduled imports and exports: January through June, 2026





Figure 9-2 shows the real-time and day-ahead import and export volume for PJM from January 1999 through June 2026. PJM shifted from a consistent net importer of energy to relatively consistent net exporter of energy in 2004 in both the real-time and day-ahead energy markets, coincident with the expansion of the PJM footprint that included the integrations of Commonwealth Edison, American Electric Power and Dayton Power and Light into PJM. The net direction of power flows is generally expected to be a function of price differences net of transactions costs. Since the modification of the up to congestion product in September 2010, up to congestion transactions have played a significant role in power flows between PJM and external balancing

3 Calculated values shown in Section 9, "Interchange Transactions," are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

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authorities in the day-ahead energy market. On November 1, 2012, PJM eliminated the requirement that every up to congestion transaction include an interface pricing point as either the source or sink. As a result, the volume of import and export up to congestion transactions decreased, and the volume of internal up to congestion transactions increased. While the gross import and export volumes in the day-ahead energy market decreased, PJM has remained primarily a net exporter in the day-ahead energy market. The requirement for external capacity resources to be pseudo tied into PJM has affected the real-time and day-ahead import volumes. Prior to June 1, 2016, these units were dynamically scheduled into PJM or were block scheduled into PJM and were part of scheduled interchange as imports. Pseudo tied units are treated as internal generation and therefore do not affect interchange volume. The reduction of the import volume based on the switch to pseudo tie status contributed to PJM remaining a net exporter in the real-time and day-ahead energy markets. On February 20, 2018, FERC issued an order limiting the eligible bidding points for up to congestion transactions to hubs, residual metered load and interfaces.[4] As a result, the volume of import and export up to congestion transactions increased, contributing to PJM becoming a net importer in the day-ahead energy market starting in March 2018. On July 16, 2020, FERC issued an order directing PJM to revise uplift allocation rules to allocate uplift to up to congestion transactions.[5] The Order requires PJM to treat an up to congestion transaction, for uplift allocation purposes, as if the up to congestion transaction were equivalent to a DEC at its sink point. On November 1, 2020, PJM began allocating uplift to up to congestion transactions. As a result, the volume of up to congestion transactions decreased, and PJM became a net exporter in the day-ahead energy market.


In February 2021, winter storms caused significant generation outages in Texas and resulted in power outages across the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) region. These outages occurred between February 10, 2021, and February 27, 2021. During this time, ERCOT imported generation from neighboring regions. While PJM did not have any scheduled exports directly to the ERCOT region, PJM exports during this time increased from an average hourly export of 4,772 MW per hour between February 1 and February 10, 2021, to 7,003 MW per hour between February 10 and February 27, 2021.

On June 13, 2022, PJM experienced several intervals of shortage pricing that resulted in high LMPs during the period from 1450 (EPT) through 1800 (EPT). PJM remained a net exporter of energy throughout the period despite the fact that PJM prices were much higher than MISO prices. PJM net exports averaged 4,431 MW during hours ending 1500 (EPT) through 1800 (EPT), a slight decrease from average net exports of 5,560 MW during the hours ending 1100 (EPT) through 1400 (EPT). Market participant response to the pricing signals in this period was affected by TLRs issued by MISO, SWPP and PJM, although the curtailments of scheduled imports to PJM were relatively small compared to the net exports. Export transactions to MISO continued to flow during this period primarily on firm and grandfathered transmission service. The lack of response to relative prices on the PJM/MISO interface was consistent with the ongoing pattern that there are net exports from PJM to MISO in almost every hour, regardless of relative prices. In the first six months of 2026, flows were in the uneconomic direction on the PJM/MISO interface in 46.4 percent of all hours.

4 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,139.
5 See 172 FERC ¶ 61,046.


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**Figure 9-2 Scheduled import and export transaction volume history: January 1, 1999 through June 30, 2026**




## Real-Time Interface Imports and Exports

In the real-time energy market, scheduled imports and exports are defined by the scheduled path, which is the transmission path a market participant selects from the original source to the final sink. These scheduled flows are measured at each of PJM's interfaces with neighboring balancing authorities. Table 9-19 includes a list of active interfaces in the first six months of 2026. Figure 9-3 shows the approximate geographic location of the interfaces. In the first six months of 2026, PJM had 19 interfaces with neighboring balancing authorities. While the Linden (LIND) Interface, the Hudson (HUDS) Interface and the Neptune (NEPT) Interface are separate from the NYIS Interface, all four are interfaces between PJM and the NYISO. There are 10 separate interfaces that make up the MISO Interface between PJM and MISO. Table 9-3 through Table 9-5 show the real-time energy market scheduled interchange totals at the individual NYISO interfaces, as well as with the NYISO as a whole. Similarly, the scheduled interchange totals at the individual interfaces between PJM and MISO are shown, as well as with MISO as a whole. Net scheduled interchange in the real-time energy market is shown by interface in the first six months of 2026 in Table 9-3, while gross scheduled imports and exports are shown in Table 9-4 and Table 9-5.

In the real-time energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at 12 of PJM's 19 interfaces. The top three net exporting interfaces in the real-time energy market accounted for 64.0 percent of the total net scheduled exports: PJM/NYISO (NYIS) with 32.7 percent, PJM/Neptune (NEPT) with 16.2 percent and PJM/MidAmerican Energy Company (MEC) with 15.2 percent of the net scheduled export volume. The four separate interfaces that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPT, PJM/HUDS and PJM/Linden (LIND)) together represented 67.4 percent of the total net PJM scheduled exports in the real-time energy market. There were net scheduled exports in the real-time energy market at six of the 10 separate interfaces that connect PJM to MISO. Those six exporting interfaces represented 28.4 percent of the total net PJM scheduled exports in the real-time energy market.

In the real-time energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled imports at six of PJM's 19 interfaces. The top two importing interfaces in the real-time energy market accounted for 93.6 percent of the total net scheduled imports: PJM/Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) with 66.1 percent and PJM/Duke (DUK) with 27.5 percent of the total net scheduled import volume. The four separate interfaces that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPT, PJM/HUDS and PJM/Linden (LIND)) had net scheduled exports in the real-time energy market. There were net scheduled imports in the real-time energy market at three of the 10 separate interfaces that connect PJM to MISO. These three importing interfaces represented 6.4 percent of the total net PJM scheduled imports in the real-time energy market.[6]

6 In the real-time energy market, one PJM interface had a net interchange of zero (PJM/City Water Light & Power (CWLP)). CWLP is a balancing authority on the western side of MISO.

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## Table 9-3 Real-time scheduled net interchange volume by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | (84.7) | (116.6) | 29.3 | 8.0 | (4.8) | (50.9) | (219.6) |
| CPLW | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 4.4 |
| DUK | 267.2 | 310.8 | 356.8 | 101.9 | 271.9 | 96.3 | 1,404.9 |
| LGEE | (79.0) | (65.4) | (107.4) | (86.9) | (60.1) | (98.7) | (497.6) |
| MISO | (1,320.2) | (93.5) | (621.8) | (323.0) | (483.6) | (1,637.5) | (4,479.7) |
| ALTE | (105.2) | (0.0) | (31.0) | 100.4 | 53.8 | (176.2) | (158.3) |
| ALTW | (36.2) | 37.8 | 55.7 | 64.9 | 31.8 | 35.5 | 189.5 |
| AMIL | 50.9 | 25.1 | 15.1 | 9.1 | 0.9 | (47.3) | 53.8 |
| CIN | (491.5) | 74.8 | (130.7) | (166.9) | (128.7) | (538.2) | (1,381.1) |
| CWLP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IPL | 53.2 | 29.6 | 11.6 | (5.7) | 7.7 | (13.9) | 82.3 |
| MEC | (507.3) | (425.2) | (442.0) | (240.7) | (429.4) | (524.8) | (2,569.4) |
| MECS | (104.1) | 117.2 | 3.0 | 42.9 | 63.5 | (210.9) | (88.4) |
| NIPS | (72.1) | (25.1) | (51.0) | (69.6) | (43.7) | (98.6) | (360.1) |
| WEC | (108.0) | 72.4 | (52.4) | (57.4) | (39.5) | (63.2) | (248.1) |
| NYISO | (2,380.6) | (2,281.9) | (2,152.9) | (1,423.0) | (1,307.7) | (1,874.4) | (11,420.6) |
| HUDS | (440.9) | (361.8) | (156.0) | (236.5) | (291.4) | (413.6) | (1,900.2) |
| LIND | (224.1) | (206.4) | (220.4) | (162.4) | (220.2) | (208.3) | (1,241.8) |
| NEPT | (488.1) | (443.6) | (495.3) | (378.5) | (476.9) | (460.0) | (2,742.4) |
| NYIS | (1,227.5) | (1,270.1) | (1,281.3) | (645.5) | (319.3) | (792.5) | (5,536.2) |
| TVA | 813.8 | 670.0 | 648.1 | 545.2 | 500.4 | 204.1 | 3,381.7 |
| Total | (2,783.3) | (1,576.6) | (1,847.9) | (1,174.0) | (1,084.0) | (3,360.8) | (11,826.5) |

## Table 9-4 Real-time scheduled gross import volume by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | 56.2 | 5.9 | 54.3 | 94.4 | 22.3 | 8.4 | 241.5 |
| CPLW | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 4.6 |
| DUK | 381.6 | 421.3 | 392.2 | 228.3 | 356.1 | 220.7 | 2,000.0 |
| LGEE | 51.6 | 37.3 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 13.8 | 13.2 | 127.0 |
| MISO | 694.8 | 855.4 | 545.7 | 707.6 | 679.2 | 275.8 | 3,758.4 |
| ALTE | 10.1 | 35.0 | 23.6 | 154.9 | 113.8 | 5.3 | 342.7 |
| ALTW | 28.0 | 44.3 | 59.2 | 85.3 | 43.5 | 87.8 | 348.2 |
| AMIL | 66.2 | 37.4 | 35.7 | 31.9 | 33.7 | 6.9 | 211.9 |
| CIN | 203.1 | 244.3 | 70.1 | 79.8 | 90.2 | 6.4 | 694.0 |
| CWLP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IPL | 69.3 | 44.8 | 27.3 | 10.7 | 17.7 | 11.5 | 181.4 |
| MEC | 73.1 | 74.1 | 96.0 | 103.0 | 108.0 | 42.0 | 496.2 |
| MECS | 188.6 | 221.3 | 224.4 | 231.2 | 249.4 | 115.0 | 1,230.0 |
| NIPS | (0.8) | 16.8 | 2.1 | (0.3) | 15.9 | (0.5) | 33.1 |
| WEC | 57.2 | 137.2 | 7.2 | 11.1 | 7.0 | 1.2 | 220.9 |
| NYISO | 139.5 | 97.4 | 144.0 | 143.8 | 130.8 | 139.0 | 794.6 |
| HUDS | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| LIND | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 5.0 |
| NEPT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| NYIS | 137.9 | 97.2 | 144.0 | 142.2 | 129.7 | 138.0 | 789.0 |
| TVA | 1,052.4 | 813.7 | 740.7 | 778.5 | 640.2 | 507.5 | 4,533.0 |
| Total | 2,376.1 | 2,230.9 | 1,882.6 | 1,962.1 | 1,842.3 | 1,165.0 | 11,459.0 |


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Table 9-5 Real-time scheduled gross export volume by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | 140.9 | 122.5 | 25.1 | 86.4 | 27.0 | 59.3 | 461.1 |
| CPLW | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| DUK | 114.3 | 110.5 | 35.4 | 126.3 | 84.2 | 124.4 | 595.1 |
| LGEE | 130.6 | 102.7 | 113.1 | 92.5 | 73.9 | 111.9 | 624.6 |
| MISO | 2,014.9 | 948.9 | 1,167.6 | 1,030.6 | 1,162.8 | 1,913.3 | 8,238.0 |
| ALTE | 115.3 | 35.1 | 54.6 | 54.5 | 60.0 | 181.5 | 501.0 |
| ALTW | 64.2 | 6.5 | 3.5 | 20.4 | 11.7 | 52.4 | 158.7 |
| AMIL | 15.3 | 12.4 | 20.7 | 22.8 | 32.8 | 54.2 | 158.1 |
| CIN | 694.7 | 169.5 | 200.8 | 246.6 | 218.9 | 544.6 | 2,075.2 |
| CWLP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IPL | 16.1 | 15.3 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 10.0 | 25.5 | 99.0 |
| MEC | 580.4 | 499.3 | 538.0 | 343.7 | 537.4 | 566.8 | 3,065.6 |
| MECS | 292.6 | 104.1 | 221.5 | 188.3 | 186.0 | 325.9 | 1,318.4 |
| NIPS | 71.2 | 41.9 | 53.1 | 69.3 | 59.6 | 98.1 | 393.2 |
| WEC | 165.2 | 64.8 | 59.6 | 68.4 | 46.4 | 64.4 | 468.9 |
| NYISO | 2,520.0 | 2,379.3 | 2,296.9 | 1,566.8 | 1,438.5 | 2,013.5 | 12,215.1 |
| HUDS | 440.9 | 362.0 | 156.0 | 236.6 | 291.4 | 413.8 | 1,900.5 |
| LIND | 225.6 | 206.5 | 220.4 | 163.9 | 221.3 | 209.2 | 1,246.9 |
| NEPT | 488.1 | 443.6 | 495.3 | 378.6 | 476.9 | 460.1 | 2,742.6 |
| NYIS | 1,365.5 | 1,367.3 | 1,425.3 | 787.7 | 449.0 | 930.5 | 6,325.1 |
| TVA | 238.6 | 143.7 | 92.5 | 233.3 | 139.8 | 303.4 | 1,151.3 |
| Total | 5,159.4 | 3,807.5 | 3,730.5 | 3,136.0 | 2,926.3 | 4,525.7 | 23,285.4 |

## Real-Time Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports

Interfaces differ from interface pricing points. An interface is a point of interconnection between PJM and a neighboring balancing authority which market participants may designate as a path on which scheduled imports or exports will flow.[7] An interface pricing point defines the price at which transactions are priced, and is based on the path of the actual, physical transfer of energy. While a market participant designates a scheduled path from a generation control area (GCA) to a load control area (LCA), this path reflects the scheduled path as defined by the transmission reservations only, and may not reflect how the energy actually flows from the GCA to LCA. For example, the import transmission path from LG&E Energy, L.L.C. (LGEE), through MISO and into PJM would show the transfer of power into PJM at the PJM/MISO Interface based on the scheduled path of the transaction. However, the physical flow of energy does not enter the PJM footprint at the PJM/MISO Interface, but enters PJM at the southern boundary. For this reason, PJM prices an import with the GCA of LGEE at the SOUTH interface pricing point rather than the MISO pricing point.

Interfaces differ from interface pricing points. The challenge is to create interface prices, composed of external pricing points, which accurately represent the locational price impact of flows between PJM and external sources of energy and that reflect the underlying economic fundamentals across balancing authority borders.[8]

Transactions can be scheduled to an interface based on a contract transmission path, but pricing points are developed and applied based on the estimated electrical impact of the external power source on PJM tie lines, regardless of the contract transmission path.[9] PJM establishes prices for transactions with external balancing authorities by assigning interface pricing points to individual balancing authorities based on the generation control area and load control area as specified on the NERC Tag. Dynamic interface pricing calculations use actual system conditions to determine a set of weights for each external pricing point in an interface price definition. The weights are designed so that the interface price reflects actual system conditions. However, the weights are an approximation given the complexity of the transmission network outside PJM and the dynamic nature of power flows. Table 9-20 presents the interface pricing points used in the first six months of 2026. On October 21, 2020, PJM updated the mappings of external balancing authorities to individual pricing points. Figure 9-4 shows a map of the default interface pricing point assignments for all external balancing authorities. Figure 9-4 shows that the balancing authorities in the Western Interconnection are mapped to either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point. This determination was made by PJM based on geographic location rather than the electrical impact on the PJM system. When power

7 There are multiple paths between any generation and load balancing authority. Market participants select the path based on transmission service availability and the transmission costs for moving energy from generation to load and interface prices.

8 See the *2007 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Appendix D, "Interchange Transactions," for a more complete discussion of the development of pricing points.

9 See "Interface Pricing Point Assignment Methodology," (May 7, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/exschedule/interface-pricing-point-assignment-methodology.pdf>. PJM periodically updates these definitions on its website.

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is scheduled across a DC tie line, its effects on the PJM system are as if a generator is located at the point in the Eastern Interconnection where the DC tie line connects. The electrical impact on PJM tie lines from sources in the Western Interconnection differ based on the relevant DC tie line and could vary from the MISO interface pricing point to the SOUTH interface pricing point. The MMU recommends that transactions sourcing in the Western Interconnection be priced at either the MISO interface pricing point or the SOUTH interface pricing point based on the locational price impact of flows between the DC tie line point of connection with the Eastern Interconnection and PJM rather than geographical location. The MMU recommends that PJM review the mappings of external balancing authority pricing points at least annually to reflect the fact that changes to the system topology can affect the electrical impact of external power sources on PJM.

The MMU has made multiple recommendations to either retire or consolidate interface pricing points used by PJM. The reasons for those recommendations include: pricing points that could no longer be used to price actual transactions; pricing points that were inappropriately used to support special agreements; pricing points that were treated as multiple pricing points when they were a single pricing point; and pricing points that were noncontiguous to the PJM footprint that created opportunities for sham scheduling. Table 9-6 shows the interface pricing points, the recommendation and the date the recommendation was adopted.

**Table 9-6 MMU interface pricing point recommendations and dates adopted**

| Interface Pricing Point | Recommendation | Date Adopted |
|---|---|---|
| IMO | Retire Pricing Point - Noncontiguous | |
| Southeast (Real-Time Market) | Retire Pricing Point - Support Special Agreements | 1-Oct-2022 |
| Southwest (Real-Time Market) | Retire Pricing Point - Support Special Agreements | 1-Oct-2022 |
| SOUTHEXP | Consolidate Pricing Points | 1-Jun-2021 |
| SOUTHIMP | Consolidate Pricing Points | 1-Jun-2021 |
| Southeast | Retire Pricing Point - Support Special Agreements | 15-Apr-2021 |
| Southwest | Retire Pricing Point - Support Special Agreements | 15-Apr-2021 |
| NCMPAEXP | Retire Pricing Point - Preferential Treatment | 3-Nov-2020 |
| NCMPAIMP | Retire Pricing Point - Preferential Treatment | 3-Nov-2020 |
| Northwest | Retire Pricing Point - Noncontiguous | 1-Oct-2020 |
| CPLEEXP | Retire Pricing Point - Preferential Treatment | 1-Jun-2020 |
| CPLEIMP | Retire Pricing Point - Preferential Treatment | 1-Jun-2020 |
| DUKEXP | Retire Pricing Point - Preferential Treatment | 1-Jun-2020 |
| DUKIMP | Retire Pricing Point - Preferential Treatment | 1-Jun-2020 |
| NIPSCO | Retire Pricing Point - Obsolete (Integration into MISO) | 1-Jun-2020 |
| OVEC | Retire Pricing Point - Obsolete (Integration into PJM) | 1-Dec-2018 |

The interface pricing method implies that the weighting factors reflect the actual system flows in a dynamic manner. In fact, the weightings are static, and are modified by PJM only occasionally.[10] The MMU recommended that PJM monitor, and adjust as necessary, the weights applied to the components of the interfaces to ensure that the interface prices reflect ongoing changes in system conditions. At the March 20, 2024, meeting of the Markets and Reliability Committee, PJM stakeholders approved the implementation of a new annual review of interface pricing definitions.[11] [12] The annual review evaluates, and adjusts as necessary, the interface pricing definitions to ensure the buses and weightings used in the interface pricing definitions capture changes in system topology over time and reflect current system conditions.

The contract transmission path only reflects the path of energy into or out of PJM to one neighboring balancing authority. The NERC Tag requires the complete path to be specified from the generation control area (GCA) to the

10 On June 1, 2015, PJM began using a dynamic weighting factor in the calculation for the Ontario interface pricing point.

11 *See* "Manual 11 Revisions – Interface Pricing Points Review," Presented at the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) meeting held on March 20, 2024 <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2024/20240320/20240320-consent-agenda-b---1-manual-11-revisions-interface-pricing-points---presentation.ashx>

12 See PJM. "Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).



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load control area (LCA), but participants do not always do so. The NERC Tag path is used by PJM to determine the interface pricing point that PJM assigns to the transaction. This approach will correctly identify the interface pricing point only if the market participant provides the complete path in the Tag.

In the real-time energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for real-time transactions. The top three net exporting interface pricing points in the real-time energy market accounted for 81.8 percent of the total net scheduled exports: PJM/MISO with 34.1 percent, PJM/NYIS with 31.8 percent and PJM/NEPTUNE with 15.9 percent of the net scheduled export volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) together represented 65.9 percent of the total net PJM scheduled exports in the real-time energy market.

In the real-time energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled imports at two of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for real-time transactions. The top importing interface pricing point in the real-time energy market was the PJM/SOUTH interface pricing point, which accounted for 84.2 percent of the total net scheduled import volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) had net scheduled exports in the real-time energy market.

### Table 9-7 Real-time scheduled net interchange volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 32.2 | 52.5 | 188.8 | 225.7 | 227.2 | 137.0 | 863.4 |
| MISO | (1,557.5) | (451.9) | (829.5) | (566.5) | (731.9) | (1,765.6) | (5,902.9) |
| NYISO | (2,363.9) | (2,255.9) | (2,152.7) | (1,427.2) | (1,311.3) | (1,879.3) | (11,390.4) |
| HUDSONTP | (440.9) | (361.8) | (156.0) | (236.5) | (291.4) | (413.6) | (1,900.2) |
| LINDENVFT | (224.1) | (206.4) | (220.4) | (162.4) | (220.2) | (208.3) | (1,241.8) |
| NEPTUNE | (488.1) | (443.6) | (495.3) | (378.5) | (476.9) | (460.0) | (2,742.4) |
| NYIS | (1,210.8) | (1,244.1) | (1,281.1) | (649.8) | (322.9) | (797.3) | (5,506.0) |
| SOUTH | 1,105.9 | 1,078.8 | 945.5 | 594.0 | 732.0 | 147.2 | 4,603.4 |
| Total | (2,783.3) | (1,576.6) | (1,847.9) | (1,174.0) | (1,084.0) | (3,360.8) | (11,826.5) |

### Table 9-8 Real-time scheduled gross import volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 111.6 | 86.4 | 200.6 | 227.8 | 229.3 | 137.3 | 993.0 |
| MISO | 376.1 | 459.8 | 318.4 | 455.1 | 424.9 | 140.7 | 2,175.1 |
| NYISO | 138.8 | 96.9 | 143.7 | 139.6 | 127.2 | 133.9 | 780.1 |
| HUDSONTP | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| LINDENVFT | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 5.0 |
| NEPTUNE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| NYIS | 137.3 | 96.7 | 143.7 | 137.9 | 126.1 | 132.9 | 774.5 |
| SOUTH | 1,749.6 | 1,587.8 | 1,219.9 | 1,139.7 | 1,060.8 | 753.0 | 7,510.8 |
| Total | 2,376.1 | 2,230.9 | 1,882.6 | 1,962.1 | 1,842.3 | 1,165.0 | 11,459.0 |

### Table 9-9 Real-time scheduled gross export volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 79.4 | 34.0 | 11.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 129.6 |
| MISO | 1,933.6 | 911.7 | 1,147.9 | 1,021.6 | 1,156.9 | 1,906.3 | 8,078.0 |
| NYISO | 2,502.6 | 2,352.9 | 2,296.4 | 1,566.8 | 1,438.5 | 2,013.2 | 12,170.5 |
| HUDSONTP | 440.9 | 362.0 | 156.0 | 236.6 | 291.4 | 413.8 | 1,900.5 |
| LINDENVFT | 225.6 | 206.5 | 220.4 | 163.9 | 221.3 | 209.2 | 1,246.9 |
| NEPTUNE | 488.1 | 443.6 | 495.3 | 378.6 | 476.9 | 460.1 | 2,742.6 |
| NYIS | 1,348.1 | 1,340.8 | 1,424.8 | 787.7 | 448.9 | 930.2 | 6,280.5 |
| SOUTH | 643.7 | 508.9 | 274.4 | 545.6 | 328.8 | 605.9 | 2,907.4 |
| Total | 5,159.4 | 3,807.5 | 3,730.5 | 3,136.0 | 2,926.3 | 4,525.7 | 23,285.4 |

## Day-Ahead Interface Imports and Exports

In the day-ahead energy market, as in the real-time energy market, scheduled imports and exports are determined by the scheduled path, which is the transmission path a market participant selects from the original source to the final sink. Entering external energy transactions in the day-ahead energy market requires fewer steps than in the real-time energy market. Market participants need to acquire a valid, willing to pay congestion (WPC) OASIS reservation to prove that their day-ahead schedule could be supported in the real-time energy market.[13] Day-ahead energy market schedules need to be cleared through the day-ahead energy market process in order to become an approved schedule. The day-ahead energy market transactions are financially

13 Effective September 17, 2010, up to congestion transactions no longer required a willing to pay congestion transmission reservation.

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binding, but will not physically flow unless they are also submitted in the real-time energy market. In the day-ahead energy market, a market participant is not required to acquire a ramp reservation, a NERC Tag, or to go through a neighboring balancing authority checkout process.

There are three types of day-ahead external energy transactions: fixed; up to congestion; and dispatchable.[14]

In the day-ahead energy market, transaction sources and sinks are determined solely by market participants. In Table 9-10, Table 9-11, and Table 9-12, the scheduled interface designation is determined by the transmission reservation that was acquired and associated with the day-ahead market transaction, and does not bear any necessary relationship to the pricing point designation selected at the time the transaction is submitted to PJM in real time. For example, if market participants want to import energy from the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) to PJM, they are likely to choose a scheduled path with the fewest transmission providers along the path and therefore the lowest transmission costs for the transaction, regardless of whether the resultant path is related to the physical flow of power. The lowest cost transmission path runs from SPP, through MISO, and into PJM, requiring only three transmission reservations, two of which are available at no cost (MISO transmission would be free based on the regional through and out rates, and the PJM transmission would be free, if using spot import transmission). Any other transmission path entering PJM, where the generating control area is to the south, would require the market participant to acquire transmission through nonmarket balancing authorities, and thus incur additional transmission costs. PJM's interface pricing method recognizes that transactions sourcing in SPP and sinking in PJM will create flows across the southern border and prices those transactions at the SOUTH interface price. As a result, a market participant who plans to submit a transaction from SPP to PJM may have a transmission reservation with a point of receipt of MISO and a point of delivery of PJM but may select SOUTH as the import pricing point when submitting the transaction in the day-ahead energy market. In the scheduled interface tables, the import transaction would appear as scheduled through the MISO Interface, and in the scheduled interface pricing point tables, the import transaction would appear as scheduled through the SOUTH interface pricing point, which reflects the expected power flow.

Table 9-10 through Table 9-12 show the day-ahead scheduled interchange totals at the individual interfaces. Net scheduled interchange in the day-ahead energy market is shown by interface for the first six months of 2026 in Table 9-10, while gross scheduled imports and exports are shown in Table 9-11 and Table 9-12.

In the day-ahead energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at 13 of PJM's 19 interfaces. The top three net exporting interfaces in the day-ahead energy market accounted for 70.0 percent of the total net scheduled exports: PJM/NYISO (NYIS) with 31.7 percent, PJM/Neptune (NEPT) with 19.3 percent and PJM/MidAmerican Energy Company (MEC) with 18.9 percent of the net scheduled export volume. The four separate interfaces that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPT, PJM/HUDS and PJM/Linden (LIND)) together represented 68.2 percent of the total net PJM scheduled exports in the day-ahead energy market. In the first six months of 2026, there were net exports in the day-ahead energy market at six of the 10 separate interfaces that connect PJM to MISO. Those six interfaces represented 26.4 percent of the total net PJM exports in the day-ahead energy market.

In the day-ahead energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled imports at four of PJM's 19 interfaces. The top importing interface in the day-ahead energy market was the Duke (DUK) Interface, which accounted for 76.3 percent of the net scheduled import volume. The four separate interfaces that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPT, PJM/HUDS and PJM/Linden (LIND)) had net scheduled exports in the day-ahead energy market. In the first six months of 2026, there were net imports in the day-ahead energy market at three of the 10 separate interfaces that connect PJM to MISO. Those three interfaces represented 23.7 percent of the total net PJM imports in the day-ahead energy market.[15]

14 See the *2010 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 4, "Interchange Transactions," for details.

15 In the day-ahead energy market, two PJM interfaces had a net interchange of zero (PJM/Carolina Power and Light West (CPLW) and PJM/City Water Light & Power (CWLP)).



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## Table 9-10 Day-ahead scheduled net interchange volume by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | (24.8) | (17.3) | (13.7) | (8.4) | (13.5) | (32.2) | (109.9) |
| CPLW | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| DUK | 102.3 | 87.7 | 72.5 | 44.8 | 84.3 | 71.3 | 463.1 |
| LGEE | (122.5) | (97.2) | (103.3) | (75.7) | (60.8) | (98.4) | (557.9) |
| MISO | (885.8) | (412.4) | (610.9) | (367.5) | (402.9) | (931.6) | (3,611.1) |
| ALTE | (34.9) | (15.0) | (42.5) | 63.9 | 58.2 | (154.0) | (124.2) |
| ALTW | (30.5) | 15.9 | 12.4 | 20.3 | 18.9 | 26.4 | 63.5 |
| AMIL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.8 | (16.2) | (13.8) |
| CIN | (206.1) | (10.5) | (84.2) | (97.6) | (38.4) | (224.1) | (660.9) |
| CWLP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IPL | 2.3 | 42.8 | 23.5 | 0.6 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 73.0 |
| MEC | (515.3) | (446.0) | (471.5) | (328.8) | (442.6) | (486.3) | (2,690.5) |
| MECS | (37.3) | (19.4) | (13.3) | 14.5 | 15.1 | (22.0) | (62.4) |
| NIPS | 0.0 | 12.7 | 0.3 | (5.8) | 9.3 | (9.1) | 7.4 |
| WEC | (64.0) | 7.1 | (37.3) | (34.7) | (27.9) | (46.2) | (203.0) |
| NYISO | (1,997.3) | (1,928.0) | (1,923.3) | (1,187.8) | (988.4) | (1,659.7) | (9,684.5) |
| HUDS | (434.9) | (385.0) | (158.2) | (235.5) | (280.1) | (419.3) | (1,913.0) |
| LIND | (90.4) | (90.5) | (95.5) | (64.2) | (85.1) | (91.5) | (517.2) |
| NEPT | (451.7) | (449.7) | (502.3) | (402.7) | (468.7) | (470.1) | (2,745.2) |
| NYIS | (1,020.4) | (1,002.8) | (1,167.3) | (485.4) | (154.5) | (678.8) | (4,509.1) |
| TVA | (20.7) | 53.5 | 92.8 | (69.0) | 27.0 | (184.5) | (100.9) |
| Total without Up To Congestion | (2,948.7) | (2,313.7) | (2,485.9) | (1,663.5) | (1,354.3) | (2,835.1) | (13,601.1) |
| Up To Congestion | (59.3) | 121.7 | 251.1 | 237.4 | 130.7 | (108.8) | 572.7 |
| Total | (3,008.0) | (2,192.0) | (2,234.7) | (1,426.1) | (1,223.6) | (2,943.9) | (13,028.4) |

## Table 9-11 Day-ahead scheduled gross import volume by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | 6.6 | 5.9 | 7.3 | 27.0 | 7.8 | 5.5 | 60.1 |
| CPLW | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| DUK | 150.8 | 112.0 | 78.1 | 65.3 | 100.0 | 87.7 | 593.9 |
| LGEE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.8 | 7.5 | 5.2 | 20.5 |
| MISO | 62.1 | 193.0 | 58.4 | 189.8 | 202.0 | 97.4 | 802.7 |
| ALTE | 1.1 | 10.9 | 1.5 | 97.4 | 93.5 | 0.5 | 204.9 |
| ALTW | 11.2 | 21.2 | 15.9 | 39.6 | 30.4 | 86.3 | 204.6 |
| AMIL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 2.4 |
| CIN | 19.1 | 49.5 | 8.9 | 13.8 | 24.1 | 3.6 | 119.0 |
| CWLP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IPL | 3.7 | 42.8 | 23.5 | 0.6 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 74.4 |
| MEC | 6.7 | 4.6 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 16.9 |
| MECS | 3.5 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 35.9 | 34.2 | 7.1 | 90.6 |
| NIPS | 0.0 | 13.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 11.5 | 0.0 | 25.2 |
| WEC | 16.8 | 45.4 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 64.7 |
| NYISO | 2.5 | 5.6 | 7.0 | 17.2 | 9.1 | 7.7 | 49.1 |
| HUDS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| LIND | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 3.3 |
| NEPT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| NYIS | 1.9 | 5.6 | 7.0 | 16.1 | 8.3 | 7.0 | 45.8 |
| TVA | 145.9 | 179.7 | 171.5 | 133.7 | 140.4 | 69.1 | 840.3 |
| Total without Up To Congestion | 368.1 | 496.2 | 322.3 | 440.8 | 466.6 | 272.6 | 2,366.6 |
| Up To Congestion | 722.1 | 597.8 | 685.8 | 547.6 | 550.3 | 478.1 | 3,581.7 |
| Total | 1,090.2 | 1,094.0 | 1,008.0 | 988.4 | 1,016.9 | 750.7 | 5,948.2 |

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**Table 9-12 Day-ahead scheduled gross export volume by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026**

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | 31.4 | 23.2 | 21.0 | 35.4 | 21.3 | 37.7 | 170.0 |
| CPLW | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| DUK | 48.5 | 24.3 | 5.6 | 20.5 | 15.6 | 16.4 | 130.9 |
| LGEE | 122.5 | 97.2 | 103.3 | 83.5 | 68.3 | 103.6 | 578.4 |
| MISO | 947.9 | 605.4 | 669.3 | 557.3 | 604.9 | 1,029.0 | 4,413.7 |
| ALTE | 36.0 | 25.9 | 43.9 | 33.5 | 35.3 | 154.4 | 329.1 |
| ALTW | 41.7 | 5.3 | 3.5 | 19.3 | 11.5 | 59.9 | 141.1 |
| AMIL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.2 | 16.2 |
| CIN | 225.1 | 60.0 | 93.2 | 111.4 | 62.5 | 227.7 | 779.9 |
| CWLP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IPL | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.4 |
| MEC | 522.0 | 450.6 | 473.4 | 328.8 | 446.3 | 486.3 | 2,707.4 |
| MECS | 40.8 | 24.6 | 18.0 | 21.4 | 19.1 | 29.1 | 153.0 |
| NIPS | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 2.3 | 9.1 | 17.8 |
| WEC | 80.8 | 38.4 | 37.3 | 37.1 | 27.9 | 46.2 | 267.7 |
| NYISO | 1,999.9 | 1,933.6 | 1,930.3 | 1,205.0 | 997.5 | 1,667.4 | 9,733.6 |
| HUDS | 434.9 | 385.0 | 158.2 | 235.5 | 280.1 | 419.3 | 1,913.0 |
| LIND | 91.1 | 90.5 | 95.5 | 65.3 | 85.9 | 92.2 | 520.5 |
| NEPT | 451.7 | 449.7 | 502.3 | 402.7 | 468.7 | 470.1 | 2,745.2 |
| NYIS | 1,022.2 | 1,008.4 | 1,174.3 | 501.5 | 162.7 | 685.8 | 4,554.9 |
| TVA | 166.6 | 126.2 | 78.8 | 202.6 | 113.4 | 253.6 | 941.2 |
| Total without Up To Congestion | 3,316.8 | 2,809.9 | 2,808.1 | 2,104.3 | 1,820.9 | 3,107.6 | 15,967.7 |
| Up To Congestion | 781.4 | 476.1 | 434.6 | 310.2 | 419.6 | 586.9 | 3,008.9 |
| Total | 4,098.2 | 3,286.0 | 3,242.8 | 2,414.5 | 2,240.6 | 3,694.6 | 18,976.6 |

## Day-Ahead Interface Pricing Point Imports and Exports

Table 9-13 through Table 9-18 show the day-ahead scheduled interchange totals at the interface pricing points. In the first six months of 2026, up to congestion transactions accounted for 60.2 percent of all scheduled import MW transactions and 15.9 percent of all scheduled export MW transactions in the day-ahead energy market. The day-ahead net scheduled interchange in the first six months of 2026, including up to congestion transactions, is shown by interface pricing point in Table 9-13. Scheduled up to congestion transactions by interface pricing point in the first six months of 2026 are shown in Table 9-14. Day-ahead gross scheduled imports and exports, including up to congestion transactions, are shown in Table 9-15 and Table 9-17, while gross scheduled import and export up to congestion transactions are shown in Table 9-16 and Table 9-18.

Maintaining outdated definitions of interface pricing points is unnecessary, inconsistent with the tariff and creates artificial opportunities for gaming by virtual transactions and FTRs. PJM should immediately eliminate interface pricing points when changes to the market mean that the pricing points can no longer be used to price actual transactions and do not reflect actual price formation.

In the day-ahead energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions. The top three net exporting interface pricing points in the day-ahead energy market accounted for 79.0 percent of the total net scheduled exports: PJM/NYIS with 33.7 percent, PJM/MISO with 27.9 percent and PJM/NEPTUNE (NEPT) with 17.5 percent of the net scheduled export volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) together represented 72.1 percent of the total net PJM scheduled exports in the day-ahead energy market.

In the day-ahead energy market, in the first six months of 2026, there were net scheduled imports at two of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions. The top importing interface pricing point in the day-ahead energy market was the PJM/SOUTH interface pricing point, which accounted for 98.0 percent of the net scheduled import volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) had net scheduled exports in the day-ahead energy market.

In the day-ahead energy market, in the first six months of 2026, up to congestion transactions had net scheduled exports at five of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions. The top two net exporting interface pricing points eligible for up to congestion transactions accounted for 55.9 percent of the total net up to congestion scheduled exports:


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PJM/NYIS with 28.2 percent and PJM/HUDSONTP with 27.7 percent of the net up to congestion scheduled export volume. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) together represented 75.1 percent of the total net scheduled up to congestion exports in the day-ahead energy market. However, the PJM/NEPTUNE interface pricing point had net up to congestion scheduled imports in the day-ahead energy market.

In the day-ahead energy market, in the first six months of 2026, up to congestion transactions had net scheduled imports at two of PJM's seven interface pricing points eligible for day-ahead transactions. The top importing interface pricing point eligible for up to congestion transactions was the PJM/SOUTH interface pricing point, which accounted for 88.1 percent of the total up to congestion scheduled imports. The four separate interface pricing points that connect PJM to the NYISO (PJM/NYIS, PJM/NEPTUNE, PJM/HUDSONTP and PJM/LINDENVFT) together represented 11.9 percent of the total net scheduled up to congestion imports in the day-ahead energy market. However, the PJM/HUDSONTP, PJM/LINDENVFT and PJM/NYIS interface pricing points had net up to congestion scheduled exports in the day-ahead energy market.

### Table 9-13 Day-ahead scheduled net interchange volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 0.0 | 7.2 | (8.4) | 30.1 | 33.3 | (33.5) | 28.8 |
| MISO | (952.2) | (509.7) | (670.8) | (381.0) | (497.8) | (1,019.1) | (4,030.4) |
| NYISO | (2,198.6) | (1,990.5) | (2,003.9) | (1,280.5) | (1,074.6) | (1,865.6) | (10,413.7) |
| HUDS | (533.5) | (475.2) | (190.3) | (268.4) | (326.8) | (471.7) | (2,265.7) |
| LINDENVFT | (184.0) | (154.6) | (118.4) | (70.1) | (104.0) | (130.0) | (761.0) |
| NEPTUNE | (363.6) | (401.1) | (484.5) | (389.9) | (449.4) | (436.5) | (2,525.0) |
| NYIS | (1,117.5) | (959.6) | (1,210.8) | (552.2) | (194.6) | (827.4) | (4,861.9) |
| SOUTH | 142.7 | 300.9 | 448.3 | 205.3 | 315.4 | (25.7) | 1,387.0 |
| Total | (3,008.0) | (2,192.0) | (2,234.7) | (1,426.1) | (1,223.6) | (2,943.9) | (13,028.4) |

### Table 9-14 Up to congestion scheduled net interchange volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 23.6 | 13.6 | (13.0) | (16.7) | (1.4) | (43.3) | (37.2) |
| MISO | (68.0) | (51.6) | (55.2) | 31.4 | (58.3) | (77.9) | (279.7) |
| NYISO | (201.9) | (69.4) | (80.6) | (90.5) | (85.7) | (206.7) | (734.9) |
| HUDSONTP | (98.6) | (90.2) | (32.1) | (32.9) | (46.7) | (52.3) | (352.8) |
| LINDENVFT | (93.6) | (64.1) | (22.9) | (5.9) | (18.8) | (38.5) | (243.8) |
| NEPTUNE | 88.0 | 48.6 | 17.8 | 12.8 | 19.4 | 33.6 | 220.2 |
| NYIS | (97.8) | 36.3 | (43.5) | (64.5) | (39.5) | (149.4) | (358.5) |
| SOUTH | 187.1 | 229.1 | 400.0 | 313.2 | 276.1 | 219.2 | 1,624.6 |
| Total Interfaces | (59.3) | 121.7 | 251.1 | 237.4 | 130.7 | (108.8) | 572.7 |
| INTERNAL | 5,770.5 | 4,166.9 | 4,596.8 | 4,364.0 | 4,247.8 | 4,587.8 | 27,733.7 |
| Total | 5,711.2 | 4,288.6 | 4,847.9 | 4,601.4 | 4,378.4 | 4,479.0 | 28,306.4 |

### Table 9-15 Day-ahead scheduled gross import volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 62.5 | 27.0 | 25.4 | 56.4 | 44.3 | 18.4 | 234.1 |
| MISO | 274.5 | 236.2 | 194.1 | 271.4 | 318.9 | 239.6 | 1,534.6 |
| NYISO | 175.3 | 220.5 | 110.1 | 98.9 | 104.1 | 94.2 | 803.0 |
| HUDSONTP | 12.5 | 18.6 | 9.8 | 15.1 | 15.5 | 12.8 | 84.4 |
| LINDENVFT | 17.6 | 10.9 | 7.1 | 12.0 | 14.4 | 10.9 | 73.0 |
| NEPTUNE | 93.1 | 62.0 | 26.6 | 22.7 | 34.1 | 41.1 | 279.5 |
| NYIS | 52.0 | 128.9 | 66.6 | 49.1 | 40.1 | 29.3 | 366.0 |
| SOUTH | 577.9 | 610.3 | 678.5 | 561.8 | 549.6 | 398.4 | 3,376.5 |
| Total | 1,090.2 | 1,094.0 | 1,008.0 | 988.4 | 1,016.9 | 750.7 | 5,948.2 |

### Table 9-16 Up to congestion scheduled gross import volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 57.6 | 25.2 | 20.0 | 9.4 | 9.6 | 7.8 | 129.7 |
| MISO | 243.0 | 101.1 | 141.1 | 127.7 | 153.6 | 153.1 | 919.5 |
| NYISO | 172.7 | 214.8 | 103.1 | 82.9 | 95.5 | 86.5 | 755.6 |
| HUDSONTP | 12.5 | 18.6 | 9.8 | 15.1 | 15.5 | 12.8 | 84.4 |
| LINDENVFT | 17.0 | 10.9 | 7.1 | 10.9 | 13.6 | 10.2 | 69.7 |
| NEPTUNE | 93.1 | 62.0 | 26.6 | 22.7 | 34.1 | 41.1 | 279.5 |
| NYIS | 50.1 | 123.3 | 59.7 | 34.2 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 321.9 |
| SOUTH | 248.7 | 256.7 | 421.5 | 327.6 | 291.6 | 230.7 | 1,776.9 |
| Total Interfaces | 722.1 | 597.8 | 685.8 | 547.6 | 550.3 | 478.1 | 3,581.7 |

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## Table 9-17 Day-ahead scheduled gross export volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 62.5 | 19.8 | 33.8 | 26.3 | 11.0 | 51.9 | 205.3 |
| MISO | 1,226.7 | 745.8 | 864.8 | 652.4 | 816.7 | 1,258.7 | 5,565.1 |
| NYISO | 2,373.8 | 2,210.9 | 2,114.0 | 1,379.4 | 1,178.7 | 1,959.8 | 11,216.7 |
| HUDSONTP | 546.0 | 493.8 | 200.1 | 283.5 | 342.3 | 484.5 | 2,350.2 |
| LINDENVFT | 201.6 | 165.5 | 125.5 | 82.1 | 118.4 | 140.9 | 834.1 |
| NEPTUNE | 456.7 | 463.1 | 511.1 | 412.6 | 483.4 | 477.6 | 2,804.5 |
| NYIS | 1,169.5 | 1,088.5 | 1,277.4 | 601.2 | 234.6 | 856.8 | 5,227.9 |
| SOUTH | 435.2 | 309.5 | 230.1 | 356.5 | 234.2 | 424.1 | 1,989.5 |
| Total | 4,098.2 | 3,286.0 | 3,242.8 | 2,414.5 | 2,240.6 | 3,694.6 | 18,976.6 |


## Table 9-18 Up to congestion scheduled gross export volume by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 34.0 | 11.6 | 33.0 | 26.1 | 11.0 | 51.2 | 166.9 |
| MISO | 311.0 | 152.7 | 196.3 | 96.3 | 211.9 | 231.0 | 1,199.3 |
| NYISO | 374.7 | 284.2 | 183.7 | 173.4 | 181.2 | 293.2 | 1,490.5 |
| HUDSONTP | 111.1 | 108.8 | 41.9 | 48.0 | 62.2 | 65.2 | 437.2 |
| LINDENVFT | 110.6 | 75.0 | 29.9 | 16.9 | 32.4 | 48.7 | 313.5 |
| NEPTUNE | 5.1 | 13.4 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 14.7 | 7.5 | 59.4 |
| NYIS | 147.9 | 87.0 | 103.1 | 98.7 | 71.8 | 171.8 | 680.4 |
| SOUTH | 61.7 | 27.6 | 21.5 | 14.4 | 15.6 | 11.5 | 152.3 |
| Total Interfaces | 781.4 | 476.1 | 434.6 | 310.2 | 419.6 | 586.9 | 3,008.9 |

## Table 9-19 Active scheduling interfaces: January through June, 2026[16]

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALTE | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| ALTW | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| AMIL | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| CIN | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| CPLE | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| CPLW | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| CWLP | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| DUK | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| HUDS | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| IPL | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| LGEE | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| LIND | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| MEC | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| MECS | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| NEPT | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| NIPS | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| NYIS | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| TVA | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| WEC | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |

## Figure 9-3 PJM's footprint and its external scheduling interfaces




16 On July 2, 2012, Duke Energy Corp. (DUK) completed a merger with Progress Energy Inc. (CPLE and CPLW). As of June 30, 2026, DUK, CPLE and CPLW continued to operate as separate balancing authorities, and are still defined as distinct interfaces in the PJM energy market.




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## Table 9-20 Active scheduled interface pricing points: January through June, 2026

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HUDSONTP | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| LINDENVFT | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| MISO | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| NEPTUNE | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| NYIS | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| Ontario IESO | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |
| SOUTH | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active | Active |

## Figure 9-4 External balancing authority default interface pricing point assignments




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## Loop Flows

Actual energy flows are the real-time metered power flows at an interface for a defined period. The comparable scheduled flows are the real-time power flows scheduled at an interface for a defined period. Inadvertent interchange is the difference between the total actual flows for the PJM system (net actual interchange) and the total scheduled flows for the PJM system (net scheduled interchange) for a defined period. Loop flows are the difference between actual and scheduled power flows at a specific interface. Loop flows can exist at the same time that inadvertent interchange is zero. For example, actual imports could exceed scheduled imports at one interface and actual exports could exceed scheduled exports at another interface by the same amount. The result is loop flow, despite the fact that system actual and scheduled power flow net to a zero difference.[17]

Loop flows result, in part, from a mismatch between incentives to use a particular scheduled transmission path and the market-based price differentials at interface pricing points that result from the actual physical flows on the transmission system.

PJM's approach to interface pricing attempts to match prices with physical power flows and their impacts on the transmission system. For example, if market participants want to import energy from the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) to PJM, they are likely to choose a scheduled path with the fewest transmission providers along the path and therefore the lowest transmission costs for the transaction, regardless of whether the resultant path is related to the physical flow of power. The lowest cost transmission path runs from SPP, through MISO, and into PJM, requiring only three transmission reservations, two of which are available at no cost (MISO transmission would be free based on the regional through and out rates, and the PJM transmission would be free, if using spot import transmission). Any other transmission path entering PJM, where the generating control area is to the south, would require the market participant to acquire transmission through nonmarket balancing authorities, and thus incur additional transmission costs. PJM's interface pricing method recognizes that transactions sourcing in SPP and sinking in PJM will create flows across the southern border and prices those transactions at the SOUTH interface price. As a result, the transaction is priced appropriately, but a difference between scheduled and actual flows is created at PJM's borders. For example, if a 100 MW transaction were submitted, there would be 100 MW of scheduled flow at the PJM/MISO interface border, but there would be no actual flows on the interface. Correspondingly, there would be no scheduled flows at the PJM/SOUTH interface border, but there would be 100 MW of actual flows on the interface. In the first six months of 2026, of the 4,603.4 GWh of net scheduled interchange that received the SOUTH interface pricing point, 536.5 GWh (11.7 percent) were scheduled through MISO. There were no net scheduled flows across the southern interface that received the MISO interface pricing point.

In the first six months of 2026, net scheduled interchange was -11,826.5 GWh and net actual interchange was -11,986.3 GWh, a difference of 159.9 GWh. In the first six months of 2025, net scheduled interchange was -17,194.6 GWh and net actual interchange was -17,012.5 GWh, a difference of 182.1 GWh. This difference is inadvertent interchange. PJM attempts to minimize the amount of accumulated inadvertent interchange by continually monitoring and correcting for inadvertent interchange. PJM can reduce the accumulation of inadvertent interchange by using unilateral or bilateral paybacks. Inadvertent interchange accumulations that are paid back unilaterally are paid by controlling to a non-zero area control error (ACE). For example, Table 9-21 shows that PJM had 159.9 GW of inadvertent interchange in the first six months of 2026. To reduce this inadvertent interchange, PJM can control to an ACE less than zero, which would result in under generating. By way of the power balance equation, power would flow into PJM from its neighboring balancing authority areas. This would create decreased actual exports that were not scheduled, thus reducing the overall inadvertent. To maintain reliability, unilateral paybacks are accounted for in the control performance standard calculations. Bilateral paybacks are scheduled with other balancing

17 See the *2012 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.



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authority areas by scheduling a correction and incorporating that amount as a bias in the energy management system.[18] [19]

Table 9-21 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the Northern Indiana Public Service (NIPS) Interface had the largest loop flows of any interface with -360.1 GWh of net scheduled interchange and -6,323.0 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 5,962.9 GWh.

**Table 9-21 Net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface (GWh): January through June, 2026**

| Interface | Actual | Net Scheduled | Difference (GWh) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CPLE | 3,074.2 | (219.6) | 3,293.8 |
| CPLW | (27.6) | 4.4 | (32.0) |
| DUK | 1,322.1 | 1,404.9 | (82.9) |
| LGEE | 1,538.1 | (497.6) | 2,035.7 |
| MISO | (10,333.3) | (4,479.7) | (5,853.7) |
| ALTE | (664.2) | (158.3) | (505.9) |
| ALTW | (1,455.3) | 189.5 | (1,644.8) |
| AMIL | 3,189.2 | 53.8 | 3,135.4 |
| CIN | (715.1) | (1,381.1) | 666.0 |
| CWLP | (180.5) | 0.0 | (180.5) |
| IPL | (838.6) | 82.3 | (921.0) |
| MEC | (2,954.8) | (2,569.4) | (385.4) |
| MECS | (1,321.6) | (88.4) | (1,233.3) |
| NIPS | (6,323.0) | (360.1) | (5,962.9) |
| WEC | 930.7 | (248.1) | 1,178.7 |
| NYISO | (11,373.2) | (11,420.6) | 47.4 |
| HUDS | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| LIND | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| NEPT | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| NYIS | (5,488.8) | (5,536.2) | 47.4 |
| TVA | 3,813.4 | 3,381.7 | 431.7 |
| Total | (11,986.3) | (11,826.5) | (159.9) |

18 See PJM. "Manual 12: Balancing Operations," Rev. 57 (April 22, 2026).
19 PJM does not publish data on inadvertent payback.

Every external balancing authority is mapped to an import and export interface pricing point. The mapping is designed to reflect the physical flow of energy between PJM and each balancing authority. The net scheduled values for interface pricing points are defined as the MWh of scheduled transactions that will receive the interface pricing point based on the external balancing authority mapping.[20] For example, the MWh for a transaction whose transmission path is SPP through MISO and into PJM would be reflected in the SOUTH interface pricing point net schedule totals because SPP is mapped to the SOUTH interface pricing point. The actual flow on an interface pricing point is defined as the metered flow across the transmission lines that are included in the interface pricing point.

The differences between the scheduled MWh mapped to a specific interface pricing point and actual power flows at the interface pricing points provide a better measure of loop flows than differences at the interfaces. The scheduled transactions are mapped to interface pricing points based on the expected flow from the generation balancing authority and load balancing authority, whereas scheduled transactions are assigned to interfaces based solely on the OASIS path that the market participants reflect the transmission path into or out of PJM to one neighboring balancing authority. Power flows at the interface pricing points provide a more accurate reflection of where scheduled power flows actually enter or leave the PJM footprint based on the complete transaction path. Table 9-22 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point.

The IMO interface pricing point with the Ontario IESO was created to reflect the fact that transactions that originate or sink in the Ontario Independent Electricity System Operator (IMO) balancing authority create physical flows that are split between the MISO and NYISO interface pricing points depending on transmission system conditions, so a mapping to a single interface pricing point does not reflect the actual flows. PJM created the IMO interface pricing point to reflect the actual power flows across both the MISO/PJM and NYISO/PJM Interfaces. The IMO does not have physical ties with PJM because it

20 The terms balancing authority and control area are used interchangeably in this section. The NERC Tag applications maintained the terminology of generation control area (GCA) and load control area (LCA) after the implementation of the NERC functional model. The NERC functional model classifies the balancing authority as a reliability service function, with, among other things, the responsibility for balancing generation, demand and interchange balance.

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is not contiguous. Table 9-22 shows actual flows associated with the IMO interface pricing point as zero because there is no PJM/IMO Interface. The actual flows between IMO and PJM are included in the actual flows at the MISO and NYISO interface pricing points.

Table 9-22 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the SOUTH interface pricing point had the largest loop flows of any interface pricing point with 4,603.4 GWh of net scheduled interchange and 9,720.1 GWh of net actual interchange, a difference of 5,116.7 GWh.

### Table 9-22 PJM flows by interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| Interface Pricing Point | Actual | Net Scheduled | Difference (GWh) |
|---|---|---|---|
| IMO | 0.0 | 863.4 | (863.4) |
| MISO | (10,333.3) | (5,902.9) | (4,430.4) |
| NYISO | (11,373.2) | (11,390.4) | 17.2 |
| HUDSONTP | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| LINDENVFT | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| NEPTUNE | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| NYIS | (5,488.8) | (5,506.0) | 17.2 |
| SOUTH | 9,720.1 | 4,603.4 | 5,116.7 |
| Total | (11,986.3) | (11,826.5) | (159.9) |

Table 9-23 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point, with adjustments made to the MISO and NYISO scheduled interface pricing points based on the quantities of scheduled interchange where transactions from the IMO entered the PJM energy market.

### Table 9-23 PJM flows by interface pricing point (GWh) (Adjusted for IMO Scheduled Interfaces): January through June, 2026

| Interface Pricing Point | Actual | Net Scheduled | Difference (GWh) |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISO | (10,333.3) | (5,009.3) | (5,324.0) |
| NYISO | (11,373.2) | (11,420.6) | 47.4 |
| HUDSONTP | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| LINDENVFT | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| NEPTUNE | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| NYIS | (5,488.8) | (5,536.2) | 47.4 |
| SOUTH | 9,720.1 | 4,603.4 | 5,116.7 |
| Total | (11,986.3) | (11,826.5) | (159.9) |

The NERC Tag requires the complete path to be specified from the generation control area (GCA) to the load control area (LCA), but participants do not always do so. The NERC Tag path is used by PJM to determine the interface pricing point that PJM assigns to the transaction. This approach will correctly identify the interface pricing point only if the market participant provides the complete path in the Tag. This approach will not correctly identify the interface pricing point if the market participant breaks the transaction into portions, each with a separate Tag. The breaking of transactions into portions can be a way to manipulate markets and the result of such behavior can be incorrect and noncompetitive pricing of transactions.

PJM attempts to ensure that external energy transactions are priced appropriately through the assignment of interface prices based on the expected actual flow from the generation balancing authority (source) and load balancing authority (sink) as specified on the NERC Tag. Assigning prices in this manner is a reasonable approach to ensuring that transactions receive or pay the PJM market value of the transaction based on expected flows, but this method does not address loop flow issues.

Loop flows remain a significant concern for the efficiency of the PJM market. Loop flows can have negative impacts on the efficiency of markets with explicit locational pricing, including impacts on locational prices, on FTR revenue adequacy and on system operations, and can be evidence of attempts to game the markets.

The MMU recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would prohibit market participants from breaking transactions into smaller segments to defeat the interface pricing rule and receive higher prices (for imports) or lower prices (for exports) from PJM resulting from the inability to identify the true source or sink of the transaction. If all of the Northeast ISOs and RTOs implemented validation to prohibit the breaking of transactions into smaller segments, the level of Lake Erie loop flow would be reduced.


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The MMU also recommends that PJM implement a validation method for submitted transactions that would require market participants to submit transactions on paths that reflect the expected actual power flow in order to reduce unscheduled loop flows.

Table 9-24 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface and interface pricing point. This table shows the interface pricing points that were assigned to energy transactions that had paths at each of PJM's interfaces. For example, Table 9-24 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the majority of imports to the PJM energy market for which a market participant specified Michigan Electric Coordinated System (MECS) as the interface with PJM based on the scheduled transmission path, had a generation control area mapped to the IMO Interface, and thus actual flows were assigned the IMO interface pricing point (849.9 GWh). The majority of exports from the PJM energy market for which a market participant specified MECS as the interface with PJM based on the scheduled transmission path had a load control area for which the actual flows would leave the PJM energy market at the MISO Interface, and were assigned the MISO interface pricing point (-1,143.9 GWh).

### Table 9-24 Net scheduled and actual flows by interface and interface pricing point (GWh): January through June, 2026

| Interface | Interface Pricing Point | Actual | Net Scheduled | Difference (GWh) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALTE | | (664.2) | (158.3) | (505.9) |
| | IMO | 0.0 | 3.5 | (3.5) |
| | MISO | (664.2) | (161.4) | (502.8) |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | (0.3) | 0.3 |
| ALTW | | (1,455.3) | 189.5 | (1,644.8) |
| | IMO | 0.0 | 32.3 | (32.3) |
| | MISO | (1,455.3) | 155.8 | (1,611.2) |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 1.4 | (1.4) |
| AMIL | | 3,189.2 | 53.8 | 3,135.4 |
| | MISO | 3,189.2 | 53.8 | 3,135.4 |
| CIN | | (715.1) | (1,381.1) | 666.0 |
| | IMO | 0.0 | (10.9) | 10.9 |
| | MISO | (715.1) | (1,420.3) | 705.1 |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 50.0 | (50.0) |
| CPLE | | 3,074.2 | (219.6) | 3,293.8 |
| | SOUTH | 3,074.2 | (219.6) | 3,293.8 |
| CPLW | | (27.6) | 4.4 | (32.0) |
| | SOUTH | (27.6) | 4.4 | (32.0) |
| CWLP | | (180.5) | 0.0 | (180.5) |
| | MISO | (180.5) | 0.0 | (180.5) |
| DUK | | 1,322.1 | 1,404.9 | (82.9) |
| | SOUTH | 1,322.1 | 1,404.9 | (82.9) |
| HUDS | | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| | HUDSONTP | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| IPL | | (838.6) | 82.3 | (921.0) |
| | IMO | 0.0 | 26.4 | (26.4) |
| | MISO | (838.6) | 51.7 | (890.3) |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 4.2 | (4.2) |
| LGEE | | 1,538.1 | (497.6) | 2,035.7 |
| | SOUTH | 1,538.1 | (497.6) | 2,035.7 |
| LIND | | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| | LINDENVFT | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| MEC | | (2,954.8) | (2,569.4) | (385.4) |
| | IMO | 0.0 | (7.6) | 7.6 |
| | MISO | (2,954.8) | (2,630.5) | (324.4) |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 68.6 | (68.6) |
| MECS | | (1,321.6) | (88.4) | (1,233.3) |
| | IMO | 0.0 | 849.9 | (849.9) |
| | MISO | (1,321.6) | (1,143.9) | (177.7) |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 205.7 | (205.7) |
| NEPT | | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| | NEPTUNE | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| NIPS | | (6,323.0) | (360.1) | (5,962.9) |
| | MISO | (6,323.0) | (360.1) | (5,962.8) |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 0.0 | (0.0) |
| NYIS | | (5,488.8) | (5,536.2) | 47.4 |
| | IMO | 0.0 | (30.2) | 30.2 |
| | NYIS | (5,488.8) | (5,506.0) | 17.2 |
| TVA | | 3,813.4 | 3,381.7 | 431.7 |
| | MISO | 0.0 | 6.8 | (6.8) |
| | SOUTH | 3,813.4 | 3,374.9 | 438.5 |
| WEC | | 930.7 | (248.1) | 1,178.7 |
| | MISO | 930.7 | (454.8) | 1,385.5 |
| | SOUTH | 0.0 | 206.8 | (206.8) |
| Grand Total | | (11,986.3) | (11,826.5) | (159.9) |

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Table 9-25 shows the net scheduled and actual PJM flows by interface pricing point and interface. The grouping is reversed from Table 9-24. Table 9-25 shows the interfaces where transactions were scheduled which received the individual interface pricing points. For example, Table 9-25 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the majority of imports to the PJM energy market for which a market participant specified a generation control area for which it was assigned the SOUTH interface pricing point, had a path that entered the PJM energy market at the TVA Interface (3,374.9 GWh). The majority of exports from the PJM energy market for which a market participant specified a load control area for which it was assigned the SOUTH interface pricing point, had a path that would leave the PJM energy market at the LGEE Interface (-497.6 GWh).

**Table 9-25 Net scheduled and actual flows by interface pricing point and interface (GWh): January through June, 2026**

| Interface Pricing Point | Interface | Actual | Net Scheduled | Difference (GWh) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HUDSONTP | | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| | HUDS | (1,900.2) | (1,900.2) | 0.0 |
| IMO | | 0.0 | 863.4 | (863.4) |
| | ALTE | 0.0 | 3.5 | (3.5) |
| | ALTW | 0.0 | 32.3 | (32.3) |
| | CIN | 0.0 | (10.9) | 10.9 |
| | IPL | 0.0 | 26.4 | (26.4) |
| | MEC | 0.0 | (7.6) | 7.6 |
| | MECS | 0.0 | 849.9 | (849.9) |
| | NYIS | 0.0 | (30.2) | 30.2 |
| LINDENVFT | | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| | LIND | (1,241.8) | (1,241.8) | 0.0 |
| MISO | | (10,333.3) | (5,902.9) | (4,430.4) |
| | ALTE | (664.2) | (161.4) | (502.8) |
| | ALTW | (1,455.3) | 155.8 | (1,611.2) |
| | AMIL | 3,189.2 | 53.8 | 3,135.4 |
| | CIN | (715.1) | (1,420.3) | 705.1 |
| | CWLP | (180.5) | 0.0 | (180.5) |
| | IPL | (838.6) | 51.7 | (890.3) |
| | MEC | (2,954.8) | (2,630.5) | (324.4) |
| | MECS | (1,321.6) | (1,143.9) | (177.7) |
| | NIPS | (6,323.0) | (360.1) | (5,962.8) |
| | TVA | 0.0 | 6.8 | (6.8) |
| | WEC | 930.7 | (454.8) | 1,385.5 |
| NEPTUNE | | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| | NEPT | (2,742.4) | (2,742.4) | 0.0 |
| NYIS | | (5,488.8) | (5,506.0) | 17.2 |
| | NYIS | (5,488.8) | (5,506.0) | 17.2 |
| SOUTH | | 9,720.1 | 4,603.4 | 5,116.7 |
| | ALTE | 0.0 | (0.3) | 0.3 |
| | ALTW | 0.0 | 1.4 | (1.4) |
| | CIN | 0.0 | 50.0 | (50.0) |
| | CPLE | 3,074.2 | (219.6) | 3,293.8 |
| | CPLW | (27.6) | 4.4 | (32.0) |
| | DUK | 1,322.1 | 1,404.9 | (82.9) |
| | IPL | 0.0 | 4.2 | (4.2) |
| | LGEE | 1,538.1 | (497.6) | 2,035.7 |
| | MEC | 0.0 | 68.6 | (68.6) |
| | MECS | 0.0 | 205.7 | (205.7) |
| | NIPS | 0.0 | 0.0 | (0.0) |
| | TVA | 3,813.4 | 3,374.9 | 438.5 |
| | WEC | 0.0 | 206.8 | (206.8) |
| Grand Total | | (11,986.3) | (11,826.5) | (159.9) |

## Data Required for Full Loop Flow Analysis

Loop flows are defined as the difference between actual and scheduled power flows at one or more specific interfaces. The differences between actual and scheduled power flows can be the result of a number of underlying causes. To adequately investigate the causes of loop flows, complete data are required.

Loop flows exist because electricity flows on the path of least resistance regardless of the path specified by contractual agreement or regulatory prescription. Loop flows can arise from transactions scheduled into, out of or around a balancing authority on contract paths that do not correspond to the actual physical paths on which energy flows. Outside of LMP-based energy markets, energy is scheduled and paid for based on contract path, without regard to the path


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of the actual energy flows. Loop flows can also result from actions within balancing authorities.

Loop flows are a significant concern. Loop flows can have negative impacts on the efficiency of markets with explicit locational pricing, including impacts on locational prices, on FTR revenue adequacy and on system operations, and can be evidence of attempts to game such markets. Loop flows also have poorly understood impacts on nonmarket areas. In general, the detailed sources of the identified differences between scheduled and actual flows remain unclear as a result of incomplete or inadequate access to the required data.

A complete analysis of loop flow could provide additional insight that could lead to enhanced overall market efficiency and clarify the interactions among market and nonmarket areas. A complete analysis of loop flow would improve the overall transparency of electricity transactions. There are areas with transparent markets, and there are areas with less transparent markets (nonmarket areas), but these areas together comprise a market, and overall market efficiency would benefit from the increased transparency that would derive from a better understanding of loop flows.

For a complete loop flow analysis, several types of data are required from all balancing authorities in the Eastern Interconnection. The Commission required access to NERC Tag data. In addition to the Tag data, actual tie line data, dynamic schedule and pseudo tie data are required in order to analyze the differences between actual and scheduled transactions. ACE data, market flow impact data and generation and load data are required in order to understand the sources, within each balancing authority, of loop flows that do not result from differences between actual and scheduled transactions.[21]

## NERC Tag Data

An analysis of loop flow requires knowledge of the scheduled path of energy transactions. NERC Tag data include the scheduled path and energy profile of the transactions, including the Generation Control Area (GCA), the intermediate Control Areas, the Load Control Area (LCA) and the energy profile of all transactions. Complete tag data include the identity of the specific market participants. FERC Order No. 771 required access to NERC Tag data for the Commission, regional transmission organizations, independent system operators and market monitoring units.[22]

## Actual Tie Line Flow Data

An analysis of loop flow requires knowledge of the actual path of energy transactions. Currently, a very limited set of tie line data is made available via the NERC IDC and the Central Repository for Curtailments (CRC) website. The available tie line data, and the data within the IDC, are presented as information on a screen, which does not permit analysis of the underlying data.

## Dynamic Schedule and Pseudo Tie Data

Dynamic schedule and pseudo ties represent another type of interchange transaction between balancing authorities. While dynamic schedules are required to be tagged, the tagged profile is only an estimate of what energy is expected to flow. Dynamic schedules are implemented within each balancing authority's Energy Management System (EMS), with the current values shared over Inter-Control Center Protocol (ICCP) links. By definition, the dynamic schedule scheduled and actual values will always be identical from a balancing authority standpoint, and the tagged profile should be removed from the calculation of loop flows to eliminate double counting of the energy profile. Dynamic schedule data from all balancing authorities are required in order to account for all scheduled and actual flows.

Pseudo ties are similar to dynamic schedules in that they represent a transaction between balancing authorities and are handled within the EMS systems and data are shared over the ICCP. Pseudo ties differ from dynamic schedules in how the generating resource is modeled within the balancing authorities' ACE equations. Dynamic schedules are modeled as resources located in one area serving load in another, while pseudo ties are modeled as resources in one area moved to another area. Unlike dynamic schedules, pseudo tie transactions are

21 It is requested that all data be made available in downloadable format in order to make analysis possible. A data viewing tool alone is not adequate.

22 See 141 FERC ¶ 61,235 (2012).

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not required to be tagged. Pseudo tie data from all balancing authorities are required in order to account for all scheduled and actual flows.

### Area Control Error (ACE) Data

Area control error (ACE) data provides information about how well each balancing authority is matching their generation with their load. This information, combined with the scheduled and actual interchange values will show whether an individual balancing authority is pushing on or leaning on the interconnection, contributing to loop flows.

NERC makes real-time ACE graphs available on their Reliability Coordinator Information System (RCIS) website. This information is presented only in graphical form, and the underlying data is not available for analysis.

### Market Flow Impact Data

In addition to interchange transactions, internal dispatch can also affect flows on balancing authorities' tie lines. The impact of internal dispatch on tie lines is called market flow. Market flow data are imported in the IDC, but there is only limited historical data, as only market flow data related to TLR levels 3 or higher are required to be made available via a Congestion Management Report (CMR). The remaining data are deleted.

There is currently a project in development through the NERC Operating Reliability Subcommittee (ORS) called the Market Flow Impact Tool. The purpose of this tool is to make visible the impacts of dispatch on loop flows. The MMU supports the development of this tool, but, equally important, requests that FERC and NERC ensure that the underlying data are provided to market monitors and other approved entities.

### Generation and Load Data

Generation data (both real-time scheduled generation and actual output) and load data would permit analysis of the extent to which balancing authorities are meeting their commitments to serve load. If a balancing authority is not meeting its load commitment with adequate generation, the result is unscheduled flows across the interconnections to establish power balance.

Market areas are transparent in providing real-time load while nonmarket areas are not. For example, PJM posts real-time load via its eDATA application. Most nonmarket balancing authorities provide only the expected peak load on their individual websites. Data on generation are not made publicly available, as this is considered market sensitive information.

The MMU recommends, that in order to permit a complete analysis of loop flow, FERC and NERC ensure that the identified data are made available to market monitors as well as other industry entities determined appropriate by FERC.

## PJM and MISO Interface Prices

Both the PJM/MISO and MISO/PJM interface pricing points represent the value of power at the relevant border, as determined in each market. In both cases, the interface price is the price at which transactions are settled. For example, a transaction into PJM from MISO would receive the PJM/MISO interface price upon entering PJM, while a transaction into MISO from PJM would receive the MISO/PJM interface price. PJM and MISO use network models to determine these prices and to attempt to ensure that the prices are consistent with the underlying electrical flows.

Under the PJM/MISO Joint Operating Agreement, the two RTOs mutually determine a set of transmission facilities on which both RTOs have an impact, and therefore jointly operate to those constraints. These jointly controlled facilities are M2M (Market to Market) flowgates. When a M2M constraint binds, PJM's LMP calculations at the buses that make up PJM's MISO interface pricing point are based on the PJM model's distribution factors of the selected buses to the binding M2M constraint and PJM's shadow price of the binding M2M constraint. MISO's LMP calculations at the buses that make up MISO's PJM interface pricing point are based on the MISO model's distribution factors of the selected buses to the binding M2M constraint and MISO's shadow price of the binding M2M constraint.

Prior to June 1, 2014, the PJM interface definition for MISO consisted of nine buses located near the middle of the MISO system and not at the border


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between the RTOs.[23] The interface definitions led to questions about the level of congestion included in interchange pricing.

PJM modified the definition of the PJM/MISO interface price effective June 1, 2014. PJM's new MISO interface pricing point includes 10 equally weighted buses that are close to the PJM/MISO border. The 10 buses were selected based on PJM's analysis that showed that over 80 percent of the hourly tie line flows between PJM and MISO occurred on 10 ties composed of MISO and PJM monitored facilities. On June 1, 2017, MISO modified their MISO/PJM interface definition to match PJM's PJM/MISO interface definition.


## Real-Time and Day-Ahead PJM/MISO Interface Prices

In the first six months of 2026, the direction of flow was consistent with price differentials in 53.6 percent of the hours. Table 9-26 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/MISO Interface and the MISO/PJM Interface based on LMP differences and flow direction. Table 9-26 shows that PJM was a net exporter of energy to MISO in all but 146 hours during the first six months of 2026. The lack of response to relative prices on the PJM/MISO interface was consistent with the ongoing pattern that there are net exports from PJM to MISO in almost every hour, regardless of relative prices. In the first six months of 2026, flows were in the uneconomic direction on the PJM/MISO interface in 46.4 percent of all hours. Figure 9-5 shows the underlying variability in prices calculated on a daily hourly average basis. There are a number of relevant measures of variability, including the number of times the price differential fluctuates between positive and negative, the standard deviation of individual prices and of price differences and the absolute value of the price differences (Table 9-30).

### Table 9-26 PJM and MISO flow based hours and price differences: January through June, 2026

| LMP Difference | Flow Direction | Number of Hours | Average Hourly Price Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISO/PJM LMP > PJM/MISO LMP | Total Hours | 2,304 | $21.53 |
| | Consistent Flow (PJM to MISO) | 2,242 | $20.99 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (MISO to PJM) | 62 | $40.95 |
| | No Flow | 0 | $0.00 |
| PJM/MISO LMP > MISO/PJM LMP | Total Hours | 2,039 | $19.62 |
| | Consistent Flow (MISO to PJM) | 84 | $43.72 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (PJM to MISO) | 1,955 | $18.59 |
| | No Flow | 1 | $47.77 |

### Figure 9-5 Price differences (MISO/PJM Interface minus PJM/MISO Interface): January through June, 2026




23 See "LMP Aggregate Definitions," (June 10, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/energy/lmp-model-info/lmp-aggregate-definitions.xlsx>. PJM periodically updates these definitions on its website. See <http://www.pjm.com>.

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## Distribution and Prices of Hourly Flows at the PJM/MISO Interface

Almost without exception, power flows from PJM to MISO regardless of the direction of price differences. In the first six months of 2026, the direction of hourly energy flows was consistent with PJM and MISO interface price differentials in 2,326 hours (53.6 percent of all hours), and was inconsistent with price differentials in 2,017 hours (46.4 percent of all hours). Table 9-27 shows the distribution of hourly energy flows between PJM and MISO based on the price differences between the PJM/MISO and MISO/PJM prices. Of the 2,017 hours where flows were in a direction inconsistent with price differences, 1,813 of those hours (89.9 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $1.00 and 1,231 of those hours (61.0 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was $1,075.54. Of the 2,326 hours where flows were consistent with price differences, 2,096 of those hours (90.1 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $1.00 and 1,194 of all such hours (51.3 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was $1,705.41.

**Table 9-27 Distribution of hourly flows that are consistent and inconsistent with price differences between PJM and MISO: January through June, 2026**

| Price Difference Range (Greater Than or Equal To) | Inconsistent Hours | Percent of Inconsistent Hours | Consistent Hours | Percent of Consistent Hours |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $0.00 | 2,017 | 100.0% | 2,326 | 100.0% |
| $1.00 | 1,813 | 89.9% | 2,096 | 90.1% |
| $5.00 | 1,231 | 61.0% | 1,194 | 51.3% |
| $10.00 | 814 | 40.4% | 683 | 29.4% |
| $15.00 | 600 | 29.7% | 474 | 20.4% |
| $20.00 | 473 | 23.5% | 377 | 16.2% |
| $25.00 | 393 | 19.5% | 317 | 13.6% |
| $50.00 | 167 | 8.3% | 184 | 7.9% |
| $75.00 | 87 | 4.3% | 129 | 5.5% |
| $100.00 | 59 | 2.9% | 88 | 3.8% |
| $200.00 | 16 | 0.8% | 38 | 1.6% |
| $300.00 | 9 | 0.4% | 22 | 0.9% |
| $400.00 | 5 | 0.2% | 15 | 0.6% |
| $500.00 | 3 | 0.1% | 11 | 0.5% |

## PJM and NYISO Interface Prices

If interface prices were defined in a comparable manner by PJM and the NYISO, if identical rules governed external transactions in PJM and the NYISO, if time lags were not built into the rules governing such transactions and if no risks were associated with such transactions, then prices at the interfaces would be expected to be very close and the level of transactions would be expected to be related to any price differentials. The fact that none of these conditions exists is important in explaining the observed relationship between interface prices and inter-RTO/ISO power flows, and those price differentials.[24]

PJM and NYISO each calculate an interface LMP using network models including distribution factor impacts. On May 1, 2017, PJM modified the PJM/NYIS interface price to be based on four buses within NYISO. The four buses were chosen based on a power flow analysis of transfers between PJM and the NYISO and the resultant distribution of flows across the free flowing A/C ties.

Prior to May 1, 2017, PJM's PJM/NYIS interface definition used two buses and included the impact of the ConEd wheeling agreement. The ConEd wheeling agreement ended on May 1, 2017. The end of the wheeling agreement meant that the expected actual power flows would change and therefore the definition of the interface price needed to change.

The NYISO uses proxy buses to calculate interface prices with neighboring balancing authorities. A proxy bus is a single bus, located outside the NYISO footprint, which represents generation and load in a neighboring balancing authority area. The NYISO models imports from PJM as generation at the Keystone proxy bus, delivered to the NYISO reference bus with the assumption that 32 percent of the flow will enter the NYISO across the free flowing A/C ties, 32 percent will enter the NYISO across the Ramapo PARs, 21 percent will enter the NYISO across the ABC PARs and 15 percent will enter the NYISO across the J/K PARs. The NYISO models exports to PJM as being delivered to load at the Keystone proxy bus, sourced from the NYISO reference bus with the assumption that 32 percent of the flow will enter PJM across the free flowing A/C ties, 32 percent will enter PJM across the Ramapo PARs, 21

24 See the *2012 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.



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percent will enter PJM across the ABC PARs and 15 percent will enter PJM across the J/K PARs.

## Real-Time and Day-Ahead PJM/NYISO Interface Prices


In the first six months of 2026, the relationship between prices at the PJM/NYIS Interface and at the NYISO/PJM proxy bus and the relationship between interface price differentials and power flows continued to be affected by differences in institutional and operating practices between PJM and the NYISO. The direction of flow was consistent with price differentials in 61.7 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2026. Table 9-28 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/NYIS Interface and the NYIS/PJM proxy bus based on LMP differences and flow direction. Figure 9-6 shows the underlying variability in prices calculated on a daily hourly average basis. There are a number of relevant measures of variability, including the number of times the price differential fluctuates between positive and negative, the standard deviation of individual prices and of price differences and the absolute value of the price differences (Table 9-30).

**Table 9-28 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and price differences: January through June, 2026[25]**

| LMP Difference | Flow Direction | Number of Hours | Average Hourly Price Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| NYIS/PJM proxy bus LBMP > PJM/NYIS LMP | Total Hours | 2,696 | $19.89 |
| | Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 2,575 | $19.40 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 121 | $30.18 |
| | No Flow | 0 | $0.00 |
| PJM/NYIS LMP > NYIS/PJM proxy bus LBMP | Total Hours | 1,647 | $32.36 |
| | Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 105 | $41.57 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 1,542 | $31.74 |
| | No Flow | 0 | $0.00 |

25 The NYISO Locational Based Marginal Price (LBMP) is the equivalent term to PJM's Locational Marginal Price (LMP).

**Figure 9-6 Price differences (NY/PJM proxy - PJM/NYIS Interface): January through June, 2026**




## Distribution and Prices of Hourly Flows at the PJM/NYISO Interface

In the first six months of 2026, the direction of hourly energy flows was consistent with PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM price differences in 2,680 hours (61.7 percent of all hours), and was inconsistent with price differences in 1,663 hours (38.3 percent of all hours). Table 9-29 shows the distribution of hourly energy flows between PJM and NYISO based on the price differences between the PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM prices. Of the 1,663 hours where flows were in a direction inconsistent with price differences, 1,565 of those hours (94.1 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $1.00 and 1,215 of all those hours (73.1 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was $1,160.39. Of the 2,680 hours where flows were consistent with price differences, 2,534 of

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those hours (94.6 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $1.00 and 1,966 of all such hours (73.4 percent) had a price difference greater than or equal to $5.00. The largest price difference with such flows was $1,460.34.

### Table 9-29 Distribution of hourly flows that are consistent and inconsistent with price differences between PJM and NYISO: January through June, 2026

| Price Difference Range (Greater Than or Equal To) | Inconsistent Hours | Percent of Inconsistent Hours | Consistent Hours | Percent of Consistent Hours |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $0.00 | 1,663 | 100.0% | 2,680 | 100.0% |
| $1.00 | 1,565 | 94.1% | 2,534 | 94.6% |
| $5.00 | 1,215 | 73.1% | 1,966 | 73.4% |
| $10.00 | 930 | 55.9% | 1,253 | 46.8% |
| $15.00 | 734 | 44.1% | 811 | 30.3% |
| $20.00 | 605 | 36.4% | 578 | 21.6% |
| $25.00 | 524 | 31.5% | 422 | 15.7% |
| $50.00 | 275 | 16.5% | 211 | 7.9% |
| $75.00 | 166 | 10.0% | 130 | 4.9% |
| $100.00 | 108 | 6.5% | 94 | 3.5% |
| $200.00 | 32 | 1.9% | 27 | 1.0% |
| $300.00 | 15 | 0.9% | 7 | 0.3% |
| $400.00 | 8 | 0.5% | 5 | 0.2% |
| $500.00 | 6 | 0.4% | 5 | 0.2% |

## Summary of Interface Prices between PJM and Organized Markets

Some measures of the real-time and day-ahead PJM interface pricing with MISO and with the NYISO are summarized and compared in Table 9-30, including average prices and measures of variability.

### Table 9-30 PJM, NYISO and MISO border price averages: January through June, 2026[26]

| | | Real-Time | | Day-Ahead | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Description | NYISO | MISO | NYISO | MISO |
| Average Interval Price | PJM Price at ISO Border | $58.90 | $42.70 | $61.64 | $46.88 |
| | ISO Price at PJM Border | $58.99 | $44.90 | $68.20 | $46.67 |
| | Difference at Border (PJM-ISO) | ($0.09) | ($2.21) | ($6.56) | $0.22 |
| | Average Absolute Value of Interval Difference at Border | $30.83 | $24.90 | $14.21 | $10.17 |
| | Sign Changes per Day | 27.5 | 30.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| Standard Deviation | PJM Price at ISO Border | $98.44 | $75.64 | $82.81 | $56.86 |
| | ISO Price at PJM Border | $87.71 | $111.98 | $97.72 | $57.78 |
| | Difference at Border (PJM-ISO) | $96.55 | $117.74 | $39.12 | $26.03 |

## Neptune Underwater Transmission Line to Long Island, New York

The Neptune Line is a 65 mile direct current (DC) merchant 230 kV transmission line, with a capacity of 660 MW, providing a direct connection between PJM (Sayreville, New Jersey), and NYISO (Nassau County on Long Island). Schedule 14 of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff provides that power flows will only be from PJM to New York. The flows were consistent with price differentials in 82.7 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2026. Table 9-31 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/NEPT Interface and the NYIS/Neptune bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.

### Table 9-31 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and price differences (Neptune): January through June, 2026

| LMP Difference | Flow Direction | Number of Hours | Average Hourly Price Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| NYIS/Neptune Bus LBMP > PJM/NEPT LMP | Total Hours | 3,593 | $30.52 |
| | Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 3,593 | $30.52 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 0 | $0.00 |
| | No Flow | 0 | $0.00 |
| PJM/NEPT LMP > NYIS/Neptune Bus LBMP | Total Hours | 750 | $61.06 |
| | Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 0 | $0.00 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 750 | $61.06 |
| | No Flow | 0 | $0.00 |

26 Effective April 1, 2018, PJM implemented five minute LMP settlements in the real-time energy market. The sign changes per day represented in this table reflect the number of intervals where the sign changed per day. For the real-time energy market, there are 288 five minute intervals per day. For the day-ahead market there are 24 hourly intervals per day.



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To move power from PJM to NYISO using the Neptune Line, two PJM transmission service reservations are required. A transmission service reservation is required from the PJM Transmission System to the Neptune HVDC Line ("Out Service") and another transmission service reservation is required on the Neptune HVDC Line ("Neptune Service").[27] The PJM Out Service is covered by normal PJM OASIS business operations.[28] The Neptune Service falls under the provisions for controllable merchant facilities, Schedule 14 of the PJM Tariff. The Neptune Service is also acquired on the PJM OASIS.

Neptune Service is owned by a primary rights holder, and any nonfirm service that is not used (as defined by a schedule on a NERC Tag) may be released either voluntarily by the primary rights holder or by default by PJM. The primary rights holder may elect to voluntarily release monthly, weekly, daily or hourly firm or nonfirm service. Voluntarily releasing the service allows for the primary rights holder to specify a rate to be charged for the released service. If the primary rights holder does not elect to voluntarily release nonfirm service, and does not use the service, the available transmission will be released by default at 12:00, one business day before the start of service. On June 30, 2026, the rate for the nonfirm service released by default was $10.00 per MWh. The primary rights holder remains obligated to pay for the released service unless a second transmission customer acquires the released service.

Table 9-32 shows the percent of scheduled interchange across the Neptune Line by the primary rights holder since commercial operations began in July 2007. Table 9-32 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the primary rights holder was responsible for 100 percent of the scheduled interchange across the Neptune Line in all months. Figure 9-7 shows the hourly average flow across the Neptune Line for the first six months of 2026.


**Table 9-32 Percent of scheduled interchange across the Neptune Line by primary rights holder: July 2007 through June 2026**

| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| January | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| February | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| March | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| April | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.99% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| May | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| June | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.41% | 100.00% |
| July | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| August | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| September | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| October | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| November | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| December | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |

27 See OASIS "PJM Business Practices for Neptune Transmission Service," (August 21, 2015) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/oasis/merch-trans-facilities/neptune-oasis-business-practices-doc-clean.pdf>.
28 See OASIS "Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices," Rev. 13 (January 22, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean-pdf.pdf>.

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Figure 9-7 Neptune hourly average flow: January through June, 2026




## Linden Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT) facility

The Linden VFT facility is a controllable AC merchant transmission facility, with a capacity of 315 MW, providing a direct connection between PJM (Linden, New Jersey) and NYISO (Staten Island, New York). The flows were consistent with price differentials in 77.7 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2026. Table 9-33 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/LIND Interface and the NYIS/Linden Bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.

Table 9-33 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and price differences (Linden): January through June, 2026

| LMP Difference | Flow Direction | Number of Hours | Average Hourly Price Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| NYIS/Linden Bus LBMP > PJM/LIND LMP | Total Hours | 3,467 | $29.14 |
| | Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 3,373 | $29.60 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 0 | $0.00 |
| | No Flow | 94 | $12.73 |
| PJM/LIND LMP > NYIS/Linden Bus LBMP | Total Hours | 876 | $65.38 |
| | Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 0 | $0.00 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 849 | $66.29 |
| | No Flow | 27 | $36.64 |

To move power from PJM to NYISO on the Linden VFT Line, two PJM transmission service reservations are required. A transmission service reservation is required from the PJM Transmission System to the Linden VFT ("Out Service") and another transmission service reservation is required on the Linden VFT ("Linden VFT Service").[29] The PJM Out Service is covered by normal PJM OASIS business operations.[30] The Linden VFT Service falls under the provisions for controllable merchant facilities, Schedule 16 and Schedule 16-A of the PJM Tariff. The Linden VFT Service is also acquired on the PJM OASIS.

Linden VFT Service is owned by a primary rights holder, and any nonfirm service that is not used (as defined by a schedule on a NERC Tag) may be released either voluntarily by the primary rights holder or by default by PJM. The primary rights holder may elect to voluntarily release monthly, weekly, daily or hourly firm or nonfirm service. Voluntarily releasing the service allows for the primary rights holder to specify a rate to be charged for the released service. If the primary rights holder elects to not voluntarily release nonfirm service, and does not use the service, the available transmission will be released by default at 1200 (EPT), one business day before the start of service. On June 30, 2026, the rate for the nonfirm service

29 See OASIS "PJM Business Practices for Linden VFT Transmission Service," (June 1, 2011) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/oasis/merch-trans-facilities/linden-vft-oasis-business-practices-clean.pdf>.
30 See OASIS "Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices," Rev. 13 (January 22, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean-pdf.pdf>.


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released by default was $6.00 per MWh. The primary rights holder remains obligated to pay for the released service unless a second transmission customer acquires the released service.


Table 9-34 shows the percent of scheduled interchange across the Linden VFT Line by the primary rights holder since commercial operations began in November, 2009. Table 9-34 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the primary rights holder was responsible for 100 percent of the scheduled interchange across the Linden VFT Line in all months. Figure 9-8 shows the hourly average flow across the Linden VFT Line for the first six months of 2026.

**Table 9-34 Percent of scheduled interchange across the Linden VFT Line by primary rights holder: November 2009 through June 2026**

| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| January | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 70.53% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| February | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 94.95% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| March | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 96.46% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| April | NA | 99.97% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.98% | 100.00% | 49.32% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| May | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| June | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 27.27% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| July | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 29.56% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| August | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 82.46% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| September | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 81.68% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| October | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 35.05% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| November | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.86% | 100.00% | 61.45% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| December | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 98.22% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 84.57% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |

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Figure 9-8 Linden hourly average flow: January through June, 2026[31]




## Hudson Direct Current (DC) Merchant Transmission Line

The Hudson direct current (DC) Line is a bidirectional merchant 230 kV transmission line, with a capacity of 673 MW, providing a direct connection between PJM (Public Service Electric and Gas Company's (PSE&G) Bergen 230 kV Switching Station located in Ridgefield, New Jersey) and NYISO (Consolidated Edison's (Con Ed) W. 49th Street 345 kV Substation in New York City). The connection is a submarine cable system. While the Hudson DC Line is a bidirectional line, power flows are only from PJM to New York because the Hudson Transmission Partners, LLC had only requested withdrawal rights (320 MW of firm withdrawal rights, and 353 MW of nonfirm withdrawal rights). The flows were consistent with price differentials in 77.5 percent of the hours in the first six months of 2026. Table 9-35 shows the number of hours and average hourly price differences between the PJM/HUDS Interface and the NYIS/Hudson bus based on LMP differences and flow direction.

Table 9-35 PJM and NYISO flow based hours and price differences (Hudson): January through June, 2026

| LMP Difference | Flow Direction | Number of Hours | Average Hourly Price Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| NYIS/Hudson Bus LBMP > PJM/HUDS LMP | Total Hours | 3,596 | $30.91 |
| | Consistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 3,365 | $31.04 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 0 | $0.00 |
| | No Flow | 231 | $29.05 |
| PJM/HUDS LMP > NYIS/Hudson Bus LBMP | Total Hours | 747 | $44.58 |
| | Consistent Flow (NYIS to PJM) | 0 | $0.00 |
| | Inconsistent Flow (PJM to NYIS) | 726 | $45.57 |
| | No Flow | 21 | $10.47 |

To move power from PJM to NYISO on the Hudson Line, two PJM transmission service reservations are required. A transmission service reservation is required from the PJM Transmission System to the Hudson Line ("Out Service") and another transmission service reservation is required on the Hudson Line ("Hudson Service").[32] The PJM Out Service is covered by normal PJM OASIS business operations.[33] The Hudson Service falls under the provisions for controllable merchant facilities, Schedule 17 of the PJM Tariff. The Hudson Service is also acquired on the PJM OASIS.

Hudson Service is owned by a primary rights holder, and any nonfirm service that is not used (as defined by scheduled on a NERC Tag) may be released either voluntarily by the primary rights holder or by default by PJM. The primary rights holder may elect to voluntarily release monthly, weekly, daily or hourly firm or nonfirm service. Voluntarily releasing the service allows for the primary rights holder to specify a rate to be charged for the released service. If the primary rights holder elects to not voluntarily release nonfirm

31 The Linden VFT Line is a bidirectional facility. The "Total Capacity" lines represent the maximum amount of interchange possible in either direction. These lines were included to maintain a consistent scale, for comparison purposes, with the Neptune DC Tie Line.

32 See OASIS "PJM Business Practices for Hudson Transmission Service,"<https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/oasis/merch-trans-facilities/hudson-oasis-business-practices-clean.pdf>.

33 See OASIS "Regional Transmission and Energy Scheduling Practices," Rev. 13 (January 22, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/etools/oasis/regional-practices-clean-pdf.pdf>.



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service, and does not use the service, the available transmission will be released by default at 1200 (EPT), one business day before the start of service. On June 30, 2026, the rate for the nonfirm service released by default was $10.00 per MWh. The primary rights holder remains obligated to pay for the released service unless a second transmission customer acquires the released service.

Table 9-36 shows the percent of scheduled interchange across the Hudson Line by the primary rights holder since commercial operations began in May, 2013. Table 9-36 shows that in the first six months of 2026, the primary rights holder was responsible for less than 100 percent of the scheduled interchange across the Hudson Line in May, and the primary rights holder was responsible for 100 percent of the scheduled interchange across the Hudson Line in the remaining months. Figure 9-9 shows the hourly average flow across the Hudson Line for the first six months of 2026.


**Table 9-36 Percent of scheduled interchange across the Hudson Line by primary rights holder: May 2013 through June 2026[34]**

| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| January | NA | 51.22% | 16.27% | 100.00% | NA | 24.44% | 52.21% | 29.70% | 37.64% | 64.30% | 81.40% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| February | NA | 49.00% | 14.67% | NA | NA | 23.25% | 77.12% | 23.61% | 47.37% | 64.34% | 82.72% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| March | NA | 40.40% | 71.88% | NA | NA | 9.55% | 72.42% | 87.24% | 53.27% | 82.65% | 83.41% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| April | NA | 100.00% | 100.00% | NA | NA | 15.13% | 100.00% | 10.02% | 70.90% | 84.91% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| May | 100.00% | 26.87% | 100.00% | 100.00% | NA | 92.18% | 100.00% | 20.53% | 65.15% | 84.15% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.92% |
| June | 100.00% | 5.89% | 59.72% | 100.00% | NA | 44.89% | 44.98% | 38.26% | 73.81% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| July | 100.00% | 18.51% | 84.34% | NA | NA | 16.26% | 36.43% | 27.56% | 76.56% | 100.00% | 89.66% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| August | 100.00% | 75.17% | 65.48% | NA | NA | 19.24% | 43.10% | 35.64% | 59.09% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 80.35% | 100.00% | |
| September | 100.00% | 75.31% | 78.73% | NA | NA | 22.90% | 43.42% | 30.75% | 53.66% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| October | 100.00% | 99.71% | 18.65% | 100.00% | NA | 22.67% | 33.60% | 52.58% | 56.26% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| November | 85.57% | 99.60% | 24.67% | 100.00% | 80.12% | 50.44% | 44.36% | 38.60% | 65.24% | 68.68% | 70.50% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| December | 28.32% | 1.68% | 100.00% | NA | 21.93% | 29.38% | 41.78% | 38.82% | 61.11% | 70.02% | 83.43% | 100.00% | 100.00% | |

34 The designation of "NA" means there was no flow on the Hudson Line during those months.

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Figure 9-9 Hudson hourly average flow: January through June, 2026




## Interchange Activity During High Load Hours

### Winter Peak Load

The PJM metered system winter peak load during the first six months of 2026 was 135,722 MW in the HE 0700 (EPT) on January 29, 2026. PJM was a net scheduled exporter of energy in all 24 hours on January 29, 2026, with average hourly scheduled exports of 3,768 MW. During HE 0700 on January 29, 2026, PJM had net scheduled exports of 2,878 MW and net metered actual exports of 2,991 MW. Net transaction exports during 0700 were consistent with price differences between the PJM/LIND Interface and the NYIS/Linden Bus and the PJM/HUDS Interface and the NYIS/Hudson Bus and between PJM and the NYISO. Net transaction exports were inconsistent with price differences between the PJM/NEPT Interface and the NYIS/Neptune Bus and between PJM and MISO. During January 2026, PJM was a net scheduled exporter of energy in 739 of the 744 hours (99.3 percent of the hours). During January 2026, the average hourly scheduled interchange was -3,741 MW (representing 3.5 percent of the average hourly load of 106,858 MW in June 2025).

### Summer Peak Load

The PJM metered system summer peak load during the first six months of 2026 was 146,175 MW in the HE 1700 (EPT) on June 30, 2026. PJM was a net scheduled exporter of energy in all 24 hours on June 30, 2026, with average hourly scheduled exports of 6,601 MW. During HE 1700 on June 30, 2026, PJM had net scheduled exports of 5,525 MW and net metered actual exports of 5,570 MW. Net transaction exports during 1700 were consistent with price differences between the PJM/NEPT Interface and the NYIS/Neptune Bus, the PJM/LIND Interface and the NYIS/Linden Bus and between PJM and the NYISO. Net transaction exports were inconsistent with price differences between the PJM/HUDS Interface and the NYIS/Hudson Bus and between PJM and MISO. During June 2026, PJM was a net scheduled exporter of energy in 720 of the 720 hours (100.0 percent of the hours). During June 2026, the average hourly scheduled interchange was -4,668 MW (representing 4.7 percent of the average hourly load of 98,036 MW in June 2026).

## Operating Agreements with Bordering Areas

To improve reliability and reduce potential seams issues, PJM and its neighbors have developed operating agreements, including: operating agreements with MISO and the NYISO; a reliability agreement with TVA, LG&E and KU; an operating agreement with Duke Energy Progress, Inc.; a reliability coordination agreement with VACAR South; a balancing authority operations agreement with the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEC); and a Northeastern planning coordination protocol with NYISO and ISO New England.

Table 9-37 shows a summary of the elements included in each of the operating agreements PJM has with its bordering areas.


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### Table 9-37 Summary of elements included in operating agreements with bordering areas

| Agreement: | PJM-MISO | PJM-NYISO | PJM-TVA-LGE-KU | PJM-DEP | PJM-VACAR | PJM-WEP | Northeastern Protocol |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Data Exhange | | | | | | | |
| Real-Time Data | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO |
| Projected Data | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| SCADA Data | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| EMS Models | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES |
| Operations Planning Data | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES |
| Available Flowgate Capability Data | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES |
| Near-Term System Coordination | | | | | | | |
| Operating Limit Violation Assistance | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| Over/Under Voltage Assistance | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| Emergency Energy Assistance | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| Outage Coordination | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| Long-Term System Coordination | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES |
| Congestion Management Process | | | | | | | |
| ATC Coordination | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| Market Flow Calculations | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Firm Flow Entitlements | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Market to Market Redispatch | YES - Redispatch | YES - Redispatch | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Joint Checkout Procedures | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | NO |

PJM-MISO = MISO/PJM Joint Operating Agreement

PJM-NYISO = New York ISO/PJM Joint Operating Agreement

PJM-TVA-LGE-KU = Joint Reliablity Coordination Agreement Between PJM - Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Louisville Gas and Electric Company (LGE) and Kentucky Utilities Company (KU)

PJM-DEP = Duke Energy Progress (DEP) - PJM Joint Operating Agreement

PJM-VACAR = PJM-VACAR South Reliability Coordination Agreement

PJM-WEP = Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement Between Wisconsin Electric Power Company and PJM Interconnection, LLC

Northeastern Protocol = Northeastern ISO-Regional Transmission Organization Planning Coordination Protocol

## PJM and MISO Joint Operating Agreement[35]

The Joint Operating Agreement between MISO and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. was executed on December 31, 2003. The PJM/MISO JOA includes provisions for congestion management that, for designated flowgates within MISO and PJM, allows for redispatch of units within the PJM and MISO regions to jointly manage congestion on these flowgates and to assign the costs of congestion management. This process was designed to address the impacts of market flows which are

35 See "Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (December 11, 2008) <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/miso-joa.pdf>.

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the loop flows on MISO's system created by PJM generators serving PJM load and vice versa. In 2012, MISO and PJM initiated a joint stakeholder process to address issues associated with the operation of the markets at the seam.[36]

Under the market to market rules, the organizations coordinate pricing at their borders. PJM and MISO each calculate an interface LMP using network models including distribution factor impacts. PJM uses 10 buses along the PJM/MISO border to calculate the PJM/MISO interface pricing point LMP. Prior to June 1, 2017, MISO used all of the PJM generator buses in its model of the PJM system in its calculation of the MISO/PJM interface pricing point.[37] On June 1, 2017, MISO modified their MISO/PJM interface definition to match PJM's PJM/MISO interface definition.

Coordinated flowgates are identified to determine which flowgates the market flows from PJM or MISO affect significantly. This set of flowgates may then be used in the congestion management process. PJM and MISO will conduct sensitivity studies to determine which flowgates are significantly affected by the market flows of the operating entity's control zones (historic control areas that existed in the IDC). There are five studies to determine which flowgates the operating entity will monitor and help control. These studies include generation to load distribution factor studies, transfer distribution factor analysis and an external asynchronous resource study. PJM or MISO may also specify additional flowgates that have not passed any of the five studies to be coordinated flowgates where the operating entity expects to use the TLR process to manage congestion. A reciprocal coordinated flowgate (RCF) is a CF that is monitored and controlled by PJM or MISO, on which both have significant impacts. Only RCFs are subject to the market to market congestion management process. [38]

As of January 1, 2026, PJM had 131 flowgates eligible for M2M (Market to Market) coordination. In the first six months of 2026, PJM added six flowgates and deleted six flowgates, resulting in 131 flowgates eligible for M2M coordination as of June 30, 2026. As of January 1, 2026, MISO had 179 flowgates eligible for M2M coordination. In the first six months of 2026, MISO added 41 flowgates and deleted 20 flowgates, resulting in 200 flowgates eligible for M2M coordination as of June 30, 2026.

The firm flow entitlement (FFE) represents the amount of historic 2004 market flows that each RTO had created on each RCF used in the market to market settlement process. The FFE establishes the amount of market flow that each RTO is permitted to create on the RCF before incurring redispatch costs during the market to market process. If the nonmonitoring RTO's real-time market flow is greater than their FFE plus the approved MW adjustment from day-ahead coordination, then the nonmonitoring RTO will pay the monitoring RTO the difference between their market flow and their FFE times the monitoring RTO's shadow price of the RCF. The shadow price is the incremental cost of dispatching marginal generation resources to relieve congestion on the RCF. If the nonmonitoring RTO's real-time market flow is less than their FFE plus the approved MW adjustment from day-ahead coordination, then the monitoring RTO will pay the nonmonitoring RTO for congestion relief provided by the nonmonitoring RTO. This payment is the difference between the nonmonitoring RTO's market flow and their FFE times the monitoring RTO's shadow price of the RCF.

April 1, 2004, known as the freeze date, is used to determine the firm rights on flowgates based on historic firm market flows that occurred prior to the implementation of M2M coordination. In the 21 years since 2004, significant topology and market changes have occurred, making the 2004 market flows irrelevant in 2026. The RTOs and stakeholders recognize that a modification to the definition of firm rights on flowgates is necessary. PJM and MISO stakeholders have spent years on the freeze date issues. No resolution to these issues appears imminent. The status quo results in significant payments by PJM customers to MISO customers. The final resolution should account for the investments made by each RTO in the transmission system. The final resolution should reflect current interchange patterns. In 2004, PJM was primarily an importer of energy from MISO. In the first three six of 2026, as it has been since about 2010, PJM is primarily an exporter of energy to MISO.

36 See "PJM/MISO Joint and Common Market Initiative," <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/stakeholder-meetings/pjm-miso-joint-common>.

37 See the *2012 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

38 See "Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (December 11, 2008) <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/miso-joa.pdf>.



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The MMU recommends eliminating the mechanism that defines FFE and M2M payments. These mechanisms are not consistent with markets and are not needed for efficient interface pricing. PJM and MISO have demonstrated a longstanding failure to resolve the definition of firm rights on flowgates and related issues. The MMU recommends that PJM file with the Commission to eliminate the FFE calculation and M2M payment of the PJM and MISO joint operating agreement.

The original logic of FFEs was not clear, the calculation of FFEs was not clear, and the measurement of market flows was and is imprecise at best. It does not make sense to use outdated and meaningless FFEs from 2004. If current FFEs are used based on actual current power flows, the role of FFEs is not clear. Fully dynamic FFEs are equivalent to eliminating FFEs while continuing to price power flows at the correct shadow price.

The solution to the FFE and M2M issue is to eliminate FFEs. Elimination of FFEs, while maintaining the exchange of shadow price information and cooperative dispatch, would keep the benefits of efficient constraint resolution between PJM and MISO.

In the first six months of 2026, market to market operations resulted in MISO and PJM redispatching units to control congestion on M2M flowgates and the exchange of payments for this redispatch. Table 9-38 shows credits for coordinated congestion management between PJM and MISO. In the first six months of 2026, MISO payments to PJM were $13.8 million, and PJM payments to MISO were $138.4 million, for a net payment from PJM to MISO of $124.6 million. The large settlements in 2022 were due to the large amount of congestion and high LMPs observed in December during Winter Storm Elliott.

**Table 9-38 PJM/MISO credits for coordinated congestion management: April 2005 through June 2026**[39]

| Year | Payments from PJM to MISO | Payments from MISO to PJM | Net Payment from PJM to MISO |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | $25,068,903 | $3,411,188 | $21,657,715 |
| 2006 | $18,664,630 | $21,381,460 | ($2,716,830) |
| 2007 | $29,917,241 | $17,774,637 | $12,142,604 |
| 2008 | $60,615,478 | $15,417,040 | $45,198,438 |
| 2009 | $48,101,017 | $10,632,885 | $37,468,132 |
| 2010 | $56,330,068 | $20,558,982 | $35,771,087 |
| 2011 | $87,113,498 | $9,445,949 | $77,667,550 |
| 2012 | $56,227,681 | $7,602,112 | $48,625,569 |
| 2013 | $32,589,519 | $14,733,770 | $17,855,748 |
| 2014 | $62,572,610 | $19,263,896 | $43,308,713 |
| 2015 | $49,379,823 | $11,266,866 | $38,112,957 |
| 2016 | $50,628,816 | $9,826,347 | $40,802,469 |
| 2017 | $69,812,858 | $16,698,276 | $53,114,581 |
| 2018 | $110,501,078 | $10,400,122 | $100,100,956 |
| 2019 | $44,391,547 | $7,886,392 | $36,505,155 |
| 2020 | $53,038,595 | $7,985,027 | $45,053,568 |
| 2021 | $45,704,128 | $18,792,183 | $26,911,945 |
| 2022 | $191,716,652 | $8,560,992 | $183,155,660 |
| 2023 | $63,976,499 | $5,467,435 | $58,509,064 |
| 2024 | $58,627,460 | $17,671,566 | $40,955,894 |
| 2025 | $99,190,899 | $8,099,528 | $91,091,371 |
| 2026 (Jan) | $45,006,873 | $9,008,623 | $35,998,251 |
| 2026 (Feb) | $20,251,807 | $115,595 | $20,136,213 |
| 2026 (Mar) | $15,240,081 | $1,623,814 | $13,616,267 |
| 2026 (Apr) | $26,338,436 | $1,071,638 | $25,266,797 |
| 2026 (May) | $21,175,119 | $817,732 | $20,357,387 |
| 2026 (Jun) | $10,395,863 | $1,204,284 | $9,191,579 |
| 2026 | $138,408,179 | $13,841,686 | $124,566,493 |

## PJM and New York Independent System Operator Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)[40]

The Joint Operating Agreement between NYISO and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. became effective on January 15, 2013. Under the market to market rules, the organizations coordinate pricing at their borders. Unlike the PJM/MISO

39 The totals represented in this figure represent the settlements as of the time of this report and may not include adjustments or resettlements.

40 See "New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Joint Operating Agreement with PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (September 16, 2019) <https://www.pjm.com/~/media/DotCom/documents/agreements/nyiso-joa.ashx>.

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JOA where firm flow entitlements are based on a freeze date, the PJM/NYISO JOA requires that each party calculates an M2M entitlement on each M2M flowgate and compare results at least once a year. This annual coordination of entitlements ensures that the impact of upgrades on both systems are incorporated into the M2M calculation. PJM and NYISO may mutually agree to not recalculate entitlements in a given year.

On June 28, 2019, NYISO and PJM submitted revisions to the NYISO-PJM Joint Operating Agreement (JOA). The revisions addressed RTO concerns identified in their joint request for limited waiver of the JOA to authorize redispatch of generation in PJM. The intent of the redispatch is to mitigate post-contingency overloads of transmission equipment on the New York side of the East Towanda-Hillside 230 kV Transmission Line. The agreement allows the RTOs to control for this contingency without the exchange of payments for redispatch.[41]

In the first six months of 2026, market to market operations did not result in NYISO and PJM redispatching units to control congestion on M2M flowgates. Therefore, there was no exchange of payments for redispatch in the first six months of 2026. Table 9-39 shows credits for coordinated congestion management between PJM and NYISO.

41 See NYISO Filing, FERC Docket No. ER19-2282-000 (June 28, 2019).

**Table 9-39 PJM/NYISO credits for coordinated congestion management (flowgates): January 2013 through June 2026[42]**

| Year | Payments from PJM to NYISO | Payments from NYISO to PJM | Net Payment from PJM to NYISO |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | $119,121 | $0 | $119,121 |
| 2014 | $58,631 | $1,005 | $57,626 |
| 2015 | $242,488 | $5,063 | $237,425 |
| 2016 | $632,768 | $50,550 | $582,219 |
| 2017 | $422,304 | $895 | $421,409 |
| 2018 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2019 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2020 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2021 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2022 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2023 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2024 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2025 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 (Jan) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 (Feb) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 (Mar) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 (Apr) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 (May) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 (Jun) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2026 | $0 | $0 | $0 |

The M2M coordination process focuses on real-time market coordination to manage transmission limitations that occur on M2M flowgates in a cost effective manner. Coordination between NYISO and PJM includes not only joint redispatch, but also incorporates coordinated operation of the PARs that are located at the PJM/NYIS border. This real-time coordination results in an efficient economic dispatch solution across both markets to manage the real-time transmission constraints that affect both markets, focusing on the actual flows in real time to manage constraints.[43] For each M2M flowgate, a PAR settlement will occur for each interval during coordinated operations. The PAR settlements are determined based on whether the measured real-time flow on each of the PARs is greater than or less than the calculated target value. If the actual flow is greater than the target flow, NYISO will make a payment to PJM. This payment is calculated as the product of the M2M flowgate shadow price,

42 The totals represented in this figure represent the settlements as of the time of this report and may not include adjustments or resettlements.

43 See "New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Joint Operating Agreement with PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (September 16, 2019) <https://www.pjm.com/~/media/DotCom/documents/agreements/nyiso-joa.ashx>.



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the PAR shift factor and the difference between the actual and target PAR flow. If the actual flow is less than the target flow, PJM will make a payment to NYISO. This payment is calculated as the product of the M2M flowgate shadow price, the PAR shift factor and the difference between the target and actual PAR flow. Effective May 1, 2017, coincident with the termination of the ConEd wheel, PJM and NYISO began M2M coordination at all of the PARs along the PJM/NYISO seam. Prior to May 1, 2017, only the Ramapo PARs were included in the M2M process. In the first six months of 2026, market to market operations resulted in NYISO and PJM adjusting PARs to control congestion and the exchange of payments for this coordination. In the first six months of 2026, PJM payments to NYISO were $650,198, and NYISO payments to PJM were $1,515,864, for a net payment from NYISO to PJM of $865,667. Table 9-40 shows the PAR credits for coordinated congestion management between PJM and NYISO.

**Table 9-40 PJM/NYISO credits for coordinated congestion management (PARs): January 2013 through June 2026[44]**

| Year | Payments from PJM to NYISO | Payments from NYISO to PJM | Net Payment from PJM to NYISO |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | $7,403,255 | $0 | $7,403,255 |
| 2014 | $5,723,571 | $0 | $5,723,571 |
| 2015 | $4,691,302 | $0 | $4,691,302 |
| 2016 | $617,733 | $0 | $617,733 |
| 2017 | $2,328,763 | $2,115,126 | $213,637 |
| 2018 | $3,327,747 | $2,407,667 | $920,081 |
| 2019 | $3,341,615 | $2,923,715 | $417,900 |
| 2020 | $3,004,543 | $2,048,317 | $956,226 |
| 2021 | $8,911,160 | $6,751,890 | $2,159,270 |
| 2022 | $21,126,437 | $13,609,266 | $7,517,171 |
| 2023 | $1,755,207 | $2,208,388 | ($453,181) |
| 2024 | $376,435 | $1,227,033 | ($850,597) |
| 2025 | $2,515,938 | $3,667,855 | ($1,151,917) |
| 2026 (Jan) | $158,870 | $121,212 | $37,658 |
| 2026 (Feb) | $266,656 | $319,741 | ($53,085) |
| 2026 (Mar) | $34,967 | $251,782 | ($216,815) |
| 2026 (Apr) | $7,068 | $326,732 | ($319,664) |
| 2026 (May) | $156,000 | $264,337 | ($108,337) |
| 2026 (Jun) | $26,637 | $232,061 | ($205,424) |
| 2026 | $650,198 | $1,515,864 | ($865,667) |

44 The totals in this figure are from the settlements at the time of this report and may change based on later adjustments or resettlements.

## PJM and TVA/LG&E and KU Joint Reliability Coordination Agreement (JRCA)[45]

The joint reliability coordination agreement (JRCA) executed on April 22, 2005, provides for the exchange of information and the implementation of reliability and efficiency protocols between TVA and PJM. The agreement also provides for the management of congestion and arrangements for both near-term and long-term system coordination. Under the JRCA, PJM and TVA honor constraints on the other's flowgates in their Available Transmission Capability (ATC) calculations. Market flows are calculated on reciprocal flowgates. When a constraint occurs on a reciprocal flowgate within TVA, PJM has the option to redispatch generation to reduce market flow, and therefore alleviate the constraint. Unlike the M2M procedure between MISO and PJM, this redispatch does not result in M2M payments. However, electing to redispatch generation within PJM can avoid potential market disruption by curtailing transactions under the Transmission Line Loading Relief (TLR) procedure to achieve the same relief. In 2022, PJM and TVA began discussions to add Louisville Gas and Electric Company (LG&E) and Kentucky Utilities (KU) as parties to the JRCA. The revisions to add LG&E and KU to the agreement were filed with the Commission on June 6, 2023.[46] On August 5, 2023, the Commission approved the filing.[47] The agreement remained in effect in the first six months of 2026.

## PJM and Duke Energy Progress, Inc. Joint Operating Agreement[48]

On September 9, 2005, FERC approved a JOA between PJM and Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC), with an effective date of July 30, 2005. As part of this agreement, both parties agreed to develop a formal congestion management protocol (CMP). On February 2, 2010, PJM and PEC filed a revision to include a CMP under Article 14 of the JOA.[49] On January 20, 2011, the Commission conditionally accepted the compliance filing. On July 2, 2012, Duke Energy

45 See "Joint Reliability Coordination Agreement Among and Between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., and Tennessee Valley Authority," (October 15, 2014) <https://www.pjm.com/library/governing-documents>.
46 See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C*, Docket No. ER23-2078-000 (June 6, 2023).
47 See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C*, Docket No. ER23-2078-000 (August 5, 2023).
48 See "Amended and Restated Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., and Duke Energy Progress Inc.," (July 22, 2019) <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/progress-joa.pdf>.
49 See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C and Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc*. Docket No. ER10-713-000 (February 2, 2010).

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and Progress Energy Inc. completed a merger. At that time, Progress Energy Carolinas Inc., now a subsidiary of Duke Energy, changed its name to Duke Energy Progress (DEP).

On May 20, 2019, PJM and DEP submitted revisions to the JOA to delete Article 14.[50] PJM and DEP requested an effective date of July 22, 2019, for the filed revisions. On July 2, 2019, the Commission issued a letter order accepting the revisions to the JOA to delete the congestion management agreement effective July 22, 2019.[51]

### PJM and VACAR South Reliability Coordination Agreement[52]

On May 23, 2007, PJM and VACAR South (comprised of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DUK), DEP, South Carolina Public Service Authority (SCPSA), Southeast Power Administration (SEPA), South Carolina Energy and Gas Company (SCE&G) and Yadkin Inc. (part of Alcoa)) entered into a reliability coordination agreement which provides for system and outage coordination, emergency procedures and the exchange of data. The parties meet on a yearly basis. The agreement remained in effect in the first six months of 2026.

### Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement between Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEC) and PJM Interconnection, LLC[53]

The Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement executed on July 20, 2013, provides for the exchange of information between WEC and PJM. The purpose of the data exchange is to allow for the coordination of balancing authority actions to ensure the reliable operation of the systems. The agreement remained in effect in the first six months of 2026.

### Northeastern ISO-Regional Transmission Organization Planning Coordination Protocol[54]

The Northeastern ISO-RTO Planning Coordination Protocol executed on December 8, 2004, provides for the exchange of information among PJM, NYISO and ISO New England. The purpose of the data exchange is to allow for the long-term planning coordination among and between the ISOs and RTOs in the Northeast. The agreement remained in effect in the first six months of 2026.

## Interchange Transaction Issues

### PJM Transmission Loading Relief Procedures (TLRs)

TLRs are called to control flows on electrical facilities when economic redispatch cannot solve overloads on those facilities. TLRs are called to control flows related to external balancing authorities, loop flows for example, as redispatch within an LMP market can generally resolve overloads on internal transmission facilities.

The number of PJM issued TLRs of level 3a or higher was two in the first six months of 2025, and three in the first six months of 2026. The number of different flowgates for which PJM declared a TLR 3a was two in the first six months of 2025, and three in the first six months of 2026. The total MWh of transaction curtailments decreased by 31.6 percent from 5,646 MWh in the first six months of 2025 to 3,863 MWh in the first six months of 2026.[55]

The number of MISO issued TLRs of level 3a or higher increased from 12 in the first six months of 2025 to 36 in the first six months of 2026. The number of different flowgates for which MISO declared a TLR 3a was five in the first six months of 2025, and 21 in the first six months of 2026. The total MWh of transaction curtailments increased by 294.6 percent from 11,375 MWh in the first six months of 2025 to 44,883 MWh in the first six months of 2026.

50 See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. ER19-1905-000 (May 20, 2019).
51 See FERC Docket No. ER19-1905-000.
52 See "PJM-VACAR South RC Agreement," (November 7, 2014) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/agreements/executed-pjm-vacar-rc-agreement.pdf>.
53 See "Balancing Authority Operations Coordination Agreement between Wisconsin Electric Power Company and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C," (July 20, 2013) <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/rs43.pdf>.
54 See "Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol," (December 8, 2004) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/agreements/NE_Protocol.ashx>.
55 TLR Level 3a is the first level of TLR that results in the curtailment of transactions. See the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix E, "Interchange Transactions," for a more complete discussion of TLR levels.


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The number of NYISO issued TLRs of level 3a or higher was zero in the first six months of 2025, and one in the first six months of 2026. The number of different flowgates for which NYISO declared a TLR 3a or higher was zero in the first six months of 2025, and one in the first six months of 2026. The total MWh of transaction curtailments was zero MWh in the first six months of 2025, and 843 MWh in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 9-41 PJM, MISO, and NYISO TLR procedures: January through June, 2026[56]

| | Number of TLRs Level 3 and Higher | | | Number of Unique Flowgates That Experienced TLRs | | | Curtailment Volume (MWh) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | PJM | MISO | NYISO | PJM | MISO | NYISO | PJM | MISO | NYISO |
| Jan-26 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 2,887 | 31,425 | 0 |
| Feb-26 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 532 | 7,539 | 0 |
| Mar-26 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Apr-26 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3,315 | 0 |
| May-26 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2,021 | 843 |
| Jun-26 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 444 | 583 | 0 |
| Total | 3 | 36 | 1 | 3 | 21 | 1 | 3,863 | 44,883 | 843 |

### Table 9-42 Number of TLRs by TLR level by reliability coordinator: January through June, 2026[57]

| Year | Reliability Coordinator | 3a | 3b | 4 | 5a | 5b | 6 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | MISO | 11 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 36 |
| | NYIS | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | ONT | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | PJM | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | SOCO | 56 | 90 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 147 |
| | SWPP | 71 | 101 | 0 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 188 |
| | TVA | 46 | 59 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 117 |
| | VACS | 4 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| Total | | 192 | 278 | 0 | 19 | 26 | 0 | 515 |

## Up To Congestion Transactions

The original purpose, in 2000, of up to congestion transactions (UTC) was to allow market participants to submit a maximum congestion charge, up to $25 per MWh, they were willing to pay on an import, export or wheel through transaction in the day-ahead energy market. This product was offered as a tool for market participants to limit their congestion exposure on scheduled transactions in the real-time energy market.[58]

Up to congestion transactions affect the day-ahead dispatch and unit commitment. Despite that, up to congestion transactions were not required to pay uplift charges from their introduction in 2000 through October 31, 2020. On July 16, 2020, FERC issued an Order directing PJM to revise uplift allocation rules to allocate uplift to one side of up to congestion transactions.[59] The Order requires PJM to treat an up to congestion transaction, for uplift allocation purposes, as if the up to congestion transaction were equivalent to a DEC at its sink point. On November 1, 2020, PJM began allocating uplift to up to congestion transactions. Up to congestion transactions also negatively affect FTR funding.[60]

Figure 9-10 shows the monthly volume of cleared up to congestion transactions. Following an initial decline, UTC volumes had steadily increased following the allocation of uplift charges to UTCs effective November 1, 2020. However, the volume of cleared UTC transactions has declined again in the recent 12 month period to levels below what was seen prior to the allocation of uplift charges to UTCs. Table 9-43 shows the UTC volumes from the 12 month period prior to the allocation of uplift charges (November 1, 2019, through October 31, 2020), to the most recent 12 month period (July 1, 2025 through June 30, 2026). Table 9-44 shows the UTC volumes for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

56 The total row in the columns of the number of unique flowgates that experience TLRs are not a sum of the individual months. The total row represents the number of unique flowgates that have experienced TLRs for the year to date

57 Southern Company Services, Inc. (SOCO) is the reliability coordinator covering a portion of Mississippi, Alabama, Florida and Georgia. Southwest Power Pool (SWPP) is the reliability coordinator for SPP. VACAR-South (VACS) is the reliability coordinator covering a portion of North Carolina and South Carolina.


58 See the *2012 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 8, "Interchange Transactions," for a more detailed discussion.

59 See 172 FERC ¶ 61,046.

60 See the *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Volume 2, Section 13: FTRs and ARRs, "FTR Forfeitures" for more information on up to congestion transaction impacts on FTRs.

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### Figure 9-10 Monthly up to congestion cleared bids in MWh: January 2005 through June 2026




### Table 9-43 Up to congestion volumes: November 1, 2019 through October 31, 2020 compared to July 1, 2025 through June 30, 2026

| Category | November 1, 2019 - October 31, 2020 | July 1, 2025 - June 30, 2026 | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Daily Average UTC Bids Submitted | 53,368 | 56,452 | 5.8% |
| Daily Average UTC Bids Cleared | 26,415 | 18,446 | (30.2%) |
| Daily Average UTC Volume Submitted (MWh) | 1,279,124 | 708,562 | (44.6%) |
| Daily Average UTC Volume Cleared (MWh) | 495,001 | 212,815 | (57.0%) |

### Table 9-44 Up to congestion volumes: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Category | 2025 (Jan-Jun) | 2026 (Jan-Jun) | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Daily Average UTC Bids Submitted | 47,825 | 54,791 | 14.6% |
| Daily Average UTC Bids Cleared | 17,390 | 18,480 | 6.3% |
| Daily Average UTC Volume Submitted (MWh) | 751,077 | 616,168 | (18.0%) |
| Daily Average UTC Volume Cleared (MWh) | 242,420 | 185,501 | (23.5%) |

Table 9-45 shows the monthly cleared submitted volume of UTC bids from January 2025 through June 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the cleared MW volume of up to congestion transactions was comprised of 8.4 percent imports, 6.7 percent exports, 2.2 percent wheeling transactions and 82.6 percent internal transactions. Less than 0.1 percent of the up to congestion transactions had matching real-time energy market transactions.



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### Table 9-45 Monthly volume of cleared and submitted up to congestion bids: January 2025 through June 2026

| | Bid MW | | | | | Bid Volume | | | | | Cleared MW | | | | | Cleared Volume | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Import | Export | Wheel | Internal | Total | Import | Export | Wheel | Internal | Total | Import | Export | Wheel | Internal | Total | Import | Export | Wheel | Internal | Total |
| Jan-25 | 2,205,672 | 2,182,123 | 334,327 | 21,101,450 | 25,823,572 | 125,604 | 187,964 | 18,092 | 1,300,404 | 1,632,064 | 464,114 | 701,211 | 108,021 | 6,876,908 | 8,150,254 | 32,413 | 91,771 | 6,004 | 547,475 | 677,663 |
| Feb-25 | 2,455,996 | 2,513,637 | 359,618 | 18,056,777 | 23,386,028 | 114,520 | 183,212 | 32,050 | 1,036,986 | 1,366,768 | 748,465 | 537,412 | 144,845 | 6,633,542 | 8,064,264 | 41,822 | 54,750 | 11,534 | 428,231 | 536,337 |
| Mar-25 | 3,118,908 | 1,826,595 | 278,735 | 20,664,128 | 25,888,366 | 170,467 | 150,970 | 20,393 | 1,214,563 | 1,556,393 | 678,923 | 587,700 | 152,636 | 6,391,031 | 7,810,290 | 46,728 | 57,345 | 7,116 | 439,419 | 550,608 |
| Apr-25 | 2,179,369 | 789,354 | 341,206 | 17,872,615 | 21,182,544 | 169,667 | 95,947 | 17,035 | 1,156,357 | 1,439,006 | 397,841 | 217,089 | 149,400 | 5,294,497 | 6,058,826 | 35,760 | 26,334 | 4,065 | 373,011 | 439,170 |
| May-25 | 1,300,945 | 867,919 | 224,558 | 13,954,428 | 16,347,850 | 105,869 | 85,547 | 12,625 | 966,859 | 1,170,900 | 363,478 | 312,867 | 120,464 | 5,044,292 | 5,841,101 | 24,841 | 20,884 | 3,267 | 324,995 | 373,987 |
| Jun-25 | 1,814,662 | 1,402,459 | 171,331 | 19,928,093 | 23,316,546 | 144,615 | 104,586 | 12,351 | 1,229,721 | 1,491,273 | 590,128 | 292,998 | 81,725 | 6,988,373 | 7,953,223 | 56,190 | 26,403 | 3,754 | 483,442 | 569,789 |
| Jul-25 | 2,271,084 | 1,445,784 | 259,642 | 17,998,508 | 21,975,019 | 186,792 | 125,712 | 18,569 | 1,327,626 | 1,658,699 | 678,823 | 266,906 | 74,374 | 6,118,292 | 7,138,395 | 79,167 | 25,831 | 5,399 | 568,717 | 679,114 |
| Aug-25 | 2,006,277 | 1,591,872 | 280,230 | 15,399,345 | 19,277,724 | 146,474 | 122,446 | 18,102 | 1,053,784 | 1,340,806 | 702,076 | 328,270 | 99,923 | 5,580,230 | 6,710,499 | 55,827 | 27,995 | 5,273 | 408,458 | 497,553 |
| Sep-25 | 1,417,219 | 2,117,739 | 234,451 | 20,273,139 | 24,042,548 | 154,729 | 134,822 | 15,782 | 1,410,148 | 1,715,481 | 328,860 | 509,245 | 75,506 | 6,174,356 | 7,087,967 | 39,739 | 30,513 | 3,961 | 459,532 | 533,745 |
| Oct-25 | 2,294,262 | 1,725,906 | 298,136 | 24,115,429 | 28,433,733 | 207,538 | 154,738 | 18,313 | 1,571,545 | 1,952,134 | 579,361 | 431,763 | 74,185 | 5,786,974 | 6,872,283 | 39,887 | 28,416 | 3,242 | 419,644 | 491,189 |
| Nov-25 | 3,349,574 | 2,372,416 | 257,628 | 21,554,060 | 27,533,679 | 237,736 | 187,705 | 31,356 | 1,539,524 | 1,996,321 | 1,123,674 | 582,248 | 85,796 | 6,459,803 | 8,251,521 | 62,226 | 36,476 | 7,097 | 445,376 | 551,175 |
| Dec-25 | 2,400,545 | 2,477,093 | 435,950 | 20,522,594 | 25,836,182 | 168,969 | 200,533 | 37,869 | 1,616,942 | 2,024,313 | 821,302 | 425,578 | 121,214 | 6,673,259 | 8,041,354 | 54,968 | 41,635 | 8,527 | 529,865 | 634,995 |
| Jan-26 | 2,265,086 | 2,243,339 | 485,784 | 18,221,249 | 23,215,458 | 137,118 | 216,957 | 32,754 | 1,689,545 | 2,076,374 | 534,932 | 594,229 | 187,170 | 5,770,543 | 7,086,873 | 32,959 | 48,865 | 9,279 | 502,567 | 593,670 |
| Feb-26 | 1,690,605 | 1,507,364 | 339,147 | 13,213,361 | 16,750,477 | 106,538 | 190,772 | 25,333 | 1,424,877 | 1,747,520 | 475,958 | 354,252 | 121,860 | 4,166,854 | 5,118,923 | 28,378 | 40,372 | 6,379 | 488,272 | 563,401 |
| Mar-26 | 2,510,867 | 1,603,024 | 215,936 | 15,254,141 | 19,583,967 | 153,974 | 139,579 | 16,836 | 1,197,203 | 1,507,592 | 582,549 | 331,435 | 103,202 | 4,596,758 | 5,613,943 | 37,791 | 25,882 | 4,408 | 416,351 | 484,432 |
| Apr-26 | 2,154,713 | 1,094,257 | 126,996 | 15,043,250 | 18,419,216 | 167,838 | 133,959 | 16,310 | 1,257,384 | 1,575,491 | 498,302 | 260,937 | 49,283 | 4,363,989 | 5,172,511 | 53,031 | 38,080 | 4,836 | 490,940 | 586,887 |
| May-26 | 1,588,239 | 911,823 | 249,127 | 14,227,960 | 16,977,149 | 145,563 | 107,061 | 15,124 | 1,238,895 | 1,506,643 | 400,727 | 270,074 | 149,563 | 4,247,765 | 5,068,128 | 49,407 | 25,922 | 5,782 | 476,222 | 557,333 |
| Jun-26 | 1,007,529 | 1,285,118 | 262,834 | 14,024,662 | 16,580,142 | 126,717 | 132,948 | 20,734 | 1,223,078 | 1,503,477 | 340,545 | 449,341 | 137,567 | 4,587,788 | 5,515,241 | 42,331 | 36,713 | 5,638 | 474,521 | 559,203 |
| TOTAL | 38,031,553 | 29,957,824 | 5,155,635 | 321,425,188 | 394,570,201 | 2,770,728 | 2,655,458 | 379,628 | 23,455,441 | 29,261,255 | 10,310,055 | 7,453,554 | 2,036,733 | 101,755,254 | 121,555,596 | 813,465 | 684,187 | 105,561 | 8,277,038 | 9,880,251 |

## Sham Scheduling

Sham scheduling refers to a scheduling method under which a market participant breaks a single transaction, from generation balancing authority (source) to load balancing authority (sink), into multiple segments. Sham scheduling hides the actual source of generation from the load balancing authority. When unable to identify the source of the energy, the load balancing authority cannot see how the power will flow to the load, which can create loop flows and result in inaccurate pricing for transactions.

For example, if the generation balancing authority (source) is NYISO, and the load balancing authority (sink) is PJM, the transaction would be priced, in the PJM energy market, at the PJM/NYIS Interface regardless of the submitted path. However, if a market participant were to break the transaction into multiple segments, one on the NYIS-ONT path, and a second segment on the ONT-MISO-PJM path, the market participant would conceal the true source (NYISO) from PJM, and PJM would price the transaction as if its source were Ontario (the ONT interface price).

Sham scheduling can also be achieved by submitting a transaction that is in the opposite direction of a portion of a larger transaction schedule.

For example, market participants can submit one transaction with multiple segments among balancing authorities and another transaction which offsets all or part of a segment of the first transaction. If a market participant submits two separate transactions, one on the ONT-MISO-PJM path, and a second on the PJM-MISO path, the result of these transactions would be a net scheduled transaction from ONT to MISO, as the MISO-PJM segment of the first transaction is offset by the PJM-MISO transaction. In this example, PJM is not required to raise or lower generation as a result of these transactions, as they would for

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an import or an export, and there are no associated power flows across PJM. Nonetheless, the market participant is paid the price difference between the PJM/ONT interface pricing point and the PJM/MISO interface pricing point. The market participant would be paid the PJM/ONT interface pricing point for the first transaction (ONT to PJM import) and the market participant would pay the PJM/MISO interface pricing point for the second transaction (PJM to MISO export). If the PJM/ONT interface price were higher than the PJM/MISO interface price, the market participant would be paid a net profit from the PJM market even though there was no impact on PJM operations.

At the April 10, 2013, PJM Market Implementation Committee (MIC), the MMU presented a problem statement and issue charge to address sham scheduling activities.[61] The expected deliverables from the stakeholder meetings were revisions to the Tariff and PJM business manuals. The topic was discussed at several MIC meetings. While there was stakeholder agreement that sham scheduling activity was inappropriate, consensus on revised tariff and manual language was not achieved. The topic was closed. The MMU clarified that it would continue to monitor transactions for sham scheduling activities and that the MMU could refer market participants for sham scheduling activities.

The MMU monitors for sham scheduling activities on a daily basis. Following the stakeholder discussions in 2013, the net profits obtained from sham scheduling activities fell by 102.2 percent, from net profits of $15.5 million in 2014, to a net loss of $339,150 in 2025. The total number of hours of sham scheduling segments where the MW profile matched exactly across all segments of the path combinations in the same hour fell by 79.0 percent, from 1,898 hours in 2014 to 398 hours in 2025.

The MMU recommends that PJM implement rules to prevent sham scheduling. The MMU recommends that PJM apply after the fact market settlement adjustments to identified sham scheduling segments to ensure that market participants cannot benefit from sham scheduling.

61 *See* Market Path/Interface Pricing Point alignment Problem Statement, at: <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2013/IMM_MIC_Market_Path_Interface_Pricing_Point_Alignment_Problem_Statement_201304010.pdf>.

## Elimination of Ontario Interface Pricing Point

The PJM/IMO interface pricing point (Ontario) was created to reflect the fact that transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority create actual energy flows that are split between the MISO and NYISO interface pricing points. PJM created the PJM/IMO interface pricing point to reflect the actual power flows across both the MISO/PJM and NYISO/PJM Interfaces. The IMO does not have physical ties with PJM because it is not contiguous.

Prior to June 1, 2015, the PJM/IMO interface pricing point was defined as the LMP at the IESO Bruce bus. The LMP at the Bruce bus includes a congestion and loss component across the MISO and NYISO balancing authorities.

The noncontiguous nature of the PJM/IMO interface pricing point creates opportunities for market participants to engage in sham scheduling activities.[62] For example, a market participant can use two separate transactions to create a flow from Ontario to MISO. In this example, the market participant uses the PJM energy market as a temporary generation and load point by first submitting a wheeling transaction from Ontario, through MISO and into PJM, then by submitting a second transaction from PJM to MISO. These two transactions, combined, create an actual flow along the Ontario/MISO Interface. Through sham scheduling, the market participant receives settlements from PJM when no changes in generation occur. This activity is similar to that observed when PJM had a Southwest and Southeast interface pricing point. During that time, market participants would use the PJM spot market as a temporary load and generation point to wheel transactions through the PJM energy market. This was done to take advantage of the price differences between the interfaces without providing the market benefits of congestion relief.

A new PJM/IMO interface price method was implemented on June 1, 2015. The new method uses a dynamic weighting of the PJM/MISO interface price and the PJM/NYIS interface price, based on the performance of the Michigan-Ontario PARs. When the absolute value of the actual flows on the PARs are greater than or equal to the absolute value of the scheduled flows on the PARs, and the scheduled and actual flows are in the same direction, the PJM/

62 *See* "Sham Scheduling," Presented at the PJM Market Monitoring Unit Advisory Committee (MMUAC) meeting held on December 6, 2013 <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2013/IMM_Sham_Scheduling_20131206.pdf>.


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IMO interface price will be equal to the PJM/MISO interface price (i.e. 100 percent weighting on the PJM/MISO Interface). When actual flows on the PARs are in the opposite direction of the scheduled flows on the PARs, the PJM/IMO interface price will be equal to the PJM/NYIS interface price (i.e. 100 percent weighting on the PJM/NYIS Interface). When the absolute value of the actual flows on the PARs are less than or equal to the absolute value of the scheduled flows on the PARs, and the scheduled and actual flows are in the same direction, the PJM/IMO interface price will be a combination to the PJM/MISO interface price and the PJM/NYIS interface price. In this case the weightings of the PJM/MISO and PJM/NYIS interface prices are determined based on the scheduled and actual flows. For example, in a given interval, the scheduled flow on the Michigan-Ontario PARs is 1,000 MW, and the actual flow is 800 MW. If in that same interval, the PJM/MISO interface price is $45.00 and the PJM/NYIS interface price $30.00, the PJM/IMO interface price would be calculated with a weighting of 80 percent of the PJM/MISO interface price ($45.00 * 0.8, or $36.00) and 20 percent of the PJM/NYIS interface price ($30.00 * 0.2, or $6.00), for a PJM/IMO interface price of $42.00.

The MMU believes that the new PJM/IMO interface price method is a step in the right direction towards pricing energy that sources or sinks in Ontario based on the path of the actual, physical transfer of energy. The MMU remains concerned about the assumption of PAR operations, and will continue to evaluate the impact of PARs on the scheduled and actual flows and the impacts on the PJM/IMO interface price. The MMU remains concerned about the potential for market participants to continue to engage in sham scheduling activities after the new method is implemented.

The MMU recommends that if the PJM/IMO interface price remains and with PJM's new method in place, that PJM implement additional business rules to remove the incentive to engage in sham scheduling activities using the PJM/IMO interface price. Such rules would prohibit the same market participant from scheduling an export transaction from PJM to any balancing authority while at the same time an import transaction is scheduled to PJM that receives the PJM/IMO interface price. PJM should also prohibit the same market participant from scheduling an import transaction to PJM from any balancing authority while at the same time an export transaction is scheduled from PJM that receives the PJM/IMO interface price.

In the first six months of 2026, there were 863.4 GWh of net scheduled transactions between PJM and IESO. The net scheduled transactions were made up of 893.6 GWh of imports wheeled through MISO, and 30.2 GWh of exports wheeled through the NYISO. (Table 9-25). The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate the PJM/IMO interface pricing point, and assign the transactions that originate or sink in the IESO balancing authority to the PJM/MISO interface pricing point.[63]

## PJM and NYISO Coordinated Interchange Transactions

Coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS) provides the option for market participants to submit intra-hour transactions between the NYISO and PJM that include an interface spread bid on which transactions are evaluated.[64] The evaluation is based on the forward-looking prices as determined by PJM's intermediate term security constrained economic dispatch tool (IT SCED) and the NYISO's real-time commitment (RTC) tool. PJM shares its PJM/NYISO interface price IT SCED results with the NYISO. The NYISO compares the PJM/NYISO interface price with its RTC calculated NYISO/PJM interface price. If the PJM and NYISO interface price spread is greater than the market participant's CTS bid, the transaction is approved. If the PJM and NYISO interface price spread is less than the CTS bid, the transaction is denied.

The IT SCED application runs every five minutes and each run produces forecast LMPs for the intervals approximately 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 90 minutes and 135 minutes ahead. Therefore, for each 15 minute interval, the various IT SCED solutions will produce 12 forecasted PJM/NYIS interface prices. To evaluate the accuracy of IT SCED forecasts, the forecasted PJM/NYIS interface price for each 15 minute interval from IT SCED was compared to the actual real-time interface LMP in the first six months of 2026. Table 9-46 shows that over all 12 forecast ranges, IT SCED predicted the real-time PJM/NYIS interface LMP within the range of $0.00 to $5.00 in 23.3 percent

63 On October 1, 2013, a sub-group of PJM's Market Implementation Committee started stakeholder discussions to address this inconsistency in market pricing.

64 PJM and the NYISO implemented CTS on November 4, 2014. 146 FERC ¶ 61,096 (2014).

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of the intervals. In those intervals, the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time LMP was $2.12 per MWh. In 24.3 percent of all intervals, the absolute value of the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than $20.00. The average price differences were $79.39 when the price difference was greater than $20.00, and $99.64 when the price difference was greater than -$20.00.

### Table 9-46 Differences between forecast and actual PJM/NYIS interface prices: January through June, 2026

| Range of Price Differences | Percent of All Intervals | Average Price Difference |
|---|---|---|
| > $20 | 12.9% | $79.39 |
| $10 to $20 | 8.9% | $14.11 |
| $5 to $10 | 10.8% | $7.20 |
| $0 to $5 | 23.3% | $2.12 |
| $0 to -$5 | 19.4% | $2.02 |
| -$5 to -$10 | 7.4% | $7.17 |
| -$10 to -$20 | 5.9% | $14.01 |
| < -$20 | 11.4% | $99.64 |

Table 9-47 shows how the accuracy of the IT SCED forecasted LMPs changes as the cases approach real-time. In the final IT SCED results prior to real time, in 38.2 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP fell within +/- $5.00 of the actual PJM/NYIS interface real-time LMP, compared to 43.3 percent in the 135 minute ahead IT SCED results.

### Table 9-47 Differences between forecast and actual PJM/NYIS interface prices: January through June, 2026

| | ~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | | ~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | | ~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | | ~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Range of Price Differences | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference |
| > $20 | 16.2% | $85.44 | 10.4% | $67.68 | 11.8% | $76.01 | 15.3% | $87.55 |
| $10 to $20 | 8.8% | $14.22 | 8.5% | $14.05 | 9.0% | $14.09 | 9.1% | $14.18 |
| $5 to $10 | 10.5% | $7.26 | 10.8% | $7.16 | 10.8% | $7.19 | 10.2% | $7.21 |
| $0 to $5 | 24.1% | $2.04 | 24.7% | $2.06 | 22.6% | $2.11 | 19.9% | $2.24 |
| $0 to -$5 | 19.3% | $1.95 | 20.3% | $1.97 | 19.3% | $2.10 | 18.3% | $2.15 |
| -$5 to -$10 | 6.6% | $7.23 | 7.6% | $7.17 | 7.9% | $7.15 | 8.1% | $7.18 |
| -$10 to -$20 | 4.9% | $13.96 | 6.0% | $13.87 | 6.5% | $14.09 | 6.8% | $14.10 |
| < -$20 | 9.6% | $100.56 | 11.8% | $98.22 | 12.1% | $99.64 | 12.2% | $101.00 |

In 27.5 percent of the intervals in the 30 minute ahead forecast, the absolute value of the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than $20.00. The average price difference was $87.55 when the price difference was greater than $20.00, and $101.00 when the price difference was greater than -$20.00.

Table 9-48 and Table 9-49 show the monthly differences between forecasted and actual PJM/NYIS interface prices. Analysis of the data on a monthly basis shows that there is a decline in the accuracy of the IT SCED forecast during periods of cold and hot weather.


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## Table 9-48 Monthly Differences between forecast and actual PJM/NYIS interface prices (percent of intervals): January through June, 2026

| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 21.1% | 21.6% | 13.6% | 11.5% | 12.1% | 12.5% | 15.3% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.0% | 6.9% | 10.5% | 10.6% | 11.7% | 8.8% | 9.1% |
| | $5 to $10 | 7.3% | 7.1% | 12.4% | 12.1% | 12.6% | 9.7% | 10.2% |
| | $0 to $5 | 19.3% | 15.9% | 21.5% | 23.8% | 20.2% | 18.5% | 19.9% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 17.0% | 17.0% | 15.0% | 18.3% | 19.3% | 23.0% | 18.3% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 6.4% | 7.5% | 7.5% | 9.7% | 8.4% | 9.0% | 8.1% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 6.2% | 6.3% | 7.1% | 6.0% | 7.9% | 7.3% | 6.8% |
| | < -$20 | 16.7% | 17.6% | 12.4% | 8.1% | 7.8% | 11.1% | 12.2% |
| **Interval** | **Range of Price Differences** | **Jan** | **Feb** | **Mar** | **Apr** | **May** | **Jun** | **YTD Avg** |
| ~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 16.9% | 18.4% | 10.7% | 8.0% | 8.9% | 8.2% | 11.8% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.7% | 6.7% | 9.8% | 10.5% | 11.8% | 8.3% | 9.0% |
| | $5 to $10 | 7.7% | 7.2% | 13.0% | 12.6% | 14.1% | 10.1% | 10.8% |
| | $0 to $5 | 21.3% | 17.3% | 22.4% | 26.2% | 23.9% | 24.0% | 22.6% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 17.4% | 18.5% | 17.0% | 20.4% | 19.2% | 23.5% | 19.3% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 6.8% | 7.9% | 7.9% | 8.4% | 8.2% | 8.2% | 7.9% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 6.1% | 6.4% | 6.5% | 6.2% | 7.0% | 6.5% | 6.5% |
| | < -$20 | 17.1% | 17.5% | 12.8% | 7.7% | 6.9% | 11.1% | 12.1% |
| **Interval** | **Range of Price Differences** | **Jan** | **Feb** | **Mar** | **Apr** | **May** | **Jun** | **YTD Avg** |
| ~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 16.8% | 15.5% | 9.2% | 5.1% | 9.1% | 6.8% | 10.4% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.3% | 6.9% | 8.5% | 9.1% | 11.6% | 8.5% | 8.5% |
| | $5 to $10 | 7.9% | 7.6% | 12.2% | 12.3% | 13.8% | 10.8% | 10.8% |
| | $0 to $5 | 21.4% | 19.3% | 25.7% | 28.5% | 25.9% | 27.1% | 24.7% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 18.9% | 19.5% | 17.7% | 22.8% | 19.7% | 23.2% | 20.3% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 7.1% | 7.3% | 8.5% | 7.8% | 7.4% | 7.1% | 7.6% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 6.1% | 6.2% | 6.2% | 5.4% | 5.8% | 6.1% | 6.0% |
| | < -$20 | 15.3% | 17.6% | 12.0% | 8.9% | 6.6% | 10.4% | 11.8% |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 21.1% | 22.9% | 16.3% | 11.1% | 15.2% | 11.3% | 16.2% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.6% | 6.1% | 8.9% | 9.3% | 12.1% | 9.6% | 8.8% |
| | $5 to $10 | 8.5% | 7.1% | 11.3% | 12.6% | 13.2% | 10.1% | 10.5% |
| | $0 to $5 | 20.4% | 18.6% | 24.5% | 28.0% | 25.8% | 26.8% | 24.1% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 18.5% | 19.0% | 18.1% | 20.9% | 17.7% | 21.5% | 19.3% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 6.7% | 6.6% | 6.8% | 6.5% | 6.5% | 6.5% | 6.6% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 5.3% | 5.4% | 4.3% | 4.6% | 4.7% | 5.0% | 4.9% |
| | < -$20 | 12.8% | 14.3% | 9.8% | 6.9% | 4.8% | 9.3% | 9.6% |

## Table 9-49 Monthly differences between forecast and actual PJM/NYIS interface prices (average price difference): January through June, 2026

| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $93.34 | $148.45 | $52.70 | $70.86 | $73.34 | $48.23 | $87.55 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.39 | $13.98 | $13.98 | $14.16 | $14.20 | $14.43 | $14.18 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.04 | $7.30 | $7.22 | $7.27 | $7.27 | $7.11 | $7.21 |
| | $0 to $5 | $2.11 | $2.14 | $2.49 | $2.23 | $2.24 | $2.17 | $2.24 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $2.05 | $2.25 | $2.26 | $2.14 | $2.16 | $2.07 | $2.15 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.11 | $6.99 | $7.13 | $7.21 | $7.42 | $7.15 | $7.18 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $14.51 | $14.44 | $14.07 | $13.91 | $13.91 | $13.84 | $14.10 |
| | < -$20 | $95.72 | $117.85 | $95.89 | $91.90 | $96.17 | $100.29 | $101.00 |
| **Interval** | **Range of Price Differences** | **Jan** | **Feb** | **Mar** | **Apr** | **May** | **Jun** | **YTD Avg** |
| ~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $86.41 | $105.31 | $47.11 | $74.61 | $64.28 | $46.03 | $76.01 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.22 | $14.25 | $13.99 | $14.08 | $14.05 | $14.06 | $14.09 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.30 | $7.03 | $7.25 | $7.26 | $7.16 | $7.12 | $7.19 |
| | $0 to $5 | $2.05 | $2.06 | $2.27 | $2.13 | $2.24 | $1.88 | $2.11 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $1.98 | $2.21 | $2.23 | $2.09 | $2.05 | $2.04 | $2.10 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $6.95 | $7.14 | $7.12 | $7.07 | $7.26 | $7.37 | $7.15 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $14.29 | $14.59 | $13.70 | $13.99 | $13.99 | $14.03 | $14.09 |
| | < -$20 | $89.97 | $114.86 | $93.38 | $92.23 | $105.10 | $101.69 | $99.64 |
| **Interval** | **Range of Price Differences** | **Jan** | **Feb** | **Mar** | **Apr** | **May** | **Jun** | **YTD Avg** |
| ~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $80.31 | $81.46 | $49.05 | $55.28 | $67.21 | $41.97 | $67.68 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.06 | $14.14 | $14.18 | $13.74 | $14.28 | $13.82 | $14.05 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.09 | $7.12 | $7.14 | $7.22 | $7.26 | $7.04 | $7.16 |
| | $0 to $5 | $1.98 | $2.02 | $2.12 | $2.17 | $2.14 | $1.91 | $2.06 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $1.82 | $2.03 | $2.08 | $2.10 | $1.96 | $1.83 | $1.97 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.09 | $7.26 | $7.14 | $7.15 | $7.24 | $7.15 | $7.17 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $14.13 | $14.25 | $13.71 | $13.49 | $13.69 | $13.95 | $13.87 |
| | < -$20 | $86.21 | $112.64 | $94.88 | $85.80 | $105.25 | $103.62 | $98.22 |
| **Interval** | **Range of Price Differences** | **Jan** | **Feb** | **Mar** | **Apr** | **May** | **Jun** | **YTD Avg** |
| ~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $101.85 | $104.24 | $73.73 | $78.89 | $79.12 | $50.78 | $85.44 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.49 | $14.32 | $14.14 | $14.14 | $14.11 | $14.25 | $14.22 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.28 | $7.17 | $7.19 | $7.30 | $7.34 | $7.20 | $7.26 |
| | $0 to $5 | $1.86 | $1.87 | $2.21 | $2.12 | $2.12 | $1.95 | $2.04 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $1.97 | $2.09 | $2.11 | $2.00 | $1.78 | $1.79 | $1.95 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.13 | $7.22 | $7.38 | $7.28 | $7.22 | $7.15 | $7.23 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $14.11 | $14.54 | $13.69 | $13.62 | $13.79 | $13.95 | $13.96 |
| | < -$20 | $84.07 | $109.62 | $101.18 | $93.27 | $121.31 | $104.60 | $100.56 |


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The NYISO uses PJM's IT SCED forecasted LMPs to compare against the NYISO Real-Time Commitment (RTC) results in its evaluation of CTS transactions. The NYISO approves CTS (spread bid) transactions when the offered spread is less than or equal to the spread between the IT SCED forecast PJM/NYIS interface LMP and the NYISO RTC forecast NYIS/PJM interface LMP. The large differences between forecast and actual LMPs in the intervals closest to real-time could cause CTS transactions to be approved that would contribute to transactions being scheduled counter to real-time economic signals, and contribute to inefficient scheduling across the PJM/NYIS border.

CTS transactions are evaluated based on the spread bid, which limits the amount of price convergence that can occur. As long as balancing operating reserve charges are applied and CTS transactions are optional, the CTS proposal represents a small incremental step toward better interface pricing. The NYISO has a 75 minute bid submission deadline. While market participants have the option to specify bid data on 15 minute intervals, market participants must submit their bids 75 minutes prior to the requested transaction start time. The 75 minute bid submission deadline associated with scheduling energy transactions in the NYISO should be shortened. Reducing this deadline could significantly improve pricing efficiency at the PJM/NYISO border for non-CTS transactions and for CTS transactions as market participants would be able to adjust their bids in response to real-time price signals.

CTS transactions were evaluated for each 15 minute interval. From November 4, 2014, through June 30, 2026, 1,262,693 15 minute CTS schedules were approved through the CTS process based on the forecast LMPs. When the forecast LMPs for the approved intervals were compared to the hourly integrated real-time LMPs, the direction of the flow in 396,506 (31.4 percent) of the intervals was inconsistent with the differences in real-time PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM prices. For example, if a market participant submits a CTS transaction from NYISO to PJM with a spread bid of $5.00, and NYISO's forecasted PJM interface price was at least $5.00 lower than PJM's forecasted NYISO interface price, the transaction would be approved. For 31.4 percent of the approved transactions, the actual, real-time price differentials were in the opposite direction of the forecast differential. The actual, real-time price differentials meant that the transactions would have been economic in the opposite direction. For 68.6 percent of the intervals, the forecast price differentials were consistent with real-time PJM/NYISO and NYISO/PJM price differences. Figure 9-11 shows the monthly volume of cleared PJM/NYIS CTS bids. Figure 9-11 also shows the percent of cleared bids that resulted in flows consistent and inconsistent with price differences.

**Figure 9-11 Monthly cleared PJM/NYIS CTS bid volume: November 4, 2014 through June 30, 2026**




The data reviewed show that IT SCED is not a highly accurate predictor of the real-time PJM/NYIS interface prices. This limits the effectiveness of CTS in improving interface pricing between PJM and NYISO.


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## Reserving Ramp on the PJM/NYISO Interface

Prior to the implementation of CTS, PJM held ramp space for all transactions submitted between PJM and the NYISO as soon as the NERC Tag was approved. At that time, once transactions were evaluated by the NYISO through their real-time market clearing process, any adjustments made to the submitted transactions would be reflected on the NERC Tags and the PJM ramp was adjusted accordingly.

As part of this process, PJM was often required to make adjustments to transactions on its other interfaces in order to bring total system ramp back to within its limit. The default ramp limit in PJM is +/- 1,000 MW. For example, the ramp in a given interval is currently -1,000 MW, consisting of 2,000 MW of imports from the NYISO to PJM and 3,000 MW of exports from PJM on its other interfaces. If, through the NYISO real-time market clearing process, the NYISO only approves 1,000 MW of the imports, the other 1,000 MW of import transactions from the NYISO would be curtailed. The ramp in this interval would then be -2,000 MW, consisting of the 1,000 MW of cleared imports from the NYISO to PJM and 3,000 MW of exports from PJM on its other interfaces. PJM would then be required to curtail an additional 1,000 MW of exports at its other interface to bring the limit back to within +/- 1,000. These curtailments were made on a last in first out basis as determined by the timestamp on the NERC Tag.

With the implementation of the CTS product with the NYISO, PJM modified how ramp is handled at the PJM/NYISO Interface. Effective November 4, 2014, PJM no longer holds ramp room for any transactions submitted between PJM and the NYISO at the time of submission. Only after the NYISO completes its real-time market clearing process, and communicates the results to PJM, does PJM perform a ramp evaluation on transactions scheduled with the NYISO. If, in the event the NYISO market clearing process would violate ramp, PJM would make additional adjustments based on a last-in first-out basis as determined by the timestamp on the NERC Tag. This process prevents the transactions scheduled at the PJM/NYISO Interface from holding (or creating) ramp until NYISO has completed its economic evaluation and the transactions are approved through the NYISO market clearing process.

## PJM and MISO Coordinated Interchange Transactions

The PJM/MISO coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS) process provides the option for market participants to submit intra-hour transactions between the MISO and PJM that include an interface spread bid on which transactions are evaluated. Similar to the PJM/NYISO approach, the evaluation is based, in part, on the forward-looking prices as determined by PJM's intermediate term security constrained economic dispatch tool (IT SCED). Unlike the PJM/NYISO CTS process in which the NYISO performs the evaluation, the PJM/MISO CTS process uses a joint clearing process in which both RTOs share forward looking prices. On October 3, 2017, PJM and MISO implemented the CTS process.

The IT SCED application runs every five minutes and each run produces forecast LMPs for the intervals approximately 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 90 minutes and 135 minutes ahead. Therefore, for each 15 minute interval, the various IT SCED solutions will produce 12 forecasted PJM/MISO interface prices. To evaluate the accuracy of IT SCED forecasts, the forecasted PJM/MISO interface price for each 15 minute interval from IT SCED was compared to the actual real-time interface LMP for the first six months of 2026. Table 9-50 shows that over all 12 forecast ranges, IT SCED predicted the real-time PJM/MISO interface LMP within the range of $0.00 to $5.00 in 23.2 percent of all intervals. In those intervals, the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time LMP was $2.18. In 23.6 percent of all intervals, the absolute value of the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than $20.00. The average price differences were $71.20 when the price difference was greater than $20.00, and $100.05 when the price difference was greater than -$20.00.

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### Table 9-50 Differences between forecast and actual PJM/MISO interface prices: January through June, 2026

| Range of Price Differences | Percent of All Intervals | Average Price Difference |
|---|---|---|
| > $20 | 15.5% | $71.20 |
| $10 to $20 | 10.4% | $14.10 |
| $5 to $10 | 12.1% | $7.23 |
| $0 to $5 | 23.2% | $2.18 |
| $0 to -$5 | 18.7% | $2.01 |
| -$5 to -$10 | 6.9% | $7.20 |
| -$10 to -$20 | 5.1% | $14.01 |
| < -$20 | 8.0% | $100.05 |

Table 9-51 shows how the accuracy of the IT SCED forecasted LMPs change as the cases approach real-time. In the final IT SCED results prior to real-time, in 38.2 percent of all intervals, the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP fell within +/- $5.00 of the actual PJM/MISO interface real-time LMP, compared to 42.3 percent in the 135 minute ahead IT SCED results.

### Table 9-51 Differences between forecast and actual PJM/MISO interface prices: January through June, 2026

| | ~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | | ~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | | ~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | | ~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Range of Price Differences | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference | Percent of Intervals | Average Price Difference |
| > $20 | 17.8% | $88.14 | 13.5% | $61.44 | 14.7% | $66.89 | 18.6% | $72.39 |
| $10 to $20 | 10.5% | $14.13 | 10.1% | $14.13 | 10.6% | $14.06 | 9.8% | $14.24 |
| $5 to $10 | 12.1% | $7.27 | 12.4% | $7.18 | 12.1% | $7.20 | 10.9% | $7.26 |
| $0 to $5 | 24.3% | $2.13 | 25.1% | $2.16 | 22.5% | $2.17 | 19.3% | $2.21 |
| $0 to -$5 | 18.0% | $1.94 | 18.9% | $2.00 | 18.9% | $2.05 | 18.8% | $2.13 |
| -$5 to -$10 | 6.3% | $7.12 | 6.8% | $7.21 | 7.1% | $7.25 | 8.1% | $7.23 |
| -$10 to -$20 | 4.4% | $13.94 | 5.0% | $13.88 | 5.6% | $14.03 | 5.7% | $14.11 |
| < -$20 | 6.6% | $102.71 | 8.2% | $99.95 | 8.6% | $99.04 | 8.8% | $97.30 |

In 27.4 percent of the intervals in the 30 minute ahead forecast, the absolute value of the average price difference between the IT SCED forecasted LMP and the actual real-time interface LMP was greater than $20.00, the average price differences were $72.39 when the price difference was greater than $20.00, and $97.30 when the price difference was greater than -$20.00.

Table 9-52 and Table 9-53 show the monthly differences between forecasted and actual PJM/MISO interface prices. Analysis of the data on a monthly basis shows that there is a decline in the accuracy of the IT SCED forecast during periods of cold and hot weather.


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## Table 9-52 Monthly differences between forecast and actual PJM/MISO interface prices (percent of intervals): January through June, 2026

| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 20.3% | 21.4% | 18.3% | 17.5% | 17.2% | 17.1% | 18.6% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.6% | 9.4% | 10.4% | 13.6% | 12.4% | 6.6% | 9.8% |
| | $5 to $10 | 9.4% | 11.0% | 13.1% | 12.0% | 11.9% | 7.9% | 10.9% |
| | $0 to $5 | 21.1% | 18.9% | 19.3% | 17.9% | 17.1% | 21.6% | 19.3% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 21.0% | 18.1% | 16.1% | 15.1% | 17.9% | 24.9% | 18.8% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 7.3% | 6.5% | 7.8% | 8.5% | 9.4% | 8.8% | 8.1% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 4.7% | 4.8% | 5.8% | 6.9% | 6.8% | 5.4% | 5.7% |
| | < -$20 | 9.7% | 10.0% | 9.3% | 8.6% | 7.2% | 7.8% | 8.8% |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 18.5% | 18.3% | 14.3% | 13.7% | 13.0% | 10.7% | 14.7% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.3% | 9.3% | 11.5% | 15.1% | 13.4% | 8.0% | 10.6% |
| | $5 to $10 | 10.5% | 10.8% | 14.8% | 13.4% | 13.7% | 9.1% | 12.1% |
| | $0 to $5 | 24.3% | 21.6% | 21.4% | 19.5% | 20.3% | 28.0% | 22.5% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 20.1% | 18.5% | 16.4% | 16.1% | 18.6% | 23.4% | 18.9% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 6.4% | 6.2% | 6.5% | 7.9% | 8.1% | 7.2% | 7.1% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 4.7% | 5.2% | 6.0% | 6.4% | 6.1% | 5.1% | 5.6% |
| | < -$20 | 9.2% | 10.1% | 9.0% | 7.9% | 6.8% | 8.5% | 8.6% |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 17.3% | 14.6% | 11.9% | 12.4% | 13.5% | 11.3% | 13.5% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.7% | 8.9% | 11.3% | 13.4% | 12.6% | 7.5% | 10.1% |
| | $5 to $10 | 9.6% | 10.4% | 15.3% | 14.8% | 14.8% | 9.4% | 12.4% |
| | $0 to $5 | 27.3% | 25.2% | 25.8% | 20.2% | 21.9% | 29.9% | 25.1% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 19.5% | 18.6% | 15.7% | 17.5% | 19.2% | 23.3% | 18.9% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 6.2% | 6.8% | 5.9% | 8.3% | 6.9% | 6.8% | 6.8% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 5.9% | 4.9% | 4.5% | 5.0% |
| | < -$20 | 8.7% | 10.4% | 8.9% | 7.6% | 6.2% | 7.4% | 8.2% |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | 21.1% | 20.5% | 17.1% | 16.5% | 18.3% | 13.2% | 17.8% |
| | $10 to $20 | 6.8% | 8.5% | 12.1% | 14.4% | 13.1% | 8.0% | 10.5% |
| | $5 to $10 | 11.1% | 9.6% | 14.4% | 13.8% | 13.5% | 9.7% | 12.1% |
| | $0 to $5 | 24.3% | 24.6% | 23.8% | 21.2% | 22.0% | 29.9% | 24.3% |
| | $0 to -$5 | 20.6% | 18.3% | 15.2% | 15.3% | 16.9% | 21.9% | 18.0% |
| | -$5 to -$10 | 5.4% | 5.9% | 6.1% | 7.2% | 6.6% | 6.5% | 6.3% |
| | -$10 to -$20 | 3.9% | 4.7% | 4.1% | 4.8% | 4.6% | 4.4% | 4.4% |
| | < -$20 | 6.9% | 7.9% | 7.2% | 6.7% | 5.0% | 6.3% | 6.6% |


## 9-53 Monthly differences between forecast and actual PJM/MISO interface prices (average price difference): January through June, 2026

| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~ 30 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $81.23 | $106.70 | $59.19 | $58.00 | $59.49 | $64.28 | $72.39 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.19 | $14.06 | $14.31 | $14.55 | $14.01 | $14.22 | $14.24 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.07 | $7.28 | $7.32 | $7.29 | $7.37 | $7.13 | $7.26 |
| | $0 to $5 | $2.12 | $2.19 | $2.44 | $2.29 | $2.26 | $1.99 | $2.21 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $2.00 | $2.20 | $2.27 | $2.33 | $2.07 | $2.02 | $2.13 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.22 | $7.37 | $7.27 | $7.30 | $7.21 | $7.05 | $7.23 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $14.31 | $14.55 | $14.11 | $14.35 | $13.86 | $13.57 | $14.11 |
| | < -$20 | $82.86 | $92.35 | $116.82 | $108.19 | $95.27 | $87.72 | $97.30 |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 45 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $84.29 | $78.53 | $57.15 | $58.95 | $54.94 | $55.86 | $66.89 |
| | $10 to $20 | $13.93 | $14.06 | $13.95 | $14.24 | $13.99 | $14.06 | $14.06 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.02 | $7.22 | $7.18 | $7.29 | $7.32 | $7.15 | $7.20 |
| | $0 to $5 | $2.04 | $2.20 | $2.39 | $2.33 | $2.22 | $1.96 | $2.17 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $1.81 | $2.17 | $2.16 | $2.16 | $2.10 | $1.97 | $2.05 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.02 | $7.40 | $7.34 | $7.28 | $7.28 | $7.20 | $7.25 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $14.42 | $14.33 | $13.66 | $14.13 | $13.89 | $13.83 | $14.03 |
| | < -$20 | $85.44 | $91.27 | $120.35 | $114.14 | $98.92 | $85.59 | $99.04 |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 90 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $85.36 | $56.94 | $48.21 | $53.88 | $61.43 | $51.59 | $61.44 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.35 | $14.28 | $13.85 | $14.21 | $13.93 | $14.40 | $14.13 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.11 | $7.16 | $7.08 | $7.25 | $7.31 | $7.15 | $7.18 |
| | $0 to $5 | $2.11 | $2.07 | $2.33 | $2.42 | $2.18 | $1.91 | $2.16 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $1.88 | $1.96 | $2.09 | $2.29 | $2.06 | $1.80 | $2.00 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.10 | $7.23 | $7.14 | $7.15 | $7.34 | $7.30 | $7.21 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $13.71 | $13.61 | $13.71 | $14.36 | $13.85 | $13.94 | $13.88 |
| | < -$20 | $80.08 | $89.62 | $121.70 | $117.13 | $101.57 | $91.71 | $99.95 |
| Interval | Range of Price Differences | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | YTD Avg |
| ~ 135 Minutes Prior to Real-Time | > $20 | $110.18 | $88.89 | $88.14 | $84.50 | $79.71 | $67.20 | $88.14 |
| | $10 to $20 | $14.09 | $14.21 | $14.13 | $14.13 | $14.12 | $14.10 | $14.13 |
| | $5 to $10 | $7.26 | $7.19 | $7.14 | $7.34 | $7.37 | $7.27 | $7.27 |
| | $0 to $5 | $2.07 | $2.14 | $2.33 | $2.30 | $2.11 | $1.91 | $2.13 |
| | $0 to -$5 | $1.85 | $2.01 | $2.02 | $2.12 | $2.07 | $1.67 | $1.94 |
| | -$5 to -$10 | $7.03 | $7.12 | $7.18 | $7.19 | $7.01 | $7.15 | $7.12 |
| | -$10 to -$20 | $13.94 | $14.03 | $14.13 | $14.02 | $13.94 | $13.56 | $13.94 |
| | < -$20 | $78.44 | $85.15 | $133.45 | $121.42 | $107.77 | $90.68 | $102.71 |

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CTS transactions were evaluated for each interval. From October 3, 2017, through June 30, 2026, 377,179 CTS schedules were approved through the CTS process based on the forecast LMPs. When the forecast LMPs for the approved intervals were compared to the hourly integrated real-time LMPs, the direction of the flow in 82,755 (21.9 percent) of the intervals was inconsistent with the differences in real-time PJM/MISO and MISO/PJM prices. For example, if a market participant submits a CTS transaction from MISO to PJM with a spread bid of $5.00, and MISO's forecasted PJM interface price was at least $5.00 lower than PJM's forecasted MISO interface price, the transaction would be approved. For 21.9 percent of the approved transactions, the actual, real-time price differentials were in the opposite direction of the forecast differential. The actual, real-time price differentials meant that the transactions would have been economic in the opposite direction. For 78.1 percent of the intervals, the forecast price differentials were consistent with real-time PJM/MISO and MISO/PJM price differences. Figure 9-12 shows the monthly volume of cleared PJM/MISO CTS bids. Figure 9-12 also shows the percent of cleared bids that resulted in flows consistent and inconsistent with price differences. In June 2022, MISO experienced software issues that prevented the submission and clearing of CTS transactions. The issue was resolved in August 2022. It is unclear why market participants did not resume scheduling CTS transactions at the MISO interface until February 2023. Market participants did not use the MISO CTS transaction option between June 2024 and January 2025. While the forecast LMPs have not proven to be a good predictor of real time LMPs, that has not changed. It is not clear why market participants stopped using the MISO CTS transaction option during that time, or have not resumed using the option at volumes previously used.

**Figure 9-12 Monthly cleared PJM/MISO CTS bid volume: October 3, 2017 through June 30, 2026**




The data reviewed show that IT SCED is not a highly accurate predictor of the real-time PJM/MISO interface prices. This limits the effectiveness of CTS in improving interface pricing between PJM and MISO.

## Willing to Pay Congestion and Not Willing to Pay Congestion

When reserving nonfirm transmission, market participants have the option to choose whether or not they are willing to pay congestion. When the market participant elects to pay congestion, PJM operators redispatch the system if necessary to allow the energy transaction to continue to flow. The system redispatch often creates price separation across buses on the PJM system. The difference in LMPs


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between two buses in PJM is the congestion cost (and losses) that the market participant pays in order for their transaction to continue to flow.

The MMU recommended that PJM modify the not willing to pay congestion product to address the issues of uncollected congestion charges. The MMU recommended charging market participants for any congestion incurred while the transaction is loaded, regardless of their election of transmission service, and restricting the use of not willing to pay congestion transactions (as well as all other real-time external energy transactions) to transactions at interfaces.

On April 12, 2011, the PJM Market Implementation Committee (MIC) endorsed the changes recommended by the MMU. The elimination of internal sources and sinks on transmission reservations addressed most of the MMU concerns, as there can no longer be uncollected congestion charges for imports to PJM or exports from PJM. There is still potential exposure to uncollected congestion charges in wheel through transactions, and the MMU will continue to evaluate if additional mitigation measures would be appropriate to address this exposure.

Table 9-54 shows that since the inception of the business rule change on April 12, 2013, there was uncollected congestion in only four months (January 2016, February 2019, January 2026 and March 2026). In those four months, there was negative uncollected congestion. The negative congestion means that market participants who used the not willing to pay congestion transmission option for their wheel through transactions had transactions that flowed in the direction opposite to congestion. When market participants use the not willing to pay congestion product, it also means that they are not willing to receive congestion credits, which was the case in January 2016, February 2019, January 2026 and March 2026.

**Table 9-54 Monthly uncollected congestion charges: January 2010 through June 2026**

| Month | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | $148,764 | $3,102 | $0 | $5 | $0 | $0 | ($44) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | ($3,572) |
| Feb | $542,575 | $1,567 | ($15) | $249 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | ($69,992) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Mar | $287,417 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | ($48) |
| Apr | $31,255 | $4,767 | ($68) | ($3,114) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| May | $41,025 | $0 | ($27) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Jun | $169,197 | $1,354 | $78 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Jul | $827,617 | $1,115 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | |
| Aug | $731,539 | $37 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | |
| Sep | $119,162 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | |
| Oct | $257,448 | ($31,443) | ($6,870) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | |
| Nov | $30,843 | ($795) | ($4,678) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | |
| Dec | $127,176 | ($659) | ($209) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | |
| Total | $3,314,018 | ($20,955) | ($11,789) | ($2,860) | $0 | $0 | ($44) | $0 | $0 | ($69,992) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | ($3,620) |

## Transmission Service Requests

Requests for transmission service are made on the PJM Open Access Same Time Information System (OASIS) on any of the posted paths. The products available on the OASIS include both firm and nonfirm service. Nonfirm service is available on an hourly, daily, weekly and monthly basis. Firm transmission service is defined as either short term or long term firm. Short term firm transmission is available on a daily, weekly or monthly basis, and long term firm is available for a period of one year or longer.

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The total transfer capability (TTC) reflects the maximum amount of power that can be transferred over a transmission line or a group of transmission lines. In order to maintain reliability, transmission providers do not make the entire TTC available to be used. The available flowgate capability (AFC) is calculated for each path and product pair by taking the TTC and subtracting existing service requests, a capacity benefit margin[65], a transmission reliability margin[66] and taking postbacks and counterflows into consideration. The amount of transmission service that can be reserved is the Available Transfer Capability (ATC). The ATC is calculated for each path and product, and is determined by taking the AFC and adjusting it for all other committed transmission service requests that impact that path.

PJM calculates and posts ATC for all valid posted paths product pairs. The range of calculated ATCs depends on the duration of service. Hourly service is available up to seven days in advance, daily service is available 35 days in advance, weekly service is available five weeks in advance and monthly service is available 18 months in advance. Any transmission request that falls within the posted ATC period is evaluated based on the posted ATC. If there is sufficient capability, the transmission service request is accepted. If there is not sufficient capability, the transmission service request is denied.

Long term firm transmission service requests that extend beyond the ATC posting calculation are subject to system impact studies and must be submitted and evaluated in the new services queue. There is currently a backlog of projects in the new services queue. The backlog is being resolved through a transition to a new planning process, but new transmission service requests may not be evaluated or approved until 2027.[67]

## Spot Imports

Figure 9-13 shows the spot import service use for the NYISO Interface, and for all other interfaces, from January 2013 through June 2026. The yellow line shows the total monthly MWh of spot import service reserved and the orange line shows the total monthly MWh of tagged spot import service. The gray shaded area between the yellow and orange lines represents the MWh of retracted spot import service and may represent potential hoarding volumes. This ATC was initially reserved, but not tagged (used). It is possible that in some instances the reserved transmission consisted of the only available ATC which could have been used by another market participant had it not been reserved and not used. The blue shaded area between the orange line and green shaded area represents the MWh of curtailed transactions using spot import service. This area may also represent hoarding opportunities, particularly at the NYISO Interface. In this instance, it is possible that while the market participant reserved and scheduled the transmission, they may have submitted purposely uneconomic bids in the NYISO market so that their transaction would be curtailed, yet their transmission would not be retracted. The NYISO allows for market participants to modify their bids on an hourly basis, so these market participants can hold their transmission service and evaluate their bids hourly, while withholding the transmission from other market participants that may wish to use it. The green shaded area represents the total settled MWh of spot import service. Figure 9-13 shows that while there are proportionally fewer retracted MWh on the NYISO Interface than on all other interfaces, the NYISO has proportionally more curtailed MWh. This is a result of the NYISO market clearing process.[68]

65 The capacity benefit margin is defined by NERC as "the amount of firm transmission transfer capability preserved by the transmission provider for Load-Serving Entities (LSEs), whose loads are located on that Transmission Service Provider's system, to enable access by the LSEs to generation from interconnected systems to meet generation reliability requirements. Preservation of CBM for an LSE allows that entity to reduce its installed generating capacity below that which may otherwise have been necessary without interconnections to meet its generation reliability requirements. The transmission transfer capability preserved as CBM is intended to be used by the LSE only in times of emergency generation deficiencies."

66 The transmission reliability margin is defined by NERC as "the amount of TTC necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the interconnected transmission network will be secure".


67 See the *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June,* Section 12, "Generation and Transmission Planning," for additional details.

68 See the *2018 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 9, "Interchange Transactions," for a more complete discussion of the history of spot import transmission service.



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Figure 9-13 Spot import service use: January 2013 through June 2026




The MMU continues to recommend that PJM permit unlimited spot market imports (as well as all nonfirm point to point willing to pay congestion imports and exports) at all PJM interfaces.

## Interchange Optimization

When PJM prices are higher than prices in surrounding balancing authorities, imports will flow into PJM until the prices are approximately equal. This is an appropriate market response to price differentials. Given the nature of interface pricing and the treatment of interface transactions, it is not possible for PJM system operators to reliably predict the quantity or sustainability of such imports. The inability to predict interchange volumes creates additional challenges for PJM dispatch in trying to meet loads, especially on high load days. If all external transactions were submitted as real-time dispatchable transactions during emergency conditions, PJM would be able to include interchange transactions in its supply stack, and dispatch only enough interchange to meet the demand.

The MMU recommends that the submission deadline for real-time dispatchable transactions be modified from 1800 (EPT) on the prior day to three hours prior to the requested start time, and that the minimum duration be modified from one hour to 15 minutes.[69] These changes would give PJM a more flexible product that could be used to meet load based on economic dispatch rather than guessing the sensitivity of the transactions to price changes.

In addition to changing prices, transmission line loading relief procedures (TLRs), market participants' curtailments for economic reasons, and external balancing authority curtailments affect the duration of interchange transactions.

The MMU recommends that PJM explore an interchange optimization solution with its neighboring balancing authorities that would remove the need for market participants to schedule physical transactions across seams. Such a solution would include an optimized, but limited, joint dispatch approach that uses supply curves and treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to other constraints within an LMP market.

## During Emergency Conditions

An interchange cap is a limit on the level of interchange permitted for nondispatchable energy using spot import or hourly point to point transmission. An interchange cap is a nonmarket intervention which should be a temporary solution and should be replaced with a market based solution as soon as possible. Since the approval of this process on October 30, 2014, PJM has not yet needed to implement an interchange cap.

The purpose of the interchange cap is to help ensure that actual interchange more closely meets operators' expectations of interchange levels when internal PJM resources, e.g. CTs or demand response, are dispatched to meet

69 The minimum duration for a real-time dispatchable transaction was modified to 15 minutes. See *Integration of Variable Energy Resources*, Order No. 764, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 764-A, 141 FERC ¶ 61231 (2012).

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the peak load. Once these resources have been called on, PJM must honor their minimum operating constraints regardless of whether additional interchange then materializes. Therefore, any interchange received in excess of what was expected can have a suppressive effect on energy and reserve pricing and result in increased uplift.

PJM will notify market participants of the possible use of the interchange cap the day before. The interchange cap will be implemented for the forecasted peak and surrounding hours during emergency conditions.

The interchange cap will limit the acceptance of spot import and hourly nonfirm point to point interchange (imports and exports) not submitted as real time with price transactions once net interchange has reached the interchange cap value. Spot imports and hourly nonfirm point to point transactions submitted prior to the implementation of the interchange cap will not be limited. In addition, schedules with firm or network designated transmission service will not be limited either, regardless of whether net interchange is at or above the cap.

The calculation of the interchange cap is based on the operator expectation of interchange at the time the cap is calculated plus an additional margin. The margin is set at 700 MW, which is half of the largest contingency on the system. The additional margin also allows interchange to adjust to the loss of a unit or deviation between actual load and forecasted load. The interchange cap is based on the maximum sustainable interchange from PJM reliability studies.

## 45 Minute Schedule Duration Rule

PJM limits the change in interchange volumes on 15 minute intervals. These changes are referred to as ramp. The PJM ramp limit is designed to limit the change in the amount of imports or exports in each 15 minute interval to account for the physical characteristics of the generation to respond to changes in the level of imports and exports. The purpose of imposing a ramp limit is to help ensure the reliable operation of the PJM system. The 1,000 MW ramp limit per 15 minute interval was based on the availability of ramping capability by generators in the PJM system. The limit is based on the assumption that the available generation in the PJM system can only move 1,000 MW over any 15 minute period, although there is no supporting analysis. As an example of how the ramp limit works, if at 0800 (EPT) the sum of all external transactions were -3,000 MW (negative sign indicates net exporting), the limit for 0815 would be -2,000 MW to -4,000 MW. In other words, the starting or ending of transactions would be limited so that the overall change from the previous 15 minute period would not exceed 1,000 MW in either direction.

In 2008, there was an increase in 15 minute external energy transactions that caused swings in imports and exports submitted in response to intrahour LMP changes. This activity was due to market participants' ability to observe price differences between RTOs in the first third of the hour, and predict the direction of the price difference on an hourly integrated basis. Large quantities of MW would then be scheduled between the RTOs for the last 15 minute interval to capture those hourly integrated price differences with relatively little risk of prices changing. This increase in interchange on 15 minute intervals created operational control issues, and in some cases led to an increase in uplift charges due to calling on resources with minimum run times greater than 15 minutes needed to support the interchange transactions. As a result, a new business rule was proposed and approved that required all transactions to be at least 45 minutes in duration.

On June 22, 2012, FERC issued Order No. 764, which required transmission providers to give transmission customers the option to schedule transmission service at 15 minute intervals to reflect more accurate power production forecasts, load and system conditions.[70] On April 17, 2014, FERC issued its order which found that PJM's 45 minute duration rule was inconsistent with Order No. 764.[71]

PJM and the MMU issued a statement indicating ongoing concern about market participants' scheduling behavior, and a commitment to address any scheduling behavior that raises operational or market manipulation concerns.[72]

70 See *id.* at P 51.
71 See *id.* at P 12.
72 See joint statement of PJM and the MMU re Interchange Scheduling issued July 29, 2014 <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/Messages/PJM_IMM_Statement_on_Interchange_Scheduling_20140729.pdf>.


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## MISO Multi-Value Project Usage Rate (MUR)

MISO defines a multi-value project (MVP) to be a project which, according to MISO, enables the reliable and economic delivery of energy in support of public policy needs, provides multiple types of regional economic value or provides a combination of regional reliability and economic value. On July 15, 2010, MISO submitted revisions to the MISO Tariff to implement criteria for identifying and allocating the costs of MVPs.[73] On December 16, 2010, the Commission accepted the proposed MVP charge for export and wheel-through transactions, except for transactions that sink in PJM.[74] The Commission stated that MISO had not shown that their proposal did not constitute a resumption of rate pancaking along the MISO-PJM seam. Following the December 16, 2010, Order, MISO began applying a multi-value usage rate (MUR) to monthly net actual energy withdrawals, export schedules and through schedules with the exception of transactions sinking in PJM. The MUR charge was applied to the relevant transactions in addition to the applicable transmission, ancillary service and network upgrade charges.

On June 7, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review regarding the Commission's determination in the MVP Order and MVP Rehearing Order.[75] The Court ordered the Commission to consider on remand whether, in light of current conditions, what if any limitations on export pricing to PJM by MISO are justified.[76] The Seventh Circuit highlighted the fact that at the time of the Commission's decision to prohibit rate pancaking on transactions between MISO and PJM, all of MISO's transmission projects were local and provided only local benefits.[77]

On July 13, 2016, FERC issued an order permitting MISO to collect charges associated with MVPs for all transactions sinking in PJM, effective immediately.[78] The July 13th Order noted that in light of "the development of large scale wind generation capable of serving both MISO's and its neighbors' energy policy requirements in the western areas of MISO; the reported need of PJM entities to access those resources; and the reported need for MISO to build new transmission facilities to deliver the output of those resources within MISO for export... it is appropriate to allow MISO to assess the MVP usage charge for transmission service used to export to PJM just as MISO assesses the MVP usage charge for transmission service used to export energy to other regions."[79]

The policy rationale for permitting MISO to impose transmission costs on PJM market participants without clear criteria is weak and results in pancaking of rates. The impact is expected to increase.

73 See Midwest Independent Transmission Operator Inc. filing, Docket No. ER10-1791-000 (July 15, 2010).
74 See 133 FERC ¶ 61,221; *order on reh'g*, 137 FERC ¶ 61,074 (2011).
75 Illinois Commerce Commission, et al. v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 778–780 (7th Cir. 2013).
76 *Id.* at 780.
77 *Id.* at 779.
78 See 156 FERC ¶ 61,034.
79 *Id.* at P 55.

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Table 9-55 shows the projected usage rate to be collected for all wheels through and exports from MISO, including those that sink in PJM, for 2026 through 2046.[80] As shown in Table 9-4, there were 3,758.4 GWh of imports from MISO in the first six months of 2026. At the 2026 MUR of $1.68 per MWh, PJM market participants paid $6.3 million towards the costs of MISO's multi value projects. It is not clear whether the MUR charge has affected interchange volumes from MISO into PJM.

### Table 9-55 MISO projected multi value project usage rate: 2026 through 2046

| Year | Total Indicative MVP Usage Rate ($/MWh) |
|---|---|
| 2026 | $1.68 |
| 2027 | $1.64 |
| 2028 | $1.60 |
| 2029 | $1.56 |
| 2030 | $1.52 |
| 2031 | $1.48 |
| 2032 | $1.44 |
| 2033 | $1.40 |
| 2034 | $1.36 |
| 2035 | $1.32 |
| 2036 | $1.29 |
| 2037 | $1.25 |
| 2038 | $1.22 |
| 2039 | $1.18 |
| 2040 | $1.15 |
| 2041 | $1.12 |
| 2042 | $1.08 |
| 2043 | $1.05 |
| 2044 | $1.02 |
| 2045 | $0.99 |
| 2046 | $0.97 |

80 See MISO, "Schedule 26A Indicative Annual Charges," (June 1, 2026) <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Schedule%2026A%20Indicative%20Annual%20Charges106365.xlsx>.



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# 10. Ancillary Service Markets

FERC defined six ancillary services in Order No. 888: scheduling, system control and dispatch; reactive supply and voltage control from generation service; regulation and frequency response service; energy imbalance service; operating reserve - spinning reserve service; and operating reserve - supplemental reserve service.[1] PJM provides scheduling, system control and dispatch as part of the PJM administrative function. Generating units provide reactive service as part of normal operations and are paid opportunity costs when they operate in real time outside of their normal range at the direction of PJM for the purpose of providing reactive service.[2] Primary frequency response service is provided through the use of automatic governors installed on generators. PJM provides regulation, energy imbalance, spinning reserve, renamed synchronized reserve, and supplemental reserve services through targeted market mechanisms.[3] The PJM ancillary service markets are regulation, synchronized reserve, primary reserve, and 30-minute reserve. Although not defined by FERC as an ancillary service, black start service plays a comparable role. Black start service is provided on the basis of formula rates and cost of service rates.

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, behavior and performance for the PJM Synchronized Reserve Market for the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-1 The synchronized reserve market results were not competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Regional Markets | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Flawed** |

- The synchronized reserve market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to supplier concentration. The RTO Reserve Zone was unconcentrated in the day-ahead market and unconcentrated in the real-time market. The MAD Reserve Subzone was moderately concentrated in the day-ahead market and highly concentrated in the real-time market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because the market rules require all available reserves to offer at cost-based offers.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive because the interaction of participant behavior with the market design does not result in competitive prices as a result of PJM's changes to the operating reserve demand curve (ORDC). In an attempt to counter poor unit specific synchronized reserve performance, PJM unilaterally and inappropriately extended the first step of the ORDC for synchronized reserve, known as the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, in May 2023, raising prices for synchronized reserves, nonsynchronized reserves and energy.
- Market design was evaluated as flawed based on PJM's modifications to the ORDC. PJM previously adopted reforms, including several based on MMU recommendations, removing both physical and economic withholding from the market.
- Significant communications technology issues when calling resources during synchronized reserve events have resulted in slow response from resources. On December 17, 2024, PJM implemented an electronic deployment of reserves via an augmented dispatch signal, but PJM does not require that resources be able to receive this signal.

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, behavior and performance for the PJM Nonsynchronized Reserve Market for the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-2 The nonsynchronized reserve market results were not competitive**

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure: Regional Markets | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Flawed** |

1 See 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996). PJM renamed spinning reserve as synchronized reserve based on PJM's inclusion of demand side resources in the product.
2 See 192 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2025).
3 Energy imbalance service refers to the real-time energy market.

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- The nonsynchronized reserve market structure was evaluated as not competitive due to supplier concentration for primary reserve. The RTO Reserve Zone was moderately concentrated in the day-ahead market and moderately concentrated in the real-time market. The MAD Reserve Subzone was highly concentrated in the day-ahead market and highly concentrated in the real-time market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because all available reserves are included by the PJM markets software, so withholding is not possible.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive because the interaction of participant behavior with the market design does not result in competitive prices as a result of PJM's changes to the operating reserve demand curve (ORDC). In an attempt to counter poor unit specific synchronized reserve performance, PJM unilaterally and inappropriately extended the first step of the ORDC for synchronized reserve, known as the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, in May 2023. Because the first step of the ORDC for primary reserve, known as the primary reserve reliability requirement, is based on the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, the primary reserve reliability requirement was consequently also extended, raising prices for synchronized reserves, nonsynchronized reserves, and energy.
- Market design was evaluated as flawed based on PJM's modifications to the first step of the ORDC.

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, behavior and performance for the PJM Secondary Reserve Market for the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-3 The secondary reserve market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Competitive** | **Effective** |

- The secondary reserve market structure was evaluated as competitive due to the lack of supplier concentration for 30-minute reserve. The RTO Reserve Zone was unconcentrated in the day-ahead market and unconcentrated in the real-time market.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as competitive because all available reserves are included by the PJM software, so withholding is not possible.
- Market performance was evaluated as competitive because the combination of a competitive market structure and competitive participation resulted in competitive market outcomes.
- The market design was evaluated as effective because the market rules ensure competitive market offers and require repayment of offline cleared secondary reserves that are not available when called on to provide energy in 30 minutes.

The MMU analyzed measures of market structure, behavior and performance for the PJM Regulation Market for the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-4 The regulation market results were not competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| **Market Performance** | **Not Competitive** | **Flawed** |

- The regulation market structure was evaluated as not competitive because the PJM Regulation Market failed the three pivotal supplier (TPS) test in 91.8 percent of half hour market intervals in the first six months of 2026.
- Participant behavior in the PJM Regulation Market was evaluated as competitive in the first six months of 2026 because market power mitigation requires competitive offers when the three pivotal supplier test is failed, although the inclusion of a $12.00 per MW positive margin in the tariff definition of a competitive offer is not consistent with competitive offers.
- Market performance was evaluated as not competitive, because all units are not paid the same price on an equivalent MW basis.


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- Market design was evaluated as flawed. The post-October 1, 2025, market results include an improved approach to opportunity cost but include an incorrect definition of opportunity cost that has significant effects on prices. The definition of performance is also incorrect. The post-October 1, 2025, design is a significant improvement over the pre-October 1, 2025, design although there are significant issues in the new design.

# Overview

## Primary Reserve

Primary reserves consist of both synchronized and nonsynchronized reserves that can provide energy within 10 minutes and sustain that output for at least 30 minutes during a contingency event. PJM made several changes to the primary reserve market, effective October 1, 2022. These included a must offer requirement and correction of misspecified cost-based offers. By removing opportunities for physical and economic withholding, the changes resulted in clearing increased quantities of available synchronized reserves at competitive prices. Starting in May 2023, to compensate for poor unit specific resource performance, PJM unilaterally increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, which in turn increased the primary reserve reliability requirement. That increase was not justified when implemented, as current data demonstrates and the increase should be removed.

## Market Structure

- **Supply.** Primary reserve is provided by both synchronized reserve (generation or demand response currently synchronized to the grid and available within 10 minutes) and nonsynchronized reserve (generation currently offline but available to start and provide energy within 10 minutes).
- **Demand.** The primary reserve reliability requirement is equal to 150 percent of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. The primary reserve requirement is equal to the primary reserve reliability requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $850 per MWh, plus the extended reserve requirement (190 MW), with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MWh. The synchronized reserve requirement is equal to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement plus the extended reserve requirement, with a default level of 190 MW. The synchronized reserve reliability requirement is normally equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). Starting in May 2023, PJM increased the size of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the most severe single contingency (MSSC), in effect increasing the primary reserve reliability requirement to 195 percent of the MSSC. On January 9, 2026, PJM decreased the size of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone to 120 percent of the MSSC, in effect setting the primary reserve reliability requirement to 180 percent of the MSSC. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average primary reserve requirement was 3,181.6 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 2,576.8 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead average primary reserve requirement was 3,169.2 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 2,560.0 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Market Concentration.** The Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone Market for primary reserve was characterized by structural market power in the first six months of 2026. The average HHI for real-time primary reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone was 1159, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The real-time RTO primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 2.0 percent of intervals.[4] The average HHI for day-ahead primary reserve in the RTO Zone was 1154, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The day-ahead RTO primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 2.0 percent of hours. The average HHI for real-time primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2526, which is classified as highly concentrated. The real-time MAD primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 80.3 percent of intervals. The average HHI for day-ahead primary reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2147, which is classified as highly concentrated. The day-ahead MAD primary reserve market was highly concentrated in 65.6 percent of hours.

4 FERC defines a highly concentrated market as having an HHI greater than 1800.

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## Synchronized Reserve Market

Synchronized reserves include all capacity synchronized to the grid and available to provide power within 10 minutes. This includes online resources loaded below their full output, storage, and condensing resources synchronized to the grid but consuming energy, and 10-minute demand response capability. As of October 1, 2022, all generation capacity resources must offer their entire synchronized reserve capability to the PJM market at all times. PJM jointly optimizes energy, synchronized reserve, primary reserve, and 30-minute reserve needs in both the day-ahead and real-time markets. Synchronized reserve prices are based on opportunity costs calculated by PJM in the market optimization plus the anticipated cost of a performance penalty. All real-time cleared synchronized reserves are obligated to perform when PJM initiates a synchronized reserve event.

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of available synchronized reserve was 5,119.3 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 2,254.7 MW on average was located in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead average supply of available synchronized reserve was 6,254.3 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 2,946.1 MW on average was located in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Demand.** The synchronized reserve requirement is equal to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $850 per MWh, plus the extended reserve requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MWh and a default value of 190 MW. The synchronized reserve reliability requirement is normally equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). From May 19, 2023, through January 8, 2026, PJM inappropriately set the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to 130 percent of the MSSC for the RTO Reserve Zone. Since January 9, 2026, PJM has inappropriately set the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to 120 percent of the MSSC for the RTO Reserve Zone. The real-time average synchronized reserve requirement in the first six months of 2026 was 2,184.4 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 1,781.2 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. The day-ahead average synchronized reserve requirement in the first six months of 2026 was 2,176.1 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone and 1,770.0 MW in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Market Concentration.** The Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone Market for synchronized reserve was characterized by structural market power in the first six months of 2026. The average HHI for real-time synchronized reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone was 927, which is classified as unconcentrated. The real-time RTO synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.2 percent of intervals. The average HHI for day-ahead synchronized reserve in the RTO Zone was 932, which is classified as unconcentrated. The day-ahead RTO synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.4 percent of hours. The average HHI for real-time synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 2086, which is classified as highly concentrated. The real-time MAD synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 59.1 percent of intervals. The average HHI for day-ahead synchronized reserve in the MAD Reserve Subzone was 1788, which is classified as moderately concentrated. The day-ahead MAD synchronized reserve market was highly concentrated in 41.8 percent of hours.

### Market Behavior

- **Offers**. There is a must offer requirement for synchronized reserve. All nonemergency generation capacity resources are required to offer their entire synchronized reserve capability. PJM calculates the available synchronized reserve for all conventional resources based on the energy offer ramp rate, energy dispatch point, and the lesser of the synchronized reserve maximum or economic maximum output. Hydro resources, Energy Storage Resource model participants, and demand response resources submit their available synchronized reserve MW. Wind, solar, and nuclear resources are by default considered incapable of providing synchronized reserve, but may offer with an exception approved by PJM. Synchronized reserve offers are capped at cost plus the expected value of performance penalties. PJM calculates opportunity costs based on LMP.


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In December 2024, PJM updated the economic basepoint signal to include deployed reserve MW during synchronized reserve events, improving performance. The yearly average performance in 2024 for events that were 10 minutes or longer was 58.2 percent, while for 2025 it was 78.3 percent and for the first six months of 2026 it was 72.3 percent. However, significant communications technology and modelling issues when calling resources during spinning events continue to result in slow response from a significant share of resources.

## Market Performance

- **Price.** In the first six months of 2026, for the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone, the weighted average real-time price for synchronized reserve was $5.01 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $6.22 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, for the RTO Reserve Zone, the weighted average real-time price for synchronized reserve was $4.92 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $5.77 per MWh.

# Nonsynchronized Reserve

Nonsynchronized reserve is comprised of nonemergency energy resources not currently synchronized to the grid that can provide energy within 10 minutes. Nonsynchronized reserve is available to meet the portions of the primary reserve requirement and the 30-minute reserve requirement not already satisfied by reserve cleared for the synchronized reserve requirement.

## Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of eligible and available nonsynchronized reserve was 1,089.7 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 747.9 MW on average was available in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of eligible and available nonsynchronized reserve was 1,056.4 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 656.6 MW on average was available in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone.
- **Demand.** Demand for nonsynchronized reserve is the primary reserve requirement less the amount of synchronized reserves cleared by PJM.[5] Although nonsynchronized reserve can be used to meet the 30-minute reserve requirement, any 30-minute reserve beyond the primary reserve requirement is usually provided by secondary reserve due to secondary reserve having lower cost and greater availability.

## Market Behavior

- **Offers.** Generation owners do not submit supply offers for nonsynchronized reserve from non-hydroelectric units. Nonemergency generation resources that are available to provide energy and can start in 10 minutes or less are defined to be available for nonsynchronized reserves. For non-hydroelectric units, PJM calculates the MW available from a unit based on the unit's energy offer. Hydroelectric units set their own offered reserve amount. For all units, the offer price of nonsynchronized reserve is $0 per MWh.[6] Hybrid units and Energy Storage Resource model participants are not eligible to provide nonsynchronized reserves.

## Market Performance

- **Price.** The nonsynchronized reserve price is determined by the marginal primary reserve resource. In the first six months of 2026, the nonsynchronized reserve weighted average real-time price for all intervals in the RTO Reserve Zone was $2.10 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $1.74 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the nonsynchronized reserve weighted average real-time price for all intervals in the MAD Reserve Subzone was $2.71 per MWh and the weighted average day-ahead price was $1.72 per MWh.

# 30-Minute Reserve Market

The supply of 30-minute reserves consists of resources, online or offline, which can respond within 30 minutes. This includes primary reserves and secondary reserves. By default, there is no reserve subzone for 30-minute reserves.

5 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.1 Overview of the PJM Reserve Markets, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
6 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

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## Market Structure

- **Supply.** The supply of 30-minute reserves is provided by both primary reserves (synchronized and nonsynchronized resources that can provide energy within 10 minutes) and secondary reserves (synchronized and nonsynchronized resources that can provide energy within 30 minutes but that take more than 10 minutes). In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of available 30-minute reserve was 24,982.6 MW in the RTO Zone.
- **Demand.** The 30-minute reserve requirement is equal to the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement, with a shortage penalty price of $850 per MWh, plus the extended reserve requirement (190 MW), with a shortage penalty price of $300 per MWh. The 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is equal to the maximum of: the primary reserve reliability requirement; the largest active gas contingency; and 3,000 MW. Since PJM increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is frequently equal to the primary reserve reliability requirement. In the first six months of 2026, the average 30-minute reserve requirement was 3,378.4 MW in the real-time market and 3,374.0 MW in the day-ahead market.
- **Market Concentration.** The RTO Reserve Zone Market for 30-minute reserves was characterized by low concentration in the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the average HHI for real-time 30-minute reserves was 774, which is classified as unconcentrated. The real-time RTO 30-minute reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.03 percent of intervals. In the first six months of 2026, the average HHI for day-ahead 30-minute reserves was 867, which is classified as unconcentrated. The day-ahead RTO 30-minute reserve market was highly concentrated in 0.02 percent of hours.

# Secondary Reserve

Secondary reserves are reserves that take more than 10 minutes to convert to energy, but less than 30 minutes. This includes the unloaded capacity of online generation that can be achieved according to the resource ramp rates in 10 to 30 minutes, and offline resources with a start time of less than 30 minutes. Secondary reserves can only be used to satisfy the 30-minute reserve requirement.

## Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, in the RTO Reserve Zone, the real-time average supply of available secondary reserve was 20,096.7 MW and the day-ahead average supply of available secondary reserve was 12,146.1 MW. As with the 30-minute reserve service, there is no defined reserve subzone for secondary reserves.
- **Demand.** Demand for secondary reserve is the 30-minute reserve requirement less the amount of primary reserves cleared by PJM.[7]

## Market Behavior

- **Offers.** Energy Storage Resource model participants, hydroelectric resources, hybrid resources, and demand-side response resources submit their available secondary reserve MW. For all other resource types, PJM calculates the MW available from a resource based on the resource's energy offer. For all resources, the offer price of secondary reserve is $0 per MWh.[8] In both the day-ahead and real-time secondary reserves markets, PJM uses lost opportunity costs as the offers and not offers submitted by market participants. For online secondary reserves, PJM calculates an opportunity cost based on LMP.

## Market Performance

- **Price.** The secondary reserve price is determined by the marginal 30-minute reserve resource. In the first six months of 2026, the secondary reserve real-time price for all intervals was $0.00 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the secondary reserve day-ahead price for all hours was $0.00 per MWh.

7 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.1 Overview of the PJM Reserve Markets, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
8 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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## Regulation Market

The PJM Regulation Market is a real-time market. The regulation market design changed significantly on October 1, 2025. PJM jointly optimizes regulation with synchronized reserve and energy to provide all three products at least cost. The PJM regulation market design includes three clearing price components: capability; performance; and opportunity cost.

PJM plans to implement additional changes to the regulation market in a second phase, to be implemented on December 1, 2026. This Phase 2 will include separate regulation up and regulation down markets. The Phase 1 changes eliminated many of the significant issues identified by the MMU under the pre-October 1, 2025, design. However, the Phase 1 changes introduced new issues that are significantly increasing market prices above the efficient and competitive level.

This report analyzes the results of the regulation market in the first six months of 2026.

### Market Structure

- **Supply.** In the first six months of 2026, the average half hour offered supply of regulation for nonramp hours was 914.7 actual MW (797.5 effective MW), 1,060.4 actual MW (923.0 effective MW) for shoulder hours, and 1,134.7 actual MW (994.8 effective MW) for ramp hours.
- **Demand.** The half hour regulation demand is 550 MW for nonramp hours, 650 MW for shoulder hours, and 750 MW for ramp hours.
- **Supply and Demand.** The nonramp regulation requirement of 550.0 effective MW was provided by 623.3 hourly average actual MW in the first six months of 2026. The shoulder regulation requirement of 650.0 effective MW was provided by 738.1 hourly average actual MW in the first six months of 2026. The ramp regulation requirement of 750.0 effective MW was provided by 850.3 hourly average actual MW in the first six months of 2026.

  The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for nonramp hours was 1.46 in the first six months of 2026. The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for shoulder hours was 1.43 in the first six months of 2026. The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for ramp hours was 1.34 in the first six months of 2026.
- **Market Concentration.** In the first six months of 2026, the three pivotal supplier test was failed in 91.8 percent of half hours. In the first six months of 2026, the effective MW weighted average HHI was 1373, which is moderately concentrated.

### Market Behavior

- **Offers.** Daily regulation offer prices are submitted for each unit by the unit owner. Owners are required to submit a cost-based offer and may submit a price-based offer. Offers include both a capability offer and a performance offer. In the first six months of 2026, there were 232 resources providing regulation.

### Market Performance

- **Price and Cost.** The weighted average clearing price for regulation was $136.40 per MW of regulation in first six months of 2026. The weighted average cost of regulation in the first six months of 2026 was $138.61 per MW of regulation.

## Black Start Service

Black start service is required for the reliable restoration of the grid following a blackout. Black start service is the ability of a generating unit to start without an outside electrical supply, or is the demonstrated ability of a generating unit to automatically remain operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid (automatic load rejection or ALR).[9]

In the first six months of 2026, total black start charges were $22.3 million, a decrease of $6.5 million (22.5 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total revenue requirement charges were $22.0

9 OATT Schedule 1 § 1.3BB. There are no ALR units currently providing black start service.

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million, a decrease of $6.5 million (22.7 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total black start uplift charges were $0.4 million, a decrease of $0.04 million (11.2 percent) from 2025. Black start revenue requirements consist of fixed black start service costs, variable black start service costs, training costs, fuel storage costs, and an incentive payment. Black start uplift charges are paid to units scheduled in the day-ahead energy market or committed in real time to provide black start service under the ALR option or for black start testing. Black start zonal charges in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $0 in the OVEC and REC Zones to $4.4 million in the AEP Zone.

CRF values are a key determinant of total payments to black start units. The CRF values in PJM tariff tables should have been changed for both black start and the capacity market when the tax laws changed effective January 1, 2018. As a result of the failure to reduce the CRF values, black start units have been and continue to be significantly overcompensated since the changes to the tax code. In March 2023, FERC issued an order establishing hearing and settlement judge procedures.[10] By order issued September 23, 2025, the Commission approved a settlement over the MMU's objection that continued to allow overcompensation.[11] On July 4, 2025, enactment of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) changed the rules for bonus depreciation again, allowing 100 percent bonus depreciation for assets constructed between January 20, 2025 and December 31, 2028, and placed in service before January 1, 2031.[12] The CRF values for affected units should incorporate 100 percent bonus depreciation. It is essential that PJM not repeat its earlier mistake when it ignored the tax law changes in 2017.

## Reactive

Reactive service, reactive supply and voltage control are provided by generation and other sources of reactive power (measured in MVAr). Reactive power helps maintain appropriate voltage levels on the transmission system and is essential to the flow of real power (measured in MW). The same equipment provides both MVAr and MW. Generation resources are required to meet defined reactive capability requirements as a condition to receive interconnection service in PJM.[13]

The longstanding nonmarket approach to reactive capability payments will be eliminated effective June 1, 2026, based on FERC's Order No. 904 and the order approving PJM's compliance filing.[14]

In the first six months of 2026, PJM customers paid $141.6 million for reactive capability based on archaic, nonmarket and unsupported assertions about cost allocation and a regulatory review process of filings by individual units that results in unsupported black box settlements. The current rules have permitted over recovery of reactive costs through reactive capability charges. The Commission resolved these issues in Order No. 904.

Reactive service charges based on opportunity costs are appropriately paid to units that operate in real time outside of their normal range at the direction of PJM for the purpose of providing real-time reactive power.

In the first six months of 2026, total reactive charges were $143.7 million, a decrease of $38.2 million (21.0 percent) from first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total reactive capability charges were $141.6 million, a decrease of $39.8 million (22.0 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total reactive service charges were $2.2 million, an increase of $1.6 million (293.9 percent) from the first six months of 2025.

Total zonal reactive service charges ranged from $0 in the REC and OVEC Zones, to $21.3 million in the AEP Zone in the first three months of 2026.

## Primary Frequency Response

On February 15, 2018, the Commission issued Order No. 842, which modified the pro forma large and small generator interconnection agreements and procedures to require all newly interconnecting non-nuclear generating facilities, both synchronous and nonsynchronous, to include equipment for

10 See 182 FERC ¶ 61,194.
11 See 193 FERC ¶ 61,059.
12 OBBA § 70301(b)(3).

13 OATT Attachment O.
14 See *Compensation for Reactive Power within the Standard Power Factor Range*, Order No. 904, 189 FERC ¶ 61,034 (2024); PJM compliance filing, Docket No. ER24-1073 (January 28, 2025); 192 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2025).


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primary frequency response capability as a condition to receive interconnection service.[15] [16]

Primary frequency response begins within a few seconds and extends up to a minute. The purpose of primary frequency response is to arrest and stabilize the system until other measures (secondary and tertiary frequency response) become active. This includes a governor or equivalent controls capable of operating with a maximum five percent droop and a ±0.036 Hz deadband.[17] In addition to resource capability, resource owners must comply by setting control systems to autonomously adjust real power output in a direction to correct for frequency deviations.

The response of generators within PJM to NERC identified frequency events occurs two to three times per month. A frequency event is declared whenever the system frequency stays outside ±0.040 Hz deadband for at least one minute, and the minimum/maximum frequency reaches ±0.053 Hz.[18] Exclusions to PJM monitoring include nuclear plants, offline units, units with no available headroom, units assigned to regulation, and units with a current outage ticket in eDART.

The MMU has identified several issues with PJM's enforcement and evaluation of generation PFR performance.

## Market Procurement of Real-Time Ancillary Services

PJM uses market mechanisms to varying degrees in the procurement of ancillary services including synchronized reserves, primary reserves, 30-minute reserves, and regulation. When a resource is used for an ancillary service instead of providing energy in real time, the cost of removing the resource, either fully or partially, from the energy market should be included in the offer for the ancillary service. The degree to which PJM markets account for these interactions depends on the timing of the product clearing, software limitations, and the accuracy of resource parameters and offers.

All reserve products are jointly cleared with energy in every real-time market solution. The synchronized reserve market clearing is more integrated with the energy market clearing than the other ancillary services because dispatched energy and synchronized reserve are outputs of the same optimization problem for each market interval. Given the joint clearing of energy and flexible synchronized reserves, the synchronized reserve market clearing price should always cover the opportunity cost of providing flexible synchronized reserves. Inflexible synchronized reserves, provided by resources that require hourly commitments due to run-time or staffing constraints, are not cleared with energy in the real-time market solution.[19] Instead, inflexible synchronized reserves are cleared hourly by the Ancillary Service Optimizer (ASO) or the day-ahead energy market.[20] The ASO considers energy market price forecasts, availability of resources for flexible synchronized reserves, and regulation requirements to estimate the costs and benefits of using a resource for inflexible synchronized reserves. The ASO selected inflexible reserves are a fixed input to RT SCED, which clears the balance of the requirement with flexible synchronized reserves.

Nonsynchronized reserves and offline secondary reserves are cleared with every real-time energy market solution. The energy commitment decisions to keep the resources offline have already been made when the RT SCED clears the five-minute reserves markets. Therefore, offline reserves have no lost opportunity cost. They will not be called on for energy during the market interval for which they are assigned as offline resources.

Prices for the regulation and reserve markets are set by the pricing calculator (LPC), which uses the RT SCED solution as an input. The LPC includes fast start pricing logic and system marginal price caps, so the final prices can be inconsistent with the marginal cost of the resources that clear regulation and reserves.

15 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulated facilities are exempt from this provision. Behind the meter generation that is sized to load is also exempt.

16 Frequency bias settings and frequency response obligations are shared in NERC's Resources Subcommittee <https://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/Pages/Resources-Subcommittee.aspx> and PJM's Operating Committee <https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/committees/oc.aspx>.

17 OATT Attachment O § 4.7.2 (Primary Frequency Response).

18 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 3.6.2 Event Selection, Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025).

19 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.3 Reserve Market Clearing, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

20 Starting October 1, 2025, the ASO now schedules regulation in half-hour blocks. However, as before the change, the ASO still schedules reserves in one-hour blocks.

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# Recommendations

## Reserve Markets

- The MMU recommends that, to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and automatically respond to the notifications. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted 2024.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM replace the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone with a reserve zone structure consistent with the actual deliverability of reserves based on current transmission constraints. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted 2022.)
- The MMU recommends that the components of the cost-based offers for providing regulation and synchronous condensing be defined in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the unit repay all credits back to the last time that the unit successfully responded to an event 10 minutes or longer. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, for calculating the penalty for a synchronized reserve resource failing to meet its scheduled obligation during a spinning event, the synchronized reserve shortfall penalty should include LOC payments as well as SRMCP and MW of shortfall. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that aggregation not be permitted to offset unit specific penalties for failure to respond to a synchronized reserve event. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM immediately remove the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement that PJM added based on a misunderstanding of reserve performance during synchronized reserve events. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that reserve resources operating below economic minimum should not be treated as being backed down by that amount to provide reserve. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Regulation Market

- The MMU recommends that the two signal regulation market design be replaced with a one signal regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Adopted 2025.)[21]
- The MMU recommends that the ability to make dual offers (to make offers as both a RegA and a RegD resource in the same market hour) be removed from the regulation market. (Priority: High. First reported 2019. Status: Adopted 2025.)[22]
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market be modified to incorporate a consistent application of the marginal benefit factor (MBF) throughout the optimization, assignment and settlement process. The MBF should be defined as the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution (MRTS) between RegA and RegD. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Adopted 2025.)[23]
- The MMU recommends that the calculation of the performance score (based on precision, delay and correlation metrics) be replaced. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Partially adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the performance score be revised to eliminate the effect of the size of the regulation assignment and to directly calculate the performance score based on the actual performance and the requested performance. (Priority: High. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market optimization be reviewed to address the logic that allows the partial clearing of inframarginal resources. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.).

21 PJM filed proposed changes to the regulation market with the FERC on April 16, 2024, (Regulation Market Design Filing," Docket No. ER24-1772-000). The Commission Order on June 17, 2024 accepted the PJM Proposal as filed. PJM will implement the changes to the regulation market in two phases. Phase 1, was implemented on October 1, 2025, resulting in a single signal, bidirectional market with one clearing price that eliminates the need for an MBF. Phase 1 eliminated RegA and RegD dual offers. Phase 1 reduced the regulation commitment period from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. In Phase 1 the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market is based on the resource's dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule.

22 See *id.*

23 See 162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).



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- The MMU recommends that if a unit sets its economic maximum at a value greater than its regulation maximum, the lost opportunity cost (LOC) of the unit should be calculated assuming the economic maximum of the unit is equal to the regulation maximum of the unit. The MMU recommends that, in cases where offered ramp is greater than actual ramp, the actual ramp be used to calculate the LOC of the unit. The MMU recommends that these fixes to the LOC logic be implemented prior to implementing Phase 2 of the regulation market design. (Priority: High. First reported Q1 2026. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that, in cases where a unit is already committed for regulation, that the actual residual ramp (based on the current market interval's regulation assignment) be used when calculating the potential regulation set point and the LOC for purposes of clearing resources. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.).
- The MMU recommends that the regulation market commitment period be reduced from a 60-minute commitment to a 30-minute commitment. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Adopted 2025.).[24]
- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost in all of the ancillary services markets be calculated using the schedule on which the unit was scheduled to run in the energy market. (Priority: High. First reported 2010. Status: Adopted 2025.[25] FERC rejected.)[26]
- The MMU recommends that the lost opportunity cost calculation used in the regulation market be based on the resource's dispatched energy offer schedule, not the lower of its price or cost offer schedule. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Adopted 2025. FERC accepted.)[27]
- The MMU recommends that the $12.00 margin adder be eliminated from the definition of the cost based regulation offer because it is a markup and not a cost. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2021. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the ramp rate limited desired MW output be used in the regulation uplift calculation, to reflect the physical limits of the unit's ability to ramp and to eliminate overpayment for opportunity costs when the payment uses an unachievable MW. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2022. Status: Adopted 2025.)[28]
- The MMU recommends enhanced documentation of the implementation of the regulation market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.)[29]
- The MMU recommends that PJM be required to save data elements necessary for verifying the performance of the regulation market. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2010. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the regulation market three pivotal supplier test be saved by PJM so that the test can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the total regulation (TReg) signal sent on a fleet wide basis be eliminated and replaced with individual regulation signals for each unit. (Priority: Low. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, to prevent gaming, there be a penalty enforced in the regulation market as a reduction in performance score and/or a forfeiture of revenues when resource owners elect to deassign assigned regulation resources within the hour. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Not adopted. FERC rejected.)[30]

## Frequency Response, Reactive, and Black Start

- The MMU recommends that all resources, new and existing, have a requirement to include and maintain equipment for primary frequency response capability as a condition of interconnection service. The PJM markets already compensate resources for frequency response capability and any marginal costs. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all data necessary to perform the generator primary frequency response evaluation be saved by PJM so that the test

24 See *id.*
25 This recommendation was adopted by PJM for the energy market and the regulation market. Lost opportunity costs in the energy market and the regulation market are calculated using the schedule on which the unit is scheduled to run.
26 See **162 FERC ¶ 61,295 (2018)**, *reh'g denied*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,259 (2020).
27 See *id.*
28 In Phase 1 the ramp rate limited desired MW output is used in the regulation uplift calculation. The MMU does not agree with how this change has been implemented.
29 See *id.*
30 See *id.*

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can be replicated. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)

- The MMU recommends that PJM maintain a full list of all units subject to the Primary Frequency Response generator requirements. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM develop the metric(s) necessary to objectively evaluate each unit's performance during primary frequency response events. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM create the necessary tariff/manual language to properly enforce compliance with the NERC mandated Primary Frequency Response generator requirements. (Priority: Medium. First reported Q1, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that separate cost of service payments for reactive capability be eliminated and the cost of reactive capability be recovered in PJM markets. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2016. Status: Adopted 2024.)[31]
- The MMU recommends that new CRF rates for black start units, incorporating current tax code changes, be implemented immediately. The new CRF rates should apply to all black start units. Black start units should be required to commit to providing black start service for the life of the unit. CRF rates effective January 20, 2025, should reflect 100 percent bonus depreciation.[32] (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that black start planning and coordination be on a regional basis recognizing cross zonal cranking paths and not on a narrowly or purely zonal basis and that the costs of black start service be shared on an equal per MWh basis across the region. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2023. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the black start rate under the Base Formula Rate should be based on the actual cost of providing the black start service, plus an incentive, rather than the unsupported use of Net CONE, escalated each year. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the fuel assurance rules be modified to recognize actual fuel assured resources within and across zones. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Reliability Backstop for black start service be eliminated. There is no reason that PJM cannot acquire black start resources if the TOs can acquire black start resources. (Priority: High. First reported Q2, 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

## Conclusion

The October 1, 2022, changes to the reserve markets included a synchronized reserve must offer requirement applicable to all generation capacity resources. This resulted in an increase in available supply. Combined with the removal of the $7.50 per MWh margin and the invalid variable operations and maintenance cost, supply and demand logic predicts lower prices, which occurred in 2022, except during Winter Storm Elliott. This is evidence of market efficiency. With the elimination of tier 1 reserves, the total reserve market clearing price credits, while based on lower prices, are paid to a larger MW quantity. Prices have been higher since PJM increased the demand for reserves in May 2023.

The new reserve market design has been called into question by PJM based on a slow response during synchronized reserve events. In all cases, other than once during Winter Storm Elliott and once during the July 2025 hot weather event, the ACE recovered within the required time frame. No reliability problems have occurred. While the total response met the needs of the system, PJM responded to the poor performance of individual units by unilaterally and inappropriately increasing reserve requirements. This increase shifts the burden of poor resource performance from the resources themselves to customers, clearing more reserves instead of directly dealing with the causes of poor performance. These increases in reserve requirements were the primary

31 On October 17, 2024, the Commission issued a final rule, Order No. 904, eliminating separate payments for reactive in all jurisdictional markets, including PJM. On January 28, 2025, PJM submitted a compliance filing to implement Order No. 904 ("Compliance Filing") that proposed a transition mechanism lasting through May 31, 2026. See Docket No. ER25-1073. This recommendation will be implemented effective June 1, 2026.

32 OBBA § 70301(b)(3).



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cause of higher reserve prices in 2023, 2024, 2025, and the first six months of 2026, including 35 intervals of shortage pricing in May 2023 and several intervals of shortage pricing during spin events in 2024, 2025, and the first six months of 2026, even while reserve markets cleared over 1,000 MW more than what was normally cleared in the months and years prior.

The data on synchronized reserve event recovery do not support the conclusion that there was or is a need to increase the demand for reserves. The focus should be on correcting issues related to the responses of individual units rather than increasing demand.

Significant communications technology and modelling issues when calling resources during spinning events result in slow response. While PJM now calculates reserve offer MW for the majority of resource types, a resource's cleared reserve MW are based on a resource's energy output at the end of a scheduling interval. If a unit is still moving when an event is called, such as near the beginning of a scheduling interval, it may or may not be able to achieve its scheduled output. Likewise, a unit that is decreasing output to create more headroom might not be able to immediately increase output when an event is called.

Although PJM now augments a resource's economic basepoint with its dispatched reserve MW during a spin event, PJM does not require resources to be able to receive this signal. Many resources are still dispatched using phone calls, either from markets operation centers waiting for the PJM ALL-CALL or from MOCs themselves manually calling plant personnel.

Even if a unit is on AGC and receiving the augmented basepoint, depending on where that unit is on its ramp rate curve, it might have to spend time coming off AGC or decreasing output in order to start ramping using power augmentation. Having a synchronized reserve maximum that is less than the unit's economic maximum can address this case, but it is the unit's responsibility to request the exception.

The immediate solution is to improve the deployment of reserves in synchronized reserve events by requiring the capability to use an electronic signal for all synchronized reserves and by requiring the actual use of the signal. The archaic telephone communications technology has been a source of slow response times, such as markets operation centers waiting for the PJM ALL-CALL or manually calling unit personnel to deploy reserves. Phone calls are not an effective or efficient method for deploying resources for immediate response. The MMU recommends that, to minimize lag and improve performance, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and automatically respond to the notifications. On December 17, 2024, PJM partially adopted this recommendation by implementing an electronic deployment of reserves via an augmented dispatch signal, but PJM does not require that resources be able to receive this signal nor that the receiving units be able to follow the signal for deploying reserves. Further improvements in communications technology and requirements are necessary, and PJM should pursue them immediately.

Along with changes to the communications and deployment process, PJM and the MMU have worked with generators and DSR to identify circumstances where reserves were not accurately measured based on the energy and reserve offer parameters. More broadly, the MMU's proposal is to buy the correct amount of reserves. No increase in demand is required. There has been no change in the need/demand for reserves. PJM ignored the supply side. The issue is that resources have not provided the reserves that were offered and paid for. With improved communications technology, instead of buying more MW of poorly performing reserves, PJM will be able to accurately recognize the actual supply of reserves and to more efficiently deploy them in synchronized reserve events. PJM should immediately remove the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in place from May 2023 through June 2026.

PJM will implement significant changes to the regulation market in two phases.[33] Phase 1, implemented on October 1, 2025, is a single product, single signal market with one clearing price. Phase 2, to be implemented on December 1, 2026, will include separate regulation up and regulation down markets. The Phase 1 changes eliminated many of the significant issues

33 See 187 FERC ¶ 61,173.

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identified by the MMU that resulted from a two product, two signal market design including the incorrect and inconsistent use and application of the MBF/MRTS. The actual implementation of the new design is flawed, but the design is significantly improved. Significant new issues were created by Phase 1 that significantly increased prices and should be fixed as soon as possible and prior to implementation of Phase 2.

The benefits of markets can be realized under the current approach to ancillary service markets. Even in the presence of structurally noncompetitive markets, there can be transparent, market clearing prices based on competitive offers that account explicitly and accurately for opportunity cost. This is consistent with the market design goal of ensuring competitive outcomes that provide appropriate incentives without reliance on the exercise of market power and with explicit mechanisms to prevent the exercise of market power. However, there are significant issues with the PJM ancillary services markets.

The MMU concludes that the synchronized reserve market results were not competitive. The MMU concludes that the nonsynchronized reserve market results were not competitive. The MMU concludes that the secondary reserve market results were competitive. The MMU concludes that the regulation market results were not competitive, and that the pre-October 1, 2025, market design is significantly flawed.

## PJM Reserve Markets

Reserves resources are scheduled and paid for the availability to respond to a loss of supply on the system by increasing their energy output within defined time limits. When a resource clears in a reserve market, it is assigned scheduled reserve MW by that reserve market. Most reserve MW are cleared by the reserve markets, but PJM has the ability to schedule resources outside of the markets when needed.

PJM clears reserves to satisfy defined reserve service requirements. There are three reserve services: the synchronized reserve service (SR), the primary reserve service (PR), and the 30-minute reserve service (TMR). Each reserve service is defined by its response time requirement and by whether the service can be provided by offline resources (Table 10-5). Only the synchronized reserve service requires that all providers be online and synchronized to the grid. The other two services, primary reserve and 30-minute reserve, can be provided by both online and offline resources.

### Table 10-5 Reserve services and their definitions

| Service | Response Requirement (minutes) | Provided by Online Resources | Provided by Offline Resources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synchronized Reserve | 10 or less | Yes | No |
| Primary Reserve | 10 or less | Yes | Yes |
| 30-Minute Reserve | 30 or less | Yes | Yes |

Each reserve service requires a specified number of MW to be available in order to cover a potential loss of supply event, known as that service's reserve requirement. The size of a service's requirement depends on the contingencies that the service is designed to address (determining the service's reliability requirement), plus the option to add a requirement to account for potential demand increases due to temporary conditions like emergencies and weather alerts (determining the extended requirement). A service's total requirement is equal to the sum of its reliability requirement, which is unique to each service, plus the extended reserve requirement, which is the same for all services and has a base value of 190 MW.[34] [35] The default extended reserve requirement of 190 MW was designed to phase in the price impacts of shortage pricing in real time.

The reserve services are nested, such that the satisfaction of the synchronized reserve requirement counts towards the satisfaction of the primary reserve requirement, which counts towards the satisfaction of the 30-minute reserve requirement. The principal contingency for which reserves are cleared is the loss, in a single event, of the largest generator or group of generators, known as the "most severe single contingency," or the MSSC. Therefore, the reliability requirement of each service, in whole or in part, depends upon the size of the MSSC. Table 10-6 shows the default definitions of the reliability requirements and the full requirements. For calculating the 30-minute reserve requirement,

34 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.3 Reserve Requirement Determination, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

35 PJM has proposed creating individual extended requirements for each reserve service. This proposal was approved by the Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force on June 6, 2024, but was rejected by the Markets & Reliability Committee on July 24, 2024.



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PJM uses a pre-defined set of additional contingencies to simulate the effects of gas infrastructure failures on gas generators.[36] The use of these special contingencies is communicated to generators via PJM Emergency Procedures under "Gas Pipeline Emergencies".[37]

PJM selectively calls upon reserve services to respond to events. For example, to deploy synchronized reserves, PJM initiates a synchronized reserve event, also called a spinning event.[38] In the first six months of 2026, PJM did not call on nonsynchronized reserves to collectively respond to a reserve event. PJM calls on some nonsynchronized resources to individually respond during synchronized reserve events.

The deployment of 10-minute reserves can also be in response to dispatches from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), which serves as the dispatcher for shared reserve activation.[39] [40] Members of the PJM Mid-Atlantic Control Zone have agreed to activate a portion of 10-minute reserve in coordination with members of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council when directed in order to relieve stress on the interconnected grid.


During an event, reserves respond either by increasing their energy output to the grid or by decreasing their energy consumption from the grid. The delivery of this energy is constrained by transmission limits, such that there are also limited locational requirements for each of the reserve services, except for the 30-minute reserve service.[41] PJM uses these constraints to define a reserve subzone with its own smaller requirements for synchronized reserve and primary reserve. Reserves in the subzone count towards the satisfaction of the requirements for the entire RTO Reserve Zone.[42] For example, satisfaction of the synchronized reserve requirement in the Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone also counts towards the primary reserve requirement in the MAD Reserve Subzone and the synchronized reserve requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone, which in turn counts towards the satisfaction of the primary reserve requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone. There is only one active reserve subzone at a time. Figure 10-1 shows how reserve requirements for the MAD Reserve Subzone are nested inside the RTO Reserve Zone when the MAD Subzone is the active subzone.

36 See PJM. "PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations," § 3.9 Assessing Gas Infrastructure Contingency Impacts on the Electric System, Rev. 97 (Nov. 20, 2025).
37 PJM. Emergency Procedures – Message Definitions. (2025) <https://emergencyprocedures.pjm.com/ep/pages/messagedefinitions.jsf> Mar. 3, 2025.
38 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 4.1.2 Loading Reserves, Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025).
39 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 4.2 Shared Reserves, Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025).
40 See NPCC. "NPCC Regional Reliability Directory #5: Reserve," Attachment B - Simultaneous Activation of Ten-Minute Reserve (SAR) Contingencies, Rev. 5 (Apr. 20, 2020).
41 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.3.1 Locational Aspect of Reserves, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
42 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.1 Product and Locational Substitution, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

### Table 10-6 Service requirement definitions[43]

| Service | Service Reliability Requirement | Service Extended Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Synchronized Reserve (SR) | Most Severe Single Contingency | SR Reliability Requirement + Extended Reserve Requirement |
| Primary Reserve (PR) | 1.5 × SR Reliability Requirement | PR Reliability Requirement + Extended Reserve Requirement |
| 30-Minute Reserve (TMR) | Max(Largest Active Gas Contingency, PR Reliability Requirement, 3,000 MW) | TMR Reliability Requirement + Extended Reserve Requirement |

### Figure 10-1 Service nesting in the RTO Reserve Zone and the Mid-Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Reserve Subzone




In May 2023, PJM made two unilateral changes in succession to the reserve requirements to compensate for the asserted lack of performance during spin events. Table 10-21 shows the average performance for events 10 or more minutes long. The average response to the two events of 10 minutes or more that occurred in the first four months of 2023, both in January, was 56.9 percent, compared to 50.3 percent in the last three months of 2022. On May

43 From mid-May 2023 through December 2025, PJM has set the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to be 130 percent of the MSSC. See "Synchronized Reserve Requirement for Reliability – Update," (March 6, 2025). <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250306/20250306-item-08b---synchronized-reserve-adder.pdf>.

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12, 2023, PJM inappropriately increased the extended reserve requirement by 1,588 MW and on May 15, 2023, PJM reversed the increase. From May 19, 2023, through January 8, 2026, PJM inappropriately increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the MSSC. Since January 9, 2026, PJM has inappropriately increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement by 20 percentage points to 120 percent of the MSSC. Figure 10-19 compares the changes in demand. PJM will decrease or increase the adder based on the average performance across non-overlapping sets of three 10-minute events.[44]

The reserve requirements effective for a scheduling interval can change from interval to interval depending on the contingencies and needs of the grid. When maintenance work at a power station risks tripping multiple generators whose total output is larger than the MSSC, PJM can increase the requirement for synchronized reserve to include that total output. PJM can increase the reserve requirement due to emergencies and weather alerts. In May 2023, PJM unilaterally modified *PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations* to allow PJM to temporarily increase the requirements to compensate for poor resource performance in order to continue compliance with ReliabilityFirst's regional criteria.[45] [46] Table 10-7 shows the instances identified by the MMU when PJM temporarily increased the reserve requirements in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-7 Temporary adjustments to 30-minute, primary, and synchronized reserve requirements: January through June, 2026[47]**

| From | To | Number of Hours | Amount of Adjustment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19-May-2023 | 08-Jan-2026 | 23,208 | 30 percent increase to synchronized reserve reliability requirement |
| 09-Jan-2026 | Ongoing | 1,968+ | 20 percent increase to synchronized reserve reliability requirement |
| 09-Mar-2026 | 30-Mar-2026 | 511 | 30-Minute Reserve (28 MW), Primary Reserve (28 MW), Synchronized Reserve (19 MW) |
| 28-May-2026 | 29-May-2026 | 24 | 30-Minute Reserve (0 MW), Primary Reserve (0 MW), Synchronized Reserve (0 MW) |

PJM must comply with the reserve requirements imposed by NERC, but PJM uses requirements that are more restrictive than NERC's requirements. NERC Performance Standard BAL-002-3, which describes NERC's Disturbance Control Standard (DCS), defines a requirement for contingency reserve, which PJM implements as primary reserve.[48] [49] NERC BAL-002-3 does not define requirements specifically for synchronized reserve or for 30-minute reserve. NERC requires that contingency reserves respond within 15 minutes, while PJM requires that primary reserves respond within 10 minutes. NERC requires that PJM have contingency reserves greater than or equal to the MSSC, while PJM has historically targeted procuring primary reserve equal to at least 150 percent of the MSSC and procuring synchronized reserve equal to at least 100 percent of the MSSC. With PJM's increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement (Table 10-7), from May 19, 2023, until January 9, 2026, PJM targeted procuring primary reserve in excess of 195 percent of the MSSC and procuring synchronized reserve in excess of 130 percent of the MSSC. From January 9, 2026, through June 30, 2026, and continuing, PJM targeted procuring primary reserve in excess of 180 percent of the MSSC and procuring synchronized reserve in excess of 120 percent of the MSSC.

In PJM, as part of the Eastern Interconnection, a NERC DCS event, also called a reportable balancing contingency event, is defined as the loss of supply, in a single event, of less than the MSSC and more than the lesser of 900 MW and 80 percent of the MSSC. For example, the loss of supply can be from a generator

44 See "Synchronized Reserve Requirement for Reliability – Update," PJM presentation to the Operating Committee. (March 6, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250306/20250306-item-08b---synchronized-reserve-adder.pdf>.

45 RFC_Criteria_BAL-002-02. "Operating Reserves," August 29, 2012. <https://rfirst.org/ProgramAreas/Standards/Criteria/Regional%20Criteria%20Library/RFC_Criteria_BAL-002-02.pdf>.

46 See *id*, which describes the document as a "ReliabilityFirst Board of Directors approved good utility practice document which are not reliability standards" and notes that "ReliabilityFirst Regional Criteria are not NERC reliability standards, regional reliability standards, or regional variances, and therefore are not enforceable under authority delegated by NERC pursuant to delegation agreements and do not require NERC approval."

47 PJM does not make public the exact increases in reserves nor the exact times increases are used. This table shows the differences between the average reserve values during times that have been identified for possible increases in reserves with the average values before and after those times. The ranges given can include several overlapping timespans of possible increases.

48 NERC BAL-002-3. "Disturbance Control Standard – Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event," April 1, 2019. <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/BAL-002-3.pdf>.

49 NERC BAL-002-3. "Disturbance Control Standard – Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event," April 1, 2019. <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/BAL-002-3.pdf>.



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tripping or from a dispatched DSR resource suddenly increasing energy use. The event begins as soon as the Reporting ACE (a version of the area control error) starts to drop and ends when the Reporting ACE returns to the lesser of zero and its value at the start of the event. Although PJM uses synchronized reserve events to recover from DCS events, synchronized reserve events are generally longer than their corresponding DCS events (Figure 10-21).

There are three kinds of resources that can provide reserves: online generators that can increase their energy output, offline generators that can start and provide their energy output, and demand response resources that can decrease their energy use. From these resources, there are three reserve products: synchronized reserves (SR), nonsynchronized reserves (NSR), and secondary reserves (SecR).[50] A reserve product is defined by its response-time requirement and by the types of resources that can provide it (Table 10-8).

### Table 10-8 Reserve products and definitions

| Reserve Product | Response Requirement (minutes) | Provided by Online Generators | Provided by Offline Generators | Provided by Demand-Side Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Synchronized Reserve | 10 or less | Yes | No | Yes |
| Nonsynchronized Reserve | 10 or less | No | Yes | No |
| Secondary Reserve | 10 exclusive to 30 exclusive | Yes | Yes | Yes |

A reserve product can only be used to satisfy a reserve service's scheduling requirement if it also satisfies that service's response-time requirement and synchronization requirement, which are listed in Table 10-5. Table 10-9 shows which reserve products can be used to satisfy which reserve services.

### Table 10-9 Reserve products and the services they can provide

| Reserve Product | Can Provide Synchronized Reserve | Can Provide Primary Reserve | Can Provide 30-Minute Reserve |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synchronized Reserve | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Nonsynchronized Reserve | No | Yes | Yes |
| Secondary Reserve | No | No | Yes |


Figure 10-2 shows how reserve products were cleared in real time to meet the reserve service requirements in the first six months of 2026. In the figure, each line represents the extended requirement of a reserve service, which is the service's reliability requirement plus the generic extended requirement. The colored areas represent how the cleared MW of the three reserve products combine to satisfy the reserve requirements. As can be seen in the figure, the cleared reserve products providing the services do not exactly equal the service requirements. In the first six months of 2026, the total amounts of cleared synchronized reserve and 30-minute reserve were frequently greater than their requirements. This can result from cleared resources providing more reserves than needed to satisfy the remainder of a requirement and can result from PJM clearing reserve products to help satisfy the requirements of the next broader reserve service. For example, in January, PJM cleared synchronized reserves in excess of the synchronized reserve requirement in order to, along with the cleared nonsynchronized reserve, more economically satisfy the primary reserve requirement.

50 OATT, Attachment K - Appendix § 1.7.19 (Ramping).

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Although not seen in Figure 10-2, PJM does not always clear enough reserves to satisfy a reserve requirement. When a service's requirement is not met, the result is shortage pricing.

**Figure 10-2 Daily average real-time reserve products cleared and daily average real-time reserve service requirements used by RT SCED: January through June, 2026**




PJM uses market mechanisms to clear resources. In general, products that meet shorter response time requirements and that can be used to satisfy multiple reserve requirements have higher prices.[51] [52] The objective is to minimize total cost when purchasing reserves and energy.

## Implementation of PJM Reserve Markets

While the primary reserve requirement and 30-minute reserve requirement can be satisfied using multiple products, the products are purchased separately. There are separate markets for synchronized reserves, nonsynchronized reserves, and secondary reserves.[53] MW that are selected as reserve are said to have cleared the market. Effective October 1, 2022, each product's reserve market has a day-ahead component and a real-time component. The obligations of a reserve resource depend on its real-time assignment, which in turn depends on how the resource clears the day-ahead and real-time markets. A resource that cleared one market is not guaranteed to have cleared the other market, and a resource that cleared both markets need not clear the same amount in real time as it did day ahead. Although multiple reserve products can be used to satisfy the same reserve service requirements, the reserve products are not necessarily paid the same market clearing prices. Each market for a reserve product has a single market clearing price that is applied to all reserve MW cleared in that market, regardless of the service that required the clearing of those MW.

In general, the reserve MW available from a resource are calculated by PJM based on the parameters in the resource's energy offer and the resource's reserve parameters. Some resource types, such as hydroelectric resources, Energy Storage Resource model participants, and demand response resources, can specify reserve offer amounts.[54] Most generation capacity resources are required to participate in the reserve markets, but nuclear, solar, and wind resources are excluded by default and must request to be included. PJM can automatically deselect a resource from participating in the reserve market for performance reasons.[55] [56] PJM can temporarily deselect a resource from providing reserves for, among other reasons, failing to reliably follow PJM's dispatch signal. A resource that is deselected for failing to follow PJM's dispatch signal is in violation of its must-offer requirement.[57]

A generation resource can request a maximum MW value for its reserve offer (synchronized, secondary, or both individually) that is lower than its economic maximum if that generator's reserve offer is subject to a physical limitation that cannot be modeled by a segmented hourly ramp rate.[58] Such a request

51 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.5 Determination of Reserve Clearing Prices, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
52 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.1 Product and Locational Substitution, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
53 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.1 Product and Locational Substitution, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
54 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
55 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.1 Reserve Market Eligibility, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
56 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.3.1 Deselection of Reserve Resources in Real-Time, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
57 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.3.1 Deselection of Reserve Resources in Real-Time, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
58 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.2.1 Communication for Reserve Capability Limitation, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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must include documentation and data demonstrating the limitation. Both PJM and the MMU review the request. PJM must respond within 30 days after data supporting the request is submitted, telling the generation owner whether the request was accepted or denied, and if denied, for what reason.

The clearing of resources to meet PJM's operational requirements includes multiple steps to commit resources, dispatch resources, and calculate clearing prices.[59] [60] Each program in the commitment and dispatching process estimates future needs. The day-ahead market solution software schedules resources in one-hour blocks.[61] The real-time software schedules resources in five-minute intervals.

Due to their start and notification times, some resources can only be cleared for reserves in the earlier steps of PJM's commitment and dispatching process. Depending on their physical run-time requirements, resources are described as either flexible or inflexible. Inflexible resources are those that must run for at least one hour and are only committed in real-time by the hour-ahead real-time software or by a PJM operator, and can include demand response resources, offline CTs and hydro resources that can operate in condensing mode, and resources whose economic minimum output equals their economic maximum output. Flexible resources are those that can be cleared for reserves by RT SCED later in the process. Such resources are already online for energy, require no notification time, and can be automatically dispatched.

In general, resources do not have to clear the same amounts in the real-time and day-ahead markets, and a resource that cleared one of the markets is not guaranteed to have cleared the other. However, if an inflexible condenser or an inflexible economic load response resource has a day-ahead assignment, that assignment is also applied to the operating day.[62]

Not all resources that provide reserves necessarily clear the reserve market. When needed, PJM is able to manually schedule a resource for reserves if that resource would not have otherwise run.[63] Similarly, not all inflexible reserve resources cleared by the ASO and IT SCED are necessarily used for reserves. When needed, PJM can manually switch inflexible resources from providing reserves to providing energy.

Figure 10-4 compares the daily average requirements of the day-ahead clearing engine, the ASO, and RT SCED. Figure 10-4 shows that the reserve requirements used by the ASO and RT SCED do not differ significantly. Until May 12, 2023, the daily average 30-minute reserve requirement was almost always 3,190 MW in the day-ahead software, the ASO, and RT SCED (Figure 10-4).

59 For more on the market solution software, see the ***2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM***, Appendix E - Ancillary Service Markets.

60 For more on the market solution software, see the ***2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM***, Appendix E - Ancillary Service Markets.

61 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.2 Day-ahead Reserve Market Clearing, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

62 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.3 Real-time Reserve Market Clearing, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

63 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.3 Real-time Reserve Market Clearing, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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Figure 10-3 compares the daily average cleared MW of the day-ahead clearing engine, the ASO, and RT SCED. In addition to the increase in cleared secondary reserve resulting from PJM correcting its software error, Figure 10-3 shows that the day-ahead market also tended to clear the most nonsynchronized reserve. For satisfying the primary reserve requirement, the ASO uses more synchronized reserves, clearing less nonsynchronized reserves than RT SCED due to differences in the available MW that result from differences in the applied unit schedules. This difference is also seen in Figure 10-27.

### Figure 10-3 Daily average MW cleared by the day-ahead engine, the ASO, and RT SCED: January through June, 2026





### Figure 10-4 Daily average requirements used in the day-ahead engine, the ASO, and RT SCED: January through June, 2026






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### Figure 10-5 Daily average available MW used in the day-ahead engine, the ASO, and RT SCED: January through June, 2026[64]





There is a defined MW demand only for synchronized reserves, primary reserves, and 30-minute reserves. The demand for nonsynchronized reserves and for secondary reserves is derived from those defined MW demand levels and cleared supply. PJM's administratively defined demand curve for reserves is called the Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC) and has two steps. The first step of each reserve product's ORDC is set at that product's reliability requirement and is priced at $850 per MWh. The second step is the extended reserve requirement and is priced at $300 per MWh. Figure 10-6 shows example ORDCs for the three reserve products using an example MSSC of 1,000 MW with no increases in the extended reserve requirement.

64 The previous version of this chart incorrectly showed the available SR MW calculated by the ASO as equaling those calculated by RT SCED.

In 2014, PJM added an optional second step to the ORDC, which could be increased from its default value of 0 MW to account for increased uncertainty identified by PJM. In 2017, PJM proposed a minimum value of 190 MW for the then optional second step, bringing it to its current form.[65] [66]

Figure 10-6 shows an example of the three operating reserve demand curves for each reserve product for an example MSSC at 1,000 MW with no increases in the extended reserve requirement. The adjusted ORDCs resulting from PJM's increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement are shown in Figure 10-20.

### Figure 10-6 An example of the reserve product real-time operating reserve demand curves, including the permanent second steps




During periods of shortage pricing, the reserve market clearing prices can be higher than the limits shown in Figure 10-6. Offer prices for synchronized reserve are cost based and are capped at the expected value of the synchronized reserve penalty. The product substitution cost is a function of LMPs, the marginal cost of energy for the resources providing reserves, and

65 See the transmittal letter to Revisions to OA Schedule 1 and OATT Att K-Appx RE Operating Reserve Demand Curve, Docket No. ER17-1590-000 (May 12, 2017) at 8.

66 For background data, see "Shortage Pricing ORDC - Order 825," PJM presentation to the Market Implementation Committee. (October 26, 2016) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/20161026-special/20161026-item-03-shortage-ordc.ashx>.

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the minimized cost of substituted MW providing energy. At the margin, the price is the sum of the offer price and the product substitution cost of the marginal unit(s).[67]

Like the markets, credits and charges for reserves have day-ahead and real-time components. Day-ahead credits depend only on a resource's day-ahead assignment and the day-ahead market clearing price. There are no lost opportunity cost (LOC) credits in the day-ahead market, nor are there any shortfall charges applied to day-ahead assignments when evaluating resource performance. These concepts apply only to the real-time reserve markets.

The real-time component, known as the balancing credit, is added to day-ahead credits based on the difference between the real-time and day-ahead assignments. This balancing credit for a resource is the sum of a resource's balancing MCP credit and LOC credit, less any shortfall charge for failing to provide the service. If a resource clears less MW in real-time than in the day-ahead market, and if it is found to be at fault for this reduction, then the balancing MCP credit is negative and so the resource buys back this difference at real-time prices. If the resource clears more in real time, then it is positive. If a resource's real-time assignment is the same as its day-ahead assignment, then the balancing MCP credit is $0 and the resource's total MCP credit uses only the day-ahead MCP.

For the synchronized reserve product and the secondary reserve product, the MW for which a resource receives real-time credit can be capped at a value less than the cleared real-time amount. Without capping, a reserve resource producing energy above its directed amount would be paid for reserve MW that it did not actually make available.

## Reserve Subzones

Reserve subzones address transmission limits that may prevent the lowest cost reserves from being deliverable throughout the RTO. A reserve subzone has its own reserve requirements, which can only be satisfied by resources within the subzone. The RTO Reserve Zone has only one active subzone at any time. In practice, PJM has maintained only one subzone, the Mid-Atlantic Dominion Reserve Subzone (MAD), and in every market solution, the most limiting constraining path sets the transfer limit between the RTO and MAD. The price in MAD may exceed the price in the rest of the RTO when the constraints are binding.

While PJM generally triggers synchronized reserve events for the entire RTO, PJM has the option to only deploy reserves in the defined subzone. For example, on January 18, 2026, PJM triggered a synchronized reserve event only for MAD.

The choice of MAD was a result of historical congestion patterns. Transmission limits at times required maintaining out of merit reserves in the MAD area. On most days, the MAD Subzone is no longer binding. As of October 1, 2022, PJM has a process to revise the definition of the subzone. The subzone definition may change as often as daily based on system conditions, and new subzones can be defined as needed.[68] To date, PJM has used only the MAD Reserve Subzone as the chosen subzone.

Figure 10-7 is a map of constraints and major generation sources, showing how the constraints separating the RTO Reserve Zone and MAD Reserve Subzone are defined by the underlying grid topology.

Figure 10-8 shows the reserve service requirements and cleared reserve product in the MAD Reserve Subzone in the first six months of 2026. As there is no 30-minute reserve requirement for the MAD Reserve Subzone, secondary reserve is excluded. The increase in reserve requirements in effect since mid-May 2023 does not apply to the MAD Reserve Subzone, only to the RTO Reserve Zone.


67 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.9 Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price (SRMCP) Calculation, Rev. 121 (July 7, 2022). This version of the manual has a clearer definition than later versions.

68 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.3.2 Creation of New Reserve Subzones, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).




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Figure 10-7 PJM RTO Zone and MAD Subzone map of constraints and generation sources




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**Figure 10-8 Daily average real-time MAD reserve products and daily average real-time MAD reserve service requirements: January through June, 2026**




# Primary Reserve


NERC Performance Standard BAL-002-3, Disturbance Control Standard – Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event, requires PJM to carry sufficient contingency reserve to recover from a sudden balancing contingency (usually a loss of generation). The Contingency Event Recovery Period is the time required to return the Reporting ACE to the lesser of zero and its pre-event level. The Contingency Reserve Restoration period is the time required to restore contingency (primary) reserve to a level greater than or equal to the largest single contingency after the end of the Contingency Event Recovery Period. NERC standards set the Contingency Event Recovery Period as 15 minutes and the Contingency Reserve Restoration Period as 90 minutes.[69] The NERC requirement is 100 percent compliance, and status must be reported quarterly. PJM implements this contingency reserve recovery period requirement using primary reserve.[70] PJM maintains 10-minute reserve (primary reserve) which is more conservative than the NERC requirement. PJM's primary reserve is made up of resources, both synchronized and nonsynchronized, that can provide energy within 10 minutes. PJM does not have a Contingency Reserve Restoration Period standard.

## Market Structure

### Demand

Demand for primary reserves is based on the primary reserve requirement. The primary reserve requirement is equal to the sum of the primary reserve reliability requirement, unique to the primary reserve service, plus the extended reserve requirement, which is the same for all services. The primary reserve reliability requirement is equal to 150 percent of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. Figure 10-9 shows an example operating reserve demand curve for primary reserve for an example synchronized reserve reliability requirement of 2,000 MW plus the default 190 MW extension.

**Figure 10-9 An example of a primary reserve real-time operating reserve demand curve, including the permanent second step**




69 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025) Attachment D, "the Disturbance Recovery Period is 15 minutes after the start of a Reportable Disturbance. Subsequently, PJM must fully restore the Synchronized Reserve within 90 minutes." While this cited attachment only references restoring synchronized reserves, PJM Manuals 10 & 13 make it clear that primary reserves serve as PJM's contingency reserves, although PJM generally uses synchronized reserves to recover from contingency events.

70 See PJM. "PJM Manual 10: Pre-Scheduling Operations," § 3.1 Reserve Definitions, Rev. 46 (Jul. 23, 2025).



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In the first six months of 2026, the average primary reserve requirement for the RTO Zone was 3,181.6 MW in the real-time market and 3,169.2 MW in the day-ahead market. The average primary reserve requirement in the MAD Subzone was 2,576.8 MW in the real-time market and 2,560.0 MW in the day-ahead market.

In an attempt to offset poor unit specific synchronized reserve performance, PJM unilaterally and inappropriately made changes to the reserve requirements in May 2023. On May 12, 2023, PJM inappropriately increased the extended reserve requirement by 1,588 MW and on May 15, 2023, PJM reversed the increase. On May 19, 2023, PJM inappropriately increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the MSSC. In effect, this increased the primary reserve reliability requirement by 45 percentage points to 195 percent of the MSSC. PJM has announced and implemented criteria to decrease or increase the adder based on average performance across non-overlapping sets of three 10-minute events.[71]

## Supply

In the first six months of 2026, the demand for primary reserve was satisfied by synchronized reserves and nonsynchronized reserves. The primary reserve requirement is met from the least expensive combination of synchronized and nonsynchronized reserves that satisfies the requirements of the primary reserve service and the synchronized reserve service. Table 10-10 shows the real-time average available MW from synchronized and nonsynchronized resources in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-10 Average available MW for clearing: January through June, 2026

| Location | Synchronized Reserve MW | Nonsynchronized Reserve MW |
|---|---|---|
| RTO | 5,119.3 | 1,089.7 |
| MAD | 2,254.7 | 747.9 |

Table 10-11 provides the average dispatched reserves, by reserve product, used by the RT SCED market solution to satisfy the primary reserve requirement in the MAD Subzone from January 2025 through June 2026. Table 10-12 shows the average dispatched reserves, by reserve product, used by the RT SCED market solution to satisfy the primary reserve requirement in the RTO Zone from January 2025 through June 2026.

### Table 10-11 Average monthly reserves used to satisfy the primary reserve requirement, MAD Subzone: January 2025 through June 2026

| Year | Month | Synchronized Reserve MW | Nonsynchronized Reserve MW | Total Primary Reserve MW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | 1,984.6 | 924.8 | 2,909.4 |
| 2025 | Feb | 1,970.7 | 839.5 | 2,810.2 |
| 2025 | Mar | 1,966.3 | 666.9 | 2,633.2 |
| 2025 | Apr | 1,783.1 | 598.5 | 2,381.6 |
| 2025 | May | 1,832.7 | 618.7 | 2,451.4 |
| 2025 | Jun | 2,040.1 | 613.2 | 2,653.3 |
| 2025 | Jul | 2,038.1 | 621.3 | 2,659.4 |
| 2025 | Aug | 2,072.8 | 738.4 | 2,811.2 |
| 2025 | Sep | 2,089.3 | 770.6 | 2,859.9 |
| 2025 | Oct | 1,929.8 | 690.6 | 2,620.4 |
| 2025 | Nov | 1,972.0 | 714.1 | 2,686.1 |
| 2025 | Dec | 2,008.6 | 863.0 | 2,871.7 |
| 2025 | Average | 1,970.2 | 755.9 | 2,726.1 |
| | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | 2,047.6 | 960.4 | 3,008.1 |
| 2026 | Feb | 1,982.7 | 879.2 | 2,862.0 |
| 2026 | Mar | 1,962.9 | 790.2 | 2,753.2 |
| 2026 | Apr | 1,691.4 | 702.0 | 2,393.4 |
| 2026 | May | 1,766.1 | 804.7 | 2,570.7 |
| 2026 | Jun | 1,943.4 | 816.0 | 2,759.5 |
| 2026 | Average | 1,898.5 | 825.3 | 2,723.8 |

71 See "Synchronized Reserve Requirement for Reliability – Update," PJM presentation to the Operating Committee. (March 6, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250306/20250306-item-08b---synchronized-reserve-adder.pdf>.

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**Table 10-12 Average monthly reserves used to satisfy the primary reserve requirement, RTO Zone: January 2025 through June 2026**

| Year | Month | Synchronized Reserve MW | Nonsynchronized Reserve MW | Total Primary Reserve MW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | 2,581.5 | 1,130.2 | 3,711.8 |
| 2025 | Feb | 2,111.2 | 1,012.8 | 3,124.0 |
| 2025 | Mar | 2,801.9 | 881.5 | 3,683.4 |
| 2025 | Apr | 2,182.8 | 776.3 | 2,959.1 |
| 2025 | May | 2,894.5 | 863.9 | 3,758.3 |
| 2025 | Jun | 3,222.9 | 734.0 | 3,956.8 |
| 2025 | Jul | 3,580.8 | 746.6 | 4,327.4 |
| 2025 | Aug | 4,068.4 | 1,096.1 | 5,164.6 |
| 2025 | Sep | 3,814.6 | 980.6 | 4,795.2 |
| 2025 | Oct | 2,952.2 | 789.0 | 3,741.2 |
| 2025 | Nov | 3,130.1 | 971.4 | 4,101.6 |
| 2025 | Dec | 3,066.4 | 1,298.3 | 4,364.7 |
| 2025 | Average | 3,041.0 | 940.3 | 3,981.3 |
| | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | 3,081.1 | 1,322.1 | 4,403.2 |
| 2026 | Feb | 2,502.5 | 1,146.8 | 3,649.3 |
| 2026 | Mar | 2,705.6 | 1,048.6 | 3,754.1 |
| 2026 | Apr | 2,275.5 | 933.9 | 3,209.3 |
| 2026 | May | 2,636.0 | 1,035.6 | 3,671.6 |
| 2026 | Jun | 2,899.7 | 1,053.2 | 3,952.9 |
| 2026 | Average | 2,687.4 | 1,090.2 | 3,777.6 |

## Market Concentration

In the first six months of 2026, the RTO primary reserve market was moderately concentrated in day ahead and moderately concentrated in real time. In the first six months of 2026, the MAD primary reserve market was highly concentrated in day ahead and highly concentrated in real time. Table 10-13 shows the average of the HHI values of each interval for primary reserves in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-13 Average primary reserve HHI: January through June, 2026**

| Location | Market | Average HHI | Percent of Intervals Max Market Share Above 20% | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTO | RT | 1159 | 72.6% | Moderately Concentrated |
| RTO | DA | 1154 | 65.5% | Moderately Concentrated |
| MAD | RT | 2526 | 99.1% | Highly Concentrated |
| MAD | DA | 2147 | 98.1% | Highly Concentrated |

## Market Performance

Figure 10-10 shows daily weighted average synchronized and nonsynchronized market clearing prices in the first six months of 2026. The synchronized reserve market clearing prices for the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone diverged in 331 intervals, 0.6 percent of the total 52,116 five-minute intervals in the first six months of 2026.[72] The nonsynchronized reserve market clearing prices for the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone diverged in 256 intervals, 0.5 percent of the total 52,116 five-minute intervals in the first six months of 2026.

Prices of synchronized reserve and nonsynchronized reserve spiked in late January and early February during a cold weather event that included Winter Storm Fern. Prices also spiked in mid-May and June during hot weather events. Shortage pricing was used for RTO primary reserve on January 24 and 31; February 2, 6, 9, 13, and 16; March 1, 12, 13, and 22; April 6; May 15 and 18; and June 2 and 29. Shortage pricing was used for MAD primary reserve on January 24; February 9; March 1, 12, and 13; and April 6. Shortage pricing was used for RTO synchronized reserve on January 23 and 30; February 1, 4, 6, and 7; March 1, 13, and 14; April 6; May 18; and June 2, 17, and 29. Shortage pricing was used for MAD synchronized reserve on January 23 and on March 12 and 13. For the cold weather event, conservative operations were declared from January 24 through February 2. For the mid-May hot weather event, PJM used pre-emergency load management reductions and issued maximum generation alerts and a maintenance outage recall. For the late-June hot weather event, which continued into July, PJM issued a maintenance outage recall.

72 Billing data can be modified by PJM Settlements at any time to reflect changes in the evaluation of energy uplift. The billing data reflected in this report were current on July 8, 2026.



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Table 10-14 shows the number of intervals with shortage pricing in which the amount cleared by RT SCED was greater than the reserve requirement absent the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. In the first six months of 2026, in the majority of intervals with shortage pricing, RT SCED cleared enough reserve MW to satisfy the original RTO reserve service requirements. These intervals were not short in the sense of failing to clear a sufficient amount of reserves; these intervals were short because of PJM's unilateral increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement. The unilateral increase does not affect the MAD Reserve Subzone.

**Figure 10-10 Daily average market clearing prices for synchronized reserve and nonsynchronized reserve: January through June, 2026**





**Table 10-14 Number of shortage pricing intervals which satisfied the unmodified reserve service requirement: January through June, 2026**

| | Reserve Service | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | SR | PR | TMR |
| Intervals with Shortage Pricing | 29 | 91 | 0 |
| Intervals where RT SCED Satisfied Original Requirement | 29 | 65 | NA |
| Percentage of Intervals where RT SCED Satisfied Original Requirement | 100.0% | 71.4% | NA |
| Intervals where RT SCED Did Not Satisfy Original Requirement | 0 | 26 | NA |

# Synchronized Reserve

All eligible generation capacity resources capable of providing synchronized reserves have a must offer requirement, and all cleared synchronized reserves have an obligation to perform and receive payment based on the synchronized reserve market clearing price. PJM Manual 11 states, "Any generator that is a PJM generation capacity resource that has a Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) or Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) Resource commitment that is eligible to provide Reserves must offer their 10-minute and 30-minute reserve capability, unless the unit is unavailable due to an approved planned outage, maintenance outage or forced outage."[73]

Since October 1, 2022, the reserve market design for synchronized reserve includes both day-ahead and real-time markets. Prior to that date, synchronized reserve was only a real-time product.

PJM uses synchronized reserve when PJM calls synchronized reserve events, also called spin events or spinning events.

## Market Structure

For most resources, synchronized reserves consist of any online capacity not being used for energy that can be achieved within 10 minutes from the current dispatch point according to the resource's ramp rate. The PJM market solves an economic dispatch to determine which, if any, of these resources should be backed down to provide reserves. Some nondispatchable resources can provide synchronized reserves, including storage resources, hydro resources with storage, synchronous condensers, and demand response resources. For both the RTO and the reserve subzone, the day-ahead market clears hourly synchronized reserve assignments and the real-time market clears five-minute synchronized reserve assignments.

## Demand

Demand for the synchronized reserve product comes from the reserve requirement for the synchronized reserve service. The synchronized reserve

73 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.2 Reserve Resource Offer Requirements, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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requirement is equal to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement plus the extended reserve requirement. The synchronized reserve reliability requirement is normally equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). Figure 10-6 shows an example operating reserve demand curve for synchronized reserve.

In the first four months of 2023, the synchronized reserve reliability requirement was equal to the most severe single contingency (MSSC). PJM unilaterally increased the extended reserve requirement by 1,588 MW from May 12, 2023, through May 15, 2023. Then, on May 19, 2023, PJM unilaterally increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to 130 percent of the MSSC, which increased the effective primary reserve reliability requirement from 150 percent of the MSSC to 195 percent of the MSSC. From May 19, 2023, through January 8, 2026, the demand portion was equal to 130 percent of the MSSC. From January 9, 2026, through June 2026, the demand portion has been equal to 120 percent of the MSSC. This increase does not apply to requirements for the MAD Reserve Subzone. For the RTO Reserve Zone, PJM's multiplier (also referred to as an adder) is applied to units outside of the subzone before the RTO synchronized reserve reliability requirement is determined. If the multiplied size of a non-subzone contingency is larger than the subzone's MSSC (for which no multiplier is used), then it is possible for the RTO reliability requirement to be larger than the MAD reliability requirement, even when the actual size of the selected RTO MSSC is smaller than the MAD MSSC. When the RTO and MAD reliability requirements are equal, this is because the MAD MSSC was larger than the multiplied size of the largest of the non-MAD contingency. Figure 10-19 compares the old and new RTO ORDCs with an example MSSC of 1,000 MW.

Figure 10-2 shows a plot of the RTO daily average real-time requirement for synchronized reserve and the RTO daily average cleared synchronized reserve MW. Figure 10-11 shows the real-time and day-ahead daily average synchronized reserve requirements for the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone. In the first six months of 2026, the average real-time synchronized requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone was 2,184.4 MW and the average day-ahead requirement was 2,176.1 MW. In the MAD Reserve Subzone, the average real-time synchronized requirement was 1,781.2 MW and the average day-ahead requirement was 1,770.0 MW.

### Figure 10-11 Daily average required MW: January through June, 2026




Prior to October 1, 2022, DSR resources were limited by PJM to being no more than 33 percent of the total cleared synchronized reserves in each interval, but that limitation was removed on October 1, 2022, as part of the Reserve Price Formation changes to the reserve markets. Figure 10-18 compares the total amount of cleared synchronized reserve with the subset of cleared synchronized reserve that is provided by DSR.

## Supply

The supply of synchronized reserves consists of all unloaded capacity from eligible online generators that can convert to energy in 10 minutes and offers from eligible economic load response that can curtail in 10 minutes.[74] Any of


74 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.1 Reserve Market Eligibility, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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this capacity that is not offered as dispatchable in the energy market does not have a lost opportunity cost in the security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). This includes synchronous condensers, storage resources, and demand response. Synchronous condensers and demand response are also considered inflexible in the reserve market and require an hourly commitment, which is made by the Ancillary Services Optimizer (ASO) in real time.[75] This means that these resources enter the SCED reserves supply curve with a marginal cost of zero because PJM is effectively committing them as must run, block loaded reserves.

In general, a resource's reserve MW are the lesser of a resource's 10-minute ramp, and the difference between its energy output and its economic maximum output. A generation resource can request a maximum MW value for its synchronized reserve offer that is lower than its economic maximum if that generator's reserve offer is subject to a physical limitation that cannot be modeled by a segmented hourly ramp rate.[76] For example, units that must hold their output steady while activating duct burners. Figure 10-12 shows how the number of units that can use a lower synchronized reserve maximum MW has increased. If generators in need of the exception request it, PJM should see improved reserve performance due to a more accurate calculation of the available reserve MW. Generator parameter changes contributed to improved performance in 2025.

**Figure 10-12 Number of units per day allowed to use a spin max less than eco max:[77] October 2022 through June 2026**




In the first six months of 2026, the average supply of offered and eligible synchronized reserve was 5,119.3 MW in the RTO Reserve Zone, of which 2,254.7 MW was located in the MAD Reserve Subzone. Figure 10-13 shows the daily average available synchronized reserve MW in the first six months of 2026. The daily average total available synchronized reserve MW increased in late January due to PJM committing more resources to be online during a cold weather event which included Winter Storm Fern. From May 18 through May 20, 2026, synchronized reserve increased during a hot weather event for which PJM issued hot weather alerts, low voltage alerts, maximum emergency generation alerts, heavy load voltage schedule warnings; recalled maintenance outages; and triggered pre-emergency load management reductions. This coincides with a decrease in available nonsynchronized reserve MW seen in Figure 10-26. On June 18, PJM issued a hot weather alert. On June 25, 2026,

75 Starting October 1, 2025, the ASO now schedules regulation in half-hour blocks. However, as before the change, the ASO still schedules reserves in one-hour blocks.


76 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.2.1 Communication for Reserve Capability Limitation, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

77 That a unit is able to use a spin maximum less than its economic maximum does not mean that it is required to do so. The count of units that used the exception on a given day can be less than what is shown.

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PJM issued a maintenance outage recall in advance of a hot weather event from late June into early July.

### Figure 10-13 Daily Average Available Synchronized Reserve: January through June, 2026




## Market Concentration

Table 10-15 provides the average HHI and the percent of intervals during which the maximum market share was above 20 percent for the day-ahead and real-time synchronized reserve markets for the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the MAD synchronized reserve market was moderately concentrated in the day-ahead market and highly concentrated in the real-time market. In the first six months of 2026, the RTO synchronized reserve market was unconcentrated in the day-ahead market and unconcentrated in the real-time market.

### Table 10-15 Day-ahead and real-time synchronized reserve average HHI: January through June, 2026

| Location | Market | Average HHI | Percent of Intervals Max Market Share Above 20% | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTO | RT | 927 | 30.2% | Unconcentrated |
| RTO | DA | 932 | 28.8% | Unconcentrated |
| MAD | RT | 2086 | 91.5% | Highly Concentrated |
| MAD | DA | 1788 | 89.6% | Moderately Concentrated |

In the first six months of 2026, the Ancillary Service Optimizer, which schedules economic inflexible resources while considering all resources against forecasted LMPs, failed the three pivotal supplier test in 3,999 ASO intervals, 58.1 percent of the 6,885 ASO intervals to which the test applied.[78]

## Market Behavior


The synchronized reserve offer price must be cost based and is capped at the expected value of the synchronized reserve penalty, which equals the average penalty multiplied by the average rate of nonperformance multiplied by the probability that an event will occur.[79] These expected values are shown in Figure 10-14. For resources that do not provide an offer price, the offer price is treated as $0 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the weighted average offer price for generators that set their offer MW was $0.00005 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the weighted average offer price for DSR resources that set their offer MW was $0.04 per MWh.

The synchronized reserve offer cap was updated monthly from October 2022 through December 2023, after which it is updated annually. On November 26, 2025, the offer cap was increased from $0.00 to $0.08 to correct for an error.[80] For 2026, the offer cap is $0.14 per MWh.

78 On October 1, 2025, the ASO switched from producing one-hour solutions to producing 30-minute solutions. Although the ASO's intervals are now 30 minutes long, the ASO still schedules reserves in one-hour blocks, each of which now span two 30-minute intervals.
79 See PJM. "PJM Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines," § 4.7 Synchronized Reserve, Rev. 47 (Oct. 1, 2025).
80 See PJM. "Synchronized Reserve Offer Cap", 2025 Annual Calculation (Dec. 12, 2025). <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/ancillary/synchronized-reserve-offer-cap-2025.xlsx>


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Figure 10-14 Expected values of the synchronized reserve penalty: October 2022 through June 2026[81]





## Market Performance

In the first six months of 2026, the real-time RTO weighted average synchronized reserve market clearing price (SRMCP) was $4.92 per MWh and the day-ahead RTO weighted average SRMCP was $5.77 per MWh. The real-time MAD weighted average SRMCP was $5.01 per MWh and the day-ahead MAD weighted average SRMCP was $6.22 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, there were 52,116 five-minute intervals in the real-time market and there were 4,343 hours in the day-ahead market. The real-time RTO SRMCP was $0 per MWh in 31,250 intervals (60.0 percent of all intervals). The real-time MAD SRMCP was $0 per MWh in 31,059 intervals (59.6 percent of all intervals). The day-ahead RTO SRMCP was $0 per MWh in 843 hours (19.4 percent of all hours). The day-ahead MAD SRMCP was $0 per MWh in 431 hours (9.9 percent of all hours).

Figure 10-15 shows the daily unweighted average prices for synchronized reserve in the real-time and day-ahead markets in the first six months of 2026. Higher day-ahead prices in late January and early February occurred during a cold weather event that included Winter Storm Fern, for which conservative operations were declared, a cold weather alert was issued, and maintenance outages were recalled. Shortage pricing for the RTO and MAD was used on January 23 and March 12. Shortage pricing for the RTO was used on January 30; February 1, 4, 6, and 7; and March 1, 13, and 14; April 6; May 18; and June 2, 17, and 29. Prices spiked on May 18 during a hot weather event, for which PJM issued a maintenance outage recall, a maximum generation alert, and triggered pre-emergency load management reductions.

Figure 10-15 Day-ahead and real-time synchronized reserve average market clearing prices: January through June, 2026




81 PJM. "Synchronized Reserve Offer Cap". December 12, 2025. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/ancillary/synchronized-reserve-offer-cap-penalty.ashx>.

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Table 10-16 and Table 10-17 compare the dispatch run and pricing run weighted average prices for the day-ahead and real-time markets. Fast start pricing increases LMP in the pricing run relative to the dispatch run, which increases reserve prices. Fast start pricing also reduces the amount of reserves available in the pricing run compared to the dispatch run, by pretending that fast start units can be dispatched for energy below their economic minimum output limit but not counting MW below the eco min as reserves. For the real-time values, these are the LPC prices weighted using the RT SCED MW. For the day-ahead values, these are the DA prices weighted using the DA dispatch MW. PJM dispatchers can update assignments after RT SCED has run, so these weights differ from the weighted average value reported elsewhere in this section.[82] In the first six months of 2026, the real-time RTO weighted average price from the pricing run was 21.8 percent higher than the real-time RTO weighted average price from the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead RTO weighted average price from the pricing run was 2.8 percent higher than the day-ahead RTO weighted average price from the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time MAD weighted average price from the pricing run was 22.2 percent higher than the real-time MAD weighted average price from the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead MAD weighted average price from the pricing run was 5.9 percent higher than the day-ahead MAD weighted average price from the dispatch run.

## Table 10-16 Day-ahead and real-time fast start pricing in the RTO synchronized reserve market: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| 2025 | Jan | $4.43 | $4.79 | $0.36 | 8.0% | $2.02 | $2.62 | $0.61 | 30.1% |
| 2025 | Feb | $2.56 | $2.56 | ($0.00) | (0.1%) | $1.96 | $2.88 | $0.92 | 46.9% |
| 2025 | Mar | $7.73 | $7.23 | ($0.50) | (6.5%) | $4.89 | $7.28 | $2.39 | 48.9% |
| 2025 | Apr | $8.65 | $8.48 | ($0.17) | (2.0%) | $2.64 | $4.91 | $2.28 | 86.4% |
| 2025 | May | $5.77 | $5.45 | ($0.32) | (5.6%) | $2.15 | $3.14 | $0.99 | 45.7% |
| 2025 | Jun | $7.96 | $7.51 | ($0.44) | (5.6%) | $9.48 | $10.77 | $1.29 | 13.6% |
| 2025 | Jul | $10.69 | $9.98 | ($0.70) | (6.6%) | $2.87 | $4.67 | $1.80 | 62.8% |
| 2025 | Aug | $3.78 | $3.22 | ($0.55) | (14.6%) | $1.24 | $2.03 | $0.79 | 63.9% |
| 2025 | Sep | $5.66 | $4.69 | ($0.97) | (17.1%) | $2.77 | $3.42 | $0.65 | 23.3% |
| 2025 | Oct | $6.50 | $6.44 | ($0.06) | (0.9%) | $2.53 | $3.59 | $1.07 | 42.1% |
| 2025 | Nov | $5.37 | $4.00 | ($1.37) | (25.5%) | $1.02 | $1.62 | $0.60 | 58.3% |
| 2025 | Dec | $3.16 | $2.59 | ($0.58) | (18.2%) | $1.90 | $2.61 | $0.71 | 37.2% |
| 2025 | All | $6.08 | $5.62 | ($0.46) | (7.5%) | $2.96 | $4.10 | $1.14 | 38.6% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $10.61 | $11.51 | $0.90 | 8.5% | $3.29 | $4.67 | $1.37 | 41.7% |
| 2026 | Feb | $2.98 | $2.15 | ($0.83) | (27.8%) | $5.66 | $6.98 | $1.32 | 23.3% |
| 2026 | Mar | $6.76 | $6.89 | $0.13 | 1.9% | $6.42 | $7.55 | $1.13 | 17.7% |
| 2026 | Apr | $3.27 | $3.40 | $0.13 | 3.9% | $2.45 | $2.82 | $0.37 | 15.1% |
| 2026 | May | $3.01 | $3.15 | $0.13 | 4.4% | $1.93 | $2.15 | $0.22 | 11.4% |
| 2026 | Jun | $2.71 | $2.93 | $0.22 | 8.0% | $4.27 | $4.92 | $0.65 | 15.1% |
| 2026 | All | $5.10 | $5.24 | $0.14 | 2.8% | $4.00 | $4.87 | $0.87 | 21.8% |

82 See PJM. "PJM Manual 01: Control Center and Data Exchange Requirements," § 1.7 Dispatch Management Tool (DMT), Rev. 50 (May 21, 2025).




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### Table 10-17 Day-ahead and real-time fast start pricing in the MAD synchronized reserve market: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| 2025 | Jan | $5.11 | $5.53 | $0.42 | 8.2% | $2.15 | $2.68 | $0.54 | 25.1% |
| 2025 | Feb | $4.02 | $4.02 | ($0.00) | (0.1%) | $1.67 | $2.40 | $0.73 | 43.6% |
| 2025 | Mar | $8.08 | $7.58 | ($0.49) | (6.1%) | $4.47 | $6.65 | $2.18 | 48.9% |
| 2025 | Apr | $9.09 | $8.92 | ($0.17) | (1.8%) | $2.41 | $4.11 | $1.71 | 70.9% |
| 2025 | May | $5.94 | $5.60 | ($0.34) | (5.7%) | $1.92 | $2.81 | $0.88 | 45.9% |
| 2025 | Jun | $8.17 | $7.74 | ($0.44) | (5.3%) | $7.76 | $8.52 | $0.77 | 9.9% |
| 2025 | Jul | $10.69 | $9.97 | ($0.72) | (6.7%) | $2.74 | $4.37 | $1.63 | 59.7% |
| 2025 | Aug | $3.98 | $3.46 | ($0.52) | (13.0%) | $1.16 | $1.91 | $0.75 | 64.5% |
| 2025 | Sep | $5.42 | $4.51 | ($0.90) | (16.7%) | $2.61 | $3.16 | $0.55 | 21.1% |
| 2025 | Oct | $6.70 | $6.69 | ($0.02) | (0.3%) | $2.35 | $3.18 | $0.83 | 35.4% |
| 2025 | Nov | $6.16 | $6.36 | $0.20 | 3.2% | $1.81 | $2.33 | $0.52 | 28.8% |
| 2025 | Dec | $6.32 | $6.49 | $0.17 | 2.7% | $5.49 | $6.61 | $1.11 | 20.2% |
| 2025 | All | $6.57 | $6.32 | ($0.24) | (3.7%) | $3.01 | $4.01 | $1.00 | 33.4% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $13.16 | $14.46 | $1.30 | 9.9% | $3.52 | $4.99 | $1.47 | 41.7% |
| 2026 | Feb | $3.40 | $3.65 | $0.25 | 7.3% | $5.69 | $7.04 | $1.35 | 23.8% |
| 2026 | Mar | $7.46 | $7.60 | $0.14 | 1.8% | $6.52 | $7.09 | $0.58 | 8.8% |
| 2026 | Apr | $4.97 | $5.10 | $0.14 | 2.7% | $2.47 | $2.76 | $0.30 | 12.1% |
| 2026 | May | $5.19 | $5.29 | $0.10 | 2.0% | $2.33 | $3.56 | $1.23 | 52.8% |
| 2026 | Jun | $3.67 | $3.97 | $0.30 | 8.2% | $5.45 | $6.09 | $0.65 | 11.9% |
| 2026 | All | $6.39 | $6.77 | $0.38 | 5.9% | $4.32 | $5.28 | $0.96 | 22.2% |

Figure 10-16 shows the dispatch-run synchronized reserve RTO market clearing prices of the day-ahead software (DA), the hour-ahead software (ASO), and the real-time software (RT SCED). The pricing-run market clearing prices, calculated by the LPC, are in Figure 10-15. As seen in Figure 10-16, there can be significant differences in the dispatch-run clearing prices. The ASO schedules units by forecasting least-cost outcomes for the operating hour, and any inflexible resources cleared by the ASO are automatically cleared by RT SCED. Because it is possible for real time to differ from the ASO's forecasts, it is possible for an inflexible resource to be scheduled during real-time conditions in which, had it not been inflexible and already cleared by the ASO, RT SCED would not have scheduled it. For example, it is possible for an inflexible resource to be scheduled in real time even when its bid price is higher than the clearing prices used by RT SCED and the LPC. This did not occur in 2025 and the first six months of 2026, but in 2024, there were 47,229 RT SCED five-minute intervals in which there was at least one inflexible unit scheduled by the ASO whose bid price was greater than the RT SCED market clearing price. In 2024, there were 229 inflexible resources cleared by the ASO for which the market clearing price of the RT SCED five-minute interval was less than the resource's bid price. The opposite can also happen, in which an inflexible resource is not cleared by the ASO while its offer parameters, had it not been inflexible, would have led to it having been cleared by RT SCED.

### Figure 10-16 Dispatch run synchronized reserve market clearing prices from the day-ahead software, the ASO, and RT SCED: January through June, 2026




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Table 10-18 shows total synchronized reserve payments by month for January 2025 through June 2026. Balancing credits for all but one month are negative, because, on average, resources buy back their day-ahead positions at higher real-time prices. LOC credits are paid to cover negative balancing credits if PJM converted a resource's day-ahead reserve position to energy in the real-time market. LOC credits are also paid to inflexible reserves when prices do not cover their opportunity costs. Shortfall charges are incurred by resources that do not provide their cleared reserve positions in real time. In Table 10-18, the only months with synchronized reserve events that lasted for 10 or more minutes were February 2025, July 2025, September 2025 through November 2025, and March 2026, so there are no shortfall charges possible outside of those months. Total credits in June 2025 were larger due to price spikes during a hot weather event in which shortage pricing was used for synchronized reserve in the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone. Total credits in July 2025 were larger due to price spikes during a second hot weather event in which PJM declared hot weather alerts, emergency maximum generation alerts, and a maintenance outage recall. Shortage pricing was not used for synchronized reserve during the July 2025 hot weather event. Total credits in January 2026 were larger due to price spikes during a cold weather event covering Winter Storm Fern, in which PJM declared cold weather alerts, conservative operations, and a maintenance outage recall.

**Table 10-18 Total synchronized reserve payments and charges by month: January 2025 through June 2026**

| Year | Month | Total Day-Ahead Credits | Total Balancing MCP Credits | Total LOC Credits | Total Shortfall Charges | Total Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | $9,766,427 | ($93,903) | $1,086,575 | $0 | $10,759,099 |
| 2025 | Feb | $5,437,781 | ($126,526) | $779,550 | $118,146 | $5,972,659 |
| 2025 | Mar | $15,181,061 | ($1,464,818) | $2,047,513 | $0 | $15,763,757 |
| 2025 | Apr | $13,256,012 | ($345,197) | $1,268,522 | $0 | $14,179,338 |
| 2025 | May | $10,685,430 | ($13,743) | $786,811 | $0 | $11,458,498 |
| 2025 | Jun | $15,012,782 | ($4,327,200) | $4,657,382 | $0 | $15,342,965 |
| 2025 | Jul | $22,507,389 | ($310,371) | $2,566,238 | $76,684 | $24,686,572 |
| 2025 | Aug | $7,390,714 | $20,554 | $1,016,144 | $0 | $8,427,413 |
| 2025 | Sep | $10,131,551 | ($840,026) | $1,576,176 | $159,581 | $10,708,120 |
| 2025 | Oct | $11,138,947 | ($485,436) | $1,526,784 | $114,170 | $12,066,126 |
| 2025 | Nov | $9,137,073 | ($11,535) | $1,375,185 | $4,336 | $10,496,388 |
| 2025 | Dec | $9,324,827 | ($435,351) | $1,997,742 | $0 | $10,887,218 |
| 2025 | All | $138,969,996 | ($8,433,550) | $20,684,624 | $472,917 | $150,748,153 |
| | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $23,153,558 | ($231,344) | $2,979,585 | $0 | $25,901,799 |
| 2026 | Feb | $4,348,346 | ($1,100,363) | $3,675,183 | $0 | $6,923,165 |
| 2026 | Mar | $13,523,239 | ($1,974,988) | $3,056,498 | $299,649 | $14,305,100 |
| 2026 | Apr | $5,949,493 | ($407,185) | $1,704,417 | $0 | $7,246,725 |
| 2026 | May | $7,207,222 | ($391,748) | $1,806,716 | $0 | $8,622,190 |
| 2026 | Jun | $6,372,683 | ($1,142,562) | $2,128,712 | $0 | $7,358,833 |
| 2026 | All | $60,554,541 | ($5,248,190) | $15,351,111 | $299,649 | $70,357,813 |


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
Table 10-19 provides the day-ahead and real-time synchronized reserve by resource type and fuel type for the first six months of 2026. For synchronized reserve, the MW for which a resource is credited at the market clearing price is capped at the lesser of its real-time assignment and the difference between its real-time output and the lesser of its economic maximum and its real-time reserve maximum. During spin events, this capped value is equal to the cleared MW. As it is this capped value for which a resource is credited, Table 10-19 only shows the capped value, excluding the additional cleared MW.

### Table 10-19 Day-ahead and real-time synchronized reserve credits by resource type and fuel type: January through June, 2026

| Resource / Fuel Type | Day-Ahead MWh | Real-Time Capped MWh | Day-Ahead Credits | Balancing MCP Credits | LOC Credits | Shortfall Charges | Total Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combined Cycle | 4,305,725 | 3,531,606 | $25,434,281 | ($8,058,182) | $5,867,729 | $84,893 | $23,158,934 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 719,453 | 1,262,820 | $12,137,161 | $1,546,941 | $2,597,870 | $815 | $16,281,157 |
| DSR | 1,393,455 | 1,988,743 | $6,105,984 | $1,394,392 | $2,224,836 | $67,639 | $9,657,573 |
| Steam - Coal | 1,820,372 | 2,362,921 | $3,764,026 | $2,766,726 | $2,960,864 | $34,869 | $9,456,747 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 868,093 | 975,648 | $5,291,236 | ($1,841,685) | $266,774 | $89,698 | $3,626,627 |
| CT - Oil | 358,252 | 374,982 | $2,793,405 | ($365,002) | $594,929 | $0 | $3,023,333 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 454,014 | 291,120 | $2,790,423 | ($520,662) | $5,035 | $12,984 | $2,261,812 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 293,706 | 380,450 | $1,173,609 | $333,461 | $444,627 | $2,533 | $1,949,164 |
| Steam - Other | 24,335 | 11,220 | $149,532 | ($22,281) | $227,150 | $83 | $354,318 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 18,950 | 24,611 | $238,903 | ($20,089) | $33,070 | $0 | $251,885 |
| RICE - Other | 124,053 | 59,386 | $482,767 | ($404,248) | $102,639 | $6,135 | $175,023 |
| Other | 115,546 | 89,148 | $193,214 | ($57,562) | $25,590 | $0 | $161,241 |

In the past, condensers made up a large part of PJM's cleared synchronized reserve. Figure 10-17 shows the percent of synchronized reserve MW cleared by RT SCED that were condensing. In the first six months of 2026, on average, condensers constituted 10.9 percent of the synchronized reserve MW cleared by RT SCED in each interval.


### Figure 10-17 Percent of RT SCED cleared MW that is condensing: January 2025 through June 2026




The October 1, 2022, changes, removed the prior cap that limited DSR to 33 percent of the cleared synchronized reserves. In the first six months of 2026, real-time DSR was more than 33 percent of the cleared real-time synchronized reserves in 3,521 five-minute intervals, 6.8 percent of the total 52,116 five-minute intervals. During these 3,521 five-minute intervals, on average, DSR made up 76.4 percent of the synchronized reserve MW. In the first six months of 2026, day-ahead DSR was more than 33 percent of the cleared day-ahead synchronized reserves in one hour. Figure 10-18 shows the portion of synchronized reserve provided by DSR. Since September 2023, there has been an increase in the use of DSR, but not enough to frequently exceed the former limit.

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**Figure 10-18 Daily average synchronized reserve from DSR and non-DSR: January 2025 through June 2026**




## Synchronized Reserve Performance

Resources providing synchronized reserves are paid for being available to respond to a synchronized reserve event and not for the actual response. Synchronized reserve resources are paid for their output in the energy market when they respond to an event.

Actual synchronized reserve event response is determined by final output minus initial output where final output is the largest output between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event, and initial output is the lowest output between one minute before the event and one minute after the event.[83]

Cleared synchronized reserve resources are obligated to sustain their final output for the shorter of the length of the event or 30 minutes. The owner of a cleared resource is penalized if it fails to perform during any synchronized reserve event lasting 10 minutes or longer, although the resource owner can use overperformance from another resource to offset those losses. As synchronized reserve resources are allowed 10 minutes to ramp up to their cleared output, performance penalties are not assessed for events lasting less than 10 minutes.

Table 10-20 shows synchronized reserve event response compliance for events that lasted 10 minutes or longer, using only the response from cleared synchronized reserves. In 2024, five events were 10 minutes or longer. Of those five reserve events, only one was associated with a DCS event. In the first six months of 2026, one event lasted for at least 10 minutes. That one 10 minute event was due to a unit trip and was associated with a DCS event. In the first six months of 2026, PJM triggered zero events explicitly due to low ACE. For all other DCS events, any associated reserve event lasted less than 10 minutes. PJM has the option, but not the obligation, to trigger a reserve event in response to a DCS event. In some circumstances, PJM system operators will opt to recover the system via regulation and the normal dispatching process.

Actual synchronized reserve response is the total increase in MW from all synchronized reserve resources from the moment the spinning event is called to 10 minutes after. The overall response to spinning events was adequate or more than adequate to meet NERC requirements, in which the Reporting ACE must return to the lesser of zero and the value of the Reporting ACE before the disturbance that caused the event.[84] PJM, in practice, not only corrects the Reporting ACE disturbance that led to the event but over corrects. In the one event lasting 10 or more minutes in the first six months of 2026, the Reporting ACE recovered not just to the NERC required level of zero but overshot by approximately 1,000 MW.

83 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.2.10 Settlements, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

84 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025) Attachment D.



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## Table 10-20 Response compliance for synchronized reserve events 10 minutes or longer by primary fuel and resource type, excluding over response: January 2025 through June 2026[85]

| Spin Event | Duration (Minutes) | Primary Resource/Fuel Type | Total Synchronized Reserve Deployed (MW) | Total Capped Synchronized Reserve Resource Response (MW) | Total Synchronized Reserve Resource Shortfall (MW) | Synchronized Reserve Response Percent | Total Synchronized Reserve Response, including Over-Response (MW) | Synchronized Reserve Response Percent, including Over-Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05-Feb-2025 1005 (EPT) | 10.0 | Combined Cycle | 548 | 411 | 137 | 75% | 627 | 115% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 559 | 513 | 46 | 92% | 563 | 101% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 199 | 106 | 93 | 53% | 119 | 60% |
| | | Steam - Natural Gas | 120 | 42 | 78 | 35% | 46 | 38% |
| | | Other | 412 | 180 | 232 | 44% | 267 | 65% |
| | | Total | 1,837 | 1,252 | 585 | 68% | 1,623 | 88% |
| 01-Jul-2025 1018 (EPT) | 10.6 | Combined Cycle | 780 | 661 | 119 | 85% | 991 | 127% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 963 | 760 | 203 | 79% | 848 | 88% |
| | | DSR | 544 | 406 | 138 | 75% | 525 | 96% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 345 | 282 | 63 | 82% | 332 | 96% |
| | | Other | 287 | 229 | 57 | 80% | 237 | 83% |
| | | Total | 2,918 | 2,337 | 580 | 80% | 2,933 | 101% |
| 22-Jul-2025 1511 (EPT) | 10.5 | Combined Cycle | 1,071 | 909 | 162 | 85% | 1,197 | 112% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 585 | 510 | 75 | 87% | 652 | 112% |
| | | DSR | 548 | 439 | 110 | 80% | 600 | 109% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 806 | 611 | 195 | 76% | 708 | 88% |
| | | Other | 236 | 141 | 95 | 60% | 147 | 62% |
| | | Total | 3,246 | 2,610 | 636 | 80% | 3,304 | 102% |
| 25-Sep-2025 1912 (EPT) | 10.7 | Combined Cycle | 813 | 608 | 205 | 75% | 775 | 95% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 971 | 829 | 142 | 85% | 949 | 98% |
| | | DSR | 589 | 491 | 98 | 83% | 625 | 106% |
| | | Hydro - Pumped Storage | 376 | 262 | 114 | 70% | 563 | 150% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 168 | 126 | 42 | 75% | 127 | 75% |
| | | Steam - Natural Gas, Other | 95 | 52 | 44 | 54% | 52 | 55% |
| | | Other | 220 | 198 | 22 | 90% | 206 | 94% |
| | | Total | 3,232 | 2,566 | 666 | 79% | 3,297 | 102% |
| 17-Oct-2025 1013 (EPT) | 11.1 | Combined Cycle | 413 | 331 | 81 | 80% | 488 | 118% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 228 | 228 | -0 | 100% | 299 | 131% |
| | | DSR | 644 | 595 | 49 | 92% | 750 | 116% |
| | | Steam - Coal, Natural Gas | 433 | 292 | 141 | 68% | 377 | 87% |
| | | Other | 618 | 446 | 173 | 72% | 483 | 78% |
| | | Total | 2,336 | 1,893 | 444 | 81% | 2,397 | 103% |
| 28-Oct-2025 1905 (EPT) | 14.7 | Combined Cycle | 658 | 501 | 157 | 76% | 693 | 105% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 222 | 58 | 164 | 26% | 124 | 56% |
| | | DSR | 574 | 447 | 126 | 78% | 551 | 96% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 320 | 250 | 70 | 78% | 337 | 105% |
| | | Steam - Natural Gas | 181 | 100 | 81 | 55% | 108 | 60% |
| | | Other | 61 | 32 | 29 | 53% | 35 | 58% |
| | | Total | 2,015 | 1,389 | 627 | 69% | 1,847 | 92% |
| 11-Nov-2025 1004 (EPT) | 10.3 | Combined Cycle | 706 | 495 | 211 | 70% | 697 | 99% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 304 | 270 | 34 | 89% | 355 | 117% |
| | | DSR | 673 | 610 | 63 | 91% | 783 | 116% |
| | | RICE - Natural Gas | 43 | 40 | 2 | 95% | 44 | 103% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 303 | 266 | 37 | 88% | 301 | 99% |
| | | Steam - Natural Gas | 176 | 119 | 57 | 67% | 143 | 81% |
| | | Other | 474 | 454 | 20 | 96% | 506 | 107% |
| | | Total | 2,679 | 2,254 | 425 | 84% | 2,829 | 106% |
| 01-Mar-2026 1929 (EPT) | 11.15 | Combined Cycle | 538 | 363 | 175 | 67% | 578 | 107% |
| | | CT - Natural Gas | 437 | 435 | 3 | 99% | 508 | 116% |
| | | DSR | 643 | 499 | 144 | 78% | 592 | 92% |
| | | Hydro | 470 | 195 | 276 | 41% | 241 | 51% |
| | | Steam - Coal | 391 | 316 | 74 | 81% | 380 | 97% |
| | | Other | 59 | 25 | 34 | 42% | 30 | 51% |
| | | Total | 2,537 | 1,832 | 705 | 72% | 2,328 | 92% |

85 Results for identified technologies shown only if they are consistent with PJM confidentiality rules.

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In the first six months of 2026, compliance with calls to respond to the single synchronized reserve event was significantly less than 100 percent. Table 10-21 shows the average amount of cleared synchronized reserve MW that responded to events 10 minutes or longer from 2017 through the first six months of 2026. PJM experienced one event longer than 10 minutes in the first six months of 2026. In December 2024, PJM updated the economic basepoint signal to include deployed reserve MW during synchronized reserve events. This allowed resources to stay on AGC while responding to synchronized reserve events and led to improved average performance in 2025 and the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-21 Average synchronized reserve response from scheduled resources for events longer than 10 minutes, excluding over response: January 2017 through June 2026**

| Year | Number of Events of Any Length | Number of Events Longer than 10 Minutes | Average Percent of Scheduled Synchronized Reserve MW that Responded to Events Longer than 10 Minutes | Percent of Events that were Longer than 10 Minutes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 16 | 6 | 87.6% | 37.5% |
| 2018 | 18 | 8 | 74.2% | 44.4% |
| 2019 | 13 | 3 | 86.8% | 23.1% |
| 2020 | 17 | 5 | 59.5% | 29.4% |
| 2021 | 18 | 5 | 83.1% | 27.8% |
| 2022 (Jan - Sep) | 14 | 3 | 71.2% | 21.4% |
| 2022 (Oct - Dec) | 9 | 7 | 50.3% | 77.8% |
| 2023 | 12 | 3 | 55.6% | 25.0% |
| 2024 | 19 | 5 | 58.2% | 26.3% |
| 2025 | 28 | 7 | 78.3% | 25.0% |
| 2026 | 8 | 1 | 72.3% | 12.5% |

In Table 10-21, from January 2017 through September 2022, cleared synchronized reserve was provided by tier 2 synchronized reserves, which were cleared when the estimated response from tier 1 resources was insufficient to cover the requirement. Since October 1, 2022, the requirement is fully met by cleared resources that offer the new synchronized reserve product. In the new reserve market, most resources capable of providing reserves were required to offer their full capability as calculated by PJM, whereas previously resources had set their own offer MW. Additionally, while units still set their prices in the new market, the maximum allowed offer price was reduced. Under these new market rules, there was a much larger pool of resources offering synchronized reserves, and these newly offered resources began clearing the reserve market offsetting more expensive reserve resources that had previously cleared more frequently. In the months immediately following the change, PJM was clearing less DSR and fewer natural gas CTs and more combined cycles and steam coal units, a portion of which had not cleared in the months leading up to the change. This, in part, lead to the drop in synchronized reserve performance seen in Table 10-21.

In 2024 and, to a lesser degree, in 2025 and the first six months of 2026, when PJM and the MMU inquired about poorly performing resources, responses pointed towards shortcomings in how resources were deployed. Although resources are required to fully respond within 10 minutes, resources do not necessarily have a full 10 minutes to respond. PJM schedules reserve MW with the expectation that resources will start responding as soon as an event begins, but this expectation fails to consider communication delays that result from how a resource's market operation center (MOC) notifies the resource of events. When a MOC receives PJM's ALL-CALL, it can take several minutes for the MOC to acknowledge the call and to contact the appropriate resources, which then can take minutes more to start responding.

The MMU recommends that, to minimize such lag, PJM use an electronic synchronized reserve event notification process for all resources and that all resources be required to have the ability to receive and to have the ability to automatically respond to the notifications. PJM has an optional inter-control room connection protocol (ICCP) signal that some control rooms use, but PJM does not track who is actually using it. This or another form of electronic signal should be required for all resources. On July 24, 2024, stakeholders approved a joint PJM/MMU proposal to implement an electronic communications and reserve deployment process. On December 17, 2024, PJM implemented changes to augment the SCED dispatch signal to include deployed reserve MW during reserve events. However, this new process is not required for all synchronized reserve resources and does not replace the ALL-CALL. The new process mainly


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benefits units that automatically respond to the dispatch signal, such as those following AGC. Between December 17, 2024, and the end of June 2026, there were eight events lasting 10 or more minutes with which to sufficiently test the augmented dispatch signal. For the event on February 5, 2025, PJM took explicit action to make the event last long enough for testing. As shown in Table 10-21, following the signaling improvements, PJM saw an increase in average performance from 58.2 percent in 2024 to 78.3 percent in 2025.

The penalty structure when a resource fails to respond fully to a spinning event has two components. The first component is, for each interval during the day on which the event occurred, the forfeiture of awarded SRMCP credits in the amount of the lesser of the resource's capped synchronized reserve assignment during that interval and the resource's maximum shortfall MW during that day. The second component is a required return of SRMCP credits paid in the Immediate Past Interval (IPI), equal to the sum of, for each scheduled interval within the IPI, the SRMCP multiplied by the lesser of a resource's capped MW assignment during the penalized interval and the resource's penalty obligation for the day of the event. The IPI is defined as the average time, in number of days, since the start of the previous event over the previous two years or, if less, the number of days since the resource last failed to fully respond. For example, the maximum IPI for 2026 is 18 days and was calculated using the events from November 1, 2023, through October 31, 2025.[86]

There are several problems with this penalty structure.[87] First, resource owners are permitted to aggregate the response of multiple cleared reserve resources within the same portfolio, allowing owners to reduce the penalty obligation of a resource's underresponse by offsetting it with another scheduled resource's overresponse.[88] Second, the maximum IPI is calculated using events of any length, even though a resource is automatically considered compliant for events less than 10 minutes in length, artificially and significantly shortening the applied IPI. Third, the historical component of the penalty only applies to a resource's SRMCP credits, but not to LOC credits, even though a large portion of credits is awarded for LOC. For the one event that lasted for 10 or more minutes in the first six months of 2026, for each resource interval in which the resource's penalty obligation MW was greater than or equal to the resource's capped MW during the penalized interval, the total historical penalty was $81,812 and the total LOC credit was $12,389.

The penalty structure for synchronized reserve nonperformance does not provide appropriate or reasonable performance incentives. Under the current penalty structure and due to the low frequency of sufficiently long events, it is possible for a resource to not respond to any spin events and yet still receive net revenues for providing synchronized reserve. The MMU continues to recommend that the penalty's repayment include the LOC credits in addition to the SRMCP credits. The MMU also recommends that a unit that fails to respond to a synchronized reserve event 10 minutes or longer repay all credits back to the last time that the unit successfully responded to an event 10 minutes or longer. A resource should not be paid for reserves that it does not provide.

The MMU also continues to recommend that aggregation not be permitted to offset resource specific penalties for failure to respond to a synchronized reserve event. Including aggregate responses from all cleared resources weakens the incentive to perform and creates an incentive to withhold reserves from other resources. Synchronized reserve commitment is resource specific, so the obligation to respond should also be resource specific.

86 See "2024 Third Quarter Synchronized Reserve Performance," PJM presentation to the Operations Committee. (December 5, 2024) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2024/20241205/20241205-item-12---synchronous-reserve-update.pdf>.

87 See "IMM Proposal: Reserve Deployment and Compensation," IMM presentation to the Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force. (March 13, 2024) <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/rcstf/2024/20240313/20240313-item-02---imm-proposal---deployment-and-compensation.ashx>.

88 See PJM. "PJM Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting," § 6.3 Charges for Synchronized Reserve, Rev. 102 (Oct. 1, 2025).

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Each row of Table 10-22 shows the possible total historical penalty if the historical penalty had been defined differently based on each of the MMU's recommendations in the first six months of 2026 for the one event lasting 10 or more minutes in length. It compares the status quo amount, the amount if the IPI were defined using only events of 10 or more minutes, the amount if LOC credits were penalized in an amount proportionate to the shortfall, and the amount if aggregate response were not allowed to offset shortfalls. As can be seen in the table, the values are similar for the status quo, for penalizing LOC credits, and for disallowing aggregate response. The larger effect of only using 10-minute events to calculate the IPI is due to using a 56-day IPI compared to PJM's current 18-day IPI. Table 10-22 shows that redefining only a single component of the reserve penalty structure will not necessarily yield a large increase in penalties. All shortcomings of the current reserve penalty structure should be addressed.

**Table 10-22 Comparison of historical/retroactive penalties using possible different definitions: January through June, 2026**

| Description | Total Retroactive Penalty |
|---|---|
| Status Quo | $330,003 |
| Using only 10-minute events for IPI | $2,744,414 |
| Including LOC credits in retroactive penalty | $389,305 |
| Disallowing aggregate response | $352,767 |
| All three changes | $3,390,648 |

Resources should not be paid for reserves that they do not provide. The MMU recommends reclaiming credits back to the last known fully compliant performance, while providing the opportunity to demonstrate performance between events. Resources do not control when PJM calls 10-minute events, nor do they control whether they are scheduled during the few 10-minute events that PJM calls. While actual performance is the key to not being penalized, those factors contribute to defining penalties for many resources. The solution is not to arbitrarily limit the penalized period, as PJM does with its IPI, but to instead provide opportunities, between events, for resources to demonstrate that they are capable of providing reserves.

## PJM's 2023 Response to Poor Unit Specific Performance

On October 1, 2022, PJM implemented substantial changes to the reserves markets, called Reserve Price Formation, meant to improve reserve reliability and improve accuracy when calculating reserve supply. Winter Storm Elliot occurred in December 2022. In the nine synchronized reserve events from October 2022 through April 2022, the average reserve performance was 53.7 percent. Excluding the events of Winter Storm Elliot, it was 49.4 percent.


In May 2023, in response to poor unit specific reserve performance since the market changes made on October 1, 2022, PJM made two unilateral decisions without approval from stakeholders or FERC. On May 12, 2023, PJM inappropriately increased the extended reserve requirement by 1,588 MW and on May 15, 2023, PJM reversed the increase. On May 19, 2023, PJM inappropriately increased the synchronized reserve reliability requirement by 30 percentage points to 130 percent of the most severe single contingency (MSSC). On January 9, 2026, PJM adjusted the synchronized reserve reliability requirement to be 120 percent of the MSSC.

This increase only applies to MSSCs located outside of the reserve subzone. If the RTO's MSSC is located inside the MAD Reserve Subzone (meaning that the MAD MSSC is also the RTO MSSC), then the adder is not used and the RTO and MAD reliability requirements are equal. Because the MAD Reserve Subzone's MSSC is always located within the subzone, the increase does not affect the MAD reserve requirements.


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
Figure 10-19 compares, for an example MSSC of 1,000 MW, the initial synchronized reserve ORDC from before these changes, the intermediate ORDC with the extension to the second step, and the new ORDC with the 30 percent increase in the first step.

### Figure 10-19 An example comparison of the old, intermediate, and new real-time synchronized reserve ORDCs




Because the definitions of the reserve reliability requirements are nested, PJM's increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement also increased the primary reserve reliability requirement, which in turn could increase the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement. Figure 10-20 shows the new ORDCs of the three reserve services using an example MSSC of 1,000 MW and the default 190 MW for the extended requirements. Figure 10-6 shows the original ORDCs for the same example MSSC. As seen in Figure 10-2, although not shown in Figure 10-20, as a result of the increase, the 30-minute reserve requirement is now usually equal to the primary reserve requirement.

### Figure 10-20 An example of the reserve services' new real-time operating reserve demand curves using the 20-percent increase, including the permanent second steps




PJM did not have the authority to increase the extended reserve requirements without a hot or cold weather alert or an emergency condition. The most common cause of doubled synchronized reserve requirements in the first four months of 2023 and in prior years was the possibility of large units tripping or being disconnected while undergoing maintenance work, which is a clear increase in the size of the most severe single contingency.

The doubling of the requirement for May 12 to May 16, 2023, lead to 31 intervals of shortage pricing for synchronized reserve and primary reserve in the RTO, even though, based on the actual contingencies, both services cleared well in excess of what was actually needed. In addition, because there was no spin event on either May 12 or May 15, it is unknown whether the response that could have been gained by this increase in demand justified these higher prices.

After making these changes, PJM later modified Manual 11 to allow "temporarily" increasing contingency reserve requirements "as necessary

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to account for resource performance."[89] Neither temporary nor resource performance criteria are specified or defined in the manual. PJM announced criteria for reducing the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in the PJM Operating Committee on March 6, 2025.[90]

PJM already clears additional 10-minute reserve in the form of nonsynchronized reserve. PJM had and continues to have the option to use all 10-minute reserve that it clears for recovering within 10 minutes, but instead chooses to increase the amount of all 10-minute reserve that PJM clears, even though it only uses a subset.[91] Despite PJM's unexplained reluctance to call a nonsynchronized reserve event, PJM does use NSR resources to respond to synchronized reserve events. That PJM occasionally uses certain nonsynchronized resources to respond to synchronized reserve events while wishing to avoid the general use of NSR suggests a mismatch between NSR's defined behavior, its actual behavior, and PJM's desired behavior. The current outcome is inefficient. PJM pays offline 10-minute reserves that it does not use. If PJM does not have confidence in the ability of certain offline units to start in 10 minutes, the units should be tested and required to submit accurate start and notification times, so that PJM can have confidence in its ability to effectively deploy NSR.

PJM gave several reasons to support the changes to the reserve ORDCs, including that resource response to spin events has been poor and that the average length of spin events greater than 10 minutes has increased. In addition, PJM was concerned that it might be less able to avoid Disturbance Control Standard (DCS) violations, in which PJM would exceed the NERC-imposed 15-minute limit for recovering Reporting ACE from changes due to Reportable Disturbances.[92] The MMU agrees about the underlying facts, with caveats, but does not agree with PJM's assertions about the reasons for poor performance, or with the assumption about DCS events or that any of these reasons support PJM's actions.

The MMU agrees that the average length of reserve events has increased, but notes that recent DCS event lengths have remained well below NERC's 15-minute requirement, except in two cases. The first case was on December 26, 2022, during Winter Storm Elliott, when PJM recovered from a DCS event in 15 minutes and 52 seconds. The second case was on July 28, 2025, during a summer hot weather event, when PJM recovered from a DCS event in 15 minutes and 41 seconds. Regardless, the data do not support the assertion that PJM is at risk of violating NERC standards during nonemergency conditions and the data do not support the assertion that there has been a change in PJM's DCS event response times. In general, PJM's recovery times are clearly and significantly shorter than NERC's 15-minute requirement and PJM's self-imposed 10-minute requirement. In many cases, PJM recovers Reporting ACE within five minutes. Figure 10-21 compares the lengths of recent DCS events with the lengths of their corresponding spin events. PJM triggers a spin event for most, but not all, DCS events. As can be seen, many spin events are minutes longer than the DCS event for which they were triggered. In the cases where a spin event continues for more than 10 minutes, this can mean that resource performance becomes subject to evaluation for spin events whose purpose had already been achieved minutes ago (that is, the recovery of the Reporting ACE and the end of the DCS event). While there are reasons for PJM dispatchers to continue a spin event even after ACE recovers, Figure 10-21 shows that the lengths of spin events do not suggest that PJM has become closer to having a DCS violation. Instead, it shows that the length of DCS events from immediately before and immediately after the implementation of Reserve Price Formation on October 1, 2022, are similar. It also demonstrates the effect of the improvement to reserve deployment since December 2024, in that all DCS events since the improvement were less than five minutes (one third of NERC's 15-minute requirement and half of PJM's 10-minute target).

89 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 6.3 Charges for Synchronized Reserve, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025). "In order to meet Reliability First (RF) Regional Criteria, PJM may schedule additional Contingency Reserves on a temporary basis in order to meet the Largest Single Contingency, as necessary to account for resource performance. PJM shall post details regarding additional scheduling of reserves in Markets Gateway."

90 See "Synchronized Reserve Requirement for Reliability – Update," PJM presentation to the Operating Committee. (March 6, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250306/20250306-item-08b---synchronized-reserve-adder.pdf> .


91 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 4.1.2 Loading Reserves, Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025).

92 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025) Attachment D.



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### Figure 10-21 Comparison of DCS event lengths with corresponding spin event lengths: January 2021 through June 2026[93]




### Figure 10-22 Direct comparison of DCS event lengths with corresponding spin event lengths: January 2021 through June 2026





Figure 10-22 directly compares the spin event lengths and DCS event lengths seen in Figure 10-21. Figure 10-22 shows that the lengths of spin events, while correlated with their corresponding DCS event length, vary noticeably. The end of a DCS event is a specific condition defined by NERC. PJM has not publicly shared the exact metrics and process they use to determine when to end a spin event. PJM has described looking at system conditions, such as whether units are coming online. Although this flexibility is useful for managing the stability of the system, this flexibility also makes spin event length less useful as a metric of reserve performance. PJM should not focus on spin event lengths as a reserve performance target. PJM should focus on DCS event lengths with their more precise definitions. PJM should justify its chosen metrics' differences from the NERC standards. According to NERC's standards, holding aside two events (one with possibly extenuating circumstances, the other without a corresponding spin event), PJM has been and continues to successfully meet the NERC standards by a wide margin.

93 This chart previously showed the SR deployment improvement starting on December 17, 2023, instead of the correct date, December 17, 2024.

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Table 10-23 lists the DCS events and corresponding spin events shown in Figure 10-21 and Figure 10-22.

### Table 10-23 Comparison of DCS event lengths with corresponding spin event lengths: January 2021 through June 2026[94]


| DCS Start | DCS End | DCS Length | Spin Start | Spin End | Spin Length |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03-Mar-2022 1218 (EPT) | 03-Mar-2022 1224 (EPT) | 00:06:03 | 03-Mar-2022 1220 (EPT) | 03-Mar-2022 1227 (EPT) | 00:07:21 |
| 06-Apr-2022 1144 (EPT) | 06-Apr-2022 1149 (EPT) | 00:05:12 | 06-Apr-2022 1145 (EPT) | 06-Apr-2022 1155 (EPT) | 00:09:43 |
| 14-Apr-2022 0928 (EPT) | 14-Apr-2022 0934 (EPT) | 00:05:40 | 14-Apr-2022 0930 (EPT) | 14-Apr-2022 0938 (EPT) | 00:08:07 |
| 16-May-2022 1531 (EPT) | 16-May-2022 1537 (EPT) | 00:06:12 | 16-May-2022 1532 (EPT) | 16-May-2022 1543 (EPT) | 00:11:05 |
| 16-May-2022 1553 (EPT) | 16-May-2022 1556 (EPT) | 00:03:18 | 16-May-2022 1553 (EPT) | 16-May-2022 1603 (EPT) | 00:09:34 |
| 23-May-2022 1717 (EPT) | 23-May-2022 1720 (EPT) | 00:03:17 | 23-May-2022 1717 (EPT) | 23-May-2022 1732 (EPT) | 00:15:00 |
| 27-Jun-2022 1700 (EPT) | 27-Jun-2022 1704 (EPT) | 00:04:16 | 27-Jun-2022 1701 (EPT) | 27-Jun-2022 1710 (EPT) | 00:09:03 |
| 07-Jul-2022 1720 (EPT) | 07-Jul-2022 1724 (EPT) | 00:03:27 | 07-Jul-2022 1721 (EPT) | 07-Jul-2022 1729 (EPT) | 00:07:52 |
| 26-Sep-2022 0335 (EPT) | 26-Sep-2022 0342 (EPT) | 00:06:16 | 26-Sep-2022 0339 (EPT) | 26-Sep-2022 0345 (EPT) | 00:06:02 |
| 29-Oct-2022 0210 (EPT) | 29-Oct-2022 0215 (EPT) | 00:04:42 | 29-Oct-2022 0212 (EPT) | 29-Oct-2022 0224 (EPT) | 00:11:52 |
| 04-Nov-2022 1501 (EPT) | 04-Nov-2022 1504 (EPT) | 00:02:58 | 04-Nov-2022 1503 (EPT) | 04-Nov-2022 1507 (EPT) | 00:04:25 |
| 29-Nov-2022 1629 (EPT) | 29-Nov-2022 1638 (EPT) | 00:08:23 | 29-Nov-2022 1630 (EPT) | 29-Nov-2022 1647 (EPT) | 00:16:45 |
| 24-Dec-2022 0223 (EPT) | 24-Dec-2022 0228 (EPT) | 00:05:15 | 24-Dec-2022 0223 (EPT) | 24-Dec-2022 0254 (EPT) | 00:30:35 |
| 05-Jan-2023 1242 (EPT) | 05-Jan-2023 1247 (EPT) | 00:04:56 | 05-Jan-2023 1243 (EPT) | 05-Jan-2023 1255 (EPT) | 00:11:33 |
| 10-Aug-2023 0039 (EPT) | 10-Aug-2023 0043 (EPT) | 00:04:02 | 10-Aug-2023 0041 (EPT) | 10-Aug-2023 0049 (EPT) | 00:07:33 |
| 14-Dec-2023 1939 (EPT) | 14-Dec-2023 1943 (EPT) | 00:03:58 | 15-Dec-2023 0041 (EPT) | 15-Dec-2023 0053 (EPT) | 00:12:15 |
| 19-Dec-2023 0449 (EPT) | 19-Dec-2023 0450 (EPT) | 00:01:25 | 19-Dec-2023 1451 (EPT) | 19-Dec-2023 1458 (EPT) | 00:06:30 |
| 13-Jan-2024 0157 (EPT) | 13-Jan-2024 0201 (EPT) | 00:04:26 | 13-Jan-2024 0159 (EPT) | 13-Jan-2024 0204 (EPT) | 00:05:15 |
| 25-Jan-2024 1237 (EPT) | 25-Jan-2024 1241 (EPT) | 00:04:48 | 25-Jan-2024 1239 (EPT) | 25-Jan-2024 1247 (EPT) | 00:08:37 |
| 29-Jan-2024 1202 (EPT) | 29-Jan-2024 1206 (EPT) | 00:04:35 | 29-Jan-2024 1203 (EPT) | 29-Jan-2024 1212 (EPT) | 00:08:54 |
| 24-Feb-2024 1546 (EPT) | 24-Feb-2024 1551 (EPT) | 00:05:36 | 24-Feb-2024 1548 (EPT) | 24-Feb-2024 1600 (EPT) | 00:12:19 |
| 04-Apr-2024 1047 (EPT) | 04-Apr-2024 1052 (EPT) | 00:04:45 | 04-Apr-2024 1050 (EPT) | 04-Apr-2024 1055 (EPT) | 00:05:15 |
| 03-Jun-2024 1852 (EPT) | 03-Jun-2024 1858 (EPT) | 00:06:41 | 03-Jun-2024 1853 (EPT) | 03-Jun-2024 1902 (EPT) | 00:08:35 |
| 29-Jun-2024 2101 (EPT) | 29-Jun-2024 2106 (EPT) | 00:04:48 | 29-Jun-2024 2103 (EPT) | 29-Jun-2024 2109 (EPT) | 00:05:36 |
| 12-Aug-2024 1709 (EPT) | 12-Aug-2024 1713 (EPT) | 00:04:25 | 12-Aug-2024 1710 (EPT) | 12-Aug-2024 1720 (EPT) | 00:09:39 |
| 26-Aug-2024 1352 (EPT) | 26-Aug-2024 1355 (EPT) | 00:02:48 | 26-Aug-2024 1353 (EPT) | 26-Aug-2024 1357 (EPT) | 00:04:13 |
| 27-Nov-2024 1934 (EPT) | 27-Nov-2024 1939 (EPT) | 00:04:35 | 27-Nov-2024 1934 (EPT) | 27-Nov-2024 1946 (EPT) | 00:11:57 |
| 11-Dec-2024 0819 (EPT) | 11-Dec-2024 0823 (EPT) | 00:04:00 | 11-Dec-2024 0821 (EPT) | 11-Dec-2024 0827 (EPT) | 00:06:00 |
| 05-Feb-2025 1003 (EPT) | 05-Feb-2025 1007 (EPT) | 00:03:49 | 05-Feb-2025 1005 (EPT) | 05-Feb-2025 1015 (EPT) | 00:10:02 |
| 06-Feb-2025 1355 (EPT) | 06-Feb-2025 1358 (EPT) | 00:02:39 | 06-Feb-2025 1356 (EPT) | 06-Feb-2025 1401 (EPT) | 00:04:59 |
| 05-Apr-2025 0420 (EPT) | 05-Apr-2025 0424 (EPT) | 00:03:54 | 05-Apr-2025 0421 (EPT) | 05-Apr-2025 0429 (EPT) | 00:08:22 |
| 24-Apr-2025 0048 (EPT) | 24-Apr-2025 0052 (EPT) | 00:04:49 | 24-Apr-2025 0050 (EPT) | 24-Apr-2025 0057 (EPT) | 00:06:43 |
| 19-May-2025 1145 (EPT) | 19-May-2025 1149 (EPT) | 00:04:14 | 19-May-2025 1146 (EPT) | 19-May-2025 1153 (EPT) | 00:07:31 |
| 01-Jul-2025 1016 (EPT) | 01-Jul-2025 1021 (EPT) | 00:04:49 | 01-Jul-2025 1018 (EPT) | 01-Jul-2025 1029 (EPT) | 00:10:39 |
| 22-Jul-2025 1510 (EPT) | 22-Jul-2025 1513 (EPT) | 00:03:08 | 22-Jul-2025 1511 (EPT) | 22-Jul-2025 1522 (EPT) | 00:10:32 |
| 30-Jul-2025 1330 (EPT) | 30-Jul-2025 1333 (EPT) | 00:02:41 | 30-Jul-2025 1331 (EPT) | 30-Jul-2025 1337 (EPT) | 00:05:58 |
| 31-Jul-2025 0132 (EPT) | 31-Jul-2025 0136 (EPT) | 00:03:56 | 31-Jul-2025 0133 (EPT) | 31-Jul-2025 0139 (EPT) | 00:06:17 |
| 15-Aug-2025 1531 (EPT) | 15-Aug-2025 1534 (EPT) | 00:02:37 | 15-Aug-2025 1533 (EPT) | 15-Aug-2025 1538 (EPT) | 00:05:23 |
| 29-Sep-2025 2128 (EPT) | 29-Sep-2025 2132 (EPT) | 00:03:58 | 29-Sep-2025 2130 (EPT) | 29-Sep-2025 2136 (EPT) | 00:06:45 |
| 09-Jan-2026 2131 (EPT) | 09-Jan-2026 2133 (EPT) | 00:01:55 | 09-Jan-2026 2132 (EPT) | 09-Jan-2026 2138 (EPT) | 00:05:18 |
| 18-Jan-2026 0320 (EPT) | 18-Jan-2026 0322 (EPT) | 00:02:43 | 18-Jan-2026 0321 (EPT) | 18-Jan-2026 0330 (EPT) | 00:09:11 |
| 30-Jan-2026 1246 (EPT) | 30-Jan-2026 1250 (EPT) | 00:03:54 | 30-Jan-2026 1247 (EPT) | 30-Jan-2026 1252 (EPT) | 00:04:37 |
| 31-Jan-2026 0522 (EPT) | 31-Jan-2026 0524 (EPT) | 00:02:23 | 31-Jan-2026 0523 (EPT) | 31-Jan-2026 0529 (EPT) | 00:05:57 |
| 23-Feb-2026 0205 (EPT) | 23-Feb-2026 0209 (EPT) | 00:03:40 | 23-Feb-2026 0206 (EPT) | 23-Feb-2026 0213 (EPT) | 00:06:52 |
| 01-Mar-2026 1928 (EPT) | 01-Mar-2026 1930 (EPT) | 00:02:45 | 01-Mar-2026 1929 (EPT) | 01-Mar-2026 1940 (EPT) | 00:11:09 |

94 This chart previously showed the SR deployment improvement starting on December 17, 2023, instead of the correct date, December 17, 2024.


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As an example of the differences between the lengths of spin events and the lengths of DCS events, Figure 10-23 shows PJM ACE during a DCS event and its corresponding spin event on January 5, 2023. The DCS event lasted 4 minutes and 56 seconds, while the spin event lasted 11 minutes and 33 seconds, more than twice as long. The DCS event ended when Reporting ACE (RACE) recovered to its level at the time of the loss of supply, while the spin event ended based on PJM discretion.

### Figure 10-23 DCS Event vs. Spin Event: January 5, 2023





If the basis of the original definition of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement was an amount of MW needed to recover within 10 minutes, then an increase in the amount of cleared reserves can shorten the length of synchronized reserve events to be less than 10 minutes. In the remainder of 2023 after the increase in the reliability requirement in May 2023, there were eight spin events, of which seven were less than 10 minutes. Similarly, of the 19 spin events in 2024, 13 were less than 10 minutes. Of the 28 spin events in 2025, 21 were less than 10 minutes. Of the eight events in the first six months of 2026, PJM triggered only one event of 10 or more minutes. Because these shorter events lasted less than 10 minutes, only a small portion of the events since the increase qualify for performance assessment under the PJM Market Rules. PJM has stated that they monitor performance for events less than 10 minutes. If the PJM analysis fails to consider the lags that the ALL-CALL system introduces, different for each contacted resource, then it will continue to show underperformance.

In most of the spin events for the RTO Reserve Zone that have occurred since the reserve requirement increase in May 2023 through the first six months of 2026, including the events less than 10 minutes, ACE response is consistent with the rate of recovery that would be expected if reserves had performed adequately. Figure 10-24 shows one such event on January 29, 2024. However, some resources are responding to PJM's event notifications when they did not clear the reserve market, so they do not have reserve assignments during those events and so do not count towards reserve performance. PJM has defined the problem as one not of poor overall system response nor of poor ACE recovery, but one of poor performance from the assigned reserves. At the Operating Committee on March 6, 2025, PJM announced that they would decrease the adder to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement if average event performance were greater than 75 percent for qualifying events. Under these announced criteria, qualifying events would be any 10-minute event and any shorter event in which event performance was at least 75 percent. Even with these criteria, the fact that performance remains unsatisfactory for multiple events in the months with the increased requirements is evidence that the increase is not the correct solution to the asserted problem.

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**Figure 10-24 ACE response during a synchronized reserve event: January 29, 2024 from 12:03 to 12:12 EPT**




The MMU disagrees with PJM that increasing the reserve requirement is the correct solution for accounting for poor reserve performance.[95] The MMU's position is that these problems with the supply of reserves should not be solved by changing the demand for reserves. The situation is a problem on the supply side, and it should be dealt with and solved on the supply side. The repeated lack of response means that resource personnel are insufficiently trained or that resource data inputs, such as ramp rates, the times needed for condensers to start, and economic maximums, are incorrect. It is the responsibility of market participants to correct their offer parameters and operating parameters. It is their obligation to submit correct data.

The data on synchronized reserve event recovery do not support the conclusion that there is an immediate need to change how reserves clear. If PJM insists on an immediate change, the focus should be on correcting the supply of reserves rather than increasing demand.

PJM's logic is that because reserves are responding at an average rate of about 50 percent during spin events, the solution is to buy twice as many MW of reserves. The result is that PJM is overpaying for reserve MW. PJM is paying for 1.0 MW but receiving 0.5 MW. PJM's solution is to pay for 2.0 MW in order to receive 1.0 MW.

Instead of increasing the demand requirement, the MMU proposes to purchase reserve MW from resources only in the amounts for which they can actually perform. If an underperforming resource's behavior shows that they can only reliably provide 0.5 MW of reserve, then PJM should only be purchasing 0.5 MW of reserve from them. PJM should not be paying MCP credits for MW that are not reliably provided, especially when it only recovers a portion of that money later via penalties and charges. Instead of PJM paying for 2.0 poorly performing MW in order to receive 1.0 reliable MW, the MMU proposal is to pay for 0.5 reliable MW from each of two underperforming units. The result is to pay for 1.0 MW and to receive 1.0 MW of reserves. The MMU proposal is to buy the correct amount of reserves by accounting for the actual performance of supply. No increase in demand is required.

A focus on the supply side issues should be implemented immediately: ensure correct and timely signals; provide education on requirements; buy required reliable MW, based on actual performance; pay only for reliable MW based on actual performance; and do not pay for MW not provided. Detailed, unit by unit analysis of the reasons for poor performance is needed. Potential unit specific issues include: ensuring the ability to receive and respond to signals; discontinuities in offer curves; the accuracy of ramp rates; ambient derates; fuel availability; demand side resource response; failure to follow dispatch; incorrect eco max or spin max; and incorrect parameters.

One result of PJM's changes to the reserve requirements is that the total cost of the synchronized reserve market has increased. For May 2023 through December 2023, total credits paid for synchronized reserve were $66.7 million in eight months or $8.3 million per month, compared to $6.4 million in four months or $1.6 million per month for January 2023 through April 2023. In 2024, the total credits paid for synchronized reserve were $74.1 million or $6.2 million per month. In 2025, the total credits paid for synchronized reserve were $150.8 million or $12.6 million per month. In the first six months of 2026, the total credits paid for synchronized reserve were $70.4 million or $11.7 million per month. Table 10-18 shows the total payments and charges

95 See "Market Monitor Report," MMU presentation to the Members Committee Webinar. (May 22, 2023) <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2023/20230522-webinar/item-04---imm-report.ashx>.



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for synchronized reserve by month. In the first six months of 2026, day-ahead credits to day-ahead synchronized reserve (which, as seen in Table 10-18, is by far the largest contributor to total synchronized reserve credits) cleared in excess of the original day-ahead synchronized reserve requirement had the adder not been in place totaled $18.1 million. In 2025, such credits totaled $47.5 million. The cost of underperformance by reserve suppliers is paid by PJM customers, while it should be incurred by the suppliers who fail to meet their responsibilities. If reserve suppliers cannot provide the energy that they offer and clear during synchronized reserve events, they should not be paid from the last time they successfully responded to a spin event. These suppliers are not accurately representing their true capability to the PJM market and/or have failed to establish processes to ensure that they follow PJM's instructions.

On March 6, 2025, PJM presented to the PJM Operating Committee its criteria for decreasing (or increasing) the adder to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement by reviewing the average performance of non-overlapping sets of three qualifying events.[96] [97] A qualifying event is an event lasting at least 10 minutes or an event whose performance was at least 75 percent of the total reserve assignment. This performance is based on a resource's scheduled MW, not the MW amount that PJM uses its tools to deploy. Table 10-24 shows the average performance required for each level of adjustment, with the adder not to exceed 30 percent of the most severe single contingency. In the first six months of 2026, there has been one event lasting 10 or more minutes out of eight events total. If synchronized reserve performs well in terms of its goal of restoring the system within 10 minutes, one would expect that the synchronized reserve event would last less than 10 minutes. As reserve performance improves following the improvement to synchronized reserve deployment in December 2024, it is possible for the larger reserve amounts cleared due to the adder to result in shorter synchronized reserve events, as more reserves are being deployed to cover supply losses less than or equal to the MSSC. If a synchronized reserve event lasts less than 10 minutes, one would expect that the reserve resources would not increase output by their full 10 minute ramp. Although PJM has included a way for shorter events to be considered for decreasing the adder, the 75 percent cutoff is arbitrary. That a shorter event does not achieve 75 percent performance in less than, for example, five minutes, is not necessarily indicative of a problem, because the only defining performance requirement for the synchronized reserve product is that it should achieve full performance by the tenth minute. Only events lasting 10 or more minutes can be true measures of under performance.

As shown by Table 10-20, poor performance is not an across the board problem, yet PJM's current criteria and approach treat it as if it were. Reserve supply issues are resource specific and should be addressed at the resource level, such as by requiring support for an electronic deployment signal. Increasing the requirement does not change resource behavior. Engaging with poorly performing resources, as the MMU and PJM have been doing, does change behavior. Reserve testing would allow PJM to identify underperforming resources that would benefit from unit specific engagement. Such identification would be proactive instead of reactive, improving event performance.

### Table 10-24 PJM criteria for adjusting the adder in the synchronized reserve reliability requirement

| Average Performance | Adder Adjustment |
|---|---|
| Below 70% | Increase by 10 percentage points |
| Above 75% | Decrease by 10 percentage points |
| Above 85% | Decrease by 20 percentage points |
| Above 95% | Decrease by 30 percentage points |

## History of Synchronized Reserve Events

Synchronized reserve is designed to provide relief for disturbances, which NERC calls "balancing contingency events".[98] [99] Reportable balancing contingency events, from which PJM must recover within 15 minutes, are defined as the loss, within 60 seconds, of no more than the most severe single contingency (MSSC) and no less than lesser of 900 MW and 80 percent of the MSSC. In the absence of a disturbance, PJM operators have used synchronized reserve as a source of energy to provide relief from low ACE. Of the 28 events

96 See "Synchronized Reserve Requirement for Reliability – Update," PJM presentation to the Operating Committee. (March 6, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250306/20250306-item-08b---synchronized-reserve-adder.pdf> .

97 See "Synchronized Reserve Requirement for Reliability – Update," PJM presentation to the Operating Committee. (May 8, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250508/20250508-item-20---synchronized-reserve-for-reliability-update.pdf>.

98 *2012 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix E – PJM's DCS Performance.

99 See PJM. "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 4.1.2 Loading Reserves, Rev. 56 (Oct. 1, 2025).

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that occurred in 2025, four events were explicitly due to low ACE, of which all four events were less than 10 minutes. Of the eight events in the first six months of 2026, zero events were explicitly due to low ACE.

The risk of using synchronized reserves for energy or any other nondisturbance reason is that it reduces the amount of synchronized reserve available for a disturbance. Disturbances are unpredictable. Synchronized reserve has a requirement to sustain its output for 30 minutes at the most. When reserve output is still needed after 30 minutes, that output should come from secondary reserves, not synchronized reserves.

From January 2022 through June 2026, PJM experienced 90 synchronized reserve events, approximately 1.4 events per month, with an average duration of 10.9 minutes. Table 10-25 shows these events with their region and their duration rounded to the nearest tenth of a minute.


### Table 10-25 Synchronized reserve events: January 2022 through June 2026

| Effective Time | Region | Duration (Minutes) | Effective Time | Region | Duration (Minutes) | Effective Time | Region | Duration (Minutes) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03-Jan-2022 1227 (EPT) | RTO | 8.9 | 13-Jan-2024 0159 (EPT) | RTO | 5.3 | 21-Jan-2025 0520 (EPT) | RTO | 4.7 |
| 03-Mar-2022 1220 (EPT) | RTO | 7.4 | 25-Jan-2024 1239 (EPT) | RTO | 8.6 | 05-Feb-2025 1505 (EPT) | RTO | 10.0 |
| 06-Apr-2022 1145 (EPT) | RTO | 9.7 | 29-Jan-2024 1203 (EPT) | RTO | 8.9 | 06-Feb-2025 1856 (EPT) | RTO | 5.0 |
| 13-Apr-2022 1725 (EPT) | RTO | 28.5 | 24-Feb-2024 1548 (EPT) | MAD | 12.3 | 11-Feb-2025 1404 (EPT) | RTO | 5.3 |
| 14-Apr-2022 0931 (EPT) | RTO | 8.1 | 04-Apr-2024 1050 (EPT) | RTO | 5.3 | 05-Apr-2025 0421 (EPT) | RTO | 8.4 |
| 16-May-2022 1532 (EPT) | RTO | 11.1 | 13-Apr-2024 0036 (EPT) | RTO | 7.1 | 24-Apr-2025 0050 (EPT) | MAD | 7.1 |
| 16-May-2022 1553 (EPT) | RTO | 9.6 | 03-Jun-2024 1853 (EPT) | RTO | 8.6 | 19-May-2025 1146 (EPT) | RTO | 7.5 |
| 23-May-2022 1717 (EPT) | RTO | 15.0 | 29-Jun-2024 2103 (EPT) | RTO | 5.6 | 22-Jun-2025 1937 (EPT) | RTO | 7.8 |
| 26-May-2022 1409 (EPT) | RTO | 6.3 | 08-Jul-2024 1757 (EPT) | RTO | 14.5 | 01-Jul-2025 1018 (EPT) | RTO | 10.6 |
| 22-Jun-2022 1506 (EPT) | RTO | 7.2 | 18-Jul-2024 1524 (EPT) | RTO | 7.0 | 22-Jul-2025 1511 (EPT) | RTO | 11.5 |
| 27-Jun-2022 1701 (EPT) | RTO | 9.1 | 21-Jul-2024 1753 (EPT) | RTO | 10.2 | 30-Jul-2025 1331 (EPT) | RTO | 6.0 |
| 07-Jul-2022 1721 (EPT) | RTO | 7.9 | 12-Aug-2024 1710 (EPT) | RTO | 9.7 | 31-Jul-2025 0133 (EPT) | RTO | 6.3 |
| 26-Sep-2022 0339 (EPT) | RTO | 6.0 | 18-Aug-2024 1604 (EPT) | RTO | 15.9 | 06-Aug-2025 1849 (EPT) | MAD | 7.9 |
| 29-Sep-2022 1025 (EPT) | RTO | 6.2 | 26-Aug-2024 1353 (EPT) | RTO | 4.2 | 14-Aug-2025 1740 (EPT) | RTO | 4.3 |
| 29-Oct-2022 1412 (EPT) | RTO | 11.9 | 22-Oct-2024 1002 (EPT) | RTO | 6.2 | 15-Aug-2025 1533 (EPT) | RTO | 5.4 |
| 04-Nov-2022 1503 (EPT) | RTO | 4.4 | 10-Nov-2024 0020 (EPT) | RTO | 10.8 | 04-Sep-2025 1956 (EPT) | RTO | 9.0 |
| 14-Nov-2022 22:01 (EPT) | RTO | 6.7 | 27-Nov-2024 1936 (EPT) | RTO | 10.0 | 25-Sep-2025 1912 (EPT) | RTO | 10.7 |
| 29-Nov-2022 1630 (EPT) | RTO | 16.8 | 29-Nov-2024 1103 (EPT) | RTO | 7.4 | 25-Sep-2025 1935 (EPT) | RTO | 7.7 |
| 23-Dec-2022 1014 (EPT) | RTO | 11.1 | 11-Dec-2024 0821 (EPT) | RTO | 6.0 | 29-Sep-2025 2130 (EPT) | RTO | 6.8 |
| 23-Dec-2022 1617 (EPT) | RTO | 111.5 | | | | 15-Oct-2025 1652 (EPT) | RTO | 5.4 |
| 24-Dec-2022 0501 (EPT) | RTO | 25.7 | | | | 17-Oct-2025 1013 (EPT) | RTO | 11.1 |
| 24-Dec-2022 0223 (EPT) | RTO | 30.6 | | | | 28-Oct-2025 1905 (EPT) | RTO | 14.7 |
| 24-Dec-2022 0423 (EPT) | RTO | 87.5 | | | | 02-Nov-2025 1446 (EPT) | RTO | 5.7 |
| | | | | | | 06-Nov-2025 2240 (EPT) | RTO | 4.2 |
| 05-Jan-2023 1243 (EPT) | RTO | 11.6 | | | | 11-Nov-2025 1004 (EPT) | RTO | 10.3 |
| 10-Jan-2023 0706 (EPT) | RTO | 17.5 | | | | 05-Dec-2025 1930 (EPT) | RTO | 4.4 |
| 26-Jan-2023 1452 (EPT) | MAD | 6.9 | | | | 06-Dec-2025 0505 (EPT) | RTO | 7.8 |
| 02-Feb-2023 0606 (EPT) | RTO | 8.0 | | | | 28-Dec-2025 1707 (EPT) | RTO | 9.8 |
| 28-May-2023 2009 (EPT) | RTO | 7.4 | | | | | | |
| 11-Jun-2023 1611 (EPT) | MAD | 8.7 | | | | 09-Jan-2026 2132 (EPT) | RTO | 5.3 |
| 23-Jun-2023 1905 (EPT) | RTO | 7.0 | | | | 18-Jan-2026 0321 (EPT) | MAD | 9.2 |
| 08-Aug-2023 0041 (EPT) | RTO | 7.6 | | | | 30-Jan-2026 1247 (EPT) | RTO | 4.6 |
| 07-Nov-2023 1619 (EPT) | RTO | 5.4 | | | | 31-Jan-2026 0523 (EPT) | RTO | 6.0 |
| 10-Nov-2023 0621 (EPT) | RTO | 8.1 | | | | 03-Feb-2026 1149 (EPT) | RTO | 4.4 |
| 15-Dec-2023 0041 (EPT) | RTO | 12.3 | | | | 23-Feb-2026 0206 (EPT) | RTO | 6.9 |
| 19-Dec-2023 0951 (EPT) | RTO | 6.5 | | | | 01-Mar-2026 1929 (EPT) | RTO | 11.2 |
| | | | | | | 05-Mar-2026 0224 (EPT) | RTO | 4.0 |


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Figure 10-25 shows spin event durations over the past 4 years. Events can last longer than 30 minutes. Beyond 30 minutes, reserves no longer have an obligation to perform. It is not clear what resources are instructed or expected to do after the 30-minute performance obligation. This ambiguity applies to three synchronized reserve events during Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022, which all lasted longer than 30 minutes.

**Figure 10-25 Synchronized reserve events duration distribution curve: January 2023 through June 2026**




## Nonsynchronized Reserve

Nonsynchronized reserve (NSR) consists of MW available within 10 minutes but not synchronized to the grid. Startup time for nonsynchronized reserve resources is not subject to testing and is based on the parameters in the energy offers submitted by resource owners. There is no defined requirement for nonsynchronized reserve; it is available to economically meet the primary reserve requirement. Generation resources that have designated their entire output as emergency are not eligible to provide nonsynchronized reserves. Generation resources that are not available to provide energy are not eligible to provide nonsynchronized reserves.

The nonsynchronized reserve market has a day-ahead and a real-time component. There are no lost opportunity costs for nonsynchronized reserve. Offline units cannot be dispatched to provide energy, because PJM has not called them to come online, so they do not have a lost opportunity to provide energy. As a result, the supply curve for nonsynchronized reserve has a price of zero and there are no uplift credits paid when LMP is higher than the incremental cost of nonsynchronized reserve units.

PJM defines the demand curve for nonsynchronized reserve, and PJM defines the supply curve based on nonemergency generation resources that are available to provide energy and can start in 10 minutes or less. Since nonsynchronized reserve is considered a lower quality product than synchronized reserve, its clearing price is less than or equal to the synchronized reserve market clearing price. In most market intervals, under usual circumstances, the nonsynchronized reserve market clearing price (NSRMCP) is $0 per MWh. However, due to PJM's increase of the synchronized reserve reliability requirement, there has been an increase in the number of intervals with nonzero NSRMCPs. For example, the percent of intervals with an RTO NSRMCP above zero was 1.7 percent for 2022 and 21.8 percent for the first six months of 2026. Table 10-26 shows the number of intervals with non-zero NSRMCPs in the first six months of 2026.

PJM has the ability to collectively deploy nonsynchronized reserve by calling a nonsynchronized reserve event, although there are no recent examples of this. There were no nonsynchronized reserve events from January 2025 through June 2026. Although PJM does not use nonsynchronized reserve events, PJM does call specific nonsynchronized reserve resources to respond to synchronized reserve events.

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# Market Structure

## Demand

There is no explicit demand for nonsynchronized reserve beyond a more general demand for primary reserve, which can be satisfied by the synchronized and nonsynchronized reserve products, and for 30-minute reserve, which can be satisfied by all three reserve products. Beyond the synchronized reserve requirement, the balance of primary reserve can be made up by the economic combination of synchronized and nonsynchronized reserve. While it can be used to satisfy the 30-minute reserve requirement, as seen in Figure 10-2, nonsynchronized reserve is mainly used for satisfying the primary reserve requirement.

In the RTO Reserve Zone, in the first six months of 2026, the average amount of real-time cleared nonsynchronized reserve was 1,021.3 MW and the average day-ahead cleared nonsynchronized reserve was 1,040.7 MW. In the MAD Reserve Subzone, in the first six months of 2026, the average real-time cleared nonsynchronized reserve was 701.4 MW and the average day-ahead cleared nonsynchronized reserve was 644.3 MW.


## Supply

The market solution considers the available supply of nonsynchronized reserve to be all generation resources currently not synchronized to the grid but available and capable of providing energy within 10 minutes. Generators that have made themselves unavailable or that have defined themselves to be emergency only are not considered. Resources that generally qualify as nonsynchronized reserve include run of river hydro, pumped hydro, and combustion turbines and RICE generators that can start in 10 minutes or less.

The available reserve MW for nonsynchronized reserve units is the lesser of the economic maximum or the ramp rate times 10 minutes minus the startup and notification time. Hydroelectric resources must separately specify their availability and offer MW.

In the first six months of 2026, an average of 1,021.3 MW of nonsynchronized reserve was cleared per five-minute interval out of an average eligible and available 1,056.4 MW as part of the primary reserve requirement in the RTO Reserve Zone. Figure 10-26 shows daily average total nonsynchronized reserve MW available in the first six months of 2026. Available nonsynchronized reserve decreased on January 25 and January 26 during a cold weather event which included Winter Storm Fern, for which PJM increased online generation. Daily average available nonsynchronized reserve decreased from May 18 through May 20 during a hot weather event for which PJM issued hot weather alerts, low voltage alerts, maximum emergency generation alerts, heavy load voltage schedule warnings; recalled maintenance outages; and triggered pre-emergency load management reductions. This coincides with an increase in synchronized reserve MW seen in Figure 10-13.

**Figure 10-26 Daily Average Available Nonsynchronized Reserve: January through June, 2026**







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Figure 10-27 shows the daily average total available NSR MW in the ASO, RT SCED, and day-ahead solutions. The available MW in the ASO are consistently lower due to differences in the available MW from flexible units based on the goal of the ASO. For example, a unit could be projected to be online by the ASO but actually be offline in real time.

**Figure 10-27 Daily average total available MW in the day-ahead, ASO, and RT SCED solutions: January through June, 2026**




## Market Behavior

The offer price for nonsynchronized reserve for all resources is cost based, which is $0 per MWh for all nonsynchronized resources.

## Market Performance

The settled price of nonsynchronized reserve is calculated in real time every five minutes for the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone. Figure 10-28 shows the daily average nonsynchronized reserve market clearing price (NSRMCP) and average credited MW for the RTO Reserve Zone. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time weighted average NSRMCP for all intervals in the RTO Reserve Zone was $2.10 per MWh and the real-time average nonsynchronized reserve cleared was 1,021.3 MW. The day-ahead weighted average NSRMCP for all intervals in the RTO Reserve Zone was $1.74 per MWh and the day-ahead average nonsynchronized reserve cleared MW was 1,040.7 MW. The real-time weighted average NSRMCP for all intervals in the MAD Reserve Subzone was $2.71 per MWh and the real-time average nonsynchronized reserve cleared was 701.4 MW. The day-ahead weighted average NSRMCP for all intervals in the MAD Reserve Subzone was $1.72 per MWh and the day-ahead average nonsynchronized reserve cleared MW was 644.3 MW.

In the first six months of 2026, shortage pricing was used in the RTO Reserve Zone for primary reserve on January 24 and 31; February 2, 6, 9, 13, and 16; and March 1, 12, 13, and 22. In the first six months of 2026, shortage pricing was used in the MAD Reserve Subzone for primary reserve on January 24; February 9; and March 1, 12, and 13. The shortage pricing on March 1, 2026, overlapped with synchronized reserve events. Conservative operations due to cold weather were in place from January 24 through February 2, 2026. Cold weather alerts were issued for January 19, 20, 23, and 24 through 31 and for February 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9. During most of these short intervals, there was not a true shortage, as PJM still cleared above the average reserve requirements used before PJM's mid-May 2023 increase.

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### Figure 10-28 Daily weighted average RTO Zone nonsynchronized reserve market clearing price, average MW purchased, and average percent of PR that is NSR: January 2025 through June 2026





Table 10-26 shows the number of five-minute intervals with an NSRMCP above $0 per MWh. The NSRMCP is equal to the cost of the marginal primary reserve resource.[100] While the offer price of NSR resources is cost based and therefore $0 per MWh, if the marginal resource of primary reserve in an interval is an SR resource with a nonzero cost, then the NSRMCP will equal the SRMCP.[101] While the real-time market clears resources in five-minute intervals, the day-ahead market clears by hour, equivalent to blocks of 12 five-minute intervals. Table 10-26 compares the two markets using five-minute intervals. There were 52,116 five-minute intervals in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-26 Number of five minute intervals with NSRMCP above $0 per MWh: January through June, 2026


| Location | Market | Number of Intervals Where NSRMCP Above $0 per MWh | Percent of Intervals Where NSRMCP Above $0 per MWh |
|---|---|---|---|
| RTO | RT | 11,338 | 21.8% |
| RTO | DA | 24,264 | 46.6% |
| MAD | RT | 11,469 | 22.0% |
| MAD | DA | 26,340 | 50.5% |

Figure 10-29 shows the number of intervals per day for which a nonzero NSRMCP equaled the SRMCP. Since the increase to the reserve requirement on May 12, 2023, the average number of such intervals per day has increased, with the maximum number and given number of such intervals per day both trending upwards. In the first six months of 2026, the number of such intervals differed for the RTO Reserve Zone and the MAD Reserve Subzone from January 4 through January 5. Table 10-27 shows the intervals for which a nonzero NSRMCP did not equal the SRMCP. Generally, when the marginal primary resource is a synchronized resource, then the NSRMCP equals the SRMCP. However, when shortage pricing is used, the two can differ, due to the NSRMCP being capped at $1,275 per MWh (1.5 times the $850 penalty factor) while the SRMCP is capped at $1,700 (two times the $850 penalty factor). Higher prices are seen in Figure 10-29 on December 14 and 15, 2025, during a cold weather event for which PJM issued cold weather alerts.

100 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.5.2 Determination of Non-Synchronized Reserve Clearing Prices, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
101 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 4.4.5.2 Determination of Non-Synchronized Reserve Clearing Prices, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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## Figure 10-29 Number of intervals per day for which a nonzero NSRMCP equaled the SRMCP: January 2025 through June 2026




## Table 10-27 Summary of intervals with a nonzero NSRMCP in which the NSRMCP did not equal the SRMCP: January through June, 2026

| | Intervals where NSRMCP differs from SRMCP | | Average Absolute MCP Difference | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day | RTO | MAD | RTO | MAD |
| 24-Jan-2026 | 2 | 2 | $575.00 | $425.00 |
| 25-Jan-2026 | 0 | 1 | NA | $40.98 |
| 9-Feb-2026 | 1 | 3 | $180.34 | $425.00 |
| 1-Mar-2026 | 2 | 2 | $850.00 | $425.00 |
| 12-Mar-2026 | 4 | 4 | $712.50 | $606.25 |
| 13-Mar-2026 | 4 | 4 | $712.50 | $393.75 |
| 6-Apr-2026 | 2 | 2 | $850.00 | $425.00 |
| 18-Apr-2026 | 0 | 1 | NA | $14.49 |
| 18-May-2026 | 2 | 2 | $300.00 | $300.00 |
| 20-May-2026 | 0 | 15 | NA | $65.82 |
| 2-Jun-2026 | 1 | 1 | $850.00 | $850.00 |
| 11-Jun-2026 | 0 | 4 | NA | $137.54 |
| 14-Jun-2026 | 0 | 5 | NA | $0.55 |
| 22-Jun-2026 | 0 | 3 | NA | $11.10 |
| 29-Jun-2026 | 2 | 2 | $207.30 | $207.30 |

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Table 10-28 shows the effect of fast start pricing on the nonsynchronized reserve market's monthly weighted average market clearing price for January 2025 through June 2026. Fast start pricing increases LMP in the pricing run relative to the dispatch run, which increases reserve prices. Fast start pricing also reduces the amount of reserves available in the pricing run compared to the dispatch run, by pretending that fast start units can be dispatched for energy below their economic minimum output limit but not counting MW below the economic minimum output limit as reserves. For the real-time market, these are the LPC prices weighted by the RT SCED MW. For the day-ahead values, these are the DA prices weighted by the DA dispatch MW. The weighted average market clearing price for each month tends to be higher in the pricing run than in the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time RTO weighted average price of the pricing run was 20.0 percent higher than that of the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead RTO weighted average price of the pricing run was 1.0 percent higher than that of the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time MAD weighted average price of the pricing run was 21.9 percent higher than that of the dispatch run. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead MAD weighted average price of the pricing run was 3.5 percent higher than that of the dispatch run.

## Table 10-28 Comparison of fast start and dispatch RTO pricing: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| 2025 | Jan | $1.23 | $1.30 | $0.07 | 6.1% | $0.70 | $0.92 | $0.22 | 31.7% |
| 2025 | Feb | $0.59 | $0.59 | ($0.00) | (0.7%) | $0.51 | $0.79 | $0.28 | 54.2% |
| 2025 | Mar | $3.27 | $3.00 | ($0.26) | (8.1%) | $2.20 | $3.41 | $1.21 | 55.1% |
| 2025 | Apr | $3.56 | $3.41 | ($0.15) | (4.2%) | $0.93 | $1.85 | $0.92 | 99.5% |
| 2025 | May | $1.89 | $1.77 | ($0.12) | (6.4%) | $1.11 | $1.55 | $0.44 | 39.8% |
| 2025 | Jun | $3.74 | $3.47 | ($0.27) | (7.1%) | $3.31 | $4.10 | $0.79 | 23.8% |
| 2025 | Jul | $6.12 | $5.56 | ($0.56) | (9.2%) | $1.81 | $2.66 | $0.85 | 47.2% |
| 2025 | Aug | $1.89 | $1.59 | ($0.30) | (15.8%) | $0.78 | $1.10 | $0.33 | 42.3% |
| 2025 | Sep | $2.52 | $1.92 | ($0.60) | (23.7%) | $1.36 | $1.70 | $0.34 | 25.1% |
| 2025 | Oct | $3.65 | $3.66 | $0.02 | 0.5% | $1.67 | $2.33 | $0.66 | 39.5% |
| 2025 | Nov | $1.84 | $1.35 | ($0.49) | (26.6%) | $0.58 | $0.86 | $0.28 | 48.4% |
| 2025 | Dec | $1.15 | $0.91 | ($0.25) | (21.4%) | $0.84 | $1.17 | $0.33 | 39.2% |
| 2025 | All | $2.41 | $2.18 | ($0.23) | (9.6%) | $1.23 | $1.75 | $0.52 | 42.0% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $2.15 | $2.18 | $0.03 | 1.6% | $1.56 | $2.09 | $0.53 | 34.4% |
| 2026 | Feb | $0.73 | $0.53 | ($0.20) | (27.4%) | $1.56 | $1.92 | $0.36 | 23.0% |
| 2026 | Mar | $2.67 | $2.73 | $0.06 | 2.2% | $2.55 | $2.95 | $0.40 | 15.7% |
| 2026 | Apr | $0.96 | $1.00 | $0.03 | 3.6% | $0.97 | $1.11 | $0.14 | 14.9% |
| 2026 | May | $1.06 | $1.11 | $0.05 | 4.3% | $1.09 | $1.20 | $0.12 | 10.9% |
| 2026 | Jun | $1.24 | $1.36 | $0.13 | 10.1% | $1.90 | $2.17 | $0.27 | 14.4% |
| 2026 | All | $1.54 | $1.55 | $0.01 | 1.0% | $1.61 | $1.93 | $0.32 | 20.0% |


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### Table 10-29 Comparison of fast start and dispatch MAD pricing: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| 2025 | Jan | $1.09 | $1.14 | $0.05 | 4.9% | $1.01 | $1.25 | $0.23 | 22.9% |
| 2025 | Feb | $1.24 | $1.23 | ($0.01) | (1.1%) | $0.60 | $0.94 | $0.34 | 56.1% |
| 2025 | Mar | $4.53 | $4.21 | ($0.33) | (7.2%) | $2.71 | $4.14 | $1.43 | 52.9% |
| 2025 | Apr | $6.57 | $6.38 | ($0.19) | (3.0%) | $1.30 | $2.37 | $1.07 | 81.8% |
| 2025 | May | $4.13 | $3.87 | ($0.26) | (6.4%) | $1.42 | $2.04 | $0.61 | 43.1% |
| 2025 | Jun | $7.22 | $6.76 | ($0.46) | (6.4%) | $4.28 | $4.91 | $0.62 | 14.5% |
| 2025 | Jul | $10.23 | $9.40 | ($0.83) | (8.1%) | $1.88 | $2.80 | $0.92 | 49.2% |
| 2025 | Aug | $3.34 | $2.82 | ($0.52) | (15.5%) | $0.82 | $1.25 | $0.44 | 53.3% |
| 2025 | Sep | $2.74 | $2.22 | ($0.52) | (19.0%) | $1.60 | $1.96 | $0.36 | 22.5% |
| 2025 | Oct | $4.30 | $4.27 | ($0.03) | (0.7%) | $1.95 | $2.66 | $0.71 | 36.4% |
| 2025 | Nov | $3.23 | $3.32 | $0.09 | 2.7% | $1.14 | $1.54 | $0.40 | 34.7% |
| 2025 | Dec | $3.20 | $3.25 | $0.04 | 1.4% | $2.76 | $3.33 | $0.57 | 20.7% |
| 2025 | All | $3.66 | $3.47 | ($0.20) | (5.3%) | $1.73 | $2.33 | $0.60 | 35.0% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $0.95 | $0.98 | $0.03 | 3.3% | $2.22 | $2.98 | $0.76 | 34.0% |
| 2026 | Feb | $0.93 | $0.98 | $0.04 | 4.7% | $2.17 | $2.61 | $0.45 | 20.6% |
| 2026 | Mar | $2.78 | $2.83 | $0.05 | 1.9% | $3.06 | $3.38 | $0.32 | 10.5% |
| 2026 | Apr | $2.04 | $2.10 | $0.06 | 2.8% | $1.56 | $1.72 | $0.16 | 10.0% |
| 2026 | May | $2.00 | $2.04 | $0.05 | 2.3% | $1.52 | $2.29 | $0.76 | 50.1% |
| 2026 | Jun | $1.76 | $1.90 | $0.14 | 7.8% | $3.02 | $3.36 | $0.34 | 11.3% |
| 2026 | All | $1.66 | $1.72 | $0.06 | 3.5% | $2.23 | $2.72 | $0.49 | 21.9% |

In the first six months of 2026, in the RTO Reserve Zone, the real-time weighted average price of nonsynchronized reserve was $2.10 per MWh and the real-time weighted average sum of the MCP credits and LOC credits for nonsynchronized reserve was $1.16 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, in the MAD Reserve Subzone, the real-time weighted average price of nonsynchronized reserve was $2.71 per MWh and the real-time weighted average sum of the MCP credits and LOC credits for nonsynchronized reserve was $1.11 per MWh.

Table 10-30 shows the total nonsynchronized reserve payments by month from January 2025 through June 2026. In January and February 2026, shortage pricing for primary reserve in the RTO was used for 34 intervals during a cold weather event. Figure 10-28 shows the resulting spike in prices. Due to units buying back portions of their day-ahead schedule at these high real-time prices, the sum of the real-time and balancing MCP credits seen in Table 10-30 for January 2026 is significantly negative.

### Table 10-30 Total nonsynchronized reserve payments and charges by month: January 2025 through June 2026

| Year | Month | Day-Ahead Credits | Real-Time and Balancing MCP Credits | LOC Credits | Shortfall Charges | Total Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | $1,310,758 | ($807,014) | $185,652 | NA | $689,396 |
| 2025 | Feb | $698,931 | ($300,892) | $96,940 | NA | $494,978 |
| 2025 | Mar | $2,079,574 | ($470,698) | $289,300 | NA | $1,898,176 |
| 2025 | Apr | $1,984,502 | ($247,956) | $91,497 | NA | $1,828,043 |
| 2025 | May | $1,340,915 | ($151,404) | $64,475 | NA | $1,253,986 |
| 2025 | Jun | $2,457,199 | ($2,282,555) | $102,702 | NA | $277,346 |
| 2025 | Jul | $3,413,482 | ($958,506) | $121,292 | NA | $2,576,268 |
| 2025 | Aug | $1,266,236 | ($425,994) | $67,415 | NA | $907,657 |
| 2025 | Sep | $1,261,458 | ($285,138) | $163,072 | NA | $1,139,392 |
| 2025 | Oct | $1,708,180 | $132,342 | $61,983 | NA | $1,902,505 |
| 2025 | Nov | $1,411,665 | ($216,606) | $84,484 | NA | $1,279,542 |
| 2025 | Dec | $1,658,885 | ($266,092) | $269,558 | NA | $1,662,352 |
| 2025 | All | $20,591,785 | ($6,280,514) | $1,598,369 | NA | $15,909,641 |
| | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $2,369,695 | ($2,046,579) | $108,896 | NA | $432,012 |
| 2026 | Feb | $585,493 | ($729,174) | $135,868 | NA | ($7,814) |
| 2026 | Mar | $2,041,630 | ($394,677) | $87,783 | NA | $1,734,736 |
| 2026 | Apr | $811,720 | ($171,224) | $84,875 | NA | $725,371 |
| 2026 | May | $1,013,798 | $57,566 | $46,700 | NA | $1,118,064 |
| 2026 | Jun | $1,034,841 | $81,885 | $26,514 | NA | $1,143,239 |
| 2026 | All | $7,857,176 | ($3,202,204) | $490,636 | NA | $5,145,608 |

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Table 10-31 provides the day-ahead and real-time nonsynchronized reserve by primary resource type and fuel type for the first six months of 2026. Much of the negative balancing MCP credits applied to hydro resources occurred during Winter Storm Fern in January.

**Table 10-31 Day-ahead and real-time nonsynchronized reserve by primary resource type and fuel type: January through June, 2026**

| Resource / Fuel Type | Day-Ahead MWh | Real-Time Scheduled MWh | Day-Ahead Credits | Balancing MCP Credits | LOC Credits | Total Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CT - Other | 1,384,885 | 1,363,882 | $4,758,356 | ($476,603) | $92,713 | $4,374,466 |
| RICE | 355,894 | 338,871 | $734,784 | ($30,909) | $54,019 | $757,894 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 25,659 | 12,740 | $34,076 | ($33,068) | $11,536 | $12,544 |
| Hydro | 2,753,414 | 2,719,955 | $2,329,960 | ($2,661,623) | $332,368 | $704 |

# 30-Minute Reserve

The 30-minute reserve service is provided by resources that can respond in 30 minutes. The requirement for the 30-minute reserve service can be satisfied by the synchronized reserve product, the nonsynchronized reserve product, and the secondary reserve product. There is no NERC standard for 30-minute reserve.

## Market Structure

### Demand


Demand for the 30-minute reserve service comes from the 30-minute reserve requirement. By default, the 30-minute reserve requirement is equal to the extended reserve requirement plus the 30-minute reserve reliability requirement. The 30-minute reserve reliability requirement is equal to the maximum of: the primary reserve reliability requirement; the largest active gas contingency; and 3,000 MW.[102] Unlike with synchronized reserve and primary reserve, PJM does not model a 30-minute reserve requirement for the defined reserve subzone.[103] However, PJM has the option to define a subzone natural gas contingency reserve requirement using 30-minute reserves. PJM did not exercise this option in the first six months of 2026.

102 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.3 Reserve Requirement Determination, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

103 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.3.1 Locational Aspect of Reserves, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

Figure 10-30 shows an example ORDC for 30-minute reserve for when the primary reserve reliability requirement and the largest active gas contingency are both less than 3,000 MW, and when the extended reserve requirement is equal to its base value of 190 MW. Since the increase to the synchronized reserve reliability requirement in May 2023, the 30-minute reserve requirement has frequently equaled the primary reserve requirement.

**Figure 10-30 An example of a 30-minute reserve real-time operating reserve demand curve, including the permanent second step**




In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average 30-minute requirement was 3,378.4 MW and the day-ahead average 30-minute requirement was 3,374.0 MW (Figure 10-4).

### Supply

The supply of 30-minute reserves includes all reserves that can convert to energy in 30 minutes. All reserve products can participate in the 30-minute reserve service. In the first six months of 2026, the demand for 30-minute reserve was satisfied by primary reserves (made of synchronized reserves and nonsynchronized reserves) and secondary reserves. The 30-minute reserve



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requirement is met from the least expensive combination of synchronized, nonsynchronized, and secondary reserves that satisfies the requirements of the synchronized, primary, and 30-minute reserve services (Table 10-9).

## Market Concentration

Table 10-32 shows the average HHI of the 30-minute reserve market, including synchronized, nonsynchronized, and secondary reserves, and the percent of intervals for which the maximum market share is above 20 percent. In the first six months of 2026, the RTO Reserve Zone was unconcentrated in the day-ahead market and unconcentrated in the real-time market.

**Table 10-32 PJM 30-minute reserve market HHI: January through June, 2026**


| Location | Market | Average HHI | Percent of Intervals Max Market Share Above 20% | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTO | RT | 774 | 18.4% | Unconcentrated |
| RTO | DA | 867 | 23.5% | Unconcentrated |

## Market Performance

Due to the large amount of available secondary reserve, most 30-minute reserve is procured at a low cost, with the amount of cleared secondary reserve far exceeding what is strictly needed to satisfy the 30-minute reserve requirement (Figure 10-2). In the first six months of 2026, there were no intervals short of 30-minute reserve.

However, 30-minute reserves were short in real time in 23 intervals from June 23, 2025, through June 24, 2025, during a hot weather event. The 30-minute reserves were not short in the day-ahead market. Figure 10-31 shows the point during the hot weather event when cleared 30-minute reserves were at their lowest. For that interval, the amount of 30-minute reserve offered was 5,954.9 MW. This was larger than the 30-minute requirement of 3,677.6 MW.

**Figure 10-31 30-minute reserve shortage during the June 2025 hot weather event: June 22 through June 27, 2025**




## Secondary Reserve

PJM defines secondary reserve as reserves (online or offline available for dispatch) that can be converted to energy in 10 to 30 minutes. There is no NERC standard for secondary reserve. The secondary reserve product can only be used to satisfy the 30-minute reserve requirement, and is cleared for five-minute intervals in the real–time market and hourly intervals in the day–ahead market. Failure to convert offline secondary reserves to energy at PJM's request results in a shortfall charge.

Unlike synchronized reserve and nonsynchronized reserve, there is no "event" process to deploy secondary reserve. Instead, PJM uses secondary reserve via the normal energy commitment and dispatch process.

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# Market Structure

## Demand

There is no explicit demand for secondary reserve beyond a more general demand for 30-minute reserve, which can be satisfied by the synchronized, nonsynchronized, and secondary reserve products. Beyond the primary reserve requirement, the balance of 30-minute reserve can be made up by the economic combination of synchronized, nonsynchronized, and secondary reserve.

When the secondary reserve market clearing price is $0 per MWh, PJM's clearing engines clear all available secondary reserve MW. Because of the large amount of secondary reserve cleared, most 30-minute reserve is secondary reserve and most cleared secondary reserve is cleared well in excess of the 30-minute reserve requirement (Figure 10-2).


## Supply

Secondary reserves are reserves that can convert to energy within 10 to 30 minutes. This includes the unloaded capacity of online generation that can be achieved according to the resource ramp rates in 10 to 30 minutes. It also includes offline resources that offer a time to start of less than 30 minutes but more than 10 minutes. Secondary reserves do not include pre-emergency or emergency demand response resources, even if they offer to start in less than 30 minutes. Secondary reserves do not include exports that can be recalled in less than 30 minutes.

As with the other reserve products, for most resources, PJM determines the MW available for secondary reserve based on energy offer parameters.[104] Energy Storage Resource model participants, hydroelectric resources, and demand response resources must specify their availability and MW separately. Online resources' secondary reserves are based on ramp rates and the lesser of the secondary reserve maximum or economic maximum parameters, as well as any cleared synchronized reserve.[105] The use of the secondary reserve maximum output limit requires prior approval by PJM.[106] Offline resources' secondary reserves are based on the time to start, which is the start-up time plus notification time, and any cleared nonsynchronized reserve.[107] Certain resource types, including nuclear, wind, and solar units, are by default excluded from providing secondary reserves.

Figure 10-32 shows the daily average total available secondary reserve in the first six months of 2026. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time average supply of secondary reserve was 20,096.7 MW and the day-ahead average supply was 12,146.1 MW. The available secondary reserve decreased in January and February during a cold weather event which included Winter Storm Fern as PJM brought on more units for energy.

### Figure 10-32 Daily Average Available Secondary Reserve: January through June, 2026




104 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
105 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.2.5.1 Reserve Market Capability for Online Generation Resources, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
106 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.2.2.1 Communication for Reserve Capability Limitation, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).
107 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.2.5.2 Reserve Market Capability for Offline Generation Resources, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).


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## Market Behavior

For all resources, the secondary reserve offer price is $0 per MWh.[108] For online resources, the energy market opportunity cost is calculated by PJM based on market prices.

## Market Performance

The secondary reserve market clearing price (SecRMCP) is equal to the cost of the marginal 30-minute reserve resource. When 30-minute reserve is short, the SecRMCP is equal to the penalty factor.

Figure 10-33 shows the unweighted average market clearing prices for secondary reserves in the first six months of 2026. Due to the product's low cost and ample supply, the secondary reserve market clearing price (SecRMCP) is almost always $0 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time SecRMCP was nonzero for zero five-minute intervals and the day-ahead SecRMCP was nonzero for zero hours.

### Figure 10-33 Secondary reserve prices: January through June, 2026





Table 10-33 compares the dispatch run and pricing run market clearing prices for the day-ahead and real-time secondary reserve markets. For both the dispatch run and the pricing run, the real-time values are the LPC prices for each run weighted by the RT SCED MW. For the day-ahead values, these are the day-ahead prices weighted by the day-ahead dispatch MW. In the first six months of 2026, the day-ahead SecRMCPs were $0 per MWh for all hours in both the pricing run and the dispatch run. In real time, the SecRMCPs for the pricing run and dispatch run were $0 per MWh for all intervals.

### Table 10-33 Comparison of fast start and dispatch pricing components: January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Day-Ahead | | | | Real-Time | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Month | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference | Dispatch-Run MCP | Pricing-Run MCP | Difference | Percent Difference |
| 2025 | Jan | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Feb | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Mar | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Apr | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | May | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Jun | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| 2025 | Jul | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Aug | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Sep | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Oct | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Nov | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | Dec | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2025 | All | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | 0.0% |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2026 | Feb | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2026 | Mar | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2026 | Apr | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2026 | May | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2026 | Jun | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |
| 2026 | All | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | NA |

108 See PJM. "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations" § 4.2.3 Reserve Market Resource Offer Structure, Rev. 136 (Oct. 1, 2025).

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Table 10-34 shows the day-ahead credits, balancing market credits, LOC credits, and effective shortfall charges for secondary reserves from January 2025 through June 2026.[109] In the first six months of 2026, the real-time weighted average secondary reserve market clearing price was $0.00 per MWh and the day-ahead weighted average secondary reserve market clearing price was $0.00 per MWh. In the first six months of 2026, the real-time weighted average credit per MWh, considering the total credits paid and the capped MWh, was $0.08 per MWh and the day-ahead weighted average credit was $0.00 per MWh. In June 2025, balancing credits were negative during a hot weather event that saw 30-minute reserve shortage, causing shortage pricing for secondary reserve.

### Table 10-34 Monthly secondary reserve settlements: January 2025 through June 2026

| Year | Month | Total Day-Ahead Credits | Total Balancing MCP Credits | Total LOC Credits | Total Effective Shortfall Charge | Total Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Jan | $0 | $0 | $243,258 | $0 | $243,258 |
| 2025 | Feb | $0 | $0 | $133,463 | $0 | $133,463 |
| 2025 | Mar | $0 | $0 | $126,843 | $0 | $126,843 |
| 2025 | Apr | $0 | $0 | $135,333 | $0 | $135,333 |
| 2025 | May | $0 | $0 | $420,010 | $0 | $420,010 |
| 2025 | Jun | $0 | ($986,243) | $1,825,703 | $0 | $839,460 |
| 2025 | Jul | $0 | $0 | $1,274,869 | $0 | $1,274,869 |
| 2025 | Aug | $0 | $0 | $1,150,153 | $0 | $1,150,153 |
| 2025 | Sep | $0 | $0 | $850,339 | $0 | $850,339 |
| 2025 | Oct | $0 | $0 | $927,503 | $0 | $927,503 |
| 2025 | Nov | $0 | $0 | $682,979 | $0 | $682,979 |
| 2025 | Dec | $0 | $0 | $1,523,348 | $0 | $1,523,348 |
| 2025 | All | $0 | ($986,243) | $9,293,801 | $0 | $8,307,558 |
| | | | | | | |
| 2026 | Jan | $0 | $0 | $1,635,470 | $0 | $1,635,470 |
| 2026 | Feb | $0 | $0 | $1,821,211 | $0 | $1,821,211 |
| 2026 | Mar | $0 | $0 | $990,352 | $0 | $990,352 |
| 2026 | Apr | $0 | $0 | $855,028 | $0 | $855,028 |
| 2026 | May | $0 | $0 | $655,207 | $0 | $655,207 |
| 2026 | Jun | $0 | $0 | $583,407 | $0 | $583,407 |
| 2026 | All | $0 | $0 | $6,540,674 | $0 | $6,540,674 |

109 Unlike synchronized reserve, for secondary reserve, shortfall is accounted for in the balancing MCP credits and is not a separate item. The effective shortfall charge is the real-time SecR MCP multiplied by the shortfall MW, a value used when calculating the balancing MCP credits.

Table 10-35 provides secondary reserve credits by primary resource and fuel type for the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-35 Secondary reserve credits by primary resource and fuel type: January through June, 2026

| Resource / Fuel Type | Day-Ahead MWh | Real-Time Capped MWh | Day-Ahead Credits | Balancing MCP Credits | LOC Credits | Total Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steam - Coal | 279 | 4,322,600 | $0 | $0 | $2,370,270 | $2,370,270 |
| Combined Cycle | 872 | 4,654,300 | $0 | $0 | $2,274,067 | $2,274,067 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 40,849,429 | 57,340,601 | $0 | $0 | $1,167,003 | $1,167,003 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0 | 728,404 | $0 | $0 | $259,253 | $259,253 |
| CT - Oil | 6,913,214 | 8,111,848 | $0 | $0 | $170,738 | $170,738 |
| Steam - Other | 0 | 105,730 | $0 | $0 | $148,522 | $148,522 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 31,110 | 61,112 | $0 | $0 | $16,645 | $16,645 |
| RICE - Oil | 334,552 | 380,010 | $0 | $0 | $4,591 | $4,591 |
| Hydro | 250,500 | 1,490,181 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Other | 18,704 | 115,168 | $0 | $0 | $129,586 | $129,586 |

Among other reasons, a secondary reserve resource is paid an LOC credit when PJM determines that the resource was backed down in order to clear more secondary reserve. Because the supply of secondary reserves greatly exceeds the amount needed to meet the 30-minute reserve requirement, PJM does not actually back down resources to clear more secondary reserve. However, because of the method used by PJM to determine whether a resource was backed down, PJM at times pays resources for an incorrectly determined real-time opportunity cost. For example, PJM erroneously treated resources coming online to provide energy as having been backed down to provide secondary reserves. PJM does not back down resources below their economic minimum to provide secondary reserves, but in the first six months of 2026, for secondary reserve resources that did not clear day-ahead and were generating below their economic minimum points, PJM paid $1,115,679 in LOC credits. The MMU recommends that reserve resources operating below economic minimum should not be treated as being backed down by that amount to provide reserve.

A unit can also be paid LOC credits if the LMP calculated by the LPC is greater than that calculated by RT SCED. In that case, the LMP desired MW increase,


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and the unit appears to have been backed down from its economic position in order to clear its assigned reserve MW.

## Regulation Market

Regulation matches generation with short term changes in load by moving the output of selected resources up and down via an automatic control signal. Regulation is provided by generators with a short-term response capability (less than five minutes) or by demand response (DR). The PJM Regulation Market is operated as a single real-time market.

PJM filed proposed significant changes to the regulation market design with FERC on April 16, 2024.[110] The Commission Order of June 14, 2024, accepted the PJM proposal as filed. PJM will implement the changes to the regulation market in two phases.[111] Phase 1, implemented on October 1, 2025, is a single product, single signal market with one clearing price. Phase 2, to be implemented on October 1, 2026, will include separate regulation up and regulation down markets. The Phase 2 implementation has been delayed until December 1, 2026. The Phase 1 changes eliminated many of the significant issues identified by the MMU in the prior two product, two signal market design, including the incorrect and inconsistent use and application of the MBF/MRTS.[112]

This report analyzes the regulation market results from the first six months of 2026 under the new Phase 1 regulation market design.

### Market Design

The objective of PJM's regulation market design should be to minimize the cost to provide regulation. The new design, as implemented, does not meet that goal.

The regulation market design includes three clearing price components: capability ($/MW, based on the MW offered); performance ($/MW mile, based on the total MW movement requested by the control signal, known as mileage); and lost opportunity cost ($/MW of lost revenue from the energy market as a result of providing regulation). The performance score translates actual MW into effective MW, and offers and clearing prices into $/effective MW.

$$\begin{aligned} Regulation\ Credits_{5\ min} &= [Capability\ Clearing\ Price_{5\ min} \\ &+ (Performance\ Clearing\ Price_{5\ min} * Mileage\ Ratio)] \\ &* Performance\ Score * RegMW/12 \end{aligned}$$

Phase 1 of PJM's regulation market redesign was implemented on October 1, 2025. The current market design replaced two separate RegA/RegD signals/products with a single signal/product, eliminating the need for the benefit factor. The current market design includes the LOC in the market price, although there are issues with the LOC calculation. The current market design simplifies the performance score calculation.

Market solution software relevant to regulation consists of the Ancillary Services Optimizer (ASO) solving each half hour; the intermediate term security constrained economic dispatch market solution (IT SCED) solving every 15 minutes; and the real-time security constrained economic dispatch market solution (RT SCED) solving every five minutes. The ASO, incorporating the forecast LMP values in the LOC calculation, defines the cleared regulation MW. The regulation market clearing price is a function of the defined demand for regulation and the offer prices that incorporate LOC based on real-time LMP from the most recently approved RT SCED case, approximately 10 minutes ahead of the target solution time. The current regulation market clears for 30 minute periods based on the resultant offer prices.

The Phase 1 design includes new definitions of regulation demand. The demand for regulation is defined by the categories of ramp hours, nonramp hours, and shoulder hours. In addition, the length of the regulation seasons and the regulation requirements for each category were modified (Table 10-36). The regulation requirement for ramp hours was changed from 800 effective MW to 750 effective MW, for nonramp hours was changed from 525 effective MW to 550 effective MW, and for the new shoulder hours was set to 650 effective MW. The definition of the hours for each category of ramp hours changes by

110 PJM, "Regulation Market Design Filing," Docket No. ER24-1772-000.
111 See 187 FERC ¶ 61,173.
112 See Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 2 (2011).

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season. These changes together will increase the yearly regulation effective MW demand by 3.9 percent.

### Table 10-36 Seasonal regulation requirement definitions

| Season | Dates | Nonramp Hours (550 MW) | Shoulder Hours (650 MW) | Ramp Hours (750 MW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 01:00 - 03:59 | 0:00 - 0:59 | 04:00 - 09:59 |
| Winter | Nov 1 - Feb 28(29) | 11:00 - 15:59 | 10:00 - 10:59 | 16:00 - 23:59 |
| | | 02:00 - 04:59 | 1:00 - 1:59 | 05:00 - 08:59 |
| Spring | Mar 1 - Apr 30 | 10:00 - 17:59 | 9:00 - 9:59 | 18:00 - 00:59 |
| Summer | May 1 - Sep 15 | 02:00 - 03:59 | 1:00 - 1:59 | 04:00 - 00:59 |
| | | 01:00 - 04:59 | 0:00 - 0:59 | 05:00 - 08:59 |
| Fall | Sep 16 - Oct 31 | 10:00 - 16:59 | 9:00 - 9:59 | 17:00 - 23:59 |

Each cleared resource is allocated a portion of the signal based on the cleared regulation MW of the resource relative to the total cleared MW of regulation. This signal is called the Total Regulation Signal (TREG) for the resource. A resource that cleared 10 MW of capability (Assigned Regulation or AREG) will be provided a percent TREG signal asking for a positive or negative regulation movement between negative and positive 100 percent around its regulation set point. This means that a unit cleared for 10 MW can be asked to provide ± 10 MW from its regulation set point.

Regulation performance scores (0.0 to 1.0) measure the response of a regulating resource to the assigned regulation signal every 10 seconds by measuring the precision, defined to be the difference between the regulation response and the regulation requested.[113] Performance scores are reported on a half hour basis for each resource.


Table 10-37 and Figure 10-34 show the simple average half hour performance score by resource type in the first six months of 2026.[114] Each category is based on the percentage of the MW of each unit type that fall in each performance category based on the full performance score.[115] In the first six months of 2026, 59.5 percent of all regulation resources had average performance scores in the 0.91-1.00 range.

113 PJM "Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 4.5.6 Performance Score Calculation, Rev. 54 (July Dec. 17, 2024).
114 Except where explicitly referred to as effective MW or effective regulation MW, MW means actual MW unadjusted for performance score.
115 PJM "Manual 12: Balancing Operations," § 4.5.6 Performance Score Calculation, Rev. 54 (July Dec. 17, 2024).

### Table 10-37 Half hour average performance score by unit type: January through June, 2026

| | Performance Score Range | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | 61-70 | 71-80 | 81-90 | 91-100 |
| Battery | 1.3% | 2.3% | 6.2% | 87.4% |
| CT | 3.5% | 11.3% | 34.6% | 45.6% |
| Diesel | 0.9% | 3.3% | 19.3% | 74.5% |
| DSR | 2.2% | 2.8% | 4.5% | 84.6% |
| Hydro | 2.3% | 6.9% | 30.8% | 57.6% |
| Steam | 4.8% | 13.0% | 34.6% | 42.7% |
| All Regulation | 3.3% | 8.5% | 24.7% | 59.5% |

### Figure 10-34 Half hour average performance score: January through June, 2026




The October 1, 2025, redesign eliminated the marginal benefit factor, and changed the definition of the mileage ratio. The mileage ratio is defined as the actual mileage divided by the 30-day historical average mileage. There


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is no reason to use this mileage ratio as a performance metric rather than actual mileage. The historic mileage is not relevant to current performance. The new design uses this mileage ratio to calculate the regulation mileage credits portion of settlements for each unit. The equation used to determine regulation credits is:

$$RegulationCredits = [RMCCP + (RMPCP * MileageRatio)] * EffectiveMW$$


Where RMCCP is the regulation market capability clearing price, RMPCP is the regulation market performance clearing price, Mileage Ratio is the actual mileage for the interval divided by the 30-day historical average mileage, and Effective MW is the cleared regulation MW of the unit multiplied by the unit's performance score. The marginal price for each interval is determined by taking the highest total offer (capability offer + performance offer + LOC), but the components used in settlements are determined by finding the maximum performance offer of all cleared units in an interval, regardless of whether it is from the marginal unit, and subtracting that from the total offer to determine the RMCCP:

$$RMPCP = \max(PerformanceOffer)$$

$$RMCCP = MarginalTotalOffer - RMPCP$$

Figure 10-35 shows the daily average mileage and mileage ratio in the first six months of 2026.

**Figure 10-35 Daily average mileage and mileage ratio: January through June, 2026**




## Market Design Issues

While the new market design corrected a number of significant issues with the old design, new issues have been identified in the new design.

The performance score is incorrect. All else held equal, the current design inappropriately calculates a lower error for units with larger MW regulation assignments than units that perform exactly the same but with a smaller regulation assignment.

Under the new regulation market design, PJM determines the five minute interval performance score by evaluating a unit's performance every 10

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seconds. This performance score is determined by calculating the error in a unit's output based on the average regulation signal MW during the entire half hour clearing interval.

$$Performance\ Score_{10Sec} = 1 - ABS\left[\frac{(RegOutputMW - SignalMW)}{\left(\frac{ClearingIntervalAvgAbsSignal + AReg}{2}\right)}\right]$$

The logic of this performance score equation is not consistent with a logical performance metric. The numerator is the difference (the error) between the actual regulation MW provided (RegOutputMW) and the regulation MW requested based on the regulation signal (SignalMW). The denominator is calculated as the average of the unit's assigned regulation MW (Areg) and the average of the absolute value of the regulation signal (ClearingIntervalAvgAbsSignal) calculated over the half hour clearing interval (sum of Areg and ClearingIntervalAvgAbsSignal divided by 2). This has the effect of scaling each 10 second performance score based on the clearing interval average of the overall regulation signal. The larger the regulation assignment (Areg) the smaller the effect of any error (RegOutput – SignalMW) on the performance score. The MMU disagrees with this calculation method because it scales the actual response based on the average signal over the clearing interval for no apparent reason. Identical behavior of the same unit can yield different results if the overall interval average signal is different. More importantly, the inclusion of the assigned regulation MW (AREG) in the denominator results means that identical responses from units with different levels of committed regulation MW will have different performance scores. Both results are illogical.

The MMU proposes to define regulation performance for each 10 second interval using only the ratio of the unit's response to the regulation signal.

$$Performance\ Score_{10Sec} = ABS(RegOutputMW/SignalMW)$$

The total performance score for the clearing interval is the average of each 10 second performance score. This means that any unit providing a steady 7.5 MW to a signal calling for 10 MW would logically receive a performance score of 0.75, regardless of the assigned regulation MW of the unit. Using PJM's equation in this case would result in different performance scores for units with the same 75 percent response, based solely on the magnitude of their regulation assignment. Table 10-38 illustrates the variation in performance scores that result from different assigned regulation MW amounts and average interval signals under the current calculation, compared to the MMU's proposal.

**Table 10-38 Performance scores under different market conditions: Current versus MMU proposed calculation**

| | | | | Performance Score | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clearing Interval Average Absolute Signal MW | Assigned Regulation MW | Regulation Output MW | Signal MW | PJM | MMU |
| | 10.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 66.7% | 75.0% |
| | 50.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 90.9% | 75.0% |
| 5.0 | 100.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 95.2% | 75.0% |
| | 10.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 75.0% | 75.0% |
| | 50.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 91.7% | 75.0% |
| 10.0 | 100.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 95.5% | 75.0% |
| | 10.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 83.3% | 75.0% |
| | 50.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 92.9% | 75.0% |
| 20.0 | 100.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 95.8% | 75.0% |

The MMU recommends that the performance score be revised to eliminate the effect of the size of the regulation assignment and to directly calculate the performance score based on the actual performance compared to the requested performance.

In October 2025, PJM identified that the clearing of less than 1.0 MW for regulation resources was a contributing factor to extremely high prices in the regulation market, particularly during reserve shortages.

As an initial workaround, PJM told participants that they could set a minimum regulation MW level in their regulation offers. In addition, PJM implemented


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an after the fact (after market clearing) step that replaces any fractional MW regulation assignments with a 1.0 MW regulation assignment for any units that are eligible for LOC and have a regulation capability greater than 1.0 MW. While this override reduced the LOC contributions to regulation prices, the override did not eliminate all associated high prices and is an ad hoc fix that ignores the underlying issue.

The MMU does not agree that asking participants to make inflexible minimum regulation offers is the correct way to address the fractional MW clearing results of the Phase 1 market design. Relying on participants to make their offers less flexible to correct for an optimization issue is not efficient or reasonable. The MMU does not agree that overriding the fractional MW assignment with a 1.0 MW assignment is a correct way to address the fractional MW clearing results of the current market clearing engine design.

The MMU recommends that the regulation market optimization be reviewed to address the logic that allows the uneconomic partial clearing of inframarginal resources, particularly in the case where that clearing risks significant LOC effects.

Since the implementation of the inflexible offers and the 1.0 MW override, it became clear that the observed and incorrect very high regulation prices are a result of interactions between the treatment of offer parameters (differences between the regulation range and economic range of units and differences between the offered ramp and actual ramp of units) and differences between the ASO forecasted LMP and the actual LMP used to set LOC for cleared regulation resources.

Regulation prices and total costs were expected to increase due to the inclusion of LOC in clearing prices rather than being paid as unit specific uplift. However, there are a number of issues with the LOC calculation(s) that have resulted in inappropriately high LOCs and correspondingly and incorrect very high regulation prices.

LOCs and prices have been incorrectly high in some hours as a result of differences between the regulation ranges and economic ranges of units and differences in the offered ramp and actual ramp of units. Offer parameters define a regulation maximum MW (RegMax) and an economic maximum MW (EcoMax). The RegMax is the upper limit on the regulation offer and the EcoMax is the upper limit on the energy offer. RegMax should equal EcoMax. For some resources, the EcoMax is incorrectly offered as greater than the RegMax. The result is to artificially increase the LOC because the LOC is defined as the revenues that could have been earned in the energy market if the unit were not providing regulation. If RegMax and EcoMax are matched, the LOC is correctly defined by matching each MW of regulation offered with a MW of energy not sold. If the EcoMax is greater than the RegMax, the LOC is incorrectly defined by a higher MW level on the energy offer than the unit's regulation offer defines as the maximum MW for which it can provide regulation. The LOC calculation is based on the incorrect assumption that the unit gives up multiple MW of energy output for every MW of regulation. That can and does lead to flawed extremely high LOC calculations that incorrectly inflate the clearing prices in the regulation market.

Differences between ASO forecasted LMPs and real time LMPs used to set LOC for cleared regulation resources can significantly amplify the RegMax/EcoMax issue and have resulted in the incorrect and extremely high regulation prices observed at times since October 1, 2025.

Holding other factors constant, if the real time LMP is greater than the ASO forecasted LMP, the LOC included in actual clearing prices will exceed the LOC assumed in the ASO clearing and the rank ordering of the unit offers is likely to differ from the rank ordering assumed in the ASO. In addition, the difference between the ASO forecast LMP and the real time LMP can further inflate the incorrect results based on the difference between EcoMax and RegMax. The smaller the regulation award in the ASO market clearing, the greater the potential difference between ASO assumed economic ordering and marginal prices of resources and LPC realized economic ordering and marginal prices of resources.


Figure 10-36 shows the components of the total LOC calculation for a unit providing regulation service. Total LOC of a regulation resource is equal to the lost energy revenue calculated as the area bound between the regulation

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set point (MW) and the economic desired MW and the difference between the LMP and the energy marginal dispatch cost of the resource between the regulation set point and the economic desired MW. The LOC cost per MW of regulation is determined by dividing the total LOC by the regulation MW assigned.

In Figure 10-36 the difference between RegMax and the Reg Set Point is the regulation MW assigned to the resource. In cases where a unit's economic maximum (EcoMax) is greater than the regulation maximum (RegMax), the total difference between the regulation set point and the economic desired MW can be larger than it would be if the regulation maximum was equal to the economic maximum. This means that when the EcoMax is greater than the RegMax, the area of realized total LOC can be much larger than realized total LOC in the case where EcoMax is equal to RegMax, depending on the real time LMP and the economic desired MW.

**Figure 10-36 Components of the LOC Calculation**





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The example in Table 10-39 demonstrates the issue. Table 10-39 shows three different resources (Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3) with identical costs curves (each MW of output increases marginal cost by $1), the same RegMax values, but different EcoMax values. Unit 1 has EcoMax equal to RegMax (20 MW). Unit 2 has EcoMax (30 MW) greater than RegMax (20 MW) by 10 MW. Unit 3 has EcoMax (40 MW) greater than RegMax (20 MW) by 20 MW. The clearing engine (ASO) has a forecast LMP for all three units at $15. At $15, the economic desired MW equals the regulation set point at 15 MW for all three units, the total LOC is equal to $0.00 for all three units and each resource can clear for 5 MW of regulation at an offer of $0.00 per MW of regulation. If the real time LMP is equal to $15 (the same as the ASO forecast LMP), the actual LOC is equal to $0.00 per MW of regulation provided (first result for each unit in Table 10-39). If, however, the real time LMP is $200, the actual LOC of Unit 1 is $182.50/MW, the actual LOC of Unit 2 is $532.50/MW, and the actual LOC of Unit 3 is $862.50/MW.

**Table 10-39 Regulation LOC Examples: EcoMax Greater than or Equal to RegMax**

| Unit | Energy Price | Reg MW | Reg Set Point | Ecnomic Desired MW | Reg Max | EcoMax | Marginal Cost at Reg Set Point | MC at Economic Desired | LOC $/MW | Total LOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | $15.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | $15.00 | $15.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | $20.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $2.50 | $12.50 |
| | $25.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $7.50 | $37.50 |
| | $200.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $182.50 | $912.50 |
| 2 | $15.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 30.0 | $15.00 | $15.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | $20.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 30.0 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $2.50 | $12.50 |
| | $25.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 25.0 | 20.0 | 30.0 | $15.00 | $25.00 | $10.00 | $50.00 |
| | $200.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 30.0 | 20.0 | 30.0 | $15.00 | $30.00 | $532.50 | $2,662.50 |
| 3 | $15.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 40.0 | $15.00 | $15.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | $20.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 40.0 | $15.00 | $20.00 | $2.50 | $12.50 |
| | $25.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 25.0 | 20.0 | 40.0 | $15.00 | $25.00 | $10.00 | $50.00 |
| | $200.00 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 40.0 | 20.0 | 40.0 | $15.00 | $40.00 | $862.50 | $4,312.50 |


In evaluating the available supply for an interval, the clearing engine can clear less than the entire offer of a unit and can also clear less than 1.0 MW of a unit's offer. A unit with no residual ramp capability cannot move from their regulation set point, which can lead to extremely high LOC when LMP increases quickly. According to PJM, the partial clearing of resources is intended to allow units with high risk of LOC to retain some residual ramp to reduce the LOC in the commitment engine. However, when the economic max of the unit is higher than the regulation max of the unit, clearing less than 1.0 of regulation can generate an extreme version of the problem shown in Table 10-39. Even after replacing the fractional MW with 1.0 MW, the market results when EcoMax is greater than RegMax can be extreme. The current clearing logic does not fully assess the potential for high LOC of these high LOC risk units accurately.

In addition, an issue has been identified with the ASO estimate of a unit's regulation LOC not accurately reflecting the actual LOC of that unit during real-time, based on real-time LMP from the LPC. The ASO does not correctly account for the residual ramp of the unit when estimating a unit's LOC, resulting in units clearing because they appear more cost effective than they actually are. Units that have little or no residual ramp due to their current regulation assignment are assumed to have their full ramp capability when the ASO is determining the regulation set point for purposes of calculating LOC to rank order the units. This causes the ASO to underestimate the LOC for the most expensive resources in the potential supply curve. In some cases, the optimization engine is estimating LOC of zero when the LOC should be positive. The size of this error (the difference between the ASO LOC and what the ASO LOC should be) can be very large.

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Figure 10-37 shows the average LOC incurred in a half hour compared to the estimated clearing LOC for all natural gas units providing regulation in June 2026. Of all the occurrences of natural gas units providing regulation in June 2026, the ASO underestimated the LOC 30.1 percent of the time compared to the average actual half hour LOC, with an average underestimate of $84.11/MW. Of the 30.1 percent underestimates, 19.7 percent of those were the result of an ASO LOC estimate of $0/MW, resulting in an average underestimate of the LOC by $244.03/MW. This error has been a significant contributor to the high price spikes observed during high LMP events in the first six months of 2026 (along the Y axis of Figure 10-37), because units with high actual LOC values are selected based on a $0/MW estimated LOC as part of their total offer.

**Figure 10-37 Average actual half hour LOC versus estimated clearing LOC for natural gas units providing regulation: June 2026**[116]




The MMU recommends that if a unit sets its economic maximum at a value greater than its regulation maximum, the lost opportunity cost (LOC) of the unit should be calculated assuming the economic maximum of the unit is equal to the regulation maximum of the unit. The MMU recommends that, in cases where offered ramp is greater than actual ramp, the actual ramp be used to calculate the LOC of the unit. The MMU recommends that, in cases where a unit is already committed for regulation, that the actual residual ramp (based on the current market interval's regulation assignment) be used when calculating the potential regulation set point and the LOC for purposes of clearing resources. The MMU recommends that these fixes to the LOC logic be implemented prior to implementing Phase 2 of the regulation market design.

116 The figure on the left includes all data for June 2026. The figure on the right shows only the data with an actual or estimated LOC less than $200/MW.


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## Market Redesign Phase 2

PJM was planning to implement its Phase 2 regulation market design on October 1, 2026, as approved by FERC. [117] Due to the additional complexity of Phase 2, along with the need for significant testing, PJM has postponed its implementation until December 1, 2026. In PJM's Phase 2 design, the regulation market will once again be split into two products with two separate prices: one product that only needs to respond when the regulation signal is above zero (RegUp), and one product that only needs to respond when the regulation signal is below zero (RegDown). In Phase 2, market resources will be able to clear as RegUp, RegDown or both in any given 30 minute market interval. PJM has not done any systematic testing of the proposal. PJM has not explained what problem this design change is intended to fix, analyzed what impact this design would have on reliability, or how this will affect the cost of regulation. The MMU continues to recommend a single product market with a single signal. The MMU also recommends that Phase 2 not be implemented until all the issues in Phase 1 have been fixed.

# Market Structure

## Supply

Table 10-40 shows average hourly offered MW (actual and effective), and average hourly cleared MW (actual and effective) for all hours in the first six months of 2026.[118] Effective MW are defined as Actual MW multiplied by the historic 100-hour moving average performance score. Offered MW are calculated based on the offers from units that are designated as available for the day. These are daily offers that can be modified on an hourly basis up to 65 minutes before the hour.[119] Eligible MW are calculated from the hourly offers from units with daily offers and units that are offered as unavailable for the day, but still offer MW into some hours. Units with daily offers are permitted to offer above or below their daily offer from hour to hour. As a result of these hourly MW adjustments, the average hourly Eligible MW can be higher than the Offered MW.

117 See Docket No. ER24-1772-000.
118 Effective MW are actual MW multiplied by performance score.
119 See "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 3.2.2 Regulation Market Eligibility, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).

In the first six months of 2026, the average half hour offered supply of regulation for nonramp hours was 914.7 actual MW (797.5 effective MW). In the first six months of 2026, the average half hour offered supply of regulation for shoulder hours was 1,060.4 actual MW (923.0 effective MW). In the first six months of 2026, the average half hour offered supply of regulation for ramp hours was 1,134.7 actual MW (994.8 effective MW).


The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for nonramp hours was 1.46 in the first six months of 2026. The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for shoulder hours was 1.43 in the first six months of 2026. The ratio of the average half hour offered supply of regulation to average half hour regulation demand (actual cleared MW) for ramp hours was 1.34 in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-40 Hourly average actual and effective MW offered and cleared: January through June, 2026**

| | | | By Resource Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | All Regulation | Generating Resources | Demand Resources |
| Actual Offered MW | Ramp | 1,134.7 | 1,073.1 | 61.6 |
| | Shoulder | 1,060.4 | 1,004.0 | 56.4 |
| | Nonramp | 914.7 | 859.7 | 55.0 |
| Effective Offered MW | Ramp | 994.8 | 938.1 | 56.7 |
| | Shoulder | 923.0 | 870.7 | 52.3 |
| | Nonramp | 797.5 | 746.8 | 50.7 |
| Actual Cleared MW | Ramp | 849.6 | 788.3 | 61.3 |
| | Shoulder | 739.6 | 683.3 | 56.3 |
| | Nonramp | 625.5 | 571.2 | 54.3 |
| Effective Cleared MW | Ramp | 750.2 | 693.8 | 56.4 |
| | Shoulder | 650.1 | 598.0 | 52.2 |
| | Nonramp | 550.3 | 500.2 | 50.1 |

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### Figure 10-38 Average hourly Reg actual MW offered and cleared: January through June, 2026






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## Demand

The demand for regulation does not change with price. The demand for regulation is completely price inelastic. The regulation requirement is set by PJM to meet NERC control standards, based on reliability objectives, which means that a significant amount of judgment is exercised by PJM in determining the demand.

Table 10-41 shows the average half hour required, eligible, and supplied regulation by month and the ratio of supply to demand for both actual and effective MW, for ramp, shoulder, and nonramp hours, for the first six months of 2026.

The nonramp regulation requirement of 550.0 effective MW was provided by 623.3 half hour average actual MW in the first six months of 2026. The shoulder regulation requirement of 650.0 effective MW was provided by 738.1 half hour average actual MW in the first six months of 2026. The ramp regulation requirement of 750.0 effective MW was provided by 850.3 half hour average actual MW in the first six months of 2026.

**Table 10-41 Required regulation, eligible and supplied regulation MW, and ratio of supply to requirement: January through June, 2026**

| | | | Average Eligibile Regulation | | Average Supplied Regulation | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hours | Month | Regulation Requirement (Effective MW) | Effective MW | Actual MW | Effective MW | Actual MW | Ratio of Eligible Effective MW to Supplied Effective MW | Ratio of Eligible Actual MW to Supplied Actual MW |
| Nonramp | Jan | 550 | 906.6 | 1,042.3 | 550.1 | 620.5 | 1.65 | 1.68 |
| | Feb | | 851.4 | 978.6 | 550.1 | 623.8 | 1.55 | 1.57 |
| | Mar | | 772.6 | 884.6 | 550.2 | 625.1 | 1.40 | 1.42 |
| | Apr | | 725.8 | 835.3 | 550.5 | 633.3 | 1.32 | 1.32 |
| | May | | 769.1 | 865.0 | 550.1 | 617.5 | 1.40 | 1.40 |
| | Jun | | 682.5 | 773.3 | 550.5 | 619.8 | 1.24 | 1.25 |
| Average | | | 784.7 | 896.5 | 550.3 | 623.3 | 1.43 | 1.44 |
| Shoulder | Jan | 650 | 1,018.5 | 1,177.6 | 650.1 | 738.2 | 1.57 | 1.60 |
| | Feb | | 967.2 | 1,119.9 | 650.2 | 744.3 | 1.49 | 1.50 |
| | Mar | | 917.7 | 1,054.3 | 650.0 | 738.1 | 1.41 | 1.43 |
| | Apr | | 853.4 | 980.4 | 650.2 | 745.9 | 1.31 | 1.31 |
| | May | | 862.6 | 970.2 | 650.1 | 729.9 | 1.33 | 1.33 |
| | Jun | | 836.1 | 947.3 | 650.0 | 732.4 | 1.29 | 1.29 |
| Average | | | 909.3 | 1,041.6 | 650.1 | 738.1 | 1.40 | 1.41 |
| Ramp | Jan | 750 | 1,098.8 | 1,260.0 | 750.1 | 847.0 | 1.46 | 1.49 |
| | Feb | | 1,054.8 | 1,212.7 | 750.1 | 853.5 | 1.41 | 1.42 |
| | Mar | | 975.9 | 1,111.9 | 750.1 | 846.2 | 1.30 | 1.31 |
| | Apr | | 942.2 | 1,082.0 | 750.2 | 860.5 | 1.26 | 1.26 |
| | May | | 963.8 | 1,089.2 | 750.1 | 845.6 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| | Jun | | 944.7 | 1,073.5 | 750.3 | 848.8 | 1.26 | 1.26 |
| Average | | | 996.7 | 1,138.2 | 750.2 | 850.3 | 1.33 | 1.34 |

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## Market Concentration

In the first six months of 2026, the effective MW weighted average HHI was 1373, which is moderately concentrated. Table 10-42 includes a monthly summary of three pivotal supplier (TPS) results. In the first six months of 2026, the three pivotal supplier test was failed in 91.8 percent of half hours. The MMU concludes that the PJM Regulation Market in the first six months of 2026 was characterized by structural market power. The results presented here are calculated by PJM. The MMU has been unable to verify these results, as some of the underlying data necessary to replicate these calculations are not saved. At the request of the Market Monitor, PJM submitted a request to the vendor more than five years ago to save all data necessary for verification. This delay is not acceptable.

**Table 10-42 Regulation market monthly three pivotal supplier results: January through June, 2026**

| | Percent of Half Hours Pivotal |
|---|---|
| Month | 2026 |
| Jan | 75.3% |
| Feb | 82.3% |
| Mar | 95.9% |
| Apr | 98.9% |
| May | 99.0% |
| Jun | 99.4% |
| Average | 91.8% |

# Market Behavior

## Offers

Regulation resources must qualify to follow a regulation signal by passing a test for that signal with at least a 75 percent performance score. The regulating resource must be able to supply at least 0.1 MW of regulation and not allow the sum of its regulating ramp rate and energy ramp rate to exceed its overall ramp rate.[120] When offering into the regulation market, regulating resources must submit a cost-based offer and may submit a price-based offer (capped at $100 per MW) by 1415 the day before the operating day. Regulation resources are also permitted to change and/or submit intraday offers.[121]

Offers in the PJM Regulation Market consist of a capability component for the MW of regulation capability provided and a performance component for the miles provided. The capability component for cost-based offers is not to exceed the increased fuel costs resulting from operating the regulating unit at a lower output level than its economically optimal output level, plus a $12.00 per MW margin. The $12.00 margin embeds market power in the regulation offers, is not part of the cost of regulation, and should be eliminated. The performance component for cost-based offers is not to exceed the increased costs (increased short run marginal costs including increased fuel costs) resulting from moving the unit up and down to provide regulation. Batteries and flywheels have zero cost for lower efficiency from providing regulation instead of energy, as they are not net energy producers. There is an energy storage loss component for batteries and flywheels as a cost component of regulation performance offers to reflect the net energy consumed to provide regulation service.[122]

Up until 65 minutes before the operating hour, the regulating resource must provide: status (available, unavailable, or self scheduled); capability (movement up and down in MW); regulation maximum and regulation minimum (the highest and lowest levels of energy output while regulating in MW). Resources have the option to submit a minimum level of regulation they are willing to provide.[123]

## Demand

All LSEs are required to procure regulation in proportion to their load share. LSEs can purchase regulation in the regulation market, purchase regulation from other providers bilaterally, or self schedule regulation to satisfy their obligation (Table 10-46).[124] [125]

120 See "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 3.2.1 Regulation Market Eligibility, Rev. 136 (October 1. 2026).

121 Id. at 3.2.2, at p 62.
122 See "PJM Manual 15: Cost Development Guidelines," § 7.8 Regulation Cost, Rev. 47 (October 1, 2025).
123 See "PJM Manual 11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations," § 3.2.1 Regulation Market Eligibility, Rev. 136 (October 1, 2025).
124 See PJM OATT § 3 Ancillary Services
125 See "PJM Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting," § 4.1 Regulation Accounting Overview, Rev. 104 (March 1, 2026).


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# Market Performance

## Results

Table 10-43 shows the settled regulation MW and credits received for each unit type in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-43 PJM regulation by source: January through June, 2026 [126]

| Year (Jan-Jun) | Source | Number of Units | Settled Regulation (Effective MW) | Percent of Settled Regulation | Clearing Price Credits | Uplift Credits | Total Regulation Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Battery | 19 | 745,738 | 25.6% | $101,019,137 | $0 | $101,019,137 |
| | Coal | 15 | 16,299 | 0.6% | $3,843,340 | $33,494 | $3,876,835 |
| | DR | 26 | 230,080 | 7.9% | $30,036,173 | $1 | $30,036,173 |
| | Hydro | 29 | 523,625 | 18.0% | $79,361,779 | $4,445,050 | $83,806,829 |
| | Natural Gas | 143 | 1,400,732 | 48.0% | $190,908,221 | $1,685,337 | $192,593,558 |
| Total | | 232 | 2,916,473.8 | 100.0% | $405,168,649 | $6,163,881 | $411,332,531 |

The top 10 units that received the most regulation uplift in the first six months of 2026 are shown in Table 10-44. In the first six months of 2026, the total regulation uplift was $6.2M compared to the first six months of 2025, where the total regulation uplift (under the old market design) was $18.1M.

### Table 10-44 Top 10 recipients of regulation uplift credits: January through June, 2026

| Rank | Parent Company | Unit Name | Fuel Type | Total Regulation Uplift Credit | Share of Total Regulation Uplift Credits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Constellation Energy Generation LLC | PE MUDDY RUN 1-8 H | HYDRO | $3,276,272 | 53.2% |
| 2 | Dominion Energy Inc | VP BATH COUNTY 1-6 H | HYDRO | $957,920 | 15.5% |
| 3 | Arclight Capital Holdings LLC | PEP KEYS ENERGY CENTER 1 CC | NATURAL GAS | $192,312 | 3.1% |
| 4 | Apollo Global Management Inc | AP LKLYN 1-4 H | HYDRO | $174,081 | 2.8% |
| 5 | Invenergy LLC | PL LACKAWANNA COUNTY 3 CC | NATURAL GAS | $125,059 | 2.0% |
| 6 | Invenergy LLC | PL LACKAWANNA COUNTY 1 CC | NATURAL GAS | $113,658 | 1.8% |
| 7 | Arclight Capital Holdings LLC | PEP PANDA 2 F | NATURAL GAS | $95,162 | 1.5% |
| 8 | Vistra Energy Corp | ME ONTELAUNEE 1 F | NATURAL GAS | $93,259 | 1.5% |
| 9 | Arclight Capital Holdings LLC | PEP PANDA 1 F | NATURAL GAS | $67,064 | 1.1% |
| 10 | JERA CO INC | PE PHILLIPS ISL LINWOOD 1 CC | NATURAL GAS | $58,614 | 1.0% |
| Total of Top 10 | | | | $5,153,400 | 83.6% |
| Total Regulation Uplift Credits | | | | $6,163,881 | 100.0% |

## Quantity


Figure 10-39 compares average half hour cleared regulation and self scheduled regulation during ramp, shoulder, and nonramp hours on an effective MW basis. Self scheduled regulation averaged 50.7 percent of all effective MW during ramp hours, 55.2 percent of all effective MW during shoulder hours, and 66.1 percent of all effective MW during nonramp hours in the first three months of 2026. Over all hours in the first six months of 2026, self scheduled regulation

126 Biomass data have been added to the natural gas category based on confidentiality rules.

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averaged 56.6 percent of all effective MW (See Table 10-45). The average half hour regulation is the amount of regulation that actually cleared and is not the same as the regulation requirement because PJM clears the market within a two percent band around the requirement.

### Figure 10-39 Nonramp, shoulder, and ramp regulation levels: January through June, 2026




### Table 10-45 Total Effective MW and Self Scheduled Effective MW during ramp, shoulder, and non ramp hours: January through June, 2026

| Year (Jan-Jun) | | Effective MW | Self Scheduled Effective MW | Percent Effective MW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Ramp | 130,526.3 | 66,227.6 | 50.7% |
| | Shoulder | 113,122.9 | 62,414.5 | 55.2% |
| | Non Ramp | 95,743.7 | 63,317.1 | 66.1% |
| Total | | 339,392.9 | 191,959.2 | 56.6% |

For total spot market regulation and self scheduled regulation, Table 10-46 shows monthly data for the first six months of 2026, and Table 10-47 shows data for the first six months of 2012 through 2026. Table 10-46 and Table 10-47 are based on cleared (purchased) MW.

### Table 10-46 Regulation sources: spot market and self scheduled purchases: January 2026 through June 2026

| Year | Month | Spot Market Regulation (Unadjusted MW) | Spot Market Percent | Self Scheduled Regulation (Unadjusted MW) | Self Scheduled Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Jan | 218,130.9 | 48.3% | 233,173.2 | 51.7% |
| | Feb | 184,870.5 | 45.7% | 219,287.4 | 54.3% |
| | Mar | 170,750.8 | 39.9% | 256,823.1 | 60.1% |
| | Apr | 148,550.6 | 34.5% | 282,228.1 | 65.5% |
| | May | 229,254.5 | 45.6% | 273,352.1 | 54.4% |
| | Jun | 140,211.5 | 30.2% | 324,630.4 | 69.8% |
| Total | | 1,091,768.8 | 40.7% | 1,589,494.4 | 59.3% |


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### Table 10-47 Regulation sources: spot market and self scheduled: January through June, 2012 through 2026

| Year (Jan-Jun) | Spot Market Regulation (Unadjusted MW) | Spot Market Percent | Self Scheduled Regulation (Unadjusted MW) | Self Scheduled Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 3,065,069.1 | 78.3% | 847,576.2 | 21.7% |
| 2013 | 1,740,438.6 | 67.2% | 849,955.3 | 32.8% |
| 2014 | 1,370,386.4 | 60.6% | 889,917.5 | 39.4% |
| 2015 | 1,282,300.1 | 58.9% | 894,595.8 | 41.1% |
| 2016 | 1,139,515.1 | 51.2% | 1,086,532.7 | 48.8% |
| 2017 | 1,176,249.8 | 55.4% | 948,195.8 | 44.6% |
| 2018 | 1,390,856.8 | 64.7% | 757,440.3 | 35.3% |
| 2019 | 1,085,870.9 | 52.5% | 980,572.5 | 47.5% |
| 2020 | 1,029,923.1 | 48.0% | 1,115,710.1 | 52.0% |
| 2021 | 1,116,629.4 | 50.7% | 1,087,804.8 | 49.3% |
| 2022 | 1,339,652.7 | 64.7% | 732,092.6 | 35.3% |
| 2023 | 1,004,373.5 | 49.9% | 1,006,690.6 | 50.1% |
| 2024 | 808,266.9 | 40.6% | 1,180,388.2 | 59.4% |
| 2025 | 835,726.2 | 41.9% | 1,157,358.1 | 58.1% |
| 2026 | 1,091,768.8 | 40.7% | 1,589,494.4 | 59.3% |

In the first six months of 2026, DR provided an average of 61.3 MW of regulation per half hour during ramp hours, 56.3 MW of regulation per half hour during shoulder hours, and 54.3 MW of regulation per half hour during non ramp hours. In the first six months of 2026, generating units supplied an average of 788.3 MW of regulation per half hour during ramp hours, 683.3 MW of regulation per half hour during shoulder hours, and 571.2 MW of regulation per half hour during non ramp hours.

## Price

Table 10-48 shows the regulation price and regulation cost per MW for the first six months of 2009 through 2026. The weighted average regulation market clearing price (RMCP) for the first six months of 2026 was $136.40 per effective MW. This is an increase of $92.10 per effective MW, or 207.9 percent, from the weighted average RMCP of $44.29 per effective MW in the first six months of 2025. This increase in the regulation clearing price was in part the appropriate result of the increase in the opportunity cost component of RMCP and in part the inappropriate result of the identified errors in the Phase 1 market design starting on October 1, 2025, that have significantly inflated the calculated opportunity costs.

### Table 10-48 Comparison of average price and cost for regulation: January through June, 2009 through 2026

| Year (Jan-Jun) | Weighted Regulation Market Price | Weighted Regulation Market Cost | Regulation Price as Percent of Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | $25.23 | $33.82 | 74.6% |
| 2010 | $18.33 | $31.43 | 58.3% |
| 2011 | $15.31 | $31.00 | 49.4% |
| 2012 | $13.89 | $18.34 | 75.7% |
| 2013 | $32.04 | $37.04 | 86.5% |
| 2014 | $62.71 | $75.97 | 82.5% |
| 2015 | $40.94 | $49.57 | 82.6% |
| 2016 | $15.90 | $18.30 | 86.9% |
| 2017 | $15.08 | $20.67 | 73.0% |
| 2018 | $32.97 | $40.76 | 80.9% |
| 2019 | $13.85 | $18.12 | 76.5% |
| 2020 | $11.73 | $14.79 | 79.3% |
| 2021 | $17.46 | $21.66 | 80.6% |
| 2022 | $47.56 | $58.95 | 80.7% |
| 2023 | $21.03 | $27.87 | 75.5% |
| 2024 | $29.53 | $37.91 | 77.9% |
| 2025 | $44.29 | $55.05 | 80.5% |
| 2026 | $136.40 | $138.61 | 98.4% |

The introduction of fast start pricing in the PJM energy market on September 1, 2021, had an effect on the regulation market LOC included in regulation offers and in the resulting clearing price for regulation. Table 10-49 shows the effect of fast start pricing on the regulation market monthly capability component of price and the total regulation market clearing price from September 2021 through June 2026. In the first six months of 2026, fast start pricing increased the average regulation market clearing price by $81.11 (an increase of 122.9 percent), from $55.27 per effective MW to $136.39 per effective MW, compared to dispatch pricing. This $81.11 per MW increase in price for the 2,916,473.8 MW of settled regulation in the first six months of 2026, resulted in an additional $236.6 million in regulation credits.

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## Table 10-49 Comparison of fast start and dispatch pricing: September 2021 through June 2026[127]

| | | Weighted Average Price ($/Perf. Adj. Actual MW) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Capability Clearing Price | | Regulation Market Clearing Price | | |
| Year | Month | Dispatch | Fast Start | Dispatch | Fast Start | Percent Fast Start Increase |
| 2021 | Sep | $27.22 | $29.08 | $28.55 | $30.41 | 6.5% |
| | Oct | $35.64 | $39.92 | $37.12 | $41.40 | 11.5% |
| | Nov | $50.56 | $54.40 | $52.43 | $56.28 | 7.3% |
| | Dec | $25.62 | $27.37 | $27.05 | $28.79 | 6.4% |
| 2022 | Jan | $68.25 | $71.14 | $69.68 | $72.56 | 4.1% |
| | Feb | $31.14 | $31.93 | $32.76 | $33.55 | 2.4% |
| | Mar | $23.91 | $25.94 | $25.70 | $27.73 | 7.9% |
| | Apr | $45.07 | $48.85 | $47.49 | $51.27 | 7.9% |
| | May | $38.09 | $41.85 | $39.84 | $43.60 | 9.4% |
| | Jun | $47.26 | $52.57 | $49.17 | $54.48 | 10.8% |
| | Jul | $47.40 | $54.51 | $48.92 | $56.04 | 14.5% |
| | Aug | $57.43 | $64.13 | $59.17 | $65.87 | 11.3% |
| | Sep | $46.17 | $48.84 | $48.07 | $50.73 | 5.5% |
| | Oct | $33.38 | $36.76 | $35.33 | $38.70 | 9.6% |
| | Nov | $21.29 | $23.08 | $22.42 | $24.21 | 8.0% |
| | Dec | $115.65 | $112.52 | $116.94 | $113.81 | (2.7%) |
| Total | | $48.66 | $51.82 | $50.37 | $53.53 | 6.3% |
| 2023 | Jan | $16.61 | $17.25 | $17.58 | $18.22 | 3.7% |
| | Feb | $15.12 | $15.48 | $16.29 | $16.65 | 2.2% |
| | Mar | $17.11 | $17.80 | $17.89 | $18.57 | 3.8% |
| | Apr | $21.51 | $23.20 | $22.60 | $24.29 | 7.5% |
| | May | $22.75 | $24.58 | $24.31 | $26.14 | 7.5% |
| | Jun | $19.77 | $20.88 | $21.27 | $22.38 | 5.2% |
| | Jul | $21.45 | $23.43 | $22.56 | $24.54 | 8.8% |
| | Aug | $20.10 | $21.32 | $21.17 | $22.39 | 5.8% |
| | Sep | $22.34 | $23.92 | $23.49 | $25.08 | 6.7% |
| | Oct | $28.11 | $32.37 | $29.25 | $33.51 | 14.6% |
| | Nov | $18.48 | $20.83 | $18.95 | $21.30 | 12.4% |
| | Dec | $16.78 | $18.12 | $17.81 | $19.15 | 7.5% |
| Total | | $20.01 | $21.60 | $21.10 | $22.69 | 7.5% |
| 2024 | Jan | $35.33 | $36.70 | $36.91 | $38.28 | 3.7% |
| | Feb | $17.72 | $19.44 | $18.70 | $20.42 | 9.2% |
| | Mar | $20.05 | $22.88 | $21.21 | $24.04 | 13.3% |
| | Apr | $20.36 | $24.52 | $20.75 | $24.90 | 20.0% |
| | May | $32.60 | $37.59 | $33.66 | $38.64 | 14.8% |
| | Jun | $27.57 | $28.96 | $28.29 | $29.68 | 4.9% |
| | Jul | $37.03 | $39.87 | $38.51 | $41.35 | 7.4% |
| | Aug | $29.85 | $31.48 | $30.56 | $32.18 | 5.3% |
| | Sep | $25.66 | $28.31 | $27.36 | $30.01 | 9.7% |
| | Oct | $33.33 | $35.59 | $34.27 | $36.53 | 6.6% |
| | Nov | $25.68 | $28.52 | $26.60 | $29.45 | 10.7% |
| | Dec | $31.90 | $33.14 | $33.45 | $34.69 | 3.7% |
| Total | | $28.29 | $30.76 | $29.39 | $31.86 | 8.4% |

127 The performance component of the regulation market clearing price is unaffected by fast start pricing.



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Cont'd


| | | Weighted Average Price ($/Perf. Adj. Actual MW) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Capability Clearing Price | | Regulation Market Clearing Price | | |
| Year | Month | Dispatch | Fast Start | Dispatch | Fast Start | Percent Fast Start Increase |
| 2025 | Jan | $57.21 | $59.04 | $60.17 | $61.99 | 3.0% |
| | Feb | $34.73 | $36.62 | $36.51 | $38.41 | 5.2% |
| | Mar | $31.37 | $35.60 | $33.70 | $37.93 | 12.6% |
| | Apr | $26.33 | $31.51 | $26.84 | $32.02 | 19.3% |
| | May | $26.44 | $28.74 | $27.61 | $29.91 | 8.4% |
| | Jun | $56.45 | $61.08 | $57.81 | $62.43 | 8.0% |
| | Jul | $37.82 | $43.07 | $39.31 | $44.56 | 13.3% |
| | Aug | $26.10 | $29.39 | $27.48 | $30.77 | 12.0% |
| | Sep | $36.70 | $39.27 | $38.49 | $41.06 | 6.7% |
| | Oct | $50.79 | $125.89 | $52.82 | $127.92 | 142.2% |
| | Nov | $33.23 | $62.87 | $33.69 | $63.33 | 88.0% |
| | Dec | $37.65 | $66.64 | $38.26 | $67.24 | 75.7% |
| Total | | $40.44 | $53.66 | $41.46 | $55.05 | 32.8% |
| 2026 | Jan | $85.24 | $142.06 | $86.35 | $143.18 | 65.8% |
| | Feb | $75.01 | $195.98 | $75.46 | $196.42 | 160.3% |
| | Mar | $37.26 | $107.26 | $37.39 | $107.39 | 187.2% |
| | Apr | $45.30 | $109.97 | $45.43 | $110.11 | 142.4% |
| | May | $41.34 | $96.42 | $41.50 | $96.58 | 132.7% |
| | Jun | $47.40 | $169.08 | $47.61 | $169.38 | 255.8% |
| Total | | $54.91 | $136.01 | $55.27 | $136.39 | 146.7% |

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Figure 10-40 shows the capability price, performance price, and the opportunity cost component for the PJM Regulation Market on an effective MW basis. The regulation clearing price is determined based on the marginal unit's total offer (Capability Offer Price + Performance Offer Price + PJM calculated LOC). Then the maximum performance offer price of any of the cleared units is used to set the marginal performance clearing price for the purposes of settlements. The difference between the marginal total clearing price and the highest performance clearing price (RMPCP) is the marginal capability clearing price (RMCCP). The capability price presented here is equal to the clearing price, minus the maximum cleared performance offer price and the LOC. This data is based on actual five minute interval operational data.

Figure 10-40 shows the components of the daily weighted average regulation market clearing price. Each section represents the contribution of the lost opportunity cost, capability price, and performance price, to the total price.[128] The lost opportunity cost is the largest component of the total clearing price. In the first six months of 2026, LOC accounted for 97.2 percent of the daily weighted average capability price, and 97.0 percent of the daily weighted average total clearing price.

**Figure 10-40 Daily weighted average regulation market clearing price components (Dollars per effective MW): January through June, 2026**




128 The performance component of the total price is too small to be visible on the scale necessary to display the average total price in the graph. See Table 10-51 for more detailed performance price information.



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Table 10-50 shows the capability and performance components of the monthly average regulation prices. These components differ from the components of the marginal unit's offers in Figure 10-40 because the performance component of the settlement price for each half hour is determined from the highest performance offer of all units providing regulation in that clearing interval, calculated independent of the marginal unit's offers.

### Table 10-50 Regulation market monthly component of price (Dollars per MW): January through June, 2026

| Year | Month | Weighted Average Regulation Market Capability Clearing Price ($/Effective MW) | Weighted Average Regulation Market Performance Clearing Price ($/Effective MW) | Weighted Average Regulation Market Clearing Price ($/Effective MW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Jan | $142.06 | $1.11 | $143.18 |
| | Feb | $195.98 | $0.44 | $196.42 |
| | Mar | $107.26 | $0.13 | $107.39 |
| | Apr | $109.97 | $0.13 | $110.11 |
| | May | $96.42 | $0.16 | $96.58 |
| 2026 | Jun | $169.08 | $0.30 | $169.38 |
| Average | | $136.01 | $0.38 | $136.39 |

Monthly and total scheduled regulation MW and regulation charges, as well as monthly average regulation price and regulation cost are shown in Table 10-51. The total of all regulation charges in the first six months of 2026 was $411,744,615.

### Table 10-51 Total regulation charges: January through June, 2026

| Year | Month | Scheduled Regulation (Effective MW) | Total Regulation Charges ($) | Weighted Average Regulation Market Price ($/Effective MW) | Cost of Regulation ($/Effective MW) | Price as Percent of Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Jan | 501,730.2 | $74,547,347 | $143.64 | $148.58 | 96.7% |
| | Feb | 451,980.3 | $90,477,186 | $196.96 | $200.18 | 98.4% |
| | Mar | 481,303.7 | $52,467,503 | $107.22 | $109.01 | 98.4% |
| | Apr | 466,089.6 | $51,558,568 | $109.42 | $110.62 | 98.9% |
| | May | 544,273.3 | $53,423,383 | $96.68 | $98.16 | 98.5% |
| | Jun | 525,169.0 | $89,269,974 | $169.19 | $169.98 | 99.5% |
| Total | | 2,970,546.2 | $411,744,615 | $136.40 | $138.61 | 98.4% |

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The capability, performance, and opportunity cost components of the cost of regulation are shown in Table 10-52. Total scheduled regulation is based on settled effective MW. In the first six months of 2026, the average total cost of regulation was $138.61 per MW. In the first six months of 2026, the monthly average capability component cost of regulation was $135.92. In the first six months of 2026, the monthly average performance component cost of regulation was $0.48

### Table 10-52 Components of regulation cost: January through June, 2026


| Year | Month | Scheduled Regulation (Effective MW) | Cost of Regulation Capability ($/Effective MW) | Cost of Regulation Performance ($/Effective MW) | Opportunity Cost ($/Effective MW) | Total Cost ($/Effective MW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Jan | 501,730.2 | $142.07 | $1.57 | $4.94 | $148.58 |
| | Feb | 451,980.3 | $196.36 | $0.60 | $3.22 | $200.18 |
| | Mar | 481,303.7 | $107.08 | $0.14 | $1.80 | $109.01 |
| | Apr | 466,089.6 | $109.29 | $0.13 | $1.20 | $110.62 |
| | May | 544,273.3 | $96.54 | $0.14 | $1.48 | $98.16 |
| | Jun | 525,169.0 | $168.89 | $0.30 | $0.79 | $169.98 |
| Total | | 2,970,546.2 | $135.92 | $0.48 | $2.21 | $138.61 |


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## Performance Standards

PJM's performance as measured by CPS1 and BAAL standards is shown in Figure 10-41 for every month from January 2011 through June 2026 with dashed vertical lines marking the date (October 1, 2012) of the implementation of what was called the Performance Based Regulation Market design including two products (the introduction of the RegD product), and the date (October 1, 2025) of the implementation of Phase 1 of the current regulation market redesign.[129] The horizontal dashed lines represent PJM internal goals for CPS1 and BAAL performance.

**Figure 10-41 Monthly CPS1 and BAAL performance: January 2011 through June 2026**




129 The Performance Based Regulation Market design was the previous market design, which introduced the RegD product, a marginal benefit factor, and the addition of a performance offer component. See *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix F: Ancillary Services.

# Black Start Service

Black start service is required for the reliable restoration of the grid following a blackout. Black start service is the ability of a generating unit to start without an outside electrical supply, or the demonstrated ability of a generating unit to automatically remain operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid (automatic load rejection or ALR).[130]

PJM does not have a market to provide black start service, but compensates black start resource owners on the basis of cost of service rates defined in the tariff.[131] Currently, there are a small number of units in unique circumstances with bilateral agreements with their transmission operator (TO) to provide black start service that were entered into prior to joining PJM. These units are compensated directly by the TO. PJM has the ability to use a backstop black start service acquisition process under some circumstances that would result in shifting responsibility from PJM to the TOs.

PJM defines required black start capability zonally, while recognizing that the most effective way to provide black start service is a regional approach that recognizes cost effective ways to provide black start across transmission zonal boundaries.[132] PJM does not adequately use a regional or cross zonal approach to providing black start. Under the current rules PJM has substantial flexibility in procuring black start resources and is responsible for black start resource selection under most conditions.[133] But PJM's stated principles for system restoration are not fully incorporated in the rules in Schedule 6A. Costs should also be allocated on a regional basis to reflect the regional benefits of black start service.

The MMU recommends that black start planning and coordination be on a regional basis recognizing cross zonal cranking paths and not on a narrowly or purely zonal basis. The region as a whole benefits from black start service,

130 OATT Schedule 1 § 1.3BB.
131 See OATT Schedule 6A para. 18.
132 See Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C to Comments, FERC Docket No. ER13-1911-000 (August 19, 2013) at 5 ("To be sure, restoration plans utilizing interconnecting Transmission Owners is not new and is currently included in all restoration plans today. Geographic or political boundaries play no role in the evaluation of the most reliable and efficient restoration strategies.").
133 See Docket No. ER13-1911-000.

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regardless of the transmission zone in which it is located, and the costs of black start service should be shared equally across the region.

## Fuel Assurance

Black start units must maintain enough fuel to allow for 16 hours of run time or for the minimum time required by the TO whichever is less. Generator operators must notify PJM and the TO when fuel levels fall below the required levels.[134] A black start unit must be able to start without an outside electrical supply or a unit with a high operating factor with demonstrated ability to automatically remain operating, at reduced levels, when disconnected to the grid.[135]

Fuel assured black start units have to meet the same requirements as black start units including maintaining enough onsite fuel and non-fuel consumables for three starts and 16 hours of full load operation, or operate on two or more interstate pipelines independently. Hybrid or intermittent resources must be able to provide 16 hours each day of full load with 90 percent confidence, although the 16 hours do not need to be continuous. Fuel assured black start units are required to provide annual certification that they meet the minimum fuel and non-fuel consumables requirements. PJM may also request certification at any time. If a fuel assured black start unit's fuel or non-fuel consumables drop below their ability to run 16 hours at full load and three starts they must report to PJM within 24 hours. In any month a fuel assured black start unit fails to maintain the fuel and non-fuel consumables they will not receive black start revenues in that month unless it meets the exception rules.[136] Exceptions rules are for an approved outage and if levels go below 16 hours as the result of a PAI.[137] Black start units that are not fuel assured do not lose black start revenues if their fuel and or non-fuel consumables fall below a 16 hour run time and/or cannot make three starts.

By order issued October 6, 2023, the FERC approved revisions to Schedule 6A defining fuel assurance for black start units, effective July 12, 2023.[138] The revisions were approved over the protest of the MMU, which identified significant flaws.[139] The planning criteria for fuel assured units and charges are applied on a zonal basis and not a regional basis, even though PJM is a regional transmission operator. The revisions to the tariff ignore the attributes of existing fuel assured units if they do not offer into the fuel assurance RFP. Intermittent resources are treated as if they are fuel assured. The X allocation factor for fuel assured hydro units is arbitrarily doubled from 0.01 to 0.02. The Z incentive factor for fuel assured units is arbitrarily doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent. For black start units in service prior to June 6, 2021, the rules apply CRF rates that ignore significant reductions in federal tax rates, including depreciation provisions, resulting in significant overpayments by PJM customers. The rules do not address environmental permits, which may limit the ability of units to provide black start service. The rules do not define the provision of black start service by DERs. The rules do not require testing units without notice to operators. The rules do not address the availability of natural gas and stored water levels. Reporting requirements for onsite fuel are not adequate. The reliability backstop improperly depends on TOs to secure black start service if PJM has two failed auctions.

The MMU recommends that the fuel assurance rules be modified to recognize actual fuel assured resources within and across zones.

## Definition of Black Start Costs

In the November 8, 2024, MIC meeting PJM proposed to change the definition of Net CONE used in the Black Start Base Formula Rate (BFR) calculation.[140] The Base Formula Rate is a formula based cost of service rate and not a market based rate. The rationale was that Net CONE values based on a combined cycle reference resource defined for the capacity market could be negative at times. PJM did not retract its proposal even after PJM decided to use a combustion turbine as the reference resource rather than a combined cycle as the reference resource. That change eliminated PJM's identified issue with negative Net CONE values. The MMU presented historical information on

134 See "PJM Manual 36: Minimum Critical Black start Requirements," § A.1.2 (June 15, 2025
135 *See* OATT Schedule 6A para. 2.
136 *See* OATT Schedule 6A para. 14.
137 See "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," §4.5.10 Performance Standards Non-Performance §4.5.14, Rev. 56 (October 1, 2025)
138 See 85 FERC ¶ 91,000.

139 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER23-1874-000 (June 6, 2023) and Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER23-1874-000 (July 6, 2023).
140 See MIC, Problem Statement and Issues Charge, "Black Start Base Formula Rate," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2024/20241108/20241108-item-03-1---black-start-base-formula-rate---problem-statement.pdf> and <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2024/20241108/20241108-item-03-2---black-start-base-formula-rate---issue-charge.pdf> (Nov. 8, 2024).


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payments under the BFR rate and argued that no change is needed to the Net CONE calculation.[141] PJM filed its proposal with the Commission on April 30, 2025.[142] The MMU filed a protest, and, after a deficiency letter issued and PJM responded, filed additional comments.[143]

Ultimately PJM's argument was simply that the current tariff calculation would result in a short term decrease in black start payments under the Base Formula Rate which includes Net CONE, and PJM did not want the rate to decrease. PJM proposed to use average Net CONE for the entire RTO over the last five years as a fixed value subject to escalation. Both Gross CONE and the net revenue offset will be escalated using an inflation index. It is illogical to escalate net revenue because net revenue is a function of the dynamics of the energy market and the fuel markets. Given the current and expected high levels of Gross CONE compared to the five year average, PJM's proposal could actually reduce payments to these black start resources compared to the status quo. PJM did not address that possibility. PJM failed to explain why their proposal is a reasonable approach to compensating these resources for providing black start service. PJM provided no information about the actual costs of providing black start service. PJM provided no information about the actual mark up over costs currently paid to these black start resources. PJM's proposal does not approximate black start service costs and fails to even attempt to demonstrate any relationship to black start service costs. Under an approach that uses Net CONE, PJM does not justify using system wide Net CONE rather than locational Net CONE.

The MMU recommends that the black start rate under the Base Formula Rate should be based on the actual cost of providing the black start service, plus an incentive, rather than the unsupported use of Net CONE, escalated each year.

## Black Start Backstop Acquisition Process

PJM Manual 14D defines a Black Start Reliability Backstop Process that is implemented in the event that PJM does not acquire enough black start resources through the RFP process. One option under this process is that one or more Transmission Owners can take responsibility for procuring the needed black start resources in their zones.

There can be up to four steps in the reliability backstop process. The first step is triggered by: a black start generation shortage or a failure to meet the fuel assurance criteria in a zone; and two failed RFPs; and no cross-zonal solutions available; and no RTEP transmission solutions available. In the second step, PJM, affected TOs, and affected state(s) will discuss the shortage, the costs, and the TO proposal. They will consider the impacts on the restoration plan and PJM will determine whether to issue a reliability backstop RFP. If a reliability backstop RFP is not issued, PJM will monitor the shortfall. If a reliability backstop RFP is issued then a third step will be taken. In the third step, an RFP will be issued by PJM to address the shortfall. The TO solution at this point will be made public excluding CEII information. The TO solution may be owned by the TO, generation owning affiliate or contracted for by the TO with a third party generation owner. The TO is obligated to provide a proposal. In the fourth step, PJM will evaluate the RFP responses and compare them to the TO solution(s). If the TO solution is the only option received then it will be implemented.[144]

The backstop process for black start service is flawed. PJM has units in zones which are fuel assured capable but are ignored if they do not bid into a fuel assured RFP. There is no reason to believe that TOs can procure black start more effectively than PJM. TOs should not own generation under cost of service regulation because it is inconsistent with competitive markets. PJM should continue its efforts until their goals are met. It is PJM's responsibility to manage black start capability.[145]

The MMU recommends that the reliability backstop for black start service be eliminated. There is no reason that PJM cannot acquire black start resources if the TOs can acquire black start resources.

141 See MIC, IMM Education, Black Start Costs and Net CONE <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mic/2025/20250205/20250205-item-03-2---black-start-base-formula-rate---imm-solution.pdf> (February 5, 2025).
142 See PJM Filing, Docket No. ER25-2123-000.
143 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER25-2123-000 (May 21, 2025); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER25-2123-000 (July 21, 2025).
144 See "PJM Manual 14D: Generator Operational Requirements," §10.3 Black Start Reliability Backstop Process, Rev. 69 (December 17, 2025).
145 See 144 FERC ¶ 61,191 (2013).

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## RFPs for Black Start Service

PJM requires a minimum of one fuel assured black start site in each zone or two non fuel assured black start sites connected to different pipelines per zone.[146] New or existing black start units that wish to be designated as fuel assured black start units must offer into the PJM fuel assured RFP.[147]

In order for a unit to be considered fuel assured, it must have one of five characteristics: onsite fuel; be capable of operating independently on two or more pipelines; be directly connected to a natural gas gathering system; hydro, non-hydro and intermittent resources must be capable of 16 hours of noncontinuous full load operation with 90 percent confidence. A zone also meets the fuel assurance requirement if the zone includes a minimum of two gas units connected to two separate natural gas pipelines.[148]

On April 7, 2021, PJM issued an incremental RFP for black start service in the BGE and PEPCO Zones. On November 1, 2021, PJM made awards for the April 7, 2021, incremental RFP. The in service date was May 2024. On August 1, 2022, PJM issued an incremental RFP for black start service in the PECO Zone. No awards were made.

On June 20, 2023, PJM issued an RTO wide request for proposals (RFP) in accordance with the five year black start selection process. The RFP was for black start service and fuel assured black start service. PJM awarded multiple existing black start units fuel assured black start service status in eight out of the 21 control zones in PJM.

On April 29, 2024, PJM issued an incremental RFP for fuel assured black start service, because the 2023 RFP did not attract offers for fuel assured black start units in all zones. The April 29, 2024, RFP failed to result in acceptable offers in eight zones.

Despite the fact that the April 29, 2024, auction was not completed until the end of June 2026, PJM had started the reliability backstop process several months earlier. In May and June of 2026, PJM awarded multiple existing black start units fuel assured black start service in five zones.

PJM has started the reliability backstop process to secure fuel assured black start service in six zones. There are three zones where no units offered into the fuel assured RFP. In the six zones where a fuel assured reliability backstop process has started, PJM has units that meet the technical requirements to be fuel assured. The actual fuel assurance characteristics of these black start units were ignored because they did not offer into the fuel assured RFP.

The premature implementation of the reliability backstop process illustrates the inefficiency and excess cost to customers of ignoring the attributes of existing fuel assured units if they do not offer into the fuel assurance RFP. PJM has failed to consider whether existing black start resources meet the fuel assurance goals regardless of whether they applied for fuel assurance status.

## Black Start Charges

Total black start charges are the sum of black start revenue requirement charges and black start uplift (operating reserve) charges.

Black start revenue requirements for black start units consist of fixed black start service costs, variable black start service costs, training costs, fuel storage costs, and an incentive factor applicable when CRF rates are not used. The tariff specifies how to calculate each component of the revenue requirement formula.[149]

Fixed black start service costs are calculated using one of three methods chosen by the black start provider from the options defined in the OATT Schedule 6A: base formula rate; capital cost recovery rate; or incremental black start NERC-CIP cost recovery. The base formula rate is Net CONE multiplied by the black start unit's capacity multiplied by the X factor. The X factor is 0.01 for hydro units and 0.02 for CT units. The capital recovery rate is the capital investment multiplied by the CRF rate. The incremental NERC-CIP cost, for existing black start resources that need to add additional capital to meet NERC-CIP requirements, is calculated using the capital cost recovery

146 See "PJM Manual 36: System Restoration," §1.2 Minimum Critical Black Start Requirement, Rev. 35 (June. 15, 2025).
147 See "PJM Manual 14D: Generator Operational Requirements," §10.1 Black Start Selection Process, Rev. 69 (December 17, 2025).
148 See "PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations," §4.5.7 Minimum Critical Black Start Unit and Fuel Assurance Black Start Unit Requirements, Rev. 55 (June. 18, 2025).
149 *See* OATT Schedule 6A para. 18.


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rate. Black start uplift charges are paid to units committed in real time to provide black start service or for black start testing.[150] Total black start charges are allocated monthly to PJM customers based on their zone and nonzone peak transmission use and point to point transmission reservations.[151]

No black start units have requested new or additional black start NERC – CIP Capital Costs.[152]

In the first six months of 2026, total black start charges were $22.3 million, a decrease of $6.5 million (22.5 percent) from 2025. The decrease resulted from units completing their capital recovery rate period and shifting to the base formula rate. In the first six months of 2026, total revenue requirement charges were $22.0 million, a decrease of $6.5 million (22.7 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total uplift charges were $0.35 million, a decrease of $0.04 million (11.2 percent) from 2025. Table 10-53 shows total charges for January through June of each year from 2010 through 2026.[153]

**Table 10-53 Black start revenue requirement charges: January through June, 2010 through 2026**

| Jan-Jun | Revenue Requirement Charges | Uplift Charges | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | $5,481,206 | $0 | $5,481,206 |
| 2011 | $5,968,676 | $0 | $5,968,676 |
| 2012 | $7,873,702 | $0 | $7,873,702 |
| 2013 | $10,584,683 | $48,075,584 | $58,660,267 |
| 2014 | $10,874,608 | $14,339,174 | $25,213,781 |
| 2015 | $23,348,866 | $5,036,053 | $28,384,918 |
| 2016 | $33,778,388 | $168,645 | $33,947,033 |
| 2017 | $35,617,856 | $146,223 | $35,764,079 |
| 2018 | $33,363,286 | $126,698 | $33,489,984 |
| 2019 | $32,100,135 | $138,612 | $32,238,747 |
| 2020 | $33,343,875 | $141,918 | $33,485,793 |
| 2021 | $33,382,549 | $182,934 | $33,565,484 |
| 2022 | $34,569,421 | $341,782 | $34,911,203 |
| 2023 | $32,861,260 | $241,237 | $33,102,497 |
| 2024 | $34,543,079 | $295,821 | $34,838,900 |
| 2025 | $28,419,396 | $393,946 | $28,813,342 |
| 2026 | $21,970,835 | $349,857 | $22,320,692 |

150 There are no black start units currently using the ALR option.
151 OATT Schedule 6A (paras. 25, 26 and 27 outline how charges are to be applied).
152 OATT Schedule 6A para. 21. "The Market Monitoring Unit shall include a Black Start Service summary in its annual State of the Market report which will set forth a descriptive summary of the new or additional Black Start NERC-CIP Capital costs requested by Black Start Units, and include a list of the types of capital costs requested and the overall cost of such capital improvements on an aggregate basis such that no data is attributable to an individual Black Start Unit."
153 Starting December 1, 2012, PJM defined a separate black start uplift category. ALR units accounted for the high uplift charges in 2013 – 2015. All ALR units had been replaced by April 2015.

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Total black start zonal charges in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $0 in the OVEC and REC Zones to $4.4 million in the AEP Zone. The rates for black start zonal charges in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $0 per MW-day in the OVEC and REC Zones to $2.36 per MW-day in the ACEC Zone. For each zone, Table 10-54 shows black start charges, zonal peak loads, and black start rates (calculated as charges per MW-day).[154] [155]

### Table 10-54 Black start zonal charges: January through June, 2025 and 2026[156]

| | Jan-Jun 2025 | | | | | Jan-Jun 2026 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | Revenue Requirement Charges | Uplift Charges | Total Charges | Peak Load (MW) | Black Start Rate ($/MW-day) | Revenue Requirement Charges | Uplift Charges | Total Charges | Peak Load (MW) | Black Start Rate ($/MW-day) |
| ACEC | $1,179,097 | $18,442 | $1,197,539 | 2,566 | $2.58 | $1,159,605 | $0 | $1,159,605 | 2,709 | $2.36 |
| AEP | $4,539,788 | $12,880 | $4,552,669 | 22,318 | $1.13 | $4,351,780 | $2,120 | $4,353,901 | 23,710 | $1.01 |
| APS | $2,537,659 | $18,366 | $2,556,025 | 8,938 | $1.58 | $1,092,198 | $7,763 | $1,099,961 | 9,792 | $0.62 |
| ATSI | $1,524,846 | $9,162 | $1,534,009 | 12,508 | $0.68 | $1,480,800 | $9,154 | $1,489,954 | 12,659 | $0.65 |
| BGE | $1,886,005 | $8,803 | $1,894,808 | 6,766 | $1.55 | $1,904,114 | $10,087 | $1,914,202 | 6,585 | $1.61 |
| COMED | $2,669,872 | $82,440 | $2,752,312 | 21,560 | $0.71 | $1,473,083 | $66,274 | $1,539,357 | 20,714 | $0.41 |
| DAY | $125,207 | $48,313 | $173,519 | 3,365 | $0.28 | $103,407 | $27,504 | $130,911 | 3,396 | $0.21 |
| DUKE | $185,565 | $14,139 | $199,705 | 5,171 | $0.21 | $208,110 | $3,402 | $211,513 | 5,190 | $0.23 |
| DUQ | $436,221 | $1,272 | $437,493 | 2,691 | $0.90 | $444,771 | $1,248 | $446,018 | 2,695 | $0.91 |
| DOM | $1,807,566 | $91,595 | $1,899,161 | 23,118 | $0.45 | $1,326,403 | $170,494 | $1,496,896 | 24,678 | $0.34 |
| DPL | $646,479 | $2,651 | $649,130 | 4,189 | $0.86 | $458,846 | $3,070 | $461,917 | 4,198 | $0.61 |
| EKPC | $161,880 | $20,087 | $181,968 | 3,748 | $0.27 | $181,776 | $0 | $181,776 | 3,757 | $0.27 |
| JCPLC | $292,317 | $2,248 | $294,565 | 6,184 | $0.26 | $188,448 | $0 | $188,448 | 6,273 | $0.17 |
| MEC | $212,053 | $10,071 | $222,124 | 3,067 | $0.40 | $201,876 | $15,510 | $217,386 | 3,000 | $0.40 |
| OVEC | $0 | $0 | $0 | NA | NA | $0 | $0 | $0 | NA | NA |
| PECO | $710,746 | $1,638 | $712,384 | 8,652 | $0.45 | $690,501 | $4,207 | $694,707 | 8,380 | $0.46 |
| PE | $1,688,053 | $0 | $1,688,053 | 2,953 | $3.16 | $429,428 | $0 | $429,428 | 2,909 | $0.82 |
| PEPCO | $3,505,456 | $24,997 | $3,530,452 | 6,162 | $3.17 | $3,741,977 | $5,956 | $3,747,933 | 6,016 | $3.44 |
| PPL | $1,679,861 | $324 | $1,680,184 | 7,460 | $1.24 | $804,748 | $246 | $804,993 | 8,057 | $0.55 |
| PSEG | $672,299 | $918 | $673,217 | 10,152 | $0.37 | $413,237 | $2,599 | $415,836 | 10,230 | $0.22 |
| REC | $0 | $0 | $0 | NA | NA | $0 | $0 | $0 | NA | NA |
| (Imp/Exp/Wheels) | $1,958,428 | $25,600 | $1,984,028 | 11,881 | $0.92 | $1,315,728 | $20,223 | $1,335,951 | 10,507 | $0.70 |
| Total | $28,419,396 | $393,946 | $28,813,342 | 173,446 | $0.92 | $21,970,835 | $349,857 | $22,320,692 | 175,453 | $0.70 |

154 See "PJM Manual 27: Open Access Transmission Tariff Accounting," § 7.3 Black Start Service Charges, Rev. 102 (Jan. 23, 2025).
155 For each zone and import export/wheels the black start rates ($/MW day) are calculated by taking total charges by zone and divided by peak load then divided by days in the period.
156 Peak load for each zone is used to calculate the black start rate per MW day.


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Table 10-55 provides a revenue requirement estimate by zone for the 2026/2027, 2027/2028 and 2028/2029 Delivery Years.[157] Revenue requirement values are rounded up to the nearest $50,000, reflecting the uncertainty about future black start revenue requirement costs. These values are illustrative only. The estimates are based on the best available data including current black start unit revenue requirements, expected black start unit termination and in service dates, changes in recovery rates, and owner provided cost estimates of incoming black start units at the time of publication and may change significantly. The estimates do not reflect the impact of FERC decisions that could affect compensation for black start.

**Table 10-55 Black start zonal revenue requirement estimate: 2026/2027 through 2028/2029 Delivery Years[158]**

| Zone | 2026 / 2027 Revenue Requirement | 2027 / 2028 Revenue Requirement | 2028 / 2029 Revenue Requirement |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACEC | $2,600,000 | $2,600,000 | $2,650,000 |
| AEP | $8,100,000 | $8,250,000 | $8,400,000 |
| APS | $2,900,000 | $5,100,000 | $5,150,000 |
| ATSI | $3,200,000 | $3,250,000 | $3,250,000 |
| BGE | $4,100,000 | $4,100,000 | $2,650,000 |
| COMED | $3,300,000 | $3,450,000 | $3,550,000 |
| DAY | $300,000 | $300,000 | $300,000 |
| DUKE | $500,000 | $500,000 | $550,000 |
| DUQ | $2,200,000 | $4,350,000 | $4,350,000 |
| DOM | $2,400,000 | $2,500,000 | $2,600,000 |
| DPL | $1,050,000 | $1,100,000 | $1,150,000 |
| EKPC | $450,000 | $450,000 | $450,000 |
| JCPLC | $650,000 | $650,000 | $700,000 |
| MEC | $600,000 | $650,000 | $650,000 |
| OVEC | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| PECO | $1,550,000 | $1,650,000 | $1,700,000 |
| PE | $750,000 | $750,000 | $800,000 |
| PEPCO | $8,250,000 | $8,300,000 | $7,500,000 |
| PPL | $1,850,000 | $1,900,000 | $2,000,000 |
| PSEG | $1,000,000 | $1,000,000 | $1,050,000 |
| REC | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total | $45,750,000 | $50,850,000 | $49,450,000 |

157 The System Restoration Strategy Task Force requested that the MMU provide estimated black start revenue requirements.

158 For the 2027/2028 and 2028/2029 Delivery Years the base formula rates fixed rate was increased by the Handy Whitman index (1.044) each successive year in calculating the estimated annual revenue requirement.

## CRF Issues

The capital recovery factor (CRF) defines the revenue requirement of black start units when new equipment is added to provide black start capability.[159] The CRF is a rate, which when multiplied by the investment, provides for a return on and of capital over a defined time period. CRFs are calculated using a formula (or a correctly defined standard financial model) that accounts for the weighted average cost of capital and its components, plus depreciation and taxes. The PJM CRF table was created in 2007 as part of the new RPM capacity market design.[160] That CRF table provided for the accelerated return of incremental investment in capacity resources based on concerns about the fact that some old coal units would be making substantial investments related to pollution control. The CRF values were later added to the black start rules.[161]

The CRF table for existing black start units includes the column header, term of black start commitment, which is misleading and incorrect. The column is simply the cost recovery period. Accelerated recovery reduces risk to black start units and should not be the basis for a shorter commitment. Full payment of all costs of black start investment on an accelerated basis should not be a reason for a shortened commitment period. Regardless of the recovery period, payment of the full costs of the black start investment should require commitment for the life of the unit.[162] In addition, there is no need for such short recovery periods for black start investment costs. Two periods, based on unit age, are more than adequate.

The values in the original CRF tariff tables, in Schedule 6A and Attachment DD § 6.8(a), were based on 2007 income tax rates and depreciation rules. The U.S. Internal Revenue Code changed significantly in December 2017 with updates to the corporate income tax rate and depreciation rules.[163] [164] The PJM CRF table did not change to reflect these changes.[165] [166] The PJM CRF tables

159 *See* OATT Schedule 6A para. 18.

160 See OATT Attachment DD § 6.8(a).

161 See OATT Schedule 6A.

162 PJM's recent filing to revise Schedule 6A includes a required commitment to provide black start service for the life of the unit. See FERC Docket No. ER21-1635.

163 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2096, Stat. 2105 (2017).

164 26 U.S. Code §11(b).

165 The corporate tax rate was lowered to 21 percent and bonus depreciation, which allows generator owners to depreciate 100 percent of the capital investment in the first year of operation, was introduced.

166 Bonus depreciation is 100 percent for capital investments placed in service after September 27, 2017, and before January 1, 2023. Bonus depreciation is 80 percent for capital investments placed in service after December 31, 2022, and before January 1, 2024, and

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in the tariff should have been updated immediately to reflect the change in the tax laws. As a result, CRF values have overcompensated black start units since the 2017 changes to the tax code. On April 7, 2021, PJM filed with FERC to update the CRF values for new black start service units.[167] PJM proposed to bifurcate the CRF calculation, applying an updated CRF calculation that incorporates the new federal tax law to new black start units while leaving the outdated and incorrect CRF in place for existing black start units. Rather than fix the inaccurate CRF values used for existing black start units, PJM's filing would have made the use of inaccurate values permanent. The MMU filed comments on April 28, 2021.[168] The MMU objected to the continued use of the outdated CRF for existing units. The MMU also introduced a CRF formula for calculating the CRF for new black start units and requested that the CRF formula be included in the tariff.[169] [170] On August 10, 2021, FERC issued an order ("August 10th Order") that accepted PJM's tariff revisions that apply to new black start units (selected for service after June 6, 2021) and directed PJM to include the CRF formula proposed by the MMU.[171] The August 10th Order also established a show cause proceeding in a new docket to "determine whether the existing rates for generating units providing Black Start Service (Black Start Units), which are based on a federal corporate income tax that pre-dates the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), remains just and reasonable."[172] The MMU requested rehearing over the Commission's conclusion that the MMU had requested "retroactive changes to the rates previously paid to generators."[173] [174] The request for rehearing was denied.[175] PJM's compliance filing to address the August 10 Order was accepted by letter order, subject to edits proposed by the MMU, on December 16, 2021.[176]

PJM's response to the show cause directive in the August 10th Order continued to support the use of the outdated CRF despite the Commission's statement that the CRF values "appear to be unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, or otherwise unlawful."[177] [178] The MMU responded with analysis showing that PJM's proposal for maintaining the outdated CRF values would result in significant over recovery of black start capital investments.[179] In March 2023, FERC issued an order establishing hearing and settlement judge procedures.[180] Settlement talks continued and in January 2024 Commission Trial Staff moved to suspend the proceeding because a settlement had been reached in principle.[181] The MMU filed comments in opposition to the settlement, and the settlement was not certified to the Commission.[182] [183] The hearing process then resumed, but rather than hold a hearing, PJM, with the support of FERC Staff, submitted a second offer of settlement on behalf of itself and certain black start unit owners, AMP, ODEC and the PJM ICC. The settlement included exactly the same values as the first settlement, but also included affidavits. By order issued September 23, 2025, the Commission approved the second offer of settlement over the MMU's objection.[184] Forty-nine black start generators received payments based on the outdated CRF. All but eight of the 49 generators have completed their black start capital cost recovery terms.

The November 15, 2024, settlement reduced the capital recovery payments for 38 black start generators. Table 10-56 shows the new CRF values from the settlement. The settlement CRF values became effective on January 1, 2024.

### Table 10-56 Settlement CRF Values

| Capital Recovery Period (years) | Original CRF Value | November 2024 Settlement CRF Value |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | 0.363 | 0.310 |
| 10 | 0.198 | 0.177 |
| 15 | 0.146 | 0.135 |
| 20 | 0.125 | 0.118 |

the bonus depreciation level is reduced by 20 percent for each subsequent year through 2026. Capital investments placed in service after December 31, 2026, are not eligible for bonus depreciation. See 26 U.S. Code §168(k)(6)(A).

167 *See* Docket No. ER21-1635-000.
168 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER21-1635-000 (April 28, 2021).
169 See Answer and Motion for Leave to Answer of the independent Market Monitor for PJM, ER21-1635 (May 20, 2021
170 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER21-1635 (July 2, 2021).
171 See 176 FERC ¶ 61,080 at 42 and 44 (2021).
172 176 FERC ¶ 61,080 at 2 (2021).
173 *Id.* at 50.
174 Request for Rehearing of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC Docket No. ER21-1635 (September 9, 2021).
175 See 177 FERC ¶ 62,017 (2021).
176 See 177 FERC ¶ 61,202 (2021).
177 *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Response to Commission's Show Cause Order*, Docket No. EL21-91 (October 12, 2021).
178 August 10th Order at 47.
179 Errata Filing of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Attachment B at 17, Docket No. EL21-91 (November 18, 2022).
180 See 182 FERC ¶ 61,194.
181 Motion of Commission Trial Staff to Suspend Procedural Schedule and Shorten Answer Period, Docket No. EL21-91-003 (January 10, 2024).
182 Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM in Opposition to Offer of Settlement, Docket No. EL21-91-000, -003 (February 20, 2024).
183 186 FERC ¶ 63,019 (2024).
184 See 193 FERC ¶ 61,059.


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There is no financial basis for the settlement CRF values and the settlement will result in significant over recovery for the owners of the black start generators. The settlement reduced the excess recovery payments from $89.7 million to $74.1 million. FERC never made a determination in the show cause proceeding (EL21-91) regarding the "just and reasonableness" of continuing to pay the existing resources at an outdated CRF based on an income tax rate that is no longer in effect. This question remains outstanding today and a similar over or under recovery issue will arise if there is a significant change in a state or federal income tax rate.

On July 4, 2025, with the enactment of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act ("OBBBA"),[185] the bonus depreciation rules changed again. Section 70301 of OBBBA (I.R.C. § 168(k)) allows 100 percent bonus depreciation for "qualified production property ("QPP") acquired and placed in service on or after January 20, 2025.[186] QPP means nonresidential real property used in manufacturing, production, or refining of tangible personal property in the United States.[187] To be eligible, construction must begin after January 19, 2025, and before January 1, 2029, and the property must be placed in service before January 1, 2031.[188]

The CRF value, once it has been assigned to a generator, should not be updated unless there is a significant change in the state or federal income tax rate.[189] PJM currently updates the CRF for generators that have already begun receiving capital recovery payments anytime the debt rate changes. This is not correct. The debt rate reflects the market conditions during the year the investment is placed into service. A change in the debt rate in a subsequent year is not relevant to the capital cost recovery, and will lead to an over or under recovery. This is not how the MMU intended for the CRF formula to be utilized. This is another negative consequence of the show cause procedure (EL21-91) being passed to hearing and settlement without resolution. A process needs to be included in Schedule 6A that specifies how and when to update the CRF value for a generator that has already been assigned a CRF and begun capital cost recovery. The formula and parameter values currently in Schedule 6A are for determining the initial capital recovery payment. To correctly update a CRF for a generator that is already receiving capital recovery payments, the outstanding capital investment must be determined and a new CRF calculated based on the updated parameter values and the years remaining in the capital recovery period.

185 Also known as the 2025 Reconciliation Bill and Public Law 119-21.
186 OBBBA § 70301(c)(1).
187 OBBBA § 70307(a)(2).
188 *Id.*
189 Because PJM rounds CRF to 3 digits, a "significant change" is one that changes the CRF by ± 0.001.

## Reactive Service and Capability

Prior to June 1, 2026, under Schedule 2 to the OATT, suppliers of reactive power were compensated separately for reactive capability and reactive service.[190] [191] [192] [193]

On October 17, 2024, the Commission issued a final rule, Order No. 904, eliminating separate payments for reactive capability in all jurisdictional markets, including PJM.[194] On January 28, 2025, PJM submitted a compliance filing to implement Order No. 904 ("Compliance Filing").[195] The Compliance Filing proposed a transition mechanism lasting through May 31, 2026. On August 4, 2025, the Commission accepted PJM's termination of separate Schedule 2 payments after May 31, 2026, but rejected PJM's proposed transition mechanism and the MMU's proposed enhancements to that mechanism.[196]

### Reactive Costs

Customers in PJM paid total reactive capability charges of $143.7 million in the first six months of 2026. Under the prior rules, effective through May 31, 2026, compensation for reactive capability was approved separately for each resource or resource group by FERC per Schedule 2 of the OATT.[197] Reactive capability credits were based on FERC approved filings for individual

190 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC, *2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through September* (November 14, 2024) at 652–656, for history and analysis of reactive power in PJM.
191 See Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 544 (2003), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 28, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ¶ 61,287 (2004), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2003-C, 111 FERC ¶ 61,401 (2005), *aff'd sub nom. National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FERC*, 475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *CAISO*, 160 FERC ¶ 61,035 at P 19 (2017); *SPP*, 119 FERC ¶ 61,199 at P 28 (2007), *order on reh'g*, 121 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2007); *see also* 178 FERC ¶ 61,088, at PP 29–31 (2022); 179 FERC ¶ 61,103, at PP 20–21 (2022).
192 See OATT Attachment O.
193 See *MISO*, 182 FERC ¶ 61,033 at P 52 (January 27, 2023) (*MISO*); *see also Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procedures*, Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 546.
194 See *Compensation for Reactive Power within the Standard Power Factor Range*, Order No. 904, 189 FERC ¶ 61,034 ("Order No. 904").
195 See Docket No. ER25-1073.
196 See 192 FERC ¶ 61,113; see also, Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER25-1073 (February 18, 2025).
197 See "PJM Manual 27: Open Access Transmission Tariff Accounting," § 3.2 Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Credits, Rev. 102 (Jan. 23, 2025); 192 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2025).

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unit revenue requirements that were typically black box settlements.[198] All payments for reactive capability credits ended on May 31, 2026.

Reactive service credits are paid to units that operate in real time outside of their normal range at the direction of PJM for the purpose of providing reactive service. Compensation for reactive power service is based on real-time lost opportunity costs.[199] Reactive service credits continue to be paid.

Total reactive capability charges are the sum of FERC approved reactive supply revenue requirements. Zonal reactive supply revenue requirement charges were allocated monthly to PJM customers based on their zonal and to any nonzonal (outside of PJM) peak transmission use and daily average point to point transmission reservations.[200] [201]

In the first six months of 2026, total reactive charges were $143.7 million, a decrease of $38.2 million (21.0 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total reactive capability charges were $141.6 million, a decrease of $39.8 million (22.0 percent) from the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, total reactive service charges were $2.2 million, an increase of $1.6 million (293.9 percent) from the first six months of 2025. Total zonal reactive service charges ranged from $0 in the REC and OVEC Zones, to $23.1 million in the AEP Zone in the first six months of 2025.

Starting June 1, 2026, the separate charges for reactive capability were terminated. Table 10-57 and Table 10-58 show reactive capability charges for the first six months of 2026.

Table 10-57 shows reactive service charges for January through June of each year from 2010 through 2026.

### Table 10-57 Reactive service charges and reactive capability charges: January through June, 2010 through 2026

| Jan-Jun | Reactive Service Charges | Reactive Capability Charges | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | $4,249,443 | $120,523,609 | $124,773,052 |
| 2011 | $15,443,482 | $124,547,354 | $139,990,836 |
| 2012 | $37,847,646 | $136,372,589 | $174,220,235 |
| 2013 | $108,519,979 | $137,334,767 | $245,854,745 |
| 2014 | $22,313,554 | $141,158,197 | $163,471,751 |
| 2015 | $9,249,621 | $138,267,680 | $147,517,301 |
| 2016 | $636,342 | $145,728,978 | $146,365,320 |
| 2017 | $9,348,963 | $150,652,786 | $160,001,749 |
| 2018 | $10,718,521 | $149,319,746 | $160,038,268 |
| 2019 | $450,564 | $162,366,426 | $162,816,990 |
| 2020 | $383,133 | $171,477,949 | $171,861,082 |
| 2021 | $735,896 | $178,774,224 | $179,510,121 |
| 2022 | $989,739 | $192,505,034 | $193,494,773 |
| 2023 | $382,859 | $191,108,308 | $191,491,167 |
| 2024 | $917,081 | $189,165,887 | $190,082,968 |
| 2025 | $547,300 | $181,405,068 | $181,952,369 |
| 2026 | $2,156,060 | $141,580,117 | $143,736,177 |

198 See OATT Schedule 2.
199 See OA Schedule 1 § 3.2.3B.
200 See OATT Schedule 2.
201 See "PJM Manual 27: Open Access Transmission Tariff Accounting," § 3.3 Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Charges, Rev. 102 (Jan. 23, 2025).


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Table 10-58 shows zonal reactive service charges, reactive capability charges and total charges for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Reactive service charges show charges to each zone for reactive service. Reactive capability charges show charges to each zone for reactive capability.

## Table 10-58 Reactive service charges and reactive capability charges by zone: January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Jan-Jun 2025 | | | Jan-Jun 2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zone | Reactive Service Charges | Reactive Capability Charges | Total Charges | Reactive Service Charges | Reactive Capability Charges | Total Charges |
| ACEC | $0 | $807,980 | $807,980 | $0 | $602,509 | $602,509 |
| AEP | $0 | $28,538,817 | $28,538,817 | $0 | $23,112,678 | $23,112,678 |
| APS | $6,825 | $9,684,140 | $9,690,964 | $0 | $7,412,203 | $7,412,203 |
| ATSI | $0 | $12,499,523 | $12,499,523 | $0 | $9,446,716 | $9,446,716 |
| BGE | $0 | $3,233,923 | $3,233,923 | $1,961,897 | $1,435,133 | $3,397,030 |
| COMED | $0 | $23,918,341 | $23,918,341 | $71,282 | $18,802,425 | $18,873,707 |
| DAY | $0 | $1,377,896 | $1,377,896 | $0 | $1,122,392 | $1,122,392 |
| DUKE | $0 | $3,917,625 | $3,917,625 | $0 | $2,892,180 | $2,892,180 |
| DOM | $0 | $22,770,160 | $22,770,160 | $17,681 | $17,539,926 | $17,557,608 |
| DPL | $505,276 | $4,764,122 | $5,269,398 | $45,133 | $3,921,587 | $3,966,720 |
| DUQ | $0 | $39,674 | $39,674 | $0 | $33,414 | $33,414 |
| EKPC | $18,496 | $1,067,353 | $1,085,848 | $40,561 | $898,948 | $939,509 |
| JCPLC | $0 | $2,679,329 | $2,679,329 | $0 | $2,256,589 | $2,256,589 |
| MEC | $11,455 | $2,818,647 | $2,830,102 | $16,069 | $1,827,556 | $1,843,625 |
| OVEC | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| PECO | $0 | $10,061,816 | $10,061,816 | $0 | $8,392,213 | $8,392,213 |
| PE | $0 | $6,082,021 | $6,082,021 | $0 | $5,058,752 | $5,058,752 |
| PEPCO | $5,249 | $4,034,817 | $4,040,066 | $0 | $3,398,211 | $3,398,211 |
| PPL | $0 | $16,997,538 | $16,997,538 | $3,436 | $13,714,626 | $13,718,062 |
| PSEG | $0 | $13,198,402 | $13,198,402 | $0 | $11,036,735 | $11,036,735 |
| REC | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| (Imp/Exp/Wheels) | $0 | $12,912,946 | $12,912,946 | $0 | $8,675,324 | $8,675,324 |
| Total | $547,300 | $181,405,068 | $181,952,369 | $2,156,060 | $141,580,117 | $143,736,177 |

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Table 10-59 shows the units which received reactive service credits in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 10-59 Reactive service credits by plant (Total dollars): January through June, 2026

| | | Jan-Jun 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Zone | Plant | Reactive Service Credits |
| BGE | BC PHILADELPHIA ROAD 1 CT | $50,990 |
| BGE | BC PHILADELPHIA ROAD 2 CT | $50,933 |
| BGE | BC PHILADELPHIA ROAD 3 CT | $53,238 |
| BGE | BC PHILADELPHIA ROAD 4 CT | $40,159 |
| BGE | BC PERRYMAN 6 CT | $42,283 |
| BGE | BC PERRYMAN 51 F | $1,007,039 |
| BGE | BC PERRYMAN 1 CT | $219,266 |
| BGE | BC PERRYMAN 3 CT | $288,328 |
| BGE | BC PERRYMAN 4 CT | $209,661 |
| COMED | COM 11 FISK 32 CT | $71,282 |
| DOM | VP FOUR RIVERS 1 CT | $5,652 |
| DOM | VP LOUISA 1 CT | $2,347 |
| DOM | VP LOUISA 5 CT | $9,682 |
| DPL | DPL COMM CHESAPEAKE - NEW CHURCH 3 CT | $45,133 |
| EKPC | EKPC COOPER 1 F | $40,561 |
| METED | ME MOUNTAIN 2 CT | $16,069 |
| PPL | PL HAZELTON 2 CT | $1,194 |
| PPL | PL HAZELTON 3 CT | $1,157 |
| PPL | PL HAZELTON 4 CT | $1,085 |



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Table 10-60 shows the settled reactive capability revenue requirements by technology effective on May 1, 2026, for active units.[202] These revenue requirements do not include revenue requirements that were filed but not yet final. The table demonstrates the wide disparity in payments for reactive capability that resulted from the cost of service rate case model settlement process that ended on June 1, 2026.

### Table 10-60 Total settled reactive revenue requirements by unit type and fuel type for active units[203]: May 1, 2026

| Unit Type | Fuel Type | Total Revenue Requirement per Year | MW | Number of Resources | Revenue Requirement per MW-year | Minimum Revenue Requirement per MW-year | Maximum Revenue Requirement per MW-year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CC | Gas | $135,126,260.82 | 54,255.1 | 157 | $339,234.51 | $302.10 | $6,666.67 |
| CT | Gas | $43,635,465.39 | 26,723.6 | 235 | $518,687.36 | $103.64 | $19,610.84 |
| CT | Oil | $4,034,954.23 | 2,709.5 | 98 | $143,913.25 | $289.74 | $4,053.88 |
| Diesel | Oil | $807,664.40 | 133.3 | 30 | $180,960.85 | $395.37 | $8,812.75 |
| Diesel | Other - Gas | $25,500.00 | 5.7 | 2 | $8,765.52 | $3,984.09 | $4,781.43 |
| FC | Gas | $45,000.00 | 2.3 | 1 | $19,565.22 | $19,565.22 | $19,565.22 |
| Hydro | Water | $23,688,426.83 | 6,569.3 | 47 | $181,445.89 | $126.37 | $16,512.79 |
| Nuclear | Nuclear | $68,183,269.46 | 32,518.3 | 31 | $75,792.76 | $807.91 | $7,107.23 |
| Solar | Solar | $13,320,315.71 | 3,718.9 | 29 | $129,284.40 | $1,378.13 | $16,221.61 |
| Steam | Coal | $42,285,338.74 | 30,847.6 | 52 | $123,887.38 | $255.85 | $9,804.78 |
| Steam | Gas | $5,802,744.39 | 5,720.2 | 17 | $20,041.22 | $626.53 | $3,830.85 |
| Steam | Oil | $1,401,105.87 | 782.4 | 4 | $7,891.19 | $1,262.01 | $3,211.11 |
| Steam | Other - Solid | $1,945,000.00 | 244.3 | 6 | $52,815.11 | $5,000.00 | $15,492.96 |
| Steam | Wood | $330,916.18 | 153.0 | 3 | $6,488.55 | $2,162.85 | $2,162.85 |
| Wind | Wind | $18,408,854.79 | 5,281.3 | 42 | $159,664.42 | $1,106.88 | $9,564.74 |
| All | | $359,040,816.82 | 169,664.8 | 754 | $2,116.18 | $103.64 | $19,610.84 |

202 The total amount in the final row of Table **10-60** is the amount that would be paid if the total rate effective on May 1, 2026, were effective for an entire year. The total rates effective on any given day depend on requests made by resource owners in filings to FERC and FERC approval of those rates.

203 For aggregate requirements, in which a single payment is made for the combined output of multiple units, the aggregate requirement was distributed in proportion to unit size for calculating a resource's individual revenue requirement. For wind, solar, and hydro resources, that size is the ELCC. For all other resources, that size is the ICAP.

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## Frequency Control

There are four distinct types of frequency control, distinguished by response timeframe and operational nature: Inertial Response, Primary Frequency Response, Secondary Frequency Control (Regulation), and Tertiary Frequency Control (Primary Reserve).

- **Inertial Response.** Inertial response to frequency excursion is the natural resistance of rotating mass turbine generators to changes in their stored kinetic energy. This response is immediate and resists short term changes to ACE from the instant of the disturbance up to twenty seconds after the disturbance.
- **Primary Frequency Response.** Primary frequency response is a response to a disturbance based on a local detection of frequency and local operational control settings. Primary frequency response begins within a few seconds and extends up to a minute. The purpose of primary frequency response is to arrest and stabilize the system until other measures (secondary and tertiary frequency response) become active.
- **Secondary Frequency Control.** Secondary frequency control is called regulation. In PJM it begins to respond within 10 to 15 seconds and can continue up to an hour. Regulation is controlled by PJM which detects the grid frequency, calculates a counterbalancing signal, and transmits that signal to all regulating resources.
- **Tertiary Frequency Control.** Tertiary frequency control and imbalance control lasting 10 minutes to an hour is called primary reserve.

### Primary Frequency Response

Primary Frequency Response ("PFR") is achieved through the use of automatic governors installed on generators. A governor can be either an electronic or mechanical device that increases or decreases a generator's output based on frequency changes in the system. Governors are set to respond to any frequency changes larger than a defined minimum, called a deadband, which is expressed in Hertz (Hz). Governors have a frequency change limit, called droop, which is expressed as a percentage of the frequency change from the optimal 60 Hz (e.g. 2 percent droop equals 0.02 * 60 Hz, or 1.2 Hz). Governor droop changes resource output in proportion to the deviation of frequency once frequency has exceeded the deadband limit. Primary frequency response alone does not restore frequency to the original scheduled value primarily because governor directed changes only occur when frequency is beyond the governor deadband.

On February 15, 2018, the Commission issued Order No. 842, which modified the pro forma large and small generator interconnection agreements and procedures to require all newly interconnecting non nuclear generating facilities, both synchronous and nonsynchronous, to include equipment for primary frequency response capability as a condition to receive interconnection service. Such equipment must include a governor or equivalent controls with the capability of operating at a maximum five percent droop and ±0.036 Hz deadband (or the equivalent or better).[204] PJM filed revisions in compliance with Order No. 842 that substantively incorporated the pro forma agreements into its market rules.[205]

PJM evaluates generators' primary frequency capabilities using two to three frequency events per month, with events being chosen based on the criteria that the frequency stays outside ±0.040 Hz deadband for at least one minute, and the minimum/maximum frequency reaches ±0.053 Hz. Nuclear units, offline units, units with no available headroom/footroom, units assigned regulation, and units with an active eDART ticket for governor outage are not evaluated. The performance of each unit is evaluated, with each event evaluated separately with a responsive/non-responsive pass/fail determination, and then averaged quarterly. A quarterly unit performance of 50 percent or greater is considered responsive. [206]

There are several current issues with PJM's enforcement and evaluation of generations PFR requirements. Despite the 2018 FERC order, PJM has not maintained an accurate, up to date list of all units subject to evaluation. This means that as new units have come online (since approximately 2020), they are not being tested at all during the monthly frequency events. In addition, PJM does not currently have an objective metric to determine what response

204 See 157 FERC ¶ 61,122 (2016).
205 See 164 FERC ¶ 61,224 (2018).
206 See PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations, § 3.6.2. Rev. 56 (October 1, 2025).


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constitutes a unit passing a test during these frequency events. Instead, the telemetric response of each unit is compared to the frequency conditions during an event, and a judgement is made as to whether or not the unit has adequately responded. Further, this underlying unit data and results of these primary frequency response events are not saved in PJM's databases, so the MMU is not currently able to verify the results of these tests. In the event of a unit's noncompliance, PJM does not have a defined penalty and remediation process.

The MMU recommends that PJM update and maintain a full list of generation resources required to provide PFR, save all of the results and underlying data associated with testing PFR capabilities, develop the metric(s) necessary to objectively evaluate each unit's PFR during events, and create the necessary tariff/manual language to properly enforce the NERC mandated requirements.

The MMU is working with PJM to update PJM's list of units that are subject to evaluation and to develop a set of metrics for monitoring compliance and measuring performance by units subject to Order No. 842.

The MMU recommends that the same capability be required of both new and existing resources. The MMU agrees with Order No. 842 that RTOs not be required to provide additional compensation specifically for frequency response. The current PJM market design provides the ability to cover all costs, including these. The current market design provides compensation, through heat rate adjusted energy offers, for any costs associated with providing frequency response. PJM rules appropriately require frequency response as a condition to receive interconnection service.[207]

On August 15, 2024, NERC proposed Project 2020-02, a modification to the PRC-029-1 reliability standard, called, "The frequency and voltage ride through requirement for inverter based generating resources ("IBRs")." This proposed standard is intended to address the risk to reliability associated with the rapid adoption of IBRs, by requiring that Category 2 Generator Owner and Generator Operator ("Category 2 GO/GOP") IBRs remain operational during and after defined frequency and voltage excursions.[208] [209] To achieve this, IBRs must continue to deliver predisturbance levels of active and reactive power, and would only be permitted to trip to avoid equipment damage. This proposal was adopted by the NERC board on October 8, 2024.[210] As of the May 15, 2026, deadline, all Category 2 IBRs were required to register with NERC.[211] PJM has identified and submitted to NERC a list of 50 units that meet the criteria for Category 2 GO/GOP IBRs.

Additional reliability risks have been identified with the construction and rapid adoption of large scale data centers within the PJM footprint, which NERC has labelled voltage sensitive large loads. These data centers have the potential for large load losses during fault events, and adequate ride through capabilities are necessary to maintain reliability of the grid. In August 2024, NERC created the Large Loads Working Group ("LLWG"), to study the impact of integrating these large load sites on the bulk power system, and in February 2025, the NERC Board issued a directive to establish an action plan. NERC is currently working to define the list of physical and electrical criteria to identify which entities will be subject to the new reliability requirements, as well as revise the reliability standards to include these voltage sensitive large loads. The current goal is to have initial reliability standard for voltage sensitive large loads by the end of 2026.[212]

207 See 164 FERC ¶ 61,224 at P 2 (2018).

208 "Category 2 GO/GOP," is defined as Generator Owners and Generator Operators that, "...own or operate IBRs that: (i) either have or contribute to an aggregate nameplate capacity of greater than or equal to 20 MVA, and (ii) are connected through a system designed primarily for delivering such capacity to a common point of connection at a voltage greater than or equal to 60 kV." See NERC, "North American Electric Reliability Corporation Inverter-Based Resources Work Plan Progress Update," <https://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/us/NERC Filings to FERC DL/IBR Work Plan Filing_May Update_signed.pdf> (Accessed November 7, 2025)

209 See NERC, "PRC-029-1," <https://www.nerc.com> (Accessed November 6, 2024).

210 See NERC, "Project 2020-02 Modifications to PRC-024 (Generator Ride-through)," <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project_2020-02_Transmission-connected_Resources.aspx> (Accessed August 7, 2025).

211 See NERC, "North American Electric Reliability Corporation Inverter-Based Resources Work Plan Progress Update," <https://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/us/NERC Filings to FERC DL/IBR Work Plan Filing_October 2025 Update_signed.pdf > (Accessed October 31, 2025)

212 See NERC, "Large Loads Frequently Asked Questions," <https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/initiatives/large-loads-action-plan/large-loads-faqs.pdf> (Accessed August 6, 2026)

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# 11 Congestion

When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy.[1] The difference is congestion.[2] As a result, congestion belongs to load and should be returned to load. Congestion is not the difference in CLMP between nodes. Congestion is not the billing line item labeled congestion.[3]

Congestion is not a useful metric for determining whether there is a benefit to building more transmission. Analyses that use congestion to support the need for transmission expansion incorrectly count congestion as a cost to load without accounting for how the congestion dollars are or are not returned to the load through ARRs and FTRs.

If FTRs worked perfectly and were assigned directly to load, FTRs would return all congestion to the load that paid the congestion. Congestion is not a cost, it is an accounting result of a market based on locational energy prices in which all load in a constrained area pays the higher single market clearing locational price, resulting in excess payments by load that are not paid to generation, which should be returned to load.

Counterintuitively, congestion can actually increase when the transmission capacity between areas with lower cost generation and areas with higher cost generation is expanded but does not fully eliminate the need for some higher cost local generation. The smaller the amount of higher cost local generation needed to meet load, the more of the local load is met via low cost generation delivered over the transmission system and therefore the higher can be the difference between what load pays and generation receives, congestion.

For all these reasons, if done correctly and if FTRs/ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the cost/benefit analysis for transmission projects would include the total net change in production costs and would not include congestion. The change in production costs correctly measures the changes in cost to load that result from a project. There clearly can be benefits to transmission expansion but congestion is not the correct metric for measuring those benefits. The correct metric is the change in production costs which measures the reduction in the reliance on higher cost generation to meet load in the presence of a transmission constraint.

This issue also illustrates the unintended and negative consequences of misunderstanding congestion and FTRs. The unintended result is to overstate the benefits of transmission expansion by not correctly recognizing how congestion dollars should be returned to load. Even in the case where there is only a partial return of congestion to load, the actual return of congestion to load must be accounted for in order to correctly identify the benefits. Ignoring the return of congestion to load from ARRs/FTRs overstates the potential benefits of transmission expansion, and ignores the value of smaller upgrades that may not eliminate a constraint, but may reduce production costs and therefore the average cost of energy for load.

The locational marginal price (LMP) is the incremental price of energy at a bus. The LMP at a bus can be divided into three components: the system marginal price (SMP) or energy component, the congestion component (CLMP), and the marginal loss component (MLMP). SMP, MLMP and CLMP are the simultaneous products of the least cost, security constrained dispatch of system resources to meet system load and the use of a load-weighted reference bus. The relative values of SMP and CLMP are arbitrary and depend on the reference bus.

SMP is defined as the incremental price of energy for the system, given the current dispatch, at the load-weighted reference bus, or LMP net of losses and congestion. SMP is the LMP at the load-weighted reference bus. The load-weighted reference bus is not a fixed location but varies with the distribution of load at system load buses. For SMP, energy means the component of LMP not associated with a binding transmission constraint. All other locational prices that result from the least cost, security constrained market solution are higher or lower than this reference point price (SMP) as a result of binding constraints. The reference bus is a point of reference. For a given market solution, changing the reference bus does not change the LMP for any node on the system, but changes only the elements of the nodal prices that are positive or negative due to the binding constraints in that solution, further illustrating that the relative levels of SMP and LMP are arbitrary.

1 Load is generically referred to as withdrawals and generation is generically referred to as injections, unless specified otherwise.
2 The difference in losses is not part of congestion.
3 PJM billing examples can be found in *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix F: Congestion and Marginal Losses.

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CLMP is defined as the incremental price of meeting load at each bus when a transmission constraint is binding, based on the shadow price associated with the relief of a binding transmission constraint in the security constrained optimization. (The shadow price is the difference between the CLMPs across the transmission constraint.) There can be multiple binding transmission constraints. CLMPs are positive or negative depending on location relative to binding constraints and relative to the load-weighted reference bus. In an unconstrained system CLMPs will be zero. This means that CLMP at a bus is not congestion. The difference between CLMPs at buses is not congestion, it is just the absolute LMP difference between the two buses caused by transmission constraints, or the shadow price. CLMP is the portion of the LMP at a bus that indicates whether the LMP at that bus is higher or lower than the marginal price of energy SMP at the selected reference bus due to binding transmission constraints. The relative values of SMP and CLMP are arbitrary and depend on the reference bus.

MLMP is defined as the incremental price of losses at a bus, based on marginal loss factors in the security constrained optimization. Losses refer to energy lost to physical resistance in the transmission network as power is moved from generation to load.

Total losses refer to total system wide transmission losses as a result of moving power from injections to withdrawals on the system. Marginal losses are the incremental change in system losses caused by changes in load and generation.

Congestion is neither good nor bad, but is a direct measure of the extent to which there are multiple marginal generating units with different offers dispatched to serve load as a result of transmission constraints. Congestion occurs when available, least-cost energy cannot be delivered to all load because transmission facilities are not adequate to deliver that energy to one or more areas, and higher cost units in the constrained area(s) must be dispatched to meet the load.[4] When the least-cost available energy cannot be delivered to load in a transmission constrained area, higher cost units in the constrained area must be dispatched to meet that load. The result is that the price of energy in the constrained area is higher than in the unconstrained area because of the combination of transmission limitations and the cost of local generation. Congestion is the difference between the total cost of energy paid by load in the transmission constrained area based on the single higher price at load buses and the total revenue received by generation based on the prices at the generator buses to provide that energy, after virtual bids have been settled. Congestion equals the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. The actual incremental cost paid by load in the constrained area is the difference in price (shadow price) times the MW of load served by higher cost local generation. This is also the higher production costs that result from the constraint.

The energy, marginal losses and congestion metrics must be interpreted carefully.

In PJM accounting, the term total congestion refers to net implicit CLMP charges plus net explicit CLMP charges plus net inadvertent CLMP charges. The net implicit CLMP charges are the implicit withdrawal CLMP charges less implicit injection CLMP credits.

As with congestion, total system energy costs are more precisely termed net system energy costs and total marginal loss costs are more precisely termed net marginal loss costs. Ignoring interchange, total generation MWh must be greater than total load MWh in any hour in order to provide for losses. Since the hourly integrated energy component of LMP is the same for every bus within every hour, the net energy bill is negative (ignoring net interchange), with more generation credits than load payments in every hour.[5]

While PJM accounting focuses on CLMPs, the individual CLMP values at any bus are irrelevant to the calculation of congestion, as CLMPs are just an artificial deconstruction of LMP based on a selected reference bus. Holding aside the marginal loss component of LMP, differences in the LMPs are caused by binding constraints in the least cost security constrained dispatch

4 This is referred to as dispatching units out of economic merit order. Economic merit order is the order of all generator offers from lowest to highest cost. Congestion occurs when loadings on transmission facilities mean the next unit in merit order cannot be used and a higher cost unit must be used in its place. Dispatch within the constrained area follows merit order for the units available to relieve the constraint.

5 The total congestion and marginal losses for 2026 were calculated as of July 31, 2026, and are subject to change, based on continued PJM billing updates.



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market solution and total congestion is the net surplus revenue that remains after all sources and sinks are credited or charged their LMPs. Changing the components of LMP by electing a different reference bus does not change the LMPs or the difference between LMPs for a given market solution, it merely changes the components of the LMP. This means that no particular importance should be assigned to the levels of SMP and CLMP at a bus.

Local congestion is the congestion paid by load at a specific bus or set of buses and is calculated on a constraint specific basis. For a given market solution, a change in the reference bus does not change the LMP at any bus and does not change total congestion paid by load and does not change the local congestion paid by load at a specific location. Holding aside the marginal loss component of LMP, local congestion is the sum of the total LMP charges to load at the defined set of buses minus the sum of the total LMP credits received by all generation that supplied that load, given the set of all binding transmission constraints, regardless of location. Local congestion reflects the underlying characteristics of the complete power system as it affects the defined area, including the nature and capability of transmission facilities, the offers and geographic distribution of generation facilities, the level and geographic distribution of incremental bids and offers and the geographic and temporal distribution of load. Local congestion fully reflects the least cost security constrained system solution and the LMPs that result from that solution.

PJM implemented fast start pricing in both day-ahead and real-time markets starting September 1, 2021. PJM's fast start pricing logic results in pricing run locational marginal prices (PLMP). PLMP is the price that load pays and generators receive in the PJM energy market.

While PLMP is the official settlement price, PJM continues to calculate LMP based on the logic that PJM uses to actually dispatch system resources and used prior to the introduction of fast start to consistently define dispatch and prices. The LMPs from the dispatch run are dispatch run locational marginal prices (DLMP). While the settlement prices are PLMP, settlement MW are based on the dispatch run in the day-ahead market and are metered output in the real-time market.

PJM inappropriately uses artificial constraints in the day-ahead and real-time markets to force specific resources (generation or demand response) to be marginal in order to have those resources set price. The resultant, artificially uniform source dfax and sink dfax of the artificial constraint can be modified, along with the line limits, by PJM to meet market outcome goals and are a source of often significant modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time market. These modeling differences result in inefficient market outcomes and false arbitrage opportunities for virtual transactions. These artificial constraints have been used to hide uplift costs by making uplift costs negative congestion charges. The use of artificial constraints is an inappropriate use of PJM discretion as the market operator, putting PJM in the position of a market actor, arbitrarily changing market results, market prices, generation revenues, congestion costs and load charges. [6]

# Overview

## Congestion Cost

- **Total Congestion.** Total congestion costs increased by $2,275.0 million or 179.9 percent, from $1,264.7 million in the first six months of 2025 to $3,539.7 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Day-Ahead Congestion.** Day-ahead congestion costs increased by $2,3562.8 million or 150.9 percent, from $1,566.3 million in the first six months of 2025 to $3,929.0 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Balancing Congestion.** Negative balancing congestion costs increased by $87.8 million, from -$301.6 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$389.3 million in the first six months of 2026. Negative balancing explicit charges increased by $25.5 million, from -$160.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$185.4 million in the first six months of 2026.

6 The MMU identified missing and erroneous distribution factors and shadow prices, primarily within the pricing run. The calculation of constraint and zonal based congestion requires accurate distribution factors and shadow prices. Where available, the MMU used distribution factors from the dispatch run. The MMU also calculated missing shadow prices for the relevant transmission constraints when feasible. This approach reduced the impact of the errors. Any remaining errors contributed to the NA component. Figures and tables affected by this error are indicated with a footnote.

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- **Real-Time Congestion.** Real-time congestion costs increased by $2,668.0 million, from $1,871.5 million in the first six months of 2025 to $4,539.4 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Monthly Congestion.** Monthly total congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $171.4 million in March to $1,205.7 million in January.
- **Geographic Differences in CLMP.** Differences in CLMP between southern and eastern control zones in PJM were primarily a result of binding constraints on the Bedington Transformer, the Pruntytown Transformer, the Bedington – Black Oak Interface, the Graceton – Manor Line, and the Pleasant View – Ashburn Line.
- **Congestion Frequency.** Congestion frequency continued to be significantly higher in the day-ahead energy market than in the real-time energy market in the first six months of 2026. The number of congestion event hours in the day-ahead energy market was about two times the number of congestion event hours in the real-time energy market.

  Day-ahead congestion frequency increased by 2.6 percent from 37,440 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 38,396 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026.

  Real-time congestion frequency increased by 21.2 percent from 15,339 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 18,586 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026.
- **Congested Facilities**. Day-ahead, congestion event hours decreased on interfaces and transformers and increased on lines and flowgates.
- The Bedington Transformer was the largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026. With $376.5 million in total congestion costs, it accounted for 10.6 percent of the total PJM congestion costs in the first six months of 2026.
- **CT Price Setting Logic and Closed Loop Interface Related Congestion**. PJM's use of CT pricing logic officially ended with the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021. While CT pricing logic was officially discontinued, PJM continues to use a related logic to force inflexible units and demand response to be on the margin in both real time and day ahead. None of the PJM defined closed loop interfaces were binding in the first six months of 2025 or 2026.
- **Zonal Congestion**. DOM had the highest zonal congestion costs among all control zones in the first six months of 2026. DOM had $643.9 million in zonal congestion costs, comprised of $720.3 million in day-ahead congestion costs and -$76.4 million in balancing congestion costs.

## Marginal Loss Cost

- **Total Marginal Loss Costs.** Total marginal loss costs increased by $501.0 million or 69.9 percent, from $716.2 million in the first six months of 2025 to $1,217.2 million in the first six months of 2026. The loss MWh in PJM increased by 631.6 GWh or 7.4 percent, from 8,504.0 GWh in the first six months of 2025 to 9,135.6 GWh in the first six months of 2026. The loss component of real-time LMP in the first six months of 2026 was $0.07, compared to $0.04 in the first six months of 2025.
- **Day-Ahead Marginal Loss Costs.** Day-ahead marginal loss costs increased by $490.4 million or 65.0 percent, from $754.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to $1,244.4 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Balancing Marginal Loss Costs.** Negative balancing marginal loss costs decreased by $10.6 million or 28.1 percent, from -$37.8 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$27.2 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Total Marginal Loss Surplus.** The total marginal loss surplus increased by $194.1 million or 74.1 percent, from $262.0 million in the first six months of 2025, to $456.2 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Monthly Total Marginal Loss Costs.** Monthly total marginal loss costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $94.3 million in March to $517.4 million in January.

## System Energy Cost

- **Total System Energy Costs.** Total system energy costs decreased by $309.9 million or 68.4 percent, from -$453.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$762.9 million in the first six months of 2026.


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- **Day-Ahead System Energy Costs.** Day-ahead system energy costs decreased by $317.3 million or 61.6 percent, from -$514.9 million in the first six months of 2025 to -$832.3 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Balancing System Energy Costs.** Balancing system energy costs decreased by $7.8 million or 11.5 percent, from $67.5 million in the first six months of 2025 to $59.8 million in the first six months of 2026.
- **Monthly Total System Energy Costs.** Monthly total system energy costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from -$323.8 million in January to -$58.5 million in April.

## Conclusion

Congestion is defined as the total payments by load in excess of the total payments to generation, excluding marginal losses. The level and distribution of congestion reflects the underlying characteristics of the power system, including the nature and defined capability of transmission facilities, the offers and geographic distribution of generation facilities, the level and geographic distribution of incremental bids and offers and the geographic and temporal distribution of load.

The current ARR/FTR design should ensure but does not ensure that load receives the rights to all congestion revenues. The congestion offset provided by ARRs and self-scheduled FTRs in the 2025/2026 planning period was 55.7 percent. The cumulative offset of congestion by ARRs for the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period, using the rules effective for each planning period, was 65.7 percent. Load has received $7.1 billion less than load should have received from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period.

# Issues

## Artificial Constraints, Closed Loop Interfaces and CT Pricing Logic

PJM has used, and in some cases, continues to use, artificial constraints in the day-ahead and real-time markets to force specific resources (generation or demand response) to be marginal in order to have those resources set price. Some of these artificial constraints, such as CT pricing logic and closed loop interfaces, result in negative congestion charges that are an artifact of the artificial nature of the constraints that cause generation to be paid more than load pays for energy affected by the constraint. PJM also makes use of artificial constraints that function like closed loop interfaces but which result in positive or negative balancing congestion. These constraints are called Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides. These constraints are similar to a closed loop interface in that they enforce artificially uniform price effects, but unlike closed loop interfaces that only affect prices on the constrained side, these artificial constraints enforce artificially uniform price spreads between the two sides of the constraint through large uniform dfax on the constrained side and small uniform dfax on the unconstrained side. These artificial constraints take the form of interfaces or enforced contingencies (modifications) on existing constraints. The uniform source dfax and uniform sink dfax of the artificial constraint can be modified, along with the transmission line limits, by PJM to meet market outcome goals and are a source of often significant modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time market. These modeling differences result in inefficient market outcomes and false arbitrage opportunities for virtual transactions. This is an inappropriate use of these tools as it puts PJM in the position of a market actor, arbitrarily changing market results, market prices, generation revenues, congestion costs and load charges. One of the side effects of these changes in parameters, besides causing modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time market, is that the apparent location of the interface or parent constraint can move intraday relative to source and sink points.

While CT pricing logic was officially discontinued by PJM with the implementation of fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, PJM continues to use the same basic logic (Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides) to force inflexible units to be on the margin in both real time and day ahead. PJM used CT pricing logic to force otherwise uneconomic resources to be marginal and set price in the day-ahead or real-time market solution. PJM used CT pricing logic to create an artificial constraint with a variable flow limit, paired with an artificial override of the inflexible resource's economic minimum, to make the resource marginal in PJM's LMP security constrained pricing logic.

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The purpose of forcing inflexible units to be marginal is to artificially reduce the uplift associated with the dispatch of inflexible resources.

Through the assumption of artificial flexibility of the affected unit and artificially creating a constraint for which the otherwise inflexible resource can be marginal, PJM's use of CT pricing logic forced the affected resource bus LMP to match the marginal offer of the resource. PJM adjusts the constraint limit based on the output of the resource. Sometimes the constraint limit does not match the flows on the constraint, and the constraint violates instead of binding, resulting in prices set by the transmission constraint penalty factor.

In the case of a closed loop interface, all buses within the interface were modeled with a distribution factor (dfax) of 1.0 to the constraint and therefore with the same constraint related congestion component of price at the marginal resource's bus. In the CT pricing logic case, the constraint affected the CLMP of constrained side buses in proportion to their dfax to that constraint.[7] One objective of making inflexible resources marginal was to artificially minimize the uplift costs associated with the inflexible resources that PJM commits for system security reasons.

The use of artificial constraints was and is a source of modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets. When artificial constraints are not included in the day-ahead market in exactly the same way as in the real-time market, including specific constraints and limits, the differences between the day-ahead and real-time market model result in positive or negative balancing congestion.

Failure to model the same constraints in the day-ahead and real-time markets results in pricing and congestion settlement differences between the day-ahead and real-time market. Any modeling differences create false arbitrage opportunities for virtual bids and contribute to negative balancing congestion.

Use of artificial constraints, closed loop interfaces and CT price setting logic requires manipulation of the economic dispatch model. Closed loop interfaces and CT price setting logic, like fast start pricing logic that replaced it, force higher cost inflexible units to be marginal.

Like closed loop interfaces and CT pricing logic, some of the artificially enforced constraint results in negative congestion. As a result, more power is produced in the artificial closed loop or constrained area than would result without the artificial constraint. This means that there are more generation credits than load charges in the constrained area. The constrained area exports power, the lower cost generators outside the constrained area are backed down and prices are lower outside the constrained area as a result. All of the generation within the artificially constrained area is paid the higher CLMP, but only a smaller amount of load (in some cases no load) in the constrained area pays this higher CLMP. As a result, load pays less than generation receives in the artificially constrained area. This difference is negative congestion. In the day-ahead market this reduces the total congestion dollars that are available to FTR holders. In the balancing market these costs are allocated directly to load as negative balancing charges.

## Locational Marginal Price (LMP)

### Components

PJM uses a distributed load reference bus. With a distributed load reference bus, the energy component of LMP is a load-weighted system price. Some price effects of binding constraints may be included in the load-weighted reference bus price.

LMP at a bus reflects the incremental price of energy at that bus. LMP at any bus can be disaggregated into three components: the system marginal price (SMP), marginal loss component (MLMP), and congestion component (CLMP).

SMP, MLMP and CLMP are a product of the least cost, security constrained dispatch of system resources to meet system load. SMP is the incremental cost of system energy, given the current dispatch and given the choice of reference bus. SMP is LMP net of losses and congestion. Losses refer to energy lost to physical resistance in the transmission and distribution network as power is moved from generation to load. Marginal losses are the incremental change in system power losses caused by changes in the system load and generation

7 The constrained side means the higher priced side with a positive CLMP created by the constraint.


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patterns.[8] The first derivative of total losses with respect to the power flow is marginal losses. Congestion cost reflects the incremental cost of relieving transmission constraints while maintaining system power balance. Congestion occurs when available, least-cost energy cannot be delivered to all loads because transmission facilities are not adequate to deliver that energy. When the least-cost available energy cannot be delivered to load in a transmission constrained area, higher cost units in the constrained area must be dispatched to meet that load.[9] The result is that the price of energy in the constrained area is higher than in the unconstrained area because of the combination of transmission limitations and the cost of local generation. Load in the constrained area pays the higher price for all energy including energy from low cost generation and energy from high cost generation. Congestion is the difference between the total cost of energy paid by load in the transmission constrained area and the total revenue received by generation to meet the load in the transmission constrained area, net of losses. Congestion equals the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion.

Table 11-1 shows the PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP components for January through June, 2008 through 2026.[10]

The real-time load-weighted average LMP increased by $20.79 or 40.2 percent from $51.75 in the first six months of 2025 to $72.54 in the first six months of 2026. The real-time load-weighted average congestion component was $0.23 in the first six months of 2026, compared to $0.12 in the first six months of 2025. The real-time load-weighted average loss component in the first six months of 2026 was $0.07, compared to $0.04 in the first six months of 2025. The real-time load-weighted average system energy component increased by $20.66 or 40.1 percent from $51.58 in the first six months of 2025 to $72.24 in the first six months of 2026. Using a load-weighted reference bus, the real-time load-weighted average congestion component of LMP should be zero. PJM's load-weighted reference bus congestion component is zero at the time that LMPs are set based on state estimator data. Metering updates during the settlement process change the load weights after the fact, but the reference bus price (SMP) is not updated with these changes over time. As a result, the average congestion and loss components used in real-time settlement are not zero.

**Table 11-1 Real-time load-weighted average LMP components (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2008 through 2026[11]**

| (Jan - Jun) | Real-Time LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | $74.77 | $74.66 | $0.07 | $0.05 |
| 2009 | $42.48 | $42.40 | $0.05 | $0.03 |
| 2010 | $45.75 | $45.65 | $0.06 | $0.04 |
| 2011 | $48.47 | $48.40 | $0.05 | $0.03 |
| 2012 | $31.21 | $31.17 | $0.04 | $0.01 |
| 2013 | $37.96 | $37.92 | $0.02 | $0.02 |
| 2014 | $69.92 | $69.95 | ($0.06) | $0.02 |
| 2015 | $42.30 | $42.24 | $0.03 | $0.02 |
| 2016 | $27.09 | $27.04 | $0.03 | $0.01 |
| 2017 | $29.81 | $29.78 | $0.02 | $0.01 |
| 2018 | $42.44 | $42.37 | $0.04 | $0.02 |
| 2019 | $27.49 | $27.45 | $0.02 | $0.02 |
| 2020 | $19.40 | $19.37 | $0.02 | $0.01 |
| 2021 | $30.62 | $30.57 | $0.03 | $0.02 |
| 2022 | $67.77 | $67.64 | $0.09 | $0.05 |
| 2023 | $29.33 | $29.27 | $0.04 | $0.02 |
| 2024 | $31.70 | $31.61 | $0.06 | $0.02 |
| 2025 | $51.75 | $51.58 | $0.12 | $0.04 |
| 2026 | $72.54 | $72.24 | $0.23 | $0.07 |

8 For additional information, see the *MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, at "Marginal Losses," (March 10, 2011) <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/references.shtml>.

9 This is referred to as dispatching units out of economic merit order. Economic merit order is the order of all generator offers from lowest to highest cost. Congestion occurs when loadings on transmission facilities mean the next unit in merit order cannot be used and a higher cost unit must be used in its place.

10 The PJM real-time, load-weighted price is weighted by accounting load, which differs from the state-estimated load used in determination of the energy component (SMP). In the real-time energy market, the distributed load reference bus is weighted by state-estimated load in real time. When the LMP is calculated in real time, the energy component equals the system load-weighted price. But real-time bus-specific loads are adjusted, after the fact, based on updated load information from meters. This meter adjusted load is accounting load that is used in settlements and is used to calculate reported PJM load-weighted prices. This after the fact adjustment means that the real-time energy market energy component of LMP (SMP) and the PJM real-time load-weighted LMP are not equal. The difference between the real-time energy component of LMP and the PJM wide real-time load-weighted average LMP is a result of the difference between state-estimated and metered loads used to weight the load-weighted reference bus and the load-weighted LMP. Without these adjustments, the congestion component of system average LMP would be zero.

11 Calculated values shown in Section 11, "Congestion and Marginal Losses," are based on unrounded, underlying data and may differ from calculations based on the rounded values in the tables.

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Table 11-2 shows the PJM day-ahead load-weighted average LMP components for the first six months of 2008 through 2026. The day-ahead load-weighted average LMP increased by $24.52, or 49.3 percent, from $49.72 in the first six months of 2025 to $74.25 in the first six months of 2026. The day-ahead load-weighted average congestion component decreased by $0.29 from $0.13 in the first six months of 2025 to -$0.16 in the first six months of 2026. The day-ahead load-weighted average loss component was -$0.01 in the first six months of 2026, compared to $0.10 in the first six months of 2025. The day-ahead load-weighted average energy component increased by $24.93, or 50.4 percent, from $49.49 in the first six months of 2025 to $74.42 in the first six months of 2026. Using a load-weighted reference bus, the day-ahead load-weighted average congestion component of LMP should be zero. PJM's load-weighted reference bus congestion component is zero based on day-ahead firm load weights. Total billing however, includes price sensitive demand and virtual load congestion related charges, which makes the total load weights in accounting different than the load weights used to determine the SMP at the load-weighted reference bus. The resulting load-weighted average price from PJM settlement for congestion and marginal losses components of price in day ahead is therefore not zero, although this component is not fully accurate.

**Table 11-2 Day-ahead load-weighted average LMP components (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2008 through 2026**

| (Jan - Jun) | Day-Ahead LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | $73.71 | $74.10 | ($0.16) | ($0.23) |
| 2009 | $42.21 | $42.47 | ($0.14) | ($0.12) |
| 2010 | $46.12 | $46.04 | $0.08 | ($0.00) |
| 2011 | $47.12 | $47.32 | ($0.10) | ($0.11) |
| 2012 | $31.84 | $31.76 | $0.10 | ($0.02) |
| 2013 | $38.23 | $38.14 | $0.09 | $0.00 |
| 2014 | $70.66 | $70.37 | $0.30 | ($0.01) |
| 2015 | $43.26 | $42.95 | $0.33 | ($0.02) |
| 2016 | $27.33 | $27.22 | $0.12 | ($0.01) |
| 2017 | $30.02 | $30.02 | $0.02 | ($0.02) |
| 2018 | $40.96 | $40.86 | $0.11 | ($0.01) |
| 2019 | $27.97 | $27.92 | $0.06 | ($0.01) |
| 2020 | $19.23 | $19.25 | ($0.01) | ($0.01) |
| 2021 | $31.00 | $30.85 | $0.13 | $0.02 |
| 2022 | $66.50 | $65.98 | $0.38 | $0.15 |
| 2023 | $30.53 | $30.54 | ($0.01) | $0.00 |
| 2024 | $31.66 | $31.59 | $0.04 | $0.03 |
| 2025 | $49.72 | $49.49 | $0.13 | $0.10 |
| 2026 | $74.25 | $74.42 | ($0.16) | ($0.01) |


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Table 11-3 shows the PJM real-time load-weighted average LMP by constrained and unconstrained hours. A constrained hour is any hour during which one or more facilities are congested.

### Table 11-3 Real-time load-weighted average LMP by constrained and unconstrained hours (Dollars per MWh): January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Constrained Hours | Unconstrained Hours | Constrained Hours | Unconstrained Hours |
| Jan | $63.62 | $39.41 | $117.02 | $25.97 |
| Feb | $48.92 | $41.67 | $93.41 | $0.00 |
| Mar | $42.11 | $0.00 | $46.21 | $16.92 |
| Apr | $46.14 | $21.60 | $48.46 | $0.00 |
| May | $37.27 | $25.96 | $56.38 | $25.73 |
| Jun | $68.44 | $22.42 | $62.69 | $21.65 |
| Jul | $60.05 | $39.23 | | |
| Aug | $40.75 | $23.95 | | |
| Sep | $43.82 | $21.96 | | |
| Oct | $51.01 | $0.00 | | |
| Nov | $47.17 | $27.70 | | |
| Dec | $55.48 | $29.70 | | |
| Avg | $51.25 | $28.78 | $72.96 | $23.49 |

Table **11-4** shows the monthly comparison of real-time constrained and unconstrained hours from January 2025 and June 2026. A constrained hour is any hour during which one or more facilities are congested. There were more real-time constrained hours in the first six months of 2026 than in the first six months of 2025.

### Table 11-4 Real-time constrained and unconstrained hours by month: January 2025 through June 2026

| | 2025 | | 2026 | | Difference | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Constrained Hours | Unconstrained Hours | Constrained Hours | Unconstrained Hours | Constrained Hours | Unconstrained Hours |
| Jan | 711 | 33 | 734 | 10 | 23 | (23) |
| Feb | 670 | 2 | 651 | 21 | (19) | 19 |
| Mar | 743 | 0 | 732 | 0 | (11) | 0 |
| Apr | 696 | 24 | 704 | 16 | 8 | (8) |
| May | 597 | 147 | 710 | 34 | 113 | (113) |
| Jun | 714 | 6 | 692 | 28 | (22) | 22 |
| Jul | 716 | 28 | | | | |
| Aug | 657 | 87 | | | | |
| Sep | 713 | 7 | | | | |
| Oct | 720 | 0 | | | | |
| Nov | 682 | 38 | | | | |
| Dec | 731 | 13 | | | | |
| Total | 8350 | 385 | 4,223 | 109 | 92 | (103) |

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## Zonal Components

The load-weighted congestion component of LMPs (CLMPs) provided in the following tables (Table 11-5 and Table 11-6) are not a metric of the amount of congestion paid by load in a zone. The listed CLMPs show whether prices (LMPs) in a zone are higher or lower than the load-weighted average price in the PJM system due to transmission constraints.

The components of real-time LMP for each control zone are presented in Table 11-5 for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2026, DOM had the highest real-time congestion component of LMP, $38.19, and COMED had the lowest real-time congestion component of LMP, -$30.93.

### Table 11-5 Zonal real-time load-weighted average LMP components (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Real-Time LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component | Real-Time LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component |
| ACEC | $49.28 | $53.87 | ($5.89) | $1.30 | $62.18 | $73.27 | ($13.07) | $1.99 |
| AEP | $49.50 | $50.64 | ($0.36) | ($0.78) | $62.64 | $70.69 | ($6.33) | ($1.72) |
| APS | $52.22 | $51.49 | $0.31 | $0.43 | $85.31 | $73.44 | $10.97 | $0.90 |
| ATSI | $48.29 | $50.68 | ($2.29) | ($0.09) | $56.74 | $69.73 | ($12.03) | ($0.96) |
| BGE | $63.19 | $53.06 | $7.93 | $2.20 | $111.47 | $75.83 | $31.83 | $3.81 |
| COMED | $37.31 | $51.32 | ($11.20) | ($2.82) | $34.59 | $70.07 | ($30.93) | ($4.54) |
| DAY | $48.80 | $51.37 | ($3.01) | $0.45 | $63.01 | $71.83 | ($8.72) | ($0.10) |
| DOM | $67.75 | $51.43 | $15.08 | $1.23 | $113.30 | $72.77 | $38.19 | $2.34 |
| DPL | $51.34 | $53.44 | ($4.12) | $2.02 | $73.87 | $77.19 | ($7.05) | $3.74 |
| DUKE | $47.20 | $51.60 | ($3.33) | ($1.07) | $62.79 | $72.74 | ($7.50) | ($2.44) |
| DUQ | $47.46 | $51.12 | ($2.93) | ($0.72) | $55.77 | $70.74 | ($13.57) | ($1.40) |
| EKPC | $49.88 | $52.77 | ($1.62) | ($1.27) | $64.43 | $78.42 | ($10.81) | ($3.17) |
| JCPLC | $49.91 | $53.98 | ($5.30) | $1.22 | $63.45 | $73.74 | ($12.66) | $2.37 |
| MEC | $49.53 | $51.73 | ($2.55) | $0.34 | $61.53 | $72.23 | ($12.04) | $1.34 |
| OVEC | $42.51 | $48.11 | ($3.80) | ($1.81) | $55.65 | $69.16 | ($10.30) | ($3.21) |
| PE | $51.49 | $50.41 | $0.49 | $0.60 | $60.89 | $70.76 | ($10.79) | $0.92 |
| PECO | $46.19 | $52.16 | ($6.42) | $0.46 | $61.81 | $73.31 | ($12.63) | $1.14 |
| PEPCO | $63.40 | $52.95 | $8.60 | $1.85 | $111.70 | $75.97 | $32.57 | $3.16 |
| PPL | $45.37 | $51.48 | ($5.95) | ($0.16) | $61.34 | $73.16 | ($12.30) | $0.48 |
| PSEG | $49.25 | $52.46 | ($4.35) | $1.13 | $63.00 | $71.76 | ($10.98) | $2.22 |
| REC | $53.26 | $53.36 | ($1.23) | $1.12 | $64.24 | $71.15 | ($9.01) | $2.11 |
| PJM | $51.75 | $51.58 | $0.12 | $0.04 | $72.54 | $72.24 | $0.23 | $0.07 |

The components of day-ahead LMP for each control zone are presented in Table 11-6 for the first six months of 2025 and 2026. In the first six months of 2026, BGE had the highest day-ahead congestion component of LMP, $33.36, and COMED had the lowest day-ahead congestion component of LMP, -$22.02.

### Table 11-6 Zonal day-ahead load-weighted average LMP components (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component | Day-Ahead LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component |
| ACEC | $46.55 | $50.51 | ($5.31) | $1.34 | $65.97 | $75.90 | ($12.28) | $2.35 |
| AEP | $48.16 | $49.07 | ($0.05) | ($0.86) | $64.72 | $73.19 | ($6.38) | ($2.09) |
| APS | $49.93 | $49.57 | ($0.28) | $0.64 | $87.27 | $75.94 | $10.27 | $1.06 |
| ATSI | $47.71 | $48.62 | ($0.89) | ($0.02) | $60.36 | $71.72 | ($10.49) | ($0.87) |
| BGE | $61.12 | $50.64 | $8.01 | $2.46 | $116.02 | $78.04 | $33.36 | $4.62 |
| COMED | $36.05 | $48.84 | ($9.91) | ($2.88) | $44.18 | $71.32 | ($22.02) | ($5.12) |
| DAY | $48.58 | $49.33 | ($1.04) | $0.29 | $67.46 | $74.15 | ($6.40) | ($0.30) |
| DOM | $63.89 | $49.76 | $12.52 | $1.61 | $108.16 | $76.15 | $29.72 | $2.30 |
| DPL | $51.62 | $51.32 | ($1.95) | $2.25 | $78.67 | $80.29 | ($5.72) | $4.10 |
| DUKE | $47.16 | $49.59 | ($1.25) | ($1.18) | $67.02 | $74.74 | ($5.01) | ($2.71) |
| DUQ | $46.17 | $49.02 | ($2.10) | ($0.76) | $58.93 | $72.55 | ($12.12) | ($1.50) |
| EKPC | $49.14 | $52.04 | ($1.08) | ($1.82) | $71.35 | $84.47 | ($8.94) | ($4.18) |
| JCPLC | $46.65 | $50.35 | ($4.88) | $1.19 | $66.44 | $75.37 | ($11.48) | $2.55 |
| MEC | $48.68 | $49.44 | ($1.29) | $0.53 | $64.97 | $73.92 | ($10.50) | $1.54 |
| OVEC | $38.17 | $39.88 | ($0.22) | ($1.48) | $43.10 | $46.02 | ($1.11) | ($1.81) |
| PE | $50.88 | $48.24 | $1.92 | $0.73 | $63.00 | $69.08 | ($7.81) | $1.73 |
| PECO | $44.87 | $49.84 | ($5.55) | $0.59 | $65.18 | $75.72 | ($11.92) | $1.38 |
| PEPCO | $60.38 | $50.83 | $7.30 | $2.26 | $114.37 | $78.23 | $32.43 | $3.71 |
| PPL | $44.50 | $49.57 | ($4.89) | ($0.19) | $65.26 | $75.18 | ($10.43) | $0.51 |
| PSEG | $46.19 | $49.47 | ($4.46) | $1.18 | $64.68 | $72.13 | ($9.77) | $2.32 |
| REC | $49.57 | $49.29 | ($0.79) | $1.07 | $65.80 | $71.66 | ($7.85) | $1.99 |
| PJM | $49.72 | $49.49 | $0.13 | $0.10 | $74.25 | $74.42 | ($0.16) | ($0.01) |



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## Hub Components

The components of real-time LMP for each hub are presented in Table 11-7 for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.[12]

### Table 11-7 Hub real-time average LMP components (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Real-Time LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component | Real-Time LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component |
| AEP Gen Hub | $42.04 | $46.93 | ($3.04) | ($1.85) | $50.57 | $63.86 | ($10.15) | ($3.14) |
| AEP-DAY Hub | $44.12 | $46.93 | ($1.78) | ($1.03) | $53.80 | $63.86 | ($8.02) | ($2.05) |
| ATSI Gen Hub | $44.00 | $46.93 | ($1.89) | ($1.05) | $51.23 | $63.86 | ($10.57) | ($2.06) |
| Chicago Gen Hub | $32.37 | $46.93 | ($11.46) | ($3.09) | $32.54 | $63.86 | ($26.39) | ($4.93) |
| Chicago Hub | $33.31 | $46.93 | ($11.17) | ($2.45) | $32.14 | $63.86 | ($27.76) | ($3.96) |
| Dominion Hub | $52.14 | $46.93 | $5.06 | $0.15 | $76.88 | $63.86 | $12.38 | $0.64 |
| Eastern Hub | $43.46 | $46.93 | ($4.94) | $1.48 | $57.25 | $63.86 | ($9.20) | $2.59 |
| N Illinois Hub | $33.23 | $46.93 | ($10.98) | ($2.72) | $31.92 | $63.86 | ($27.59) | ($4.35) |
| New Jersey Hub | $42.85 | $46.93 | ($4.95) | $0.87 | $54.81 | $63.86 | ($10.82) | $1.77 |
| Ohio Hub | $44.28 | $46.93 | ($1.57) | ($1.08) | $53.61 | $63.86 | ($8.14) | ($2.11) |
| West Interface Hub | $47.30 | $46.93 | $0.98 | ($0.61) | $62.34 | $63.86 | ($0.32) | ($1.19) |
| Western Hub | $48.89 | $46.93 | $1.43 | $0.54 | $70.46 | $63.86 | $5.56 | $1.04 |

The components of day-ahead LMP for each hub are presented in Table 11-8 for the first six months of 2025 and 2026.

### Table 11-8 Hub day-ahead average LMP components (Dollars per MWh): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component | Day-Ahead LMP | Energy Component | Congestion Component | Loss Component |
| AEP Gen Hub | $42.53 | $45.73 | ($1.35) | ($1.86) | $54.20 | $65.50 | ($7.84) | ($3.45) |
| AEP-DAY Hub | $44.23 | $45.73 | ($0.43) | ($1.07) | $56.95 | $65.50 | ($6.25) | ($2.29) |
| ATSI Gen Hub | $44.37 | $45.73 | ($0.58) | ($0.78) | $54.67 | $65.50 | ($9.00) | ($1.83) |
| Chicago Gen Hub | $32.55 | $45.73 | ($10.03) | ($3.15) | $39.94 | $65.50 | ($20.14) | ($5.41) |
| Chicago Hub | $33.30 | $45.73 | ($9.87) | ($2.57) | $40.44 | $65.50 | ($20.51) | ($4.55) |
| Dominion Hub | $50.43 | $45.73 | $4.23 | $0.47 | $74.41 | $65.50 | $8.61 | $0.30 |
| Eastern Hub | $44.20 | $45.73 | ($3.18) | $1.65 | $60.79 | $65.50 | ($7.57) | $2.86 |
| N Illinois Hub | $33.10 | $45.73 | ($9.80) | ($2.84) | $40.13 | $65.50 | ($20.43) | ($4.94) |
| New Jersey Hub | $42.33 | $45.73 | ($4.35) | $0.95 | $58.08 | $65.50 | ($9.40) | $1.98 |
| Ohio Hub | $44.29 | $45.73 | ($0.31) | ($1.13) | $56.73 | $65.50 | ($6.39) | ($2.38) |
| West Interface Hub | $46.71 | $45.73 | $1.38 | ($0.39) | $63.74 | $65.50 | ($0.52) | ($1.23) |
| Western Hub | $48.10 | $45.73 | $1.63 | $0.74 | $74.29 | $65.50 | $7.02 | $1.77 |

12 The real-time components of LMP are the simple average of the hourly components for each hub. Some hubs include only generation buses and do not include load buses. The real-time components of LMP were previously reported as the real-time, load-weighted, average of the hourly components of LMP.

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# Congestion

## Congestion Accounting

In PJM accounting, total congestion costs equal net implicit CLMP charges, plus net explicit CLMP charges, plus net inadvertent CLMP charges. Implicit CLMP charges equal implicit withdrawal charges less implicit injection credits. Explicit CLMP charges are the net CLMP charges associated with the injection credits and withdrawal charges for point to point energy transactions. Inadvertent CLMP charges are not directly attributable to specific participants that are distributed on a load ratio basis. Each of these categories of congestion costs is comprised of day-ahead and balancing congestion costs.

While PJM accounting focuses on CLMPs, the individual CLMP values at any bus are irrelevant to the calculation of congestion, as CLMPs are just an artificial deconstruction of LMP based on a selected reference bus. Holding aside the marginal loss component of LMP, differences in the LMPs are caused by binding constraints in the least cost security constrained dispatch market solution, and total congestion is the net surplus revenue that remains after all sources and sinks are credited or charged their LMPs. Changing the components of LMP by electing a different reference bus does not change the LMPs or the difference between LMPs for a given market solution or actual congestion, it merely changes the components of the LMP.

Congestion occurs in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets.[13] Day-ahead congestion costs are based on day-ahead MWh while balancing congestion costs are based on deviations between day-ahead and real-time MWh priced at the congestion price in the real-time energy market.

Implicit CLMP charges are the CLMP charges calculated for energy injected or withdrawn at a location. The explicit CLMP charges are the CLMP charges calculated for transactions with a defined source and a sink. For example, implicit CLMP charges are calculated for network load and explicit CLMP charges are calculated for up to congestion transactions (UTCs). Inadvertent CLMP charges are CLMP charges resulting from the differences between the net actual energy flow and the net scheduled energy flow into or out of the PJM control area each hour.

CLMP charges and CLMP credits are calculated for both the day-ahead and balancing energy markets.

- **Day-Ahead Implicit Load CLMP Charges.** Day-ahead implicit withdrawal charges are calculated for all cleared demand, decrement bids and day-ahead energy market sale transactions. Day-ahead implicit withdrawal charges are calculated using MW and the load bus CLMP, the decrement bid bus CLMP or the CLMP at the source of the sale transaction.
- **Day-Ahead Implicit Generation CLMP Credits.** Day-ahead implicit injection credits are calculated for all cleared generation, increment offers and day-ahead energy market purchase transactions.[14] Day-ahead implicit injection credits are calculated using MW and the generator bus CLMP, the increment offer's bus CLMP or the CLMP at the sink of the purchase transaction.
- **Balancing Implicit Load CLMP Charges.** Balancing implicit withdrawal charges are calculated for all deviations between a PJM member's real-time load and energy sale transactions and their day-ahead cleared demand, decrement bids and energy sale transactions. Balancing implicit withdrawal charges are calculated using MW deviations and the real-time CLMP for each aggregate where a deviation exists.
- **Balancing Implicit Generation CLMP Credits.** Balancing implicit injection credits are calculated for all deviations between a PJM member's real-time generation and energy purchase transactions and the day-ahead cleared generation, increment offers and energy purchase transactions. Balancing implicit injection credits are calculated using MW deviations and the real-time CLMP for each aggregate where a deviation exists.

13 When the term *congestion charge* is used in documents by PJM's Market Settlement Operations, it has the same meaning as the term *congestion costs* as used here.

14 Internal bilateral transactions are included in the tariff definitions of Market Participant Energy Injections and Market Participant Energy Withdrawals. The purchase part of an internal bilateral transaction is an injection to the buyer and the sale part of an internal bilateral transaction is a withdrawal to the seller. The tariff (Attachment K) also says market participants will be charged implicit CLMP charges for all Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and will be credited implicit CLMP credits for all Market Participant Energy Injections. The seller of an internal bilateral transaction will be charged implicit CLMP charges at the source and the buyer of an internal bilateral transaction will be credited implicit CLMP credits at the sink. Internal bilateral transaction CLMP credits and charges sum to zero, as the IBT is merely a transfer of ownership injection and withdrawal MW and associated charges and credits between participants, meaning that the sum of all MW and all credits and all charges with and without IBTs are the same.



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- **Explicit CLMP Charges.** Explicit CLMP charges are the net CLMP costs associated with point to point energy transactions. Day-ahead explicit CLMP charges equal the product of the transacted MW and CLMP differences between sources (origins) and sinks (destinations) in the day-ahead energy market. Balancing explicit CLMP charges equal the product of the deviations between the real-time and day-ahead transacted MW and the differences between the real-time CLMP at the transactions' sources and sinks. Explicit CLMP charges are calculated for internal purchase, import and export transaction, and up to congestion transactions (UTCs.)
- **Inadvertent CLMP Charges.** Inadvertent CLMP charges are charges resulting from the differences between the net actual energy flow and the net scheduled energy flow into or out of the PJM control area each hour. This inadvertent interchange of energy may be positive or negative, where positive interchange typically results in a charge while negative interchange typically results in a credit. Inadvertent CLMP charges are common costs, not directly attributable to specific participants that are distributed on a load ratio basis.[15]

The congestion accounting calculation equations are in Table 11-9.

### Table 11-9 Congestion accounting calculations

| Congestion Category | Calculation |
|---|---|
| Day-Ahead Implicit Withdrawal CLMP Charges | Day-Ahead Demand MWh * Day-Ahead CLMP |
| Day-Ahead Implicit Injection CLMP Credits | Day-Ahead Supply MWh * Day-Ahead CLMP |
| Day-Ahead Explicit CLMP Charges | Day-Ahead Transaction MW * (Day-Ahead Sink CLMP - Day-Ahead Source CLMP) |
| Day-Ahead Total Congestion Costs | Day-Ahead Implicit Withdrawal CLMP Charges - Day-Ahead Implicit Injection CLMP Credits + Day-Ahead Explicit CLMP Charges |
| Balancing Implicit Withdrawal CLMP Charges | Balancing Demand MWh * Real-Time CLMP |
| Balancing Implicit Injection CLMP Credits | Balancing Supply MWh * Real-Time CLMP |
| Balancing Explicit CLMP Costs | Balancing Transaction MW * (Real-Time Sink CLMP - Real-Time Source CLMP) |
| Balancing Total Congestion Costs | Balancing Implicit Withdrawal CLMP Charges - Balancing Implicit Injection CLMP Credits + Balancing Explicit CLMP Costs |
| Total Congestion Costs | Day-Ahead Total Congestion Costs + Balancing Total Congestion Costs |

| MWh Category | Definition |
|---|---|
| Day-Ahead Demand MWh | Cleared Demand, Decrement Bids, Energy Sale Transactions |
| Day-Ahead Supply MWh | Cleared Generation, Increment Bids, Energy Purchase Transactions |
| | |
| Real-Time Demand MWh | Load and Energy Sale Transactions |
| Real-Time Supply MWh | Generation and Energy Purchase Transactions |
| | |
| Balancing Demand MWh | Real-Time Demand MWh - Day-Ahead Demand MWh |
| Balancing Supply MWh | Real-Time Supply MWh - Day-Ahead Supply MWh |

PJM billing items include Day-Ahead Transmission Congestion Charges, Day-Ahead Transmission Congestion Credits, Balancing Transmission Congestion Charges, and Balancing Transmission Congestion Credits. Those line items are calculated for each PJM member. The congestion bill shows the CLMP charges or credits collected from the PJM market participants. However, the sum of an individual customer's CLMP credits or charges on the customer's bill is not a measure of the congestion paid by that customer.

15 PJM Operating Agreement Schedule 1 §3.7.

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The congestion paid by a customer is the difference between what the customer paid for energy and what all network sources of that energy were paid to serve that customer. A load customer's congestion bill, in contrast, merely indicates whether the LMP they paid for their withdrawals is higher or lower than the system energy price due to transmission constraints. The customer's bill does not measure congestion paid by the customer, only how much the customer was charged and credited for their MW positions. The congestion costs associated with specific constraints are the sum of the total day-ahead and balancing congestion costs associated with those constraints. Zonal congestion is calculated on a constraint by constraint basis. The congestion calculations are the total difference between what the zonal load pays in CLMP charges and what the generation that serves that load is paid, regardless of whether the zone is a net importer or a net exporter of generation. CLMPs can be both positive and negative and CLMP charges and CLMP credits can be both positive and negative. CLMP charges, positive or negative, are paid by withdrawals and CLMP credits, positive or negative, are paid to injections. Total congestion costs (the sum of charges and credits), when positive, measure the net congestion payment by a participant group and when negative, measure the net congestion credit paid to a participant group. Explicit CLMP charges, when positive, measure the CLMP payment from a PJM member and when negative, measure the CLMP credit paid to a PJM member. Explicit CLMP charges are calculated for up to congestion transactions (UTCs). In all cases, whether positive or negative, CLMP charges and credits merely indicate whether the LMP being paid by withdrawals or credited to injections is higher or lower than the system weighted average price due to binding transmission constraints.

The congestion accounting definitions are misleading. Load pays congestion. Congestion is the difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy due to binding transmission constraints. Generation does not pay congestion. Some generation receives a price lower than SMP and some generation receives a price greater than SMP but that does not mean that generation is paying congestion. It means only that generation is being paid an LMP that is higher or lower than the system load-weighted average LMP.

The CLMP is calculated with respect to the LMP at the system reference bus, also called the system marginal price (SMP). When a transmission constraint occurs, the resulting CLMP is positive on one side of the constraint and negative on the other side of the constraint and the corresponding CLMP costs are positive or negative. For each transmission constraint, the CLMP reflects the cost of a constraint at a pricing node and is equal to the product of the constraint shadow price and the distribution factor from the constraint to the pricing node. The total CLMP at a pricing node is the sum of all constraint contributions to LMP and is equal to the difference between the actual LMP that results from transmission constraints, excluding losses, and the SMP. If an area experiences lower prices because of a constraint, the CLMP in that area is negative.[16]

Load-weighted LMP components are calculated relative to a load-weighted, average LMP. At the load-weighted reference bus, which represents the load center of the system, the LMP calculation is designed to include no congestion or loss components, but it may include congestion. The load-weighted average CLMP across all load buses, calculated relative to that reference bus, is equal to, or very close to, zero, with non-zero results caused by state estimator error and after the fact meter updates. The sum of load related CLMP charges is logically zero and the small reported differences are the result of accounting issues. A positive CLMP at a load bus indicates that the load at that bus has a total energy price higher than the average LMP, due to transmission constraints. A negative CLMP at a load bus indicates that the load at that bus has a total energy price lower than the average LMP, due to transmission constraints. The LMPs at the load buses are a function of marginal generation bus LMPs determined through the least cost security constrained economic dispatch which accounts for transmission constraints and marginal losses. Due to transmission constraints, the average generation weighted CLMP for generation resources is lower than the LMP at the load-weighted reference bus price. Calculated relative to the load reference bus which has a CLMP of zero, this means that the average of the generation bus CLMPs is negative. This means that total generation CLMP credits are negative. Figure 11-1 shows the weighted average CLMPs of generation and load in the day-ahead market.


16 For an example of the congestion accounting methods used in this section, see *MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets*, at "FTRs and ARRs," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Technical_References/docs/2010-som-pjm-technical-reference.pdf>.



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Figure 11-1 shows that from January 2024 to June 2026, day-ahead generation weighted CLMPs were generally negative and day-ahead, load-weighted CLMPs were generally positive, indicating that load was charged a higher weighted average LMP for energy as a result of transmission constraints than the weighted average LMP generation was paid to provide that energy. This means that total CLMP load payments are higher than total CLMP generation credits. The difference in load payments and generation credits (load charges minus generation credits) is congestion (Table 11-12 and Table 11-13). This result is a product of the least cost, security constrained dispatch and the use of a load-weighted reference bus that is used for the determination of the components of LMP. More generally, in a least cost, security constrained market solution the weighted average LMP at load buses is higher than the weighted average price at generation buses.

**Figure 11-1 Day-ahead generation weighted CLMPs and day-ahead load-weighted CLMPs: January 2024 through June 2026**




## Total Congestion

Total congestion costs in PJM in the first six months of 2026 were $3,539.7 million. Total congestion is the difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy, due to binding transmission constraints.

Table 11-10 shows total congestion for the first six months of 2008 through 2026. Total congestion costs in Table 11-10 include congestion associated with PJM facilities and those associated with reciprocal, coordinated flowgates in MISO and in NYISO.[17] [18]

**Table 11-10 Total congestion costs (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026[19]**

| (Jan - Jun) | Congestion Cost | Percent Change | Total PJM Billing | Percent of PJM Billing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | $1,166 | NA | $16,549 | 7.0% |
| 2009 | $408 | (65.0%) | $13,457 | 3.0% |
| 2010 | $644 | 57.8% | $16,314 | 3.9% |
| 2011 | $570 | (11.5%) | $18,685 | 3.1% |
| 2012 | $263 | (53.8%) | $13,991 | 1.9% |
| 2013 | $306 | 16.3% | $15,571 | 2.0% |
| 2014 | $1,442 | 371.3% | $31,060 | 4.6% |
| 2015 | $919 | (36.3%) | $23,390 | 3.9% |
| 2016 | $479 | (47.8%) | $18,290 | 2.6% |
| 2017 | $286 | (40.4%) | $18,960 | 1.5% |
| 2018 | $897 | 214.0% | $25,780 | 3.5% |
| 2019 | $254 | (71.7%) | $21,290 | 1.2% |
| 2020 | $180 | (29.2%) | $16,920 | 1.1% |
| 2021 | $354 | 96.9% | $22,400 | 1.6% |
| 2022 | $1,143 | 223.0% | $39,700 | 2.9% |
| 2023 | $396 | (65.3%) | $23,260 | 1.7% |
| 2024 | $702 | 76.9% | $24,340 | 2.9% |
| 2025 | $1,265 | 80.3% | $35,890 | 3.5% |
| 2026 | $3,540 | 179.9% | $59,710 | 5.9% |

17 See "Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (December 11, 2008) Section 6.1, Effective Date: May 30, 2016. <http://www.pjm.com/documents/agreements.aspx>.

18 See "NYISO Tariffs New York Independent System Operator, Inc." (June 21, 2017) 35.12.1, Effective Date: May 1, 2017. <http://www.pjm.com/documents/agreements.aspx>.

19 In Table 11-10, the MMU uses Total PJM Billing values provided by PJM. For 2019 and after, the MMU has modified the Total PJM Billing calculation to better reflect historical PJM total billing through the PJM settlement process.

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CLMP charges and credits are not congestion. CLMP charges and credits reflect marginal energy price differences caused by binding system constraints. Congestion is the sum of all congestion related charges and credits. In a two settlement system all virtual bids have net zero MW after their day-ahead and balancing positions are cleared, which means that virtual bids are fully settled in terms of CLMP credits and charges at the close of the market for any particular day, with either a net loss or profit due to differences between day-ahead and real-time prices. Net payouts (negative credits) to virtual bids appear as negative adjustments to either day-ahead or balancing congestion and net charges to virtual bids appear as positive adjustments to either day-ahead or balancing congestion.

Table 11-11 shows total congestion by day-ahead and balancing component for the first six months of 2008 through 2026.

**Table 11-11 Total CLMP credits and charges by accounting category (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026**

| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Jan - Jun) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Congestion Costs |
| 2008 | $727.6 | ($589.4) | $86.7 | $1,403.8 | ($102.4) | $68.2 | ($67.1) | ($237.7) | $0.0 | $1,166.1 |
| 2009 | $159.3 | ($299.4) | $63.1 | $521.7 | ($17.0) | ($2.4) | ($99.0) | ($113.6) | $0.0 | $408.2 |
| 2010 | $151.5 | ($544.1) | $38.1 | $733.8 | ($7.3) | $18.6 | ($63.9) | ($89.8) | ($0.0) | $644.0 |
| 2011 | $256.0 | ($420.3) | $25.6 | $701.9 | $31.1 | $56.0 | ($107.0) | ($131.9) | $0.0 | $570.0 |
| 2012 | $56.8 | ($267.4) | $65.4 | $389.6 | ($5.0) | $19.5 | ($101.8) | ($126.4) | $0.0 | $263.3 |
| 2013 | $133.2 | ($306.1) | $87.8 | $527.1 | ($8.4) | $90.4 | ($122.3) | ($221.1) | ($0.0) | $306.0 |
| 2014 | $392.5 | ($1,353.6) | ($54.1) | $1,691.9 | $64.4 | $219.9 | ($94.2) | ($249.7) | $0.0 | $1,442.3 |
| 2015 | $428.5 | ($655.2) | $9.5 | $1,093.2 | $10.7 | $68.8 | ($116.5) | ($174.6) | $0.0 | $918.6 |
| 2016 | $201.9 | ($293.4) | $18.7 | $514.0 | $0.4 | $11.5 | ($23.7) | ($34.8) | $0.0 | $479.1 |
| 2017 | $47.1 | ($246.0) | $3.8 | $296.8 | $6.1 | $21.5 | $4.1 | ($11.3) | $0.0 | $285.5 |
| 2018 | $211.8 | ($745.0) | ($40.3) | $916.5 | $14.7 | $45.8 | $11.2 | ($19.9) | $0.0 | $896.6 |
| 2019 | $100.4 | ($188.3) | $22.9 | $311.5 | $0.2 | $28.0 | ($29.7) | ($57.4) | $0.0 | $254.1 |
| 2020 | $28.9 | ($174.6) | $32.9 | $236.4 | ($0.4) | $19.1 | ($37.0) | ($56.6) | $0.0 | $179.8 |
| 2021 | $168.4 | ($297.9) | $35.4 | $501.7 | ($25.3) | $61.6 | ($60.8) | ($147.7) | $0.0 | $354.0 |
| 2022 | $634.7 | ($751.8) | $69.3 | $1,455.8 | ($5.2) | $169.4 | ($137.7) | ($312.3) | ($0.0) | $1,143.5 |
| 2023 | $163.3 | ($301.1) | $74.8 | $539.2 | $10.7 | $28.4 | ($125.0) | ($142.7) | $0.0 | $396.5 |
| 2024 | $274.0 | ($498.0) | $89.7 | $861.7 | ($0.5) | $50.7 | ($109.0) | ($160.2) | $0.0 | $701.5 |
| 2025 | $500.6 | ($991.0) | $74.7 | $1,566.3 | ($15.4) | $126.2 | ($160.0) | ($301.6) | ($0.0) | $1,264.7 |
| 2026 | $1,099.4 | ($2,776.8) | $52.9 | $3,929.0 | $73.5 | $277.3 | ($185.4) | ($389.3) | $0.0 | $3,539.7 |

## Charges and Credits versus Congestion: Virtual Transactions, Load and Generation

In PJM, there is a day-ahead market and a real-time market (balancing market) that make up a market day. This is referred to as a two settlement system.

In a two settlement system all virtual bids have net zero MW after their day-ahead and balancing positions are cleared, which means that virtual bids are fully settled in terms of CLMP credits and charges at the close of each market day, with either a net loss or profit due to differences between day-ahead and real-time


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prices. Net payouts (negative credits) to virtual bids appear as negative adjustments to either day-ahead or balancing congestion and net charges to virtual bids appear as positive adjustments to either day-ahead or balancing congestion.

Unlike virtual bids, physical load and generation have net MW at the close of a market day's day-ahead and balancing settlement.

Generation does not pay congestion. Some generation receives a price lower than SMP and some generation receives a price greater than SMP but that does not mean that generation is paying congestion. It means that generation is being paid an LMP that is higher or lower than the system load-weighted average LMP.

The residual difference between total load charges (day-ahead and balancing) and generation credits (day-ahead and balancing) after virtual bids have settled their day-ahead and balancing positions is congestion. That is, congestion is the difference between what withdrawals (load) pay for energy and what injections (generation) are paid for energy due to binding transmission constraints, after virtual bids are settled at the end of the market day. Load is the source of the net surplus after generation is paid and virtuals are settled at the end of the market day. Load pays congestion.

Table 11-12 and Table 11-13 show the total CLMP charges and credits for each transaction type in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Table 11-12 shows that in the first six months of 2026 DECs were credited $69.8 million in (negative) CLMP charges in the day-ahead market, charged $10.2 million in CLMP charges in the balancing energy market, resulting in a net payment of $59.5 million. In the first six months of 2026, INCs paid $163.2 million in CLMP (negative) credits in the day-ahead market, were paid $275.7 million in CLMP credits in the balancing energy market resulting in a net payment of $112.4 million. In the first six months of 2026, up to congestion (UTCs) paid $56.1 million in net CLMP charges in the day-ahead market, were paid $177.2 million in net (negative) CLMP charges in the balancing market resulting in a total payment of $121.1 million in total CLMP credits.

### Table 11-12 Total CLMP credits and charges by transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| DEC | ($69.8) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($69.8) | $10.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $10.2 | $0.0 | ($59.5) |
| Demand | ($4.5) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($4.5) | $178.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $178.4 | $0.0 | $173.9 |
| Demand Response | $5.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $5.3 | ($5.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($5.1) | $0.0 | $0.2 |
| Explicit Congestion Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.1 |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.5) | ($1.5) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.5) |
| Export | ($122.9) | $0.0 | ($1.0) | ($123.9) | ($90.3) | $0.0 | ($6.9) | ($97.2) | $0.0 | ($221.1) |
| Generation | $0.0 | ($3,875.3) | $0.0 | $3,875.3 | $0.0 | $120.0 | $0.0 | ($120.0) | $0.0 | $3,755.3 |
| Import | $0.0 | ($29.1) | $0.0 | $29.1 | $0.0 | ($98.8) | $0.0 | $98.8 | $0.0 | $127.8 |
| INC | $0.0 | ($163.2) | $0.0 | $163.2 | $0.0 | $275.7 | $0.0 | ($275.7) | $0.0 | ($112.4) |
| Internal Bilateral | $1,291.5 | $1,291.0 | ($0.5) | $0.0 | ($15.4) | ($15.1) | $0.0 | ($0.3) | $0.0 | ($0.3) |
| Up to Congestion | $0.0 | $0.0 | $56.1 | $56.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($177.2) | ($177.2) | $0.0 | ($121.1) |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($4.4) | ($1.3) | $3.1 | $0.0 | $3.1 |
| Wheel Out | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($4.4) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($4.4) | $0.0 | ($4.7) |
| Total | $1,099.4 | ($2,776.8) | $52.9 | $3,929.0 | $73.5 | $277.3 | ($185.4) | ($389.3) | $0.0 | $3,539.7 |

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## Table 11-13 Total CLMP credits and charges by transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2025

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| DEC | ($9.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($9.0) | ($35.4) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($35.4) | $0.0 | ($44.5) |
| Demand | $62.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $62.0 | $62.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $62.5 | $0.0 | $124.6 |
| Demand Response | $0.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.6 | ($1.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.1) | $0.0 | ($0.5) |
| Explicit Congestion Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.3 | $0.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.3 |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.7) | ($0.7) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($0.8) |
| Export | ($42.6) | $0.0 | ($0.4) | ($43.0) | ($31.3) | $0.0 | ($1.2) | ($32.5) | $0.0 | ($75.6) |
| Generation | $0.0 | ($1,375.9) | $0.0 | $1,375.9 | $0.0 | $1.3 | $0.0 | ($1.3) | $0.0 | $1,374.6 |
| Import | $0.0 | ($4.5) | $0.0 | $4.5 | $0.0 | ($10.1) | $0.0 | $10.1 | $0.0 | $14.6 |
| INC | $0.0 | ($101.8) | $0.0 | $101.8 | $0.0 | $144.8 | $0.0 | ($144.8) | $0.0 | ($43.0) |
| Internal Bilateral | $489.9 | $491.4 | $1.5 | $0.0 | ($7.3) | ($7.0) | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | ($0.2) |
| Up to Congestion | $0.0 | $0.0 | $74.2 | $74.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($156.1) | ($156.1) | $0.0 | ($81.9) |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | ($0.3) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($2.9) | ($2.5) | $0.3 | $0.0 | $0.4 |
| Wheel Out | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.3) | ($2.9) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($2.9) | $0.0 | ($3.1) |
| Total | $500.6 | ($991.0) | $74.7 | $1,566.3 | ($15.4) | $126.2 | ($160.0) | ($301.6) | $0.0 | $1,264.7 |


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Table 11-14 shows the change in total CLMP credits and charges by transaction type in the first six months of 2025 and 2026. Total negative CLMP credits to generation increased by $2,380.7 million, and total CLMP charges to demand increased by $49.4 million. The total CLMP credits to up to congestion transactions (UTCs) decreased by $39.2 million in the first six months of 2026. Total day-ahead CLMP charges to UTCs decreased by $18.2 million in the first six months of 2026. Balancing CLMP credits to UTCs decreased by $21.1 million in the first six months of 2026.

### Table 11-14 Change in total CLMP credits and charges by transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2025 to 2026

| Change in CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| DEC | ($60.8) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($60.8) | $45.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $45.7 | $0.0 | ($15.1) |
| Demand | ($66.5) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($66.5) | $115.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $115.9 | $0.0 | $49.4 |
| Demand Response | $4.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $4.7 | ($4.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($4.0) | $0.0 | $0.7 |
| Explicit Congestion Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.2) |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.8) | ($0.8) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.2 | $0.2 | $0.0 | ($0.7) |
| Export | ($80.3) | $0.0 | ($0.6) | ($80.9) | ($59.0) | $0.0 | ($5.7) | ($64.7) | $0.0 | ($145.6) |
| Generation | $0.0 | ($2,499.3) | $0.0 | $2,499.3 | $0.0 | $118.7 | $0.0 | ($118.7) | $0.0 | $2,380.7 |
| Import | $0.0 | ($24.6) | $0.0 | $24.6 | $0.0 | ($88.6) | ($0.0) | $88.6 | $0.0 | $113.2 |
| INC | $0.0 | ($61.4) | $0.0 | $61.4 | $0.0 | $130.8 | $0.0 | ($130.8) | $0.0 | ($69.4) |
| Internal Bilateral | $801.6 | $799.6 | ($2.0) | ($0.0) | ($8.1) | ($8.1) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.0) |
| Up to Congestion | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($18.2) | ($18.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($21.1) | ($21.1) | $0.0 | ($39.2) |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($1.6) | $1.2 | $2.8 | $0.0 | $2.7 |
| Wheel Out | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.6) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.6) | $0.0 | ($1.5) |
| Total | $598.8 | ($1,785.7) | ($21.8) | $2,362.8 | $88.9 | $151.2 | ($25.5) | ($87.8) | $0.0 | $2,275.0 |

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Table 11-15 compares CLMP credits and charges for each transaction type between the dispatch run and pricing run in first six months of 2026. Total CLMP charges to generation decreased by $707.6 million, and total CLMP charges to demand increased by $4.0 million from the dispatch run to the pricing run. The total CLMP credits to DECs increased by $14.9 million, the total CLMP credits to INCs decreased by $19.8 million and the total CLMP credits to UTCs increased by $25.6 million from the dispatch run to the pricing run.

### Table 11-15 Total CLMP credits and charges by dispatch run and pricing run (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dispatch Run | | | Pricing Run | | | Difference | | |
| Transaction Type | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total |
| DEC | ($82.6) | $8.1 | ($74.5) | ($69.8) | $10.2 | ($59.5) | $12.8 | $2.1 | $14.9 |
| Demand | ($4.8) | $174.7 | $169.9 | ($4.5) | $178.4 | $173.9 | $0.3 | $3.7 | $4.0 |
| Demand Response | $6.5 | ($4.8) | $1.7 | $5.3 | ($5.1) | $0.2 | ($1.3) | ($0.3) | ($1.5) |
| Explicit Congestion Only | $0.1 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | $0.1 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.0) |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | ($2.0) | $0.0 | ($2.0) | ($1.5) | $0.0 | ($1.5) | $0.5 | ($0.0) | $0.5 |
| Export | ($145.0) | ($93.3) | ($238.3) | ($123.9) | ($97.2) | ($221.1) | $21.1 | ($3.9) | $17.1 |
| Generation | $4,571.1 | ($108.3) | $4,462.8 | $3,875.3 | ($120.0) | $3,755.3 | ($695.8) | ($11.7) | ($707.6) |
| Import | $30.9 | $93.5 | $124.4 | $29.1 | $98.8 | $127.8 | ($1.9) | $5.3 | $3.4 |
| INC | $173.1 | ($265.7) | ($92.6) | $163.2 | ($275.7) | ($112.4) | ($9.8) | ($10.0) | ($19.8) |
| Internal Bilateral | $0.0 | ($0.3) | ($0.3) | $0.0 | ($0.3) | ($0.3) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) |
| Up to Congestion | $23.7 | ($170.5) | ($146.8) | $56.1 | ($177.2) | ($121.1) | $32.4 | ($6.7) | $25.6 |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | $3.1 | $3.1 | $0.0 | $3.1 | $3.1 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Wheel Out | ($0.2) | ($4.2) | ($4.5) | ($0.2) | ($4.4) | ($4.7) | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | ($0.2) |
| Total | $4,570.8 | ($367.7) | $4,203.1 | $3,929.0 | ($389.3) | $3,539.7 | ($641.7) | ($21.7) | ($663.4) |



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## UTCs and Negative Balancing Explicit CLMP Charges

Figure 11-2 shows the change in up to congestion balancing explicit CLMP charges from January 2018 through June 2026. Figure 11-2 shows that UTCs account for almost all balancing explicit CLMP charges in PJM. As shown in Figure 11-2, UTCs are generally paid balancing CLMP credits, which take the form of negative balancing CLMP charges being allocated to UTC positions. In the first six months of 2026, 95.6 percent (-$177.2 million out of -$185.4 million) of negative balancing explicit CLMP charges was incurred by UTCs and 4.4 percent (-$8.2 out of -$185.4 million) was incurred by Explicit Congestion Only, Export, Import and Wheel In transactions (Table 11-12). The vertical line at February 22, 2018, marks the date on which the FERC order that limited UTC trading to hubs, residual metered load, and interfaces was effective.[20] The vertical line at November 1, 2020, marks the date on which the FERC order that required PJM to allocate uplift to up to congestion transactions was effective.[21]

Negative balancing explicit CLMP charges were substantially higher in December 2022 than in other months as a result of transmission constraint penalty factors in the real-time market in 2022. The total negative balancing explicit CLMP charges on December 7 and 8, 2022, and the Winter Storm Elliott days of December 23 through 26, 2022, were 64.1 percent (-$62.3 million out of -$97.2 million) of total negative balancing explicit CLMP charges in December 2022.

**Figure 11-2 Monthly balancing explicit CLMP charges incurred by UTCs: January 2018 through June 2026**




20 For additional information about the FERC order, see the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix F: Congestion and Marginal Losses.
21 172 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2020).

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Balancing congestion is caused by settling real-time deviations from day-ahead positions at real-time prices. Whether balancing congestion is positive or negative depends on the differences between market solutions (changes in load and/or generation) and differences between the day-ahead and real-time market models including modeled constraints, the transfer capability (line limits) of the modeled constraints and the differences in deviations between day-ahead and real-time flows that result. The deviations are priced at the real-time LMPs.

For example, one source of negative balancing congestion is that the PJM system has less transmission transfer capability in the real-time market than is modeled in the day-ahead market. In order to reduce processing time in the presence of large number of virtual bids and offers, PJM only enforces or models a subset of its physical transmission limits in the day-ahead market. Transmission constraints not modeled in the day-ahead market have unlimited transfer capability in the day-ahead market model. The inclusion of the actual, lower transmission capability in the real-time market requires the use of more high cost generation and the use of less low cost generation to serve load, which means a decrease in congestion.[22] The reduction in real-time congestion compared to day-ahead congestion creates negative balancing congestion.

As a day-ahead spread bid, UTCs can take advantage of and profit from LMP differences caused by modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time market. UTCs clear between source and sink points with little or no price difference in the day-ahead market, and settle the resulting deviations at higher real-time price differences in the real-time market. The result is negative balancing congestion caused by and paid to UTCs in the form of CLMP credits. This is an example of false arbitrage because the UTCs cannot cause prices to converge and the profits to decrease. As a result of the FERC order requiring load to pay balancing congestion, load is responsible for paying the balancing congestion caused by UTCs.[23]

Table 11-16 provides an example of how UTCs can profit from differences in day-ahead and real-time models and generate negative balancing congestion. In the example, Bus A and Bus B are linked by a transmission line. In the day-ahead market the transmission limit is modeled as 9,999 MW (no limit is enforced in the day-ahead market solution). In the real-time market the physical limit between bus A and bus B is 50 MW. Generation at A has a price of $1.00 and Generation at B has a price of $6. There is 100 MW of load at bus A and 100 MW of load at bus B. There is a UTC of 200 MW that will source at bus A and sink at bus B if the spread in the prices between A and B is less than $1.

As a result of the fact that the transmission capability between A and B is unlimited in the day-ahead market, all of load at A and B can be met with the $1 generation at bus A. The constraint between A and B does not bind in day-ahead so the price at A and B is $1. The price spread between bus A and bus B is zero, which is less than the UTC spread requirement of $1, so the UTC clears. The UTC causes a 200 MW injection at A and 200 MW withdrawal at B, creating 200 MW of flow between bus A and bus B. The 300 MW of combined flow from generation at A and UTC injections at A to the load and UTC sink at B does not exceed the DA modeled limit between A and B. This means that all 200 MW of the UTC injection at A and 200 MW of withdrawal at B can clear without forcing a price spread between A and B. Total day-ahead congestion, which is the difference between CLMP charges and credits, is zero. There is no price difference between the two nodes and every MW of injection and every MW of withdrawal at bus A and bus B settles at the same price.

In the real-time market, the transmission line between bus A and bus B has a 50 MW limit. The UTC does not physically exist in the real-time market and therefore has deviations at Bus A (-200 MW) and at Bus B (+200 MW). The UTC must buy at bus A at the real-time price and sell at bus B at the real-time price to settle its deviations. The load at A (100 MW) and B (100 MW) does not change, so there are no load deviations. With only 50 MW of transmission capability between A and B, the generation at A cannot be used to meet total load on the system. Generation from A meets the load at A (100 MW) and can supply only 50 MW of the 100 MW of load at B. Due to the binding constraint

22 Although it seems counter intuitive, as the amount of low cost generation decreases and the amount of high cost generation increases, the difference between load payments to generation and the payments received by generators goes down. High cost generation receives what load pays.

23 On September 15, 2016, FERC ordered PJM to allocate balancing congestion to load, rather than to FTRs, to modify PJM's Stage 1A ARR allocation process and to continue to use portfolio netting. 153 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016).



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between A and B, the remaining 50 MW of load at B must be met with local generation at B at a cost of $6 and the price at A remains $1.

The UTC must buy 200 MW at A at the real-time price of $1 and sell 200 MW at B at the real-time price of $6. The UTC pays $200 at A and is paid $1,200 at B. The result is a net payment to the UTC of $1,000 in balancing credits.

Table 11-16 shows the balancing credits and charges associated with the real-time deviations in the example. Total congestion (day-ahead plus balancing congestion) in this example is negative $1,250. Total CLMP credits (payments) to generation and the UTC exceed the total charges collected from load. The negative balancing congestion that results is paid by the load under the FERC order.[24]

The UTC did not and could not contribute to price convergence between the day-ahead and real-time market and did not and could not improve efficiency in system dispatch or commitment. The UTC took advantage of the modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets. The UTC did significantly increase payments by load. Load was required to pay the UTC $1,000 in negative balancing, over and above the costs of generation that was needed to meet real-time load. The differences in modeling would have resulted in only $250 in negative balancing congestion if there had been no UTCs.

**Table 11-16 Example of UTC causing and profiting from negative balancing congestion**

| Prices | Bus A | Transfer Capability (Line Limit MW) | Bus B | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMP DA | $1.00 | 9,999 | $1.00 | |
| LMP RT | $1.00 | 50 | $6.00 | |
| Day-Ahead MW | Bus A | | Bus B | Total MW |
| Day-Ahead Generation | 200 | | 0 | 200 |
| Day-Ahead Load | (100) | | (100) | (200) |
| Day-Ahead UTC (+/-) | 200 | | (200) | 0 |
| Total MW | 300 | | (300) | 0 |
| **Day-Ahead Credits and Charges** | **Bus A** | | **Bus B** | **Total Day-Ahead Congestion** |
| Total DA Gen Credits | $200.00 | | $0.00 | |
| Total DA Load Charges | $100.00 | | $100.00 | |
| Total DA UTC Credits | $200.00 | | ($200.00) | |
| Total DA Credits | $300.00 | | ($300.00) | $0.00 |
| Total Day-Ahead Congestion (Charges - Credits) | | | | $0.00 |
| **Balancing Deviation MW** | **Bus A** | | **Bus B** | **Total Deviations** |
| RT GEN Deviations | (50) | | 50 | |
| RT Load Deviations | 0 | | 0 | |
| DA UTC (+/-) | (200) | | 200 | |
| Total Deviations | (250) | | 250 | 0 |
| **Balancing Credits and Charges** | **Bus A** | | **Bus B** | **Balancing Congestion Credits** |
| Total BA Gen Credits | ($50.00) | | $300.00 | $250.00 |
| Total BA Load Charges | $0.00 | | $0.00 | |
| Total BA UTC Credits | ($200.00) | | $1,200.00 | $1,000.00 |
| Total BA Credits | ($250.00) | | $1,500.00 | $1,250.00 |
| Total Balancing Congestion (Charges - Credits) | | | | ($1,250.00) |

24 See 153 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016).

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## Zonal and Load Aggregate Congestion

Zonal, and load aggregate, congestion is calculated on a constraint specific basis for a specific location or set of load pricing nodes (a zone or an aggregate). Local congestion is the difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy due to individual binding transmission constraints. Local congestion includes all energy charges or credits incurred to serve a specific load, zone or load aggregate. Local congestion calculations account for the total difference between what the specified load pays and what the generation that serves that load is paid, regardless of whether the zone is a net importer or a net exporter of generation.

Local congestion is calculated on a constraint specific basis. Congestion is the total congestion payments by load at the buses within a defined area minus total CLMP credits received by generation that supplied that load, given the transmission constraints. Congestion reflects the underlying characteristics of the entire power system as it affects the defined area, including the nature and capability of transmission facilities, the offers and geographic distribution of generation facilities, the level and geographic distribution of decrement bids and increment offers and the geographic and temporal distribution of load.

On a system wide basis, congestion results from transmission constraints that prevent the lowest cost generation from serving some load that must be served by higher cost generation.

The total congestion caused by a constraint is equal to the product of the constraint shadow price times the net flow on the binding constraint. (The shadow price is the difference between the CLMPs across the constraint.) Total congestion caused by the constraint can also be calculated using the CLMPs caused by the constraint at every bus and the net MW injections or MW withdrawals at every affected bus. Congestion associated with a specific constraint is equal to load CLMP charges (CLMP of that specific constraint at each bus times load MW at each bus) caused by that constraint in excess of generation CLMP credits (CLMP of that specific constraint at each bus times generation MW at each bus) caused by that constraint. Equivalently, total congestion caused by the constraint can also be calculated by the shadow price of the constraint times the market flow on that constraint.

Congestion paid by zonal load is a function of the load share of the total load market flow on all binding constraints. Congestion is the difference between what load pays for energy due to binding transmission constraints and what generation, whether inside or outside the load's zone, is paid to serve that load. This calculation is done for both day-ahead congestion and balancing congestion.


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Table 11-17 and Table 11-18 show day-ahead and balancing congestion by zone and the proportion of congestion resulting from constraints that are external to or internal to each zone, in the first six months of 2026 and 2025. Constraints are internal to a zone if both the source and sink points of the constraint are in the zone. DOM had the largest zonal congestion costs among all control zones in the first six months of 2026. DOM had $643.9 million in zonal congestion costs, comprised of $720.3 million in zonal day-ahead congestion costs and -$76.4 million in zonal balancing congestion costs. The Bedington Transformer, the Pruntytown Transformer, the Bedington – Black Oak Interface, the Graceton - Manor Line, and the Pleasant View - Ashburn Line contributed $249.7 million, or 38.9 percent of the DOM zonal congestion costs.[25]

## Table 11-17 CLMP credits and charges and total congestion revenue collected by zone (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | Congestion Costs | | |
| Control Zone | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Internal to Zone | External to Zone | Grand Total |
| ACEC | $10.2 | ($30.8) | $0.6 | $41.6 | $0.6 | $2.8 | ($1.9) | ($4.0) | $0.0 | $37.6 | $37.6 |
| AEP | $175.7 | ($445.4) | $10.3 | $631.5 | $12.4 | $42.9 | ($30.4) | ($60.9) | $18.5 | $552.1 | $570.6 |
| APS | $76.1 | ($189.3) | $4.1 | $269.4 | $3.8 | $19.1 | ($12.6) | ($27.9) | $85.0 | $155.5 | $241.5 |
| ATSI | $73.6 | ($189.1) | $4.6 | $267.4 | $6.0 | $18.0 | ($13.4) | ($25.4) | $2.1 | $239.9 | $242.0 |
| BGE | $55.7 | ($126.9) | ($0.6) | $182.0 | $3.3 | $12.1 | ($6.3) | ($15.1) | $9.3 | $157.5 | $166.9 |
| COMED | $106.7 | ($258.3) | $4.5 | $369.5 | $11.0 | $26.5 | ($16.4) | ($31.9) | $9.5 | $328.0 | $337.6 |
| DAY | $20.8 | ($53.5) | $1.2 | $75.5 | $1.6 | $4.8 | ($3.6) | ($6.9) | $0.0 | $68.6 | $68.6 |
| DOM | $228.7 | ($481.9) | $9.8 | $720.3 | $17.8 | $58.1 | ($36.1) | ($76.4) | $128.1 | $515.8 | $643.9 |
| DPL | $20.8 | ($74.7) | $1.6 | $97.2 | ($0.6) | $4.4 | ($5.0) | ($9.9) | $7.5 | $79.7 | $87.2 |
| DUKE | $31.8 | ($81.5) | $1.8 | $115.1 | $2.3 | $7.3 | ($5.4) | ($10.4) | $0.0 | $104.6 | $104.7 |
| DUQ | $14.4 | ($37.4) | $0.9 | $52.7 | $1.2 | $3.6 | ($2.6) | ($5.0) | $0.3 | $47.4 | $47.7 |
| EKPC | $21.0 | ($50.2) | $0.9 | $72.0 | $1.0 | $4.7 | ($3.1) | ($6.8) | $0.0 | $65.2 | $65.2 |
| EXT | $14.6 | ($34.8) | $0.9 | $50.4 | $1.1 | $7.0 | ($4.2) | ($10.1) | $1.1 | $39.1 | $40.2 |
| JCPLC | $28.4 | ($86.4) | $1.9 | $116.7 | $1.9 | $8.0 | ($5.6) | ($11.7) | $0.0 | $105.0 | $105.0 |
| MEC | $16.7 | ($52.4) | $1.1 | $70.2 | $0.3 | $4.7 | ($3.3) | ($7.6) | $1.7 | $60.9 | $62.6 |
| OVEC | $1.4 | ($3.5) | $0.1 | $5.0 | $0.1 | $0.3 | ($0.2) | ($0.5) | $0.0 | $4.5 | $4.6 |
| PE | $18.9 | ($49.8) | $1.1 | $69.8 | $0.9 | $4.6 | ($3.4) | ($7.1) | $2.3 | $60.5 | $62.8 |
| PECO | $41.9 | ($128.5) | $2.6 | $173.0 | $2.0 | $11.8 | ($8.2) | ($18.0) | $1.7 | $153.4 | $155.0 |
| PEPCO | $52.1 | ($120.5) | ($0.5) | $172.1 | $2.8 | $11.2 | ($5.9) | ($14.3) | $0.0 | $157.8 | $157.9 |
| PPL | $44.0 | ($143.2) | $2.9 | $190.0 | $1.2 | $12.7 | ($8.7) | ($20.2) | $12.3 | $157.5 | $169.8 |
| PSEG | $44.3 | ($133.9) | $2.9 | $181.1 | $2.7 | $12.4 | ($8.8) | ($18.4) | $1.3 | $161.4 | $162.7 |
| REC | $1.5 | ($4.6) | $0.2 | $6.4 | $0.1 | $0.4 | ($0.3) | ($0.6) | $0.1 | $5.7 | $5.8 |
| Total | $1,099.4 | ($2,776.8) | $52.9 | $3,929.0 | $73.5 | $277.3 | ($185.4) | ($389.3) | $280.9 | $3,257.8 | $3,539.7 |

25 For additional information about the top 20 constraints that affected each zone, see the *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Appendix F: Congestion and Marginal Losses.

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## Table 11-18 CLMP credits and charges and total congestion revenue collected by zone (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2025

| CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | Congestion Costs | | |
| Control Zone | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Internal to Zone | External to Zone | Grand Total |
| ACEC | $4.5 | ($9.7) | $0.8 | $14.9 | ($0.2) | $1.4 | ($1.6) | ($3.2) | $0.3 | $11.4 | $11.8 |
| AEP | $78.0 | ($150.8) | $12.8 | $241.6 | ($2.2) | $17.8 | ($24.8) | ($44.8) | $23.7 | $173.1 | $196.8 |
| APS | $38.1 | ($68.8) | $5.0 | $111.9 | ($1.4) | $8.7 | ($11.2) | ($21.3) | $7.9 | $82.7 | $90.6 |
| ATSI | $40.3 | ($72.0) | $5.9 | $118.1 | ($0.1) | $8.2 | ($11.5) | ($19.8) | $1.6 | $96.7 | $98.3 |
| BGE | $18.6 | ($43.1) | $2.6 | $64.3 | ($0.4) | $4.8 | ($6.1) | ($11.3) | $3.3 | $49.6 | $52.9 |
| COMED | $37.3 | ($98.6) | $6.1 | $142.1 | $1.4 | $11.6 | ($14.2) | ($24.4) | $12.1 | $105.6 | $117.7 |
| DAY | $8.0 | ($18.8) | $1.5 | $28.2 | ($0.0) | $2.1 | ($3.0) | ($5.1) | $0.0 | $23.2 | $23.2 |
| DOM | $97.1 | ($193.8) | $15.4 | $306.4 | ($0.2) | $25.9 | ($31.7) | ($57.8) | $121.1 | $127.5 | $248.6 |
| DPL | $19.8 | ($21.6) | $1.5 | $43.0 | ($3.4) | $3.1 | ($2.6) | ($9.0) | $12.5 | $21.4 | $33.9 |
| DUKE | $12.1 | ($27.2) | $2.1 | $41.4 | ($0.0) | $3.2 | ($4.6) | ($7.7) | $0.3 | $33.4 | $33.7 |
| DUQ | $6.6 | ($11.1) | $0.9 | $18.5 | ($0.0) | $1.6 | ($2.3) | ($3.9) | $0.1 | $14.5 | $14.6 |
| EKPC | $6.9 | ($16.2) | $1.3 | $24.4 | ($0.3) | $2.1 | ($2.7) | ($5.1) | $0.0 | $19.2 | $19.2 |
| EXT | $8.8 | ($17.5) | $1.6 | $27.9 | ($0.7) | $4.4 | ($5.7) | ($10.8) | $1.4 | $15.7 | $17.1 |
| JCPLC | $15.3 | ($26.7) | $1.9 | $43.9 | ($0.5) | $3.8 | ($4.6) | ($9.0) | $0.4 | $34.4 | $34.9 |
| MEC | $15.5 | ($16.9) | $1.1 | $33.4 | ($3.5) | $2.6 | ($2.7) | ($8.8) | $2.6 | $22.1 | $24.7 |
| OVEC | $0.4 | ($1.2) | $0.9 | $2.5 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | ($0.2) | ($0.3) | $0.8 | $1.4 | $2.2 |
| PE | $11.3 | ($18.4) | $1.2 | $30.9 | ($0.4) | $2.3 | ($2.9) | ($5.6) | $6.0 | $19.3 | $25.3 |
| PECO | $16.6 | ($42.5) | $2.9 | $62.1 | ($1.0) | $5.7 | ($6.9) | ($13.5) | $3.7 | $44.8 | $48.6 |
| PEPCO | $17.9 | ($40.3) | $2.5 | $60.7 | ($0.5) | $4.6 | ($5.7) | ($10.8) | $0.2 | $49.7 | $50.0 |
| PPL | $23.5 | ($48.4) | $3.3 | $75.3 | ($1.1) | $6.1 | ($7.4) | ($14.6) | $2.3 | $58.4 | $60.7 |
| PSEG | $23.0 | ($46.0) | $3.3 | $72.3 | ($0.9) | $6.0 | ($7.3) | ($14.2) | $0.6 | $57.4 | $58.1 |
| REC | $0.8 | ($1.4) | $0.2 | $2.4 | ($0.0) | $0.2 | ($0.2) | ($0.5) | $0.1 | $1.8 | $1.9 |
| Total | $500.6 | ($991.0) | $74.7 | $1,566.3 | ($15.4) | $126.2 | ($160.0) | ($301.6) | $201.4 | $1,063.3 | $1,264.7 |

In cases where PJM has used an artificial constraint that causes net negative congestion and/or there is no load bus on the constrained side of a binding constraint, the congestion of the artificial constraint is handled as a special case. In the first six months of 2026, the total congestion costs associated with these special cases were $46.3 million or 1.3 percent of the total congestion costs. Table 11-17 and Table 11-18 include congestion allocations from these special case artificial constraints.

There are five categories of artificial constraint based specific allocation special cases that can cause negative congestion: congestion associated with artificial constraints with no downstream load bus (no load bus); congestion associated with artificial constraints with downstream load buses with zero value CLMPs (zero CLMP); congestion associated with closed loop interfaces (closed loop interfaces); congestion associated with CT price setting logic (CT price setting logic); and congestion associated with nontransmission artificial facility constraints in the day-ahead energy market and/or any unaccounted for difference between PJM billed CLMP charges and calculated congestion costs including rounding errors (unclassified). [26]

26 While CT pricing logic was officially discontinued by PJM on September 1, 2021, PJM continued to use a related logic to force inflexible units to be on the margin in both real time and day ahead. These results have been included in the CT Pricing Logic totals.


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Table 11-19 and Table 11-20 show total congestion by type of special case, congestion, and total congestion by zone. Closed loop interfaces and CT pricing logic, and similar artificial constraints employed by PJM to force resources to be marginal, generally result in negative congestion on a constraint specific basis. PJM's use of both the closed loop interfaces and CT Pricing Logic forces the affected resource bus LMP to match the marginal offer of the resource. This causes higher CLMP payments to the affected generation than the CLMP load charges to any affected load, resulting in negative congestion associated with the constraint. None of the closed loop interfaces were binding in the first six months of 2025 or 2026. The congestion associated with Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides is included in the Normal Constraint Congestion totals.

## Table 11-19 CLMP charges and credits and total congestion collected by zone and special case logic (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | | | | Balancing | | | | | | | | | |
| Control Zone | Load Bus Zero CLMP | CT Price Setting Logic | Closed Loop Interfaces | No Load Buses | Unclassified | Normal Constraint Congestion | Total | Load Bus Zero CLMP | CT Price Setting Logic | Closed Loop Interfaces | No Load Buses | Unclassified | Normal Constraint Congestion | Total | Grand Total | Special Cases Total | Percent of Special Cases |
| ACEC | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.5 | $41.2 | $41.6 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($4.0) | ($4.0) | $37.6 | $0.4 | 1.0% |
| AEP | $0.0 | ($1.1) | $0.0 | $0.1 | $8.0 | $624.5 | $631.5 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.2 | ($0.0) | ($60.9) | ($60.9) | $570.6 | $6.9 | 1.2% |
| APS | $0.0 | ($0.5) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $3.1 | $266.9 | $269.4 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($27.8) | ($27.9) | $241.5 | $2.4 | 1.0% |
| ATSI | $0.0 | ($0.4) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $3.6 | $264.2 | $267.4 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($25.3) | ($25.4) | $242.0 | $3.1 | 1.3% |
| BGE | ($0.0) | ($0.3) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $2.3 | $180.0 | $182.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($15.1) | ($15.1) | $166.9 | $2.0 | 1.2% |
| COMED | $0.6 | ($0.7) | $0.0 | $1.2 | $5.0 | $363.4 | $369.5 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($31.8) | ($31.9) | $337.6 | $5.9 | 1.7% |
| DAY | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.0 | $74.6 | $75.5 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($6.8) | ($6.9) | $68.6 | $0.8 | 1.2% |
| DOM | ($0.0) | ($1.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $8.8 | $712.6 | $720.3 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($76.2) | ($76.4) | $643.9 | $7.5 | 1.2% |
| DPL | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.0 | $96.3 | $97.2 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($9.9) | ($9.9) | $87.2 | $0.8 | 0.9% |
| DUKE | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.5 | $113.8 | $115.1 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($10.4) | ($10.4) | $104.7 | $1.3 | 1.2% |
| DUQ | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.8 | $52.0 | $52.7 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($5.0) | ($5.0) | $47.7 | $0.7 | 1.4% |
| EKPC | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.8 | $71.4 | $72.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($6.7) | ($6.8) | $65.2 | $0.6 | 1.0% |
| EXT | $1.1 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.7 | $48.6 | $50.4 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($10.1) | ($10.1) | $40.2 | $1.7 | 4.2% |
| JCPLC | $0.0 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1.4 | $115.5 | $116.7 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($11.7) | ($11.7) | $105.0 | $1.1 | 1.1% |
| MEC | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.7 | $69.6 | $70.2 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($7.6) | ($7.6) | $62.6 | $0.6 | 0.9% |
| OVEC | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $5.0 | $5.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.5) | ($0.5) | $4.6 | $0.1 | 1.9% |
| PE | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.8 | $69.2 | $69.8 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($7.0) | ($7.1) | $62.8 | $0.6 | 1.0% |
| PECO | $0.0 | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $2.0 | $171.4 | $173.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($17.9) | ($18.0) | $155.0 | $1.6 | 1.0% |
| PEPCO | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $2.0 | $170.4 | $172.1 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($14.2) | ($14.3) | $157.9 | $1.7 | 1.1% |
| PPL | $0.0 | ($0.4) | $0.0 | $3.5 | $1.8 | $185.1 | $190.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($0.1) | ($0.0) | ($20.1) | ($20.2) | $169.8 | $4.8 | 2.8% |
| PSEG | $0.0 | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $2.1 | $179.3 | $181.1 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($18.4) | ($18.4) | $162.7 | $1.7 | 1.1% |
| REC | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.1 | $6.3 | $6.4 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.6) | ($0.6) | $5.8 | $0.1 | 1.3% |
| Total | $1.7 | ($7.0) | $0.0 | $4.9 | $48.0 | $3,881.4 | $3,929.0 | $0.0 | ($1.5) | $0.0 | $0.2 | ($0.0) | ($388.0) | ($389.3) | $3,539.7 | $46.3 | 1.3% |

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## Table 11-20 CLMP charges and credits and congestion collected by zone and special case logic (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2025

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | | | | Balancing | | | | | | | | |
| Control Zone | Load Bus Zero CLMP | CT Price Setting Logic | Closed Loop Interfaces | No Load Buses | Unclassified | Normal Constraint Congestion | Total | Load Bus Zero CLMP | CT Price Setting Logic | Closed Loop Interfaces | No Load Buses | Unclassified | Normal Constraint Congestion | Total | Grand Total | Special Cases Total | Percent of Special Cases |
| ACEC | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $15.1 | $14.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($3.2) | ($3.2) | $11.8 | ($0.1) | (1.1%) |
| AEP | ($0.0) | ($1.8) | $0.0 | $0.6 | $0.0 | $242.8 | $241.6 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($44.8) | ($44.8) | $196.8 | ($1.2) | (0.6%) |
| APS | ($0.0) | ($0.9) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $112.7 | $111.9 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($21.3) | ($21.3) | $90.6 | ($0.9) | (1.0%) |
| ATSI | ($0.0) | ($0.6) | $0.0 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $118.7 | $118.1 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($19.8) | ($19.8) | $98.3 | ($0.6) | (0.6%) |
| BGE | ($0.0) | ($0.4) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $64.7 | $64.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($11.3) | ($11.3) | $52.9 | ($0.4) | (0.8%) |
| COMED | $0.1 | ($1.3) | $0.0 | $0.9 | ($0.0) | $142.3 | $142.1 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($24.4) | ($24.4) | $117.7 | ($0.3) | (0.2%) |
| DAY | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $28.5 | $28.2 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($5.1) | ($5.1) | $23.2 | ($0.2) | (0.9%) |
| DOM | ($0.0) | ($1.7) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $308.0 | $306.4 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($57.8) | ($57.8) | $248.6 | ($1.6) | (0.7%) |
| DPL | $0.0 | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $43.3 | $43.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($9.1) | ($9.0) | $33.9 | ($0.3) | (0.8%) |
| DUKE | ($0.0) | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $41.8 | $41.4 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($7.7) | ($7.7) | $33.7 | ($0.3) | (1.0%) |
| DUQ | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $18.7 | $18.5 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($3.9) | ($3.9) | $14.6 | ($0.2) | (1.0%) |
| EKPC | ($0.0) | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $24.6 | $24.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($5.1) | ($5.1) | $19.2 | ($0.3) | (1.3%) |
| EXT | $1.2 | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $26.9 | $27.9 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($10.8) | ($10.8) | $17.1 | $1.0 | 6.1% |
| JCPLC | $0.4 | ($0.4) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $43.8 | $43.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($9.0) | ($9.0) | $34.9 | $0.1 | 0.2% |
| MEC | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.2 | $0.0 | $33.4 | $33.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($8.8) | ($8.8) | $24.7 | $0.0 | 0.0% |
| OVEC | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.8 | $0.0 | $1.7 | $2.5 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.3) | ($0.3) | $2.2 | $0.8 | 35.9% |
| PE | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.1 | $0.0 | $31.1 | $30.9 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($5.6) | ($5.6) | $25.3 | ($0.2) | (0.6%) |
| PECO | $0.0 | ($0.6) | $0.0 | $0.4 | ($0.0) | $62.3 | $62.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($13.5) | ($13.5) | $48.6 | ($0.2) | (0.4%) |
| PEPCO | ($0.0) | ($0.4) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $61.1 | $60.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($10.8) | ($10.8) | $50.0 | ($0.4) | (0.8%) |
| PPL | $0.0 | ($0.6) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $75.9 | $75.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($14.6) | ($14.6) | $60.7 | ($0.6) | (1.0%) |
| PSEG | $0.0 | ($0.6) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $72.8 | $72.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($14.2) | ($14.2) | $58.1 | ($0.6) | (1.0%) |
| REC | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $2.4 | $2.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.5) | ($0.5) | $1.9 | ($0.0) | (1.0%) |
| Total | $1.8 | ($11.4) | $0.0 | $3.2 | ($0.0) | $1,572.7 | $1,566.3 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($301.6) | ($301.6) | $1,264.7 | ($6.4) | (0.5%) |


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Table 11-21 show total balancing congestion caused by each of the Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides constraints PJM used in the first six months of 2026. The congestion associated with Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides is included in the Normal Constraint Congestion totals. Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides are artificial transmission contingencies on physical transmission elements. Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides temporarily force a generator to be marginal. Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides are typically in place for a period of from several hours to a few days. Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides are similar to a closed loop interface in that they enforce artificially uniform price effects, but unlike closed loop interfaces that only affect prices on the constrained side, these artificial constraints enforce artificially uniform price spreads between the two sides of the constraint through large uniform dfax on the constrained side and small uniform dfax on the unconstrained side. The uniform source dfax and uniform sink dfax of the artificial constraint can be modified, along with the transmission line limits, by PJM to meet market outcome goals and are a source of significant modeling differences between the day-ahead and real-time market.

## Table 11-21 CLMP charges and credits and congestion collected by Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides by affected Constraint: January through June, 2026[27]

| | | | | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Balancing | | | | |
| No. | Constraint | Type | Location | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Percent of Total Congestion Caused by Real-Time Short-Term Marginal Value Overrides |
| 1 | Carlisle Pike - Gardners | Line | PE | (0.4) | 0.2 | (0.0) | (0.5) | 81.9% |
| 2 | Piney Grove - Wattsville | Line | DPL | (0.1) | 0.0 | (0.0) | (0.1) | 18.1% |
| 3 | Burnham - Munster | Line | COMED | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 4 | Bellehaven - Kellam | Line | DPL | (0.0) | (0.0) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| | Total | | | ($0.5) | $0.2 | ($0.0) | ($0.7) | 100.0% |

27 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

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## Fast Start Pricing Effect on Zonal Congestion

PJM implemented fast start pricing in both day-ahead and real-time markets starting September 1, 2021. Table 11-22 compares the congestion costs between the dispatch run and the pricing run in the first six months of 2026. The table shows that the implementation of fast starting pricing logic caused day-ahead total congestion costs to decrease $641.7 million (or 14.0 percent), caused negative balancing congestion costs to increase $21.7 million (or 5.9 percent), and caused total congestion costs to decrease $663.4 million (or 15.8 percent) from the dispatch run to the pricing run in the first six months of 2026. In comparing the two pricing results, the same MW, from the dispatch run in the day-ahead market and metered output in the real-time market, are used in the accounting cost calculations.

The day-ahead DLMP was higher than the PLMP in January 2026 due to transmission constraint violations during Winter Storm Fern and the use of a $30,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor (TCPF) in the day-ahead DLMP calculation compared to a $2,000 per MWh transmission constraint penalty factor in the day-ahead PLMP calculation. The day-ahead market dispatch violated multiple high voltage constraints into the Dominion and BGE Zones during Winter Storm Fern, particularly on January 27, 2026. The higher TCPF in the dispatch run compared to the pricing run caused a negative $5,060 per MWh difference in the dispatch and pricing run day-ahead market prices for the 7:00 AM hour, which coincided with the winter peak load.

**Table 11-22 Total congestion by dispatch and pricing run (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026[28]**

| | Congestion Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dispatch Run | | | Pricing Run | | | Difference | | |
| Control Zone | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total |
| ACEC | $45.9 | ($3.8) | $42.0 | $41.6 | ($4.0) | $37.6 | ($4.3) | ($0.2) | ($4.5) |
| AEP | $710.4 | ($57.5) | $652.8 | $631.5 | ($60.9) | $570.6 | ($78.9) | ($3.4) | ($82.2) |
| APS | $305.4 | ($26.1) | $279.2 | $269.4 | ($27.9) | $241.5 | ($35.9) | ($1.8) | ($37.7) |
| ATSI | $298.5 | ($24.0) | $274.5 | $267.4 | ($25.4) | $242.0 | ($31.1) | ($1.4) | ($32.5) |
| BGE | $290.9 | ($14.3) | $276.6 | $182.0 | ($15.1) | $166.9 | ($108.9) | ($0.9) | ($109.7) |
| COMED | $412.2 | ($30.2) | $382.0 | $369.5 | ($31.9) | $337.6 | ($42.7) | ($1.7) | ($44.4) |
| DAY | $84.7 | ($6.5) | $78.2 | $75.5 | ($6.9) | $68.6 | ($9.3) | ($0.4) | ($9.7) |
| DOM | $810.6 | ($72.1) | $738.5 | $720.3 | ($76.4) | $643.9 | ($90.3) | ($4.3) | ($94.6) |
| DPL | $107.7 | ($9.1) | $98.5 | $97.2 | ($9.9) | $87.2 | ($10.5) | ($0.8) | ($11.3) |
| DUKE | $129.3 | ($9.8) | $119.4 | $115.1 | ($10.4) | $104.7 | ($14.2) | ($0.6) | ($14.8) |
| DUQ | $58.7 | ($4.8) | $53.9 | $52.7 | ($5.0) | $47.7 | ($6.0) | ($0.3) | ($6.2) |
| EKPC | $84.0 | ($6.4) | $77.6 | $72.0 | ($6.8) | $65.2 | ($11.9) | ($0.4) | ($12.3) |
| EXT | $56.4 | ($9.6) | $46.8 | $50.4 | ($10.1) | $40.2 | ($6.0) | ($0.5) | ($6.6) |
| JCPLC | $127.8 | ($11.1) | $116.7 | $116.7 | ($11.7) | $105.0 | ($11.1) | ($0.6) | ($11.7) |
| MEC | $78.0 | ($7.3) | $70.7 | $70.2 | ($7.6) | $62.6 | ($7.7) | ($0.4) | ($8.1) |
| OVEC | $5.7 | ($0.4) | $5.3 | $5.0 | ($0.5) | $4.6 | ($0.7) | ($0.0) | ($0.7) |
| PE | $78.2 | ($6.7) | $71.6 | $69.8 | ($7.1) | $62.8 | ($8.4) | ($0.4) | ($8.8) |
| PECO | $191.7 | ($17.1) | $174.6 | $173.0 | ($18.0) | $155.0 | ($18.7) | ($0.9) | ($19.5) |
| PEPCO | $276.4 | ($13.5) | $262.9 | $172.1 | ($14.3) | $157.9 | ($104.3) | ($0.8) | ($105.1) |
| PPL | $211.9 | ($19.2) | $192.6 | $190.0 | ($20.2) | $169.8 | ($21.8) | ($1.0) | ($22.8) |
| PSEG | $199.6 | ($17.5) | $182.1 | $181.1 | ($18.4) | $162.7 | ($18.5) | ($0.9) | ($19.4) |
| REC | $7.0 | ($0.6) | $6.4 | $6.4 | ($0.6) | $5.8 | ($0.6) | ($0.0) | ($0.6) |
| Total | $4,570.8 | ($367.7) | $4,203.1 | $3,929.0 | ($389.3) | $3,539.7 | ($641.7) | ($21.7) | ($663.4) |

28 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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## Monthly Congestion

Table 11-23 shows day-ahead, balancing and inadvertent congestion costs by month for January 2025 through June 2026.

Total negative balancing congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 were highest in January. The top constraint that contributed to the total balancing congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 was the Pruntytown Circuit Breaker. The constraint accounted for 9.0 percent of the total balancing congestion costs in the first six months of 2026. The majority (74.0 percent) of negative balancing congestion costs for the Pruntytown Circuit Breaker were the result of Generation.


In the first six months of 2026, total congestion costs were highest in January and lowest in March.

### Table 11-23 Monthly congestion costs by market (Dollars (Millions)): January 2025 through June 2026

| | Congestion Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | | | | 2026 | | | |
| | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Inadvertent Charges | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Inadvertent Charges | Total |
| Jan | $361.5 | ($133.8) | ($0.0) | $227.8 | $1,341.1 | ($135.4) | $0.0 | $1,205.7 |
| Feb | $146.5 | ($22.0) | ($0.0) | $124.5 | $740.1 | ($101.9) | $0.0 | $638.2 |
| Mar | $195.5 | ($44.4) | ($0.0) | $151.0 | $199.5 | ($28.2) | $0.0 | $171.4 |
| Apr | $185.7 | ($24.2) | ($0.0) | $161.6 | $281.9 | ($43.6) | $0.0 | $238.2 |
| May | $253.4 | ($15.7) | ($0.0) | $237.7 | $581.3 | ($66.2) | $0.0 | $515.0 |
| Jun | $423.6 | ($61.5) | ($0.0) | $362.2 | $785.2 | ($13.9) | ($0.0) | $771.3 |
| Jul | $625.4 | ($16.5) | ($0.0) | $608.9 | | | | |
| Aug | $176.8 | ($26.3) | $0.0 | $150.4 | | | | |
| Sep | $235.1 | ($25.4) | ($0.0) | $209.8 | | | | |
| Oct | $386.3 | ($34.4) | ($0.0) | $351.9 | | | | |
| Nov | $222.6 | ($28.2) | ($0.0) | $194.5 | | | | |
| Dec | $437.8 | ($44.5) | ($0.0) | $393.3 | | | | |
| Total | $3,650.4 | ($476.9) | ($0.0) | $3,173.5 | $3,929.0 | ($389.3) | $0.0 | $3,539.7 |

Figure 11-3 shows PJM monthly total congestion cost for January 2008 through June 2026.

### Figure 11-3 Monthly total congestion cost (Dollars (Millions)): January 2008 through June 2026




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Table 11-24 shows monthly total CLMP credits and charges for each virtual transaction type for January 2025 through June 2026. Virtual transaction CLMP charges, when positive, are the total CLMP charges to the virtual transactions and when negative, are the total CLMP credits to the virtual transactions. The negative totals in Table 11-24 show that virtuals were paid, in net, CLMP credits in the first six months of 2026 and 2025. In the first six months of 2026, 41.3 percent of the total credits to virtuals went to UTCs, compared to 48.4 percent in the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, the average hourly cleared UTC MW decreased by 23.5 percent, compared to the first six months of 2026.

**Table 11-24 Monthly CLMP charges by virtual transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January 2025 through June 2026**

| | | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | DEC | | | INC | | | Up to Congestion | | | |
| Year | | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Grand Total |
| 2025 | Jan | $3.3 | ($31.1) | ($27.8) | $22.3 | ($35.9) | ($13.6) | $16.8 | ($50.6) | ($33.8) | ($75.1) |
| | Feb | ($5.2) | $4.2 | ($1.0) | $12.7 | ($17.4) | ($4.7) | $11.2 | ($14.9) | ($3.7) | ($9.4) |
| | Mar | ($2.3) | $2.2 | ($0.1) | $22.4 | ($29.5) | ($7.1) | $14.2 | ($27.0) | ($12.9) | ($20.1) |
| | Apr | ($0.8) | $0.6 | ($0.2) | $20.8 | ($26.9) | ($6.1) | $6.4 | ($16.5) | ($10.1) | ($16.5) |
| | May | ($0.6) | ($5.0) | ($5.6) | $13.7 | ($15.2) | ($1.5) | $6.7 | ($7.7) | ($0.9) | ($8.1) |
| | Jun | ($3.3) | ($6.3) | ($9.7) | $9.9 | ($19.9) | ($10.0) | $18.9 | ($39.5) | ($20.6) | ($40.2) |
| | Jul | ($8.4) | $0.8 | ($7.6) | $12.0 | ($13.6) | ($1.6) | $8.3 | ($11.0) | ($2.7) | ($11.9) |
| | Aug | $0.1 | ($10.4) | ($10.3) | $4.7 | ($7.6) | ($2.9) | $6.4 | ($8.2) | ($1.9) | ($15.1) |
| | Sep | ($7.7) | $2.9 | ($4.9) | $10.0 | ($11.1) | ($1.2) | $11.0 | ($14.8) | ($3.9) | ($9.9) |
| | Oct | ($15.7) | $18.1 | $2.5 | $24.8 | ($39.6) | ($14.8) | $18.4 | ($30.9) | ($12.4) | ($24.7) |
| | Nov | ($9.7) | $4.4 | ($5.3) | $13.5 | ($22.6) | ($9.1) | $10.2 | ($13.1) | ($2.8) | ($17.2) |
| | Dec | $4.8 | ($26.4) | ($21.6) | $5.7 | ($12.2) | ($6.5) | $8.5 | ($16.3) | ($7.9) | ($36.0) |
| | Total | ($45.6) | ($46.0) | ($91.6) | $172.5 | ($251.6) | ($79.1) | $137.0 | ($250.5) | ($113.5) | ($284.2) |
| 2026 | Jan | ($4.8) | ($13.0) | ($17.8) | $43.6 | ($71.2) | ($27.7) | $1.4 | ($42.9) | ($41.5) | ($87.0) |
| | Feb | ($3.3) | ($27.2) | ($30.5) | $42.1 | ($69.9) | ($27.8) | $11.3 | ($22.9) | ($11.6) | ($69.9) |
| | Mar | ($14.0) | $11.0 | ($3.1) | $13.4 | ($19.5) | ($6.0) | $11.7 | ($17.5) | ($5.8) | ($14.9) |
| | Apr | ($0.6) | ($0.3) | ($0.9) | $20.8 | ($31.3) | ($10.6) | $13.9 | ($21.0) | ($7.2) | ($18.6) |
| | May | ($13.2) | $16.7 | $3.6 | $24.6 | ($54.9) | ($30.3) | $11.5 | ($53.5) | ($42.0) | ($68.8) |
| | Jun | ($33.8) | $23.0 | ($10.8) | $18.9 | ($28.9) | ($10.0) | $6.3 | ($19.4) | ($13.1) | ($33.9) |
| | Total | ($69.8) | $10.2 | ($59.5) | $163.2 | ($275.7) | ($112.4) | $56.1 | ($177.2) | ($121.1) | ($293.1) |

## Congested Facilities

A congestion event exists when a unit or units must be dispatched out of merit order to control for the potential impact of a contingency on a monitored facility or to control an actual overload. A congestion event hour exists when a specific facility is constrained for one or more five-minute intervals within an hour. A congestion event hour differs from a constrained hour, which is any hour during which one or more facilities are congested. If two facilities are constrained during an hour, the result is one constrained hour and two congestion event hours. Constraints are often simultaneous, so the number of congestion event hours usually exceeds the number of constrained hours and the number of congestion event hours usually exceeds the number of hours in a year.

In order to have a consistent metric for real-time and day-ahead congestion frequency, real-time congestion frequency is measured using the convention that an hour is constrained if any of its component five-minute intervals is constrained. This is consistent with the way in which PJM reports real-time congestion.


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In the first six months of 2026, there were 38,396 day-ahead congestion event hours compared to 37,440 day-ahead congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025. Of the day-ahead congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026, only 8,859 (23.1 percent) were also constrained in the real-time energy market (Table 11-26). In the first six months of 2026, there were 18,586 real-time, congestion event hours compared to 15,339 real-time, congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025. Of the real-time congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026, 8,903 (47.9 percent) were also constrained in the day-ahead energy market (Table 11-27).

## Congestion Event Hours

Table 11-25 compares the monthly day-ahead and real-time congestion event hours in January 2025 to June 2026. Day-ahead congestion event hours are significantly greater than real-time congestion event hours.

### Table 11-25 Monthly day-ahead and real-time congestion event hours: January 2025 through June 2026

| | Day-Ahead Congestion Event Hours | | Real-Time Congestion Event Hours | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | 2026 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Jan | 6,599 | 6,886 | 2,574 | 3,803 |
| Feb | 6,213 | 7,086 | 2,176 | 3,151 |
| Mar | 8,016 | 6,445 | 3,663 | 3,114 |
| Apr | 5,238 | 6,154 | 2,446 | 2,928 |
| May | 4,653 | 5,382 | 1,738 | 2,567 |
| Jun | 6,727 | 7,514 | 2,688 | 3,013 |
| Jul | 6,835 | | 2,256 | |
| Aug | 5,120 | | 1,646 | |
| Sep | 6,985 | | 2,469 | |
| Oct | 6,851 | | 3,083 | |
| Nov | 6,170 | | 2,420 | |
| Dec | 7,538 | | 3,264 | |
| Total | 76,945 | 39,467 | 30,423 | 18,576 |

Table 11-26 and Table 11-27 compare day-ahead and real-time congestion event hours. Among the hours for which a facility is constrained in the day-ahead energy market, the number of hours during which the facility is also constrained in the real-time energy market are presented in Table 11-26.[29]

Among the hours for which a facility was constrained in the real-time energy market, the number of hours during which the facility was also constrained in the day-ahead energy market are presented in Table 11-27.

Congestion frequency continued to be significantly higher in the day-ahead energy market than in the real-time energy market in the first six months of 2026. The number of congestion event hours in the day-ahead energy market was about 2 times the number of congestion event hours in the real-time energy market.

In the real-time market, PJM has the ability to model and monitor almost all PJM transmission facilities. In the day-ahead market, PJM can model and monitor only a portion of PJM transmission facilities. This difference in modeling is the basis of false arbitrage and the source of significant virtual profits. While more constraints are modeled and monitored in the PJM real-time market than the day-ahead market, there is significantly more network flow in the day-ahead market than in the real-time market as a result of virtual bids and offers. Virtual bids and offers also contribute to day-ahead market flows that do not align with realized real-time physical flows. The number of congestion event hours in the day-ahead energy market was about two times the number of congestion event hours in the real-time energy market, despite the fact that only a portion of PJM transmission facilities are modeled in the day-ahead market.

### Table 11-26 Congestion event hours (day-ahead against real-time): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| | Congestion Event Hours | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
| Type | Day-Ahead Constrained | Corresponding Real-Time Constrained | Percent | Day-Ahead Constrained | Corresponding Real-Time Constrained | Percent |
| Flowgate | 6,179 | 934 | 15.1% | 6,910 | 1,326 | 19.2% |
| Interface | 848 | 131 | 15.4% | 846 | 162 | 19.1% |
| Line | 23,633 | 4,490 | 19.0% | 24,985 | 5,438 | 21.8% |
| Transformer | 3,605 | 369 | 10.2% | 3,422 | 949 | 27.7% |
| Other | 3,175 | 1,617 | 50.9% | 2,233 | 984 | 44.1% |
| Total | 37,440 | 7,541 | 20.1% | 38,396 | 8,859 | 23.1% |

29 Constraints are mapped to transmission facilities. In the day-ahead energy market, within a given hour, a single transmission facility may be associated with multiple constraints. In such situations, the same facility accounts for more than one congestion event hour for a given hour in the day-ahead energy market. Similarly in the real-time market a facility may account for more than one congestion event hour within a given hour.

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### Table 11-27 Congestion event hours (real-time against day-ahead): January through June, 2025 and 2026

| Congestion Event Hours | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 (Jan - Jun) | | | 2026 (Jan - Jun) | | |
| Type | Real-Time Constrained | Corresponding Day-Ahead Constrained | Percent | Real-Time Constrained | Corresponding Day-Ahead Constrained | Percent |
| Flowgate | 2,453 | 930 | 37.9% | 3,831 | 1,334 | 34.8% |
| Interface | 349 | 159 | 45.6% | 596 | 279 | 46.8% |
| Line | 9,399 | 4,483 | 47.7% | 10,899 | 5,446 | 50.0% |
| Transformer | 966 | 376 | 38.9% | 1,575 | 846 | 53.7% |
| Other | 2,172 | 1,646 | 75.8% | 1,685 | 998 | 59.2% |
| Total | 15,339 | 7,594 | 49.5% | 18,586 | 8,903 | 47.9% |

## Congestion by Facility Type and Voltage

Table 11-28 shows congestion costs by facility voltage class in first six months of 2026. Congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 increased for all facility voltage classes except for 130kV and 115kV compared to the first six months of 2025.

### Table 11-28 Congestion summary (By facility voltage): January through June, 2026[30]

| CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | Event Hours | |
| Voltage (kV) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Congestion Costs | Day-Ahead | Real-Time |
| 765 | $1.6 | ($9.4) | $1.7 | $12.7 | $0.2 | $0.3 | ($0.2) | ($0.3) | $12.4 | 186 | 8 |
| 500 | $585.1 | ($1,427.5) | $7.3 | $2,020.0 | $11.7 | $174.2 | ($46.5) | ($209.0) | $1,810.9 | 3,714 | 2,371 |
| 345 | ($27.7) | ($327.2) | $17.2 | $316.6 | ($10.7) | $19.8 | ($40.4) | ($70.9) | $245.7 | 4,447 | 2,600 |
| 230 | $498.9 | ($603.2) | $8.6 | $1,110.8 | $80.1 | $78.5 | ($62.8) | ($61.2) | $1,049.6 | 11,812 | 5,657 |
| 161 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | 1 | 18 |
| 138 | ($1.8) | ($300.4) | $16.5 | $315.1 | ($10.5) | $7.5 | ($29.2) | ($47.2) | $267.9 | 11,928 | 5,952 |
| 130 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.9) | ($2.0) | ($1.6) | ($0.4) | ($0.4) | 0 | 175 |
| 115 | $34.8 | ($53.1) | $0.2 | $88.1 | $4.6 | ($0.0) | ($4.0) | $0.6 | $88.7 | 4,329 | 1,486 |
| 69 | ($1.4) | ($17.0) | $1.3 | $16.9 | ($0.3) | ($0.7) | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $16.9 | 1,948 | 275 |
| 45 | ($0.0) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | $0.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.2 | 6 | 0 |
| 13.8 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 25 | 0 |
| 1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.6) | ($0.2) | ($0.3) | ($0.7) | ($0.7) | 0 | 44 |
| Unclassified | $9.9 | ($38.6) | $0.1 | $48.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $48.6 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | $1,099.4 | ($2,776.8) | $52.9 | $3,929.0 | $73.5 | $277.3 | ($185.4) | ($389.3) | $3,539.7 | 38,396 | 18,586 |

30 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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## Table 11-29 Congestion summary (By facility voltage): January through June, 2025

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | Event Hours | |
| Voltage (kV) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Costs | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Costs | Total | Congestion Costs | Day-Ahead | Real-Time |
| 765 | $2.2 | ($11.8) | $1.7 | $15.7 | ($1.2) | $2.3 | ($3.9) | ($7.4) | $8.3 | 164 | 76 |
| 500 | $119.3 | ($243.7) | $14.6 | $377.7 | ($18.3) | $65.1 | ($43.0) | ($126.4) | $251.3 | 1,517 | 641 |
| 345 | ($8.1) | ($118.0) | $6.8 | $116.7 | ($5.9) | ($0.2) | ($13.0) | ($18.7) | $98.0 | 3,386 | 1,434 |
| 230 | $287.6 | ($314.8) | $28.9 | $631.4 | $22.4 | $17.9 | ($64.6) | ($60.1) | $571.3 | 12,069 | 4,064 |
| 161 | ($0.1) | ($0.4) | $0.0 | $0.4 | $0.0 | $0.2 | ($0.2) | ($0.5) | ($0.1) | 17 | 22 |
| 138 | $66.8 | ($160.6) | $20.8 | $248.2 | ($19.1) | $7.4 | ($32.5) | ($59.0) | $189.2 | 11,763 | 5,490 |
| 130 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0 | 0 |
| 115 | $21.4 | ($141.0) | $0.9 | $163.2 | $13.8 | $30.9 | ($2.5) | ($19.5) | $143.7 | 6,128 | 2,953 |
| 69 | $11.2 | $1.0 | $0.8 | $11.0 | ($4.5) | $0.5 | ($0.5) | ($5.4) | $5.6 | 2,348 | 377 |
| 45 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0 | 0 |
| 13.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | $0.2 | ($1.6) | $0.2 | $2.0 | ($2.6) | $2.2 | ($0.0) | ($4.9) | ($2.9) | 48 | 231 |
| Unclassified | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | $500.5 | ($991.0) | $74.7 | $1,566.3 | ($15.3) | $126.5 | ($160.2) | ($302.0) | $1,264.3 | 37,440 | 15,288 |

Day-ahead, congestion event hours decreased on interfaces and transformers and increased on flowgates and lines in the first six months of 2026. Congestion event hours on lines increased by 1,352 congestion event hours from 23,633 day-ahead, congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 24,985 day-ahead congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-30).

Real-time, congestion event hours increased on flowgates, interfaces, lines and transformers in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-31). Lines increased by 1,551 congestion event hours from 9,348 real-time, congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 10,899 real-time congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026.

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Table 11-30 provides congestion event hour subtotals and congestion cost subtotals comparing the first six months of 2026 results by facility type: line, transformer, interface, flowgate and unclassified facilities.[31] [32]

## Table 11-30 Congestion summary (By facility type): January through June, 2026[33]

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | Event Hours | |
| Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Congestion Costs | Day-Ahead | Real-Time |
| Flowgate | $14.1 | ($286.6) | $33.0 | $333.7 | ($21.4) | $6.0 | ($38.2) | ($65.6) | $268.1 | 6,910 | 3,831 |
| Interface | $207.8 | ($369.9) | ($3.7) | $574.0 | $2.6 | $72.5 | ($12.2) | ($82.0) | $492.0 | 846 | 596 |
| Line | $468.0 | ($981.0) | $19.0 | $1,468.0 | $77.3 | $98.4 | ($103.8) | ($124.9) | $1,343.1 | 24,985 | 10,899 |
| Transformer | $256.2 | ($743.7) | ($0.5) | $999.4 | $2.0 | $59.5 | ($17.7) | ($75.1) | $924.3 | 3,422 | 1,575 |
| Other | $143.4 | ($356.8) | $5.0 | $505.2 | $9.8 | $50.0 | ($13.7) | ($53.9) | $451.4 | 2,233 | 1,685 |
| Unclassified | $9.9 | ($38.6) | $0.1 | $48.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $48.6 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | $1,099.4 | ($2,776.8) | $52.9 | $3,929.0 | $70.4 | $286.3 | ($185.5) | ($401.5) | $3,527.6 | 38,396 | 18,586 |

## Table 11-31 Congestion summary (By facility type): January through June, 2025

| | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | Event Hours | |
| Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Congestion Costs | Day-Ahead | Real-Time |
| Flowgate | ($4.6) | ($183.9) | $19.4 | $198.8 | ($5.4) | $2.0 | ($12.7) | ($20.1) | $178.6 | 6,179 | 2,453 |
| Interface | $64.2 | ($152.4) | $12.0 | $228.6 | ($21.5) | $60.8 | ($32.5) | ($114.9) | $113.7 | 848 | 349 |
| Line | $313.9 | ($508.4) | $32.9 | $855.2 | $1.9 | $57.2 | ($98.7) | ($154.0) | $701.1 | 23,633 | 9,348 |
| Transformer | $54.9 | ($141.0) | $5.3 | $201.2 | ($4.3) | $0.3 | ($8.9) | ($13.5) | $187.7 | 3,605 | 966 |
| Other | $72.2 | ($5.4) | $5.0 | $82.5 | $14.1 | $6.2 | ($7.4) | $0.5 | $83.1 | 3,175 | 2,172 |
| Unclassified | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | $500.6 | ($991.0) | $74.7 | $1,566.3 | ($15.3) | $126.5 | ($160.2) | ($302.0) | $1,264.3 | 37,440 | 15,288 |

31 Unclassified are congestion costs related to nontransmission facility constraints in the day-ahead energy market and any unaccounted for difference between PJM billed CLMP charges and calculated congestion costs including rounding errors. Nontransmission facility constraints include day-ahead market only constraints such as constraints on virtual transactions and constraints associated with phase-angle regulators.

32 The term flowgate refers to MISO reciprocal coordinated flowgates and NYISO M2M flowgates.

33 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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## Constraint Frequency

Table 11-32 lists the constraints in the first six months of 2025 and 2026 that were most frequently binding and Table 11-33 shows the constraints which experienced the largest change in congestion event hours from the first six months of 2025 to the first six months of 2026. In Table 11-32, constraints are presented in descending order of total day-ahead event hours and real-time event hours in the first six months of 2026. In Table 11-33, the constraints are presented in descending order of absolute value of day-ahead event hour changes plus real-time event hour changes from the first six months of 2025 to the first six months of 2026.

### Table 11-32 Top 25 constraints: January through June, 2026[34]

| | | | (Jan - Jun) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Congestion Event Hours | | | | | | Percent of Annual Hours | | | | | |
| | | | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | |
| No. | Constraint | Type | 2025 | 2026 | Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change |
| 1 | East Towanda - Hillside | Line | 535 | 1,921 | 1,386 | 188 | 1,339 | 1,151 | 12.3% | 44% | 32% | 4% | 31% | 27% |
| 2 | Graceton - Manor | Line | 686 | 1,769 | 1,083 | 289 | 1,070 | 781 | 16% | 41% | 25% | 7% | 25% | 18% |
| 3 | Haumesser Road - Steward | Line | 733 | 1,918 | 1,185 | 425 | 918 | 493 | 17% | 44% | 27% | 10% | 21% | 11% |
| 4 | Chicago Ave - Praxair | Flowgate | 15 | 1,137 | 1,122 | 25 | 1,055 | 1,030 | 0% | 26% | 26% | 1% | 24% | 24% |
| 5 | Burnham - Munster | Flowgate | 0 | 1,561 | 1,561 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 36% | 36% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 6 | Kewanee | Other | 994 | 671 | (323) | 783 | 735 | (48) | 23% | 15% | (7%) | 18% | 17% | (1%) |
| 7 | Lenox - Macnew Tap | Line | 0 | 628 | 628 | 0 | 612 | 612 | 0% | 14% | 14% | 0% | 14% | 14% |
| 8 | Nottingham | Other | 2,058 | 619 | (1,439) | 1,306 | 493 | (813) | 47% | 14% | (33%) | 30% | 11% | (19%) |
| 9 | State Line - Roxana | Flowgate | 0 | 550 | 550 | 0 | 547 | 547 | 0% | 13% | 13% | 0% | 13% | 13% |
| 10 | Bedington | Transformer | 5 | 569 | 564 | 9 | 469 | 460 | 0% | 13% | 13% | 0% | 11% | 11% |
| 11 | Burnham - Munster | Line | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 921 | 921 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 21% | 21% |
| 12 | Pierce - Dearborn | Line | 0 | 437 | 437 | 0 | 350 | 350 | 0% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 8% | 8% |
| 13 | Conastone - Peach Bottom | Line | 11 | 497 | 486 | 11 | 249 | 238 | 0% | 11% | 11% | 0% | 6% | 5% |
| 14 | Everts Drive - South Troy | Line | 64 | 659 | 595 | 0 | 74 | 74 | 1% | 15% | 14% | 0% | 2% | 2% |
| 15 | Gardners - Texas Eastern | Line | 648 | 629 | (19) | 109 | 68 | (41) | 15% | 14% | (0%) | 3% | 2% | (1%) |
| 16 | Batesville - Hubble | Flowgate | 0 | 456 | 456 | 1 | 238 | 237 | 0% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 5% | 5% |
| 17 | Pruntytown | Transformer | 0 | 414 | 414 | 0 | 256 | 256 | 0% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 6% | 6% |
| 18 | Fremont - Fremont Center | Line | 150 | 533 | 383 | 37 | 132 | 95 | 3% | 12% | 9% | 1% | 3% | 2% |
| 19 | Cedar Grove - Clifton | Line | 329 | 568 | 239 | 17 | 91 | 74 | 8% | 13% | 6% | 0% | 2% | 2% |
| 20 | Bedington - Black Oak | Interface | 138 | 218 | 80 | 53 | 364 | 311 | 3% | 5% | 2% | 1% | 8% | 7% |
| 21 | Conastone - Northwest | Line | 282 | 346 | 64 | 109 | 201 | 92 | 6% | 8% | 1% | 3% | 5% | 2% |
| 22 | Niles - Evergreen | Line | 0 | 331 | 331 | 0 | 206 | 206 | 0% | 8% | 8% | 0% | 5% | 5% |
| 23 | Eldred - Sunbury | Line | 32 | 386 | 354 | 40 | 135 | 95 | 1% | 9% | 8% | 1% | 3% | 2% |
| 24 | Pleasant View - Ashburn | Line | 565 | 316 | (249) | 164 | 133 | (31) | 13% | 7% | (6%) | 4% | 3% | (1%) |
| 25 | Sugar Creek - Dresser | Flowgate | 49 | 249 | 200 | 55 | 189 | 134 | 1% | 6% | 5% | 1% | 4% | 3% |

34 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

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### Table 11-33 Top 25 constraints year to year change in occurrence: January through June, 2025 and 2026[35]

| | | | (Jan - Jun) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Congestion Event Hours | | | | | | Percent of Annual Hours | | | | | |
| | | | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | | Day-Ahead | | | Real-Time | | |
| No. | Constraint | Type | 2025 | 2026 | Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change | 2025 | 2026 | Change |
| 1 | Lenox - North Meshoppen | Line | 2,591 | 0 | (2,591) | 2,221 | 0 | (2,221) | 60% | 0% | (60%) | 51% | 0% | (51%) |
| 2 | East Towanda - Hillside | Line | 535 | 1,921 | 1,386 | 188 | 1,339 | 1,151 | 12% | 44% | 32% | 4% | 31% | 27% |
| 3 | Nottingham | Other | 2,058 | 619 | (1,439) | 1,306 | 493 | (813) | 47% | 14% | (33%) | 30% | 11% | (19%) |
| 4 | Chicago Ave - Praxair | Flowgate | 15 | 1,137 | 1,122 | 25 | 1,055 | 1,030 | 0% | 26% | 26% | 1% | 24% | 24% |
| 5 | Graceton - Manor | Line | 686 | 1,769 | 1,083 | 289 | 1,070 | 781 | 16% | 41% | 25% | 7% | 25% | 18% |
| 6 | Dune Acres - Michigan City | Flowgate | 1,789 | 0 | (1,789) | 31 | 0 | (31) | 41% | 0% | (41%) | 1% | 0% | (1%) |
| 7 | Haumesser Road - Steward | Line | 733 | 1,918 | 1,185 | 425 | 918 | 493 | 17% | 44% | 27% | 10% | 21% | 11% |
| 8 | Burnham - Munster | Flowgate | 0 | 1,561 | 1,561 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 36% | 36% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 9 | Jordan - West Frankfort | Flowgate | 798 | 70 | (728) | 614 | 26 | (588) | 18% | 2% | (17%) | 14% | 1% | (14%) |
| 10 | Lenox - Macnew Tap | Line | 0 | 628 | 628 | 0 | 612 | 612 | 0% | 14% | 14% | 0% | 14% | 14% |
| 11 | State Line - Roxana | Flowgate | 0 | 550 | 550 | 0 | 547 | 547 | 0% | 13% | 13% | 0% | 13% | 13% |
| 12 | Dune Acres - Michigan City | Line | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,060 | 0 | (1,060) | 0% | 0% | 0% | 24% | 0% | (24%) |
| 13 | Bedington | Transformer | 5 | 569 | 564 | 9 | 469 | 460 | 0% | 13% | 13% | 0% | 11% | 11% |
| 14 | Easton - East Muni | Line | 816 | 0 | (816) | 158 | 0 | (158) | 19% | 0% | (19%) | 4% | 0% | (4%) |
| 15 | Prest - Tibb | Flowgate | 471 | 40 | (431) | 495 | 0 | (495) | 11% | 1% | (10%) | 11% | 0% | (11%) |
| 16 | Burnham - Munster | Line | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 921 | 921 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 21% | 21% |
| 17 | Pierce - Dearborn | Line | 0 | 437 | 437 | 0 | 350 | 350 | 0% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 8% | 8% |
| 18 | Conastone - Peach Bottom | Line | 11 | 497 | 486 | 11 | 249 | 238 | 0% | 11% | 11% | 0% | 6% | 5% |
| 19 | Glendon - Hosensack | Line | 504 | 7 | (497) | 197 | 0 | (197) | 12% | 0% | (11%) | 5% | 0% | (5%) |
| 20 | Batesville - Hubble | Flowgate | 0 | 456 | 456 | 1 | 238 | 237 | 0% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 5% | 5% |
| 21 | Carlisle Pike - Gardners | Line | 619 | 50 | (569) | 154 | 51 | (103) | 14% | 1% | (13%) | 4% | 1% | (2%) |
| 22 | Pruntytown | Transformer | 0 | 414 | 414 | 0 | 256 | 256 | 0% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 6% | 6% |
| 23 | Everts Drive - South Troy | Line | 64 | 659 | 595 | 0 | 74 | 74 | 1% | 15% | 14% | 0% | 2% | 2% |
| 24 | DoeX530 | Transformer | 634 | 25 | (609) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15% | 1% | (14%) | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 25 | Chaparral - Carson | Line | 604 | 0 | (604) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14% | 0% | (14%) | 0% | 0% | 0% |

## Top Constraints

The top five constraints by congestion costs contributed $1,340.0 million, or 37.9 percent, of the total PJM congestion costs in the first six months of 2026. The top five constraints were the Bedington Transformer, the Pruntytown Transformer, the Bedington – Black Oak Interface, the Graceton – Manor Line, and the Pleasant View – Ashburn Line. Table 11-34 and Table 11-35 show the top constraints contributing to congestion costs by facility for the first six months of 2026 and 2025.

The Bedington Transformer was the largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 with $376.5 million and 10.6 percent of total PJM congestion costs. The day-ahead congestion event hours of the Bedington Transformer increased from 5 in the first six months of 2025 to 569 in the first six months of 2026 and the real-time congestion event hours of the Bedington Transformer increased from 9 in the first six months of 2025 to 469 in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-32).

35 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.


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The Pruntytown Transformer was the second largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 with $352.3 million and 10.0 percent of the total PJM congestion costs. The day-ahead congestion event hours of the Pruntytown Transformer increased from 0 in the first six months of 2025 to 414 in the first six months of 2026 and the real-time congestion event hours of the Pruntytown Transformer increased from 0 in the first six months of 2025 to 256 in first six months of 2026 (Table 11-32).

The Bedington – Black Oak Interface was the third largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 with $295.6 million and 8.4 percent of total PJM congestion costs. The day-ahead congestion event hours of the Bedington – Black Oak Interface increased from 138 in the first six months of 2025 to 218 in the first six months of 2026 and the real-time congestion event hours of the Bedington – Black Oak Interface increased from 53 in the first six months of 2025 to 364 in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-32).

The Graceton – Manor Line was the fourth largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 with $158.8 million and 4.5 percent of the total PJM congestion costs. The day-ahead congestion event hours of the Graceton – Manor Line increased from 686 in the first six months of 2025 to 1,769 in the first six months of 2026 and the real-time congestion event hours of the Graceton – Manor Line increased from 289 in the first six months of 2025 to 1,070 in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-32).

The Pleasant View - Ashburn Line was the fifth largest contributor to congestion costs in the first six months of 2026 with $156.9 million and 4.4 percent of the total PJM congestion costs. The day-ahead congestion event hours of the Pleasant View - Ashburn Line decreased from 565 in the first six months of 2025 to 316 in the first six months of 2026 and the real-time congestion event hours of the Pleasant View - Ashburn Line decreased from 164 in the first six months of 2025 to 133 in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-32).

The Pruntytown Circuit Breaker was the largest contributor to balancing congestion costs in the first six months of 2026. The constraint accounted for 9.0 percent of the total balancing congestion costs in the first six months of 2026.

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## Table 11-34 Top 25 constraints affecting congestion costs: January through June, 2026[36] [37]

| | | | | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| No. | Constraint | Type | Location | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Congestion Costs | Percent of Total PJM Congestion Costs |
| 1 | Bedington | Transformer | APS | $66.7 | ($334.5) | ($2.1) | $399.1 | ($2.4) | $21.7 | $1.6 | ($22.6) | $376.5 | 10.6% |
| 2 | Pruntytown | Transformer | APS | $120.8 | ($245.8) | ($2.2) | $364.4 | ($3.1) | $9.0 | ($0.1) | ($12.2) | $352.3 | 10.0% |
| 3 | Bedington - Black Oak | Interface | 500 | $121.9 | ($195.7) | $0.1 | $317.7 | ($3.9) | $16.6 | ($1.6) | ($22.1) | $295.6 | 8.4% |
| 4 | Graceton - Manor | Line | BGE | $160.1 | $3.0 | ($8.4) | $148.8 | $38.0 | $35.5 | $7.5 | $10.0 | $158.8 | 4.5% |
| 5 | Pleasant View - Ashburn | Line | DOM | $86.0 | ($83.4) | $4.2 | $173.6 | $21.2 | $15.6 | ($22.3) | ($16.7) | $156.9 | 4.4% |
| 6 | Loudoun | Other | DOM | $36.8 | ($116.0) | $2.2 | $155.0 | ($0.4) | ($0.4) | ($0.9) | ($0.9) | $154.1 | 4.4% |
| 7 | Pruntytown | Other | APS | $97.8 | ($88.3) | $2.5 | $188.6 | ($1.2) | $29.0 | ($5.1) | ($35.2) | $153.4 | 4.3% |
| 8 | Conastone - Northwest | Line | BGE | $80.3 | ($40.0) | ($4.1) | $116.2 | $4.6 | ($3.0) | $2.4 | $10.0 | $126.2 | 3.6% |
| 9 | Burnham - Munster | Flowgate | MISO | $20.8 | ($85.1) | $13.3 | $119.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $119.2 | 3.4% |
| 10 | AP South | Interface | 500 | $62.0 | ($45.2) | $2.5 | $109.6 | $10.3 | $5.3 | ($3.1) | $1.9 | $111.6 | 3.2% |
| 11 | Ashburn - Goose Creek | Line | DOM | $50.6 | ($69.5) | $1.5 | $121.6 | $12.1 | $12.1 | ($17.0) | ($17.1) | $104.5 | 3.0% |
| 12 | Eldred - Sunbury | Line | PPL | ($19.4) | ($106.6) | ($0.1) | $87.2 | ($11.5) | $1.6 | ($0.6) | ($13.7) | $73.5 | 2.1% |
| 13 | Ladysmith | Other | DOM | ($22.4) | ($102.3) | ($0.8) | $79.1 | $0.6 | $9.5 | ($3.9) | ($12.8) | $66.3 | 1.9% |
| 14 | Ox | Transformer | DOM | $23.5 | ($53.0) | $1.3 | $77.8 | $2.1 | $6.5 | ($7.9) | ($12.3) | $65.4 | 1.8% |
| 15 | East Towanda - Hillside | Line | PE | ($3.8) | ($54.9) | $2.0 | $53.1 | $11.5 | $12.3 | ($1.9) | ($2.6) | $50.4 | 1.4% |
| 16 | Unclassified | Unclassified | Unclassified | $9.9 | ($38.6) | $0.1 | $48.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $48.6 | 1.4% |
| 17 | Nottingham | Other | PECO | $40.7 | ($3.6) | $0.4 | $44.8 | $10.9 | $9.1 | ($1.4) | $0.4 | $45.3 | 1.3% |
| 18 | Clifton - Ox | Line | DOM | $1.6 | ($37.1) | $0.6 | $39.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $39.4 | 1.1% |
| 19 | Messick Road - Ridgeley | Line | APS | $1.4 | ($36.5) | $0.4 | $38.3 | $2.7 | $1.2 | ($0.5) | $1.1 | $39.4 | 1.1% |
| 20 | Hyatt - Marysville | Line | AEP | ($11.6) | ($52.0) | ($0.3) | $40.1 | ($0.6) | ($0.0) | ($0.8) | ($1.4) | $38.7 | 1.1% |
| 21 | BCPEP | Interface | PEPCO | $11.2 | ($29.7) | ($4.3) | $36.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $36.6 | 1.0% |
| 22 | Burnham - Munster | Line | COMED | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($14.9) | ($2.4) | ($22.2) | ($34.7) | ($34.7) | (1.0%) |
| 23 | Conastone - Peach Bottom | Line | 500 | $20.0 | ($14.9) | $2.9 | $37.9 | $3.2 | $5.8 | ($2.1) | ($4.6) | $33.3 | 0.9% |
| 24 | Juniata | Transformer | 500 | $5.0 | ($28.7) | ($0.5) | $33.2 | ($0.1) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $33.2 | 0.9% |
| 25 | Aquia Harbor - Cranes Corner | Line | DOM | ($7.1) | ($34.6) | ($0.2) | $27.4 | $1.8 | ($1.5) | $0.8 | $4.1 | $31.5 | 0.9% |
| | Top 25 Total | | | $952.8 | ($1,893.2) | $11.2 | $2,857.3 | $81.0 | $183.2 | ($79.0) | ($181.2) | $2,676.1 | 75.6% |
| | All Other Constraints | | | $146.6 | ($883.5) | $41.7 | $1,071.8 | ($7.5) | $94.1 | ($106.5) | ($208.1) | $863.6 | 24.4% |
| | Total | | | $1,099.4 | ($2,776.8) | $52.9 | $3,929.0 | $73.5 | $277.3 | ($185.4) | ($389.3) | $3,539.7 | 100.0% |

36 All flowgates are mapped to MISO as Location if they are flowgates coordinated by both PJM and MISO regardless of the location of the flowgates.
37 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.


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## Table 11-35 Top 25 constraints affecting congestion costs: January through June, 2025[38]

| | | | | CLMP Credits and Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| No. | Constraint | Type | Location | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Congestion Costs | Percent of Total PJM Congestion Costs |
| 1 | Pleasant View - Ashburn | Line | DOM | $87.9 | ($75.4) | $4.6 | $167.8 | $12.4 | $11.9 | ($25.0) | ($24.6) | $143.3 | 11.3% |
| 2 | Lenox - North Meshoppen | Line | PE | $2.6 | ($121.4) | $1.3 | $125.3 | $22.5 | $28.4 | ($2.7) | ($8.5) | $116.8 | 9.2% |
| 3 | Goose Creek | Transformer | DOM | $38.8 | ($55.5) | $1.5 | $95.8 | $0.6 | ($0.2) | ($1.2) | ($0.5) | $95.3 | 7.5% |
| 4 | Nottingham | Other | PECO | $71.0 | $0.1 | $4.4 | $75.3 | $12.4 | $3.8 | ($2.5) | $6.1 | $81.4 | 6.4% |
| 5 | AP South | Interface | 500 | $35.7 | ($46.2) | $4.0 | $85.8 | $0.7 | $4.1 | ($2.0) | ($5.4) | $80.4 | 6.4% |
| 6 | Dune Acres - Michigan City | Flowgate | MISO | $4.8 | ($61.1) | $9.2 | $75.2 | ($0.1) | $0.1 | ($0.3) | ($0.6) | $74.6 | 5.9% |
| 7 | Chaparral - Carson | Line | DOM | $7.1 | ($42.9) | $3.0 | $52.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $52.9 | 4.2% |
| 8 | Bedington - Black Oak | Interface | 500 | $12.7 | ($31.6) | $2.1 | $46.4 | ($0.6) | $1.9 | ($1.7) | ($4.1) | $42.3 | 3.3% |
| 9 | AEP - DOM | Interface | 500 | $20.0 | ($37.9) | $6.0 | $63.9 | ($21.7) | $54.9 | ($28.8) | ($105.3) | ($41.4) | (3.3%) |
| 10 | Bunsonville - Eugene | Flowgate | MISO | $0.5 | ($35.1) | $0.8 | $36.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $36.3 | 2.9% |
| 11 | Conastone - Northwest | Line | BGE | $10.7 | ($14.9) | $0.5 | $26.1 | $4.2 | ($7.7) | ($3.9) | $7.9 | $34.0 | 2.7% |
| 12 | Dickerson - Dickerson Station | Line | PEPCO | $26.9 | ($2.9) | $3.2 | $32.9 | $1.8 | $1.6 | ($1.1) | ($0.8) | $32.1 | 2.5% |
| 13 | Meridian - Twin Branch | Line | AEP | $1.0 | ($29.0) | $2.1 | $32.1 | ($2.2) | ($1.4) | ($1.9) | ($2.6) | $29.4 | 2.3% |
| 14 | Dune Acres - Michigan City | Line | MISO | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($10.7) | $1.4 | ($16.7) | ($28.8) | ($28.8) | (2.3%) |
| 15 | Beco - Paragon Park | Line | DOM | $11.5 | ($22.5) | $2.5 | $36.5 | $2.3 | $2.0 | ($12.6) | ($12.3) | $24.1 | 1.9% |
| 16 | Graceton - Manor | Line | BGE | $12.0 | ($9.2) | $0.6 | $21.7 | $1.8 | $1.4 | ($0.2) | $0.2 | $21.9 | 1.7% |
| 17 | Jordan - West Frankfort | Flowgate | MISO | ($2.9) | ($21.8) | $1.7 | $20.7 | $0.8 | $1.1 | ($1.2) | ($1.5) | $19.2 | 1.5% |
| 18 | BCPEP | Interface | PEPCO | $6.2 | ($12.3) | $0.1 | $18.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $18.6 | 1.5% |
| 19 | Harrowgate - Locks | Line | DOM | ($0.2) | ($18.6) | $1.1 | $19.5 | ($0.5) | $0.2 | ($0.9) | ($1.6) | $17.8 | 1.4% |
| 20 | Pleasant View | Transformer | DOM | $7.3 | ($12.7) | $0.8 | $20.9 | ($0.6) | $0.3 | ($2.3) | ($3.2) | $17.7 | 1.4% |
| 21 | Cool Spring - Milford | Line | DPL | $3.5 | ($14.0) | $0.2 | $17.7 | ($0.9) | ($0.2) | ($0.1) | ($0.8) | $16.9 | 1.3% |
| 22 | Joshua Falls | Transformer | AEP | $2.2 | ($10.3) | $1.5 | $14.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $14.0 | 1.1% |
| 23 | Idylwood - Clark | Line | DOM | $0.8 | ($11.3) | $0.6 | $12.7 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($0.2) | $0.1 | $12.8 | 1.0% |
| 24 | West | Interface | 500 | ($8.9) | ($21.8) | ($0.1) | $12.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $12.7 | 1.0% |
| 25 | Crete - St Johns Tap | Flowgate | MISO | $0.8 | ($8.1) | $3.1 | $12.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $12.1 | 1.0% |
| | Top 25 Total | | | $352.1 | ($716.5) | $54.5 | $1,123.1 | $22.2 | $103.3 | ($105.4) | ($186.5) | $936.5 | 74.1% |
| | All Other Constraints | | | $148.5 | ($274.5) | $20.2 | $443.2 | ($37.4) | $23.2 | ($54.8) | ($115.5) | $327.8 | 25.9% |
| | Total | | | $500.6 | ($991.0) | $74.7 | $1,566.3 | ($15.3) | $126.5 | ($160.2) | ($302.0) | $1,264.3 | 100.0% |

38 All flowgates are mapped to MISO as Location if they are flowgates coordinated by both PJM and MISO regardless of the location of the flowgates.

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Figure 11-4 shows the total hourly congestion costs of the top five constraints in the first six months of 2026. The Bedington Transformer was the top constraint.

### Figure 11-4 Top five constraints affecting total congestion costs: January through June, 2026[39]






Figure 11-5 shows the total hourly balancing congestion costs of the top five constraints in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 11-5 Top five constraints affecting balancing congestion costs: January through June, 2026[40]




39 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.


40 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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Figure 11-6 shows the total hourly day-ahead congestion costs of the top five constraints in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 11-6 Top five constraints affecting day-ahead congestion costs: January through June, 2026[41]





41 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

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Figure 11-7 shows the locations of the top 10 constraints by total congestion costs on a contour map of the real-time, load-weighted average CLMP in the first six months of 2026.

**Figure 11-7 Location of the top 10 constraints by total congestion costs: January through June, 2026**






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Figure 11-8 shows the locations of the top 10 constraints by balancing congestion costs on a contour map of the real-time load-weighted average CLMP in the first six months of 2026.


## Figure 11-8 Location of top 10 constraints by balancing congestion costs: January through June, 2026




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Figure 11-9 shows the locations of the top 10 constraints by day-ahead congestion costs on a contour map of the day-ahead load-weighted average CLMP in the first six months of 2026.

### Figure 11-9 Location of top 10 constraints by day-ahead congestion costs: January through June, 2026




Comparing Figure 11-8 (Location of the top 10 constraints by balancing congestion costs) and Figure 11-9 (Location of the top 10 constraints by day-ahead congestion costs) shows the significant differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets.


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
## Congestion Event Summary: Impact of Changes in UTC Volumes

UTCs have a significant impact on congestion events in the day-ahead market and, as a result, contribute to differences between day-ahead and real-time congestion events. The greater the volume of UTCs, the greater the number of congestion events in the day-ahead market and the greater the differences between the day-ahead and real-time congestion events.[42]

In the first six months of 2026, the average hourly cleared UTC MW decreased by 23.5 percent, compared to the first six months of 2025. Day-ahead congestion event hours increased by 2.6 percent from 37,440 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2025 to 38,396 congestion event hours in the first six months of 2026 (Table 11-26).

Figure 11-10 shows the daily day-ahead and real-time congestion event hours for January 2014 through June 2026.

Figure 11-10 Daily congestion event hours: January 2014 through June 2026




42 A series of FERC orders has affected UTC activity which has in turn affected congestion events in the day-ahead market. See Appendix F: Congestion and Marginal Losses.

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# Marginal Losses

## Marginal Loss Accounting

Marginal losses occur in the day-ahead and real-time energy markets. PJM calculates marginal loss costs for each PJM member. The loss cost is based on the applicable day-ahead and real-time marginal loss component of LMP (MLMP). Losses are the difference between what load (withdrawals) pay for energy and what generation (injections) are paid for energy, due to transmission line losses.

Losses increase with distance between sources and sinks and the amount of power moved. Total loss collected (loss surplus) increases with load, holding distance and resistance constant. Every incremental increase in load has to be met with a slightly larger increment of generation. The result is that the total energy losses increase as load increases.

Ignoring interchange, total generation MWh must be greater than total load MWh in any hour in order to provide for losses. Total marginal loss costs, analogous to total congestion costs, are equal to the net of the withdrawal loss charges minus injection loss credits, plus explicit loss charges, incurred in both the day-ahead energy market and the balancing energy market.

Total marginal loss costs can be more accurately thought of as net marginal loss costs. Total marginal loss costs equal implicit marginal loss charges plus explicit marginal loss charges plus net inadvertent loss charges. Implicit marginal loss charges equal withdrawal loss charges minus injection loss credits. Net explicit marginal loss costs are the net marginal loss costs associated with point to point energy transactions. Net inadvertent loss charges are the losses associated with the hourly difference between the net actual energy flow and the net scheduled energy flow into or out of the PJM control area.[43] Unlike the other categories of marginal loss accounting, inadvertent loss charges are costs not directly attributable to specific participants. Inadvertent loss charges are assigned to participants based on real-time load (excluding losses) ratio share.[44] Each of these categories of marginal loss costs is comprised of day-ahead and balancing marginal loss costs.

43 PJM Operating Agreement Schedule 1 §3.7.
44 *Id.*

The accounting definitions can be misleading. Load pays losses. Losses are the difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy due to losses. Generation does not pay losses. Some generation receives a price lower than SMP and some generation receives a price greater than SMP due to the MLMP but that does not mean that generation is paying or being paid losses. It means that generation is being paid an LMP that is higher or lower than the system load-weighted, average LMP due to losses on the system.

While PJM accounting focuses on MLMPs, the individual MLMP values at any bus are irrelevant to the calculation of total losses. Total losses are the net surplus revenue that remains after all sources and sinks are credited or charged their LMPs. Changing the components of LMP by electing a different reference bus does not change the LMPs or the difference between LMPs for a given market solution or losses, it merely changes the components of the LMP.

The MLMP component of LMP is the marginal cost of energy, due to losses associated with serving load at the bus. The MLMP at the load-weighted reference bus is the marginal cost of energy at the load-weighted reference bus (holding the proportion of load at every bus constant). Due to losses, MLMP is non zero at the load reference bus. The LMP at the load reference bus is the system marginal price of energy (SMP) plus the marginal cost of energy due to losses at the reference bus.

Load-weighted LMP components are calculated relative to a load-weighted, average LMP. LMPs at specific load buses will reflect the fact that marginal generators must produce more (or less) energy due to losses to serve that bus than is needed to serve the load-weighted reference bus. The LMP at any bus is a function of the SMP, losses and congestion. Relative to the system marginal price (SMP) at the load-weighted reference bus, the loss factor can be either positive or negative.

At the load-weighted reference bus, the LMP includes no congestion component, but does include a loss component. The load-weighted average MLMP across all load buses, calculated relative to that reference bus is positive. The LMPs at the load buses are a function of marginal generation bus LMPs determined


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through the least cost security constrained economic dispatch which accounts for transmission constraints and marginal losses.

Other than the effect on the optimal dispatch point, LMP at the marginal generator bus, and therefore the payment to the generator, is not affected by marginal losses. By paying for losses based on marginal instead of average losses at the load bus, a revenue over collection occurs.

The residual difference between total marginal loss related load charges (day-ahead and balancing) and marginal loss related generation credits (day-ahead and balancing) after virtual bids have settled their marginal loss related credits and charges for their day-ahead and balancing positions is total loss. That is, losses are the difference between what withdrawals (load) are paying for energy and what injections (generation) are being paid for energy due to losses, after virtual bids marginal loss related charges and credits are settled at the end of the market day. Load is the source of the net loss surplus after generation is paid and virtuals are settled at the end of the market day. Load pays losses. Generation does not pay losses.

Day-ahead marginal loss costs are based on day-ahead MWh priced at the marginal loss price component of LMP. Balancing marginal loss costs are based on the load or generation deviations between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets priced at the marginal loss price component of LMP in the real-time energy market. If a participant has real-time generation or load that is greater than its day-ahead generation or load then the deviation will be positive. If there is a positive load deviation at a bus where the real-time LMP has a positive marginal loss component, positive balancing marginal loss costs will result. Similarly, if there is a positive load deviation at a bus where real-time LMP has a negative marginal loss component, negative balancing marginal loss costs will result. If a participant has real-time generation or load that is less than its day-ahead generation or load then the deviation will be negative. If there is a negative load deviation at a bus where real-time LMP has a positive marginal loss component, negative balancing marginal loss costs will result. Similarly, if there is a negative load deviation at a bus where real-time LMP has a negative marginal loss component, positive balancing marginal loss costs will result.

The total marginal loss surplus is the remaining loss amount from collection of marginal losses, after accounting for total system energy costs and net residual market adjustments. The marginal loss surplus is allocated to PJM market participants based on real-time load plus export ratio share as marginal loss credits.[45]

## Day-Ahead Implicit Load MLMP Charges

- **Day-Ahead Implicit Load MLMP Charges.** Day-ahead implicit load MLMP charges are calculated for all cleared demand, decrement bids and day-ahead energy market sale transactions. Day-ahead implicit load MLMP charges are calculated using MW and the load bus MLMP, the decrement bid MLMP or the MLMP at the source of the sale transaction.
- **Day-Ahead Implicit Generation MLMP Credits.** Day-ahead implicit generation MLMP credits are calculated for all cleared generation and increment offers and day-ahead energy market purchase transactions. Day-ahead implicit generation MLMP credits are calculated using MW and the generator bus MLMP, the increment offer MLMP or the MLMP at the sink of the purchase transaction.
- **Balancing Implicit Load MLMP Charges.** Balancing implicit load MLMP charges are calculated for all deviations between a PJM member's real-time load and energy sale transactions and their day-ahead cleared demand, decrement bids and energy sale transactions. Balancing implicit load MLMP charges are calculated using MW deviations and the real-time MLMP for each bus where a deviation exists.
- **Balancing Implicit Generation MLMP Credits.** Balancing implicit Generation MLMP credits are calculated for all deviations between a PJM member's real-time generation and energy purchase transactions and the day-ahead cleared generation, increment offers and energy purchase transactions. Balancing implicit Generation MLMP credits are calculated using MW deviations and the real-time MLMP for each bus where a deviation exists.
- **Explicit Loss Charges.** Explicit loss charges are the net loss costs associated with point to point energy transactions, including UTCs. These costs equal the product of the transacted MW and MLMP differences between

45 See PJM. "Manual 28: Operating Agreement Accounting," Rev. 98 (December 17, 2024).

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sources (origins) and sinks (destinations) in the day-ahead energy market. Balancing energy market explicit loss costs equal the product of the differences between the real-time and day-ahead transacted MW and the differences between the real-time MLMP at the transactions' sources and sinks.

- **Inadvertent Loss Charges.** Inadvertent loss charges are the net loss charges resulting from the differences between the net actual energy flow and the net scheduled energy flow into or out of the PJM control area each hour. This inadvertent interchange of energy may be positive or negative, where positive interchange typically results in a charge while negative interchange typically results in a credit. Inadvertent loss charges are common costs, not directly attributable to specific participants, which are distributed on a load plus export ratio basis.[46]

## Total Marginal Loss Cost

Total marginal loss is the difference between what withdrawals (load) pay for energy and what injections (generation) are paid for energy due to losses, after generation is paid and virtuals' marginal loss related charges and credits are settled. Load pays losses.

The total marginal loss cost in PJM for the first six months of 2026 was $1,217.2 million, which was comprised of implicit withdrawal MLMP charges of $53.0 million minus implicit injection MLMP credits of -$1,173.1 million plus explicit loss charges of -$8.9 million plus inadvertent loss charges of $0.0 million (Table 11-36).

Monthly marginal loss costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from $94.3 million in March to $517.4 million in January. Total marginal loss surplus increased in the first six months of 2026 by $194.2 million or 74.1 percent from $262.0 million in the first six months of 2025 to $456.2 million in the first six months of 2026.


Total marginal loss is the difference between what withdrawals (load) pay for energy and what injections (generation) are paid for energy due to losses, after generation is paid and virtuals' marginal loss related charges and credits are settled. Load pays losses. Figure 11- shows the contour map of the day-ahead, load-weighted average MLMP in the first six months of 2026.

46 PJM Operating Agreement Schedule 1 §3.7.



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
Figure 11-11 Contour map of the day-ahead, load-weighted average MLMP: January through June, 2026




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Total marginal loss is the difference between what withdrawals (load) pay for energy and what injections (generation) are paid for energy due to losses, after generation is paid and virtuals' marginal loss related charges and credits are settled. Load pays losses. Figure 12 shows the contour map of the real-time, load-weighted average MLMP in the first six months of 2026.

Figure 11-12 Contour map of the real-time, load-weighted average MLMP: January through June, 2026





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Table 11-36 shows PJM total marginal loss costs by accounting category for the first six months of 2008 through 2026. Table 11-37 shows PJM total marginal loss costs by accounting category by market for the first six months of 2008 through 2026.

### Table 11-36 Total marginal loss costs by accounting category (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026

| | Marginal Loss Costs (Millions) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Jan - Jun) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Inadvertent Charges | Total |
| 2008 | ($130.8) | ($1,349.6) | $52.4 | $0.0 | $1,271.2 |
| 2009 | ($42.2) | ($726.4) | $20.7 | $0.0 | $704.8 |
| 2010 | ($15.7) | ($750.5) | $16.2 | ($0.0) | $750.9 |
| 2011 | ($70.6) | ($755.3) | $16.8 | $0.0 | $701.5 |
| 2012 | ($17.9) | ($473.4) | ($10.6) | $0.0 | $444.9 |
| 2013 | $8.6 | ($512.4) | ($26.6) | ($0.0) | $494.5 |
| 2014 | ($35.7) | ($1,083.3) | ($41.4) | $0.0 | $1,006.2 |
| 2015 | ($15.4) | ($635.5) | ($11.9) | $0.0 | $608.3 |
| 2016 | ($19.5) | ($338.7) | ($13.4) | $0.0 | $305.8 |
| 2017 | ($24.9) | ($363.5) | ($17.9) | $0.0 | $320.6 |
| 2018 | ($22.9) | ($550.3) | ($6.0) | $0.0 | $521.4 |
| 2019 | ($22.9) | ($354.6) | ($6.6) | $0.0 | $325.0 |
| 2020 | ($18.5) | ($219.3) | ($7.3) | $0.0 | $193.4 |
| 2021 | ($4.8) | ($384.1) | ($3.4) | $0.0 | $375.9 |
| 2022 | $67.0 | ($768.3) | ($17.3) | ($0.0) | $817.9 |
| 2023 | ($2.6) | ($356.6) | ($3.7) | ($0.0) | $350.3 |
| 2024 | $23.0 | ($390.3) | ($3.7) | $0.0 | $409.5 |
| 2025 | $69.7 | ($652.9) | ($6.3) | ($0.0) | $716.2 |
| 2026 | $53.0 | ($1,173.1) | ($8.9) | $0.0 | $1,217.2 |

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## Table 11-37 Total marginal loss costs by market (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026

| | Marginal Loss Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| (Jan - Jun) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| 2008 | ($64.9) | ($1,299.8) | $64.3 | $1,299.2 | ($65.9) | ($49.8) | ($11.9) | ($28.0) | $0.0 | $1,271.2 |
| 2009 | ($43.8) | ($723.3) | $44.6 | $724.1 | $1.5 | ($3.1) | ($23.9) | ($19.3) | $0.0 | $704.8 |
| 2010 | ($27.2) | ($751.6) | $33.5 | $757.9 | $11.4 | $1.2 | ($17.3) | ($7.0) | ($0.0) | $750.9 |
| 2011 | ($90.4) | ($774.1) | $44.3 | $728.1 | $19.8 | $18.8 | ($27.5) | ($26.6) | $0.0 | $701.5 |
| 2012 | ($30.4) | ($481.4) | $15.5 | $466.5 | $12.5 | $8.0 | ($26.1) | ($21.6) | $0.0 | $444.9 |
| 2013 | ($7.2) | ($528.2) | $25.0 | $546.0 | $15.9 | $15.8 | ($51.6) | ($51.6) | ($0.0) | $494.5 |
| 2014 | ($75.4) | ($1,118.8) | $51.6 | $1,095.0 | $39.7 | $35.6 | ($93.0) | ($88.8) | $0.0 | $1,006.2 |
| 2015 | ($33.2) | ($643.0) | $15.6 | $625.4 | $17.8 | $7.4 | ($27.5) | ($17.1) | $0.0 | $608.3 |
| 2016 | ($23.3) | ($339.8) | $18.9 | $335.4 | $3.9 | $1.1 | ($32.4) | ($29.5) | $0.0 | $305.8 |
| 2017 | ($29.6) | ($364.1) | $30.2 | $364.7 | $4.6 | $0.6 | ($48.1) | ($44.0) | $0.0 | $320.6 |
| 2018 | ($26.3) | ($543.9) | $16.7 | $534.4 | $3.4 | ($6.3) | ($22.7) | ($12.9) | $0.0 | $521.4 |
| 2019 | ($23.1) | ($352.1) | $22.7 | $351.7 | $0.1 | ($2.5) | ($29.3) | ($26.7) | $0.0 | $325.0 |
| 2020 | ($19.0) | ($219.8) | $18.6 | $219.4 | $0.5 | $0.5 | ($26.0) | ($25.9) | $0.0 | $193.4 |
| 2021 | ($4.5) | ($382.4) | $16.5 | $394.4 | ($0.3) | ($1.7) | ($19.8) | ($18.4) | $0.0 | $375.9 |
| 2022 | $74.5 | ($763.4) | $34.9 | $872.8 | ($7.4) | ($4.9) | ($52.3) | ($54.9) | ($0.0) | $817.9 |
| 2023 | ($0.9) | ($353.4) | $37.8 | $390.2 | ($1.7) | ($3.3) | ($41.5) | ($39.9) | ($0.0) | $350.3 |
| 2024 | $23.9 | ($387.5) | $30.8 | $442.2 | ($1.0) | ($2.8) | ($34.5) | ($32.6) | $0.0 | $409.5 |
| 2025 | $73.6 | ($647.2) | $33.2 | $754.0 | ($3.9) | ($5.7) | ($39.5) | ($37.8) | ($0.0) | $716.2 |
| 2026 | $56.5 | ($1,162.3) | $25.6 | $1,244.4 | ($3.4) | ($10.8) | ($34.5) | ($27.2) | $0.0 | $1,217.2 |


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Table 11-38 and Table 11-39 show PJM accounting based total loss costs for each transaction type in the first six months of 2026 and 2025.

Virtual transaction loss costs, when positive, measure the total loss costs to virtual transactions and when negative, measure the total loss credits to virtual transactions. In the first six months of 2026, DECs were paid $4.8 million in MLMP credits in the day-ahead market, paid $6.0 million in MLMP in the balancing energy market and paid $1.2 million in total MLMP charges. In the first six months of 2026, INCs paid $46.1 million in MLMP charges in the day-ahead market, were paid $45.2 million in MLMP credits in the balancing energy market and paid $0.8 million in total MLMP credits. In the first six months of 2026, up to congestion paid $27.7 million in MLMP charges in the day-ahead market, were paid $32.9 million in MLMP credits in the balancing energy market and received $5.1 million in total MLMP credits.

### Table 11-38 Total loss costs by transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | Marginal Loss Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| DEC | ($4.8) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($4.8) | $6.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $6.0 | $0.0 | $1.2 |
| Demand | ($1.8) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.8) | $14.9 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $14.9 | $0.0 | $13.1 |
| Demand Response | $0.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.8 | ($0.7) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.7) | $0.0 | $0.1 |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($2.1) | ($2.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($2.2) |
| Export | ($16.0) | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($16.2) | ($17.8) | $0.0 | ($1.2) | ($19.0) | $0.0 | ($35.2) |
| Generation | $0.0 | ($1,184.4) | $0.0 | $1,184.4 | $0.0 | ($13.4) | $0.0 | $13.4 | $0.0 | $1,197.9 |
| Import | $0.0 | ($10.2) | $0.0 | $10.2 | $0.0 | ($37.0) | $0.0 | $37.0 | $0.0 | $47.1 |
| INC | $0.0 | ($46.1) | $0.0 | $46.1 | $0.0 | $45.2 | $0.0 | ($45.2) | $0.0 | $0.8 |
| Internal Bilateral | $78.2 | $78.4 | $0.2 | ($0.0) | ($5.7) | ($5.6) | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($0.1) |
| Up to Congestion | $0.0 | $0.0 | $27.7 | $27.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($32.9) | ($32.9) | $0.0 | ($5.1) |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.4) | ($0.4) | $0.0 | ($0.4) |
| Total | $56.5 | ($1,162.3) | $25.6 | $1,244.4 | ($3.4) | ($10.8) | ($34.5) | ($27.2) | $0.0 | $1,217.2 |

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### Table 11-39 Total loss costs by transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2025

| | Marginal Loss Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| DEC | ($2.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($2.0) | $4.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $4.4 | $0.0 | $2.4 |
| Demand | $44.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $44.1 | $7.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $7.8 | $0.0 | $51.9 |
| Demand Response | $0.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.3 | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.3) | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1.5) | ($1.5) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($1.5) |
| Export | ($16.0) | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($16.2) | ($12.0) | $0.0 | ($0.5) | ($12.6) | $0.0 | ($28.8) |
| Generation | $0.0 | ($667.2) | $0.0 | $667.2 | $0.0 | ($16.2) | $0.0 | $16.2 | $0.0 | $683.3 |
| Import | $0.0 | ($2.0) | $0.0 | $2.0 | $0.0 | ($15.5) | $0.0 | $15.5 | $0.0 | $17.6 |
| INC | $0.0 | ($25.7) | $0.0 | $25.7 | $0.0 | $29.8 | $0.0 | ($29.8) | $0.0 | ($4.1) |
| Internal Bilateral | $47.2 | $47.7 | $0.5 | $0.0 | ($3.8) | ($3.7) | $0.0 | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($0.1) |
| Up to Congestion | $0.0 | $0.0 | $34.5 | $34.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($38.7) | ($38.7) | $0.0 | ($4.2) |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.2) | ($0.2) | $0.0 | ($0.3) |
| Total | $73.6 | ($647.2) | $33.2 | $754.0 | ($3.9) | ($5.7) | ($39.5) | ($37.8) | $0.0 | $716.2 |

Table 11-40 compares MLMP credits and charges for each transaction type between the dispatch run and pricing run in the first six months of 2026. Total MLMP charges to generation decreased by $46.5 million, and total MLMP charges to demand increased by $1.3 million from the dispatch run to the pricing run. The total MLMP charges to DECs increased by $0.6 million, the total MLMP credits to INCs decreased by $4.2 million and the total CLMP credits to UTCs decreased by $2.8 million from the dispatch run to the pricing run.

### Table 11-40 Total loss costs by dispatch and pricing run (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | Marginal Loss Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dispatch Run | | | Pricing Run | | | Difference | | |
| Transaction Type | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total |
| DEC | ($5.0) | $5.6 | $0.6 | ($4.8) | $6.0 | $1.2 | $0.2 | $0.4 | $0.6 |
| Demand | ($1.7) | $13.6 | $11.8 | ($1.8) | $14.9 | $13.1 | ($0.0) | $1.3 | $1.3 |
| Demand Response | $0.9 | ($0.6) | $0.2 | $0.8 | ($0.7) | $0.1 | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | ($0.1) |
| Explicit Congestion and Loss Only | ($2.1) | ($0.1) | ($2.2) | ($2.1) | ($0.1) | ($2.2) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) |
| Export | ($17.3) | ($17.6) | ($34.8) | ($16.2) | ($19.0) | ($35.2) | $1.1 | ($1.4) | ($0.4) |
| Generation | $1,231.4 | $12.9 | $1,244.3 | $1,184.4 | $13.4 | $1,197.9 | ($47.0) | $0.5 | ($46.5) |
| Import | $10.3 | $34.0 | $44.3 | $10.2 | $37.0 | $47.1 | ($0.1) | $3.0 | $2.9 |
| INC | $46.9 | ($41.8) | $5.0 | $46.1 | ($45.2) | $0.8 | ($0.8) | ($3.4) | ($4.2) |
| Internal Bilateral | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | ($0.1) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) |
| Up to Congestion | $28.1 | ($30.5) | ($2.4) | $27.7 | ($32.9) | ($5.1) | ($0.4) | ($2.4) | ($2.8) |
| Wheel In | ($0.0) | ($0.4) | ($0.4) | ($0.0) | ($0.4) | ($0.4) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) |
| Total | $1,291.5 | ($25.1) | $1,266.4 | $1,244.4 | ($27.2) | $1,217.2 | ($47.1) | ($2.1) | ($49.2) |


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## Monthly Marginal Loss Costs


Table 11-41 shows a monthly summary of marginal loss costs by market type for January 2025 through June 2026.

### Table 11-41 Monthly marginal loss costs (Millions): January 2025 through June 2026

| | Marginal Loss Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | | | | 2026 | | | |
| | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Inadvertent Charges | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Inadvertent Charges | Total |
| Jan | $233.1 | ($10.4) | ($0.0) | $222.8 | $521.8 | ($4.4) | $0.0 | $517.4 |
| Feb | $121.0 | ($5.1) | ($0.0) | $115.9 | $258.2 | ($9.9) | $0.0 | $248.3 |
| Mar | $95.6 | ($5.4) | ($0.0) | $90.2 | $99.0 | ($4.7) | $0.0 | $94.3 |
| Apr | $81.1 | ($2.4) | ($0.0) | $78.7 | $100.1 | ($3.7) | $0.0 | $96.4 |
| May | $79.3 | ($4.4) | ($0.0) | $74.9 | $113.1 | ($2.3) | $0.0 | $110.9 |
| Jun | $143.9 | ($10.2) | ($0.0) | $133.7 | $152.1 | ($2.2) | ($0.0) | $149.9 |
| Jul | $204.2 | ($7.6) | ($0.0) | $196.6 | | | | |
| Aug | $99.4 | ($3.6) | $0.0 | $95.9 | | | | |
| Sep | $91.9 | ($5.0) | ($0.0) | $86.8 | | | | |
| Oct | $114.9 | ($3.4) | ($0.0) | $111.5 | | | | |
| Nov | $120.5 | ($4.4) | ($0.0) | $116.1 | | | | |
| Dec | $187.0 | ($6.8) | ($0.0) | $180.2 | | | | |
| Total | $1,571.9 | ($68.6) | ($0.0) | $1,503.3 | $1,244.4 | ($27.2) | $0.0 | $1,217.2 |

Figure 11-13 shows PJM monthly marginal loss costs for January 2008 through June 2026.

### Figure 11-13 Monthly marginal loss cost (Dollars (Millions)): January 2008 through June 2026




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Table 11-42 shows the monthly total loss charges for each virtual transaction type for January 2025 through June 2026. In the first six months of 2026, 165.0 percent of the total credits to virtuals went to UTCs, compared to 71.0 percent in the first six months of 2025.

### Table 11-42 Monthly loss charges by virtual transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Marginal Loss Charges (Millions) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | DEC | | | INC | | | Up to Congestion | | | |
| Year | | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Grand Total |
| 2025 | Jan | ($0.1) | $1.1 | $1.0 | $6.3 | ($7.6) | ($1.3) | $9.4 | ($9.9) | ($0.5) | ($0.8) |
| | Feb | ($0.4) | $0.4 | ($0.0) | $3.6 | ($4.8) | ($1.1) | $5.5 | ($7.0) | ($1.6) | ($2.7) |
| | Mar | ($0.4) | $0.8 | $0.3 | $5.1 | ($5.7) | ($0.5) | $4.5 | ($4.9) | ($0.5) | ($0.7) |
| | Apr | ($0.8) | $0.8 | ($0.0) | $4.5 | ($4.5) | ($0.0) | $3.3 | ($3.6) | ($0.3) | ($0.3) |
| | May | $0.2 | $0.1 | $0.3 | $3.4 | ($3.5) | ($0.1) | $4.4 | ($3.9) | $0.4 | $0.6 |
| | Jun | ($0.4) | $1.2 | $0.8 | $2.7 | ($3.7) | ($1.0) | $7.5 | ($9.3) | ($1.7) | ($1.9) |
| | Jul | ($2.2) | $2.7 | $0.5 | $3.7 | ($3.7) | ($0.0) | $6.2 | ($7.2) | ($1.0) | ($0.5) |
| | Aug | ($1.5) | $1.6 | $0.2 | $2.1 | ($2.0) | $0.1 | $3.2 | ($3.9) | ($0.7) | ($0.5) |
| | Sep | ($1.0) | $1.2 | $0.3 | $2.5 | ($2.5) | $0.0 | $4.5 | ($5.3) | ($0.7) | ($0.5) |
| | Oct | ($1.5) | $1.7 | $0.2 | $5.9 | ($5.9) | ($0.1) | $4.5 | ($5.0) | ($0.5) | ($0.3) |
| | Nov | ($1.6) | $1.6 | $0.1 | $7.2 | ($6.4) | $0.8 | $7.4 | ($7.3) | $0.1 | $1.0 |
| | Dec | $1.0 | ($0.9) | $0.0 | $6.7 | ($6.7) | $0.1 | $7.9 | ($8.7) | ($0.8) | ($0.7) |
| | Total | ($8.7) | $12.4 | $3.7 | $53.8 | ($57.0) | ($3.2) | $68.3 | ($76.1) | ($7.8) | ($7.3) |
| 2026 | Jan | ($4.1) | $2.7 | ($1.4) | $16.9 | ($13.1) | $3.8 | $6.6 | ($8.3) | ($1.7) | $0.7 |
| | Feb | $1.3 | ($1.1) | $0.2 | $12.2 | ($13.8) | ($1.6) | $4.9 | ($5.5) | ($0.5) | ($2.0) |
| | Mar | ($0.2) | $0.4 | $0.2 | $3.9 | ($4.6) | ($0.7) | $4.1 | ($5.1) | ($1.0) | ($1.5) |
| | Apr | ($0.1) | $1.0 | $0.9 | $5.3 | ($5.3) | ($0.0) | $3.8 | ($4.0) | ($0.2) | $0.7 |
| | May | ($0.4) | $0.7 | $0.4 | $4.1 | ($4.4) | ($0.3) | $3.8 | ($4.5) | ($0.7) | ($0.7) |
| | Jun | ($1.2) | $2.2 | $1.0 | $3.6 | ($3.9) | ($0.3) | $4.5 | ($5.5) | ($1.0) | ($0.3) |
| | Total | ($3.1) | $2.0 | ($1.1) | $33.1 | ($31.5) | $1.5 | $15.7 | ($18.9) | ($3.2) | ($2.8) |

## Marginal Loss Costs and Loss Credits

Total marginal loss surplus is calculated by adding the total system energy costs (which are negative), the total marginal loss costs (which are positive) and net residual market adjustments (which can be net positive or negative). The total system energy costs are equal to the net implicit energy charges (implicit withdrawal charges minus implicit injection credits) plus net inadvertent energy charges. Total marginal loss costs are equal to the net implicit marginal loss charges (implicit load MLMP charges less implicit generation MLMP credits) plus net explicit loss charges plus net inadvertent loss charges.

Ignoring interchange, total generation MWh must be greater than total load MWh in any hour in order to provide for losses. Since the hourly integrated energy component of LMP is the same for every bus within every hour, the net energy bill is negative (ignoring net interchange), with more injection credits than withdrawal charges in every hour. The greater the level of load the greater the difference between energy charges collected from load (SMP x load MW) and credited to generation (SMP x generation MW). Total system energy costs plus total marginal loss costs plus net residual market adjustments equal marginal loss credits which are distributed to the PJM market participants according to the ratio of their real-time load plus their real-time exports to total PJM real-time load plus real-time exports as marginal loss credits. The net residual market adjustment is calculated as known day-ahead error value minus day-ahead loss MW congestion value and minus balancing loss MW congestion value.


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Table 11-43 shows the total system energy costs, the total marginal loss costs collected, the net residual market adjustments and total marginal loss surplus redistributed for the first six months of 2008 through 2026. The total marginal loss surplus increased by $165.2 million or 105.1 percent in the first six months of 2026 from the first six months of 2025.

### Table 11-43 Marginal loss surplus (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026[47]

| | Marginal Loss Surplus (Millions) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | System Energy Cost | Marginal Loss Costs | Net Residual Market Adjustments | | | Total Marginal Loss Surplus |
| (Jan - Jun) | | | Known Day-Ahead Error | Day-Ahead Loss MW Congestion | Balancing Loss MW Congestion | |
| 2008 | ($610.2) | $1,271.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $661.0 |
| 2009 | ($343.6) | $704.8 | ($0.0) | ($0.4) | ($0.1) | $361.7 |
| 2010 | ($372.8) | $750.9 | $0.0 | ($1.2) | ($0.0) | $379.4 |
| 2011 | ($393.9) | $701.5 | $0.0 | $0.6 | ($0.0) | $306.9 |
| 2012 | ($262.0) | $444.9 | ($0.0) | ($0.9) | $0.0 | $183.7 |
| 2013 | ($332.6) | $494.5 | $0.1 | $0.8 | $0.0 | $161.1 |
| 2014 | ($677.2) | $1,006.2 | $0.0 | $3.9 | $0.0 | $325.1 |
| 2015 | ($397.6) | $608.3 | ($0.3) | $3.7 | $0.0 | $206.6 |
| 2016 | ($204.2) | $305.8 | $0.0 | $1.3 | $0.0 | $100.4 |
| 2017 | ($222.2) | $320.6 | $0.0 | $0.3 | $0.0 | $98.2 |
| 2018 | ($345.2) | $521.4 | ($0.0) | $1.3 | ($0.0) | $175.0 |
| 2019 | ($218.9) | $325.0 | ($0.0) | $0.7 | ($0.0) | $105.4 |
| 2020 | ($133.9) | $193.4 | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | ($0.0) | $59.7 |
| 2021 | ($240.5) | $375.9 | ($0.0) | $1.3 | ($0.0) | $134.2 |
| 2022 | ($551.8) | $817.9 | ($0.0) | $4.3 | ($0.1) | $262.0 |
| 2023 | ($233.8) | $350.3 | ($0.0) | ($0.1) | ($0.2) | $116.8 |
| 2024 | ($264.9) | $409.5 | $0.0 | $0.4 | ($0.1) | $144.3 |
| 2025 | ($453.0) | $716.2 | $0.0 | $1.5 | ($0.2) | $262.0 |
| 2026 | ($762.9) | $1,217.2 | ($0.1) | ($1.7) | ($0.3) | $456.2 |

47 The net residual market adjustments included in the table are comprised of the known day-ahead error value minus the sum of the day-ahead loss MW congestion value, balancing loss MW congestion value and measurement error caused by missing data.

# System Energy Costs

## Energy Accounting

The system energy component of LMP is the system reference bus LMP, also called the system marginal price (SMP). The system energy cost is based on the day-ahead and real-time energy components of LMP. Total system energy costs, analogous to total congestion costs and total loss costs, are equal to the withdrawal energy charges to load minus injection energy credits to generators, in both the day-ahead energy market and the balancing energy market, plus net inadvertent energy charges. Total system energy costs can be more accurately thought of as net system energy costs. Due to line losses associated with moving energy from generation to load, more energy is injected by generation than is withdrawn by load. Total system energy charges are negative because there are, due to losses, more generation MW being paid SMP (energy component of price) than load MW paying SMP (the energy component of price).

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## Total System Energy Costs

The total system energy cost for the first six months of 2026 was -$762.9 million, which was comprised of implicit withdrawal energy charges of $44,074.7 million, implicit injection energy credits of $44,847.2 million, explicit energy charges of $0.0 million and inadvertent energy charges of $9.6 million. The monthly system energy costs for the first six months of 2026 ranged from -$323.8 million in January to -$58.5 million in April.

System energy costs for the first six months of, 2008 through 2026 are shown in Table 11-44 and Table 11-45. Table 11-44 shows PJM system energy costs by accounting category and Table 11-45 shows PJM system energy costs by market category.

**Table 11-44 Total system energy costs by accounting category (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026**

| | System Energy Costs (Millions) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Jan - Jun) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Inadvertent Charges | Total |
| 2008 | $61,281.2 | $61,891.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($610.2) |
| 2009 | $22,815.7 | $23,162.1 | $0.0 | $2.9 | ($343.6) |
| 2010 | $25,040.9 | $25,406.7 | $0.0 | ($7.1) | ($372.8) |
| 2011 | $23,524.8 | $23,932.1 | $0.0 | $13.3 | ($393.9) |
| 2012 | $16,823.4 | $17,092.7 | $0.0 | $7.2 | ($262.0) |
| 2013 | $20,488.2 | $20,819.3 | $0.0 | ($1.5) | ($332.6) |
| 2014 | $39,885.0 | $40,556.7 | $0.0 | ($5.4) | ($677.2) |
| 2015 | $24,267.0 | $24,667.1 | $0.0 | $2.5 | ($397.6) |
| 2016 | $14,857.8 | $15,062.3 | $0.0 | $0.4 | ($204.2) |
| 2017 | $16,768.7 | $16,991.8 | $0.0 | $0.9 | ($222.2) |
| 2018 | $23,080.9 | $23,430.9 | $0.0 | $4.9 | ($345.2) |


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## Table 11-45 Total system energy costs by market (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2008 through 2026

| System Energy Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | | |
| (Jan - Jun) | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Inadvertent Charges | Grand Total |
| 2008 | $42,539.7 | $43,214.3 | $0.0 | ($674.6) | $18,741.5 | $18,677.1 | $0.0 | $64.5 | $0.0 | ($610.2) |
| 2009 | $22,893.0 | $23,278.1 | $0.0 | ($385.1) | ($77.3) | ($116.0) | $0.0 | $38.7 | $2.9 | ($343.6) |
| 2010 | $25,072.6 | $25,450.1 | $0.0 | ($377.5) | ($31.6) | ($43.4) | $0.0 | $11.8 | ($7.1) | ($372.8) |
| 2011 | $23,685.6 | $24,076.3 | $0.0 | ($390.6) | ($160.8) | ($144.1) | $0.0 | ($16.7) | $13.3 | ($393.9) |
| 2012 | $16,907.0 | $17,148.9 | $0.0 | ($241.9) | ($83.6) | ($56.2) | $0.0 | ($27.4) | $7.2 | ($262.0) |
| 2013 | $20,543.4 | $20,895.6 | $0.0 | ($352.2) | ($55.1) | ($76.3) | $0.0 | $21.2 | ($1.5) | ($332.6) |
| 2014 | $39,831.7 | $40,780.0 | $0.0 | ($948.3) | $53.3 | ($223.3) | $0.0 | $276.6 | ($5.4) | ($677.2) |
| 2015 | $24,389.1 | $24,858.0 | $0.0 | ($468.9) | ($122.1) | ($190.9) | $0.0 | $68.8 | $2.5 | ($397.6) |
| 2016 | $14,970.7 | $15,252.9 | $0.0 | ($282.3) | ($112.9) | ($190.6) | $0.0 | $77.7 | $0.4 | ($204.2) |
| 2017 | $16,974.1 | $17,296.6 | $0.0 | ($322.5) | ($205.3) | ($304.8) | $0.0 | $99.4 | $0.9 | ($222.2) |
| 2018 | $23,126.4 | $23,506.8 | $0.0 | ($380.4) | ($45.5) | ($75.9) | $0.0 | $30.3 | $4.9 | ($345.2) |
| 2019 | $15,552.6 | $15,820.6 | $0.0 | ($268.0) | ($205.0) | ($252.7) | $0.0 | $47.7 | $1.3 | ($218.9) |
| 2020 | $10,275.1 | $10,450.7 | $0.0 | ($175.6) | ($119.1) | ($160.3) | $0.0 | $41.2 | $0.5 | ($133.9) |
| 2021 | $16,373.1 | $16,646.1 | $0.0 | ($273.0) | ($133.8) | ($165.4) | $0.0 | $31.6 | $0.9 | ($240.5) |
| 2022 | $36,040.4 | $36,649.9 | $0.0 | ($609.6) | ($322.7) | ($383.1) | $0.0 | $60.4 | ($2.6) | ($551.8) |
| 2023 | $16,224.1 | $16,552.9 | $0.0 | ($328.7) | ($163.5) | ($258.6) | $0.0 | $95.1 | ($0.1) | ($233.8) |
| 2024 | $18,229.8 | $18,551.4 | $0.0 | ($321.7) | ($216.9) | ($269.7) | $0.0 | $52.8 | $3.9 | ($264.9) |
| 2025 | $28,841.1 | $29,356.0 | $0.0 | ($514.9) | $77.8 | $10.3 | $0.0 | $67.5 | ($5.6) | ($453.0) |
| 2026 | $44,294.2 | $45,126.5 | $0.0 | ($832.3) | ($219.5) | ($279.3) | $0.0 | $59.8 | $9.6 | ($762.9) |

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Table 11-46 and Table 11-47 show the total system energy costs for each transaction type in the first six months of 2026 and 2025. In the first six months of 2026, generation was paid $31,894.6 million and demand paid $30,472.7 million in net energy payment. In the first six months of 2025, generation was paid $20,877.4 million and demand paid $19,666.5 million in net energy payment.

## Table 11-46 Total system energy costs by transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | System Energy Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Grand Total |
| DEC | $1,541.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1,541.8 | ($1,583.0) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1,583.0) | ($41.2) |
| Demand | $29,814.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $29,814.3 | $658.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $658.4 | $30,472.7 |
| Demand Response | ($46.9) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($46.9) | $41.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $41.5 | ($5.4) |
| Export | $1,050.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1,050.2 | $532.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $532.8 | $1,583.0 |
| Generation | $0.0 | $31,622.6 | $0.0 | ($31,622.6) | $0.0 | $272.1 | $0.0 | ($272.1) | ($31,894.6) |
| Import | $0.0 | $167.5 | $0.0 | ($167.5) | $0.0 | $736.1 | $0.0 | ($736.1) | ($903.6) |
| INC | $0.0 | $1,401.5 | $0.0 | ($1,401.5) | $0.0 | ($1,418.2) | $0.0 | $1,418.2 | $16.7 |
| Internal Bilateral | $11,931.5 | $11,931.5 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $111.7 | $111.7 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | $3.3 | $0.0 | ($3.3) | $0.0 | $19.1 | $0.0 | ($19.1) | ($22.4) |
| Wheel Out | $3.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $3.3 | $19.1 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $19.1 | $22.4 |
| Total | $44,294.2 | $45,126.5 | $0.0 | ($832.3) | ($219.5) | ($279.3) | $0.0 | $59.8 | ($772.5) |

## Table 11-47 Total system energy costs by transaction type by (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2025

| | System Energy Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Day-Ahead | | | | Balancing | | | | |
| Transaction Type | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Implicit Withdrawal Charges | Implicit Injection Credits | Explicit Charges | Total | Grand Total |
| DEC | $1,072.2 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $1,072.2 | ($1,118.8) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($1,118.8) | ($46.5) |
| Demand | $19,276.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $19,276.0 | $390.6 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $390.6 | $19,666.5 |
| Demand Response | ($21.7) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($21.7) | $21.8 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $21.8 | $0.1 |
| Export | $875.7 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $875.7 | $355.3 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $355.3 | $1,231.0 |
| Generation | $0.0 | $20,537.4 | $0.0 | ($20,537.4) | $0.0 | $340.0 | $0.0 | ($340.0) | ($20,877.4) |
| Import | $0.0 | $52.6 | $0.0 | ($52.6) | $0.0 | $401.2 | $0.0 | ($401.2) | ($453.8) |
| INC | $0.0 | $1,127.2 | $0.0 | ($1,127.2) | $0.0 | ($1,159.8) | $0.0 | $1,159.8 | $32.6 |
| Internal Bilateral | $7,634.9 | $7,634.9 | $0.0 | ($0.0) | $413.5 | $413.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Wheel In | $0.0 | $4.0 | $0.0 | ($4.0) | $0.0 | $15.4 | $0.0 | ($15.4) | ($19.4) |
| Wheel Out | $4.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $4.0 | $15.4 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $15.4 | $19.4 |
| Total | $28,841.1 | $29,356.0 | $0.0 | ($514.9) | $77.8 | $10.3 | $0.0 | $67.5 | ($447.4) |



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Table 11-48 compares the total system energy costs for each transaction type between the dispatch run and the pricing run in the first six months of 2026. The system energy charges to demand decreased $1,101.0 million, and the energy credits to generation increased $1,180.7 million from the dispatch run to the pricing run. The energy charges to DECs decreased $123.4 million, the energy credits to INCs increased $118.9 million from the dispatch run to the pricing run.

### Table 11-48 Total system energy costs by dispatch and pricing run (Dollars (Millions)): January through June, 2026

| | System Energy Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dispatch Run | | | Pricing Run | | | Difference | | |
| Transaction Type | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total |
| DEC | $1,553.1 | ($1,470.8) | $82.2 | $1,541.8 | ($1,583.0) | ($41.2) | ($11.2) | ($112.2) | ($123.4) |
| Demand | $30,966.2 | $607.5 | $31,573.7 | $29,814.3 | $658.4 | $30,472.7 | ($1,151.9) | $50.9 | ($1,101.0) |
| Demand Response | ($49.6) | $37.6 | ($12.0) | ($46.9) | $41.5 | ($5.4) | $2.7 | $3.9 | $6.6 |
| Export | $1,076.8 | $495.9 | $1,572.7 | $1,050.2 | $532.8 | $1,583.0 | ($26.6) | $36.9 | $10.3 |
| Generation | ($32,822.5) | ($252.8) | ($33,075.3) | ($31,622.6) | ($272.1) | ($31,894.6) | $1,199.9 | ($19.2) | $1,180.7 |
| Import | ($169.1) | ($678.6) | ($847.7) | ($167.5) | ($736.1) | ($903.6) | $1.6 | ($57.6) | ($55.9) |
| INC | ($1,421.2) | $1,319.0 | ($102.2) | ($1,401.5) | $1,418.2 | $16.7 | $19.6 | $99.3 | $118.9 |
| Internal Bilateral | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.0) |
| Wheel In | ($3.3) | ($18.0) | ($21.3) | ($3.3) | ($19.1) | ($22.4) | ($0.0) | ($1.0) | ($1.0) |
| Wheel Out | $3.3 | $18.0 | $21.3 | $3.3 | $19.1 | $22.4 | $0.0 | $1.0 | $1.0 |
| Total | ($866.4) | $57.8 | ($808.5) | ($832.3) | $59.8 | ($772.5) | $34.1 | $1.9 | $36.0 |

## Monthly System Energy Costs

Table 11-49 shows a monthly summary of system energy costs by market type for January 2025 through June 2026. Total balancing system energy costs in the first six months of 2026 increased in every month compared to the first six months of 2025 except for January, May, and June. Monthly total system energy costs in the first six months of 2026 ranged from -$323.8 million in January to -$58.5 million in April.


### Table 11-49 Monthly system energy costs (Dollars (Millions)): January 2025 through June 2026

| | System Energy Costs (Millions) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | | | | 2026 | | | |
| | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Inadvertent Charges | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Inadvertent Charges | Total |
| Jan | ($153.9) | $16.7 | ($0.6) | ($137.8) | ($336.8) | $9.0 | $4.0 | ($323.8) |
| Feb | ($85.3) | $9.8 | ($0.8) | ($76.2) | ($173.6) | $16.0 | $3.0 | ($154.6) |
| Mar | ($68.3) | $12.4 | ($1.0) | ($56.9) | ($74.8) | $12.9 | $2.2 | ($59.6) |
| Apr | ($55.5) | $7.0 | ($1.2) | ($49.7) | ($71.9) | $10.0 | $3.4 | ($58.5) |
| May | ($56.4) | $11.5 | ($1.5) | ($46.4) | ($75.0) | $6.9 | $1.0 | ($67.0) |
| Jun | ($95.5) | $10.0 | ($0.4) | ($86.0) | ($100.3) | $4.9 | ($4.0) | ($99.4) |
| Jul | ($133.5) | $9.7 | ($0.4) | ($124.2) | | | | |
| Aug | ($65.6) | $6.9 | $0.7 | ($58.0) | | | | |
| Sep | ($64.4) | $12.4 | ($1.0) | ($53.0) | | | | |
| Oct | ($77.3) | $12.8 | ($1.5) | ($65.9) | | | | |
| Nov | ($83.6) | $13.5 | ($0.8) | ($70.9) | | | | |
| Dec | ($128.1) | $17.0 | ($1.1) | ($112.1) | | | | |
| Total | ($1,067.5) | $139.9 | ($9.5) | ($937.2) | ($832.3) | $59.8 | $9.6 | ($762.9) |

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Figure 11-14 shows PJM monthly system energy costs for January 2008 through June 2026. Ignoring interchange, total generation MWh must be greater than total load MWh in any hour in order to provide for losses. Since the hourly integrated energy component of LMP (SMP) is the same for every bus in the market in every hour, the net energy bill is always negative (ignoring net interchange): (SMP x withdrawals + SMP x injections) < 0. Assuming power balance is maintained in the presence of losses, the greater the level of load the greater the difference between energy charges collected from load (SMP x load MW) and credited to generation (SMP x generation MW). With higher load levels, there are generally higher SMPs and more negative total energy charges.

**Figure 11-14 Monthly system energy costs (Millions): January 2008 through June 2026**






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Table 11-50 shows the monthly total system energy costs for each virtual transaction type in the first six months of 2026 and 2025. In the first six months of 2026, DECs paid $1,541.8 million in energy charges compared to $1,072.2 million in the first six months of 2025 in the day-ahead market, were paid $1,583.0 million in energy credits compared to $1,118.8 million in the first six months of 2025 in the balancing energy market and paid $41.2 million in total energy charges compared to $46.5 million in total energy credits in the first six months of 2025. In the first six months of 2026, INCs were paid $1,401.5 million in energy credits compared to $1,127.2 million in the first six months of 2025 in the day-ahead market, paid $1,418.2 million in energy charges compared to $1,159.8 million in the first six months of 2025 in the balancing market and were paid $16.7 million in total energy credits compared to $32.6 million in total energy charges in the first six months of 2025. The system energy costs are zero for UTCs because the system energy costs for UTCs equal the difference in the energy component between source and sink and the energy component is the same at all buses.

## Table 11-50 Monthly energy charges by virtual transaction type (Dollars (Millions)): January 2025 through June 2026

| | | Energy Charges (Millions) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | DEC | | | INC | | | |
| Year | | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Total | Grand Total |
| 2025 | Jan | $232.3 | ($228.2) | $4.1 | ($269.2) | $261.9 | ($7.3) | ($3.2) |
| | Feb | $167.5 | ($168.2) | ($0.7) | ($192.3) | $191.8 | ($0.5) | ($1.2) |
| | Mar | $159.2 | ($164.8) | ($5.6) | ($181.7) | $188.6 | $6.9 | $1.3 |
| | Apr | $144.2 | ($146.2) | ($2.0) | ($193.9) | $196.4 | $2.5 | $0.5 |
| | May | $143.6 | ($138.3) | $5.3 | ($141.2) | $139.1 | ($2.1) | $3.2 |
| | Jun | $225.4 | ($273.0) | ($47.6) | ($148.9) | $182.0 | $33.1 | ($14.5) |
| | Jul | $310.6 | ($281.0) | $29.7 | ($225.8) | $200.9 | ($24.9) | $4.7 |
| | Aug | $192.0 | ($193.1) | ($1.1) | ($134.2) | $134.5 | $0.3 | ($0.8) |
| | Sep | $205.1 | ($212.9) | ($7.8) | ($141.0) | $148.1 | $7.1 | ($0.7) |
| | Oct | $200.4 | ($201.6) | ($1.1) | ($225.8) | $225.7 | ($0.1) | ($1.2) |
| | Nov | $176.9 | ($167.7) | $9.2 | ($240.6) | $226.8 | ($13.8) | ($4.6) |
| | Dec | $241.4 | ($226.9) | $14.5 | ($249.1) | $233.9 | ($15.2) | ($0.7) |
| | Total | $2,398.6 | ($2,401.9) | ($3.3) | ($2,343.6) | $2,329.7 | ($13.9) | ($17.3) |
| 2026 | Jan | $400.4 | ($337.0) | $63.3 | ($405.1) | $329.8 | ($75.3) | ($12.0) |
| | Feb | $266.6 | ($288.3) | ($21.7) | ($297.4) | $329.5 | $32.0 | $10.4 |
| | Mar | $181.9 | ($198.9) | ($17.0) | ($160.2) | $174.7 | $14.6 | ($2.4) |
| | Apr | $205.9 | ($216.7) | ($10.8) | ($194.6) | $203.7 | $9.2 | ($1.6) |
| | May | $194.3 | ($228.1) | ($33.8) | ($162.2) | $183.8 | $21.7 | ($12.2) |
| | Jun | $292.7 | ($314.0) | ($21.3) | ($182.1) | $196.7 | $14.6 | ($6.7) |
| | Total | $1,541.8 | ($1,583.0) | ($41.2) | ($1,401.5) | $1,418.2 | $16.7 | ($24.5) |

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# 12 Generation and Transmission Planning

## Overview[1]

### Generation Interconnection Planning

#### Existing Generation Mix

- As of June 30, 2026, PJM had a total installed capacity of 202,384.2 MW, of which 37,741.4 MW (18.6 percent) are coal fired steam units, 57,047.7 MW (28.2 percent) are combined cycle units, 7,563.1 MW (3.7 percent) are hydro units (including both pumped storage and run of river) and 33,452.6 MW (16.5 percent) are nuclear units. This measure of installed capacity differs from capacity market installed capacity because it includes energy only units, excludes all external units, and uses nameplate values for solar and wind resources.
- Of the 202,384.2 MW of installed capacity, 76,094.5 MW (37.6 percent) are from units older than 40 years, of which 30,189.3 MW (39.7 percent) are coal fired steam units, 255.0 MW (0.3 percent) are combined cycle units, 7,152.2 MW (9.4 percent) are hydro units (including both pumped storage and run of river) and 26,711.6 MW (35.1 percent) are nuclear units.

#### Generation Retirements[2]

- As of June 30, 2026, there were 56,414.6 MW of generation that have been retired since 2011, of which 41,409.8 MW (73.4 percent) are coal fired steam units.
- In the first six months of 2026, 669.0 MW of generation retired. The largest generators that retired in the first six months of 2026 were the four 150.0 MW Elwood CT-Natural Gas units located in the COMED Zone. Of the 669.0 MW of generation that retired in the first six months of 2026, 600.0 MW (89.7 percent) were located in the COMED Zone.
- As of June 30, 2026, there were 7,932.3 MW of generation that have requested retirement after June 30, 2026, of which 2,620.0 MW (33.0 percent) are located in the AEP Zone. Of the generation requesting retirement in the AEP Zone, 2,620.0 MW (100.0 percent) are coal fired steam units.

### Generation Queue

#### New Service Requests Serial Process[3]

- On November 29, 2022, the Commission issued an order accepting PJM's tariff revisions to improve the queue process.[4] The new queue process includes modifications to implement a cluster/cycle based processing method to replace the first in/first out serial processing method.[5] This change will allow projects to move forward based on a first ready/first out analysis, where readiness is demonstrated through site control and financial milestones and there is an option to exit the study process early based on system impacts. The transition to the new queue process began on July 10, 2023.
- There were 8,190 generation request projects submitted in the new service request serial process queue from 1997 until the implementation of the new cycle process on July 10, 2023. As a result of the transition to the new services cycle process, 312 projects (40,650.1 MW) were moved to transition cycle 1 (TC1). There were 1,347 projects eligible to resubmit for evaluation in transition cycle 2 (TC2). Of those 1,347 eligible projects, 550 projects (49,168.4 MW) resubmitted and are now being evaluated in TC2. Of the 1,347 eligible projects, 797 projects (53,155.5 MW) did not resubmit, and were withdrawn from the queue. There were 1,070 projects initially entered into the AH2 queue and beyond. Those 1,070 projects (70,729.8 MW) are now considered invalid and have been removed from the queue. As a result of the transition to the cycle process, the 8,190 projects in the serial process queue have been reduced to 5,461 projects. Projects that will be evaluated in TC1 and TC2, and those projects no

1 Totals presented in this section include corrections to historical data and may not match totals presented in previous reports.
2 See PJM. Planning. "Generator Deactivations," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/gen-deactivations>.
3 See PJM. Planning. "Serial Service Request Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/serial-service-request-status>.
4 See 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).
5 See PJM. "Interconnection Process Reform," Members Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2022/20220427/20220427-item-01a-1-interconnection-process-reform-presentation.ashx>.

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longer eligible to be evaluated in the serial process have been removed from the new service requests serial process metrics. New service requests cycle process metrics are reported separately from the serial process metrics.

- As of June 30, 2026, a total of 38,064.0 MW, on an energy basis, were in generation request serial service queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended.[6] Based on historical completion rates, 19,675.3 MW (51.7 percent), on an energy basis, of new generation in the queue are expected to go into service. As projects move through the queue process, projects can be removed from the queue due to incomplete or invalid data, withdrawn by the market participant or placed in service.
- Of the 4,182.5 MW, on an energy basis, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas, CT oil and coal fired steam projects) in the serial queue, 3,002.7 MW (71.8 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.
- Of the 2,960.4 MW, on an energy basis, of battery projects in the serial queue, only 779.4 MW (26.3 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.
- Of the 30,877.1 MW, on an energy basis, of renewable projects in the serial queue, 15,870.6 MW (51.4 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.
- Of the 4,150.6 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas. CT oil and coal fired steam projects) requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 2,906.4 MW (70.0 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction,[7] the 4,150.6 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 2,181.8 MW of capacity (52.6 percent of the total requested capacity).[8]
- Of the 2,000.6 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 215.6 MW (10.8 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 2,000.6 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 127.2 MW of capacity (6.4 percent of the total requested capacity).
- Of the 15,914.7 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in the serial generation queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 8,134.3 MW (51.1 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 15,914.7 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 937.5 MW of capacity (5.9 percent of the total requested capacity).
- As of June 30, 2026, 22,109.9 MW of capacity requests (requested CIRs) were in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended. Based on historical completion rates, 11,278.4 MW (51.0 percent) are expected to go into service. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 22,109.9 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 3,267.8 MW of capacity (14.8 percent of the total requested capacity).
- As of June 30, 2026, 5,461 projects, representing 610,103.6 MW, have entered the serial queue process since its inception. Of those, 1,288 projects, representing 97,476.7 MW (16.0 percent of the MW), went into

6 Unless otherwise noted, the queue totals in this report are the winter net MW energy for the interconnection requests ("MW Energy") as shown in the queue.

7 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate factors in this section are based on the *ELCC Class Ratings for 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (February 25, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/28-29-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf>.

8 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate adjusted MW are calculated using the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction ELCC factors. The adjusted MW are calculated using the four hour storage ELCC derate for battery resources, tracking solar for solar resources and onshore wind for wind resources.



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service. Of the projects that entered the serial queue process, 3,786 projects, representing 474,562.9 MW (77.8 percent of the MW) withdrew prior to completion. Such projects may create barriers to entry for projects that would otherwise be completed, by taking up queue positions, increasing interconnection costs and creating uncertainty.

- In the first six months of 2026, 1,000.1 MW from the serial queue went into service. Of the 1,000.1 MW that went in service, 940.0 MW (94.0 percent) were Combined Cycle units, 31.8 MW (3.2 percent) were solar units, 15.7 MW (1.6 percent) were battery units and 12.6 MW (1.3 percent) were wind units.
- Of the 2,809 projects that entered the serial queue from January 1, 2015, through July 10, 2023, 2,063 projects (73.4 percent) were renewable. Of the 690 projects that entered the serial queue in 2020, 546 projects (79.1 percent) were renewable. Renewable projects make up 85.3 percent of all projects in the serial queue and account for 81.1 percent of the nameplate MW currently active, suspended or under construction in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026.
- On June 30, 2026, 26,968.4 MW, on an energy basis, were in generation request serial queues that had reached the construction service agreement milestone or equivalent, in the status of active, suspended or under construction. Of the 26,968.4 MW, 9,721.1 MW (36.0 percent) had not begun construction, 7,121.7 MW (26.4 percent) had begun construction, but are now suspended, and 10,125.6 MW (37.5 percent) are currently under construction. Reaching the final milestone required prior to construction does not mean a project will immediately begin construction or even that it necessarily will ever begin construction.

## New Service Requests Cycle Process[9]

### Transition Cycle 1 (TC1)

- Transition cycle 1 (TC1) is comprised of 312 proposed generation projects. Those projects make up 40,650.1 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in TC1 were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 40,650.1 MW in TC1, 14,120.0 MW (34.7 percent) were active or under construction (10,763.0 MW (26.5 percent) were active and 3,357.0 MW (8.2 percent) were under construction) and 26,530.1 MW (65.3 percent) were withdrawn.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 14,120.0 MW, on an energy basis, of which 6,798.9 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in TC1 in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 6,798.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 1,741.7 MW (25.6 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 569.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including CT natural gas projects) requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 381.2 MW (67.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 3,727.4 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 372.7 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 1,022.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 603.0 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 5,207.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 757.5 MW (14.5 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

9 See PJM. Planning. "Cycle Service Request Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/m/cycle-service-request-status>.

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## Transition Cycle 2 (TC2) and Reliability Resource Initiative (RRI)

- On December 13, 2024, PJM submitted modifications to its Open Access Transmission Tariff to add provisions, through a one-time reliability based expansion of the projects in TC2.[10] On February 11, 2025, the Commission approved the RRI tariff modifications.[11] The proposed RRI Tariff revisions created a second TC2 application window that enabled RRI projects to join TC2 and be studied for interconnection during the transition period.
- PJM received 97 applications (28.6 GW) of RRI projects during the RRI application window. Of these projects, 48 involved uprates, in which existing resources are modified to increase the economic maximum generation capability, and 49 proposed building new generation. PJM reviewed the submitted RRI projects using the Commission approved scoring criteria, and approved 51 projects (11,577.4 MW).[12] On June 30, 2026, all RRI projects were either in the status of active or withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 11,577.4 MW of approved RRI projects, 7,932.4 MW (68.5 percent) were active and 3,645.0 MW (31.5 percent) were withdrawn.
- Transition cycle 2 (TC2) is comprised of 647 proposed generation projects. TC2 includes 550 projects submitted during the TC2 window, and 97 projects submitted through the RRI window. Those projects make up 77,760.6 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in TC2 were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 77,760.6 MW in TC2, 29,822.6 MW (38.3 percent) were active or under construction (29,742.6 MW (38.2 percent) were active and 80.0 MW (0.1 percent) were under construction) and 47,938.0 MW (61.6 percent) were withdrawn.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 29,822.6 MW, on an energy basis, of which 21,719.2 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in TC2 in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 21,719.2 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 10,753.4 MW (49.5 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 7,337.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle and CT natural gas projects) requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 5,642.4 MW (76.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 6,366.4 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 636.6 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 5,122.3 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 3,022.2 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 7,919.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 811.2 MW (10.2 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

## Cycle Process Totals[13]

- On June 30, 2026, there were 959 proposed generation projects in the new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 118,410.7 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in the cycle process queues were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn. Of the 118,410.7 MW in the cycle process queues, 43,942.6 MW (37.1 percent) were active or under construction (40,505.6 MW (34.2 percent) were active and 3,437.0 MW (2.9 percent) were under construction) and 74,468.0 MW (62.9 percent) were withdrawn.

10 See *PJM Interconnection L.L.C.* Docket No. ER25-712 (December 13, 2024).
11 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 (February 11, 2025).
12 The RRI proposal was to select the top 50 projects using the approved scoring criteria. The implemented scoring criteria resulted in a tie for the 50th project. This resulted in PJM selecting 51 projects as part of the RRI process.
13 As of June 30, 2026, the cycle process totals include those projects included in TC1 and TC2.


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- On June 30, 2026, there were 43,942.6 MW, on an energy basis, of which 28,518.1 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 28,518.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in the cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 12,495.1 MW (43.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 7,906.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle and CT natural gas projects) requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 6,023.6 MW (76.2 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 10,093.8 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active, 1,009.4 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 6,144.3 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 3,625.1 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 13,127.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 1,568.6 MW (11.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

## Serial and Cycle Process Totals

- On July 10, 2023, there were 287,185.2 MW in the status of active, under construction or suspended in the serial queue. As part of the transition to the new cycle process projects were removed from the queue because developers chose to not resubmit their projects in the TC2 queue, invalid projects were removed and must be resubmitted in Cycle 1, and projects were withdrawn as part of the normal queue process. On June 30, 2026, of the 287,185.2 MW, there were 74,074.2 MW (25.8 percent) in the status of active, in service or under construction, 11,726.7 MW (4.1 percent) went in service, and 201,384.3 MW (70.1 percent) have been withdrawn from the queue.
- As of June 30, 2026, 6,420 proposed generation projects had been submitted to the combined serial and new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 728,514.3 MW. On June 30, 2026, projects in the combined serial and cycle process queues were in the status of active, under construction, suspended, in service or were withdrawn. Of the 728,514.3 MW in the combined serial and cycle process queues, 82,006.7 MW (11.3 percent) were active, under construction or suspended, (58,486.0 MW (8.0 percent) were active, 16,399.0 MW (2.3 percent) were under construction and 7,121.7 MW (1.0 percent) were suspended), 97,476.7 MW (13.4 percent) were in service and 549,030.9 MW (75.4 percent) were withdrawn.
- Of the 82,006.7 MW in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 12,458.1 MW (15.2 percent) are thermal projects.
- On June 30, 2026, there were 82,006.7 MW, on an energy basis, of which 50,628.0 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction.
- Of the 50,628.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 18,681.5 MW (36.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 12,057.5 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas, CT oil and coal fired steam projects) requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues

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in the status of active or under construction, 9,139.0 MW (75.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

- Of the 23,601.5 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 2,360.1 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 8,144.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 4,805.5 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.
- Of the 29,041.7 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 3,417.1 MW (11.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

## Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP)

### Market Efficiency Process

- There are significant issues with PJM's benefit/cost analysis that should be addressed prior to approval of additional projects. If done correctly and if FTRs/ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the benefit/cost analysis would include the total net change in production costs and would not include congestion. In addition, PJM's benefit/cost analysis includes only the decreases in costs to load and ignores the increases in costs to load associated with market efficiency projects.
- Through June 30, 2026, PJM has completed six market efficiency cycles under Order No. 1000.[14] In February 2024, PJM completed the 2024/2025 market efficiency base case. In May 2024, PJM posted the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency planning assumptions. The long term market efficiency window opened on April 11, 2025, and closed on June 10, 2025. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on three identified flowgates. PJM received 14 proposals from five entities. Two projects, submitted by incumbent transmission owners, were selected as the preferred solutions.[15] These projects were presented to, and approved by, the PJM Board on February 12, 2026. There were no projects selected for acceleration in the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency window. The 2026/2027 Market Efficiency cycle will be performed on study years 2027, 2031, 2034, 2037 and 2041. The preliminary base case for the 2026/2027 Market Efficiency cycle is expected to be posted in July 2026, with stakeholder feedback accepted through October 2026.

### PJM MISO Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP)

- PJM and MISO developed a process to facilitate the construction of interregional projects in response to the Commission's concerns about interregional coordination along the PJM-MISO seam. This process, called the Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP), operates on a two year study schedule and is designed to address forward looking congestion.
- The simultaneous use for joint projects of an incorrectly defined benefit/cost method by PJM and the correct method by MISO results in an overallocation of the costs associated with joint PJM/MISO projects to PJM participants and in some cases approval of projects that do not pass a correctly defined benefit/cost test.

### PJM MISO Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP)

- PJM and MISO developed the Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP) to facilitate the resolution of historic congestion issues that could be addressed through small, quick implementation projects.

### PJM MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS)

- PJM and MISO developed the Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS) to help identify potential transmission projects that could

14 See *Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities*, Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323 (2011) (Order No. 1000), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 1000-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132 (2012).

15 One of the three identified congestion drivers included in the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency window was addressed in the 2025 RTEP Window 1.



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incrementally improve the systems' ability to mitigate constraints, improve market efficiency, respond to extreme weather and increase interregional transfer capability.

## Supplemental Transmission Projects

- Supplemental projects are defined to be "transmission expansions or enhancements that are not required for compliance with PJM criteria and are not state public policy projects according to the PJM Operating Agreement. These projects are used as inputs to RTEP models, but are not required for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance criteria, as determined by PJM."[16] Supplemental projects are exempt from competition.
- The average number of supplemental projects expected in each in service year increased by 1,150.0 percent, from 20 for years 1998 through 2007 (pre Order No. 890) to 250 for years 2008 through 2026 (post Order 890).[17]

## End of Life Transmission Projects

- An end of life transmission project is a project submitted for the purpose of replacing existing infrastructure that is at, or is approaching, the end of its useful life. End of life transmission projects should be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build the project. Under the current approach, end of life projects are excluded from the RTEP process and exempt from competition.

## Board Authorized Transmission Upgrades

- The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) reviews proposals to improve transmission reliability in PJM and between PJM and neighboring regions. These proposals, which include reliability baseline, network, market efficiency and targeted market efficiency projects, as well as scope changes and project cancellations, but exclude supplemental and end of life projects, are periodically presented to the PJM Board of Managers for authorization.[18] In the first six months of 2026, the PJM Board approved a net change of $11.2 billion in transmission upgrades. As of June 30, 2026, the PJM Board has approved $69.7 billion in system enhancements since 1999.

## Transmission Competition

- The MMU makes several recommendations related to the competitive transmission planning process. The recommendations include improved process transparency, incorporation of competition between transmission and generation alternatives, and the removal of barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission. These recommendations would help ensure that the process is an open and transparent process that results in the most competitive solutions.
- On May 24, 2018, the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) approved a motion that required PJM, with input from the MMU, to develop a comparative framework to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of competitive transmission proposals with binding cost containment proposals compared to proposals from incumbent and nonincumbent transmission companies without cost containment provisions.

## Qualifying Transmission Upgrades (QTU)

- A Qualifying Transmission Upgrade (QTU) is an upgrade to the transmission system, financed and built by market participants, that increases the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL) into an LDA and can be offered into capacity auctions as capacity. Once a QTU is in service, the upgrade is eligible to continue to offer the approved incremental import capability into future RPM Auctions. As of June 30, 2026, no QTUs have cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction.

## Transmission Facility Outages

- PJM maintains a list of reportable transmission facilities. When a reportable transmission facility needs to be taken out of service, PJM transmission owners are required to report planned transmission facility outages as early as possible. PJM processes the transmission facility

16 See PJM. "Transmission Construction Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/m/project-construction>.

17 See *Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service*, Order No. 890, 118 FERC ¶ 61,119, *order on reh'g*, Order No. 890-A, 121 FERC ¶ 61,297 (2007), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2008), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228, *order on clarification*, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009).

18 Supplemental Projects, including the end of life subset of supplemental projects, do not require PJM Board of Managers authorization.

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outage requests according to rules in PJM's Manual 3 to decide if the outage is on time or late and whether or not they will allow the outage.[19]

- There were 22,073 transmission outage requests submitted in the 2025/2026 planning period. Of the requested outages, 75.5 percent were planned for less than or equal to five days and 9.3 percent were planned for greater than 30 days. Of the requested outages, 40.7 percent were submitted late according to the rules in PJM's Manual 3.

# Recommendations

## Generation Retirements

- The MMU recommends that CIRs end on the date of retirement in order to help ensure competitive markets and competitive access to the grid. The rules need to ensure that incumbents cannot exploit control of CIRs to block or postpone entry of competitors or to exercise market power by requiring high payments for CIRs.[20] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2012.)

## Generation Queue

- Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data. PJM does not update this data. (Priority: High. First reported 2023. Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that barriers to entry be addressed in a timely manner in order to help ensure that the capacity market will result in the entry of new capacity to meet the needs of PJM market participants. (Priority: Low. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM establish an expedited PJM managed queue process to identify commercially viable projects that could help eliminate or reduce the need for specific RMRs or that could address specific reliability needs and allow the identified projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming. (Priority: High. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends improvements in queue management including that PJM establish a review process to ensure that projects are removed from the queue if they are not viable, as well as an expedited process to allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming.[21] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends continuing analysis of the study phase of PJM's transmission planning to reduce the need for postponements of study results, to decrease study completion times, and to improve the likelihood that a project at a given phase in the study process will successfully go into service.[22] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends outsourcing interconnection studies to an independent party to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Currently, these studies are performed by incumbent transmission owners under PJM's direction. This creates potential conflicts of interest, particularly when transmission owners are vertically integrated and the owner of transmission also owns generation. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

## RTEP Model and Assumptions

- The MMU recommends that PJM include only existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied, and queued generation with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, that has a high probability of completion, in the RTEP models. If a future study cannot achieve power balance with such generation, then the addition of load should be capped at the level that can be supplied by actual generation and not allowed to connect until expected generation can support it. (Priority: High. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

19 See "PJM Manual 03: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).

20 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER12-1177-000 (March 12, 2012) <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/Filings/2012/IMM_Comments_ER12-1177-000_20120312.PDF>.

21 PJM Filing, FERC Docket No. ER22-2110-000 (June 14, 2022); 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).

22 Ibid.



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## Market Efficiency Process

- The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated because it is not consistent with a competitive market design. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, PJM modify the rules governing benefit/cost analysis, the evaluation process for selecting among competing market efficiency projects and cost allocation for economic projects in order to ensure that all changes in production costs but not congestion costs, including increased costs to load and the risk of project cost increases, in all zones are included in order to ensure that the correct metrics are used for defining benefits. The MMU also recommends that, if the market efficiency process is retained, market efficiency projects that fail to meet PJM benefit/cost criteria in a Schedule 6 annual reevaluation, prior to construction commencing or prior to state approval, be canceled and removed from further consideration. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

## Comparative Cost Framework

- The MMU recommends that PJM modify the project proposal templates to include data necessary to perform a detailed project lifetime financial analysis. The required data includes, but is not limited to: capital expenditure; capital structure; return on equity; cost of debt; tax assumptions; ongoing capital expenditures; ongoing maintenance; and expected life. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Transmission Competition

- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of supplemental projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that the basis for all such exemptions be reviewed and modified to ensure that the supplemental project designation is not used to exempt transmission projects from a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects or to effectively replace the RTEP process. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.) [23]
- The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of end of life projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that end of life transmission projects be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.) [24]
- The MMU recommends that PJM enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission providers. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM incorporate the principle that the goal of transmission planning should be the incorporation of transmission investment decisions into market driven processes as much as possible. (Priority: Low. First reported 2001. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends the creation of a mechanism to permit a direct comparison, or competition, between transmission and generation alternatives, including which alternative is less costly and who bears the risks associated with each alternative. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM establish fair terms of access to rights of way and property, such as at substations, in order to remove any barriers to entry and require competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers in the RTEP. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)

23 The FERC accepted tariff provisions that exclude supplemental projects from competition in the RTEP. 162 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2018), ***reh'g denied***, 164 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2018).

24 In recent decisions addressing competing proposals on end of life projects, the Commission accepted a transmission owner proposal excluding end of life projects from competition in the RTEP process, 172 FERC ¶ 61,136 (2020), ***reh'g denied***, 173 FERC ¶ 61,225 (2020), ***affirmed***, American Municipal Power, Inc., et al. v. FERC, Case No. 20-1449 (D.C. Cir. November 17, 2023), and rejected a proposal from PJM stakeholders that would have included end of life projects in competition in the RTEP process, 173 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020).

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- The MMU recommends that rules be implemented to require competition to provide financing for transmission projects. This competition could reduce the cost of capital for transmission projects and significantly reduce total costs to customers. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that storage resources not be includable as transmission assets for any reason. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)

## Cost Allocation

- The MMU recommends a comprehensive review of the ways in which the solution based dfax allocation method is implemented. The goal for such a process would be to ensure that the most rational and efficient approach to implementing the solution based dfax method is used in PJM. Such an approach should allocate costs consistent with benefits and appropriately calibrate the incentives for investment in new transmission capability. No replacement approach should be approved until all potential alternatives, including the status quo, are thoroughly reviewed. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends changing the minimum distribution factor in the allocation from 0.01 to 0.00 and adding a threshold minimum usage impact on the transmission facilities.[25] (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted, 2026.)[26]

## Transmission Line Ratings

- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners use the same methods to define line ratings and that all PJM transmission owners implement dynamic line ratings (DLR), subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2019. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners investigate the applicability and potential cost savings of Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) and that all PJM transmission owners implement cost effective GET, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the implementation of Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) be opened to competition from third parties, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2024. Status: Not adopted.)

## Transmission Facility Outages

- The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate all transmission outage tickets as on time or late as if they were new requests when an outage is rescheduled, create options for late requests based on the reasons, and apply the modified rules for late submissions to any such outages. The MMU recommends that PJM create options for treatment of late outages. The current rules apply more stringent rules, based on controlling actions, to late outages without distinguishing among reasons for late outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2014. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM draft a definition of the economic and physical congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests and associated triggers, including both the extent of overloaded facilities and the level of economic congestion, to include in PJM manuals after appropriate review with appropriate rules for on time and late outage requests. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM create options for late requests based on the reasons, and modify the rules to reduce or eliminate the approval of late outage requests submitted or rescheduled after the FTR auction bidding opening date, based on those options. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM not permit transmission owners to divide long duration outages into smaller segments to avoid complying with the requirements for long duration outages. (Priority: Low. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

25 See *2015 State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume II, Section 12: Generation and Transmission Planning, at 463, Cost Allocation Issues.

26 On June 4, 2026, in Docket No. ER26-2736-000, PJM submitted revisions to its Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff) in compliance with the Commission's March 6, 2026, Order on Remand to eliminate the de minimis threshold from the solution based DFAX method.



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## Conclusion

The goal of the PJM market design should be to enhance competition and to ensure that competition is the core element of all PJM markets. Transmission investments have not been fully incorporated into competitive markets. The construction of new transmission facilities has significant impacts on the energy and capacity markets. When generating units retire or load increases, there is no market mechanism in place that would require or even permit direct competition between transmission and generation to meet loads in the affected area. In addition, despite FERC Order No. 1000, there is not yet a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build transmission projects, to ensure that competitors provide an enforceable total project cost cap, or to obtain least cost financing through the capital markets.

The MMU recognizes that the Commission has issued orders that are inconsistent with the recommendations of the MMU and that PJM cannot unilaterally modify those directives. It remains the recommendation of the MMU that the PJM rules for competitive transmission development through the RTEP should build upon FERC Order No. 1000 to create real competition between incumbent transmission providers and nonincumbent transmission providers. The ability of transmission owners to block competition for supplemental projects and end of life projects and the reasons for that policy should be reevaluated. PJM should enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission. Rigorous standards that protect customers from risk should be applied to competitive transmission suppliers to ensure that customers receive the benefits of competition.

Order No. 1000 removed the right of first refusal (ROFR) for transmission projects for incumbent transmission owners except for the case of supplemental projects. This created an incentive for incumbent transmission owners to designate projects as supplemental projects to avoid the Order No. 1000 competitive provisions. Two PJM states, Indiana and Michigan, have passed laws that provide ROFR to incumbent utilities/transmission owners.[27] [28]

Given the significant impact of transmission line ratings on all aspects of wholesale power markets, ensuring and improving the accuracy and transparency of line ratings is essential. Line ratings should incorporate ambient temperature conditions, wind speed and other relevant operating conditions. Line ratings should be provided for a range of durations to ensure that operators understand the actual impact of short term flows versus longer term flows when making decisions that affect market prices. PJM real-time prices are calculated every five minutes for thousands of nodes. PJM prices are extremely sensitive to transmission line ratings. For consistency with the dynamic nature of wholesale power markets, line ratings should be updated in real time to reflect real time conditions and to help ensure that real-time prices are based on actual current line ratings. New technologies that permit dynamic line ratings (DLR) should be implemented. All PJM Transmission Owners should be required to immediately adopt current dynamic line rating (DLR) methods for all transmission facilities, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC.

Given the slow pace of adoption by Transmission Owners of Grid Enhancing Technologies (GETs), PJM and the Commission should introduce rules that would allow third parties to propose adding GETs to the transmission system, subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. The third parties would be compensated in the same way that TOs would be compensated for comparable investments.

Another element of opening competition would be to consider transmission owners' ownership of property and rights of way at or around transmission substations. In many cases, the land acquired included property intended to support future expansion of the grid. Incumbents have included the costs of the property in their rate base, paid for by customers. PJM now has the

27 See IN Code § 8-1-38-9, effective 7/1/2023. Applies to transmission facilities approved for construction through an RTO planning process. Incumbent Transmission Owner must exercise within 90 days.

28 See MCL §460.593, effective 12/17/2021 which applies to regionally cost shared transmission lines included in a plan adopted by a recognized planning authority. Must be exercised by the incumbent (s) within 90 days after plan is adopted/approved.

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responsibility for planning the development of the grid under its RTEP process. Property bought to facilitate future expansion should be a part of the RTEP process and be made available to all providers on equal terms.

It would be antithetical to competition to permit transmission owners to own black start units under the backstop rules, to own batteries (storage as a transmission asset) or to permit transmission owners to build new generation, all under the antiquated cost of service regulation rules that were displaced by more efficient competitive markets. Such an approach would undermine competitive markets and require market projects built with investors' capital at risk to compete with subsidized resources. Nonetheless, PJM supports the ownership of black start units by transmission owners under the backstop rules and PJM supports storage as a transmission asset.

The process for determining the reasonableness or purpose of supplemental transmission projects that are asserted to be not needed for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance as defined under the RTEP process needs additional oversight and transparency. If there is a need for a supplemental project, that need should be clearly defined and there should be a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build the project. If there is no defined need for a supplemental project for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance then the project should not be included in rates.

Managing the generation queues is a complex process. The PJM queue evaluation process is being significantly improved, based on the proposal submitted by PJM on June 14, 2022, and approved by FERC on November 29, 2022.[29] [30] The new rules include significant modifications to the interconnection process designed to address some of the key underlying issues and significantly improve the efficiency of the process. These modifications include process efficiency enhancements, recognition of project clusters affecting the same transmission facilities, incentives to reduce the entry of speculative projects in the queue, and incentives to remove projects that are not expected to reach commercial operation. The new process should help to reduce backlog and to remove projects that are not viable earlier to help improve the overall efficiency of the queue process and to reduce uncertainty for new generation. However, the interconnection queue remains an inefficient barrier to the entry of new generation and more work is required to remove any such barrier.

On June 30, 2026, there were 959 proposed generation projects in the new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 118,410.7 MW. Of the 118,410.7 MW in the cycle process queues, 43,942.6 MW (37.1 percent) were active or under construction (40,505.6 MW (34.2 percent) were active and 3,437.0 MW (2.9 percent) were under construction) and 74,468.0 MW (62.9 percent) were withdrawn. The volume of withdrawn projects in the new cycle process does not necessarily mean that the new process is not effective. Under the new cycle queue process, the impact on the studies that account for withdrawn projects and the impacts on other projects in the queue has been significantly reduced. So far, the transition cycles have remained on schedule while managing withdrawn projects.

While the changes in the queue process will clearly improve the process, the MMU's recommendations related to the queue process will remain until the new process is fully in place and it can be evaluated. The impact of the new cycle process will not be fully known until after the first complete cycle under the new process is completed (the Cycle 1 final negotiation phase is currently scheduled to end on May 19, 2028) and generation from Cycle 1 is actually put in service. The impact of the modifications to the queue process will need to be evaluated to determine if they successfully remove projects from the queue if they are not viable, and allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress. There has already been a significant reduction in queue projects as a result of PJM's improvements to the process. The behavior of project developers also creates issues with queue management. When developers put multiple projects in the queue to maintain their own optionality while planning to build only one project they also affect all the projects that follow them in the queue. Project developers may also enter speculative projects in the queue and then put the project in suspended status while they address financing. The impacts of such behavior and the incentives for such behavior are addressed in the new process which includes nonrefundable fees, credit

29 See *PJM*, Docket No. ER22-2110 (June 14, 2022).
30 See 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).


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requirements, enhanced site control, elimination of the ability to suspend a project and milestone requirements. The impact of these aspects of the revised interconnection process should continue to be evaluated to ensure that they are having the desired effect on project developer behavior. Initial results from the transition cycles have shown that developers are withdrawing their projects at the specified decision points, which is helping to remove speculative projects from the queue process sooner. Whether the new cycle process will result in enough new dispatchable and renewable generation to meet system needs cannot be determined until after a full cycle has been completed, projects go in service and completion rates can be evaluated. The PJM queue evaluation process should continue to be improved to help ensure that barriers to competition for new generation investments are not created. Issues that need to be addressed include the ownership rights to CIRs and whether transmission owners should perform interconnection studies.

The roles and efficiency of PJM, TOs and developers in the queue process all need to be examined and enhanced in order to help ensure that the queue process can function effectively and efficiently as the gateway to competition in the energy and capacity markets and not as a barrier to competition.

The Commission should require PJM, for example, to enhance the transparency and queue management process for nonincumbent transmission investment. Issues related to data access and complete explanations of cost impacts should be addressed. The goal should be to remove barriers to competition from nonincumbent transmission while ensuring that customers receive the benefits of competition.

On January 31, 2025, PJM submitted revisions to the PJM Tariff to expedite the transfer of CIRs from deactivating generating resources to new replacement resources.[31] The Market Monitor filed opposing comments.[32] The Commission rejected the filing, finding (i) "that the lack of a maximum time limit for Commercial Operation Date extensions, which introduces the opportunity to delay commercial operation for an indefinite period of time, would result in a generator replacement process that does not promote the efficient interconnection of new resources;" and (ii) "because the unrestricted opportunity for a Replacement Generation Resource Project Developer to significantly delay commercial operation may result in CIRs and associated transmission capacity dedicated to accommodate the Replacement Generation Resource's operation going unused."[33] PJM filed a new proposal that continued to be flawed. [34] On January 29, 2026, the Commission approved the tariff revisions.[35]

The suggestion that generation owners should be permitted to avoid the queue process and directly transfer the generation CIRs to an affiliate or directly sell the CIRs to an unaffiliated entity should be rejected.[36] [37] This proposed approach is about creating a process to maximize the value of existing CIRs to incumbent generators and not about facilitating the efficient replacement of retiring resources. In effect, this approach, if adopted by the large number of retiring units, would create a chaotic, bilateral private queue process that would create market power and facilitate the exercise of market power in the sale of CIRs by incumbent generators. In effect, the proposed approach would replace a significant part of the recently redesigned PJM queue process. The proposed continuation of retention of CIRs by incumbent generators creates the potential for delays of up to a year and the proponents have proposed the option to request further delays. This approach would inappropriately delegate the authority from PJM to the incumbent generator to choose the new resource based on highest offer for CIRs rather than based on PJM defined system reliability needs. There would be no requirement to even be a capacity resource and there would be no requirement to offer the capacity into the capacity market. After the entire process, the contribution to PJM reliability could be zero. PJM's recently proposed expedited process for addressing reliability needs (RRI) is preferable and should be considered as the preferred alternative to the proposed approach from the Planning Committee stakeholder process.

31 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER25-1128 (January 31, 2025).
32 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER25-1128-000 (February 21, 2025).
33 See 192 FERC ¶ 61,137 at PP 38–39 (2025).
34 *See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. ER26-403-000 (October 31, 2025).
35 See 194 FERC ¶ 61,079 (January 29, 2026).
36 See PJM. "*Enhancing Capacity Interconnection Rights (CIR) Transfer Efficiency: Problem / Opportunity Statement*," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/ips/2023/20230731/20230731-item-08b---enhancing-capacity-interconnection-rights---cir---transfer-efficiency-problem-statement.ashx>.
37 On April 30, 2024, the CIR Transfer Efficiency issue was transferred from the Interconnection Process Subcommittee (IPS) to the Planning Committee (PC).

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The MMU recommends that PJM establish an expedited PJM managed queue process to identify commercially viable projects that could help eliminate or reduce the need for specific RMRs or that could address specific reliability needs and allow the identified projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming. Rules should be developed to permit PJM to advance projects in the queue if they would resolve immediate reliability issues that result, for example, from unit retirements. The rules should be consistent with the flexibility included in the new queue process but add the option for PJM to expedite the interconnection and commercial operation of projects in the queue that would address identified reliability issues, consistent with the standing of the projects in the queue.

On February 27, 2026, PJM filed revisions to the tariff to establish an expedited interconnection track (EIT) process for generating facilities.[38] The EIT was designed to expedite the interconnection of new generation that commits to firm commercial in service dates, has a commitment from the relevant siting authority (or a state executive officer in certain circumstances) to expedite consideration of applicable siting, and provides a pathway for new generation. On June 9, 2026, the Commission approved the revised tariff revisions to establish the EIT process effective July 31, 2026.[39]

The PJM queue process should continue to define available and needed CIRs for all capacity queue projects. CIRs from retiring units should be made available to the next resource in the queue that can use them, on the retirement date of the retiring resource. Generation owners do not have property rights in CIRs. The value of CIRs is a result of the entire transmission system which has been paid for by customers and other generators. The value of CIRs is a result of the existence of a network and is not a result solely or even primarily of the investment that may or may not have been required in order to get CIRs. The cost of CIRs is part of project costs included in generation owners' investment decisions like any other project cost and subject to the same risk and reward structure. Open access to the transmission system by new resources should not be limited by claims to own the access rights by retiring units.

The fundamental purpose of the queue process is to provide open access to the grid for supply resources. More specifically, the fundamental purpose of the queue process for capacity resources is to provide open access to the grid and to ensure that the energy from capacity resources is deliverable so that capacity resources can meet their must offer obligations in the energy market and provide reliable energy supply during all conditions.

The addition of a planned transmission project changes the parameters of the capacity auction for the area, changes the amount of capacity needed in the area, changes the capacity market supply and demand fundamentals in the area and may effectively forestall the ability of generation to compete. However, there is no mechanism to permit a direct comparison, let alone competition, between transmission and generation alternatives. There is no mechanism to evaluate whether the generation or transmission alternative is less costly, whether there is more risk associated with the generation or transmission alternatives, or who bears the risks associated with each alternative. Creating such a mechanism should be an explicit goal of PJM market design.

The current market efficiency process does exactly the opposite by permitting transmission projects to be approved without competition from generation. The broader issue is that the market efficiency project approach explicitly allows transmission projects to compete against future generation projects, but without allowing the generation projects to compete. Projecting speculative transmission related benefits for 15 years based on the existing generation fleet and existing patterns of congestion eliminates the potential for new generation to respond to market signals. The market efficiency process allows assets built under the cost of service regulatory paradigm to displace generation assets built under the competitive market paradigm. In addition, there are significant issues with PJM's current benefit/cost analysis which cause it to consistently overstate the potential benefits of market efficiency projects. The market efficiency process is misnamed. The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated.

In addition, the use of an incorrectly defined cost-benefit method by PJM and the correct method by MISO results in an over allocation of the costs associated with joint PJM/MISO transmission projects to PJM participants

38 See PJM. Docket No. ER26-1563 (February 27, 2026).
39 195 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2026).


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and in some cases approval of projects that do not pass a correctly defined benefit/cost test.

If it is retained, there are significant issues with PJM's benefit/cost analysis that should be addressed prior to approval of additional projects. The current benefit/cost analysis explicitly and incorrectly ignores the increased costs to load in zones that results from an RTEP project when calculating the energy market benefits. All increases and decreases in costs should be included in all zones and LDAs. The definition of benefits should also be reevaluated.

The benefit/cost analysis should also account for the fact that the transmission project costs are not subject to cost caps and may exceed the estimated costs by a wide margin. When actual costs exceed estimated costs, the benefit/cost analysis is effectively meaningless and low estimated costs may result in inappropriately favoring transmission projects over market generation projects. The risk of cost increases for transmission projects should be incorporated in the benefit/cost analysis.

Recent proposals from Transmission Owners to use storage as a transmission asset (SATA) raises a number of additional concerns about PJM's benefit/cost analysis. Storage is a market asset and should not be owned by transmission owners. PJM should not be evaluating SATA at all without a decision from FERC that SATA is allowable in PJM. At present, it is not allowed.

A significant flaw in PJM's benefit/cost analysis is that projected benefits are based on load forecasts which are currently dominated by projected large data center loads that are not verified by PJM and cannot be verified by PJM. That creates a bias towards finding transmission projects beneficial despite the fact that data center loads are imposing transmission costs on other customers as a result.

There are currently no market incentives for transmission owners to plan, submit and complete transmission outages in a timely and efficient manner. Requiring transmission owners to pay does not create an effective incentive when those payments are passed through to transmission customers. The process for the submission of planned transmission outages needs to be carefully reviewed and redesigned to limit the ability of transmission owners to submit transmission outages that are late for FTR auction bid submission dates and are late for the day-ahead energy market and that have large and unnecessary impacts on the PJM energy market. The submission of late transmission outages can inappropriately affect market outcomes when market participants do not have the ability to modify market bids and offers. The PJM process for evaluating the congestion impact of transmission outages needs to be clearly defined and upgraded to provide for management of transmission outages to minimize market impacts. The MMU continues to recommend that PJM draft a clear and expanded definition of the congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests that is incorporated in the PJM Market Rules. PJM Manual 38 currently defines congestion resulting from a transmission outage as an overload on transmission facilities rather than using the general economic definition of congestion resulting from out of merit generation to control constraints. PJM does not currently evaluate the economic impact of congestion when reviewing proposed transmission outages.[40]

The treatment by PJM and Dominion Virginia Power of the outage for the Lanexa – Dunnsville Line illustrates some of the issues with the current process. The outage was submitted and delayed more than once. PJM's analysis of expected congestion did not highlight the magnitude of the issue. Dominion Virginia Power did not stage the outage so as to minimize market disruption and congestion until after there were significant disruptions and congestion.

As an example of the complexities of defining the benefits of transmission investments, the reduction in congestion is frequently and incorrectly cited as a metric of benefits. Congestion is frequently misunderstood. Congestion is not static. Congestion exhibits dynamic intertemporal variability and dynamic locational variability. More importantly, congestion is not the correct metric for evaluating the potential benefits of enhancing the transmission grid. The correct metric is the total net change in production costs.

There is not a secular trend towards increasing congestion in PJM. Congestion is volatile on a monthly, daily and hourly basis. For example, higher congestion can result from changes in seasonal and daily/hourly fuel costs. The level and

40 PJM, "Manual 38: Operations Planning," Rev. 20 (January 22, 2026) at 19-20.

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distribution of congestion at a point in time is a function of the location and size of generating units, the relative costs of the fuels burned and the associated marginal costs of generating units, the location and size of load and the locational capability of the transmission grid. Each of these factors changes over time.

The geographic distribution of congestion is dynamic. The nature and location of congestion in the PJM system has changed significantly over the last 10 years and continues to change. The nature and location of congestion in PJM can also change from one day to the next as a result of changes in relative fuel costs. As a result, building transmission to address a specific pattern of congestion does not make sense, unless the technology can be easily moved to new locations as conditions change. The transmission system is only one of many reasons that congestion exists. The dynamic nature of congestion and the multiple, interactive causes of congestion make it virtually impossible to identify the standalone impacts of an individual transmission investment on future congestion. It is possible, for example, that congestion occurring during a period of a few days in the winter as a result of very high fuel prices, significantly increases the reported level of congestion for the entire year. This has occurred in PJM. It would be a mistake to consider that level of congestion to be a signal to build transmission.

At a more fundamental level, congestion is not the correct metric for evaluating the potential benefits of enhancing the transmission grid. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. Congestion is neither good nor bad, but is a direct measure of the extent to which there are multiple marginal generating units with different offers dispatched to serve load as a result of transmission constraints. Congestion occurs when available, least-cost energy cannot be delivered to all load because transmission facilities are not adequate to deliver that energy to one or more areas, and higher cost units in the constrained area(s) must be dispatched to meet the load. The result is that the price of energy in the constrained area(s) is higher than in the unconstrained area. Load in the constrained area pays the higher price for all energy including energy from low cost generation and energy from high cost generation, while only high cost generators are paid the high price at their bus and low cost generators are paid only the low price at their bus.

If FTRs worked perfectly and were assigned directly to load, FTRs would return all congestion to the load that paid the congestion. Congestion is not a cost, it is an accounting result of a market based on locational energy prices in which all load in a constrained area pays the higher single market clearing locational price, resulting in excess payments by load that are not paid to generation, which should be returned to load.

Counterintuitively, congestion actually increases when the transmission capacity between areas with lower cost generation and areas with higher cost generation increases but does not fully eliminate the need for some higher cost local generation. The smaller the amount of higher cost local generation needed to meet load, the more of the local load is met via low cost generation delivered over the transmission system and therefore the higher is the difference between what load pays and generation receives, congestion.

For all these reasons, if done correctly and if FTRs/ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the benefit/cost analysis for transmission projects would include the total net change in production costs and would not include congestion. The change in production costs correctly measures the changes in cost to load that result from a project.

The PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) successfully addresses the need for transmission investment to reliably meet load. Together with the requirement that new generation pay interconnection costs, the RTEP process has resulted in the appropriate level of new transmission investment in PJM. There is no evidence that the PJM planning process is not adequate to meet the requirements of the PJM markets. Additional transmission investment is not a panacea. Transmission investment is expensive and long lived and it is essential that transmission investments be carefully planned for clearly identified needs in order to ensure that power markets can continue to provide reliable service at a competitive price.


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PJM must make out of market payments to units that want to retire (deactivate) but that PJM requires to remain in service, for limited operation, for a defined period because the unit is needed for reliability.[41] This provision has been known as Reliability Must Run (RMR) service but RMR is not defined in the PJM tariff. The correct term is Part V reliability service. The need to retain uneconomic units in service reflects a flawed market design and/or planning process problems. If a unit is needed for reliability, the market should reflect a locational value consistent with that need which would result in the unit remaining in service or being replaced by a competitor unit. The planning process should evaluate the impact of the loss of units at risk and determine in advance whether transmission upgrades are required in order to limit the duration of Part V service for individual units. It is essential that the deactivation provisions of the tariff be evaluated and modified. It is also essential that PJM look forward and attempt to plan for foreseeable unit retirements, whether for economic or regulatory reasons. PJM should consider an expedited queue process for projects that could replace the retiring capacity including the immediate transfer of the retiring unit's CIRs to units in the queue in order to permit generation to compete as an alternative to the current transmission only approach.

An area in northern Virginia in the Dominion Transmission Zone, known as Data Center Alley, has experienced significant load growth from data centers. Dominion has presented 44 supplemental project requests to serve the increase in load through the summer of 2025. As part of the supplemental planning process, PJM performs a do no harm analysis. PJM identified the need for additional baseline reinforcements to support the load growth. These baseline reinforcements were addressed in the 2022 RTEP Window 3, when the PJM board approved $1.4 billion of necessary baseline upgrades specific to the Data Center Alley reinforcements.[42] These regional transmission costs were allocated according to Schedule 12 of PJM's Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), where costs are shared across all zones by a combination of load ratio share and distribution factor impacts. The transmission owners include these project costs in their base case, and all retail customers in the PJM footprint pay for those upgrade costs through increased energy bills. The cost allocation of the $1.4 billion in baseline upgrades are assigned to all retail customers and not solely to the customers requesting interconnection.

The high level of customer requests in Data Center Alley resulted in the need for significant baseline reliability upgrades. These costs were allocated per Schedule 12 of the PJM OATT. Not all customer requests result in reliability upgrades. Transmission upgrades for customer requests that are submitted through the supplemental planning process are allocated 100 percent to the zone where they are interconnecting. The transmission owner of that zone then includes those project costs in their rate base, and all retail customers in that zone pay those costs.

The Virginia case illustrates the imposition of transmission costs by data centers on other PJM customers. These additional transmission costs are in addition to the significant capacity market costs imposed on other customers by the actual and forecast addition of large data centers.

The main focus of PJM's planning requirements has been to ensure adequate transmission to allow for generation to reliably serve load. Historically, PJM has had enough excess generation to serve the forecasted load in the RTEP process. In recent years, due in part to the significant increase in load resulting from large load data center interconnection requests and an increase in thermal unit deactivations, meeting forecasted loads and reserves with existing generation has become an issue. In order to solve the RTEP study cases, PJM must make assumptions about the existing and future generation to include in the RTEP model based on the need to serve load. The RTEP analysis first includes all existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied. When the forecasted load exceeds the expected in service generation, the RTEP analysis includes future generation. Planned generators with a signed interconnection service agreement (ISA) or generation interconnection agreement (GIA), or that cleared a BRA, are included. When the PJM load in the RTEP analysis exceeds the sum of existing generation and generation with an executed final agreement, the RTEP analysis simply adds speculative new generation that is in its Phase 3

41 OATT Part V §114.

42 See "*Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) Recommendations to the PJM Board*," December 2023. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2023/20231205/20231205-pjm-teac-board-whitepaper-december-2023.ashx>.

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system impact study status to meet the load. If needed, additional generation (pre-GIA stage or with a suspended status) may be modeled (assumed) consistent with the procedures noted in Manual 14B.[43] [44] The RTEP analysis is not adequately coordinated with PJM markets analysis including the energy and capacity markets. In effect, the RTEP process could result in building expensive transmission based on speculation about the location and type of capacity additions and load additions. The related impacts are exacerbated by the uncertainty about the actual additions of large data centers. This approach to planning is inefficient and unsustainable.

43 See "Review of 2025 RTEP Assumptions," presented at the January 7, 2025 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2025/20250107/20250107-item-11---2025-rtep-assumption.pdf>.
44 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).


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# Generation Interconnection Planning

## Existing Generation Mix

Table 12-1 shows the existing PJM capacity by control zone and unit type.[45] [46] As of June 30, 2026, PJM had an installed capacity of 202,384.2 MW, of which 37,741.4 MW (18.6 percent) are coal fired steam units, 57,047.7 MW (28.2 percent) are combined cycle units, 7,563.1 MW (3.7 percent) are hydro units (including both pumped storage and run of river) and 33,452.6 MW (16.5 percent) are nuclear units. This measure of installed capacity differs from capacity market installed capacity because it includes energy only units, external units and uses nameplate values for solar and wind resources.

The AEP Zone has the most installed capacity of any PJM zone. Of the 202,384.2 MW of PJM installed capacity, 38,424.2 MW (19.0 percent) are in the AEP Zone, of which 13,463.0 MW (35.1 percent) are coal fired steam units, 9,294.0 MW (24.2 percent) are combined cycle units and 2,071.0 MW (5.4 percent) are nuclear units.

**Table 12-1 Existing capacity: June 30, 2026 (By zone and unit type (MW))[47]**

| Zone | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACEC | 0.0 | 781.6 | 395.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 5.4 | 68.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 1,264.3 |
| AEP | 0.0 | 9,294.0 | 4,028.2 | 16.2 | 4.8 | 0.0 | 66.0 | 420.9 | 2,071.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.4 | 4,660.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13,463.0 | 738.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,641.2 | 0.0 | 38,424.2 |
| AMPT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| APS | 33.0 | 2,843.7 | 1,223.3 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 129.2 | 0.0 | 22.4 | 0.0 | 18.3 | 642.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,119.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,040.0 | 0.0 | 11,073.7 |
| ATSI | 0.0 | 5,571.0 | 1,383.0 | 183.0 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,134.0 | 0.0 | 5.5 | 4.7 | 757.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 325.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,505.6 |
| BGE | 3.5 | 0.0 | 267.6 | 215.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,716.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 31.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,273.0 | 17.5 | 702.0 | 57.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,287.8 |
| COMED | 104.5 | 4,631.1 | 6,153.3 | 226.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,473.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 59.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,646.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,633.2 | 0.0 | 29,941.8 |
| DAY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 897.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 34.0 | 0.0 | 742.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,674.3 |
| DUKE | 10.0 | 522.2 | 598.0 | 56.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 112.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.8 | 289.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,252.0 | 47.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,891.9 |
| DUQ | 0.0 | 306.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.3 | 1,777.0 | 14.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 54.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,172.9 |
| DOM | 184.7 | 9,138.0 | 3,835.3 | 256.4 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 3,003.0 | 586.3 | 3,581.3 | 0.0 | 18.0 | 92.7 | 5,678.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,473.2 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 318.4 | 790.0 | 0.0 | 30,021.1 |
| DPL | 0.0 | 1,742.5 | 978.2 | 478.2 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 86.0 | 14.1 | 776.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 710.0 | 153.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,038.0 |
| EKPC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 774.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 205.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,687.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,802.0 |
| JCPLC | 192.8 | 2,115.5 | 683.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 140.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 497.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,629.3 |
| MEC | 0.0 | 2,595.0 | 2.0 | 398.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.9 | 430.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.0 | 35.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,650.4 |
| OVEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,388.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,388.8 |
| PECO | 0.0 | 4,089.0 | 0.0 | 828.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,070.0 | 572.0 | 4,546.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 765.3 | 0.0 | 103.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,978.0 |
| PE | 28.4 | 1,900.0 | 422.1 | 57.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 513.0 | 77.8 | 0.0 | 120.1 | 28.0 | 11.0 | 338.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,169.5 | 610.0 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 1,347.9 | 0.0 | 9,665.2 |
| PEPCO | 0.0 | 1,736.5 | 770.2 | 258.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.7 | 35.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,164.1 | 0.0 | 52.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,025.1 |
| PPL | 20.0 | 5,558.5 | 234.0 | 36.0 | 20.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 706.6 | 2,520.0 | 12.0 | 5.0 | 14.7 | 220.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,859.9 | 3,137.0 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 216.5 | 0.0 | 14,589.8 |
| PSEG | 7.7 | 4,223.1 | 963.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 3,493.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 236.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 179.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,119.3 |
| XIC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 670.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,140.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,330.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 3,240.6 |
| Total | 584.6 | 57,047.7 | 24,279.0 | 3,024.4 | 43.8 | 32.0 | 4,792.0 | 2,771.1 | 33,452.6 | 168.9 | 180.5 | 254.8 | 15,726.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37,741.4 | 7,606.9 | 855.0 | 1,046.5 | 12,776.3 | 0.0 | 202,384.2 |

45 The unit type RICE refers to Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines.
46 XIC refers to external installed capacity.
47 The capacity described in this section refers to all capacity in PJM at the summer installed capacity rating, regardless of whether the capacity entered the RPM Auction.

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Table 12-2 shows the installed capacity by state for each fuel type. Pennsylvania has the most installed capacity of any PJM state. Of the 202,384.2 MW of installed capacity, 47,646.3 MW (23.5 percent) are in Pennsylvania, of which 6,109.4 MW (12.8 percent) are coal fired steam units, 18,292.2 MW (38.4 percent) are combined cycle units and 8,843.8 MW (18.6 percent) are nuclear units.

### Table 12-2 Existing capacity: June 30, 2026 (By state and unit type (MW))

| State | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DC | 0.0 | 19.5 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25.5 |
| DE | 0.0 | 742.5 | 325.5 | 116.3 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 710.0 | 0.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,052.4 |
| IL | 104.5 | 4,631.1 | 6,153.3 | 226.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,473.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 59.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,646.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,633.2 | 0.0 | 29,941.8 |
| IN | 0.0 | 1,835.0 | 441.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 1,432.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,923.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,353.2 | 0.0 | 9,997.4 |
| KY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,618.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 382.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,687.0 | 278.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,101.1 |
| MD | 3.5 | 2,717.0 | 1,684.5 | 489.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,716.0 | 0.0 | 74.0 | 18.9 | 1,063.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,273.0 | 1,181.6 | 855.0 | 191.0 | 349.9 | 0.0 | 11,617.9 |
| MI | 0.0 | 994.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.8 | 2,071.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,089.4 |
| NC | 0.0 | 165.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 315.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18.0 | 0.0 | 1,321.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 397.0 | 0.0 | 2,216.5 |
| NJ | 200.5 | 7,120.2 | 2,041.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 140.0 | 5.0 | 3,493.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 14.4 | 802.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 179.1 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 14,012.9 |
| OH | 10.0 | 11,558.2 | 4,626.2 | 255.2 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 2,134.0 | 0.0 | 34.0 | 9.5 | 4,495.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,820.0 | 47.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 1,288.0 | 0.0 | 31,619.5 |
| PA | 49.9 | 18,292.2 | 1,545.5 | 1,334.5 | 20.6 | 0.0 | 1,583.0 | 1,445.7 | 8,843.8 | 168.9 | 38.5 | 75.8 | 1,202.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,109.4 | 4,872.3 | 0.0 | 234.0 | 1,829.8 | 0.0 | 47,646.3 |
| TN | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| VA | 184.7 | 8,973.0 | 4,092.3 | 591.4 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 3,069.0 | 460.1 | 3,581.3 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 98.7 | 4,793.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,468.2 | 515.0 | 0.0 | 236.4 | 26.0 | 0.0 | 28,113.4 |
| WV | 31.5 | 0.0 | 1,073.9 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 189.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 120.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12,484.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 791.7 | 0.0 | 14,709.4 |
| XIC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 670.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,140.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,330.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 3,240.6 |
| Total | 584.6 | 57,047.7 | 24,279.0 | 3,024.4 | 43.8 | 32.0 | 4,792.0 | 2,771.1 | 33,452.6 | 168.9 | 180.5 | 254.8 | 15,726.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37,741.4 | 7,606.9 | 855.0 | 1,046.5 | 12,776.3 | 0.0 | 202,384.2 |

Table 12-3 and Figure 12-1 show the age of existing PJM generators, by unit type, as of June 30, 2026. Of the 202,384.2 MW of installed capacity, 76,094.5 MW (37.6 percent) are from units older than 40 years, of which 30,189.3 MW (39.7 percent) are coal fired steam units, 255.0 MW (0.3 percent) are combined cycle units, 7,152.2 MW (9.4 percent) are hydro units (including both pumped storage and run of river) and 26,711.6 MW (35.1 percent) are nuclear units.

### Table 12-3 Capacity (MW) by unit type and age (years): June 30, 2026

| Age (years) | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Less than 20 | 584.6 | 36,580.4 | 2,404.4 | 0.0 | 43.8 | 32.0 | 0.0 | 293.6 | 0.0 | 134.5 | 0.0 | 148.3 | 15,726.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,440.0 | 82.0 | 0.0 | 47.4 | 12,505.8 | 0.0 | 71,023.4 |
| 20 to 40 | 0.0 | 20,212.3 | 21,409.8 | 478.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 117.3 | 6,741.0 | 34.4 | 22.0 | 90.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,112.1 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 708.1 | 270.5 | 0.0 | 55,266.2 |
| 40 to 60 | 0.0 | 255.0 | 350.8 | 2,517.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,586.0 | 383.1 | 26,711.6 | 0.0 | 140.5 | 15.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 26,605.5 | 4,829.4 | 855.0 | 85.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 67,335.4 |
| Greater than 60 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 114.0 | 28.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 206.0 | 1,977.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,583.8 | 2,625.5 | 0.0 | 206.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,759.1 |
| Total | 584.6 | 57,047.7 | 24,279.0 | 3,024.4 | 43.8 | 32.0 | 4,792.0 | 2,771.1 | 33,452.6 | 168.9 | 180.5 | 254.8 | 15,726.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37,741.4 | 7,606.9 | 855.0 | 1,046.5 | 12,776.3 | 0.0 | 202,384.2 |



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## Figure 12-1 Capacity (MW) by age (years): June 30, 2026






Figure 12-2 is a map of units, less than 20 MW in size that came online between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2026. A mapping to these unit names is in Table 12-4.

## Figure 12-2 Map of unit additions (less than 20 MW): January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2026




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
## Table 12-4 Unit identification for map of unit additions (less than 20 MW): January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2026

| ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ACE CAPE MAY COUNTY 1 LF | 56 | COM GRAND RIDGE 6 BT | 111 | JC FRENCHTOWN 2 SP | 166 | PN CLARION BOARDS 2 CT | 221 | PS LUMBERTON STACY HAINES 5 SP | 276 | VP OCCOQUAN 1 LF |
| 2 | ACE CATES ROAD 2 SP | 57 | COM MAGID GLOVE 1 BT | 112 | JC FRENCHTOWN 3 SP | 167 | PN COBALT 1 SP | 222 | PS MANTUA CREEK 7 BT | 277 | VP OCCOQUAN 2 LF |
| 3 | ACE CEDAR BRANCH 1 SP | 58 | COM MORRIS 1 LF | 113 | JC HANOVER 2 SP | 168 | PN GARRETT 1 BT | 223 | PS MARION SOLAR 1 SP | 278 | VP OCEANA 1 SP |
| 4 | ACE EGG HARBOR-KELLOGG 1 FC | 59 | COM ORCHARD 1 LF | 114 | JC HARMONY 1 SP | 169 | PN LAUREL HIGHLANDS 2 LF | 224 | PS MATRIX PA SOLAR 2 SP | 279 | VP PULLER 1 SP |
| 5 | ACE GALLOWAY LANDFILL 2 SP | 60 | COM SOLBERG 1 BT | 115 | JC HIGH STREET 6 SP | 170 | PN LISTONBURG 1 SP | 225 | PS MAYWOOD SOLAR 1 SP | 280 | VP QUILLWORT 4 SP |
| 6 | ACE GEMS LANDFILL 1 SP | 61 | COM STERLING RAIL 1 BT | 116 | JC HOFFMAN STATION ROAD 2 SP | 171 | PN MEYERSDALE 2 BT | 226 | PS METRO HQ 2 SP | 281 | VP REMINGTON 1 SP |
| 7 | ACE KETTLE RUN 1 SP | 62 | DEOK BECKJORD 1 BT | 117 | JC HOLLAND 4 SP | 172 | PN MILAN ENERGY 1 D | 227 | PS MIDDLESEX 1 SP | 282 | VP ROCHAMBEAU 1 SP |
| 8 | ACE MAYS LANDING 1 SP | 63 | DEOK BECKJORD 2 BT | 118 | JC HOLLAND-MORRISPA 8 SP | 173 | PN NORTH MESHOPPEN 1 CT | 228 | PS MILL CREEK 1 SP | 283 | VP SCOTT - POWHATAN 3 HB |
| 9 | ACE MIDTOWN THERMAL 2 CT | 64 | DEOK BROWN COUNTY 1 LF | 119 | JC HOLMDEL 9 SP | 174 | PN OXBOW CREEK ENERGY CENTER 1 D | 229 | PS MOORESTOWN 1 SP | 284 | VP SHANDS ENERGY 2 BT |
| 10 | ACE MONROE - SICKLERVILLE 1 SP | 65 | DEOK CLINTON 1 BT | 120 | JC HOWELL 1 SP | 175 | PN SAMARITAN 1 SP | 230 | PS MT LAUREL 1 SP | 285 | VP TWITTYS CREEK 1 SP |
| 11 | ACE OAK FAIRTON 1 SP | 66 | DEOK NICKEL - CIN ZOO 1 SP | 121 | JC HOWELL 4 BT | 176 | PN WHITETAIL 1 SP | 231 | PS NATIONAL PARK 1 SP | 286 | VP VIRGINIA OFFSHORE 1 WF |
| 12 | ACE PEAR STREET 1 SP | 67 | DEOK WILLEY 1 BT | 122 | JC JACOBSTOWN 1 SP | 177 | PS ALDENE SOLAR 1 SP | 232 | PS NEW MILFORD SOLAR 1 SP | 287 | VP WAN - GLOUCESTER 1 SP |
| 13 | ACE PILESGROVE 1 SP | 68 | DPL BLOOM ENERGY 1 FC | 123 | JC JUNCTION ROAD 6 SP | 178 | PS ATHENIA SOLAR 1 SP | 233 | PS NEW ROAD 1 SP | 288 | VP WHITAKERS 1 SP |
| 14 | ACE PILESGROVE 2 SP | 69 | DPL BUCKTOWN 1 SP | 124 | JC LAKEHURST 3 SP | 179 | PS BAYONNE 1 SP | 234 | PS NEWARK SOLAR 1 SP | 289 | VP WHITE MARSH - SUFFOLK 1 SP |
| 15 | ACE PITTSGROVE 1 SP | 70 | DPL CHURCH HILL 1 SP | 125 | JC LEBANON 1 SP | 180 | PS BAYONNE SOLAR 2 SP | 235 | PS NEWARK SOLAR 3 SP | 290 | VP WOODBINE ROAD 1 SP |
| 16 | ACE SEASHORE 1 SP | 71 | DPL COSTEN 1 SP | 126 | JC LEGLER LANDFILL 7 SP | 181 | PS BELLEVILLE SOLAR 1 SP | 236 | PS NIXON LANE 2 SP | | |
| 17 | ACE TANSBORO ROAD 1 FC | 72 | DPL COSTEN 2 SP | 127 | JC MANALAPAN 1 SP | 182 | PS BENNETTS SOLAR 1 SP | 237 | PS NORTH AMERICAN 4 SP | | |
| 18 | AEP BALLS GAP 1 BT | 73 | DPL HEBRON 1 SP | 128 | JC MILLHURST 3 SP | 183 | PS BLACK ROCK 1 SP | 238 | PS NORTH AVE SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 19 | AEP CHARLESTON 1 LF | 74 | DPL KUMQUAT 1 SP | 129 | JC MOUNT OLIVE 3 SP | 184 | PS BRIDGEWATER SOLAR 2 SP | 239 | PS OWENS CORNING 1 SP | | |
| 20 | AEP CLOYDS MT 1 LF | 75 | DPL PONDTOWN 1 SP | 130 | JC MUDDY FORGE 3 SP | 185 | PS BUSTLETON 2 SP | 240 | PS PARKLANDS 1 SP | | |
| 21 | AEP DEERCREEK 1 SP | 76 | DPL WORCESTER NORTH 1 SP | 131 | JC NORTH HANOVER 4 SP | 186 | PS CALDWELL PUMP 2 BT | 241 | PS PATERSON PLANK ROAD 1 SP | | |
| 22 | AEP EAST WATERVLIET 1 SP | 77 | DPL WORCESTER SOUTH 2 SP | 132 | JC NORTH PARK 1 SP | 187 | PS CAMPUS DRIVE 2 SP | 242 | PS PENNINGTON 3 BT | | |
| 23 | AEP OLIVE 1 SP | 78 | DPL WYE MILLS 1 SP | 133 | JC NORTH PARK 2 SP | 188 | PS CEDAR GROVE SOLAR 1 SP | 243 | PS PENNINGTON 4 SP | | |
| 24 | AEP ORCHARD HILLS 1 LF | 79 | DUQ BE-PINE 1 SP | 134 | JC NORTH RUN 11 SP | 189 | PS CEDAR LANE FLORENCE 6 SP | 244 | PS PENNSAUKEN 1 LF | | |
| 25 | AEP RALEIGH COUNTY 1 LF | 80 | DUQ BE-PINE 2 SP | 135 | JC OLD BRIDGE 1 SP | 190 | PS COOK ROAD SOLAR 2 SP | 245 | PS PENNSAUKEN 3 SP | | |
| 26 | AEP TRENT 1 BT | 81 | DUQ PIT MICROGRID 1 CT | 136 | JC PAUCH 3 SP | 191 | PS COOPER HOSPITAL 1 BT | 246 | PS PRINCETON HOSPITAL 1 CT | | |
| 27 | AEP TWINBRANCH 1 SP | 82 | FE DOVETAIL 1 CT | 137 | JC PEMBERTON 1 SP | 192 | PS COOPER HOSPITAL 15 SP | 247 | PS RARITAN CENTER 3 SP | | |
| 28 | AEP ZANESVILLE 2 LF | 83 | FE ERIE COUNTY 1 LF | 138 | JC PEMBERTON 2 SP | 193 | PS CRANBURY 2 SP | 248 | PS REEVES EAST 3 SP | | |
| 29 | AP BAKER POINT 1 SP | 84 | FE GENEVA 1 LF | 139 | JC QUAKERTOWN 12 SP | 194 | PS CROSSWIC 1 SP | 249 | PS REEVES SOUTH 1 SP | | |
| 30 | AP BIGGS FORD 1 SP | 85 | FE LORAIN 1 LF | 140 | JC QUAKERTOWN 9 SP | 195 | PS CROSSWIC 2 SP | 250 | PS REEVES WEST 4 SP | | |
| 31 | AP DOUBLE TOLLGATE SP | 86 | FE MAHONING 1 LF | 141 | JC RICHLINE 3 SP | 196 | PS DEVILSBROOK 1 SP | 251 | PS RIDER UNIVERSITY 3 SP | | |
| 32 | AP EAST HAGERSTOWN 1 SP | 87 | FE WARREN-EVERGREEN 1 CT | 142 | JC RINGOES 1 SP | 197 | PS DOREMUS SOLAR 1 SP | 252 | PS RIVER ROAD 2 SP | | |
| 33 | AP ELK HILL 1 SP | 88 | JC AUGUSTA 1 SP | 143 | JC ROY ROAD 5 BT | 198 | PS E RUTHERFORD SOLAR 1 SP | 253 | PS ROSELAND SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 34 | AP GANS 5 SP | 89 | JC BEAVER RUN 3 SP | 144 | JC SOUTH COMBE 2 SP | 199 | PS EASTAMPTON 1 SP | 254 | PS RUTGERS GENERATION 1 F | | |
| 35 | AP HAGERSTOWN 1 SP | 90 | JC BERKSHIRE 2 SP | 145 | JC SUSSEX 1 LF | 200 | PS EDISON 1 SP | 255 | PS SADDLE BROOK SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 36 | AP HP HOOD 1 CT | 91 | JC BERNARDS TOWNSHIP 1 SP | 146 | JC TINTON FALLS 3 SP | 201 | PS ESSEX 105 CT | 256 | PS SPRINGFIELD SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 37 | AP JADE MEADOW 1 SP | 92 | JC BRICKYARD 4 SP | 147 | JC UPPER FREEHOLD 1 SP | 202 | PS FAIRLAWN SOLAR 1 SP | 257 | PS SUNNYMEADE SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 38 | AP LETZBURG - ELK HILL 2 SP | 93 | JC BRIGHT ROAD 2 BT | 148 | JC WANTAGE 2 SP | 203 | PS FOODBANK 1 SP | 258 | PS TAYLORS LANE 1 SP | | |
| 39 | AP MAHONING CREEK 1 H | 94 | JC COPPER HILL 4 SP | 149 | JC WARREN 1 SP | 204 | PS FORTY NINTH SOLAR 1 SP | 259 | PS THOROFARE SOLAR 2 SP | | |
| 40 | AP MT ST MARYS PV PARK 2 SP | 95 | JC CYPHERS ROAD 5 SP | 150 | JC WASHBURN AVE 4 SP | 205 | PS GLOUCESTER SOLAR 1 SP | 260 | PS TURNPIKE 1 SP | | |
| 41 | AP PECHIN 2 SP | 96 | JC DIXSOLAR 51 SP | 151 | JC WASHINGTON - MORRISPA 2 SP | 206 | PS HACKENSACK 1 SP | 261 | PS W CALDWELL SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 42 | AP PINESBURG 1 SP | 97 | JC DIXSOLAR 52 SP | 152 | ME GLENDON 1 LF | 207 | PS HIGHLAND PARK 3 BT | 262 | PS W CALDWELL SOLAR 2 SP | | |
| 43 | AP SPRING LANE 1 SP | 98 | JC DOMIN LANE 1 SP | 153 | ME READING HOSPITAL 1 CT | 208 | PS HIGHLAND PARK 4 SP | 263 | PS WALDWICK SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 44 | AP STATE COLLEGE 1 BT | 99 | JC DURBAN AVENUE 1 SP | 154 | PE MORRIS ROAD 1 D | 209 | PS HILLSDALE SOLAR 1 SP | 264 | PS WEST ORANGE SOLAR 1 SP | | |
| 45 | AP UNION BRIDGE 1 SP | 100 | JC E FLEMINGTON 5 SP | 155 | PEP CAPITAL POWER PLANT 1 CT | 210 | PS HINCHMANS SOLAR 1 SP | 265 | PS WEST PEMBERTON 1 SP | | |
| 46 | BC ALPHA RIDGE 1 LF | 101 | JC EAST AMWELL 7 SP | 156 | PEP ROLLINS AVENUE 3 SP | 211 | PS HOBOKEN SOLAR 2 SP | 266 | PS WEST WINDSOR 1 CT | | |
| 47 | BC BRIGHTON DAM 1 H | 102 | JC EGYPT 3 SP | 157 | PEP SPECTRUM 1 SP | 212 | PS HOPEWELL 1 SP | 267 | VP BUCKINGHAM 1 SP | | |
| 48 | BC CHESAPEAKE BEACH 1 BT | 103 | JC FISCHER 8 SP | 158 | PL DART CONTAINER 1-2 LF | 213 | PS HOPEWELL 2 BT | 268 | VP CAMELLIA - WAN 2 SP | | |
| 49 | BC FAIRHAVEN 2 BT | 104 | JC FOUL RIFT 8 SP | 159 | PL HOLTWOOD 11 | 214 | PS JACKSON SOLAR 1 SP | 269 | VP COASTAL VIRGINIA T2G07 - 2 WF | | |
| 50 | BC FAIRVIEW - OTTERPT 1SP | 105 | JC FOUL RIFT ROAD 1 SP | 160 | PL HOLTWOOD 13 | 215 | PS KINSLEY BEAVER 2 SP | 270 | VP COLICE HALL 1 SP | | |
| 51 | BC FAIRVIEW - OTTERPT 2SP | 106 | JC FRANKFORD 4 SP | 161 | PL KEYSTONE 1 SP | 216 | PS KINSLEY DEPTFORD 1 SP | 271 | VP GARDNER FARMS 1 SP | | |
| 52 | BC KINGSVILLE 1 SP | 107 | JC FRANKLIN 7 SP | 162 | PL PA SOLAR 1 SP | 217 | PS KUSER SOLAR 1 SP | 272 | VP GARDYS MILL ROAD 5 SP | | |
| 53 | BC MILLERSVILLE 1 LF | 108 | JC FREEMALL 1 FC | 163 | PL TURKEY HILL 1 WF | 218 | PS LANDFILL 5 SP | 273 | VP HOLLYFIELD 1 SP | | |
| 54 | COM COUNTRYSIDE 1 LF | 109 | JC FRENCHES 2 SP | 164 | PN ALPACA GLORY BARN 1 D | 219 | PS LAWNSIDE 14 BT | 274 | VP MURPHY 1 SP | | |
| 55 | COM DIXON LEE 5 LF | 110 | JC FRENCHTOWN 1 SP | 165 | PN CARDINAL - CLARKSUM 1 SP | 220 | PS LEONIA SOLAR 1 SP | 275 | VP NORTHEAST 2 LF | | |


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Figure 12-3 is a map of units, 20 MW or greater in size, that came online between January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2026. A mapping to these unit names is in Table 12-5.

**Figure 12-3 Map of unit additions (20 MW or greater): January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2026**




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## Table 12-5 Unit identification for map of unit additions (20 MW or greater): January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2026

| ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ACE CLAYVILLE 1 CT | 56 | AEP UNION RIDGE 1 SP | 111 | COM GREEN RIVER 2 WF | 166 | FE ARCHE ENERGY 1 SP | 221 | PL SWIFTWATER 1 SP | 276 | VP DOSWELL 2 CT | 331 | VP WAVERLY 1 SP |
| 2 | ACE VINELAND 11 CT | 57 | AEP VIRGINIA CITY 1 F | 112 | COM HIGHPOINT 11 SP | 167 | FE BIG PLAIN 2 SP | 222 | PL WALKER 1 SP | 277 | VP DOSWELL 3 CT | 332 | VP WAVERLY 2 SP |
| 3 | ACE WEST DEPTFORD CROWN POINT 1 CC | 58 | AEP WAPAHANI - RIVERSTART IV 1 SP | 113 | COM HILLTOPPER 1 WF | 168 | FE FREMONT 1 SCCT | 223 | PN ASPEN ROAD 1 SP | 278 | VP DRY BREAD 1 SP | 333 | VP WHITEHORN 1 SP |
| 4 | AEP ALTAVISTA 1 SP | 59 | AEP WILDCAT 1A WF | 114 | COM JOLIET 1 BT | 169 | FE FREMONT 2 SCCT | 224 | PN BEAVER DAM 1 D | 279 | VP DRY BRIDGE EC 1 BT | 334 | VP WILKINSON ENERGY CENTER 1 SP |
| 5 | AEP AXTON 1 SP | 60 | AEP WILDCAT 1B WF | 115 | COM KELLY CREEK 1 WF | 170 | FE FREMONT ENERGY CENTER 3 CC | 225 | PN BIG LEVEL 1 WF | 280 | VP DULLES 1-2 SP | 335 | VP WINTERBERRY 1 SP |
| 6 | AEP BELLFLOWER 1 SP | 61 | AEP WILLOWBROOK 1 SP | 116 | COM LEE DEKALB 3 BT | 171 | FE HIBBETS MILL SOUTHFIELD 1 CC | 226 | PN CHESTNUT FLATS 1 WF | 281 | VP ELIZABETH CITY 1 SP | | |
| 7 | AEP BITTER RIDGE 1 WF | 62 | AEP WYTHE COUNTY 1 SP | 117 | COM LONE TREE 3 WF | 172 | FE HIBBETS MILL SOUTHFIELD 2 CC | 227 | PN ERIE 1 SP | 282 | VP FOUNTAIN CREEK 1 SP | | |
| 8 | AEP BLUE CREEK 3 WF | 63 | AEP YELLOWBUD 1 SP | 118 | COM MARENGO 1 BT | 173 | FE HICKORY RUN 1 CC | 228 | PN FAIRVIEW 1 CC | 283 | VP FOXHOUND 1 SP | | |
| 9 | AEP BLUE HARVEST 1 SP | 64 | AP BARTONSVILLE 1 SP | 119 | COM MCHENRY 1 BT | 174 | FE LORDSTOWN ENERGY CENTER 1 CC | 229 | PN FAIRVIEW 2 CC | 284 | VP GRASSFIELD 1 SP | | |
| 10 | AEP BLUFF POINT 2 WF | 65 | AP BEECH RIDGE 2 WF | 120 | COM MIDLAND 1 WF | 175 | FE LORDSTOWN ENERGY CENTER 2 CC | 230 | PN HIGHLAND NORTH 2 WF | 285 | VP GREENSVILLE 1 CC | | |
| 11 | AEP CADENCE 1 SP | 66 | AP BEECH RIDGE 3 BT | 121 | COM MINONK 1 WF | 176 | FE MADISON FIELDS 1 SP | 231 | PN LAUREL HILLS 1 WF | 286 | VP GUTENBERG - OCONECHE 1 SP | | |
| 12 | AEP CARROLL COUNTY 1 CC | 67 | AP BLACK ROCK 1 WF | 122 | COM OTTER CREEK 1 WF | 177 | FE MARION COUNTY 1 SP | 232 | PN LIBERTY ASYLUM 10 F | 287 | VP HARTS MILL 1 SP | | |
| 13 | AEP CARROLL COUNTY 2 CC | 68 | AP BLAIRS VALLEY 12 SP | 123 | COM PILOT HILL 1 WF | 178 | FE MONTPELIER 1 SP | 233 | PN LIBERTY ASYLUM 20 F | 288 | VP HAWTREE CREEK 1 SP | | |
| 14 | AEP DODSON CREEK 1 SP | 69 | AP BLAKE 1 SP | 124 | COM RADFORDS RUN 1 WF | 179 | FE OREGON ENERGY CENTER 1 CC | 234 | PN MAPLE HILL-FIDDLERS 1 SP | 289 | VP IVORY LANE 1 SP | | |
| 15 | AEP DRESDEN 1 CC | 70 | AP CAPON BRIDGE 1 SP | 125 | COM SHADY OAKS 1 WF | 180 | FE TRUMBULL EC 1 CC | 235 | PN MEHOOPANY 1 WF | 290 | VP IVY NECK 2 SP | | |
| 16 | AEP ELKHART COUNTY - MCNUTT 1 SP | 71 | AP CPV BACKBONE 1 SP | 126 | COM SHADY OAKS 2 WF | 181 | FE WHEATSBOROUGH 1 SP | 236 | PN MEHOOPANY 2 WF | 291 | VP KELFORD 1 SP | | |
| 17 | AEP FOWLER RIDGE 4 WF | 72 | AP DANS MOUNTAIN 1 WF | 127 | COM TOP HAT 1 WF | 182 | JC EDGE ROAD 5 BT | 237 | PN PATTON 1 WF | 292 | VP MACKEYS ALBERMAE 1 SP | | |
| 18 | AEP FOX SQUIRREL 1 SP | 73 | AP FAIR WIND 2 WF | 128 | COM WALNUT RIDGE 1 WF | 183 | JC HAMILTON ROAD 5 SP | 238 | PN PGCOGEN 1 CT | 293 | VP MECHANICSVILLE 2 SP | | |
| 19 | AEP GREAT BEND 1 SP | 74 | AP FOURMILE RIDGE 1 WF | 129 | COM WEST CHICAGO 3 BT | 184 | JC JUSTIN COURT 10 BT | 239 | PN PGCOGEN 2 CT | 294 | VP MOCCASIN CREEK - FERN 1 SP | | |
| 20 | AEP GROVER HILL 1 WF | 75 | AP FOXGLOVE 1 SP | 130 | COM WHITNEY HILL 2 WF | 185 | JC MONTAGUE STORAGE 3 BT | 240 | PN RINGER HILL 1 WF | 295 | VP MONTROSS 1 SP | | |
| 21 | AEP GUERNSEY 11 CC | 76 | AP GREAT COVE 1 SP | 131 | DAY BUCKEYE PLAINS 2 SP | 186 | JC OAK RIDGE 3 SP | 241 | PN ROGUE 1 WF | 296 | VP MOON CORNER 1 SP | | |
| 22 | AEP GUERNSEY 21 CC | 77 | AP GREAT COVE 2 SP | 132 | DAY CLEARVIEW 1 SP | 187 | JC PLUMSTED ENERGY 6 BT | 242 | PN SANDY RIDGE 1 WF | 297 | VP MORGAN CORNER 1 SP | | |
| 23 | AEP GUERNSEY 31 CC | 78 | AP GREENE COUNTY 1 CC | 133 | DAY CLINTON - EASTFORK 1 SP | 188 | JC SAYREVILLE 3 CT | 243 | PN SANDY RIDGE 2 WF | 298 | VP NEW CREEK 1 WF | | |
| 24 | AEP HARDIN 12 SP | 79 | AP LAUREL MOUNTAIN 1 BT | 134 | DAY FAYETTE 1 SP | 189 | JC WARREN GLEN 6 BT | 244 | PN SCHOOL HOUSE 1 SP | 299 | VP NEWSOMS 1 SP | | |
| 25 | AEP HARDIN 23 SP | 80 | AP LAUREL MOUNTAIN 1 WF | 135 | DAY HIGHLAND COUNTY 1 SP | 190 | JC WOODBRIDGE 1 CC | 245 | PN SUGAR RUN 2 CT | 300 | VP NORGE 2 SP | | |
| 26 | AEP HARDIN 34 SP | 81 | AP LEGORE BRIDGE 1 SP | 136 | DAY HIGHLAND COUNTY 2 SP | 191 | JC WOODBRIDGE 2 CC | 246 | PN VIADUCT 1 SP | 301 | VP OAK 1 SP | | |
| 27 | AEP HEADWATERS 1 WF | 82 | AP MARLOWE 1 SP | 137 | DAY HIGHLAND COUNTY 3-4 SP | 192 | ME ADAMS 1 SP | 247 | PS KEARNY 131 CT | 302 | VP OAK TRAIL 1 SP | | |
| 28 | AEP HEADWATERS 2 WF | 83 | AP NORTH LONGVIEW 1 F | 138 | DAY PICKAWAY COUNTY 1 SP | 193 | ME BIRDSBORO 1 CC | 248 | PS KEARNY 132 CT | 303 | VP PANDA STONEWALL 1 CC | | |
| 29 | AEP HOG CREEK 1 WF | 84 | AP PINNACLE 1 WF | 139 | DAY TAIT 8 BT | 194 | ME COTTONTAIL 1 SP | 249 | PS KEARNY 133 CT | 304 | VP PECAN 1 SP | | |
| 30 | AEP HONEYSUCKLE 1 SP | 85 | AP ROTH ROCK 1 WF | 140 | DEOK HILLCREST 1 SP | 195 | ME COTTONTAIL 2 SP | 250 | PS KEARNY 134 CT | 305 | VP PINE GLADE 1 SP | | |
| 31 | AEP INDECK NILES ENERGY CENTER 1 CC | 86 | AP SOUTH CHESTNUT 1 WF | 141 | DEOK MELDAHL DAM 1 H | 196 | ME COTTONTAIL 8 SP | 251 | PS KEARNY 141 CT | 306 | VP PINEY CREEK 1 SP | | |
| 32 | AEP LONG RIDGE ENERGY 1 CC | 87 | AP ST THOMAS 1 SP | 142 | DEOK MIDDLETOWN ENERGY 1 CC | 197 | ME LYONS 1 SP | 252 | PS KEARNY 142 CT | 307 | VP PLEASANT HILL - SUFFOLK 2 SP | | |
| 33 | AEP MAMMOTH NORTH 1 SP | 88 | AP ST THOMAS 2 SP | 143 | DEOK NESTLEWOOD 1 SP | 198 | PE DELTA 1-4 CC | 253 | PS NEWARK ENERGY CENTER 10 CC | 308 | VP POCATY 1 SP | | |
| 34 | AEP MAPLEWOOD 1 SP | 89 | AP TWIN RIDGES 1 WF | 144 | DEOK YANKEE 1 F | 199 | PE DELTA 5-7 CC | 254 | PS SEWAREN 7 CC | 309 | VP POWELLS CREEK 1 SP | | |
| 35 | AEP MARK CENTER 1 SP | 90 | AP WARRIOR RUN 2 BT | 145 | DPL CHERRYDALE 1 SP | 200 | PEP KEYS ENERGY CENTER 1 CC | 255 | VP ALTON POST OFFICE 1 SP | 310 | VP POWHATAN 2 SP | | |
| 36 | AEP MARTIN COUNTY 1 SP | 91 | AP WESTMORELAND 1 CC | 146 | DPL CHERRYWOOD 1 SP | 201 | PEP MILLS GROVE 1 SP | 256 | VP AMERICAN BEECH 1 SP | 311 | VP PROSPECT POWER 1 BT | | |
| 37 | AEP MEADOW LAKE 5 WF | 92 | AP WILLIAMSPORT 3 SP | 147 | DPL DEMEC - CLAYTON 2 CT | 202 | PEP ST CHARLES - KELSON RIDGE 1 CC | 257 | VP AULANDER HOLLOMAN 1 SP | 312 | VP PUMPKINSEED 1 SP | | |
| 38 | AEP MEADOW LAKE 6 WF | 93 | AP WILLOW ISLAND 1 H | 148 | DPL DORCHESTER COUNTY 1 SP | 203 | PEP ST CHARLES-KELSON RIDGE 1 CC | 258 | VP BEAR GARDEN | 313 | VP RANCHLAND 2 SP | | |
| 39 | AEP PAULDING 3 WF | 94 | AP WS SARISH - SMITH FRANCIS 1 SP | 149 | DPL EGYPT ROAD - MACELANE 1 SP | 204 | PEP ST CHARLES-KELSON RIDGE 2 CC | 259 | VP BLUESTONE FARM 1 SP | 314 | VP RENAN 1 SP | | |
| 40 | AEP PAULDING 41 WF | 95 | BC PERRYMAN 6 CT | 150 | DPL GARRISON EC 1 CC | 205 | PL EAST CHILLI 1 SP | 260 | VP BOOKERS MILL 1 SP | 315 | VP SAPONY 1 SP | | |
| 41 | AEP PAULDING 42 WF | 96 | COM 924 THREE RIVERS EC 1 CC | 151 | DPL GREAT BAY KINGS CREEK 1 SP | 206 | PL HAZEL 1 FW | 261 | VP BRIEL FARM 1 SP | 316 | VP SHILLELAGH 1 SP | | |
| 42 | AEP POWELL CREEK - LAMMER 1 SP | 97 | COM 924 THREE RIVERS EC 2 CC | 152 | DPL GREAT BAY KINGS CREEK 2 SP | 207 | PL HOLTWOOD 18 | 262 | VP BRUNSWICK 1CC | 317 | VP SOLIDAGO 1 SP | | |
| 43 | AEP RIVERSTART 1 SP | 98 | COM 929 JACKSON 1 CC | 153 | DPL JONES FARM LANE 1 SP | 208 | PL HOLTWOOD 19 | 263 | VP BUTCHER CREEK 1 SP | 318 | VP SOUTH BOSTON 1 F | | |
| 44 | AEP RIVERSTART 3 SP | 99 | COM 929 JACKSON 2 CC | 154 | DPL MORGNEC ROAD 1 SP | 209 | PL HUMMEL STATION 1 CC | 264 | VP CARVERS CREEK 1 SP | 319 | VP SPANISH GROVE 1 SP | | |
| 45 | AEP ROSS COUNTY 1 SP | 100 | COM 942 NELSON 1 CC | 155 | DPL OAK HALL 1 SP | 210 | PL HUNLOCK CC | 265 | VP CAVALIER 1 SP | 320 | VP SPOTSYLVANIA 1 SP | | |
| 46 | AEP SALT CITY 1 SP | 101 | COM 942 NELSON 2 CC | 156 | DPL PONDTOWN 2 SP | 211 | PL LACKAWANNA COUNTY 1 CC | 266 | VP CERULEAN 1 SP | 321 | VP SPRING GROVE 1 SP | | |
| 47 | AEP SCIOTO RIDGE 1 WF | 102 | COM 942 NELSON 3 CT | 157 | DPL RED LION 1 FC | 212 | PL LACKAWANNA COUNTY 2 CC | 267 | VP CHESTNUT 1 SP | 322 | VP SPRING GROVE 2 SP | | |
| 48 | AEP ST JOSEPH ENERGY CENTER 1 CC | 103 | COM 942 NELSON 4 CT | 158 | DPL RICHFIELD 3 SP | 213 | PL LACKAWANNA COUNTY 3 CC | 268 | VP CHICKAHOMINY 1 SP | 323 | VP SUMMIT FARMS 1 SP | | |
| 49 | AEP ST JOSEPH SOLAR PARK 1 SP | 104 | COM ALTA FARMS II 1 WF | 159 | DPL TOWNSEND 1 SP | 214 | PL MOXIE FREEDOM 11 CC | 269 | VP CHICKAHOMINY 2 SP | 324 | VP SUNNYBROOK FARM 1 SP | | |
| 50 | AEP SYCAMORE CREEK 1 SP | 105 | COM BISHOP HILL 1 WF | 160 | DPL WILDCAT POINT 1 CC | 215 | PL MOXIE FREEDOM 21 CC | 270 | VP COLONIAL TRAIL WEST 1 SP | 325 | VP TIMBERMILL 1 WF | | |
| 51 | AEP TIMBER ROAD 1 SP | 106 | COM BISHOP HILL 2 WF | 161 | DUQ GAUCHO 2 SP | 216 | PL NORTHUMBERLAND 2 SP | 271 | VP CONETOE 2 SP | 326 | VP UNION CAMP 9-10 F | | |
| 52 | AEP TIMBER2 1 WF | 107 | COM BLOOMING GROVE 1 WF1 | 162 | DUQ MONACA-PENNCHEM 1 CC | 217 | PL PA SOLAR 2 SP | 272 | VP CORRECTIONAL 1 SP | 327 | VP WARDS CREEK 1 SP | | |
| 53 | AEP TRADE POST 1 SP | 108 | COM BRIGHT STALK 1 WF | 163 | EKPC BLUEBIRD 1 SP | 218 | PL PATRIOT 1 F | 273 | VP CRYSTAL HILL 1 SP | 328 | VP WARREN COUNTY FRONT ROYAL CC | | |
| 54 | AEP TRISHE 1 WF | 109 | COM GRAND RIDGE 7 BT | 164 | EKPC GLOVER CREEK 1 SP | 219 | PL PATRIOT 2 F | 274 | VP DESERT 1 WF | 329 | VP WATER STRIDER 1 SP | | |
| 55 | AEP UNION 1 SP | 110 | COM GREEN RIVER 1 WF | 165 | EKPC TURKEY CREEK 1 SP | 220 | PL PENN 3 SP | 275 | VP DESPER 1 SP | 330 | VP WATLINGTON 1 SP | | |


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## Generation Retirements[48] [49] [50]

Generating units generally plan to retire when they are not economic and do not expect to be economic. Generating units may also plan to retire if environmental restrictions make it too costly to comply or impossible to comply. The MMU performs an analysis of the economics of all units that plan to retire in order to verify that the units are not economic and there is no potential exercise of market power through physical withholding that could advantage the owner's portfolio.[51] The definition of economic is that unit net revenues are greater than or equal to the unit's avoidable or going forward costs.

PJM does not have the authority to order generating plants to continue operating. PJM's responsibility is to ensure system reliability. When a unit retirement creates reliability issues based on existing and planned generation facilities and on existing and planned transmission facilities, PJM identifies transmission solutions. The U. S. Department of Energy does have the authority to temporarily order generating plants to continue operating under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act in the event of emergency or reliability issues.[52]

Rules that preserve ownership of the Capacity Interconnection Rights (CIRs) associated with retired units, and with the conversion from Capacity Performance (CP) to energy only status, impose significant costs on new entrants. Currently, CIRs persist for one year if unused, and that period can be further extended, at no cost, if the CIRs are assigned to a new project in the interconnection queue at the same point of interconnection.[53] There are currently no rules governing the retention of CIRs when units want to convert to energy only status or require time to upgrade to retain CP status. The rules governing conversion or upgrades should be the same as the rules governing retired units. Reforms that require the holders of CIRs to use or lose them, and that terminate CIRs on the date of retirement, would make new entry appropriately more attractive. There is no good economic and policy rationale for extending ownership rights to CIRs for inactive units. Incumbent providers receive a significant advantage simply by imposing on new entrants the entire cost of system upgrades needed to accommodate new entrants. In May 2012, PJM stakeholders (through the Interconnection Process Senior Task Force (IPSTF)) modified the rules to reduce the length of time for which CIRs are retained by the current owner after unit retirements from three years to one.[54] The MMU recognized the progress made in this rule change, but it did not fully address the issues. Even if the policy treatment of such CIRs remains unchanged, the rules need to ensure that incumbents cannot exploit control of CIRs to block or postpone entry of competitors or to exercise market power by requiring high payments for CIRs. The MMU recommends that CIRs should end on the date of retirement in order to help ensure competitive markets and competitive access to the grid.

## Replacement Generation Interconnection Service Requests

On January 31, 2025, PJM proposed revisions to the tariff to revise the existing process for transferring CIRs from deactivating generation resources to Replacement Generation Resources.[55] Under the proposed revisions, replacement generation resources are required to have a commercial operation date that is the later of three years after the actual deactivation date of the deactivating generating facility, or the date that the replacement generation project developer executes a GIA (or requests that the GIA be filed unexecuted).[56] The package included three exceptions to the commercial operation date requirements. First, generation resources with industry recognized significant construction timelines are permitted to have a commercial operation date beyond three years. Second, the proposed revisions provides generation resources with a one time option to extend their commercial operation date beyond three years for any cause. Finally, the proposed revisions allow project developers to use the unilateral, one year milestone extension found in the pro forma GIA.

48 See PJM. Planning. "Generator Deactivations," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/gen-deactivations>.
49 Generation retirements reported in this section do not include external units. Therefore, retirement totals reported in this section may not match totals reported elsewhere in this report where external units are included.
50 For additional information on canceled unit retirement requests, see *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 5: Capacity, "Timing of Unit Retirements".
51 See OATT Part V and Attachment M–Appendix § IV.
52 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
53 See OATT § 230.3.3.
54 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER12-1177 (Feb. 29, 2012).
55 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER25-1128 (January 31, 2025).
56 Id. at 7.

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On August 8, 2025, the Commission issued its order rejecting PJM's proposed Tariff revisions.[57] The Commission found that the proposed one-time option for a replacement generation project developer to extend a project's commercial operation date without a maximum time limit for the extension rendered PJM's proposal unjust and unreasonable.

On October 31, 2025, PJM filed a revised replacement generation interconnection service process that addressed the concerns raised by the Commission.[58]

The MMU submitted comments in opposition to the proposed process.[59] The proposed process creates delays by permitting retiring generators to delay the transfer of CIRs for up to a full year for the sole purpose of maximizing the profits from selling the CIRs or gaining a special advantage in jumping the interconnection queue. Retiring generators do not have property rights in the CIRs which depend on the entire transmission grid for their value. The CIR transfer process does nothing to enhance efficiency or the timely replacement of retiring generation resources. The basic purpose of the process is to permit existing generators to sell their CIRs to the highest bidder rather than to identify the best replacement resource. The proposal is inconsistent with open access and the purpose of CIRs. A process that truly reforms CIRs would terminate CIRs immediately at the time a resource deactivates, and thereby avoid undue discrimination, promote competition and facilitate the rapid entry of needed new generation.

On January 29, 2026, the Commission approved the revised tariff revisions to establish the replacement generation interconnection service process.[60]

As of June 30, 2026, four replacement generation interconnection service requests had been submitted. Of the four requests, one request has been withdrawn.[61]

## Generation Retirements 2011 through 2030

As of June 30, 2026, there were 56,414.6 MW of generation that have been retired, of which 41,409.8 MW (73.4 percent) are coal fired steam units. Retirements are primarily a result of the inability of coal and other units to compete with efficient combined cycle units burning low cost gas.

57 192 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2025).
58 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-403 (October 31, 2025).
59 See IMM Comments. *PJM Interconnection L.L.C.* Docket No. ER26-403.

60 194 FERC ¶ 61,079 (2026).
61 See PJM. Planning. "Replacement Generation Interconnection Service Requests," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/services-requests/replacement-generation-interconnection-service-requests.xlsx>.


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## Table 12-6 Summary of unit retirements by unit type (MW): 2011 through 2030

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retirements 2011 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 128.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 543.0 | 522.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,196.5 |
| Retirements 2012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 250.0 | 240.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,907.9 | 0.0 | 548.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,961.9 |
| Retirements 2013 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.9 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,589.9 | 82.0 | 166.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,858.8 |
| Retirements 2014 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 136.0 | 422.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,239.0 | 158.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,970.3 |
| Retirements 2015 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,319.0 | 856.2 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,064.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.4 | 0.0 | 9,262.7 |
| Retirements 2016 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 65.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 243.0 | 74.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 400.4 |
| Retirements 2017 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,038.0 | 34.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,112.8 |
| Retirements 2018 | 1.0 | 425.0 | 0.0 | 38.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 614.5 | 0.0 | 17.2 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,166.5 | 1,016.0 | 148.0 | 108.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,542.7 |
| Retirements 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 346.8 | 51.4 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 805.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,110.5 | 100.3 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,456.3 |
| Retirements 2020 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 232.5 | 24.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,131.8 | 0.0 | 786.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,255.0 |
| Retirements 2021 | 4.0 | 118.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,020.4 | 102.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,310.3 |
| Retirements 2022 | 41.0 | 240.5 | 99.0 | 360.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,385.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,162.4 |
| Retirements 2023 | 0.0 | 114.0 | 52.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 19.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,380.0 | 1,326.0 | 800.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,727.8 |
| Retirements 2024 | 28.5 | 0.0 | 149.2 | 108.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 180.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 527.4 |
| Retirements 2025 | 33.4 | 16.5 | 380.0 | 12.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 15.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 410.0 | 126.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,000.3 |
| Retirements 2026 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 665.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 669.0 |
| Planned Retirements (July 1, 2026 and later) | 89.9 | 0.0 | 1,148.0 | 114.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,117.0 | 760.0 | 702.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,932.3 |
| Total | 239.8 | 914.0 | 4,778.1 | 2,420.1 | 22.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1,419.5 | 0.0 | 84.1 | 166.3 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 46,526.8 | 4,300.8 | 3,160.0 | 302.0 | 10.4 | 0.0 | 64,346.9 |

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Table 12-7 shows the capacity, average size, and average age of units retiring in PJM, from 2011 through 2030, while Table 12-8 shows these retirements by state. Of the 64,346.9 MW of units that have been, or are planned to be, retired from 2011 through 2030, 46,526.8 MW (72.3 percent) are coal fired steam units. These coal fired steam units have an average age of 52.2 years and an average size of 238.6 MW. Over half of the retiring coal fired steam units, 51.1 percent, are located in Ohio or Pennsylvania.

## Table 12-7 Retirements by unit type: 2011 through 2030

| Unit Type | Number of Units | Avg. Size (MW) | Avg. Age at Retirement (Years) | Total MW | Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Battery | 19 | 12.6 | 9.7 | 239.8 | 0.4% |
| Combined Cycle | 8 | 114.3 | 27.0 | 914.0 | 1.4% |
| Combustion Turbine | 161 | 31.5 | 35.2 | 7,220.2 | 11.2% |
| Natural Gas | 85 | 56.2 | 39.5 | 4,778.1 | 7.4% |
| Oil | 70 | 34.6 | 46.9 | 2,420.1 | 3.8% |
| Other | 6 | 3.7 | 19.2 | 22.0 | 0.0% |
| Fuel Cell | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Hydro | 1 | 0.5 | 113.8 | 0.5 | 0.0% |
| Pumped Storage | 1 | 0.5 | 113.8 | 0.5 | 0.0% |
| Run of River | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Nuclear | 2 | 709.8 | 47.2 | 1,419.5 | 2.2% |
| RICE | 49 | 5.1 | 26.9 | 250.4 | 0.4% |
| Natural Gas | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Oil | 18 | 4.7 | 40.3 | 84.1 | 0.1% |
| Other | 31 | 5.4 | 13.4 | 166.3 | 0.3% |
| Solar | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Solar + Storage | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Solar + Wind | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Steam | 239 | 197.2 | 46.1 | 54,289.6 | 84.4% |
| Coal | 195 | 238.6 | 52.2 | 46,526.8 | 72.3% |
| Natural Gas | 26 | 165.4 | 57.9 | 4,300.8 | 6.7% |
| Oil | 9 | 351.1 | 49.1 | 3,160.0 | 4.9% |
| Other | 9 | 33.6 | 25.3 | 302.0 | 0.5% |
| Wind | 1 | 10.4 | 15.6 | 10.4 | 0.0% |
| Wind + Storage | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Total | 481 | 133.8 | 43.4 | 64,346.9 | 100.0% |



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
## Table 12-8 Retirements (MW) by unit type and state: 2011 through 2030

| State | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 240.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 548.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 788.0 |
| DE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 664.0 | 136.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 800.0 |
| IL | 81.5 | 0.0 | 2,168.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 35.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,926.1 | 1,326.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,538.2 |
| IN | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,602.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,602.0 |
| KY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,111.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,111.0 |
| MD | 20.0 | 0.0 | 347.5 | 274.9 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,521.0 | 297.0 | 702.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,169.2 |
| NC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 31.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 324.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 355.5 |
| NJ | 2.0 | 579.5 | 2,060.3 | 1,066.2 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 614.5 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 38.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,001.9 | 932.5 | 148.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,470.3 |
| OH | 64.0 | 16.5 | 0.0 | 421.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 34.3 | 46.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16,607.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17,189.9 |
| PA | 11.4 | 51.0 | 121.4 | 307.3 | 14.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 805.0 | 0.0 | 15.9 | 20.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,180.0 | 1,046.3 | 176.0 | 109.0 | 10.4 | 0.0 | 9,868.2 |
| TN | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 |
| VA | 0.0 | 267.0 | 80.0 | 79.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23.9 | 22.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,897.9 | 563.0 | 1,586.0 | 133.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,652.6 |
| WV | 60.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,691.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,751.9 |
| Total | 239.8 | 914.0 | 4,778.1 | 2,420.1 | 22.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1,419.5 | 0.0 | 84.1 | 166.3 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 46,526.8 | 4,300.8 | 3,160.0 | 302.0 | 10.4 | 0.0 | 64,346.9 |

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Figure 12-4 is a map of unit retirements from 2011 through 2030, with a mapping to unit names in Table 12-9.

### Figure 12-4 Map of unit retirements: 2011 through 2030






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## Table 12-9 Unit identification for map of unit retirements: 2011 through 2030

| ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit | ID | Unit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | AC Landfill Units 1 and 2 | 61 | Chalk Point Unit 2 | 121 | Elrama 3 | 181 | Killen CT | 241 | Notch Cliff GT6 | 301 | Sewaren 4 | 361 | West Lorain B |
| 2 | AES Beaver Valley | 62 | Chambers CCLP | 122 | Elrama 4 | 182 | Kimberly Clark Generator | 242 | Notch Cliff GT7 | 302 | Sewaren 6 | 362 | West Shore CT 1-2 |
| 3 | Albright 1 | 63 | Chesapeake 1-4 | 123 | Essex 10-11 | 183 | Kincaid Unit 1 | 243 | Notch Cliff GT8 | 303 | Sherman Avenue CT1 | 363 | Westport 5 |
| 4 | Albright 2 | 64 | Chesapeake 7-10 | 124 | Essex 12 | 184 | Kincaid Unit 2 | 244 | Oaks Landfill | 304 | Sidney Unit 5 | 364 | Will County 3 |
| 5 | Albright 3 | 65 | Chesterfield 3 | 125 | Essex 9 | 185 | Kinsley Landfill | 245 | Occoquan 1 LF | 305 | Solberg 1 BT | 365 | Will County 4 |
| 6 | Allentown CT 1-4 | 66 | Chesterfield 4 | 126 | Evergreen Power United Corstack | 186 | Kitty Hawk GT 1 | 246 | Ocean County LF | 306 | Southeast Chicago CT11 | 366 | Willey Energy Storage |
| 7 | Armstrong 1 | 67 | Chesterfield 5 | 127 | FE DOVETAIL 1 CT | 187 | Kitty Hawk GT 2 | 247 | Orchard Hills LF | 307 | Southeast Chicago CT12 | 367 | Williamsport-Lycoming CT 1-2 |
| 8 | Armstrong 2 | 68 | Chesterfield 6 | 128 | FRACKVILLE WHEELABRATOR 1 | 188 | Koppers Co. IPP | 248 | Ottawa County Project | 308 | Southeast Chicago CT5 | 368 | Willow Island 1 |
| 9 | Arnold (Green Mtn.) Wind Farm | 69 | Cheswick 1 | 129 | Fairless Hills Landfill A | 189 | Lake Kingman | 249 | Oyster Creek | 309 | Southeast Chicago CT6 | 369 | Willow Island 2 |
| 10 | Ashtabula 5 | 70 | Clinch River 3 | 130 | Fairless Hills Landfill B | 190 | Lake Shore 18 | 250 | PL MARTINS CREEK 1-4 CT | 310 | Southeast Chicago CT7 | 370 | Winnebago Landfill |
| 11 | Avon Lake 10 | 71 | Clinton Battery | 131 | Fauquier County Landfill | 191 | Lake Shore EMD | 251 | Parlin NUG | 311 | Southeast Chicago CT8 | 371 | York Generation Facility |
| 12 | Avon Lake 7 | 72 | Columbia Dam Hydro | 132 | Fishbach CT 1 | 192 | Lanier 1 CT | 252 | Pedricktown Cogen CC | 312 | Southeast Chicago GT10 | 372 | Yorktown 1-2 |
| 13 | Avon Lake 9 | 73 | Conesville 3 | 133 | Fishbach CT 2 | 193 | Laurel Mountain Battery | 253 | Pennsbury Generator Landfill 1 | 313 | Southeast Chicago GT9 | 373 | Yorktown 3 |
| 14 | BC Landfill | 74 | Conesville 4 | 134 | Fisk Street 19 | 194 | Lee DeKalb 3 BT | 254 | Pennsbury Generator Landfill 2 | 314 | Sporn 1-4 | 374 | Zanesville Landfill |
| 15 | BL England 1 | 75 | Conesville 5 | 135 | Forked River Unit 1 | 195 | Lock Haven CT 1 | 255 | Perryman 2 | 315 | Sporn 5 | 375 | Zimmer 1 |
| 16 | BL England 2 | 76 | Conesville 6 | 136 | Forked River Unit 2 | 196 | Logan | 256 | Picway 5 | 316 | Spruance NUG1 (Rich 1-2) | 376 | Zion Energy CT1 |
| 17 | BL England 3 | 77 | Cooper 1 | 137 | GUDE Landfill | 197 | Lorain 1 LF | 257 | Piney Creek NUG | 317 | Spruance NUG2 (Rich 3-4) | 377 | Zion Energy CT2 |
| 18 | BL England Diesel Units 1-4 | 78 | Countryside Landfill | 138 | Gilbert 1-4 | 198 | MANTUA CREEK 7 BT | 258 | Portland 1 | 318 | State Line 3 | 378 | Zion Energy CT3 |
| 19 | Balls Gap Battery Facility | 79 | Crane 1 | 139 | Glen Gardner 1-8 | 199 | MEA NUG (WVU) | 259 | Portland 2 | 319 | State Line 4 | | |
| 20 | Barbados AES Battery | 80 | Crane 2 | 140 | Glen Lyn 5-6 | 200 | MH50 Markus Hook Co-gen | 260 | Possum Point 3 | 320 | Stuart 1 | | |
| 21 | Bay Shore 2 | 81 | Crane GT1 | 141 | Glendon LF | 201 | Mad River CTs A | 261 | Possum Point 4 | 321 | Stuart 2 | | |
| 22 | Bay Shore 3 | 82 | Crawford 7 | 142 | Gosport 1 F | 202 | Mad River CTs B | 262 | Possum Point 5 | 322 | Stuart 3 | | |
| 23 | Bay Shore 4 | 83 | Crawford 8 | 143 | Gould Street Generation Station | 203 | Manchester 1 LF | 263 | Potomac River 1 | 323 | Stuart 4 | | |
| 24 | Bayonne Cogen Plant (CC) | 84 | Cromby 1 | 144 | Grand Ridge Energy IV battery component | 204 | Mansfield 1 | 264 | Potomac River 2 | 324 | Stuart Diesels 1-4 | | |
| 25 | Beckjord Battery Unit 2 | 85 | Cromby 2 | 145 | Grand Ridge Energy Storage | 205 | Mansfield 2 | 265 | Potomac River 3 | 325 | Stuart Diesels 1-4 | | |
| 26 | Beckjord Storage Unit 1 | 86 | Cromby D | 146 | Green Mountain Energy Storage | 206 | Mansfield 3 | 266 | Potomac River 4 | 326 | Sunbury 1-4 | | |
| 27 | Beech Ridge Energy Storage | 87 | Cumberland CT 1 | 147 | Harrisburg 4 CT | 207 | McKee 1 | 267 | Potomac River 5 | 327 | Sussex County LF | | |
| 28 | Bellefontaine Landfill Generating Station | 88 | DINWIDDIE 1 CT | 148 | Harrisburg CT 1 | 208 | McKee 2 | 268 | Pottstown LF (Moser) | 328 | Tait Battery | | |
| 29 | Bellemeade | 89 | Dale 1-2 | 149 | Harrisburg CT 2 | 209 | McKee 3 | 269 | R Paul Smith 3 | 329 | Tanners Creek 1-4 | | |
| 30 | Benning 15 | 90 | Dale 3 | 150 | Harrisburg CT 3 | 210 | Mercer 1 | 270 | R Paul Smith 4 | 330 | Three Mile Island Unit 1 | | |
| 31 | Benning 16 | 91 | Dale 4 | 151 | Harwood 1-2 | 211 | Mercer 2 | 271 | Reichs Ford Road Landfill Generator | 331 | Titus 1 | | |
| 32 | Bergen 3 | 92 | Deepwater 1 | 152 | Hatfield's Ferry 1 | 212 | Mercer 3 | 272 | Riverside 4 | 332 | Titus 2 | | |
| 33 | Bethlehem Renewable Energy Generator (Landfill) | 93 | Deepwater 6 | 153 | Hatfield's Ferry 2 | 213 | Miami Fort 6 | 273 | Riverside 6 | 333 | Titus 3 | | |
| 34 | Big Sandy 2 | 94 | Dickerson CT1 | 154 | Hatfield's Ferry 3 | 214 | Mickleton CT1 | 274 | Riverside 7 | 334 | Trent Battery Storage | | |
| 35 | Birchwood Plant | 95 | Dickerson Unit 1 | 155 | Homer City 1 | 215 | Middle 1-3 | 275 | Riverside 8 | 335 | VP Virginia Beach | | |
| 36 | Brandon Shores 1 | 96 | Dickerson Unit 2 | 156 | Homer City 2 | 216 | Missouri Ave B,C,D | 276 | Riversville 5 | 336 | Viking Energy NUG | | |
| 37 | Brandon Shores 2 | 97 | Dickerson Unit 3 | 157 | Homer City 3 | 217 | Mitchell 2 | 277 | Riversville 6 | 337 | Vineland West CT | | |
| 38 | Bremo 3 | 98 | Dixon Lee Landfill Generator | 158 | Hopewell James River Cogeneration | 218 | Mitchell 3 | 278 | Roanoke Valley 1 | 338 | WARRIOR RUN 2 BT | | |
| 39 | Bremo 4 | 99 | ELWOOD CT 1 | 159 | Howard Down 10 | 219 | Modern Power Landfill NUG | 279 | Roanoke Valley 2 | 339 | Wagner 1 | | |
| 40 | Brunner Island Diesels | 100 | ELWOOD CT 2 | 160 | Hudson 1 | 220 | Monmouth NUG landfill | 280 | Rockford CT11 | 340 | Wagner 2 | | |
| 41 | Brunot Island 1B | 101 | ELWOOD CT 3 | 161 | Hudson 2 | 221 | Montour ATG | 281 | Rockford CT12 | 341 | Wagner 3 | | |
| 42 | Brunot Island 1C | 102 | ELWOOD CT 4 | 162 | Hurt NUG | 222 | Morgantown CT 5 | 282 | Rockford CT21 | 342 | Wagner 4 | | |
| 43 | Buchanan Units 1 and 2 | 103 | ELWOOD CT 8 | 163 | Hutchings 1-3, 5-6 | 223 | Morgantown CT 6 | 283 | Rockport Unit 1 | 343 | Wagner CT 1 | | |
| 44 | Buggs Island 1 (Mecklenberg) | 104 | ELWOOD CT 9 | 164 | Hutchings 4 | 224 | Morgantown CT1 | 284 | Rockport Unit 2 | 344 | Walter C Beckjord 1 | | |
| 45 | Buggs Island 2 (Mecklenberg) | 105 | Eastlake 1 | 165 | Indian River 1 | 225 | Morgantown CT2 | 285 | Rockville CT | 345 | Walter C Beckjord 2 | | |
| 46 | Burger 3 | 106 | Eastlake 2 | 166 | Indian River 3 | 226 | Morgantown Unit 1 | 286 | Rocky Road CT 33 | 346 | Walter C Beckjord 3 | | |
| 47 | Burger EMD | 107 | Eastlake 3 | 167 | Indian River 4 | 227 | Morgantown Unit 2 | 287 | Rolling Hills Landfill Generator | 347 | Walter C Beckjord 4 | | |
| 48 | Burlington 8,11 | 108 | Eastlake 4 | 168 | Ingenco Petersburg | 228 | Morris Landfill Generator | 288 | SMART Paper | 348 | Walter C Beckjord 5-6 | | |
| 49 | Burlington 9 | 109 | Eastlake 5 | 169 | Jenkins CT 1-2 | 229 | Morris Road 1 D | 289 | STAFFORD 1 LF | 349 | Walter C Beckjord GT 1-4 | | |
| 50 | Buzzard Point East Banks 1,2,4-8 | 110 | Eastlake 6 | 170 | Joliet 6 | 230 | Muskingum River 1-5 | 290 | Salem County LF | 350 | Warren County Landfill | | |
| 51 | Buzzard Point West Banks 1-9 | 111 | Easton Diesel Unit 8 | 171 | Joliet 7 | 231 | National Park 1 | 291 | Sammis 1-4 | 351 | Warren County NUG | | |
| 52 | Cambria CoGen | 112 | Eddystone 1 | 172 | Joliet 8 | 232 | New Bay Cogen CC | 292 | Sammis Diesel Units | 352 | Warren Evergreen CT1 | | |
| 53 | Cape May County LF 4 | 113 | Eddystone 2 | 173 | Joliet Energy Storage | 233 | Niles 1 | 293 | Sammis Unit 5 | 353 | Warrior Run | | |
| 54 | Carbon Limestone LF | 114 | Eddystone Unit 3 | 174 | Kammer 1-3 | 234 | Niles 2 | 294 | Sammis Unit 6 | 354 | Waukegan 7 | | |
| 55 | Carlls Corner CT1 | 115 | Eddystone Unit 4 | 175 | Kanawha River 1-2 | 235 | Northeastern Power NEPCO | 295 | Sammis Unit 7 | 355 | Waukegan 8 | | |
| 56 | Carlls Corner CT2 | 116 | Edgecomb NUG (Rocky 1-2) | 176 | Kearny 10 | 236 | Notch Cliff GT1 | 296 | Schuylkill 1 | 356 | Weakley CT | | |
| 57 | Cates Road Solar | 117 | Edison 1-3 | 177 | Kearny 11 | 237 | Notch Cliff GT2 | 297 | Schuylkill Diesel | 357 | Werner 1-4 | | |
| 58 | Cedar 1 | 118 | Elmwood Park Power | 178 | Kearny 9 | 238 | Notch Cliff GT3 | 298 | Sewaren 1 | 358 | West Chicago Energy Storage | | |
| 59 | Cedar 2 | 119 | Elrama 1 | 179 | Keystone Recovery (Units 1 - 7) | 239 | Notch Cliff GT4 | 299 | Sewaren 2 | 359 | West Kingsport LF | | |
| 60 | Chalk Point Unit 1 | 120 | Elrama 2 | 180 | Killen 2 | 240 | Notch Cliff GT5 | 300 | Sewaren 3 | 360 | West Lorain A | | |

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## Current Year Generation Retirements

Table 12-10 shows that in the first six months of 2026, 669.0 MW of generation retired. The largest generators that retired in the first six months of 2026 were the four 150.0 MW Elwood CT-Natural Gas units located in the COMED Zone. Of the 669.0 MW of generation that retired in the first six months of 2026, 600.0 MW (89.7 percent) were located in the COMED Zone.

### Table 12-10 Unit deactivations: January through June, 2026

| Owner | Unit Name | ICAP (MW) | Unit Type | Zone Name | Age (Years) | Retirement Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Galt Power Inc. | Beckjord Storage Unit 1 | 2.0 | Battery | DUKE | 11 | 05-Mar-26 |
| Hull Street Energy LLC | ELWOOD CT 3 | 150.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 27 | 03-May-26 |
| Hull Street Energy LLC | ELWOOD CT 4 | 150.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 27 | 03-May-26 |
| Hull Street Energy LLC | Forked River Unit 1 | 34.0 | CT-Natural Gas | JCPLC | 37 | 12-May-26 |
| Hull Street Energy LLC | Forked River Unit 2 | 31.0 | CT-Natural Gas | JCPLC | 37 | 12-May-26 |
| Hull Street Energy LLC | ELWOOD CT 1 | 150.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 27 | 01-Jun-26 |
| Hull Street Energy LLC | ELWOOD CT 2 | 150.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 27 | 01-Jun-26 |
| SYSO Inc. | STAFFORD 1 LF | 2.0 | RICE-Other | DOM | 17 | 01-Jun-26 |
| Total | | 669.0 | | | | |


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## Planned Generation Retirements

Table 12-11 shows that, as of June 30, 2026, there were 7,932.3 MW of generation that have requested retirement after June 30, 2026. Of the 7,932.3 MW requesting retirement, 5,117.0 MW (64.5 percent) are coal fired steam units. Of the 7,932.3 MW of planned retirements, 2,620.0 MW (33.0 percent) are located in the AEP Zone. Of the generation requesting retirement in the AEP Zone, 2,620.0 MW (100.0 percent) are coal fired steam units.

### Table 12-11 Planned retirement of units: June 30, 2026

| Owner | Unit Name | ICAP (MW) | Unit Type | Zone Name | Projected Deactivation Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dairyland Power Cooperative | Rocky Road CT 33 | 28.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 01-Jul-26 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Eddystone Unit 3 | 380.0 | Steam-Natural Gas | PECO | 22-Aug-26 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Eddystone Unit 4 | 380.0 | Steam-Natural Gas | PECO | 22-Aug-26 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Clinton Battery | 10.0 | Battery | DUKE | 01-Jan-27 |
| Invenergy LLC | Beech Ridge Energy Storage | 31.5 | Battery | APS | 01-Apr-27 |
| Cape May County Municipal Utilities Authority | Cape May County LF 4 | 1.4 | RICE-Other | ACEC | 01-Apr-27 |
| Invenergy LLC | Grand Ridge Energy Storage | 4.5 | Battery | COMED | 01-Apr-27 |
| NextEra Energy, Inc. | Green Mountain Energy Storage | 10.4 | Battery | PE | 01-Apr-27 |
| NextEra Energy, Inc. | Lee DeKalb 3 BT | 31.5 | Battery | COMED | 01-Apr-27 |
| NextEra Energy, Inc. | MANTUA CREEK 7 BT | 2.0 | Battery | PSEG | 01-Apr-27 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Cumberland CT 1 | 90.8 | CT-Natural Gas | ACEC | 01-Jun-27 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Sherman Avenue CT1 | 84.3 | CT-Natural Gas | ACEC | 01-Jun-27 |
| Vistra Energy Corp | Kincaid Unit 1 | 554.0 | Steam-Coal | COMED | 30-Nov-27 |
| Vistra Energy Corp | Kincaid Unit 2 | 554.0 | Steam-Coal | COMED | 30-Nov-27 |
| American Electric Power Company, Inc. | Rockport Unit 1 | 1,320.0 | Steam-Coal | AEP | 31-Dec-28 |
| American Electric Power Company, Inc. | Rockport Unit 2 | 1,300.0 | Steam-Coal | AEP | 31-Dec-28 |
| Talen Energy Corporation | Brandon Shores 1 | 635.0 | Steam-Coal | BGE | 31-May-29 |
| Talen Energy Corporation | Brandon Shores 2 | 638.0 | Steam-Coal | BGE | 31-May-29 |
| Talen Energy Corporation | Wagner 3 | 305.0 | Steam-Oil | BGE | 31-May-29 |
| Talen Energy Corporation | Wagner 4 | 397.0 | Steam-Oil | BGE | 31-May-29 |
| NRG Energy Inc | Rockford CT11 | 149.1 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 31-Dec-29 |
| NRG Energy Inc | Rockford CT12 | 147.8 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 31-Dec-29 |
| NRG Energy Inc | Rockford CT21 | 153.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 31-Dec-29 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Zion Energy CT1 | 165.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 31-Dec-29 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Zion Energy CT2 | 165.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 31-Dec-29 |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Zion Energy CT3 | 165.0 | CT-Natural Gas | COMED | 31-Dec-29 |
| Lotus Infrastructure Partners | West Lorain A | 57.0 | CT-Oil | ATSI | 01-Jun-30 |
| Lotus Infrastructure Partners | West Lorain B | 57.0 | CT-Oil | ATSI | 01-Jun-30 |
| East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc | Cooper 1 | 116.0 | Steam-Coal | EKPC | 31-Dec-30 |

## Generation Queue[62]

Any entity that requests interconnection of a new generating facility, including increases to the capacity of an existing generating unit, or that requests interconnection of a merchant transmission facility, must follow the process defined in the PJM tariff to obtain interconnection service.[63] PJM's process is

62 Unless otherwise noted, the queue totals in this report are the winter net MW energy for the interconnection requests ("MW Energy") as shown in the queue.
63 See OATT Parts IV & VI.

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designed to ensure that new generation is added in a reliable and systematic manner. The process is complex and time consuming at least in part as a result of the required analyses. The cost, time and uncertainty associated with interconnecting to the grid may create barriers to entry for potential entrants. But the behavior of project developers also creates issues with queue management and exacerbates the barriers.

Generation request queues are groups of proposed projects, including new units, reratings of existing units, capacity resources and energy only resources. Each queue is open for a fixed amount of time. Studies commence on all projects in a given queue when that queue closes. Projects submitted to the queue undergo a deficiency review to ensure that all required information is provided. A queue position is assigned once the project has met the submission requirements. Projects that do not meet submission requirements are removed from the queue.

In 2022, after a lengthy stakeholder process (Interconnection Process Reform Task Force (IPRTF)) PJM filed significant changes to improve overall queue management. On November 29, 2022, the Commission issued an order accepting PJM's tariff revisions modifying how PJM manages the new services queue.[64] The new queue process includes modifications to implement a cluster/cycle based processing method to replace the first in/first out processing method.[65] This change will allow projects to move forward based on a first ready/first out analysis, where readiness is demonstrated through site control and financial milestones and there is an option to exit the study process early based on system impacts.

The new cycle process also includes defining progress to completion through three phases, with a customer decision at the end of each. The new cycle process requires a stronger definition of site control, and includes readiness deposits (some of which are nonrefundable) based on the phase of development. Additional process modifications include limits to technology changes, improvements to the application review phase, removal of optional interconnection study processes, modifications to the study schedules to reduce the number of restudies required in the event of project modifications, adjusting the queue window schedule to coincide with the previous clusters' milestones, and modifications to cost responsibility by assigning responsibility to all projects within a queue cycle. The new cycle process should help to reduce backlog and to remove projects that are not viable earlier to help improve the overall efficiency of the queue process.

The transition to the new cycle process began on July 10, 2023. The last open series queue prior to July 10, 2023, was AJ1. The new cycle process includes a transition which treats projects based on their series queue status. All projects through series queue window AD2 will continue as part of the series queue process. The transition process assigned series queue projects in queue windows AE1 through AH1 to transition cycle 1 (TC1) and transition cycle 2 (TC2) and also provides for the expedited treatment (fast track) of projects submitted in the AE1 through AG1 queue windows with upgrade costs less than $5 million. The start of the transition to the new cycle process on July 10, 2023, also started the 60 day readiness review period for active projects in the AE1 through AG1 queues. During this time, project developers provided evidence of site control and provided the necessary readiness deposit.[66] Those projects in the AE1 through AG1 series queues that had not yet received an interconnection service agreement or a wholesale market power agreement and also met readiness requirements were reviewed to determine if they were eligible for the fast track process, or if they would be studied as part of transition cycle 1. Of the 734 projects in queues AE1 through AG1 reviewed, 306 projects (41.7 percent) qualified for the expedited process, 312 projects (42.5 percent) were assigned to transition cycle 1 and 116 projects (15.8 percent) were withdrawn from the queue.

The transition process must also account for the fact that PJM significantly underestimated the level of CIRs required for intermittent resources. PJM had required only CIRs equal to the ELCC rating of intermittent resources when in fact those resources required CIRs equal to the maximum output that contributed to the ELCC rating. In general, CIRs were understated by the difference between the ELCC derating factor and the maximum facility output

64 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).

65 See "Interconnection Process Reform," presented at the April 27, 2022 meeting of the Members Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2022/20220427/20220427-item-01a-1-interconnection-process-reform-presentation.ashx>.

66 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026) for a complete list of all readiness requirements.



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of the intermittent resource. PJM filed revised rules and FERC approved them.[67] PJM has created a process to permit such resources to increase their CIRs to the required level through appropriate investments in interconnection facilities. This process will occur coincident with the start of the new service request Cycle 1.

The MMU recommends improvements in queue management including that PJM establish a review process to ensure that projects are removed from the queue if they are not viable, as well as a process to allow commercially viable projects to advance in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming.[68]

## New Service Requests Serial Process

### Interconnection Process Studies and Agreements[69]

Prior to implementation of the new cycle process, PJM used a serial service process. In the study stage of the interconnection planning serial process, a series of studies were performed to determine the feasibility, impact, and cost of projects in the queue. Table 12-12 is an overview of the studies PJM performed in the study stage of the interconnection serial process. System impact and facilities studies were often redone when a project was withdrawn in order to determine the impact on the projects remaining in the queue.

**Table 12-12 Interconnection planning serial process: study stage**

| Study | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Feasibility Study | The feasibility study determines preliminary estimates of the type, scope, cost and lead time for construction of facilities required to interconnect the project. |
| System Impact Study | The system impact study is a comprehensive regional analysis of the impact of adding the new generation and/or transmission facility to the system. The study identifies the system constraints related to the project and the necessary attachment facilities, local upgrades, and network upgrades. The study refines and more comprehensively estimates cost responsibility and construction lead times for facilities and upgrades. |
| Facilities Study | In the facilities study, stability analysis is performed and the system impact study results are modified as necessary to reflect changes in the characteristics of other projects in the queue. |

In addition to the feasibility, system impact and facilities studies, PJM would also perform additional studies under certain circumstances. These studies included the affected systems study, interim deliverability study and the long term firm transmission studies. Table 12-13 is an overview of the additional studies PJM could have performed.

**Table 12-13 Interconnection planning serial process: study stage – additional studies**

| Study | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Affected System Study | PJM and its neighboring balancing authorities conduct interconnection studies to determine the impacts of interconnection requests on the neighboring transmission system. |
| Interim Deliverability Studies | Interim deliverability studies are conducted on a periodic basis in support of RPM auctions and other interconnection studies to determine if a new facility may come on line prior to its scheduled date. These studies evaluate the available system capability and provide the customer(s) with the availability of service by planning year. Interim deliverability studies use the same criteria used for the evaluation of the need for reinforcements associated with a project under study. |
| Long Term Firm Transmission Studies | Transmission service requests that extend beyond the available transfer capability horizon of 18 months are evaluated along with the other requests for service in the PJM new services queue to ensure deliverability. Long term firm transmission studies follow the same feasibility, system impact and facilities study process as new generation. |

67 183 FERC ¶61,009.
68 Once implemented, the approved solutions from PJM's Interconnection Process Reform Task Force (IPRTF) should result in improvements in these areas.
69 See "PJM Manual 14A: New Services Request Process," Rev. 31 (June 30, 2026) for a complete explanation of the interconnection process studies and agreements.

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After the completion of a facility study, the project would enter the construction stage of the interconnection process. The final agreements required depended on the type of project. These agreements included a Construction Service Agreement (CSA), Interconnection Service Agreement (ISA), Upgrade Construction Service Agreement (UCSA), Wholesale Market Participant Agreement (WMPA) or Transmission Service Agreement (TSA). Table 12-14 is an overview of the agreements in the construction stage of the interconnection serial process.

**Table 12-14 Interconnection planning serial process: construction stage agreements**

| Agreement | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Interconnection Service Agreement (ISA) | An ISA defines the generation or transmission developer's cost responsibility for required system upgrades. For generation interconnection customers, the ISA defines the capacity interconnection rights for a capacity resource and any operational restrictions or other limitations. For transmission interconnection customers, the ISA defines transmission injection and withdrawal rights and applicable incremental delivery, available transfer capability revenue and auction revenue rights. |
| Interim Interconnection Service Agreements (I-ISA) | If a developer wishes to start project construction activities prior to completion of the generation or transmission interconnection facilities study, the interim ISA would commit the developer to pay all costs incurred for the construction activities being advanced. |
| Interconnection Construction Service Agreement (CSA) | The CSA defines the standard terms and conditions of the interconnection, including construction responsibility, includes a construction schedule and contains notification and insurance obligations. |
| Upgrade Construction Service Agreement (USCA) | A new service customer who proposes to make an upgrade to an existing transmission facility or who seeks incremental auction revenue rights (IARRs) will receive an upgrade construction service agreement after their study process is completed. |
| Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (WMPA) | Developers interconnecting to non-FERC jurisdictional facilities who intend to participate in the PJM wholesale market will receive a three party agreement (WMPA). The WMPA is a non-Tariff agreement which must be filed with the FERC. The WMPA is essentially an ISA without interconnection provisions. |

## Planned Generation Additions

There were 8,190 generation request projects submitted in the new service request serial process queue from 1997 until the implementation of the new cycle process on July 10, 2023. As a result of the transition to the new services cycle process, 312 projects were moved to transition cycle 1 (TC1). There were 1,347 projects eligible to resubmit for evaluation in transition cycle 2 (TC2). Of those 1,347 eligible projects, 550 projects resubmitted and are now being evaluated in TC2. Of the 1,347 eligible projects, 797 projects did not resubmit, and were withdrawn from the queue. There were 1,070 projects initially entered into the AH2 queue and beyond. Those 1,070 projects are now considered invalid and have been removed from the queue. As a result of the transition to the cycle process, the 8,190 projects in the serial process queue has been reduced to 5,461 projects. Projects that will be evaluated in TC1 and TC2, and those projects no longer eligible to be evaluated in the serial process have been removed from the new service requests serial process metrics. New service requests cycle process metrics are reported separately from the serial process metrics.

Expected net revenues provide incentives to build new generation to serve PJM markets. The amount of planned new generation in PJM reflects investors' perception of the incentives provided by the combination of revenues from the PJM energy, capacity and ancillary service markets and from federal and state subsidies and incentives. On June 30, 2026, 38,064.0 MW were in generation request serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, for construction through 2031. Although it is clear that not all generation in the queues will be built, PJM has added capacity steadily since markets were implemented on April 1, 1999.[70]

As projects move through the queue process, projects can be removed from the queue due to incomplete or invalid data, withdrawn by the market participant or placed in service. Table 12-15 shows the total MW in the serial queues by expected completion year and MW changes in the serial queue between December 31, 2025, and June 30, 2026, for ongoing projects, i.e. projects with the status active, under construction or suspended.[71]

70 See "*PJM Generation Capacity and Funding Sources 2007/2008 through 2021/2022 Delivery Years*," <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_2020_PJM_Generation_Capacity_and_Funding_Sources_20072008_through_20212022_DY_20200915.pdf>.
71 Expected completion dates are entered when the project enters the queue. Actual completion dates are generally different than expected completion dates.


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### Table 12-15 Serial queue comparison by expected completion year (MW): December 31, 2025 and June 30, 2026[72]

| | | | Year Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | As of 12/31/2025 | As of 6/30/2026 | MW | Percent |
| 2008 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2009 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2010 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2011 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2013 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2014 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2015 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2016 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2017 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2018 | 44.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2020 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2021 | 116.0 | 116.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 2023 | 185.0 | 100.0 | (85.0) | (45.9%) |
| 2024 | 514.1 | 95.2 | (418.9) | (81.5%) |
| 2025 | 2,793.1 | 1,861.7 | (931.4) | (33.3%) |
| 2026 | 10,447.2 | 8,909.5 | (1,537.7) | (14.7%) |
| 2027 | 9,629.9 | 8,751.7 | (878.2) | (9.1%) |
| 2028 | 8,300.0 | 9,722.2 | 1,422.2 | 17.1% |
| 2029 | 3,771.4 | 3,995.4 | 224.0 | 5.9% |
| 2030 | 1,280.0 | 2,215.0 | 935.0 | 73.0% |
| 2031 | 983.4 | 2,253.4 | 1,270.0 | 129.1% |
| Total | 38,064.0 | 38,064.0 | 0.0 | 0.0% |

Table 12-16 shows the project status changes in more detail and how scheduled serial queue MW have changed between December 31, 2025, and June 30, 2026. For example, of the total 20,110.4 MW marked as active on December 31, 2025, 658.1 MW were withdrawn, 280.8 MW were suspended and 3,176.8 MW started construction by June 30, 2026. Analysis of projects that were suspended on December 31, 2025 show that 1,805.7 MW came out of suspension and are now active as of June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-16 Change in project status (MW): December 31, 2025, to June 30, 2026

| | | Status at 6/30/2026 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Status at 12/31/2025 | Total at 12/31/2025 | Active | In Service | Under Construction | Suspended | Withdrawn |
| (Entered during 2025) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Active | 20,110.4 | 15,994.7 | 0.0 | 3,176.8 | 280.8 | 658.1 |
| In Service | 96,040.3 | 0.0 | 96,040.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Under Construction | 11,196.6 | 180.0 | 1,436.4 | 9,400.2 | 120.0 | 60.0 |
| Suspended | 9,889.1 | 1,805.7 | 0.0 | 385.0 | 6,720.9 | 977.5 |
| Withdrawn | 472,867.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 472,867.2 |
| Total | 610,103.6 | 17,980.4 | 97,476.7 | 12,962.0 | 7,121.7 | 474,562.9 |

On June 30, 2026, 38,064.0 were in generation request serial queues in the status of active, suspended or under construction. Table 12-17 shows each status by unit type. Of the 17,980.4 MW in the status of active on June 30, 2026, 1,750.0 MW (9.7 percent) were combined cycle projects. Of the 12,962.0 MW in the status of under construction, 1,228.8 MW (9.5 percent) were combined cycle projects and 8,627.3 MW (66.6 percent) were solar projects. A significant amount of renewable hybrid projects (defined as solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage projects) have entered the queue in recent years. Of the 38,064.0 MW in the serial queues in the status of active on June 30, 2026, 1,722.6 MW (9.6 percent) were renewable hybrid projects. Of the 12,962.0 MW in the status of under construction, 161.6 MW (1.3 percent) were renewable hybrid projects.

72 Unless otherwise noted, wind and solar capacity totals in this section have not been adjusted to reflect derating.

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### Table 12-17 Current project status (MW) by unit type: June 30, 2026

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 2,152.2 | 1,750.0 | 1,027.7 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,369.3 | 1,722.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 857.7 | 0.0 | 17,980.4 |
| Suspended | 468.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,671.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,981.8 | 0.0 | 7,121.7 |
| Under Construction | 340.0 | 1,228.8 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,627.3 | 161.6 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,434.3 | 0.0 | 12,962.0 |
| Total | 2,960.4 | 2,978.8 | 1,117.7 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23,668.3 | 1,884.2 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,273.7 | 0.0 | 38,064.0 |

A significant shift in the distribution of unit types within the PJM footprint continues to develop as renewable, hybrid and other intermittent resources enter the queue, fewer natural gas fired units enter the queue, and coal fired steam units retire. As of June 30, 2026, of the 38,064.0 MW in the generation request serial queues in the status of active, suspended or under construction, 23,668.3 MW (62.2 percent) were solar projects, 5,273.7 MW (13.9 percent) were wind projects, 4,096.5 MW (10.8 percent) were natural gas fired projects (including combined cycle units, CTs, RICE units, and natural gas fired steam units), 1,884.2 MW (4.9 percent) were renewable hybrid projects (solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage units), and 36.0 MW (0.09 percent) were coal fired steam projects.

As of June 30, 2026, there were 5,117.0 MW of coal fired steam units and 1,908.0 MW of natural gas units slated for deactivation between April 1, 2026, and December 31, 2030 (See Table 12-11). The ongoing replacement of coal fired steam units by natural gas units will continue to significantly affect future congestion, the role of firm and interruptible gas supply, and natural gas supply infrastructure. The growing level of renewables, hybrids and other intermittents will have increasingly significant impacts on the energy and capacity markets.

On June 30, 2026, 26,968.4 MW, on an energy basis, were in generation request serial queues that had reached the construction service agreement milestone or equivalent, in the status of active, suspended or under construction. Table 12-18 shows the status by unit type. Of the 26,968.4 MW, 9,721.1 MW (36.0 percent) had not begun construction, 7,121.7 MW (26.4 percent) began construction, but are now suspended and 10,125.6 MW (37.5 percent) are currently under construction. Reaching the final milestone required prior to construction does not mean a project will immediately begin construction or even that it necessarily will ever begin construction.

### Table 12-18 Current status (MW) by unit type for projects that have reached the CSA Milestone: June 30, 2026

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 775.0 | 1,750.0 | 588.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,308.6 | 641.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 657.7 | 0.0 | 9,721.1 |
| Suspended | 468.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,671.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,981.8 | 0.0 | 7,121.7 |
| Under Construction | 290.0 | 1,228.8 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,840.9 | 161.6 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,434.3 | 0.0 | 10,125.6 |
| Total | 1,533.2 | 2,978.8 | 678.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15,821.2 | 803.2 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,073.7 | 0.0 | 26,968.4 |


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Table 12-19 shows the total MW in the status of active, in service, under construction, suspended, or withdrawn for each serial queue since the beginning of the RTEP process and the total MW that had been included in each queue. All projects in queues A-Z2 are either in service or have been withdrawn. As of June 30, 2026, there were 38,064.0 MW in serial queues that are not yet in service or withdrawn, of which 7,121.7 MW (18.7 percent) are suspended, 12,962.0 MW (34.1 percent) are under construction and 17,980.4 MW (47.2 percent) have not begun construction.

## Table 12-19 Serial queue totals by status (MW): June 30, 2026[73]

| Queue | Active | In Service | Under Construction | Suspended | Withdrawn | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A Expired 31-Jan-98 | 0.0 | 9,102.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17,252.0 | 26,354.0 |
| B Expired 31-Jan-99 | 0.0 | 5,500.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14,958.8 | 20,459.2 |
| C Expired 31-Jul-99 | 0.0 | 531.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,558.3 | 4,089.3 |
| D Expired 31-Jan-00 | 0.0 | 850.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,358.0 | 8,208.6 |
| E Expired 31-Jul-00 | 0.0 | 795.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,021.8 | 8,817.0 |
| F Expired 31-Jan-01 | 0.0 | 52.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,092.5 | 3,144.5 |
| G Expired 31-Jul-01 | 0.0 | 1,171.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17,961.8 | 19,133.4 |
| H Expired 31-Jan-02 | 0.0 | 702.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,421.9 | 9,124.4 |
| I Expired 31-Jul-02 | 0.0 | 103.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,728.4 | 3,831.4 |
| J Expired 31-Jan-03 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 846.0 | 888.0 |
| K Expired 31-Jul-03 | 0.0 | 157.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 485.3 | 642.9 |
| L Expired 31-Jan-04 | 0.0 | 256.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,033.7 | 4,290.2 |
| M Expired 31-Jul-04 | 0.0 | 504.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,705.6 | 4,210.4 |
| N Expired 31-Jan-05 | 0.0 | 2,398.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,129.3 | 10,528.0 |
| O Expired 31-Jul-05 | 0.0 | 1,885.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,466.8 | 7,352.4 |
| P Expired 31-Jan-06 | 0.0 | 3,290.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,320.5 | 8,610.8 |
| Q Expired 31-Jul-06 | 0.0 | 3,147.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,385.7 | 14,533.6 |
| R Expired 31-Jan-07 | 0.0 | 1,787.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,708.9 | 22,496.0 |
| S Expired 31-Jul-07 | 0.0 | 3,596.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12,396.5 | 15,992.9 |
| T Expired 31-Jan-08 | 0.0 | 4,196.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23,313.3 | 27,509.8 |
| U1 Expired 30-Apr-08 | 0.0 | 218.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,937.8 | 8,156.7 |
| U2 Expired 31-Jul-08 | 0.0 | 716.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16,218.6 | 16,935.3 |
| U3 Expired 31-Oct-08 | 0.0 | 333.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,635.6 | 2,968.6 |
| U4 Expired 31-Jan-09 | 0.0 | 85.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,945.0 | 5,030.2 |
| V1 Expired 30-Apr-09 | 0.0 | 197.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,572.8 | 2,770.7 |
| V2 Expired 31-Jul-09 | 0.0 | 989.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,641.2 | 4,631.1 |
| V3 Expired 31-Oct-09 | 0.0 | 1,132.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,822.7 | 4,954.7 |
| V4 Expired 31-Jan-10 | 0.0 | 748.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,708.0 | 4,456.8 |
| W1 Expired 30-Apr-10 | 0.0 | 567.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,139.5 | 5,706.9 |
| W2 Expired 31-Jul-10 | 0.0 | 351.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,051.7 | 3,403.4 |
| W3 Expired 31-Oct-10 | 0.0 | 504.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,695.9 | 9,200.2 |
| W4 Expired 31-Jan-11 | 0.0 | 1,415.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,152.6 | 5,568.4 |
| X1 Expired 30-Apr-11 | 0.0 | 1,101.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,200.6 | 7,302.3 |
| X2 Expired 31-Jul-11 | 0.0 | 3,706.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,578.4 | 9,284.3 |
| X3 Expired 31-Oct-11 | 0.0 | 109.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,665.9 | 7,775.1 |
| X4 Expired 31-Jan-12 | 0.0 | 2,948.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,419.4 | 5,368.3 |
| Y1 Expired 30-Apr-12 | 0.0 | 1,795.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,279.7 | 8,075.2 |
| Y2 Expired 31-Oct-12 | 0.0 | 1,477.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,636.5 | 11,113.7 |
| Y3 Expired 30-Apr-13 | 0.0 | 1,634.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,605.2 | 6,239.6 |
| Z1 Expired 31-Oct-13 | 0.0 | 3,280.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,730.0 | 8,010.1 |
| Z2 Expired 30-Apr-14 | 0.0 | 3,059.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,037.8 | 6,097.5 |
| AA1 Expired 31-Oct-14 | 0.0 | 4,986.9 | 78.2 | 0.0 | 6,973.4 | 12,038.5 |
| AA2 Expired 30-Apr-15 | 0.0 | 3,031.6 | 550.0 | 0.0 | 12,484.7 | 16,066.3 |
| AB1 Expired 31-Oct-15 | 484.0 | 3,775.6 | 516.0 | 247.8 | 15,240.3 | 20,263.7 |
| AB2 Expired 31-Mar-16 | 0.0 | 3,729.6 | 285.1 | 92.0 | 10,968.3 | 15,075.0 |
| AC1 Expired 30-Sep-16 | 530.0 | 5,900.1 | 818.9 | 203.0 | 12,559.0 | 20,010.9 |
| AC2 Expired 30-Apr-17 | 667.7 | 1,596.6 | 641.9 | 275.7 | 9,387.8 | 12,569.6 |
| AD1 Expired 30-Sep-17 | 859.0 | 1,595.7 | 1,026.7 | 528.0 | 7,227.2 | 11,236.6 |
| AD2 Expired 31-Mar-18 | 621.0 | 1,751.1 | 1,024.5 | 709.5 | 16,150.6 | 20,256.7 |
| AE1 Expired 30-Sep-18 | 1,620.0 | 911.2 | 2,495.6 | 2,574.1 | 25,242.0 | 32,842.8 |
| AE2 Expired 31-Mar-19 | 2,560.7 | 2,007.3 | 1,542.9 | 1,769.1 | 20,705.1 | 28,585.1 |
| AF1 Expired 30-Sep-19 | 3,425.0 | 1,238.2 | 1,851.7 | 579.0 | 14,200.3 | 21,294.3 |
| AF2 Expired 31-Mar-20 | 3,369.7 | 393.5 | 1,475.6 | 78.0 | 12,525.0 | 17,841.7 |
| AG1 Expired 30-Sep-20 | 3,843.4 | 112.2 | 654.9 | 65.5 | 14,079.3 | 18,755.3 |
| AG2 Expired 31-Mar-21 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Total | 17,980.4 | 97,476.7 | 12,962.0 | 7,121.7 | 474,562.9 | 610,103.6 |

73 Projects listed as partially in service are counted as in service for the purposes of this analysis.

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Table 12-20 shows the projects with a status of active, suspended or under construction, by unit type, and control zone. As of June 30, 2026, 38,064.0 MW were in generation request serial queues for construction through 2031. Table 12-20 also shows the planned retirements for each zone.

**Table 12-20 Serial queue totals for projects (active, suspended and under construction) by LDA, control zone and unit type (MW): June 30, 2026[74]**

| LDA | Zone | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total Queue Capacity | Planned Retirements |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMAAC | ACEC | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.6 | 38.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 432.0 | 0.0 | 531.6 | 176.5 |
| | DPL | 9.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 546.1 | 16.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 255.1 | 0.0 | 826.8 | 0.0 |
| | JCPLC | 310.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 85.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 816.0 | 0.0 | 1,281.0 | 0.0 |
| | PECO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 760.0 |
| | PSEG | 525.0 | 51.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 582.1 | 2.0 |
| | REC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | EMAAC Total | 894.0 | 51.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 648.7 | 124.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,503.1 | 0.0 | 3,265.5 | 938.5 |
| SWMAAC | BGE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,975.0 |
| | PEPCO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 |
| | SWMAAC Total | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 1,975.0 |
| WMAAC | MEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 224.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 224.6 | 0.0 |
| | PE | 160.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 982.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 109.9 | 0.0 | 1,252.3 | 10.4 |
| | PPL | 170.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 603.4 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 833.4 | 0.0 |
| | WMAAC Total | 330.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,810.4 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 109.9 | 0.0 | 2,310.3 | 10.4 |
| Non-MAAC | AEP | 819.2 | 960.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,300.2 | 659.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 740.3 | 0.0 | 14,565.7 | 2,620.0 |
| | AMPT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 |
| | APS | 0.0 | 1,865.0 | 30.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 986.2 | 380.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 160.0 | 0.0 | 3,471.2 | 31.5 |
| | ATSI | 0.0 | 0.0 | 458.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,310.8 | 57.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 297.7 | 0.0 | 2,124.9 | 114.0 |
| | COMED | 180.0 | 102.7 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,100.9 | 19.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,384.6 | 0.0 | 3,848.1 | 2,116.9 |
| | DAY | 85.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 649.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 734.8 | 0.0 |
| | DUKE | 52.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 149.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 201.2 | 10.0 |
| | DLCO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | DOM | 600.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,251.2 | 583.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 78.2 | 0.0 | 7,081.4 | 0.0 |
| | EKPC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 381.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 381.0 | 116.0 |
| | OVEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | RMU | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Non-MAAC Total | 1,736.4 | 2,927.7 | 1,117.7 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 21,169.1 | 1,699.6 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,660.7 | 0.0 | 32,448.3 | 5,008.4 |
| Total | | 2,960.4 | 2,978.8 | 1,117.7 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23,668.3 | 1,884.2 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,273.7 | 0.0 | 38,064.0 | 7,932.3 |

## Withdrawn Projects

The serial queue contains a substantial number of projects that are not likely to be built. The serial queue process results in a substantial number of projects that are withdrawn. Manual 14B requires PJM to apply a commercial probability factor at the feasibility study stage to improve the accuracy of capacity and cost estimates. The commercial probability factor is based on the historical incidence of projects dropping out of the queue at the impact study stage, but the actual

74 This data includes only projects with a status of active, under construction, or suspended.



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calculation of commercial probability factors is less than transparent.[75] The impact and facilities studies are performed using the full amount of planned generation in the queues.

Table 12-21 shows the milestone status when projects were withdrawn, for all withdrawn projects in the serial queue. Of the 3,786 projects withdrawn as of June 30, 2026, 1,577 (41.7 percent) were withdrawn before the system impact study was completed. Once a Construction Service Agreement (CSA) is executed, the financial obligation for any necessary transmission upgrades cannot be retracted. Of the 3,786 projects withdrawn, 867 projects (22.9 percent) were withdrawn after the completion of a Construction Service Agreement as of June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-21 Last milestone at time of withdrawal: January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2026

| Milestone Completed | Projects Withdrawn | Percent | Average Days | Maximum Days | MW Withdrawn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Never Started | 513 | 13.5% | 81 | 868 | 53,163.6 |
| Feasibility Study | 1,064 | 28.1% | 290 | 1,633 | 196,263.0 |
| System Impact Study | 907 | 24.0% | 829 | 3,248 | 115,206.2 |
| Facilities Study | 435 | 11.5% | 1,315 | 4,107 | 58,959.3 |
| Construction Service Agreement (CSA) or beyond | 867 | 22.9% | 1,539 | 7,864 | 50,970.8 |
| Total | 3,786 | 100.0% | | | 474,562.9 |

75 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026.

## Average Time in Serial Queue

Table 12-22 shows the time spent at various stages in the serial queue process and the completion time for the studies performed. For completed projects, there is an average time of 1,279 days, or 3.5 years, between entering a serial queue and going into service. For withdrawn projects, there is an average time of 813 days, or 2.2 years, between entering a serial queue and withdrawing.

### Table 12-22 Project serial queue times by status (days): June 30, 2026[76]

| Status | Average (Days) | Standard Deviation | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 2,533 | 417 | 3,925 |
| In-Service | 1,279 | 885 | 6,628 |
| Suspended | 2,814 | 413 | 3,956 |
| Under Construction | 2,839 | 497 | 4,333 |
| Withdrawn | 813 | 812 | 7,864 |

Table 12-23 presents information on the time in the stages of the serial queue for those projects not yet in service or already withdrawn. Of the 387 projects in the serial queue, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, as of June 30, 2026, 109 (28.2 percent) had a completed facilities study and 278 (71.8 percent) had a completed construction service agreement.

### Table 12-23 Project serial queue times by milestone (days): June 30, 2026

| Milestone Reached | Number of Projects | Percent of Total Projects | Average Days | Maximum Days |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under Review | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0 |
| Feasibility Study | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0 |
| System Impact Study | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0 |
| Facilities Study | 109 | 28.2% | 2,345 | 2,836 |
| Construction Service Agreement (CSA) or beyond | 278 | 71.8% | 2,830 | 4,333 |
| Total | 387 | 100.0% | | |

76 The queue data shows that some projects were withdrawn and a withdrawal date was not identified. These projects were removed for the purposes of this analysis.

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Table 12-24 shows the time spent in the serial queue by fuel type, and year the project entered the queue, for projects that are in service. The time from when a project enters the serial queue to the time the project goes in service has generally been decreasing compared to the period prior to 2017 although there are significant exceptions. For example, for a battery project entering the serial queue in 2015, there was an average of 2,062 days from the time it entered the queue until it went in service, compared to 1,409 days when entering the queue in 2018.

## Table 12-24 Average time in serial queue (days) by fuel type and year submitted (In Service Projects): June 30, 2026[77]

| Unit Type | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Battery | 983 | 609 | 417 | 710 | 789 | 2,062 | 941 | | 1,409 | 1,289 | 1,147 |
| CC | 1,310 | 1,426 | 1,663 | 1,419 | 1,175 | 1,266 | 1,199 | 1,013 | 1,140 | 1,069 | 659 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 1,131 | 804 | 953 | 1,073 | 1,409 | 619 | 1,566 | 1,192 | 938 | 317 | 805 |
| CT - Oil | 717 | | 259 | | | | | | | 280 | 349 |
| CT - Other | 729 | 634 | 954 | 1,248 | 718 | 360 | | | | | |
| Fuel Cell | | | | | | 827 | | | | 280 | |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | | | | | | 1,402 | | | | | |
| Hydro - Run of River | | | 1,325 | 614 | 332 | | 580 | 426 | 606 | | |
| Nuclear | 885 | 866 | | 1,234 | | | 2,434 | 1,113 | 1,772 | | |
| RICE - Natural Gas | | | 1,702 | 1,053 | 1,332 | 798 | | 250 | | 770 | |
| RICE - Oil | | | | | | 1,849 | | | | | |
| RICE - Other | 638 | 1,385 | 1,479 | 241 | 627 | 622 | 491 | | 466 | | |
| Solar | 1,701 | 1,395 | 969 | 1,014 | 1,009 | 1,899 | 1,998 | 2,111 | 1,784 | 1,550 | 1,186 |
| Solar + Storage | | | | | | 635 | 322 | | 553 | | 809 |
| Solar + Wind | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Steam - Coal | 745 | | 513 | 1,010 | 583 | 853 | 684 | 647 | 1,810 | 2,139 | |
| Steam - Natural Gas | | | | 1,182 | | 421 | 751 | | | | 1,286 |
| Steam - Oil | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Steam - Other | 256 | 838 | 643 | | | | | | | | |
| WInd | 2,748 | 2,711 | 1,750 | 2,103 | 1,205 | 1,463 | 1,837 | 1,398 | 1,289 | | 1,266 |
| Wind + Storage | | | | | | | 2,680 | | | | |

77 A blank cell in this table means that no project of that fuel type, which was submitted to the queue in that year, subsequently went in service.



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Table 12-25 shows 610,103.6 MW have entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through June 10, 2023. Table 12-25 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date as of June 30, 2026. Of the 610,103.6 MW to enter the serial queue, 349,081.9 MW (57.2 percent) were thermal units.

### Table 12-25 Total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year: June 30, 2026

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 0.0 | 775.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,911.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,686.0 |
| 1998 | 0.0 | 4,659.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,662.1 |
| 1999 | 0.0 | 22,573.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.4 | 0.0 | 22,603.2 |
| 2000 | 0.0 | 9,900.8 | 409.6 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,335.3 |
| 2001 | 0.0 | 7,088.5 | 432.0 | 315.0 | 29.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 165.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 110.6 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,142.6 |
| 2002 | 0.0 | 2,622.2 | 2,987.0 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 65.5 | 0.0 | 5,903.1 |
| 2003 | 0.0 | 4,072.1 | 638.7 | 0.0 | 59.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 198.0 | 46.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 263.6 | 0.0 | 5,297.0 |
| 2004 | 0.0 | 15,581.2 | 77.3 | 33.0 | 16.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 41.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 23.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 139.5 | 0.0 | 15,961.4 |
| 2005 | 0.0 | 17,149.1 | 993.0 | 251.0 | 42.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,693.0 | 29.0 | 5.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,880.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 809.9 | 0.0 | 22,859.6 |
| 2006 | 0.0 | 6,033.0 | 23.3 | 49.5 | 43.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 147.2 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 30.5 | 58.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 527.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 529.0 | 1,480.2 | 0.0 | 8,923.6 |
| 2007 | 0.0 | 3,484.6 | 131.0 | 17.0 | 84.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 174.0 | 19.5 | 0.0 | 86.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 750.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 68.0 | 1,087.8 | 0.0 | 5,910.0 |
| 2008 | 1.0 | 7,003.4 | 628.0 | 59.3 | 38.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 331.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 57.6 | 3.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 254.5 | 101.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 2,098.6 | 0.0 | 10,599.0 |
| 2009 | 120.0 | 2,717.2 | 257.7 | 108.6 | 118.7 | 0.0 | 340.0 | 252.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 41.2 | 28.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,058.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 4,349.5 | 0.0 | 9,438.2 |
| 2010 | 16.0 | 1,811.9 | 137.8 | 83.9 | 320.7 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 94.9 | 301.0 | 10.5 | 0.0 | 15.8 | 231.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,599.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.8 | 9,286.1 | 0.0 | 18,005.8 |
| 2011 | 52.5 | 10,887.5 | 816.4 | 23.0 | 110.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27.0 | 512.0 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 41.8 | 1,818.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,614.0 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 108.9 | 5,355.2 | 0.0 | 29,388.2 |
| 2012 | 27.0 | 13,786.8 | 389.5 | 310.0 | 120.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 82.9 | 391.0 | 0.0 | 6.4 | 2.0 | 1,892.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,407.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 426.6 | 7,637.1 | 0.0 | 28,479.4 |
| 2013 | 73.0 | 9,252.2 | 62.5 | 730.5 | 78.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 219.0 | 238.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 113.0 | 674.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,949.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 254.1 | 8,057.4 | 0.0 | 21,756.5 |
| 2014 | 159.1 | 7,105.5 | 0.0 | 684.0 | 96.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,120.0 | 74.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.3 | 904.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,288.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 63.8 | 11,758.7 | 186.0 | 25,452.9 |
| 2015 | 214.6 | 15,591.3 | 417.4 | 42.0 | 22.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 378.5 | 147.8 | 19.5 | 9.0 | 3.8 | 1,240.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,271.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 81.5 | 4,161.6 | 0.0 | 23,601.4 |
| 2016 | 422.5 | 16,553.3 | 332.1 | 0.0 | 144.9 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 71.2 | 4,082.0 | 46.9 | 0.0 | 30.2 | 1,737.6 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 107.8 | 4,459.3 | 0.0 | 28,083.9 |
| 2017 | 134.1 | 17,489.5 | 835.0 | 401.0 | 135.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 86.2 | 1,640.0 | 283.6 | 0.0 | 18.2 | 2,158.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 47.0 | 606.5 | 0.0 | 7.2 | 3,010.2 | 0.0 | 26,853.7 |
| 2018 | 175.0 | 17,902.0 | 404.9 | 0.0 | 11.6 | 1.1 | 34.0 | 12.5 | 1,644.0 | 95.0 | 0.0 | 41.0 | 3,369.9 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 148.0 | 57.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,135.7 | 0.0 | 29,032.3 |
| 2019 | 303.0 | 14,793.4 | 1,036.8 | 14.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.5 | 0.0 | 79.7 | 0.0 | 33.6 | 7,203.3 | 629.8 | 0.0 | 1,710.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 5,377.6 | 16.3 | 31,233.9 |
| 2020 | 621.7 | 7,243.7 | 1,178.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 128.0 | 39.9 | 4.0 | 0.8 | 5,726.6 | 615.5 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 64.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,886.7 | 0.0 | 24,533.9 |
| 2021 | 1,176.9 | 17,904.2 | 687.3 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 48.0 | 0.0 | 15.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13,387.0 | 2,052.0 | 0.0 | 47.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 62.5 | 4,817.7 | 90.0 | 40,298.3 |
| 2022 | 2,677.1 | 12,723.2 | 1,629.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,000.0 | 28.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,837.9 | 1,578.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,249.7 | 0.0 | 32,743.4 |
| 2023 | 2,462.2 | 12,105.0 | 1,439.7 | 13.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 36.6 | 54.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12,497.0 | 5,400.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,987.4 | 0.0 | 35,999.0 |
| 2024 | 619.5 | 4,522.5 | 646.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 1,594.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,211.5 | 1,037.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,148.2 | 0.0 | 19,795.9 |
| 2025 | 253.4 | 146.7 | 463.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,799.5 | 142.5 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,695.9 | 0.0 | 9,546.7 |
| 2026 | 666.0 | 1,515.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,099.8 | 230.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,224.2 | 0.0 | 12,735.4 |
| 2027 | 666.0 | 676.1 | 735.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,965.9 | 376.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,938.8 | 0.0 | 12,558.6 |
| 2028 | 961.2 | 960.0 | 19.3 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,973.1 | 1,106.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,313.3 | 0.0 | 11,433.9 |
| 2029 | 960.0 | 595.0 | 599.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,147.9 | 690.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,709.7 | 0.0 | 7,711.1 |
| 2030 | 250.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,035.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,285.0 |
| 2031 | 0.0 | 1,270.0 | 439.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 150.0 | 394.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,253.4 |
| Total | 13,011.6 | 288,494.5 | 18,848.6 | 3,195.3 | 1,478.8 | 10.9 | 1,590.0 | 3,068.0 | 13,275.0 | 669.3 | 104.2 | 586.2 | 102,094.1 | 14,257.3 | 0.0 | 36,783.6 | 986.5 | 0.0 | 1,832.2 | 109,525.3 | 292.3 | 610,103.6 |

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Table 12-26 shows there were 38,064.0 MW in the serial queue in the status of active, under construction and suspended as of June 30, 2026. Table 12-26 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date. Of the 38,064.0 MW, 4,182.5 MW (11.0 percent) are thermal units. Of the 35,847.2 MW with projected in service dates between 2026 and 2031, 4,043.8 MW (10.6 percent) are thermal units.

**Table 12-26 Total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year (active, under construction and suspended): June 30, 2026**

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 1998 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 1999 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2000 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2001 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2002 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2003 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2004 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2005 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2006 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2007 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2008 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2009 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2010 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2011 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2013 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2014 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2015 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2016 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2017 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2018 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 |
| 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2020 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.0 | 0.0 | 116.0 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| 2024 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 52.5 | 2.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 95.2 |
| 2025 | 102.2 | 102.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,578.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 78.7 | 0.0 | 1,861.7 |
| 2026 | 626.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,759.3 | 197.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,326.4 | 0.0 | 8,909.5 |
| 2027 | 545.0 | 51.1 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,703.2 | 253.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,138.7 | 0.0 | 8,751.7 |
| 2028 | 817.2 | 960.0 | 19.3 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,828.7 | 746.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,250.0 | 0.0 | 9,722.2 |
| 2029 | 580.0 | 595.0 | 599.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,531.4 | 290.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 400.0 | 0.0 | 3,995.4 |
| 2030 | 250.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,965.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,215.0 |
| 2031 | 0.0 | 1,270.0 | 439.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 150.0 | 394.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,253.4 |
| Total | 2,960.4 | 2,978.8 | 1,117.7 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23,668.3 | 1,884.2 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,273.7 | 0.0 | 38,064.0 |



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Table 12-27 shows there were 474,562.9 MW withdrawn from the serial queue from January 1, 1997, through June 30, 2026. Table 12-27 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date. Of the 474,562.9 MW withdrawn from the serial queue, 280,279.1 MW (59.1 percent) were thermal units. Of the 12,145.9 MW withdrawn with projected in service dates between 2026 and 2031, 1,875.0 MW (15.4 percent) were thermal units.

### Table 12-27 Total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year (withdrawn): June 30, 2026

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 0.0 | 775.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,911.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,686.0 |
| 1998 | 0.0 | 4,659.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,662.1 |
| 1999 | 0.0 | 22,573.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 22,575.8 |
| 2000 | 0.0 | 9,900.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,904.5 |
| 2001 | 0.0 | 6,988.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,045.1 |
| 2002 | 0.0 | 14.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 28.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.5 | 0.0 | 137.7 |
| 2003 | 0.0 | 1,287.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 59.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 73.6 | 0.0 | 1,422.1 |
| 2004 | 0.0 | 12,073.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 41.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 75.0 | 0.0 | 12,201.2 |
| 2005 | 0.0 | 17,134.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 42.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,860.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 802.4 | 0.0 | 19,844.5 |
| 2006 | 0.0 | 4,847.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 43.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 142.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 520.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,430.2 | 0.0 | 7,013.1 |
| 2007 | 0.0 | 3,455.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 71.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 675.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 554.5 | 0.0 | 4,805.6 |
| 2008 | 1.0 | 6,826.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 38.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 18.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 152.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,857.0 | 0.0 | 8,895.3 |
| 2009 | 120.0 | 2,618.2 | 0.0 | 61.0 | 113.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 252.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 28.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 935.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 3,129.5 | 0.0 | 7,264.1 |
| 2010 | 16.0 | 1,776.9 | 0.0 | 81.0 | 302.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 54.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 168.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,512.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.8 | 7,853.1 | 0.0 | 15,785.7 |
| 2011 | 25.1 | 8,985.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 98.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 140.0 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 | 1,747.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,817.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 108.0 | 4,781.0 | 0.0 | 24,718.7 |
| 2012 | 20.5 | 13,711.5 | 0.5 | 310.0 | 87.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 82.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 1,801.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,751.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 426.6 | 6,535.0 | 0.0 | 25,733.9 |
| 2013 | 72.0 | 9,168.0 | 0.0 | 730.0 | 38.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 79.0 | 34.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 651.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,861.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 254.1 | 7,686.3 | 0.0 | 20,584.1 |
| 2014 | 114.1 | 6,438.0 | 0.0 | 684.0 | 96.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,085.1 | 74.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 809.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,212.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 11,308.7 | 0.0 | 23,831.6 |
| 2015 | 111.6 | 13,216.5 | 12.5 | 42.0 | 10.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 218.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 1,041.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,251.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 81.5 | 3,956.6 | 0.0 | 19,951.4 |
| 2016 | 400.1 | 9,812.3 | 35.4 | 0.0 | 144.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 71.2 | 3,980.0 | 26.0 | 0.0 | 11.7 | 1,484.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.8 | 4,181.8 | 0.0 | 20,307.1 |
| 2017 | 134.1 | 13,041.4 | 696.0 | 401.0 | 135.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 1,640.0 | 263.7 | 0.0 | 17.1 | 1,822.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.2 | 2,375.2 | 0.0 | 20,549.1 |
| 2018 | 109.5 | 10,224.0 | 64.9 | 0.0 | 11.6 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,600.0 | 89.8 | 0.0 | 36.2 | 3,017.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.0 | 27.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,618.0 | 0.0 | 19,879.6 |
| 2019 | 303.0 | 10,812.9 | 922.8 | 14.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 39.9 | 0.0 | 33.6 | 6,771.8 | 629.8 | 0.0 | 1,710.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 4,286.6 | 16.3 | 25,571.6 |
| 2020 | 621.7 | 5,987.7 | 1,022.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 39.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,789.8 | 614.4 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,786.4 | 0.0 | 20,984.0 |
| 2021 | 1,175.4 | 14,345.5 | 330.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 48.0 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12,267.5 | 2,048.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,178.0 | 90.0 | 34,490.8 |
| 2022 | 2,650.3 | 8,412.3 | 1,533.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,000.0 | 28.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,412.3 | 1,578.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,249.7 | 0.0 | 26,884.7 |
| 2023 | 2,408.2 | 10,861.0 | 851.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,258.0 | 5,383.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,705.0 | 0.0 | 30,504.2 |
| 2024 | 577.0 | 4,522.5 | 646.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 1,594.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,964.6 | 1,034.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,047.4 | 0.0 | 16,398.0 |
| 2025 | 115.5 | 44.0 | 463.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 827.2 | 142.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,176.7 | 0.0 | 4,785.7 |
| 2026 | 40.0 | 575.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,328.7 | 32.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 885.2 | 0.0 | 2,861.4 |
| 2027 | 121.0 | 625.0 | 675.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,242.7 | 123.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 800.1 | 0.0 | 3,787.0 |
| 2028 | 144.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,144.4 | 360.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 63.3 | 0.0 | 1,711.7 |
| 2029 | 380.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 616.5 | 400.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,309.7 | 0.0 | 3,715.7 |
| 2030 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 70.0 |
| 2031 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 9,660.0 | 235,711.6 | 7,255.8 | 2,324.0 | 1,316.7 | 6.4 | 1,200.0 | 2,209.9 | 9,227.0 | 481.2 | 76.9 | 98.6 | 64,266.8 | 12,347.9 | 0.0 | 34,396.6 | 33.0 | 0.0 | 1,088.0 | 92,756.2 | 106.3 | 474,562.9 |

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## Completion Rates

The probability of a project going into service increases as each step of the serial planning process is completed. Table 12-28 shows the historic completion rates (MW energy) by unit type for projects that have completed the system impact study (SIS), facilities study agreement (FSA) and any milestone completed beyond the FSA including a Construction Service Agreement (CSA), Interconnection Service Agreement (ISA), Upgrade Construction Service Agreement (UCSA) and Wholesale Market Participant Agreement (WMPA) as well as the historic completion rates for all projects including those withdrawn before reaching the SIS milestone.[78] For each unit type, the total MW in service was divided by the total energy MW entered in the serial queue. To calculate the completion rates for projects that reached the individual milestones, only those projects that reached a final status of withdrawn or in service were evaluated. For example, if a project was withdrawn after the completion of its SIS, but before the completion of the FSA, the totals would be included in the calculation of the SIS completion rate, but not in the calculation of the FSA or CSA completion rates. Similarly, if a project was withdrawn after the completion of its FSA, but before the completion of the CSA, the totals would be included in the calculation of the SIS and FSA completion rates, but not in the calculation of the CSA completion rate. The completion rates show that of all battery projects to ever enter the serial queue and complete the system impact study stage, 6.5 percent of the queued MW have gone into service. The completion rate for battery projects increases to 15.4 percent when battery projects complete the facility study agreement and further increases to 36.5 percent when battery projects complete the construction service agreement. Of all battery projects to enter the serial queue, only 4.2 percent of the queued MW have gone into service.

### Table 12-28 Historic completion rates (MW energy) by unit type for projects with a completed SIS, FSA and CSA: June 30, 2026

| Unit Type | Completion Rate (SIS) | Completion Rate (FSA) | Completion Rate (CSA) | Completion Rate (ALL) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Battery | 6.5% | 15.4% | 36.5% | 4.2% |
| CC | 34.6% | 50.4% | 72.1% | 17.1% |
| CT - Natural Gas | 60.7% | 71.5% | 73.3% | 51.6% |
| CT - Oil | 35.7% | 60.0% | 90.9% | 25.0% |
| CT - Other | 12.1% | 18.4% | 29.4% | 10.6% |
| Fuel Cell | 50.6% | 51.8% | 51.8% | 41.4% |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 35.8% | 35.8% | 66.1% | 24.5% |
| Hydro - Run of River | 40.2% | 55.5% | 61.5% | 20.7% |
| Nuclear | 34.3% | 41.4% | 51.3% | 28.2% |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 32.4% | 44.7% | 49.4% | 28.0% |
| RICE - Oil | 34.0% | 59.7% | 59.7% | 26.2% |
| RICE - Other | 88.9% | 91.3% | 92.0% | 77.9% |
| Solar | 29.0% | 45.3% | 61.0% | 15.6% |
| Solar + Storage | 0.4% | 1.0% | 2.3% | 0.2% |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Coal | 13.8% | 25.7% | 37.9% | 6.4% |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 90.5% | 91.1% | 91.1% | 90.5% |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Other | 31.0% | 40.6% | 48.6% | 28.0% |
| Wind | 16.9% | 32.7% | 50.1% | 10.6% |
| Wind + Storage | 45.3% | 45.3% | 45.3% | 45.3% |

On June 30, 2026, 38,064.0 MW were in generation request serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended. Of the total 38,064.0 MW in the queue, 26,968.4 MW (70.9 percent) have reached the CSA milestone and 11,095.6 MW (29.1 percent) have not received a completed CSA. Based on historical completion rates, (applying the unit type specific completion rates for those projects that have reached the SIS, FSA or any milestone beyond the FSA, and using the overall completion rates for those projects that have not yet reached the SIS milestone), 19,675.3 MW (51.7 percent) of new generation in the serial queue are expected to go into service.

78 All milestones after the FSA are included in the totals under the CSA headings of the tables within Section 12, "Generation and Transmission Planning."



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Table 12-29 shows the percent of all project MW, by unit type, to go in service by year submitted to the serial queue. Of all battery projects that entered the serial queue in 2010, 65.5 percent reached the status of in service by June 30, 2026. Of all battery projects that entered the serial queue in 2016, only 1.3 percent have reached the status of in service as of June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-29 Percent of all projects (MW energy) to go in service by unit type and year submitted to the serial queue: June 30, 2026

| Unit Type | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Battery | 65.5% | 8.3% | 15.1% | 45.7% | 21.5% | 11.5% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 3.1% | 0.9% | 0.4% |
| CC | 14.6% | 24.5% | 30.8% | 35.6% | 53.6% | 17.0% | 20.7% | 8.1% | 4.1% | 2.7% | NA |
| CT - Natural Gas | 100.0% | 98.3% | 71.6% | 42.2% | 56.8% | 0.2% | 13.2% | 38.9% | 8.4% | 5.9% | 7.2% |
| CT - Oil | 100.0% | NA | 1.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA | NA | NA | 0.0% | 100.0% | 7.4% |
| CT - Other | 28.8% | 26.0% | 36.1% | 100.0% | 11.5% | 100.0% | NA | 0.0% | NA | NA | NA |
| Fuel Cell | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 67.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA | 100.0% | NA |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 100.0% | NA | NA | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA |
| Hydro - Run of River | 0.0% | 0.0% | 57.6% | 49.6% | 11.2% | NA | 100.0% | 26.8% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Nuclear | 15.5% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 100.0% | NA | NA | 25.4% | 100.0% | 100.0% | NA | 0.0% |
| RICE - Natural Gas | NA | NA | 100.0% | 66.7% | 5.4% | 6.2% | 0.0% | 5.4% | NA | 100.0% | NA |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA | NA | NA | 30.8% | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| RICE - Other | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 79.7% | 25.5% | 2.8% | 0.0% | 100.0% | NA | NA |
| Solar | 10.7% | 8.1% | 16.9% | 24.4% | 38.8% | 30.5% | 40.3% | 17.8% | 7.1% | 11.9% | 1.8% |
| Solar + Storage | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 100.0% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Coal | 100.0% | 0.0% | 1.4% | 68.4% | 1.2% | 23.4% | 37.5% | 100.0% | 59.2% | 100.0% | NA |
| Steam - Natural Gas | NA | NA | NA | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | NA | NA | 45.5% |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Other | 0.5% | 61.2% | 16.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| WInd | 6.1% | 3.4% | 2.5% | 20.7% | 20.7% | 12.5% | 26.8% | 2.6% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 0.6% |
| Wind + Storage | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA | NA | NA |
| All | 11.6% | 19.0% | 25.9% | 35.9% | 43.0% | 18.5% | 27.4% | 13.1% | 4.2% | 7.2% | 1.4% |

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Table 12-30 shows the total MW that went in service each year, by unit type, since 1999. In the first six months of 2026, 1,000.1 MW from the serial queue went in service. Of the 1,000.1 MW that went in service, 940.0 MW (94.0 percent) were Combined Cycle units, 31.8 MW (3.2 percent) were solar units, 15.7 MW (1.6 percent) were battery units and 12.6 MW (1.3 percent) were wind units.

### Table 12-30 Total (MW Energy) by unit type and year project went in service: June 30, 2026

| Unit Type | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Battery | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27.4 | 4.5 | 23.0 | 24.0 | 110.4 | 10.0 | 2.0 | 40.0 | 25.5 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 60.8 | 42.5 | 0.0 | 15.7 |
| CC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 2,608.0 | 2,785.0 | 3,508.0 | 15.1 | 1,196.0 | 4.0 | 177.0 | 52.0 | 35.0 | 1,869.0 | 162.7 | 82.2 | 2,155.7 | 2,977.7 | 5,418.0 | 3,888.1 | 10,865.0 | 2,983.0 | 88.0 | 3,424.7 | 1,825.9 | 2,644.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 940.0 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 409.6 | 432.0 | 2,987.0 | 638.7 | 61.3 | 993.0 | 39.3 | 97.0 | 821.0 | 181.7 | 97.8 | 850.4 | 393.0 | 95.0 | 125.2 | 317.9 | 72.0 | 212.0 | 388.0 | 104.0 | 161.5 | 314.0 | 151.6 | 532.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Oil | 4.0 | 0.0 | 315.0 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 33.0 | 292.0 | 7.5 | 21.0 | 15.3 | 85.6 | 0.0 | 23.9 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 18.2 | 0.0 | 70.3 | 17.6 | 6.0 | 9.0 | 5.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fuel Cell | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 340.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 34.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.0 | 196.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 5.7 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 54.2 | 180.0 | 27.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 28.9 | 160.5 | 0.0 | 29.5 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nuclear | 0.0 | 0.0 | 165.0 | 15.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 1,693.0 | 242.0 | 130.0 | 115.0 | 0.0 | 281.0 | 422.0 | 328.0 | 117.0 | 80.0 | 54.0 | 133.8 | 130.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 54.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 29.0 | 2.0 | 19.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18.9 | 20.9 | 19.9 | 5.2 | 39.8 | 0.0 | 14.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 17.2 | 0.0 | 27.5 | 44.9 | 86.6 | 57.6 | 38.8 | 13.8 | 39.8 | 2.0 | 109.0 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 19.3 | 22.4 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 5.1 | 6.8 | 137.2 | 98.9 | 44.4 | 59.8 | 172.1 | 290.8 | 450.9 | 284.5 | 555.6 | 1,670.8 | 807.5 | 1,078.5 | 1,284.9 | 4,451.0 | 2,713.1 | 31.8 |
| Solar + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 12.0 | 20.0 | 59.0 | 21.0 | 0.0 | 37.0 | 20.0 | 14.0 | 55.0 | 720.5 | 123.0 | 177.0 | 97.0 | 708.0 | 48.0 | 16.0 | 92.5 | 0.0 | 47.0 | 24.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25.0 | 145.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 696.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 64.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 529.0 | 18.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 122.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| WInd | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 190.0 | 84.9 | 7.5 | 380.0 | 867.3 | 725.2 | 620.0 | 1,183.5 | 275.6 | 1,423.1 | 150.0 | 500.0 | 455.0 | 465.8 | 700.7 | 762.0 | 535.0 | 1,008.4 | 310.0 | 0.0 | 282.4 | 286.4 | 254.9 | 12.6 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 186.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 32.0 | 430.8 | 1,083.5 | 5,772.4 | 3,870.9 | 3,761.6 | 3,077.1 | 2,460.4 | 1,522.9 | 2,806.8 | 1,500.4 | 2,142.1 | 3,775.6 | 3,192.4 | 742.7 | 3,001.4 | 4,372.8 | 7,133.0 | 5,503.5 | 12,411.7 | 4,268.0 | 3,015.1 | 4,886.2 | 3,056.0 | 4,875.4 | 4,784.9 | 2,997.0 | 1,000.1 |


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## Analysis by Fuel Group

Table 12-31 shows the number of projects that entered the serial queue by year and by fuel group. The fuel groups are nuclear units, renewable units (including hydro run of river, solar and wind units (including renewable solar and wind hybrids), storage units (including battery and pumped storage hydro units), thermal units (including combined cycle, CT natural gas and oil, RICE natural gas and oil and steam coal, natural gas and oil) and other units (all other fuels). Of the 2,809 projects entered from January 2015 through June 2023, 2,063 projects (73.4 percent) were renewable.

### Table 12-31 Number of projects entered in the serial queue by fuel group: June 30, 2026

| | Fuel Group | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year Entered | Nuclear | Percent Nuclear | Renewable | Percent Renewable | Storage | Percent Storage | Thermal | Percent Thermal | Other | Percent Other | Total |
| 1997 | 2 | 15.38% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 11 | 84.62% | 0 | 0.00% | 13 |
| 1998 | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 18 | 100.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 18 |
| 1999 | 1 | 1.11% | 5 | 5.56% | 0 | 0.00% | 82 | 91.11% | 2 | 2.22% | 90 |
| 2000 | 2 | 2.41% | 3 | 3.61% | 0 | 0.00% | 75 | 90.36% | 3 | 3.61% | 83 |
| 2001 | 4 | 4.40% | 6 | 6.59% | 0 | 0.00% | 78 | 85.71% | 3 | 3.30% | 91 |
| 2002 | 3 | 5.88% | 15 | 29.41% | 0 | 0.00% | 23 | 45.10% | 10 | 19.61% | 51 |
| 2003 | 1 | 1.89% | 34 | 64.15% | 0 | 0.00% | 13 | 24.53% | 5 | 9.43% | 53 |
| 2004 | 4 | 7.41% | 17 | 31.48% | 0 | 0.00% | 23 | 42.59% | 10 | 18.52% | 54 |
| 2005 | 3 | 2.26% | 74 | 55.64% | 1 | 0.75% | 36 | 27.07% | 19 | 14.29% | 133 |
| 2006 | 9 | 5.73% | 67 | 42.68% | 0 | 0.00% | 47 | 29.94% | 34 | 21.66% | 157 |
| 2007 | 9 | 4.11% | 64 | 29.22% | 1 | 0.46% | 123 | 56.16% | 22 | 10.05% | 219 |
| 2008 | 3 | 1.39% | 102 | 47.22% | 7 | 3.24% | 79 | 36.57% | 25 | 11.57% | 216 |
| 2009 | 10 | 5.78% | 107 | 61.85% | 2 | 1.16% | 34 | 19.65% | 20 | 11.56% | 173 |
| 2010 | 5 | 1.13% | 370 | 83.90% | 5 | 1.13% | 40 | 9.07% | 21 | 4.76% | 441 |
| 2011 | 6 | 1.69% | 264 | 74.37% | 4 | 1.13% | 61 | 17.18% | 20 | 5.63% | 355 |
| 2012 | 2 | 1.26% | 59 | 37.11% | 11 | 6.92% | 69 | 43.40% | 18 | 11.32% | 159 |
| 2013 | 1 | 0.65% | 54 | 35.06% | 21 | 13.64% | 69 | 44.81% | 9 | 5.84% | 154 |
| 2014 | 0 | 0.00% | 100 | 52.08% | 21 | 10.94% | 59 | 30.73% | 12 | 6.25% | 192 |
| 2015 | 0 | 0.00% | 130 | 42.07% | 63 | 20.39% | 103 | 33.33% | 13 | 4.21% | 309 |
| 2016 | 2 | 0.50% | 284 | 71.18% | 22 | 5.51% | 65 | 16.29% | 26 | 6.52% | 399 |
| 2017 | 2 | 0.56% | 280 | 78.87% | 7 | 1.97% | 47 | 13.24% | 19 | 5.35% | 355 |
| 2018 | 1 | 0.23% | 336 | 77.42% | 50 | 11.52% | 46 | 10.60% | 1 | 0.23% | 434 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0.00% | 487 | 78.30% | 85 | 13.67% | 49 | 7.88% | 1 | 0.16% | 622 |
| 2020 | 2 | 0.29% | 546 | 79.13% | 121 | 17.54% | 21 | 3.04% | 0 | 0.00% | 690 |
| 2021 | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 |
| Total | 72 | 1.32% | 3,404 | 62.33% | 421 | 7.71% | 1,271 | 23.27% | 293 | 5.37% | 5,461 |

As of June 30, 2026, renewable projects make up 85.3 percent of all projects in the serial queue and those projects account for 81.1 percent of the nameplate MW currently active, suspended or under construction.

### Table 12-32 Serial queue details by fuel group: June 30, 2026

| Fuel Group | Number of Projects | Percent of Projects | MW | Percent MW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear | 1 | 0.3% | 44.0 | 0.1% |
| Renewable | 330 | 85.3% | 30,877.1 | 81.1% |
| Storage | 40 | 10.3% | 2,960.4 | 7.8% |
| Thermal | 16 | 4.1% | 4,182.5 | 11.0% |
| Other | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Total | 387 | 100.0% | 38,064.0 | 100.0% |

Historical completion rates for renewable projects may not be an accurate predictor of completion rates for current renewable projects. The outcomes for current projects will provide additional information and improve the ability to assess the likely future generation mix based on the type of projects in the queue.

Since wind resources cannot be dispatched on demand, PJM rules previously required that the unforced capacity of wind resources be derated to 20 percent of nameplate capacity until actual generation data are available. Beginning with Queue U, PJM derated wind resources to 13 percent of nameplate capacity until there was operational data to support a different conclusion.[79] PJM derated solar resources to 38 percent of nameplate capacity. Effective June 1, 2017, PJM adjusted the derates of wind and solar resources. The capacity factor derates for wind resources were dependent on the wind farm locations and had an average derate of 16.2 percent. The capacity factor derates for solar resources were dependent on the solar installation type and had an average derate of 46.7 percent.

Beginning with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, unforced capacity for intermittent resources and limited duration resources are determined by PJM's effective load carrying capability (ELCC) analysis. The PJM ELCC analysis determines capacity derates by resource class for each Delivery Year. The unforced capacity derate for a specific resource will equal the product of the ELCC class

79 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).

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rating and a resource specific performance factor. For example, the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction ELCC class rating for onshore wind resources is 34.0 percent, for solar resources with tracking panels is 10.0 percent and for solar resources with fixed panels is 7.0 percent.[80] The ELCC class rating for battery or storage resources replaces the 10 hour rule that was previously used to determine the unforced capacity value for a storage resource. PJM defined four different storage classes differentiated by duration. The ELCC class rating is 59.0 percent for storage resources that can continuously generate energy at the nameplate capacity for four hours (four hour storage). The ELCC class rating is 68.0 percent for six hour storage and 71.0 percent for eight hour storage and 78.0 percent for 10 hour storage.

While renewables currently make up the majority of both projects and nameplate MW in the serial queue, historical completion rates and derating factors must be accounted for when evaluating the share of capacity resources that are likely to be contributed by renewables. Table 12-33 shows the total MW of all projects in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, suspended and under construction, by unit type. Table 12-33 also shows the total MW Energy and MW Capacity for each fuel type adjusted based on current historical completion rates and, for Capacity MW in the queue, adjusted for ELCC derates.[81]

Table 12-33 shows that of the 4,182.5 MW, on an energy basis, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas and coal fired steam projects) in the serial queue, 3,002.7 MW (71.8 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.

Of the 2,960.4 MW, on an energy basis, of battery projects in the serial queue, 779.4 MW (26.3 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.

Of the 30,877.1 MW, on an energy basis, of renewable projects in the serial queue, 15,870.6 MW (51.4 percent) are expected to go in service based on historical completion rates as of June 30, 2026.

Of the 2,909.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of combined cycle projects requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 2,071.3 MW (71.2 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 2,909.1 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 1,615.6 MW of capacity (55.5 percent of the total requested capacity).

Of the 4,150.6 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas and coal fired steam projects) requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 2,906.4 MW (70.0 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction,[82] the 4,150.6 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 2,181.8 MW of capacity (52.6 percent of the total requested capacity).

Of the 2,000.6 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 215.6 MW (10.8 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 2,000.6 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 127.2 MW of capacity (6.4 percent of the total requested capacity).

Of the 15,914.7 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under

80 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate factors in this section are based on the *ELCC Class Ratings for 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (February 25, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/28-29-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf>.

81 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate adjusted MW are calculated using the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction ELCC factors. The adjusted MW are calculated using the four hour storage ELCC derate of 59.0 percent for battery resources, 34.0 percent ELCC derate for wind resources and 10.0 percent ELCC derate for solar resources.

82 Unless otherwise noted, the ELCC derate factors in this section are based on the *ELCC Class Ratings for 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction*, PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (February 25, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/28-29-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf>.



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construction or suspended, 8,134.3 MW (51.1 percent) are expected to go into service based on historical completion rates. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 15,914.7 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 937.5 MW of capacity (5.9 percent of the total requested capacity).

As of June 30, 2026, 22,109.9 MW of capacity requests (requested CIRs) were in the generation serial queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended. Based on historical completion rates, 11,278.4 MW (51.0 percent) are expected to go into service. Based on historical completion rates and the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction, the 22,109.9 MW of capacity requests currently under construction, suspended or active in the serial queue would be reduced to 3,267.8 MW of capacity (14.8 percent of the total requested capacity).

**Table 12-33 Serial queue totals for projects (active, suspended and under construction) by unit type adjusted for current historical completion rates and ELCC derates (MW): June 30, 2026**

| | Energy (MW) | | Capacity (MW) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Total | Completion Rate Adjusted | Total | Completion Rate Adjusted | Completion Rate and ELCC Adjusted |
| Battery | 2,960.4 | 779.4 | 2,000.6 | 215.6 | 127.2 |
| CC | 2,978.8 | 2,147.7 | 2,909.1 | 2,071.3 | 1,615.6 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 1,117.7 | 811.4 | 1,155.5 | 795.1 | 532.7 |
| CT - Oil | 50.0 | 30.0 | 50.0 | 26.4 | 21.9 |
| CT - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fuel Cell | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 51.0 | 28.3 | 30.0 | 17.2 | 6.0 |
| Nuclear | 44.0 | 22.6 | 44.0 | 22.1 | 21.2 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 23,668.3 | 13,205.7 | 13,507.7 | 7,601.2 | 760.1 |
| Solar + Storage | 1,884.2 | 29.3 | 1,337.6 | 16.7 | 1.7 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 36.0 | 13.6 | 36.0 | 13.7 | 11.6 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind | 5,273.7 | 2,607.3 | 1,039.4 | 499.1 | 169.7 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 38,064.0 | 19,675.3 | 22,109.9 | 11,278.4 | 3,267.8 |

## Analysis by Unit Type and Project Classification

Table 12-34 shows the status of all generation serial queue projects by unit type and project classification as of June 30, 2026. As of June 30, 2026, 5,461 projects, representing 610,103.6 MW, have entered the serial queue process from 1997 until the implementation of the new cycle process on July 10, 2023. Of those, 1,288 projects, representing 97,476.7 MW (16.0 percent of the MW), went into service. Of the projects that entered the serial queue process, 3,786 projects, representing 474,562.9 MW (77.8 percent of the MW)

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withdrew prior to completion. Such projects may create barriers to entry for projects that would otherwise be completed by taking up queue positions, increasing interconnection costs and creating uncertainty.

A total of 4,353 projects have been classified as new generation and 1,108 projects have been classified as upgrades. Natural gas, wind, solar and renewable hybrid projects (including solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage) have accounted for 4,361 projects (79.9 percent) of all 5,461 generation serial queue projects to enter the queue since January 1, 1997.

### Table 12-34 Status of all generation serial queue projects: June 30, 2026

| | | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 31 | 68 | 51 | 10 | 25 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 55 | 322 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 100 | 1 | 712 |
| | Upgrade | 9 | 117 | 136 | 25 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 19 | 45 | 9 | 2 | 16 | 89 | 1 | 0 | 59 | 10 | 0 | 8 | 21 | 1 | 576 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 74 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 91 |
| | Upgrade | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 30 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 71 |
| | Upgrade | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 18 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 239 | 440 | 32 | 10 | 82 | 28 | 4 | 48 | 9 | 29 | 12 | 16 | 1,659 | 156 | 0 | 55 | 1 | 0 | 34 | 488 | 1 | 3,343 |
| | Upgrade | 95 | 107 | 25 | 13 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 15 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 111 | 5 | 0 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 31 | 1 | 443 |
| Active | New Generation | 21 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 90 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 136 |
| | Upgrade | 6 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 300 | 512 | 84 | 21 | 107 | 30 | 4 | 58 | 11 | 40 | 12 | 71 | 2,204 | 182 | 0 | 63 | 7 | 0 | 38 | 607 | 2 | 4,353 |
| | Upgrade | 114 | 227 | 167 | 38 | 17 | 1 | 3 | 24 | 61 | 9 | 4 | 19 | 260 | 8 | 0 | 75 | 12 | 0 | 10 | 57 | 2 | 1,108 |

Table 12-35 shows the totals in Table 12-34 by share of classification as new generation or upgrade. Within a unit type the shares of upgrades add to 100 percent and the shares of new generation add to 100 percent. For example, 79.2 percent of all hydro run of river projects classified as upgrades are currently in service in PJM, 16.7 percent of hydro run of river upgrades were withdrawn and 4.2 percent of hydro run of river upgrades are active in the serial queue.

### Table 12-35 Status of all generation serial queue projects as a percent of total projects by classification: June 30, 2026

| | | Percent of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 10.3% | 13.3% | 60.7% | 47.6% | 23.4% | 6.7% | 0.0% | 17.2% | 18.2% | 27.5% | 0.0% | 77.5% | 14.6% | 3.3% | 0.0% | 12.7% | 85.7% | 0.0% | 10.5% | 16.5% | 50.0% | 16.4% |
| | Upgrade | 7.9% | 51.5% | 81.4% | 65.8% | 29.4% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 79.2% | 73.8% | 100.0% | 50.0% | 84.2% | 34.2% | 12.5% | 0.0% | 78.7% | 83.3% | 0.0% | 80.0% | 36.8% | 50.0% | 52.0% |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.4% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 2.1% |
| | Upgrade | 0.9% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 6.9% | 12.5% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.3% | 0.0% | 2.7% |
| Suspended | New Generation | 2.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 0.0% | 1.6% |
| | Upgrade | 2.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.5% | 0.0% | 1.6% |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 79.7% | 85.9% | 38.1% | 47.6% | 76.6% | 93.3% | 100.0% | 82.8% | 81.8% | 72.5% | 100.0% | 22.5% | 75.3% | 85.7% | 0.0% | 87.3% | 14.3% | 0.0% | 89.5% | 80.4% | 50.0% | 76.8% |
| | Upgrade | 83.3% | 47.1% | 15.0% | 34.2% | 70.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.7% | 24.6% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 15.8% | 42.7% | 62.5% | 0.0% | 20.0% | 16.7% | 0.0% | 20.0% | 54.4% | 50.0% | 40.0% |
| Active | New Generation | 7.0% | 0.4% | 1.2% | 4.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.1% | 8.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 3.1% |
| | Upgrade | 5.3% | 0.0% | 2.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.2% | 12.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.7% |


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Table 12-36 shows the total MW of projects in the PJM generation status queue by unit type and project classification. For example, the 488 new generation wind projects that have been withdrawn from the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, (as shown in Table 12-34) constitute 90,604.5 MW. The 440 new generation combined cycle projects that have been withdrawn in the same time period constitute 221,887.8 MW.

### Table 12-36 Status of all generation (MW) in the generation serial queue: June 30, 2026

| | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 311.5 | 41,304.9 | 7,279.4 | 676.5 | 148.8 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 371.5 | 1,639.0 | 170.8 | 0.0 | 440.1 | 12,585.6 | 22.1 | 0.0 | 1,343.0 | 728.0 | 0.0 | 60.9 | 10,890.2 | 186.0 | 78,159.8 |
| | Upgrade | 79.8 | 8,499.1 | 3,195.7 | 144.8 | 13.3 | 3.0 | 390.0 | 435.6 | 2,365.0 | 17.3 | 27.3 | 47.5 | 1,573.4 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 1,008.0 | 225.5 | 0.0 | 683.3 | 605.2 | 0.0 | 19,316.9 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 290.0 | 1,030.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,971.9 | 61.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,178.4 | 0.0 | 11,531.9 |
| | Upgrade | 50.0 | 198.8 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 655.4 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 255.9 | 0.0 | 1,430.1 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 366.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,385.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,874.5 | 0.0 | 6,625.7 |
| | Upgrade | 102.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 286.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.3 | 0.0 | 496.0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 7,383.0 | 221,887.8 | 5,794.3 | 1,735.0 | 1,248.0 | 6.4 | 1,200.0 | 2,105.9 | 8,161.0 | 481.2 | 63.9 | 88.6 | 61,136.1 | 11,904.2 | 0.0 | 33,511.6 | 27.0 | 0.0 | 1,050.9 | 90,604.5 | 90.0 | 448,479.3 |
| | Upgrade | 2,276.9 | 13,823.9 | 1,461.5 | 589.0 | 68.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 104.0 | 1,066.0 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 10.0 | 3,130.7 | 443.7 | 0.0 | 885.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 37.1 | 2,151.8 | 16.3 | 26,083.5 |
| Active | New Generation | 1,880.0 | 1,750.0 | 569.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,669.5 | 1,628.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 857.7 | 0.0 | 15,404.7 |
| | Upgrade | 272.2 | 0.0 | 458.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,699.8 | 94.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,575.7 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 10,230.5 | 265,972.7 | 13,642.7 | 2,461.5 | 1,396.8 | 7.9 | 1,200.0 | 2,477.4 | 9,800.0 | 652.0 | 63.9 | 528.7 | 94,748.3 | 13,616.4 | 0.0 | 34,854.6 | 755.0 | 0.0 | 1,111.8 | 106,405.2 | 276.0 | 560,201.4 |
| | Upgrade | 2,781.1 | 22,521.8 | 5,205.9 | 733.8 | 82.0 | 3.0 | 390.0 | 590.6 | 3,475.0 | 17.3 | 40.3 | 57.5 | 7,345.8 | 640.9 | 0.0 | 1,929.0 | 231.5 | 0.0 | 720.4 | 3,120.1 | 16.3 | 49,902.3 |

Table 12-37 shows the MW totals in Table 12-36 by share by classification as new generation or upgrade. Within a unit type the shares of upgrades add to 100 percent and the shares of new generation add to 100 percent. For example, 85.2 percent of wind project MW classified as new generation have been withdrawn from the serial queue between January 1, 1997, and June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-37 Status of all generation serial queue projects as percent of total MW in project classification: June 30, 2026

| | | Percent of Total Projects by Classification | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| | New Generation | 3.0% | 15.5% | 53.4% | 27.5% | 10.7% | 19.2% | 0.0% | 15.0% | 16.7% | 26.2% | 0.0% | 83.2% | 13.3% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 3.9% | 96.4% | 0.0% | 5.5% | 10.2% | 67.4% | 14.0% |
| In Service | Upgrade | 2.9% | 37.7% | 61.4% | 19.7% | 16.2% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 73.8% | 68.1% | 100.0% | 67.7% | 82.6% | 21.4% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 52.3% | 97.4% | 0.0% | 94.9% | 19.4% | 0.0% | 38.7% |
| | New Generation | 2.8% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.4% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 0.0% | 2.1% |
| Under Construction | Upgrade | 1.8% | 0.9% | 1.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.9% | 15.6% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.2% | 0.0% | 2.9% |
| | New Generation | 3.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 1.2% |
| Suspended | Upgrade | 3.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.4% | 0.0% | 1.0% |
| | New Generation | 72.2% | 83.4% | 42.5% | 70.5% | 89.3% | 80.8% | 100.0% | 85.0% | 83.3% | 73.8% | 100.0% | 16.8% | 64.5% | 87.4% | 0.0% | 96.1% | 3.6% | 0.0% | 94.5% | 85.2% | 32.6% | 80.1% |
| Withdrawn | Upgrade | 81.9% | 61.4% | 28.1% | 80.3% | 83.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 17.6% | 30.7% | 0.0% | 32.3% | 17.4% | 42.6% | 69.2% | 0.0% | 45.9% | 2.6% | 0.0% | 5.1% | 69.0% | 100.0% | 52.3% |
| | New Generation | 18.4% | 0.7% | 4.2% | 2.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 9.2% | 12.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 2.7% |
| Active | Upgrade | 9.8% | 0.0% | 8.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 23.1% | 14.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.2% |

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Table 12-38 shows the project MW that entered the PJM generation serial queue by unit type and year of entry. Since 2016, 82.5 percent of all new projects entering the generation serial queue have been combined cycle (19.5 percent), wind (17.2 percent) or solar projects (45.8 percent). Prior to 2015, no renewable hybrid units (solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage) entered the queue. In the time period from January 1, 2015 through June 10, 2023, 14,549.6 MW of renewable hybrid units have entered the serial queue.

### Table 12-38 Serial queue project MW by unit type and queue entry year: June 30, 2026

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 0.0 | 4,148.0 | 321.0 | 315.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,840.0 |
| 1998 | 0.0 | 7,006.0 | 1,775.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,781.0 |
| 1999 | 0.0 | 30,075.7 | 2,614.1 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 196.0 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 47.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 525.0 | 115.4 | 0.0 | 33,628.2 |
| 2000 | 0.0 | 21,144.8 | 493.6 | 31.5 | 8.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 95.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 95.6 | 0.0 | 21,909.9 |
| 2001 | 0.0 | 25,411.7 | 264.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.0 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,244.6 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 234.9 | 0.0 | 27,377.8 |
| 2002 | 0.0 | 4,154.0 | 11.7 | 0.0 | 70.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 293.0 | 236.0 | 8.0 | 23.3 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,895.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 790.9 | 0.0 | 7,486.9 |
| 2003 | 0.0 | 2,361.4 | 10.0 | 8.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 0.0 | 27.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 522.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 165.0 | 1,061.5 | 0.0 | 4,187.2 |
| 2004 | 0.0 | 3,610.0 | 43.3 | 20.0 | 49.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,911.0 | 0.0 | 35.5 | 17.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,187.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,428.7 | 186.0 | 8,488.1 |
| 2005 | 0.0 | 5,824.6 | 961.0 | 281.0 | 51.4 | 0.0 | 340.0 | 174.2 | 242.0 | 21.5 | 0.0 | 65.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,360.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 24.0 | 6,015.4 | 0.0 | 20,360.3 |
| 2006 | 0.0 | 4,188.1 | 454.3 | 607.5 | 73.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 159.0 | 6,894.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 93.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,586.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 258.5 | 7,598.3 | 0.0 | 29,911.8 |
| 2007 | 0.0 | 13,825.6 | 941.2 | 215.9 | 149.5 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 209.6 | 368.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 56.5 | 3.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,078.0 | 190.0 | 0.0 | 68.5 | 18,508.5 | 0.0 | 43,630.5 |
| 2008 | 121.0 | 26,001.0 | 129.7 | 1,113.0 | 488.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,254.5 | 105.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 32.0 | 66.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,200.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 189.8 | 10,955.3 | 0.0 | 41,662.9 |
| 2009 | 34.0 | 5,548.4 | 14.0 | 66.0 | 214.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 133.9 | 1,933.8 | 4.5 | 16.0 | 15.2 | 636.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,273.0 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 148.0 | 6,672.6 | 0.0 | 16,715.6 |
| 2010 | 72.4 | 9,185.4 | 176.0 | 7.9 | 117.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 132.6 | 426.0 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 54.6 | 3,671.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 64.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 173.5 | 9,803.4 | 0.0 | 23,886.9 |
| 2011 | 24.1 | 19,744.0 | 29.5 | 0.0 | 172.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 182.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 75.3 | 2,014.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 357.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 49.0 | 5,576.4 | 0.0 | 28,267.4 |
| 2012 | 142.6 | 18,014.8 | 102.1 | 42.5 | 48.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.8 | 369.0 | 37.2 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 284.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,837.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 143.1 | 1,529.8 | 0.0 | 22,566.8 |
| 2013 | 217.4 | 10,493.1 | 1,201.8 | 5.0 | 11.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 89.4 | 102.0 | 59.7 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 231.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 158.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 44.7 | 1,293.2 | 0.0 | 13,948.7 |
| 2014 | 246.9 | 11,704.5 | 1,532.5 | 401.0 | 8.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 60.5 | 0.0 | 48.0 | 0.0 | 17.7 | 1,553.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,730.5 | 27.0 | 0.0 | 43.1 | 1,691.3 | 0.0 | 19,065.3 |
| 2015 | 546.9 | 27,360.8 | 1,324.5 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 34.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 320.4 | 13.0 | 31.4 | 2,919.3 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 47.0 | 606.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,160.6 | 0.0 | 35,370.9 |
| 2016 | 111.1 | 18,802.5 | 1,392.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 59.0 | 23.5 | 0.0 | 38.9 | 11,446.1 | 85.6 | 0.0 | 80.0 | 77.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,445.7 | 16.3 | 35,593.1 |
| 2017 | 24.6 | 5,477.6 | 691.0 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 2.7 | 0.0 | 20.5 | 39.1 | 97.1 | 0.0 | 33.8 | 13,686.8 | 324.9 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 17.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,137.0 | 90.0 | 25,660.3 |
| 2018 | 1,413.7 | 11,080.1 | 2,510.5 | 14.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 700.0 | 2.4 | 28.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 19,895.6 | 3,907.9 | 0.0 | 49.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17,278.3 | 0.0 | 56,880.4 |
| 2019 | 4,142.8 | 3,332.5 | 1,009.2 | 13.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 500.0 | 99.0 | 0.0 | 14.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25,384.3 | 4,625.3 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,036.1 | 0.0 | 45,170.6 |
| 2020 | 5,914.1 | 0.0 | 846.6 | 54.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.2 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,300.4 | 5,310.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,096.4 | 0.0 | 34,713.0 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 13,011.6 | 288,494.5 | 18,848.6 | 3,195.3 | 1,478.8 | 10.9 | 1,590.0 | 3,068.0 | 13,275.0 | 669.3 | 104.2 | 586.2 | 102,094.1 | 14,257.3 | 0.0 | 36,783.6 | 986.5 | 0.0 | 1,832.2 | 109,525.3 | 292.3 | 610,103.6 |



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## Combined Cycle Project Analysis

Table 12-39 shows the status of all combined cycle projects by number of projects that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the seven combined cycle projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, three projects (42.9 percent) are located in the APS Zone.

### Table 12-39 Status of all combined cycle serial queue projects by zone (number of projects): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 1 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 0 | 68 |
| | Upgrade | 3 | 15 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 13 | 3 | 4 | 12 | 14 | 0 | 117 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 24 | 20 | 0 | 46 | 14 | 8 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 16 | 3 | 26 | 25 | 0 | 44 | 41 | 35 | 42 | 55 | 2 | 440 |
| | Upgrade | 7 | 10 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 15 | 0 | 107 |
| Active | New Generation | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 25 | 29 | 0 | 51 | 19 | 10 | 20 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 25 | 18 | 3 | 33 | 29 | 0 | 49 | 43 | 39 | 51 | 60 | 2 | 512 |
| | Upgrade | 10 | 25 | 0 | 22 | 9 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 27 | 11 | 0 | 14 | 12 | 0 | 16 | 10 | 9 | 20 | 30 | 0 | 227 |

Table 12-40 shows the status of all combined cycle projects by MW that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 2,978.8 MW of combined cycle projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation queue, 1,865.0 MW (62.6 percent) are located in the APS Zone.

### Table 12-40 Status of all combined cycle serial queue projects by zone (MW): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 650.0 | 5,611.0 | 0.0 | 1,970.0 | 4,691.0 | 140.0 | 2,960.9 | 0.0 | 533.0 | 0.0 | 5,828.6 | 319.2 | 0.0 | 1,665.8 | 2,557.0 | 0.0 | 3,328.0 | 1,900.0 | 1,560.0 | 5,892.0 | 1,698.5 | 0.0 | 41,304.9 |
| | Upgrade | 229.0 | 1,300.0 | 0.0 | 959.7 | 344.0 | 0.0 | 642.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,035.0 | 102.0 | 0.0 | 110.0 | 188.9 | 0.0 | 974.5 | 112.3 | 228.6 | 1,426.6 | 845.9 | 0.0 | 8,499.1 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0.0 | 480.0 | 0.0 | 550.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,030.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 102.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.1 | 0.0 | 198.8 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 8,542.5 | 13,559.5 | 0.0 | 22,373.1 | 9,596.0 | 3,122.1 | 11,392.0 | 1,150.0 | 134.5 | 665.0 | 12,961.0 | 5,145.4 | 991.8 | 13,562.6 | 13,001.0 | 0.0 | 24,140.0 | 16,114.0 | 22,268.2 | 18,917.7 | 24,244.6 | 6.9 | 221,887.8 |
| | Upgrade | 156.9 | 1,031.0 | 0.0 | 1,368.0 | 636.0 | 0.0 | 1,735.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 780.4 | 1,410.0 | 0.0 | 413.0 | 1,742.0 | 0.0 | 240.0 | 1,125.6 | 229.1 | 703.0 | 2,217.9 | 0.0 | 13,823.9 |
| Active | New Generation | 0.0 | 480.0 | 0.0 | 1,270.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,750.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 9,192.5 | 20,130.5 | 0.0 | 26,163.1 | 14,287.0 | 3,262.1 | 14,352.9 | 1,150.0 | 667.5 | 665.0 | 18,789.6 | 5,464.6 | 991.8 | 15,228.4 | 15,558.0 | 0.0 | 27,468.0 | 18,014.0 | 23,828.2 | 24,809.7 | 25,943.1 | 6.9 | 265,972.7 |
| | Upgrade | 385.9 | 2,331.0 | 0.0 | 2,372.7 | 980.0 | 0.0 | 2,480.3 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 1,815.4 | 1,512.0 | 0.0 | 523.0 | 1,930.9 | 0.0 | 1,214.5 | 1,237.9 | 457.7 | 2,129.6 | 3,114.9 | 0.0 | 22,521.8 |

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Of the seven combined cycle units in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, one unit had a projected in service date prior to January 1, 2026 and six units, representing 2,876.1 MW had a projected in service date between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2031.

## Combustion Turbine - Natural Gas Project Analysis

Table 12-41 shows the status of all combustion turbine natural gas projects by number of projects that entered PJM generation queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the seven combustion turbine natural gas projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, four projects (57.1 percent) are located in the ATSI Zone.

### Table 12-41 Status of all combustion turbine - natural gas generation serial queue projects by zone (number of projects): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 51 |
| | Upgrade | 4 | 11 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 0 | 20 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 14 | 0 | 136 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 32 |
| | Upgrade | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| Active | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 7 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 0 | 84 |
| | Upgrade | 7 | 12 | 0 | 12 | 10 | 0 | 26 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 31 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 14 | 0 | 167 |

Table 12-42 shows the status of all combustion turbine natural gas projects by MW that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 1,117.7 MW of combustion turbine natural gas projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 569.0 MW (50.9 percent) are located in the DOM Zone.

### Table 12-42 Status of all combustion turbine - natural gas serial queue projects by zone (MW): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 360.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,184.0 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 190.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 205.0 | 1,081.0 | 1,685.0 | 0.0 | 520.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 559.0 | 379.9 | 5.0 | 150.9 | 925.9 | 0.0 | 7,279.4 |
| | Upgrade | 43.7 | 278.1 | 0.0 | 267.8 | 105.0 | 0.0 | 744.0 | 83.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 925.7 | 86.0 | 0.0 | 25.5 | 47.6 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 40.5 | 39.0 | 252.3 | 215.0 | 0.0 | 3,195.7 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 90.0 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 237.5 | 1,519.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 153.6 | 10.0 | 104.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,069.8 | 0.0 | 73.0 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 789.8 | 0.0 | 19.9 | 1,815.1 | 0.0 | 5,794.3 |
| | Upgrade | 165.5 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 686.2 | 124.0 | 0.0 | 18.5 | 57.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 327.0 | 48.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,461.5 |
| Active | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 458.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 458.7 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 598.2 | 1,519.0 | 0.0 | 1,184.0 | 0.0 | 176.6 | 200.0 | 104.0 | 0.0 | 205.0 | 2,719.8 | 1,685.0 | 73.0 | 522.1 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 559.5 | 1,169.7 | 5.0 | 170.8 | 2,741.0 | 0.0 | 13,642.7 |
| | Upgrade | 209.2 | 284.1 | 0.0 | 301.8 | 588.7 | 0.0 | 1,490.2 | 207.5 | 0.0 | 18.5 | 982.7 | 86.0 | 0.0 | 25.5 | 47.6 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 367.5 | 87.3 | 252.3 | 215.0 | 0.0 | 5,205.9 |


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Of the seven combustion turbine natural gas units in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, no units had a projected in service date prior to January 1, 2026 and seven units, representing 1,117.7 MW had a projected in service date between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2031.

## Wind Project Analysis

Table 12-43 shows the status of all wind generation projects, by number of projects that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 24 wind projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM serial generation queue, 10 projects (41.7 percent) are located in the COMED Zone.

### Table 12-43 Status of all wind generation serial queue projects by zone (number of projects): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 1 | 17 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 23 | 121 | 0 | 46 | 10 | 0 | 116 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 14 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 63 | 0 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 488 |
| | Upgrade | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 31 |
| Active | New Generation | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 25 | 142 | 0 | 66 | 11 | 0 | 152 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 15 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 87 | 0 | 58 | 1 | 0 | 607 |
| | Upgrade | 2 | 6 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 57 |

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Table 12-44 shows the status of all wind projects by MW that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 5,273.7 MW of wind projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 2,384.6 MW (45.2 percent) are located in the COMED Zone.

### Table 12-44 Status of all wind generation serial queue projects by zone (MW): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 7.5 | 3,223.0 | 0.0 | 1,232.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,586.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 508.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,041.0 | 0.0 | 291.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,890.2 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 281.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 213.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 105.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 605.2 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0.0 | 340.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,650.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 78.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 109.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,178.4 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 255.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 255.9 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 432.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 278.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 247.8 | 0.0 | 816.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,874.5 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.3 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 7,653.2 | 24,794.7 | 0.0 | 3,552.2 | 1,814.0 | 0.0 | 27,483.5 | 2,128.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,788.5 | 3,680.8 | 150.3 | 4,447.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,257.0 | 0.0 | 3,835.2 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 90,604.5 |
| | Upgrade | 5.0 | 370.0 | 0.0 | 119.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 754.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 114.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 510.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 243.4 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,151.8 |
| Active | New Generation | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 160.0 | 297.7 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 857.7 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 8,092.7 | 28,658.0 | 0.0 | 4,945.1 | 2,111.7 | 0.0 | 34,198.9 | 2,128.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,374.8 | 3,928.6 | 150.3 | 5,263.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,407.9 | 0.0 | 4,126.2 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 106,405.2 |
| | Upgrade | 5.0 | 751.0 | 0.0 | 124.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,223.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 114.0 | 37.3 | 0.0 | 510.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 349.3 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,120.1 |

Of the 24 wind units in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, two units, representing 158.7 MW had a projected in service date prior to January 1, 2026 and 22 units, representing 5,115.1 MW had a projected in service date between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2029.

A total of 48 offshore wind projects entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023. Offshore wind projects are included in the wind generation statistics. Of the 24 wind projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue (Table 12-43), four projects (16.7 percent) are offshore wind. Of the 5,273.7 MW of wind projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue (Table 12-44), 1,503.1 MW (25.5 percent) are offshore wind projects. Table 12-43 shows that 519 wind projects have been withdrawn from the serial queue. Of those 519 wind projects, 43 projects (8.3 percent) were offshore wind. Table 12-44 shows that those 519 wind projects that have been withdrawn from the serial queue totaled 92,756.2 MW. Of the 72,756.2 MW of withdrawn wind projects, 16,787.2 MW (18.1 percent) were offshore wind projects.


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## Solar Project Analysis

Table 12-45 shows the status of all solar generation projects by number of projects that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 283 solar projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 93 projects (32.9 percent) are located in the AEP Zone.

### Table 12-45 Status of all solar generation serial queue projects by zone (number of projects): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 11 | 28 | 0 | 27 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 80 | 21 | 3 | 57 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 6 | 46 | 0 | 322 |
| | Upgrade | 2 | 9 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 26 | 12 | 2 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 89 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 2 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 74 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0 | 17 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 59 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 193 | 165 | 0 | 134 | 39 | 14 | 56 | 33 | 16 | 1 | 296 | 148 | 20 | 199 | 42 | 2 | 12 | 98 | 25 | 74 | 92 | 0 | 1,659 |
| | Upgrade | 4 | 13 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 111 |
| Active | New Generation | 0 | 36 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 90 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 29 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 206 | 270 | 1 | 175 | 58 | 18 | 65 | 45 | 21 | 4 | 415 | 177 | 28 | 261 | 50 | 2 | 13 | 132 | 30 | 94 | 139 | 0 | 2,204 |
| | Upgrade | 6 | 38 | 0 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 12 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 75 | 23 | 4 | 23 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 3 | 16 | 7 | 0 | 260 |

Table 12-46 shows the status of all solar projects by MW that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 23,668.3 MW of solar projects classified as new generation or upgrade currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 11,300.2 MW (47.7 percent) are located in the AEP Zone.

### Table 12-46 Status of all solar generation serial queue projects by zone (MW): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 67.6 | 3,383.9 | 0.0 | 783.9 | 597.0 | 32.1 | 59.0 | 699.2 | 214.9 | 45.9 | 4,641.7 | 529.6 | 165.0 | 446.7 | 160.0 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 338.4 | 35.6 | 140.0 | 241.9 | 0.0 | 12,585.6 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 557.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 144.8 | 85.0 | 8.3 | 492.8 | 39.8 | 40.0 | 21.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 1,573.4 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 11.6 | 3,597.1 | 0.0 | 210.0 | 368.0 | 0.0 | 116.0 | 349.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,328.4 | 200.0 | 286.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 303.5 | 0.0 | 180.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 7,971.9 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 260.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 56.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 159.9 | 40.0 | 40.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 48.5 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 655.4 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0.0 | 2,005.1 | 40.0 | 199.5 | 212.9 | 0.0 | 210.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 947.9 | 207.6 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 149.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 173.6 | 40.0 | 92.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,385.2 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 79.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 33.0 | 94.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 286.5 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 2,449.7 | 12,808.8 | 0.0 | 3,875.2 | 2,259.2 | 112.3 | 4,237.1 | 2,333.5 | 689.4 | 20.0 | 19,229.4 | 2,564.4 | 1,266.9 | 1,641.3 | 1,249.7 | 198.0 | 124.2 | 3,303.1 | 283.9 | 1,899.9 | 590.2 | 0.0 | 61,136.1 |
| | Upgrade | 172.5 | 473.0 | 0.0 | 140.7 | 279.7 | 0.0 | 185.0 | 100.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,357.6 | 52.0 | 70.0 | 23.8 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 90.0 | 3.6 | 141.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 3,130.7 |
| Active | New Generation | 0.0 | 4,451.5 | 0.0 | 498.3 | 674.0 | 0.0 | 534.9 | 279.9 | 49.0 | 0.0 | 1,414.0 | 4.0 | 55.0 | 51.6 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 426.8 | 0.0 | 175.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,669.5 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 907.5 | 0.0 | 78.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 190.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 368.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 135.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,699.8 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 2,528.9 | 26,246.4 | 40.0 | 5,566.9 | 4,111.1 | 144.4 | 5,157.0 | 3,662.5 | 1,053.3 | 65.9 | 28,561.4 | 3,505.6 | 1,772.9 | 2,162.0 | 1,614.3 | 198.0 | 127.5 | 4,545.4 | 359.5 | 2,487.4 | 838.1 | 0.0 | 94,748.3 |
| | Upgrade | 172.5 | 2,276.5 | 0.0 | 279.1 | 395.7 | 0.0 | 475.0 | 265.3 | 85.0 | 8.3 | 2,411.3 | 226.3 | 150.0 | 56.7 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 168.5 | 3.6 | 306.9 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 7,345.8 |

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Of the 283 solar units in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 24 units, representing 1,730.7 MW had a projected in service date prior to January 1, 2026 and 259 units, representing 21,937.6 MW had a projected in service date between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2031.

## Battery Project Analysis

Table 12-47 shows the status of all battery generation projects by number of projects that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 40 battery projects currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 12 projects (30.0 percent) are located in the AEP Zone.

### Table 12-47 Status of all battery generation serial queue projects by zone (number of projects): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 31 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 12 | 29 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 27 | 21 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 29 | 25 | 2 | 40 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 239 |
| | Upgrade | 7 | 13 | 0 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 95 |
| Active | New Generation | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 21 |
| | Upgrade | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 13 | 42 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 28 | 29 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 36 | 26 | 2 | 51 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 13 | 15 | 0 | 300 |
| | Upgrade | 8 | 16 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 20 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 114 |

Table 12-48 shows the status of all battery projects by MW that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 2,960.4 MW of battery generation currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 819.2 MW (27.7 percent) are located in the AEP Zone.

### Table 12-48 Status of all battery generation serial queue projects by zone (MW): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 86.0 | 12.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 | 35.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 112.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 311.5 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 27.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 28.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 79.8 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 270.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 290.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0.0 | 197.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 160.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 366.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 52.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 102.2 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 303.0 | 1,047.4 | 0.0 | 237.0 | 106.1 | 580.6 | 387.0 | 19.9 | 75.5 | 75.0 | 1,190.4 | 600.5 | 46.3 | 976.1 | 395.9 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 470.8 | 21.0 | 424.8 | 421.5 | 0.0 | 7,383.0 |
| | Upgrade | 20.0 | 769.2 | 0.0 | 239.0 | 20.3 | 0.0 | 125.3 | 135.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 441.0 | 54.0 | 28.0 | 55.1 | 194.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 76.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,276.9 |
| Active | New Generation | 20.0 | 530.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 85.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 240.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 290.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 170.0 | 525.0 | 0.0 | 1,880.0 |
| | Upgrade | 30.0 | 52.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 150.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 272.2 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 323.0 | 1,784.4 | 0.0 | 249.5 | 106.1 | 583.1 | 493.0 | 116.9 | 91.5 | 75.0 | 1,736.1 | 609.5 | 46.3 | 1,398.9 | 395.9 | 0.0 | 5.3 | 630.8 | 21.0 | 614.8 | 949.5 | 0.0 | 10,230.5 |
| | Upgrade | 50.0 | 865.4 | 0.0 | 266.4 | 20.3 | 0.0 | 285.3 | 143.0 | 76.2 | 0.0 | 531.0 | 54.0 | 28.0 | 63.1 | 194.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 104.4 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,781.1 |


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Of the 40 battery units in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, four units, representing 142.2 MW had a projected in service date prior to January 1, 2026 and 36 units, representing 2,818.2 MW had a projected in service date between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2030.

## Renewable Hybrid Project Analysis

Table 12-49 shows the status of all renewable hybrid generation projects (solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage) by number of projects that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone.[83] Of the 22 renewable hybrid projects currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, five projects (22.7 percent) are located in the AEP Zone.

### Table 12-49 Status of all renewable hybrid generation serial queue projects by zone (number of projects): June 30, 2026

| Project Status | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Project Classification | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 7 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 6 | 17 | 0 | 13 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 38 | 1 | 9 | 4 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 1 | 20 | 9 | 0 | 157 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Active | New Generation | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 7 | 21 | 0 | 16 | 10 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 42 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 1 | 22 | 14 | 0 | 184 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 |

83 PJM does not currently have a definition of a hybrid resource.

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Table 12-50 shows the status of all renewable hybrid projects by MW that entered PJM generation serial queues from January 1, 1997, through July 10, 2023, by zone. Of the 1,884.2 MW of renewable hybrid generation currently active, suspended or under construction in the PJM generation serial queue, 659.0 MW (35.0 percent) are located in the AEP Zone.

**Table 12-50 Status of all renewable hybrid generation serial queue projects by zone (MW): June 30, 2026**

| Project Status | Project Classification | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 186.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 208.1 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 57.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 61.6 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Suspended | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 114.5 | 4,703.8 | 0.0 | 460.5 | 659.9 | 0.0 | 1,004.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37.5 | 2,804.2 | 10.0 | 1,252.0 | 110.0 | 97.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 475.0 | 20.0 | 195.0 | 49.9 | 0.0 | 11,994.2 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 400.0 | 0.0 | 16.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 460.0 |
| Active | New Generation | 38.0 | 559.0 | 0.0 | 380.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 489.0 | 12.7 | 0.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,628.6 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 94.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 94.0 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 152.5 | 5,262.8 | 0.0 | 1,026.5 | 717.6 | 0.0 | 1,024.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37.5 | 3,310.2 | 26.5 | 1,252.0 | 180.0 | 97.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 475.0 | 20.0 | 255.0 | 54.9 | 0.0 | 13,892.4 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 503.2 | 0.0 | 16.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 94.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 657.2 |

Of the 22 renewable hybrid units in the serial queue as of June 30, 2026, in the status of active, under construction or suspended, one unit, representing 2.7 MW had a projected in service date prior to January 1, 2026 and 21 units, representing 1,881.5 MW had a projected in service date between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2031.

## New Service Requests Cycle Process[84]

### Interconnection Process Studies and Agreements

The transition to the new queue process began on July 10, 2023. The new queue process includes modifications to implement a cluster/cycle based processing method to replace the first in/first out processing method.[85] Each cycle consists of the: application phase, phase I, decision point I, phase II, decision point II, phase III, decision point III, and the final agreement negotiation phase.

#### Application Phase

The application phase includes the submission and review of a new service request. A new service request could be a request to interconnect a new generating facility, a request to increase the capability of an existing generating facility, a request to interconnect a merchant transmission facility, a request to increase the capability of an existing merchant transmission facility, a request to interconnect a generating facility to distribution facilities located in PJM that are to be used for transmission of power in interstate commerce, and to make wholesale sales or a long term firm transmission service request outside of the 18 month available transfer capability (ATC) horizon. The deadline for submitting applications for a new cycle corresponds with the completion of phase II of the previous cycle.

84 Material in this section is based on information found in PJM Manual 14H. See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026).

85 See "Interconnection Process Reform," presented at the April 27, 2022 meeting of the Members Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2022/20220427/20220427-item-01a-1-interconnection-process-reform-presentation.ashx>.



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For an application to be considered complete, and included in a cycle, PJM must receive a completed and executed application and studies agreement (ASA), required technical information, a wire transfer for the entirety of study deposit, a wire transfer or letter of credit for the entirety of Readiness Deposit No. 1 and, for generation requests, evidence of site control.

### Phase I

Phase I of a cycle begins after the application phase of a cycle is completed and a group of valid new service requests is established. During phase I of a cycle, PJM performs a phase I system impact study (SIS). The phase I SIS is conducted on an aggregate basis within a cycle, and results are provided in a single cycle format. The phase I SIS results are posted on PJM's website. The phase I SIS evaluates each new service request on a summer peak, winter peak and light load RTEP base case. PJM only performs a load flow analysis during the phase I system impact study. In phase I of the cycle, PJM also conducts an affected system screen and provides each affected system operator with a list of new service requests within the cycle including potential impacts to their system. During phase I, PJM creates both the short circuit and stability base cases that will be used in the phase II SIS.

### Decision Point I

New service requests that are studied in phase I will enter decision point I. After reviewing the results of the phase I SIS, the project developer must decide whether or not to move forward to phase II of the process. Decision point I starts on the first business day following the end of phase I and closes 30 calendar days later. Before the close of decision point I, the project developer can choose to either remain in the cycle by meeting the decision point I requirements or to withdraw its new service request. If a project developer fails to submit all required deposits, evidence, and data before the close of decision point I, the new service request will be terminated and withdrawn.

### Phase II

After the decision point I phase of a cycle is completed and a group of valid new service requests is established, phase II of a cycle will begin. During phase II of a cycle, PJM performs the phase II SIS. PJM retools the load flow results from the phase I SIS (summer peak, winter peak and light load) based on decisions made during decision point I. PJM also conducts any required voltage analyses, performs short circuit and stability analyses and coordinates with affected systems to confirm which projects in the cycle will require affected system studies. If the affected system operator indicates that an affected system study is required, PJM notifies the project developer of the need for an affected system study and the requirement to execute an affected system study agreement with the impacted affected system operator. If applicable and available, PJM includes the results of the affected system operator's affected system study in the phase II SIS results.

The phase II SIS includes a facilities study by the affected transmission owner that identifies any required network upgrades. The facilities studies will include good faith estimates of the costs to be charged to each affected new service customer for the network upgrades that are necessary to accommodate each new service request evaluated in the study, the time required to complete detailed design and construction of the facilities and upgrades and a description of any site-specific environmental issues or requirements that could reasonably be anticipated to affect the cost or time required to complete construction of such facilities and upgrades.

### Decision Point II

New service requests that are studied in phase II will enter decision point II. After reviewing the results of the phase II SIS, the project developer must decide whether or not to move forward to phase III of the process. Decision point II starts on the first business day following the end of phase II and closes 30 calendar days later. Before the close of decision point II, the project developer can choose to either remain in the cycle by meeting the decision point II requirements or to withdraw its new service request. If a project developer fails to submit all required deposits, evidence, and data before the close of decision point II, the new service request will be terminated and withdrawn.

### Phase III

After the decision point II phase of a cycle is completed and a group of valid new service requests is established, phase III of a cycle will begin. During phase III of a cycle, PJM performs the phase III SIS. PJM retools the load flow,

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short circuit and stability results from the phase II SIS based on decisions made during decision point II. PJM also coordinates with affected systems to conduct any studies required to determine the final impact of a new service request on any affected system. If applicable and available, PJM includes the results of the affected system operator's final affected system study in the phase III SIS results.

### Decision Point III

New service requests that are studied in phase III will enter decision point III. After reviewing the results of the phase III SIS, the project developer must decide whether or not to move forward to the final agreement negotiation phase. Decision point III starts on the first business day following the end of phase III and runs concurrently with the final agreement negotiation phase. The project developer can choose to either remain in the cycle by meeting the decision point III requirements or to withdraw its new service request. If a project developer fails to submit all required deposits, evidence, and data before the close of decision point III, the new service request will be terminated and withdrawn.

### Final Agreement Negotiation Phase

The final agreement negotiation phase starts on the first business day immediately following the end of phase III, and runs concurrently with decision point III. The purpose of the final agreement negotiation phase is to negotiate, execute and enter into the applicable final interconnection related service agreement, conduct any remaining analyses or updated analyses based on new service requests withdrawn during decision point III and adjust the security obligation based on new service requests withdrawn during decision point III and/or during the final agreement negotiation phase. PJM uses reasonable efforts to complete the final agreement negotiation phase within 60 days. Table 12-51 is an overview of the agreements used in the new service requests cycle process.

**Table 12-51 Final agreements: new service requests cycle process**

| Agreement | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Generation Interconnection Agreement (GIA) | The GIA defines the obligations of the project developer regarding cost responsibility for any required system upgrades. The GIA also confers the rights associated with the interconnection of a generating facility as a capacity resource and any operational restrictions or other limitations on which those rights depend. For transmission project developers, the GIA confers transmission injection and withdrawal rights and applicable incremental delivery rights and incremental auction revenue rights.The GIA further identifies any changes in construction responsibility from the standard option for transmission owner interconnection facilities due to the project developer exercising the negotiated contract option or option to build. |
| Construction Service Agreement (CSA) | The CSA defines the standard terms and conditions of the interconnection, including construction responsibility, includes a construction schedule and contains notification and insurance obligations.The CSA is included as a schedule within a GIA; however, a stand-alone CSA may be implemented in circumstances in which network upgrades to the system of a transmission owner are required to accommodate the interconnection request of a project developer, whose facilities do not directly interconnect to the transmission owner's system. Examples include project developers who are affected system customers (external to the PJM region), that require network upgrades to be constructed by PJM transmission owners, or project developers requiring upgrades to be constructed by PJM transmission owners, other than their interconnecting transmission owner |
| Upgrade Construction Service Agreement (USCA) | A new service customer who proposes to make an upgrade to an existing transmission facility or who seeks incremental auction revenue rights (IARRs) will receive an upgrade construction service agreement after their study process is completed. |
| Network Upgrade Cost Responsibility Agreement (NUCRA) | The NUCRA refers to the agreement entered into by two or more project developers and PJM, relating to construction of common use upgrades (network upgrades needed for the interconnection of generating or merchant transmission facilities for more than one project developer that share cost responsibility) and coordination of the construction and interconnection of associated generating facilities. A separate NUCRA will be executed for each set of common use upgrades on the system of a specific transmission owner that is associated with the interconnection of a generating facility or merchant transmission facility. The NUCRA includes the identified common use upgrades scope and schedule of work, the cost responsibility for the project developers that share cost responsibility, as well as the terms and conditions for the agreement. |
| Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (WMPA) | Developers interconnecting to non-FERC jurisdictional facilities who intend to participate in the PJM wholesale market will receive a three party agreement (WMPA). The WMPA is a non-Tariff agreement which must be filed with the FERC. The WMPA is essentially an ISA without interconnection provisions. |


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## Transition Cycle 1 (TC1)

On November 29, 2022, the Commission issued an order accepting PJM's tariff revisions to improve the queue process.[86] The new queue process includes modifications to implement a cluster/cycle based processing method to replace the first in/first out processing method.[87] This change will allow projects to move forward based on a first ready/first out analysis, where readiness is demonstrated through site control and financial milestones and there is an option to exit the study process early based on system impacts. The transition to the new queue process began on July 10, 2023.

On May 20, 2024, PJM completed the phase I system impact study for transition cycle 1 (TC1). Developers had 30 days (until June 20, 2024) to decide whether to proceed with their new service requests into the next study phase of TC1 or to withdraw their projects. Continuing with phase II required developers to meet the decision point I requirements (including additional readiness deposits and proof of site control).[88]

On December 20, 2024, PJM completed the phase II system impact study for TC1. Developers had 30 days (until January 19, 2025) to decide whether to proceed with their new service requests into the next study phase of TC1 or to withdraw their projects. Continuing with phase III requires developers to meet the decision point II requirements, (including additional readiness deposits and proof of site control).[89]

On April 21, 2025, phase III of TC1 began. During phase III, PJM performed the phase III SIS. PJM retooled the load flow, short circuit and stability results from the phase II SIS based on decisions made during decision point II. PJM also coordinated with affected systems to conduct any studies required to determine the final impact of a new service request on any affected system. Phase III of TC1 completed on September 19, 2025. The TC1 decision point III ran for 30 days, and completed on October 21, 2025. Additionally, the TC1 final agreement phase also began at the completion of phase III, and completed on November 20, 2025.

### Planned Generation Additions

TC1 is comprised of 312 proposed generation projects. Those projects make up 40,650.1 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in TC1 were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn from the cycle. Table 12-52 shows each status by unit type. Of the 40,650.1 MW in TC1, 14,120.0 MW (34.7 percent) were active or under construction (10,763.0 MW (26.5 percent) were active and 3,357.0 MW (8.2 percent) were under construction) and 26,530.1 MW (65.3 percent) were withdrawn. Of the 10,763.0 MW in the status of active, 7,336.2 MW (68.2 percent) were solar projects, 1,245.9 MW (11.6 percent) were wind projects, and 1,330.0 MW (12.4 percent) were battery projects.

86 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022).
87 See "Interconnection Process Reform," presented at the April 27, 2022 meeting of the Members Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/2022/20220427/20220427-item-01a-1-interconnection-process-reform-presentation.ashx>.
88 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026) for a complete list of all readiness requirements.
89 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026) for a complete list of all readiness requirements.

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### Table 12-52 Transition cycle 1 project status (MW) by unit type: June 30, 2026

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 1,330.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,336.2 | 851.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,245.9 | 0.0 | 10,763.0 |
| Under Construction | 75.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 224.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,489.0 | 0.0 | 3,357.0 |
| Withdrawn | 4,877.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13,369.8 | 3,257.2 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,826.7 | 0.0 | 26,530.1 |
| Total | 6,282.4 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,930.0 | 4,108.2 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,561.6 | 0.0 | 40,650.1 |

Table 12-53 shows the projects in TC1 with a status of active or under construction, by unit type, and control zone. As of June 30, 2026, 14,120.0 MW were in TC1 for construction through 2031. Table 12-53 also shows the planned retirements for each zone.

### Table 12-53 Transition cycle 1 totals for projects (active and under construction) by LDA, control zone and unit type (MW): June 30, 2026

| LDA | Zone | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total Queue Capacity | Planned Retirements |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMAAC | ACEC | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 70.0 | 176.5 |
| | DPL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | JCPLC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | PECO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 760.0 |
| | PSEG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 |
| | REC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | EMAAC Total | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 70.0 | 938.5 |
| SWMAAC | BGE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,975.0 |
| | PEPCO | 500.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 500.0 | 0.0 |
| | SWMAAC Total | 500.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 500.0 | 1,975.0 |
| WMAAC | MEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | PE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 110.0 | 245.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 355.0 | 10.4 |
| | PPL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | WMAAC Total | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 110.0 | 245.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 355.0 | 10.4 |
| Non-MAAC | AEP | 255.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,115.0 | 500.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 755.0 | 0.0 | 2,625.0 | 2,620.0 |
| | AMPT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | APS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 31.5 |
| | ATSI | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 114.0 |
| | COMED | 330.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,853.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 490.9 | 0.0 | 4,674.0 | 2,116.9 |
| | DAY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 206.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 206.6 | 0.0 |
| | DUKE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 |
| | DLCO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | DOM | 250.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,439.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,489.0 | 0.0 | 4,747.0 | 0.0 |
| | EKPC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 824.5 | 106.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 930.5 | 116.0 |
| | OVEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | RMU | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Non-MAAC Total | 835.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,450.2 | 606.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,734.9 | 0.0 | 13,195.0 | 5,008.4 |
| Total | | 1,405.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,560.2 | 851.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,734.9 | 0.0 | 14,120.0 | 7,932.3 |



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Table 12-54 shows that on June 30, 2026 there were 14,120.0 MW, on an energy basis, of which 6,798.9 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in TC1 in the status of active or under construction. Table 12-54 also shows the total capacity MW adjusted for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 6,798.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 1,741.7 MW (25.6 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 569.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including CT natural gas projects) requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 381.2 MW (67.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 3,727.4 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 372.7 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 1,022.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 603.0 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 5,207.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in TC1 in the status of active or under construction, 757.5 MW (14.5 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

**Table 12-54 Transition cycle 1 totals for projects (active and under construction) by unit type adjusted for ELCC derates (MW): June 30, 2026**

| | Energy (MW) | Capacity (MW) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Total | Total | ELCC Adjusted |
| Battery | 1,405.0 | 1,022.0 | 603.0 |
| CC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 569.0 | 569.0 | 381.2 |
| CT - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fuel Cell | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nuclear | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 7,560.2 | 3,727.4 | 372.7 |
| Solar + Storage | 851.0 | 494.3 | 49.4 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind | 3,734.9 | 986.3 | 335.3 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 14,120.0 | 6,798.9 | 1,741.7 |

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## Withdrawn Projects

Table 12-55 shows the status of all TC1 projects as they have progressed through the cycle process. Of the 312 projects included in TC1, 122 projects (39.1 percent of all projects and 39.5 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn during phase I or decision point I, 63 projects (20.2 percent of all projects and 17.4 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn during phase II or decision point II, 40 projects (12.8 percent of all projects and 7.1 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn during phase III or decision point III and 4 projects (1.3 percent of all projects and 1.2 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn during the final agreement stage. On June 30, 2026, 83 projects (26.6 percent of all projects and 34.7 percent of the total MW) remain active, have reached the final agreement stage or are under construction in TC1.

### Table 12-55 Transition cycle 1 status: June 30, 2026

| | Number of Projects | Percent of Projects | MW Energy | Percent of MW Energy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transition cycle 1 approved projects | 312 | 100.0% | 40,650.1 | 100.0% |
| Withdrawn prior to start of phase I | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Withdrawn during phase I or decision point I | 122 | 39.1% | 16,076.8 | 39.5% |
| Withdrawn during phase II or decision point II | 63 | 20.2% | 7,067.5 | 17.4% |
| Withdrawn during phase III or decision point III | 40 | 12.8% | 2,886.5 | 7.1% |
| Withdrawn during final agreement stage | 4 | 1.3% | 499.2 | 1.2% |
| Active as of June 30, 2026 | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| In final agreement stage as of June 30, 2026 | 74 | 23.7% | 10,763.0 | 26.5% |
| Under construction | 9 | 2.9% | 3,357.0 | 8.3% |
| In Service | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |

Table 12-56 shows 40,650.1 MW have entered TC1. Table 12-56 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date as of June 30, 2026. Of the 40,650.1 MW to enter TC1, 569.0 MW (1.4 percent) were thermal units.

### Table 12-56 Transition cycle 1 total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year: June 30, 2026

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 255.0 | 0.0 | 345.0 |
| 2019 | 831.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,750.3 | 1,826.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,112.2 | 0.0 | 7,520.9 |
| 2020 | 4,045.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,529.6 | 1,430.4 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,459.6 | 0.0 | 18,664.2 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 66.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 66.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2026 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2027 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 125.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 180.0 |
| 2028 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 277.1 | 106.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 453.1 |
| 2029 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,587.5 | 745.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,045.9 | 0.0 | 5,147.4 |
| 2030 | 830.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,633.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 3,663.6 |
| 2031 | 250.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,351.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,601.0 |
| 2032 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 500.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,489.0 | 0.0 | 2,989.0 |
| Total | 6,282.4 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,930.0 | 4,108.2 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,561.6 | 0.0 | 40,650.1 |


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Table 12-57 shows there were 14,120.0 MW in TC1 in the status of active or under construction as of June 30, 2026. Table 12-57 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date. Of the 14,120.0 MW, 569.0 MW (4.0 percent) are thermal units.

**Table 12-57 Transition cycle 1 total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year (active and under construction): June 30, 2026**

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2020 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 66.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 66.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2026 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2027 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 125.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 180.0 |
| 2028 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 277.1 | 106.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 453.1 |
| 2029 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,587.5 | 745.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,045.9 | 0.0 | 5,147.4 |
| 2030 | 830.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,633.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 3,663.6 |
| 2031 | 250.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,351.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,601.0 |
| 2032 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 500.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,489.0 | 0.0 | 2,989.0 |
| Total | 1,405.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,560.2 | 851.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,734.9 | 0.0 | 14,120.0 |

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Table 12-58 shows there were 26,530.1 MW withdrawn from TC1. Table 12-58 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date. Of the 26,530.1 MW withdrawn from TC1, none were identified as thermal units.

### Table 12-58 Transition cycle 1 total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year (withdrawn): June 30, 2026

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 255.0 | 0.0 | 345.0 |
| 2019 | 831.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,750.3 | 1,826.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,112.2 | 0.0 | 7,520.9 |
| 2020 | 4,045.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,529.6 | 1,430.4 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,459.6 | 0.0 | 18,664.2 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2026 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2027 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2028 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2029 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2030 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2031 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2032 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 4,877.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13,369.8 | 3,257.2 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,826.7 | 0.0 | 26,530.1 |

## Analysis by Fuel Group

Table 12-59 shows the number of projects that entered TC1 by year and by fuel group. The fuel groups are nuclear units, renewable units (including hydro run of river, solar and wind units (including renewable solar and wind hybrids), storage units (including battery and pumped storage hydro units), thermal units (including combined cycle, CT natural gas and oil, RICE natural gas and oil and steam coal, natural gas and oil) and other units (all other fuels). The 312 projects submitted to TC1 were made up of 233 renewable projects (74.7 percent), 77 storage projects (24.7 percent) and two thermal projects (0.6 percent).

### Table 12-59 Transition cycle 1 number of projects by fuel group: June 30, 2026

| | Fuel Group | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year Entered | Nuclear | Percent Nuclear | Renewable | Percent Renewable | Storage | Percent Storage | Thermal | Percent Thermal | Other | Percent Other | Total |
| 2018 | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 80.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 20.0% | 0 | 0.00% | 5 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0.0% | 57 | 78.1% | 15 | 20.5% | 1 | 1.4% | 0 | 0.00% | 73 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0.0% | 172 | 73.5% | 62 | 26.5% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.00% | 234 |
| Total | 0 | 0.0% | 233 | 74.7% | 77 | 24.7% | 2 | 0.6% | 0 | 0.00% | 312 |


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As of June 30, 2026, there were 83 projects in TC1 in the status of active or under construction. Those 83 projects consisted of 66 renewable projects (79.5 percent of all projects and 86.0 percent of the nameplate MW), 16 storage projects (19.3 percent of all projects and 10.0 percent of the nameplate MW) and one thermal project (1.2 percent of all projects and 4.0 percent of the nameplate MW) (Table 12-60).

### Table 12-60 Transition cycle 1 details by fuel group: June 30, 2026

| Fuel Group | Number of Projects | Percent of Projects | MW | Percent MW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Renewable | 66 | 79.5% | 12,146.0 | 86.0% |
| Storage | 16 | 19.3% | 1,405.0 | 10.0% |
| Thermal | 1 | 1.2% | 569.0 | 4.0% |
| Other | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Total | 83 | 100.0% | 14,120.0 | 100.0% |

## Analysis by Unit Type and Project Classification

Table 12-61 shows the status of all new generation projects in TC1 by unit type and project classification as of June 30, 2026. Project classification is defined as either new generation or an uprate in which existing resources are modified to increase the economic maximum generation capability. There were 312 projects, representing 40,650.1 MW, entered into TC1. Of those, 312 projects, 229 projects, representing 26,530.1 MW (65.3 percent of the MW) withdrew prior to completion.

A total of 222 projects have been classified as new generation and 90 projects have been classified as upgrades. Natural gas, wind, solar and renewable hybrid projects (including solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage) have accounted for 235 projects (75.3 percent) of all 312 generation projects to enter TC1.

### Table 12-61 Transition Cycle 1 status of all generation projects: June 30, 2026

| | | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 8 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 95 | 27 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 162 |
| | Upgrade | 36 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 67 |
| Active | New Generation | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 52 |
| | Upgrade | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 22 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 32 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 133 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 222 |
| | Upgrade | 45 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 90 |

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Table 12-62 shows the totals in Table 12-61 by share of classification as new generation or upgrade. Within a unit type the shares of upgrades add to 100 percent and the shares of new generation add to 100 percent. For example, 20.0 percent of all battery projects in TC1 classified as upgrades were active and 80.0 percent of battery projects classified as upgrades were withdrawn from TC1 as of June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-62 Transition Cycle 1 status of all generation projects as a percent of total projects by classification: June 30, 2026

| | | Percent of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 3.1% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 13.0% | 0.0% | 3.6% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.1% |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 78.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 71.4% | 84.4% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 60.9% | 0.0% | 73.0% |
| | Upgrade | 80.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 63.9% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 75.0% | 0.0% | 74.4% |
| Active | New Generation | 18.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 26.3% | 15.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 26.1% | 0.0% | 23.4% |
| | Upgrade | 20.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 33.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 25.0% | 0.0% | 24.4% |

Table 12-63 shows the total MW of projects in TC1 by unit type and project classification. For example, the 25 new generation battery projects that have been withdrawn from TC1 as of June 30, 2026, (as shown in Table 12-61) constitute 3,629.7 MW. The 95 new generation solar projects that have been withdrawn in the same time period constitute 11,236.8 MW.

### Table 12-63 Transition cycle 1 status of all generation (MW) projects: June 30, 2026

| | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 75.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 212.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,489.0 | 0.0 | 3,345.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 3,629.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,236.8 | 2,994.8 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,360.2 | 0.0 | 22,420.4 |
| | Upgrade | 1,247.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,133.0 | 262.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 466.6 | 0.0 | 4,109.7 |
| Active | New Generation | 920.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,131.1 | 851.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,095.9 | 0.0 | 8,997.9 |
| | Upgrade | 410.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,205.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 150.0 | 0.0 | 1,765.1 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 4,624.7 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17,579.9 | 3,845.8 | 199.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,945.1 | 0.0 | 34,763.4 |
| | Upgrade | 1,657.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,350.1 | 262.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 616.6 | 0.0 | 5,886.8 |


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Table 12-64 shows the MW totals in Table 12-63 share by classification as new generation or upgrade. Within a unit type the shares of upgrades add to 100 percent and the shares of new generation add to 100 percent. For example, 24.7 percent of all battery project MW in TC1 classified as upgrades were active and 75.3 percent of battery project MW classified as upgrades were withdrawn from TC1 as of June 30, 2026.

**Table 12-64 Transition cycle 1 status of all generation projects as percent of total MW in project classification: June 30, 2026**

| | | Percent of Total Projects by Classification | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 1.6% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 31.3% | 0.0% | 9.6% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 78.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 63.9% | 77.9% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 54.9% | 0.0% | 64.5% |
| | Upgrade | 75.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 63.7% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 75.7% | 0.0% | 69.8% |
| Active | New Generation | 19.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 34.9% | 22.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 13.8% | 0.0% | 25.9% |
| | Upgrade | 24.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 36.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 24.3% | 0.0% | 30.0% |

## Transition Cycle 2 (TC2) and Reliability Resource Initiative (RRI)

On December 13, 2024, PJM submitted modifications to its Open Access Transmission Tariff to add provisions, through a one-time reliability based expansion of the projects in TC2.[90] The MMU supports the stated goals of the December 13th Filing, and supported approval of the December 13th Filing, but also identified significant flaws that compromise the ability of the proposal to achieve its stated goals.[91] PJM's RRI scoring criteria placed undue emphasis on ELCC values rather than on dispatchability. PJM stated that the goal is to be fuel and technology neutral. That is not the appropriate objective when there are defined differences in reliability and dispatchability across resource types, by fuel and technology. The goal of the December 13th Filing should have been to select the most reliable fuel and technology combinations. PJM also focused on an arbitrary number of projects (50) that could qualify as RRI projects rather than on a target level of MW needed for reliability. PJM should have identified the number of MW, with the required reliability characteristics, that it believes are needed to address PJM's identified reliability shortfall and use the RRI process to obtain those MW. PJM's RRI scoring criteria should have been a series of thresholds that must be met in sequence rather than a single formula that considers all elements simultaneously and assumes that the criteria are comparable through relative weights. The first threshold should have been that the resource is in the right location to address the identified locational reliability issue. The second threshold should have been that the operational characteristics of the resource fully address the identified reliability issue including technology and fuel source(s). The third threshold should have been commercial viability within a defined time period with detailed tracking and strong financial incentives. No RRI resource should have been approved unless it met all three thresholds.

In addition to the one time RRI process, the MMU recommends that PJM establish an ongoing expedited PJM managed queue process to identify commercially viable projects that could help eliminate or reduce the need for specific RMRs or that could address specific reliability needs and allow the identified projects to advance

90 See *PJM Interconnection LLC.* Docket No. ER25-712 (December 13, 2024).
91 See IMM Comments. *PJM Interconnection LLC.* Docket No. ER25-712

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in the queue ahead of projects which have failed to make progress, subject to rules to prevent gaming.[92] While it is important to respect the existing, improved PJM queue process, it is also essential to provide strong and clear incentives for projects to actually resolve reliability issues and to actually guarantee timely in service dates in order to help ensure that the queue is not a mirage as it has been in significant part for its recent history. Recognizing that improved queue rules are being implemented, the history of queue projects becoming actual in service capacity resources suggests strongly that such incentives have not been provided by the queue process.

On February 11, 2025, the Commission approved the RRI tariff modifications.[93] The proposed RRI Tariff revisions created a second TC2 application window that enabled RRI projects to join TC2 and be studied for interconnection during the transition period.

PJM included a range of important enforceable provisions that help ensure that the selected RRI resources will actually go online as promised. These provisions include a must offer obligation which is essential to the efficacy of the entire filing as capacity resources that do not offer do not help solve the identified problem. The MMU supports these provisions.

PJM received 97 applications (28.6 GW) of RRI projects during the RRI application window. Of these projects, 48 involve uprates, in which existing resources are modified to increase the economic maximum generation capability, and 49 propose building new generation. The RRI application window did not limit the number and type of projects (or any restriction on fuel type of projects) that may apply to enter the RRI process. However, PJM restricted the number of RRI projects to be added to TC2 by scoring all the RRI applications using weighted criteria to determine the 50 projects that best satisfy the need for reliable capacity that can be available relatively quickly. The submitted RRI projects were reviewed to determine which projects will be added to TC2.

PJM reviewed the submitted RRI projects using the Commission approved scoring criteria, and approved 51 projects (11,577.4 MW).[94] Table 12-65 shows the status of the 51 approved RRI projects by unit type. On June 30, 2026, all approved RRI projects were either in the status of active or were withdrawn from the cycle. Of the 11,577.4 MW of approved RRI projects, 7,932.4 MW (68.5 percent) were active and 3,645.0 MW (31.5 percent) were withdrawn. Of the 7,932.4 MW in the status of active, 4,843.6 MW (61.1 percent) were combined cycle projects, and 1,575.0 MW (19.9 percent) were battery projects.

**Table 12-65 RRI project status (MW) by unit type: June 30, 2026**

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 1,575.0 | 4,843.6 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,932.4 |
| Withdrawn | 700.0 | 2,945.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,645.0 |
| Total | 2,275.0 | 7,788.6 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,577.4 |

Of the 51 approved RRI projects, 10 (19.6 percent) have been withdrawn as of June 30, 2026. These 10 projects were withdrawn at the request of the developer. Withdrawn RRI projects highlight the flaws in the project selection stage. A better approach would have been to select enough projects, using supported

92 The MMU has consistently supported a stronger role for PJM in addressing immediate reliability needs. As part of the CIR Transfer Efficiency initiative, the MMU proposed to allow PJM to initiate an expedited fast track process to address PJM identified reliability issues. The proposed expedited process would have allowed PJM to open a limited scope expedited reliability process to select projects that address the reliability issues. See "CIR Transfer Efficiency IMM Package," MMU presentation to the PJM Planning Committee (October 8, 2024), <*https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2024/IMM_PC_CIR_Transfer_Efficiency_IMM_Package_20241008_v2.pdf*>

93 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 (February 11, 2025).

94 The RRI proposal was to select the top 50 projects using the approved scoring criteria. The implemented scoring criteria resulted in a tie for the 50th project. This resulted in PJM selecting 51 projects as part of the RRI process.



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commercial operation date as a gating criterion, to meet a desired MW quantity (accounting for expected withdrawals) to ensure a reliable outcome rather than a set number of projects.

Table 12-66 shows that on June 30, 2026, there were 7,932.4 MW, on an energy basis, of which 7,443.8 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of RRI projects in the status of active or under construction. Table 12-66 also shows the total capacity MW adjusted for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 7,443.8 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of RRI projects in the status of active or under construction, 5,737.8 MW (77.1 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 4,524.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of RRI combined cycle projects in the status of active or under construction, 3,529.4 MW (78.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 1,575.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of RRI battery projects in the status of active or under construction, 929.3 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

**Table 12-66 RRI totals for projects (active and under construction) by unit type adjusted for ELCC derates (MW): June 30, 2026**

| | Energy (MW) | Capacity (MW) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Total | Total | ELCC Adjusted |
| Battery | 1,575.0 | 1,575.0 | 929.3 |
| CC | 4,843.6 | 4,524.9 | 3,529.4 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 11.0 | 38.0 | 25.5 |
| CT - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fuel Cell | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nuclear | 1,502.8 | 1,305.9 | 1,253.7 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 7,932.4 | 7,443.8 | 5,737.8 |

The application phase for TC2 opened on June 20, 2024, coincident with the close of phase I of transition cycle 1. The application phase required all active projects in queues AG2 and AH1 to reapply under the new rules. The application phase of TC2 was open for 180 days, and closed on December 17, 2024.

There were 1,347 projects (102,323.9 MW) eligible to resubmit for evaluation in TC2. Of those 1,347 eligible projects, 550 projects (49,168.3 MW) resubmitted and are now being evaluated in TC2. Of the 1,347 eligible projects, 797 projects (53,155.5 MW) did not resubmit, and were withdrawn from the queue.

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The TC2 application review stage began at the close of the application phase. PJM reviewed the submissions for required data and deposits and built the models required for the TC2 system impact studies. The TC2 application review stage completed on July 6, 2025.

On October 31, 2025, PJM completed the phase I system impact study for transition cycle 2 (TC2). Developers had 30 days (until December 2, 2025) to decide whether to proceed with their new service requests into the next study phase of TC2 or to withdraw their projects. Continuing with phase II required developers to meet the decision point I requirements (including additional readiness deposits and proof of site control).[95]

On June 5, 2026, PJM completed the phase II system impact study for TC2. Developers have 30 days (until July 7, 2026) to decide whether to proceed with their new service requests into the next study phase of TC2 or to withdraw their projects. Continuing with phase III requires developers to meet the decision point II requirements, (including additional readiness deposits and proof of site control).[96]

## Planned Generation Additions

TC2 is comprised of 647 proposed generation projects. TC2 includes 550 projects submitted during the TC2 window, and 97 projects submitted through the RRI window. Those projects make up 77,760.6 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in TC2 were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn from the cycle. Table 12-67 shows each status by unit type. Of the 77,760.6 MW in TC2, 29,822.6 MW (38.3 percent) were active or under construction (29,742.6 MW (38.2 percent) were active and 80 MW (0.1 percent) were under construction) and 47,938.0 MW (61.6 percent) were withdrawn. Of the 29,742.6 MW in the status of active, 11,646.1 MW (39.2 percent) are solar projects, 468.4 MW (1.6 percent) are wind projects, and 6,335.8 MW (21.3 percent) are battery projects.

### Table 12-67 Transition cycle 2 and RRI project status (MW) by unit type: June 30, 2026

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 6,335.8 | 6,943.6 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,646.1 | 2,047.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.4 | 0.0 | 29,742.6 |
| Under Construction | 80.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.0 |
| Withdrawn | 13,515.9 | 13,742.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13,687.6 | 3,465.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3,494.4 | 0.0 | 47,938.0 |
| Total | 19,931.7 | 20,686.2 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25,333.8 | 5,512.8 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3,962.8 | 0.0 | 77,760.6 |

95 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026) for a complete list of all readiness requirements.
96 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026) for a complete list of all readiness requirements.


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Table 12-68 shows the projects in TC2 with a status of active or under construction, by unit type, and control zone. As of June 30, 2026, 29,822.6 MW were in TC2 for construction through 2031. Table 12-68 also shows the planned retirements for each zone.

**Table 12-68 Transition cycle 2 and RRI totals for projects (active and under construction) by LDA, control zone and unit type (MW): June 30, 2026**

| LDA | Zone | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total Queue Capacity | Planned Retirements |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMAAC | ACEC | 300.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 84.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 384.0 | 176.5 |
| | DPL | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 102.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 122.2 | 0.0 |
| | JCPLC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 117.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 117.9 | 0.0 |
| | PECO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 760.0 |
| | PSEG | 0.0 | 293.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 256.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 550.0 | 2.0 |
| | REC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | EMAAC Total | 320.0 | 293.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 256.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 304.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,174.1 | 938.5 |
| SWMAAC | BGE | 635.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 690.0 | 1,975.0 |
| | PEPCO | 0.0 | 53.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 110.0 | 670.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 833.7 | 0.0 |
| | SWMAAC Total | 635.0 | 53.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 165.0 | 670.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,523.7 | 1,975.0 |
| WMAAC | MEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 859.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 859.0 | 0.0 |
| | PE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 354.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 379.0 | 10.4 |
| | PPL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 48.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 48.0 | 0.0 |
| | WMAAC Total | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 859.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 402.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,286.0 | 10.4 |
| Non-MAAC | AEP | 1,703.0 | 72.0 | 752.0 | 0.0 | 10.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,298.2 | 565.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6,400.8 | 2,620.0 |
| | AMPT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | APS | 390.0 | 2,370.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 614.9 | 46.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.4 | 0.0 | 3,890.1 | 31.5 |
| | ATSI | 150.0 | 1,796.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 170.0 | 110.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,226.7 | 114.0 |
| | COMED | 1,187.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 387.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,135.0 | 359.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,084.8 | 2,116.9 |
| | DAY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | DUKE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 |
| | DLCO | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.7 | 0.0 |
| | DOM | 2,030.8 | 1,572.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,610.7 | 207.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7,441.1 | 0.0 |
| | EKPC | 0.0 | 786.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 543.0 | 63.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,392.3 | 116.0 |
| | OVEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 398.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 398.5 | 0.0 |
| | RMU | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Non-MAAC Total | 5,460.8 | 6,597.0 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 387.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,775.0 | 1,352.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.4 | 0.0 | 25,838.8 | 5,008.4 |
| Total | | 6,415.8 | 6,943.6 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,646.1 | 2,047.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.4 | 0.0 | 29,822.6 | 7,932.3 |

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Table 12-69 shows that on June 30, 2026, there were 29,822.6 MW, on an energy basis, of which 21,719.2 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in TC2 in the status of active or under construction. Table 12-69 also shows the total capacity MW adjusted for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 21,719.2 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 10,753.4 MW (49.5 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 7,337.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle and CT natural gas projects) requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 5,642.4 MW (76.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 6,366.4 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 636.6 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 5,122.3 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 3,022.2 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 7,919.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in TC2 in the status of active or under construction, 811.2 MW (10.2 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

**Table 12-69 Transition cycle 2 and RRI totals for projects (active and under construction) by unit type adjusted for ELCC derates (MW): June 30, 2026**

| | Energy (MW) | Capacity (MW) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Total | Total | ELCC Adjusted |
| Battery | 6,415.8 | 5,122.3 | 3,022.2 |
| CC | 6,943.6 | 6,599.9 | 5,147.9 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 763.0 | 738.0 | 494.5 |
| CT - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Other | 30.1 | 29.1 | 19.5 |
| Fuel Cell | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nuclear | 1,502.8 | 1,305.9 | 1,253.7 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 11,646.1 | 6,366.4 | 636.6 |
| Solar + Storage | 2,047.8 | 1,472.5 | 147.2 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind | 468.4 | 80.2 | 27.3 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 29,822.6 | 21,719.2 | 10,753.4 |



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## Withdrawn Projects

Table 12-70 shows the status of all TC2 projects as they have progressed through the cycle process. Of the 647 projects included in TC2, 46 projects (7.1 percent of all projects and 21.9 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn as part of the RRI evaluation, 51 projects (7.9 percent of all projects and 6.7 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn prior to the beginning of phase I, and 272 projects (42.0 percent of all projects and 33.1 percent of the total MW) were withdrawn during phase I or decision point I. On June 30, 2026, 278 projects (43.0 percent of all projects and 38.4 percent of the total MW) remain active in TC2.

### Table 12-70 Transition cycle 2 and RRI status: June 30, 2026

| | Number of Projects | Percent of Projects | MW Energy | Percent of MW Energy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transition cycle 2 approved projects | 647 | 100.0% | 77,760.6 | 100.0% |
| RRI projects not selected | 46 | 7.1% | 17,014.8 | 21.9% |
| Withdrawn prior to start of phase I | 51 | 7.9% | 5,201.1 | 6.7% |
| Withdrawn during phase I or decision point I | 272 | 42.0% | 25,722.0 | 33.1% |
| Withdrawn during phase II or decision point II | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Active as of June 30, 2026 | 270 | 41.7% | 29,742.6 | 38.2% |
| In final agreement stage as of June 30, 2026 | 4 | 0.6% | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| Under Construction | 4 | 0.6% | 80.0 | 0.1% |
| In Service | 0 | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0% |

Table 12-71 shows 77,760.6 MW have entered TC2. Table 12-71 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date as of June 30, 2026. Of the 77,760.6 MW to enter TC2, 21,449.2 MW (27.6 percent) were thermal units.

### Table 12-71 Transition cycle 2 and RRI total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year: June 30, 2026

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2020 | 207.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 523.9 | 33.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 250.0 | 0.0 | 1,013.9 |
| 2021 | 7,161.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12,979.7 | 2,849.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,244.4 | 0.0 | 26,264.3 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 6,147.0 | 13,800.6 | 52.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 202.0 | 583.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,792.8 |
| 2026 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 88.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 140.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 282.2 |
| 2027 | 100.0 | 167.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,245.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 540.7 | 733.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 147.0 | 0.0 | 2,954.5 |
| 2028 | 2,125.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,797.5 | 1,265.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 321.4 | 0.0 | 9,520.2 |
| 2029 | 3,705.0 | 127.2 | 700.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 169.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,712.5 | 49.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,462.7 |
| 2030 | 425.0 | 2,894.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,237.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,557.2 |
| 2031 | 60.8 | 3,652.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,712.8 |
| 2032 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 |
| Total | 19,931.7 | 20,686.2 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25,333.8 | 5,512.8 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3,962.8 | 0.0 | 77,760.6 |

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Table 12-72 shows there were 29,822.6 MW in TC2 in the status of active or under construction as of June 30, 2026. Table 12-72 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date. Of the 29,822.6 MW, 7,706.6 MW (25.8 percent) are thermal units.

**Table 12-72 Transition cycle 2 and RRI total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year (active and under construction): June 30, 2026**

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2020 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 0.0 | 58.0 | 52.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 133.0 |
| 2026 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 88.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 140.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 282.2 |
| 2027 | 100.0 | 167.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,245.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 540.7 | 733.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 147.0 | 0.0 | 2,954.5 |
| 2028 | 2,125.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5,797.5 | 1,265.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 321.4 | 0.0 | 9,520.2 |
| 2029 | 3,705.0 | 127.2 | 700.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 169.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,712.5 | 49.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,462.7 |
| 2030 | 425.0 | 2,894.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,237.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,557.2 |
| 2031 | 60.8 | 3,652.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,712.8 |
| 2032 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 200.0 |
| Total | 6,415.8 | 6,943.6 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11,646.1 | 2,047.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.4 | 0.0 | 29,822.6 |



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Table 12-73 shows there were 47,938.0 MW withdrawn from TC2 as of June 30, 2026. Table 12-73 presents totals by fuel type and projected in service date. Of the 47,938.0 MW withdrawn from TC2, 13,742.6 MW (28.7 percent) were thermal units.

**Table 12-73 Transition cycle 2 and RRI total (MW Energy) by unit type and projected in service year (withdrawn): June 30, 2026**

| Year | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2020 | 207.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 523.9 | 33.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 250.0 | 0.0 | 1,013.9 |
| 2021 | 7,161.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12,979.7 | 2,849.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3,244.4 | 0.0 | 26,264.3 |
| 2022 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2023 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2024 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2025 | 6,147.0 | 13,742.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 184.0 | 583.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,659.8 |
| 2026 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2027 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2028 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2029 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2030 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2031 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 13,515.9 | 13,742.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13,687.6 | 3,465.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3,494.4 | 0.0 | 47,938.0 |

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## Analysis by Fuel Group

Table 12-74 shows the number of projects that entered TC2 by year and by fuel group. The fuel groups are nuclear units, renewable units (including hydro run of river, solar and wind units (including renewable solar and wind hybrids), storage units (including battery and pumped storage hydro units), thermal units (including combined cycle, CT natural gas and oil, RICE natural gas and oil and steam coal, natural gas and oil) and other units (all other fuels). The 647 projects submitted to TC2 were made up of 391 renewable projects (60.4 percent), 188 storage projects (29.1 percent), 58 thermal projects (9.0 percent), five nuclear projects (0.8 percent) and five other fuel projects (0.8 percent).

### Table 12-74 Transition cycle 2 and RRI number of projects by fuel group: June 30, 2026

| | Fuel Group | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year Entered | Nuclear | Percent Nuclear | Renewable | Percent Renewable | Storage | Percent Storage | Thermal | Percent Thermal | Other | Percent Other | Total |
| 2018 | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0.0% | 18 | 72.0% | 6 | 24.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 4.0% | 25 |
| 2021 | 0 | 0.0% | 365 | 69.9% | 150 | 28.7% | 4 | 0.8% | 3 | 0.6% | 522 |
| 2022 | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 |
| 2024 | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 |
| 2025 | 5 | 5.2% | 5 | 5.2% | 32 | 33.0% | 54 | 55.7% | 1 | 1.0% | 97 |
| Total | 5 | 0.8% | 391 | 60.4% | 188 | 29.1% | 58 | 9.0% | 5 | 0.8% | 647 |

As of June 30, 2026, there were 278 projects in TC2 in the status of active or under construction. Those 278 projects consisted of 172 renewable projects (61.9 percent of all projects and 47.5 percent of the nameplate MW), 62 storage projects (22.3 percent of all projects and 21.5 percent of the nameplate MW), 36 thermal projects (12.9 percent of all projects and 25.8 percent of the nameplate MW), five nuclear projects (1.8 percent of all projects and 5.0 percent of the nameplate MW) and three other fuel type projects (1.1 percent of all projects and 0.1 percent of the nameplate MW) (Table 12-75).

### Table 12-75 Transition cycle 2 and RRI details by fuel group: June 30, 2026

| Fuel Group | Number of Projects | Percent of Projects | MW | Percent MW |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear | 5 | 1.8% | 1,502.8 | 5.0% |
| Renewable | 172 | 61.9% | 14,162.3 | 47.5% |
| Storage | 62 | 22.3% | 6,415.8 | 21.5% |
| Thermal | 36 | 12.9% | 7,706.6 | 25.8% |
| Other | 3 | 1.1% | 35.1 | 0.1% |
| Total | 278 | 100.0% | 29,822.6 | 100.0% |


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## Analysis by Unit Type and Project Classification

Table 12-76 shows the status of all new generation projects in TC2 by unit type and project classification as of June 30, 2026. Project classification is defined as either new generation or an uprate in which existing resources are modified to increase the economic maximum generation capability. There were 647 projects, representing 77,760.6 MW, entered into TC2. Of those, 647 projects, 369 projects, representing 47,938.0 MW (61.6 percent of the MW) withdrew prior to completion.

A total of 428 projects have been classified as new generation and 219 projects have been classified as upgrades. Natural gas, wind, solar and renewable hybrid projects (including solar + storage, solar + wind and wind + storage) have accounted for 446 projects (68.9 percent) of all 647 generation projects to enter TC2.

### Table 12-76 Transition Cycle 2 and RRI status of all generation projects: June 30, 2026

| | | Number of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| | Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 67 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 130 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 254 |
| | Upgrade | 59 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 115 |
| Active | New Generation | 34 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 106 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 170 |
| | Upgrade | 24 | 18 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 104 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 105 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 236 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 428 |
| | Upgrade | 83 | 26 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 83 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 219 |

Table 12-77 shows the totals in Table 12-76 by share of classification as new generation or upgrade. Within a unit type the shares of upgrades add to 100 percent and the shares of new generation add to 100 percent. For example, 28.9 percent of all battery projects in TC2 classified as upgrades were active and 71.1 percent of battery projects classified as upgrades were withdrawn from TC2 as of June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-77 Transition Cycle 2 and RRI status of all generation projects as a percent of total projects by classification: June 30, 2026

| | | Percent of Projects | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 3.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.9% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 63.8% | 73.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 55.1% | 64.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 70.0% | 0.0% | 59.3% |
| | Upgrade | 71.1% | 30.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 49.4% | 71.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 52.5% |
| Active | New Generation | 32.4% | 26.3% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 44.9% | 36.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 30.0% | 0.0% | 39.7% |
| | Upgrade | 28.9% | 69.2% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 50.6% | 28.6% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 47.5% |

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Table 12-78 shows the total MW of projects in TC2 by unit type and project classification. For example, the 67 new generation battery projects that have been withdrawn from TC2 as of June 30, 2026, (as shown in Table 12-76) constitute 10,075.1 MW. The 130 new generation solar projects that have been withdrawn in the same time period constitute 10,806.9 MW.

### Table 12-78 Transition cycle 2 and RRI status of all generation (MW) projects: June 30, 2026

| | | Project MW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 80.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 80.0 |
| | Upgrade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 10,075.1 | 13,492.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10,806.9 | 3,097.6 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3,426.4 | 0.0 | 40,930.7 |
| | Upgrade | 3,440.8 | 250.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,880.7 | 367.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 68.0 | 0.0 | 7,007.3 |
| Active | New Generation | 5,219.4 | 5,738.0 | 700.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 859.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9,761.1 | 1,967.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.4 | 0.0 | 24,743.8 |
| | Upgrade | 1,116.4 | 1,205.6 | 63.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 643.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,885.0 | 80.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,998.8 |
| Total Projects | New Generation | 15,374.5 | 19,230.2 | 700.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 859.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 20,568.1 | 5,065.4 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3,894.8 | 0.0 | 65,754.4 |
| | Upgrade | 4,557.2 | 1,456.0 | 63.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 643.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,765.7 | 447.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 68.0 | 0.0 | 12,006.1 |

Table 12-79 shows the MW totals in Table 12-78 by share by classification as new generation or upgrade. Within a unit type the shares of upgrades add to 100 percent and the shares of new generation add to 100 percent. For example, 24.5 percent of all battery project MW in TC2 classified as upgrades were active and 75.5 percent of battery project MW classified as upgrades were withdrawn from TC2 as of June 30, 2026.

### Table 12-79 Transition cycle 2 and RRI status of all generation projects as percent of total MW in project classification: June 30, 2026

| | | Percent of Total Projects by Classification | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Status | Project Classification | Battery | CC | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
| In Service | New Generation | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Under Construction | New Generation | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| | Upgrade | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Withdrawn | New Generation | 65.5% | 70.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 52.5% | 61.2% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 88.0% | 0.0% | 62.2% |
| | Upgrade | 75.5% | 17.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 60.4% | 82.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 58.4% |
| Active | New Generation | 33.9% | 29.8% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 47.5% | 38.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 12.0% | 0.0% | 37.6% |
| | Upgrade | 24.5% | 82.8% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 39.6% | 17.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 41.6% |


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## Cycle 1

Applications for Cycle 1 were accepted until April 27, 2026. The application review stage is scheduled for 90 days (concluding on July 27, 2026). During this time, PJM will review the applications to ensure all requirements are met prior to including them in Cycle 1. PJM posted the Cycle 1 model on June 26, 2026.

## Cycle Process Totals[97]

On June 30, 2026, there were 959 proposed generation projects in the new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 118,410.7 MW. On June 30, 2026, all projects in the cycle process queues were either in the status of active, under construction or were withdrawn. Table 12-80 shows each status by unit type. Of the 118,410.7 MW in the cycle process queues, 43,942.6 MW (37.1 percent) were active or under construction (40,505.6 MW (34.2 percent) were active and 3,437.0 MW (2.9 percent) were under construction) and 74,468.0 MW (62.9 percent) were withdrawn. Of the 40,505.6 MW in the status of active, 18,982.3 MW (46.9 percent) were solar projects, 1,714.3 MW (4.2 percent) were wind projects, and 7,665.8 MW (18.9 percent) were battery projects.

**Table 12-80 All cycles (TC1, TC2 and RRI) project status (MW) by unit type: June 30, 2026**

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 7,665.8 | 6,943.6 | 763.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18,982.3 | 2,898.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,714.3 | 0.0 | 40,505.6 |
| Under Construction | 155.0 | 0.0 | 569.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 224.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,489.0 | 0.0 | 3,437.0 |
| Withdrawn | 18,393.3 | 13,742.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27,057.4 | 6,722.2 | 209.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 8,321.1 | 0.0 | 74,468.0 |
| Total | 26,214.1 | 20,686.2 | 1,332.0 | 0.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 46,263.7 | 9,620.9 | 209.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 12,524.4 | 0.0 | 118,410.7 |

Table 12-81 shows that on June 30, 2026, there were 43,942.6 MW, on an energy basis, of which 28,518.1 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction. Table 12-81 also shows the total capacity MW adjusted for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 28,518.1 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in the cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 12,495.1 MW (43.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 7,906.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle and CT natural gas projects) requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 6,023.6 MW (76.2 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 10,093.8 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 1,009.4 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

97 As of June 30, 2026, the cycle process totals include those projects included in TC1 and TC2.

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Of the 6,144.3 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 3,625.1 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 13,127.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 1,568.6 MW (11.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

**Table 12-81 All cycles (TC1, TC2 and RRI) projects (active and under construction) by unit type adjusted for ELCC derates (MW): June 30, 2026**

| | Energy (MW) | Capacity (MW) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Total | Total | ELCC Adjusted |
| Battery | 7,820.8 | 6,144.3 | 3,625.1 |
| CC | 6,943.6 | 6,599.9 | 5,147.9 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 1,332.0 | 1,307.0 | 875.7 |
| CT - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CT - Other | 30.1 | 29.1 | 19.5 |
| Fuel Cell | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nuclear | 1,502.8 | 1,305.9 | 1,253.7 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 19,206.3 | 10,093.8 | 1,009.4 |
| Solar + Storage | 2,898.8 | 1,966.7 | 196.7 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind | 4,203.3 | 1,066.4 | 362.6 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 43,942.6 | 28,518.1 | 12,495.1 |

## Serial and Cycle Process Totals

On July 10, 2023, there were 287,185.2 MW in the status of active, under construction or suspended in the serial queue. As part of the transition to the new cycle process, projects were removed from the queue because developers chose to not resubmit their projects in the TC2 queue, invalid projects were removed and must be resubmitted in Cycle 1, and projects were withdrawn as part of the normal queue process. On June 30, 2026, of the 287,185.2 MW, there were 74,074.2 MW (25.8 percent) in the status of active, in service or under construction, 11,726.7 MW (4.1 percent) went in service and 201,384.3 MW (70.1 percent) have been withdrawn from the queue.

On June 30, 2026, 6,420 proposed generation projects had been submitted to the combined serial and new services cycle process queues. Those projects make up 728,514.3 MW. On June 30, 2026, projects in the combined serial and cycle process queues were in the status of active, under construction, suspended, in service or were withdrawn. Of the 728,514.3 MW in the combined serial and cycle process queues, 82,006.7 MW (11.3 percent) were active, under construction or suspended (58,486.0 MW (8.0 percent) were active, 16,399.0 MW (2.3 percent) were under construction and 7,121.7 MW (1.0 percent) were suspended), 97,476.7 MW (13.4 percent) were in service and 549,030.9 MW (75.4 percent) were withdrawn.


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### Table 12-82 All Queues (Serial Queue, TC1, TC2 and RRI) project status (MW) by unit type: June 30, 2026

| | Battery | Combined Cycle | CT - Natural Gas | CT - Oil | CT - Other | Fuel Cell | Hydro - Pumped Storage | Hydro - Run of River | Nuclear | RICE - Natural Gas | RICE - Oil | RICE - Other | Solar | Solar + Storage | Solar + Wind | Steam - Coal | Steam - Natural Gas | Steam - Oil | Steam - Other | Wind | Wind + Storage | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 9,818.0 | 8,693.6 | 1,790.7 | 50.0 | 30.1 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 1,502.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 29,351.6 | 4,621.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,572.0 | 0.0 | 58,486.0 |
| In Service | 391.3 | 49,804.0 | 10,475.1 | 821.3 | 162.1 | 4.5 | 390.0 | 807.1 | 4,004.0 | 188.1 | 27.3 | 487.6 | 14,159.0 | 25.2 | 0.0 | 2,351.0 | 953.5 | 0.0 | 744.2 | 11,495.4 | 186.0 | 97,476.7 |
| Suspended | 468.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,671.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,981.8 | 0.0 | 7,121.7 |
| Under Construction | 495.0 | 1,228.8 | 659.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8,851.3 | 161.6 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4,923.3 | 0.0 | 16,399.0 |
| Withdrawn | 28,053.3 | 249,454.2 | 7,255.8 | 2,324.0 | 1,316.7 | 6.4 | 1,200.0 | 2,229.1 | 9,227.0 | 481.2 | 76.9 | 98.6 | 91,324.2 | 19,070.1 | 209.0 | 34,396.6 | 33.0 | 0.0 | 1,091.2 | 101,077.3 | 106.3 | 549,030.9 |
| Total | 39,225.8 | 309,180.7 | 20,180.6 | 3,195.3 | 1,508.9 | 15.9 | 1,590.0 | 3,087.2 | 14,777.8 | 669.3 | 104.2 | 586.2 | 148,357.8 | 23,878.2 | 209.0 | 36,783.6 | 986.5 | 0.0 | 1,835.4 | 122,049.7 | 292.3 | 728,514.3 |

Of the 82,006.7 MW in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active, under construction or suspended, 12,458.1 MW (15.2 percent) are thermal projects.

Table 12-83 shows that on June 30, 2026, there were 82,006.7 MW, on an energy basis, of which 50,628.0 MW are on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction. Table 12-83 also shows the total capacity MW adjusted for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 50,628.0 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 18,681.5 MW (36.9 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 12,057.5 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of thermal projects (including combined cycle, CT natural gas, CT oil and coal fired steam projects) requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 9,139.0 MW (75.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 23,601.5 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of solar projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 2,360.1 MW (10.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 8,144.9 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of battery projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 4,805.5 MW (59.0 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

Of the 29,041.7 MW, on a capacity basis that requested CIRs, of renewable projects requested in the combined serial and cycle process queues in the status of active or under construction, 3,417.1 MW (11.8 percent) are expected to go into service after accounting for the ELCC derate factors using the class ratings for the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction.

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**Table 12-83 All Queues (Serial Queue, TC1, TC2 and RRI) projects (active, suspended and under construction) by unit type adjusted for ELCC derates (MW): June 30, 2026**

| | Energy (MW) | Capacity (MW) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit Type | Total | Total | ELCC Adjusted |
| Battery | 10,781.2 | 8,144.9 | 4,805.5 |
| CC | 9,922.4 | 9,509.0 | 7,417.0 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 2,449.7 | 2,462.5 | 1,649.9 |
| CT - Oil | 50.0 | 50.0 | 41.5 |
| CT - Other | 30.1 | 29.1 | 19.5 |
| Fuel Cell | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 51.0 | 30.0 | 10.5 |
| Nuclear | 1,546.8 | 1,349.9 | 1,295.9 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 42,874.6 | 23,601.5 | 2,360.1 |
| Solar + Storage | 4,782.9 | 3,304.4 | 330.4 |
| Solar + Wind | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 36.0 | 36.0 | 30.6 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Wind | 9,477.0 | 2,105.8 | 716.0 |
| Wind + Storage | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 82,006.7 | 50,628.0 | 18,681.5 |

## Surplus Interconnection Service (SIS)

FERC Order 845 required transmission providers to create a process for interconnection customers to use surplus interconnection service at existing points of interconnection.[98] Surplus interconnection service is defined as "any unneeded portion of interconnection service established in a large generator interconnection agreement (LGIA), such that if surplus interconnection service is utilized, the total amount of interconnection service at the point of interconnection would remain the same."[99] For example, a developer may request SIS to add a solar facility at the location of an existing battery storage facility. In this example, the battery storage facility operates at night only, while the solar facility operates during the day. The net output at the point of interconnection would never exceed the maximum facility output as studied for the existing battery storage facility's generation interconnection agreement.

Surplus interconnection service requests can be made by a project developer or one of its affiliates whose generating facility is already interconnected to the PJM transmission system or has executed (or requested to file unexecuted) an interconnection service agreement (ISA) or generation interconnection agreement (GIA), or by an unaffiliated project developer. The project developer, or one of its affiliates, has priority to use the service. However, if a project developer or affiliate does not submit a request for SIS, an unaffiliated project developer may request service. Under the SIS process, projects that do not trigger transmission system upgrades qualify for expedited review by PJM outside the interconnection queue. In order for a SIS request to be approved, no new network upgrades must be required to accommodate the request.[100]

If surplus interconnection service is requested on a generating facility that is an energy only resource, the generating facility requesting the SIS will also be an energy only resource. If surplus interconnection service is requested on a generating facility that is a capacity resource, the generating facility requesting surplus interconnection service may be an energy resource or a capacity resource, not to exceed the amount of CIRs established in the ISA or GIA. Requests for SIS are not posted publicly by PJM.

## Interconnection Costs for New Projects

Any entity that requests interconnection of a new generating facility, including increases to the capacity of an existing generating unit, or that requests interconnection of a merchant transmission facility, must follow the process defined in the PJM tariff to obtain interconnection service.[101] PJM's process is designed to ensure that new generation is added in a reliable and systematic manner. As part of the interconnection planning process, a series of studies are performed to determine the feasibility, impact, and cost of interconnecting

98 See *Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements, Order No. 845*, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2018).
99 Id. At Pg. 373

100 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026).
101 See OATT Parts IV & VI.


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projects in the queue. Interconnection requests are for energy only resources and for capacity resources.

Interconnecting capacity resources must meet a higher standard than energy only resources. For interconnecting capacity resources, PJM performs deliverability studies that ensure that the energy from the proposed generator can be reliably provided to the PJM region. Deliverability studies identify network upgrades needed to ensure that the transmission system is capable of delivering the aggregate system generating capacity at peak load, including the new resource, with all firm transmission service modeled.[102] The interconnection service agreement identifies the transmission modifications needed to maintain the reliability of the transmission system as a result of a new service request. These identified modifications are known as network upgrades. In general, there are fewer network upgrades associated with energy only resources, as energy only resources are not required to be deliverable to the entire PJM footprint.[103] On June 30, 2026, there were 2,102 active network transmission upgrades. If a project is withdrawn from the queue, the network upgrades associated with that project are no longer required, unless it is required to support another queue project.

While not all projects in the queue require network upgrades, the number of planned network transmission upgrades is strongly correlated with the number of active projects in the queue. The number of planned network upgrades is also strongly correlated with the number of new generation projects requesting interconnection as a capacity resource. After the execution of an interconnection service agreement, queue projects become part of the RTEP study and the costs of any upgrade later necessary to preserve their Capacity Interconnection Rights are included as part of the overall transmission system costs paid by all transmission customers.

The system impact study is a detailed system analysis performed for new service requests that tests deliverability under peak load conditions and light load conditions. The system impact study identifies system constraints caused by the request and the local upgrades and network upgrades required to solve those constraints. The system impact study includes power flow analysis and short circuit analysis. The power flow analysis includes expected output level from the new resource under summer peak and light load system conditions.[104] PJM's recent improvements to the deliverability analyses reflect more accurate information about the expected performance of intermittent resources, by type of resource (solar fixed, solar tracking, onshore wind and offshore wind), by season (summer, winter and light load) and by region (PJM West, Mid-Atlantic and Dominion), under each of these system conditions. Those modifications are necessary to accurately reflect the expected output of intermittent resources under various seasons and system conditions as the penetration and role of intermittents in PJM increases.[105] For example, the expected output of onshore wind varies from its maximum facility output to zero, depending on weather conditions, and the expected output levels are used for each system load condition.[106]

Capacity resources receive Capacity Interconnection Rights (CIRs) based on the deliverable MW which result from a combination of upgrades paid for by each project and existing system capability. Intermittent resources also require CIRs. The level of CIRs required for intermittent resources has been significantly understated because the required CIRs have been based on the derated capacity value of intermittents rather than the maximum energy injections required to achieve the derated value.

After a lengthy stakeholder process, on April 7, 2023, FERC approved updates to PJM's ELCC method that cap the level of an intermittent generator's output used to calculate the generator's reliability contribution (ELCC derated MW) at the generator's CIR level.[107] Rules prior to the FERC order allowed generation at a level greater than the CIR value, and that was therefore not deliverable, to be inappropriately included in the ELCC calculations. For example, if a 100 MW solar resource has CIRs of 60 MW, generation in excess of 60 MW will not be included in the ELCC calculations under the updated rules. Prior to the update, the generation in excess of the CIR level was included,


102 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Regional Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).
103 See "PJM Manual 14G: Generation Interconnection Requests," Rev. 8 (July 26, 2023).
104 Winter peak load is included in the generation deliverability powerflow analysis during the RTEP baseline reliability analysis, but is not currently performed for new interconnection requests. The light load analysis ensures generation deliverability during light load conditions, which is defined as 50 percent of the annual peak demand.
105 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).
106 See "Generation Deliverability Test Modifications: Light Load, Summer & Winter," presented at January 25, 2023 meeting of the Markets and Reliability Committee <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2023/20230125/consent-agenda-c---1-generator-deliverability-test-revisions---presentation.ashx>.
107 183 FERC ¶61,009.

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overstating the ELCC ratings and reliability contribution of ELCC resources. The overstatement of intermittent capacity has inefficiently suppressed capacity market clearing prices.[108] [109] In order to retain the prior, incorrectly calculated ELCC values, existing intermittent generating units are required to increase their CIRs by going through an expedited queue process. The ELCC updates established a transitional period during which intermittent generators can be awarded temporary increases in their CIRs based on the availability of transmission system capability.[110] PJM expects a transitional period of four years, beginning with the 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction, to be sufficient time for intermittent resources to reenter the queue and be awarded additional CIRs. New intermittent generators will be required to pay for CIRs consistent with their calculated reliability contribution.

Figure 12-5 shows the latest estimated interconnection costs for new generators (network transmission project cost) by projected and actual in service year for generators that are in service (red line), and for the total of generators in service and still in the queue in active status (blue line). The estimated costs for in service projects (red line) are much lower than the estimated costs that also include all projects in the queue (blue line). The increase in estimated total network upgrade costs for planned projects is a result of the large number of requests in the new services queue and the existing backlog (Figure 12-5). However, as generators withdraw from the queue, the overall network costs decrease. The estimated network upgrade costs for in service projects are much lower. The projected in service dates for network projects are not updated regularly, and therefore, may not be an accurate predictor of when these projects are actually expected to go in service. Figure 12-5 shows a significant level of estimated interconnection costs for resources with projected in service dates as far back as 2008 and a peak for projects with a projected in service date of 2026. Even the costs for projects that are in service are only estimates because PJM does not track final project costs. The final in service costs include only the last estimate provided by PJM before the project went in service. PJM's data collection, management and retention related to transmission spending of all types is inadequate and needs a significant upgrade. The failure to collect data on estimated and final project costs makes it impossible to track transmission project costs for all project types. Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data.

**Figure 12-5 Cost estimates of network projects by projected and actual in service year: January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2027**




108 *See* "Analysis of the 2023/2024 RPM Base Residual Auction," <*https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2022/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20232024_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20221028.pdf*>. (October 28, 2022).
109 *See* "Analysis of the 2022/2023 RPM Base Residual Auction—Revised," <*https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2023/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20222023_RPM_BRA_Revised_20230113.pdf*> (January 13, 2023).
110 183 FERC ¶61,009 at 31.


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## Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) [111]

The PJM RTEP process is designed to identify needed transmission system additions and improvements to continue to provide reliable service throughout the RTO. The objective of the RTEP process is to provide PJM with an optimal set of solutions necessary to solve reliability issues, operational performance issues and transmission constraints.

The RTEP process initially considered only factors such as load growth and the generation interconnection requests in its development of the 15 year plan. Currently, the RTEP process includes a broader range of inputs including the effects of public policy, market efficiency, interregional coordination and the effects of aging infrastructure.

### RTEP Process

The PJM RTEP process is a 24 month planning process that identifies reliability issues for the next 15 year period. This 24 month planning process includes a process to build power flow models that represent the expected future system topology, studies to identify issues, stakeholder input and PJM Board of Managers approvals. The 24 month planning process is made up of overlapping 18 month planning cycles to identify and develop shorter lead time transmission upgrades and one 24 month planning cycle to provide sufficient time for the identification and development of longer lead time transmission upgrades that may be required to satisfy planning criteria.

### RTEP Model and Assumptions

PJM is responsible for maintaining an updated power flow model. The power flow model is used to perform the various RTEP planning studies and is also available for all stakeholders to use for their own analysis. The power flow model contains a detailed representation of the Eastern Interconnection power system load, generation and transmission, and includes specific assumptions. The load assumptions are based on the annual PJM load forecast. This forecast includes the basis for all load level assumptions for planning analyses throughout the 15 year planning horizon. Generation and transmission planning assumptions are also included in the base case power flow models.[112] Additional assumptions are included in the power flow model specific to the type of RTEP analysis being performed (e.g., load deliverability, generator deliverability, etc.).

On January 6, 2026, PJM presented the 2026 RTEP planning assumptions to the PJM Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC).[113] The 2026 RTEP planning load flow modeling assumptions were taken from the 2025 Multi-regional Modeling Working Group (MMWG) power flow cases. PJM coordinates with its neighbors to identify updates or corrections to network topology. Topology updates to the PJM 2026 model include all PJM Board approved upgrades through the Q1 2026 PJM Board of Managers approvals, all supplemental projects included in 2025 local plan and, to avoid development of redundant reinforcements, all reinforcements from earlier RTEPs are modeled based on required in service date. Other assumptions include long term firm transmission commitments, generation outage rates, breaker settings, thermal and voltage limits and load forecasts for summer, winter and light load conditions. Additionally, generators that officially notified PJM of deactivation will be modeled offline in RTEP base cases for all study years after the intended deactivation date, and RTEP baseline upgrades associated with generation deactivations are modeled.

The generation assumptions included in the 2026 RTEP model include: all existing generation expected to remain in service for the year being studied will be modeled, and future generation with signed Interconnection Service Agreement (ISA) or Generation Interconnection Agreement (GIA), or that cleared in the 2025/2026 BRA, will be modeled like existing generation along with any associated network upgrades. PJM will monitor the status of offshore wind projects and will adjust the model accordingly. Energy storage, including battery energy storage systems (BESS), will be modeled and dispatched in the base case as needed. The 2026 model assumptions also

111 The material in this section is based in part on the PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process. See PJM. "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).

112 These assumptions are developed annually by PJM and are "derived from the Eastern Reliability Assessment Group (ERAG) processes and procedures pursuant to NERC standard MOD-032, as well as Transmission Owners' assumptions included in their respective FERC Form No. 715. As necessary, PJM updates its models (e.g., power flow, short circuit, and stability) with the most recent data available for its own regional studies." See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).

113 See "Review of 2026 RTEP Assumptions," presented at the January 6, 2026, meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2026/20260106/20260106-item-08---2026-rtep-assumptions.pdf>.

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note that if needed, additional generation (pre-GIA stage or with a suspended status) may be modeled.[114] This means that PJM will assume that generation exists when it does not.

The large impact of data centers in load forecasts has resulted in requiring a significant amount of generation assumptions in the RTEP model. These assumptions are required to achieve power balance when performing those studies. While generation assumptions included in the RTEP model are a necessary aspect of performing RTEP studies, the results can only be as good as the assumptions. Including existing generation that is expected to remain in service in future years is a valid assumption. Including queued resources with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, is a reasonable assumption even though historical data has shown that not all generation projects in the queue that have a signed ISA or GIA will go in service. Including pre-GIA resources, or resources in the status of suspended to achieve power balance makes the RTEP model less realistic, as those resources are less likely to go in service.

The MMU recommends that PJM include only existing generation that is expected to remain in service for the year being studied, and queued generation with a signed ISA or GIA, or that cleared in a future BRA, that has a high probability of completion, in the RTEP models. If a future study cannot achieve power balance with such generation, then the addition of load should be capped at the level that can be supplied by actual generation and not allowed to connect until expected generation can support it. Allowing generation in the RTEP model that is not likely to be in service undermines the value of the studies and undermines PJM's ability to enforce a requirement that the transmission system be able to reliably serve new load before the load is interconnected. The result can be to undermine reliability by allowing the interconnection of new data centers when there is not adequate transmission or generation to serve them.

114 See "Review of 2026 RTEP Assumptions," presented at the January 6, 2026, meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/teac/2026/20260106/20260106-item-08---2026-rtep-assumptions.pdf>.

## Market Efficiency Process

PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) process includes a market efficiency analysis. The stated purpose of the market efficiency analysis is to: determine which reliability based enhancements have economic benefit if accelerated; identify new transmission enhancements that result in economic benefits; and identify economic benefits associated with modification to existing RTEP reliability based enhancements that when modified would relieve one or more economic constraints. The PJM market efficiency analysis is badly flawed and results in concluding there are net benefits when there are not. PJM presents the RTEP market efficiency enhancements to the PJM Board, along with stakeholder input, for Board approval.

To be recommended to the PJM Board of Managers for approval, the relative benefits and costs of the economic based enhancement or expansion of the proposed project must reduce congestion on one or more constraints by at least one dollar, meet a ratio threshold of at least 1.25:1 and have an independent cost review, performed by PJM, if expected costs are over $50 million. PJM provides the review of a project with a projected cost of over $50 million using its own staff or outside consultants. PJM presents its findings to the TEAC where PJM's findings are reviewed by the stakeholders. While stakeholders can comment on the findings, PJM makes the final decision about what costs will be used for the purpose of calculating the benefit/cost ratio for the project. The benefit/cost ratio is the ratio of the present value of the total annual benefit for 15 years to the present value of the total annual cost for the first 15 years of the life of the enhancement or expansion.

The market efficiency process is comprised of a 12 month cycle and a 24 month cycle, both of which begin and end on the calendar year. The 12 month cycle is used for analysis of modifications and accelerations to approved RTEP projects only. The 24 month cycle is used for analysis of new economic transmission projects for years five through 15. This long-term proposal window takes place concurrently with the long-term proposal window for reliability projects.


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PJM's first market efficiency analysis was performed in 2013, prior to Order 1000. The 2013 window was open from August 12, 2013, through September 26, 2013. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on 25 identified flowgates. PJM received 17 proposals from six entities. One project, submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, was approved by the PJM Board.

The first market efficiency cycle conducted under Order 1000 was performed during the 2014/2015 RTEP long term window. The 2014/2015 long term window was open from November 1, 2014, through February 28, 2015. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on 12 identified flowgates. PJM received 93 proposals from 19 entities. Thirteen projects, all submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, were approved by the PJM Board.

The second market efficiency cycle was performed during the 2016/2017 RTEP long term window. The 2016/2017 long term window was open from November 1, 2016, through February 28, 2017. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on four identified flowgates. PJM received 96 proposals from 20 entities. Four projects, all submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, were approved by the PJM Board.

PJM also held an addendum 2016/2017 long term window. This 2016/2017 1A long term window was open from September 14, 2017, through September 28, 2017. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on one identified flowgate. PJM received three proposals from two entities. One project, submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, was approved by the PJM Board.

The fourth market efficiency cycle was performed for the 2018/2019 RTEP long term window. The 2018/2019 long term window was open from November 2, 2018, through March 15, 2019. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on one internal and three interregional flowgates. PJM received 33 proposals from 10 entities. One project, submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, was approved by the PJM Board to address the historical congestion on the internal flowgate, and one project, submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, was approved by the PJM Board to address the historical congestion on one of the interregional flowgates.[115]

The fifth market efficiency cycle was performed for the 2020/2021 RTEP long term window. The 2020/2021 RTEP long term window was open from November 11, 2020, through May 11, 2021. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on four internal flowgates. PJM received 24 proposals from seven entities. Four projects, all submitted by an incumbent transmission owner, were approved by the PJM Board.

The sixth market efficiency cycle was performed during the 2022/2023 RTEP long term window. The 2022/2023 RTEP long term window was delayed until the reliability violations for the 2022 Window 3 (Dominion data center loads) could be addressed. On November 21, 2023, PJM requested that the Commission grant a waiver to extend the time for PJM to complete its annual review of the benefit/cost analysis associated with the market efficiency cycle.[116] PJM requested the waiver to remain in effect until PJM completes its 2023 annual review no later than the end of the second quarter of 2024. On December 21, 2023, The Commission approved the waiver request.[117] In January 2024, PJM completed updating the 2022/2023 market efficiency base case to include the solution selected from the 2022 Window 3. No flowgates experienced historical congestion that required an open window.

In February 2024, PJM completed the 2024/2025 market efficiency base case. In May 2024, PJM posted the 2024/2025 Market Efficiency planning assumptions. The long term market efficiency window opened on April 11, 2025, and closed on June 10, 2025. This window accepted proposals to address historical congestion on three identified flowgates (Museville-Smith Mountain 128 kV in AEP, West Point-Lanexa 115 kV in DOM and Garrett-Garrett Tap 115 kV in PN-APS). PJM received 14 proposals from five entities. Two projects, submitted by incumbent transmission owners, were approved by the PJM Board.[118] There were no projects selected for acceleration in the 2024/2025 market efficiency window.

115 No proposals effectively resolved the congestion on two of the three identified interregional market efficiency flowgates.
116 See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. ER24-477-000 (November 21, 2023).
117 185 FERC ¶61,212.
118 One of the three identified congestion drivers included in the market efficiency window (Garrett-Garrett Tap 115 kV) was addressed in the 2025 RTEP Window 1.

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The 2026/2027 Market Efficiency cycle will be performed for study years 2027, 2031, 2034, 2037 and 2041. The preliminary base case for the 2026/2027 Market Efficiency cycle is expected to be posted in July 2026, with stakeholder feedback accepted through October 2026.

## The Benefit/Cost Evaluation

For an RTEP project to be recommended to the PJM Board of Managers for approval as a market efficiency project, the relative benefits and costs of the economic based enhancement or expansion must meet a benefit/cost ratio threshold of at least 1.25:1.

The total benefit of a project is calculated as the sum of the net present value of calculated energy market benefits and calculated reliability pricing model (RPM) benefits for a 15 year period, starting with the projected in service date of the project. Depending on the type of project being evaluated PJM may measure benefits as reductions in estimated load charges and production costs in the energy market and reductions in estimated load capacity payments and in system capacity costs in the capacity market, but does not weight increases and decreases in benefits equally. There are significant issues with PJM's definition of benefits. If done correctly and if FTRs/ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the benefit/cost analysis would include the total net change in production costs and would not include congestion. The change in production costs correctly measures the changes in cost to load that result from a project.

The energy market benefit analysis uses an energy market simulation tool that produces an hourly least-cost, security constrained market solution, including total operational costs, hourly LMPs, bus specific injections and bus specific withdrawals for each modeled year with and without the proposed RTEP project. Using the output from the model, PJM calculates changes in energy production costs and load energy payments.

PJM rules require that the energy market benefit simulation maintain sufficient capacity to meet load projections plus installed reserve margins over the 15 year study period.[119] In order to solve the cases, PJM must make assumptions about the existing and future generation to include in the model based on the need to serve load. In the event that the existing installed capacity is not sufficient to meet the load, PJM first adds generation from the queue with signed interconnection service agreements. If this is insufficient, PJM simply adds speculative new generation, based on assumptions about probable projects. In effect, this process could result in approving and building expensive transmission based on speculation about the location and type of capacity additions and load additions. The related impacts are exacerbated by the uncertainty about the actual additions of large data centers. This approach to benefit/cost analysis is inefficient and unsustainable.

The basis for load projections depends primarily on the projections of data center load which are highly uncertain and for which PJM has limited information about exact location and specifications. As made clear in the queue analysis, the actual addition of generation resources by type and location is also highly uncertain. The level of uncertainty makes the value of efficiency projects speculative and not an appropriate basis for investment in transmission projects.

The definition of the energy benefit analysis depends on whether the project is regional or subregional. A regional project is any project rated at or above 230 kV. A subregional project is any project rated at less than 230 kV. For a regional project, the energy benefit for each modeled year is equal to 50 percent of the change in system wide total system energy production costs with and without the project plus 50 percent of the change in zonal load payments with and without the project but, inexplicably, only for those zones where the project reduces the load payments and ignoring zones where the project increases load payments. For subregional projects, the calculation of benefits for each modeled year ignores any impact on system wide energy production costs and is instead based only the change in zonal load energy payments with and without the project, but again only for those zones where the project reduces the load energy payments and ignoring zones where the project increases load payments.

In both the regional and subregional analysis, changes in zonal load energy payments subtract the estimated value of any Auction Revenue Rights (ARR)

119 See PJM Operating Agreement Schedule 61.7.7 (i).



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that sink in that zone. An increase in ARR revenues that result from a project would reduce the benefits of that project to load. If done correctly and if ARRs returned 100 percent of congestion to load, the changes in load payments would equal the change in production costs. However, the calculated ARR credits in the benefit/cost analysis ignore any increases in ARR MW and include only the reduction in the estimated CLMP differences. Estimated ARR credits are calculated for each simulated year using the most recent planning year's actual ARR MW combined with the simulation's CLMP differences between ARR source and sink points. ARR MW are not adjusted to reflect any increase in ARR MW created by the RTEP upgrade. This means that the reduction in the ARR offset value is too large, the reduction in load payments is overstated, and the value of the proposed project is artificially increased.

The definition of the benefit in the RPM benefit analysis depends on whether the project is regional or subregional. For a regional project, the RPM benefit for each modeled year is equal to 50 percent of the change in system wide total system capacity payments with and without the project plus 50 percent of the change in zonal capacity payments with and without the project, including only those zones where the project reduced the capacity payments. For subregional projects, the reliability pricing model benefits for each modeled year ignores any impact on system wide total capacity payments and is equal to the change in zonal capacity payments with and without the project, including only those zones where the project reduced the capacity payments. As with the miscalculation of the congestion impacts in the energy market, this approach overstates the benefits.

The difference in the benefits calculation used in the regional and subregional benefit/cost threshold tests is related to how the direct costs of the transmission projects are allocated for approved regional and subregional projects. The costs of an approved regional project are allocated so that 50 percent of the total costs are allocated on a system wide load ratio share basis and the remaining 50 percent of the total costs are allocated to zones with projected energy market benefits and reliability pricing model benefits in proportion to those projected positive benefits. The costs of an approved subregional project are allocated so that the total costs of the project is allocated to zones with projected energy market benefits and reliability pricing model benefits in proportion to those projected positive benefits. The allocation will be incorrect to the extent that the benefits calculations are incorrect.

There are significant issues with PJM's benefit/cost analysis. The current rules governing benefit/cost analysis of competing transmission projects do not correctly measure the relative costs and benefits of transmission projects. PJM measures benefits as reductions in estimated load charges and production costs in the energy market and reductions in estimated load capacity payments in the capacity market, but PJM's analysis ignores any increases in costs. This means that PJM's benefit/cost analysis systematically overstates the benefits of transmission projects. ARR MW allocations are not adjusted to reflect any potential changes in ARR MW that result from the RTEP upgrade. This means that the reduction in the ARR offset value is too large, the ARR offset is too small, and the result is to artificially increase the value of the proposed project. The correct metric is the change in production costs. In addition, the current rules do not account for the fact that the benefits of projects are uncertain and highly sensitive to the modeling assumptions used, or for the fact that the project costs are nonbinding estimates, are not subject to cost caps and may significantly exceed the estimated costs. These flaws have contributed to PJM approving market efficiency projects with forecasted benefits that only appear to, but do not actually exceed the forecasted costs. In addition, there is no after the fact analysis to validate the planning assumptions and there is no data gathered on the actual costs and benefits that would permit such an analysis.

Recent proposals to use storage as a transmission asset (SATA) raises a number of additional concerns about PJM's benefit/cost analysis. Storage is a market asset and should not be owned by transmission owners. PJM should not be evaluating SATA at all without a decision from FERC that SATA is allowable in PJM. At present it is not allowed. PJM's benefit/cost analysis uses a 15 year forecast for purposes of evaluating benefits and costs of traditional transmission assets with an expected useful life of 50 years or more. Using the same 15 year horizon does not make sense for SATA resources with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, depending on use.

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In addition, there is no basis for assuming anything about the actual use of a transmission storage asset and therefor any imputed benefits. Using a 15 year benefit horizon exaggerates the forecasted benefit stream relative to the stream of benefits that could be produced over the expected useful life relative to traditional transmission assets. Further, the rules for how to account for the actual, and forecasted, revenues and charges for operating the SATA to provide transmission load relief have not been established. Without clear rules on how to allocate operational revenues and costs, and without detailed information about exactly the storage would be used, it is impossible to develop forecasted benefits and/or costs of a SATA project.

The broader issue is that the market efficiency project approach explicitly allows transmission projects to compete against future generation projects, but without allowing the generation projects to compete. Projecting speculative transmission related benefits for 15 years based on the existing generation fleet and existing patterns of congestion eliminates the potential for new generation to respond to market signals. The market efficiency process allows assets built under the cost of service regulatory paradigm to displace generation assets built under the competitive market paradigm. This is particularly noteworthy for the SATA case in which transmission owners would built market capacity assets under cost of service regulation that competes directly with market assets.

A significant flaw in PJM's benefit/cost analysis is that projected benefits are based on load forecasts which are currently dominated by projected large data center loads that are not verified by PJM and cannot be verified by PJM. That creates a bias towards finding transmission projects beneficial despite the fact that data center loads are imposing transmission costs on other customers as a result.

The MMU recommends that the market efficiency process be eliminated.

## PJM MISO Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP)

PJM and MISO developed a process to facilitate the construction of interregional projects in response to the Commission's concerns about interregional coordination along the PJM-MISO seam. This process, called the Interregional Market Efficiency Process (IMEP), operates on a two year study schedule and is designed to address forward looking congestion. To qualify as an IMEP project, the project must be evaluated in a joint study process, qualify as an economic transmission enhancement in both PJM and MISO transmission expansion models and meet specific IMEP cost benefit criteria.[120] The allocation of costs to each RTO for IMEPs will be in proportion to the benefits received.

While the IMEP process is a joint effort, PJM and MISO perform their own analysis of benefits to their own system and each uses a different modeling approach and a different metric for determining the benefits of a proposed project. PJM uses the benefit/cost analysis used for its own internal market efficiency projects which will, by definition, overstate project benefits by ignoring areas where energy costs are increased. MISO, on the other hand, measures benefits as changes in projected system wide production cost caused by the project. The use of different approaches to measuring benefits is an issue when studying potential benefits of projects in a joint effort, and when using the defined benefits to allocate the costs of IMEP projects to each RTO. PJM's approach will over allocate the costs of IMEP projects to PJM members and under allocate costs to MISO members.

No interregional constraints were identified in either PJM's or MISO's regional processes. Therefore, an IMEP study was not required during the 2020/2021 IMEP cycle. No interregional constraints were identified in either PJM or MISO's regional processes. Therefore, an IMEP study was not required during the 2022/2023 IMEP cycle.

PJM and MISO coordinated interregional congestion issues to identify potential constraints to address in the 2024/2025 IMEP cycle. The joint

120 See "Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (December 11, 2008) <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/miso-joa.pdf>.



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regional planning committee (JRPC) decided to not initiate a coordinated system plan in 2025, and will instead prioritize the interregional transfer capability study (ITCS).

As of June 30, 2026, PJM and MISO were coordinating interregional congestion issues to identify potential constraints to address in the 2026/2027 IMEP cycle.

## PJM MISO Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP)

PJM and MISO developed the Targeted Market Efficiency Process (TMEP) to facilitate the resolution of historic congestion issues that could be addressed through small, quick implementation projects. The TMEP process operates on a 12 month study schedule. To qualify as a TMEP project, the project must have an estimated in service date by the third summer peak season from the year the project was approved, have an estimated cost of less than $20 million and must have estimated benefits, based on the projected congestion reduction over a four year period that exceed the expected installed capacity cost of the proposed project.[121] [122] The TMEP process calculates congestion and assigns congestion costs to load but fails to account for the offsetting value of ARRs and FTRs. The current rules incorrectly count congestion as a cost to load without accounting for how the congestion dollars are or are not returned to the load through ARRs and FTRs. The correct benefit metric is the change in production costs.

The benefit of a proposed TMEP project is calculated as the value of reducing congestion on the affected constraint over a four year period. PJM and MISO calculate the estimated value of eliminating congestion by calculating the average congestion for the two prior years prior and multiplying by four. Congestion is correctly calculated as the shadow price (difference in CLMP) times the market flow on the line.

The allocation of costs to each RTO for an approved TMEP project will be in proportion to the benefits, as calculated by PJM and MISO, received by that RTO.[123] The proportion of benefits is calculated using the change in the average shadow price of the constraint times the dfax to the affected downstream buses times the MW of load at the buses. This correctly identifies the proportion of the benefits that go to the load that would benefit from the project. Within an RTO, the RTO's share of the cost of the approved project is allocated to each transmission control area in proportion to the benefits received by each transmission control area.

PJM and MISO did not conduct a TMEP study in 2019. As a result of decreases in M2M congestion and the addition of transmission upgrades already in process that affect the top congested historical M2M flowgates, PJM and MISO did not conduct a TMEP study in 2020. PJM and MISO agreed to assess the impact of planned upgrades and congestion using an additional year of market data. As a result, PJM and MISO did not conduct a TMEP study in 2021. The 2022 TMEP study focused on 23 flowgates as potential TMEP projects. Of the 23 initial flowgates, 19 were eliminated due to their relationship with other existing reliability projects already included in PJM's RTEP or MISO's MTEP plans, or the identified congestion was caused by outages.[124] Two projects were eliminated after studies showed that congestion was not persistent in October 2022, and an additional project was eliminated in December 2022 after further studies showed congestion was not persistent, leaving one TMEP project (Powerton - Towerline 138 kV) that was approved for implementation by the PJM Board on February 15, 2023, and by the MISO Board on March 23, 2023.[125] [126] [127] For both 2023 and 2024, the RTOs decided not to initiate a Coordinated System Plan (CSP) study, and to continue to assess the impact of planned upgrades and congestion persistence with additional market data.

PJM and MISO began coordinating on interregional congestion issues to identify potential constraints to address in the 2024/2025 TMEP cycle. The joint regional planning committee (JRPC) decided to not initiate a coordinated

121 See "Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.," (December 11, 2008) <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/miso-joa.pdf>.

122 On November 2, 2017, PJM submitted a compliance filing including additional revisions to the MISO-PJM JOA to include stakeholder feedback in the TMEP project selection process. See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. ER17-718-000, et al. (November 2, 2017).

123 See *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Docket No. ER17-729-000 (December 30, 2016).

124 See "Interregional Planning Update," presented at the August 9, 2022 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2022/20220809/item-01---interregional-planning-update.ashx>.

125 See "Interregional Planning Update," presented at the October 4, 2022 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2022/20221004/item-01----interregional-planning-update.ashx>.

126 See "PJM-MISO IPSAC," presented at the December 15, 2022 meeting of the PJM-MISO Inter-regional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/ipsac/2022/20221215/ipsac-presentation.ashx>.

127 See "PJM-MISO IPSAC," presented at the December 11, 2023 meeting of the PJM-MISO Inter-regional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/ipsac/2024/20240325/20240325-miso-seam-identified-issues-and-solutions-.ashx>

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system plan in 2025, and will instead prioritize the interregional transfer capability study (ITCS).

In the first quarter of 2026, PJM and MISO identified $1,122 Million of congestion costs on market to market flowgates in 2024 and 2025. Of this, $441 Million of the identified congestion was determined to not be persistent or to be mitigated by existing planned projects. The remaining congestion ($681 million) will be evaluated as part of the 2026 TMEP study to determine the causes of congestion, whether the congestion is expected to persist, if there are any planned projects that may mitigate the congestion and if there is a viable TMEP solution.[128]

The PJM and MISO TMEP process for measuring the projected benefits of a TMEP transmission projects is flawed. The current rules incorrectly count congestion as a cost to load without accounting for how the congestion dollars are or are not returned to the load through ARRs and FTRs. The benefit of a TMEP transmission upgrade should be the expected difference in the total production cost of energy before and after the upgrade to all affected load. This measurement would include the change in expected LMP of all affected load before and after the upgrade, times the MW of load, plus the change in congestion dollars returned to the affected load before and after the upgrade. Congestion revenue returned to load is not a cost to the load, it is a credit against the overpayment of load payments compared to generation credits caused by the transmission constraint. Ignoring the return of congestion from ARRs/FTRs overstates the potential benefits of eliminating congestion through the TMEP upgrades, and ignores the value of smaller upgrades that may not eliminate a constraint, but may reduce the average cost of energy for load.

## PJM MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS)

PJM and MISO are performing an Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS).[129] PJM and MISO are coordinating assumptions and models, but will not perform a joint study. The PJM/MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study is part of PJM's and MISO's strategy to comply with FERC Order No. 1920. The ITCS study appears to mirror PJM's multi driver RTEP process in that it identifies several drivers (efficiency, reliability, transfer needs) for evaluating the value or need for a project, though neither MISO nor PJM provide any specificity as to the exact metrics for the evaluation of the benefits or costs within each identified driver, how the drivers will be weighted or how costs of potential projects should be allocated. The stated purpose of the PJM/MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study is to allow PJM and MISO to consider needs, assumptions, cost allocations and analysis outside the limits of the existing PJM/MIO JOA/CSP process. The goal of the PJM and MISO ITCS is to identify opportunities to enhance transfer capability on an incremental basis over and above other JOA/CSP based studies.

The ITCS study is intended to look out through 2032. In its ITCS study, PJM plans to use a model that blends MISO planning models for MISO's footprint and a set of PJM's long-term planning assumptions for PJM's footprint. PJM is calling this a blended model. PJM's blended model will use the 2023 Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) topology with 2022 RTEP Window 3 solutions, the PJM 2024 official Load Forecast, retirements due to federal regulations and state laws based on the Independent State Agencies Committee (ISAC) workbook and the assumption of sufficient replacement generation or storage for resource adequacy (i.e. to meet 1-in-10 Loss of Load Expectation) selected from interconnection requests and withdrawals. Although it is a feature of many transmission planning studies, simply assuming specific generating assets is not a reasonable way to do transmission planning with significant cost impacts on customers.

Preliminary results from the ITCS study identified various transfer, reliability and economic issues from both PJM and MISO.[130] PJM and MISO presented results and near and long term actions resulting from the ITCS study on June 25, 2025.[131] Interregional constraints were identified in the 2024/2025

128 See "PJM-MISO IPSAC," presented at the June 8, 2026 meeting of the PJM-MISO Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/ipsac/2026/20260608/20260608-item-01--1-targeted-market-efficiency-project-study-update---presentation.pdf>.

129 See PJM and MISO Interregional Capability Study (ICTS) FAQ <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/interregional-planning/pjm-and-miso-interregional-transfer-capability-study-faq.pdf>.

130 See "PJM/MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study," presented at the March 7, 2025 meeting of the PJM/MISO Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/ipsac/2025/20250307/20250307-miso-pjm-ipsac-interregional-transfer-capability-study-itcs-to-pjm---working-draft.pdf>.

131 See PJM/MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study (June 25, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/ipsac/2025/20250625/20250625-item-02---interregional-transfer-capability-study-update.pdf>.



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PJM and MISO's joint ITCS analysis.[132] MISO opened a proposal window for the identified MISO and MISO intertie constraints that closed in May of 2025. MISO received 34 unique proposals from eight entities. Based on these proposals MISO developed 54 potential solution ideas for further evaluation by PJM and MISO. PJM and MISO have stated that they do not have a defined project type (and related cost allocation) to address all of the issues/benefits for the solutions identified in the ITCS process. PJM is reviewing the MISO potential solutions to see if any of the proposals are captured in the PJM RTEP reliability, RTEP Market Efficiency and/or the M-3 (Supplemental) process. In the case of any overlaps between RTEP and ITCS, PJM will consider the ITCS needs in RTEP solutions.

## Expedited Interconnection Track (EIT)

On February 27, 2026, PJM filed revisions to the tariff to establish an expedited interconnection track (EIT) process for generating facilities.[133] The EIT was designed to expedite the interconnection of new generation that commits to firm commercial in service dates, has a commitment from the relevant siting authority (or a state executive officer in certain circumstances) to expedite consideration of applicable siting, and provides a pathway for new generation. The EIT process would allow PJM to consider up to 10 interconnection requests per calendar year on an expedited basis for large new or uprated resources. The EIT process is designed to help PJM address the need for additional capacity resources. The process is expected to take approximately 10 months for a resource to obtain a generation interconnection agreement (GIA). On June 9, 2026, the Commission approved the revised tariff revisions to establish the EIT process effective July 31, 2026.[134]

## Multi Driver Process

On September 12, 2014, PJM filed revisions to the tariff to include provisions allowing PJM to include multi driver projects in its regional transmission expansion plan.[135] When a transmission project addresses a combination of reliability, market efficiency and/or public policy objectives, it is termed a multi driver project. PJM may choose a solution using either the proportional multi driver method or the incremental multi driver method. The proportional method combines separate solutions that address reliability, economics and/or public policy into a single transmission enhancement or expansion project. The incremental method expands a proposed single driver solution to include one or more additional component(s) to address a combination of reliability, economic and/or public policy drivers.[136] On February 20, 2015, the Commission approved the tariff revisions with an effective date of November 12, 2014.[137]

On June 7, 2022, PJM opened its first multi driver proposal window. The window seeks to address reliability and market efficiency needs on three identified facilities. PJM accepted proposed solutions until August 8, 2022. PJM received 14 proposals from three entities. After conducting a cost review, a reliability analysis and a market efficiency analysis on the 14 proposals and a combination of the proposals, PJM proposed a combination of two proposals made by two companies (Project 644 + 908) as its preferred solution. The preferred solution has an estimated capital cost of $82.30 million with a PJM determined expected benefit/cost ratio of 1.99.[138] PJM shared its recommendation with MISO for their evaluation. MISO did not indicate any concern with the proposed solution. On February 7, 2023, the PJM Board approved the recommended solution (Project 644 + 908).

The benefit/cost analysis used in the multi driver review is the same flawed benefit/cost analysis that PJM uses for evaluating Market Efficiency projects. PJM's assumed benefit of the combined project was calculated as the sum of the present value of positive (energy cost reductions to some loads) effects of $169.8 million. The sum of the present value of negative effects (energy cost increases to other loads), which was ignored in the PJM calculation of benefits, was $149.1 million. The total benefit of the proposed multi driver project is therefore only $20.7 million, not the $169.8 asserted by PJM, even ignoring the use of changes in congestion rather than changes in production costs. Using the total positive and negative effects to compare to the net

132 See PJM/MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study (June 25, 2025) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/ipsac/2025/20250625/20250625-item-02---interregional-transfer-capability-study-update.pdf>.
133 See PJM. Docket No. ER26-1563 (February 27, 2026).
134 195 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2026).
135 See PJM. Docket No. ER14-2864 (September 12, 2014).
136 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026).
137 150 FERC ¶ 61,117 (February 20, 2015).
138 See "2022 RTEP Multi-Driver Proposal Window No. 1," presented at the December 6, 2022 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2022/20221206/item-07---multi-driver-proposal-window-update.ashx>.

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present value of costs in the PJM's analysis, the benefit/cost ratio is 0.24, not 1.99. All $149.1 million of the increases in energy costs (negative benefits) would be paid by load in the ComEd Zone. Based on the requirement of benefit/cost ratio of 1.25, the energy efficiency portion of the multi driver project should have been rejected.

## State Agreement Approach (SAA)

PJM's State Agreement Approach (SAA) is a provision in PJM's Operating Agreement that allows states to propose transmission projects for inclusion in PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan if the state agrees to assume the full cost of the proposed transmission projects. The purpose of the SAA is to allow states to pursue their public policy goals without imposing costs on other states. The SAA can also be used by a group of states that agree to a transmission project as part of a collaborative goal. Under the SAA, a state can elect to select the entity to complete the project or the states can request that PJM open a competitive window to seek transmission solutions from developers that address the required upgrades. SAA projects are classified as public policy baseline projects or as supplemental projects developed by the selected PJM Transmission Owner. The state decides whether to pursue a project that comes out of the SAA process.

Five states (Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia and New Jersey) made a joint request to PJM to conduct a two phase study (The Offshore Wind Transmission Study) to determine reinforcements to the onshore grid to reliably deliver 6,416 to 17,016 of offshore wind plus additional RPS target requirements.[139] The phase one study, published on October 19, 2021, examined, at a high level, enhancements to the existing infrastructure needed to reliably integrate the proposed offshore wind generation, but did not include any estimates of the costs of the transmission infrastructure needed. The phase 1 study did not consider any greenfield transmission solutions, instead using existing facilities as potential points on injection (POI) and existing transmission paths as locations for upgrades. The study considered six scenarios.

Scenario 1 focused on a short term window that assumed a wind injection total of 6,416 MW and RPS targets through 2027 with a projected cost of $627 million. Scenario 1 included generator deactivations that were announced as of October 1, 2020, and were included in PJM's RTEP base case that formed the basis of the study. The other scenarios (Scenario 2 through Scenario 6) were longer term studies that looked out through 2035. Scenario 2, with a projected cost of $2,461.4 million, assumed 14,416 MW of offshore wind capacity and the same generator deactivations assumed in Scenario 1. Scenarios 2 through 6 assumed 1,739 MW of additional deactivated generation in addition to what was modeled in Scenario 1 and 2. Scenario 3 was abandoned due to legislation being withdrawn that had required the retirement of specific units. Scenario 4 assumed an increase (relative to Scenario 1) of 2,600 MW additional offshore wind connecting to Virginia POI resulting in projected costs of $3,213.1 million in needed upgrades. Scenario 5 assumed a different POI for Scenario 1 New Jersey offshore wind and cost $2,591.8 million in expected upgrade costs. Scenario 6 removed 2,000 MW of New Jersey offshore wind from Scenario 2 resulting in $2,164.3 million in projected upgrade costs.

The states decided to not pursue a joint Phase 2 study.

### Delaware Offshore Wind

Delaware does not have any offshore wind projects. Delaware is the point of interconnection for Maryland's MarWin and Momentum Wind offshore wind projects being developed by US Wind. In January 2025, US Wind entered into a contract with Delaware to provide 150,000 offshore renewable energy credits (ORECs) over the life of the two projects, which will be transferred to Delaware utilities to help them meet clean energy requirements. The MarWin and Momentum Wind projects will be the source of these credits. Both the MarWin and Momentum Wind projects are being developed in Maryland through the SAA process.

139 See Offshore Wind Transmission Study: Phase 1 Results, October 19, 2021 (https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2021/20211019-offshore-wind-transmission-study-phase-1-results.pdf)


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## New Jersey State Agreement Approach (SAA) for Offshore Wind

In 2021, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJ BPU) initiated a proposal window under the SAA to meet New Jersey's goal of interconnecting up to 7,500 MW of offshore wind.[140] PJM received 80 proposals covering solutions that addressed onshore and offshore reliability criteria and transmission connections. The NJ BPU selected a proposal to interconnect 3,742 MW of offshore wind to central New Jersey at a total estimated cost for the project of $1.1 billion, with construction expected to start in 2027 and finish in 2029, with in service dates from December 2027 through June 2030. The costs for the NJ BPU offshore wind project would be recovered from customers in the state of New Jersey. On December 6, 2022, the PJM Board approved the BPU's proposal.

On October 31, 2023, Danish wind power developer Ørsted announced that it was canceling two major offshore wind projects, Ocean Wind 1 (1,100 MW) and Ocean Wind 2 (1,148 MW), that were planned off the coast of New Jersey. Prior this announcement, on September 22, 2023, Public Service Electric and Gas Company filed an application for an abandoned plant incentive to recover costs associated with the canceled wind projects.[141] The filing seeks "authorization for the ability to recover 100 percent of prudently incurred costs for certain transmission upgrades that PSE&G will construct in the event that the [offshore wind] transmission upgrades are abandoned or cancelled (in whole or in part) for reasons that are outside of PSE&G's control." Ørsted is taking a $2.9 billion impairment attributed to Ocean Wind 1.[142]

On April 23, 2026, PJM filed with FERC a mutual agreement to terminate the New Jersey SAA. The New Jersey Board found that "...continued investment in the SAA Projects is not in the best interest of the State and New Jersey's ratepayers. The Board further finds that continuing the SAA Projects as contemplated in the SAA Agreement unduly risks imposing costs on New Jersey ratepayers with little, or no, guarantee of any return on investment."[143] As part of the SAA termination, the NJBPU has agreed that New Jersey customers will continue to bear prudently incurred costs associated with the projects that will be terminated, while also remaining responsible for costs associated with the projects that will remain in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan ("RTEP").[144]

On June 30, 2026, only two New Jersey offshore wind projects remained, both in the serial queue and both suspended.

## Maryland State Agreement Approach (SAA) for Offshore Wind

On December 5, 2024, the Maryland Public Service Commission (MD PSC) requested that PJM conduct analysis of Maryland's 8,500 MW offshore wind target, assuming three different point of interconnection scenarios, in response to the Maryland POWER Act of 2023. PJM provided the requested study on March 21, 2025.[145] On June 23, 2025, the Maryland Public Service Commission requested that PJM issue a competitive solicitation for proposals under the SAA process for onshore injection of 2,000 MW of offshore wind at Indian River by 2028 (DP&L), 1,500 MW of offshore wind at Cool Spring by 2030 (DP&L), 1,500 MW of offshore wind at Piney Grove by 2030 (DP&L), 1,500 MW of offshore wind at Nelson by 2030 (DP&L) and 2,000 MW of offshore wind at Calvert Cliffs by 2031 (PEPCO).[146] PJM is currently working with the MD PSC to draft a SAA study agreement, which must be filed and approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

Maryland has three offshore wind projects. Of the three projects, two have been bid on. The first project, MarWin (300 MW), was won by US Wind and Skipjack Energy in 2017. The second project, Momentum Wind (808 MW), was won by US Wind and Skipjack Energy in 2021. The State of Maryland signed offtake agreements to purchase the output from two projects and awarded OREC (Offshore Renewable Energy Credits) to US Wind and Skipjack

140 See PJM Operating Agreement, Schedule 6, Section 1.5.9

141 See *Public Service Electric and Gas Company*, Docket No. ER23-2916 (September 22, 2023).

142 Ørsted, Ørsted ceases development of its US offshore wind projects Ocean Wind 1 and 2, takes final investment decision on Revolution Wind, and recognises DKK 28.4 billion impairments (October 31, 2023) <*https://orsted.com/en/company-announcement-list/2023/10/oersted-ceases-development-of-its-us-offshore-wind-73751*>.

143 In the Matter of Declaring Transmission to Support Offshore a Public Policy of the State of New Jersey, Order, NJBPU Docket No. Q020100630 (Apr. 22, 2026) ("April 2026 Order").

144 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-2294-000 (April 23, 2026).

145 See MDPSC Case No. 9800, "Promoting Offshore Wind Energy Resources Act – Transmission Solicitation" Maryland Offshore Wind Information Study Results, (March 21, 2025) <https://webpscxb.psc.state.md.us/DMS/case/9800>.

146 See Maryland PSC Request Letter, (June 23, 2025) <https://webpscxb.psc.state.md.us/DMS/case/9800>.

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Energy. Skipjack Wind subsequently backed out due to financing issues and relinquished the ORECs it had been awarded. To replace Skipjack's share, Maryland opened bidding which US Wind won. US Wind will construct a 1,710-megawatt (MW) project developed in four phases that will consist of 114 15 MW turbines. Phase 1 has an expected commercial operation date of 2029 while Phases 2, 3, and 4 have an anticipated commercial operating date of December 2030, with the first year of the OREC schedules beginning in January 2031. The project plan calls for direct connections from the Maryland projects to substations along the shore of the state of Delaware.

The Maryland Offshore Wind Project (the MarWin and Momentum Wind phases) received federal approval for its Construction and Operations Plan (COP) as of December 3, 2024. In December 2025, the Trump administration ordered construction to stop on five major US offshore wind projects citing national security concerns, including The Maryland Offshore Wind Project. The developers of the five offshore projects (including US Wind) challenged the move in court and secured injunctions allowing work to continue. The projects were put on hold in September 2025 when the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) vacated the federal permit for the project.

On June 30, 2026, only two Maryland offshore wind projects remained, both in the serial queue and both suspended.

## Virginia's Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW)

The Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) project is owned and operated by Dominion Energy. The project consists of 176 wind turbine generators, three offshore substations and nine buried submarine cables that will connect the wind turbines to the State Military Reservation in Virginia Beach, Virginia. With the exception of the near shore portion of the submarine cable length (within 3 miles of shore), the offshore project components will be located in federal waters. The CVOW project, designed to provide 2,600 MW of offshore wind, was scheduled for completion in 2026.

On January 20, 2025, the Trump Administration issued an executive order that temporarily prevented "consideration of any area in the OCS for any new or renewed wind energy leasing for the purposes of generation of electricity or any other such use derived from the use of wind."[147] The order stated that "[n]othing in this withdrawal affects rights under existing leases in the withdrawn areas." The order called for the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a comprehensive review of the ecological, economic, and environmental necessity of terminating or amending any existing wind energy leases. On December 8, 2025, a federal judge vacated the executive order.

On December 22, 2025, the US Interior Department, Bureau of Energy Management, issued a 90 day suspension of five offshore wind leases, including the lease associated with the CVOW project. Dominion filed a lawsuit on December 23, 2025, asking the court to reject the pause.[148] As of December 31, 2025, work on the CVOW was on pause.[149]

On March 23, 2025, the first commercial turbine of Dominion's Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind project started producing power. On June 30, 2026, only three Dominion offshore wind projects remained, all in the cycle queue and all under construction. As of June 30, 2026, two turbines of the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind project have been constructed. The second turbine is not currently producing power. The entire project is scheduled to be completed in 2027.

## Long Term Regional Transmission Planning

On May 13, 2024, the Commission issued Order No. 1920 which requires public utility transmission providers to engage in long-term regional transmission planning over a 20-year planning horizon, develop long-term scenarios to identify long-term transmission needs and enable the identification and evaluation of transmission facilities to meet those transmission needs. Order No. 1920 also requires transmission providers to determine a cost allocation method for long-term regional transmission facilities, make other reforms to enhance transparency in local transmission planning, to correctly size

147 See January 20, 2025 Executive Order, Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government's Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/temporary-withdrawal-of-all-areas-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-from-offshore-wind-leasing-and-review-of-the-federal-governments-leasing-and-permitting-practices-for-wind-projects/>.

148 Case No. 2:25-cv-00830-JKW-LRL (USDC E.D. Va.).

149 See Monthly Mariner's Update Costal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW), (January 1, 2026) <https://coastalvawind.com/resources/docs/20260101_january_mariner_update.pdf>.



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transmission projects and include interregional transmission coordination to support the development of cost-effective projects.[150]

On November 21, 2024, the Commission issued Order No. 1920-A.[151] Order No. 1920-A significantly expanded the role of States in the long-term regional transmission planning. Order No. 1920-A requires states' input into regional transmission planning and cost allocation processes, both in the transmission providers' development of Order No. 1920 compliance filings and the ongoing implementation of these reforms in the future. Order No. 1920-A also increases the states' role in: (i) developing long term scenarios; (ii) requesting additional scenarios beyond the three Long-Term Scenarios required by Order No. 1920; (iii) developing the evaluation processes and criteria for selecting new transmission facilities in the long-term regional transmission; (iv) developing cost allocation approaches for selected transmission facilities; and (v) voluntary funding opportunities.

PJM requested that the Commission extend PJM's deadline to comply with Order No. 1920's compliance directives by six months, (to December 12, 2025), while leaving the implementation deadline of two years after the initial due date of the compliance filing (June 12, 2027) unchanged. The extension was requested to accommodate the States' broader role required by Order No. 1920-A in developing Order No. 1920-compliant Long-Term Regional Transmission Planning protocols.[152] On December 12, 2025, PJM submitted its compliance filing.[153]

## Supplemental Transmission Projects

Supplemental projects are asserted to be "transmission expansions or enhancements that are not required for compliance with PJM criteria and are not state public policy projects according to the PJM Operating Agreement. These projects are used as inputs to RTEP models, but are not required for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance criteria, as determined by PJM."[154] Attachment M-3 of the PJM OATT defines the process that Transmission Owners (TO) must follow in adding Supplemental Projects in their local plan.

The M-3 Process requires TOs to present the criteria, assumptions and models that they will use to plan and identify Supplemental Projects on a yearly basis. The criteria identified for Supplemental Projects are very broad and include: equipment material condition, performance and risk, operational flexibility and efficiency, infrastructure resilience, customer service or other, as well as asset management.

While the identification of the criteria violations and solutions are reviewed, and stakeholders have the opportunity to comment, the solution that is submitted in the Local Plan is the Transmission Owner's decision. PJM conducts a do no harm analysis to ensure the Supplemental Projects do not negatively affect the reliability of the system. Supplemental Projects are ultimately included in PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and are allocated 100 percent to the zone in which the transmission facilities are located. Supplemental Projects may displace projects that would have otherwise been implemented through the RTEP process.

Supplemental projects are currently exempt from the Order No. 1000 competitive process.[155] Transmission owners have a clear incentive to increase investments in rate base given that transmission owners are paid for these projects on a cost of service basis.

Figure 12-6 shows the latest cost estimate of all baseline and supplemental projects by expected in service year. Baseline projects are RTEP projects needed for reliability. FERC Order No. 890 was issued on February 16, 2007, and implemented in PJM starting in 2008. Order No. 890 required Transmission Providers to participate in a coordinated, open and transparent planning process. Prior to the implementation of Order No. 890, there were transmission projects planned by transmission owners and included in the PJM planning models that were not included in the totals shown in Figure 12-6, Table 12-

150 See *Building for the Future Through Electric Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, Order No. 1920*, 187 FERC ¶ 61,068 (2022).
151 See *Order on rehearing and clarification, Order No. 1920-A*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2024).
152 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. RM21-17-000 (December 20, 2024).
153 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-751-000 (December 12, 2025).
154 See PJM. Planning. "Transmission Construction Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/project-construction>.
155 FERC accepted tariff provisions that exclude supplemental projects from competition in the RTEP. 162 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2018), *reh'g denied*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2018).

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84 and Table 12-85 because PJM did not track or report such projects. There has been a significant increase in supplemental projects coincident with the implementation of Order No. 890 starting in 2008 and the competitive planning process introduced by FERC Order No. 1000 starting in 2011.

PJM's data collection, management and retention related to transmission spending of all types is inadequate and needs a significant upgrade. The failure to collect data on estimated and final project costs makes it impossible to track transmission project costs for all project types. Given the significance of data to market participants and regulators, the MMU recommends that all queue data and supplemental, network and baseline project data, including projected in service dates and estimated and final costs, be regularly updated with accurate and verifiable data.

**Figure 12-6 Cost estimate of baseline and supplemental projects by expected in service year: January 1, 1998 through December 31, 2026**





Table 12-84 shows the number of supplemental projects by expected in service year for each transmission zone. The average number of supplemental projects in each expected in service year increased by 1,150.0 percent, from 20 for years 1998 through 2007 (pre Order No. 890) to 250 for years 2008 through 2026 (post Order No. 890). As of June 30, 2026, there were 1,859 supplemental projects with expected in service dates between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2036.



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## Table 12-84 Number of supplemental projects by expected in service year and zone: 1998 through 2050

| Year | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | NEET | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 1999 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 2000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
| 2001 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| 2002 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 2003 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| 2004 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 40 |
| 2005 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 14 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 39 |
| 2006 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 31 |
| 2007 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 35 |
| 2008 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 41 |
| 2009 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 39 |
| 2010 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 42 |
| 2011 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 41 |
| 2012 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 11 | 0 | 65 |
| 2013 | 5 | 21 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 14 | 19 | 0 | 107 |
| 2014 | 2 | 31 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 14 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 18 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 15 | 0 | 124 |
| 2015 | 4 | 15 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 37 | 0 | 8 | 4 | 17 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 22 | 0 | 141 |
| 2016 | 6 | 17 | 0 | 4 | 17 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 13 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 11 | 29 | 0 | 146 |
| 2017 | 8 | 107 | 0 | 3 | 26 | 1 | 23 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 31 | 11 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 22 | 43 | 0 | 298 |
| 2018 | 10 | 144 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 14 | 3 | 22 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 25 | 0 | 288 |
| 2019 | 3 | 163 | 0 | 4 | 30 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 33 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 15 | 0 | 15 | 27 | 0 | 359 |
| 2020 | 5 | 132 | 0 | 4 | 35 | 6 | 12 | 7 | 13 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 33 | 1 | 17 | 23 | 0 | 356 |
| 2021 | 4 | 156 | 0 | 6 | 30 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 2 | 22 | 0 | 8 | 17 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 24 | 0 | 19 | 23 | 0 | 385 |
| 2022 | 1 | 153 | 0 | 10 | 31 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 9 | 1 | 28 | 2 | 6 | 14 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 29 | 0 | 18 | 17 | 0 | 379 |
| 2023 | 5 | 186 | 0 | 17 | 19 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 35 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 5 | 14 | 20 | 0 | 385 |
| 2024 | 7 | 207 | 1 | 27 | 28 | 11 | 8 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 31 | 4 | 10 | 16 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 23 | 7 | 16 | 17 | 0 | 469 |
| 2025 | 1 | 296 | 1 | 11 | 29 | 10 | 4 | 12 | 12 | 4 | 33 | 0 | 4 | 17 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 49 | 6 | 17 | 16 | 0 | 560 |
| 2026 | 2 | 205 | 3 | 29 | 28 | 5 | 15 | 18 | 11 | 4 | 54 | 2 | 9 | 34 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 30 | 6 | 28 | 10 | 0 | 525 |
| 2027 | 3 | 164 | 7 | 36 | 28 | 4 | 15 | 15 | 8 | 2 | 44 | 2 | 9 | 19 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 24 | 3 | 50 | 17 | 0 | 474 |
| 2028 | 3 | 163 | 13 | 20 | 19 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 6 | 2 | 37 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 11 | 4 | 29 | 12 | 0 | 385 |
| 2029 | 10 | 105 | 1 | 29 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 18 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 230 |
| 2030 | 4 | 79 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 133 |
| 2031 | 1 | 46 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 64 |
| 2032 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| 2033 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| 2034 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| 2035 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2036 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 2037 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2038 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2039 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2040 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2041 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2042 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2043 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2044 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2045 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2046 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2047 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2048 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2049 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2050 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 109 | 2,424 | 29 | 289 | 374 | 90 | 282 | 104 | 156 | 68 | 529 | 160 | 88 | 180 | 244 | 2 | 5 | 81 | 276 | 45 | 368 | 384 | 0 | 6,287 |

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Table 12-85 shows the latest cost estimate of supplemental projects by expected in service year for each transmission zone. The average cost of supplemental projects in each expected in service year increased by 3,311.0 percent, from $64.5 million for years 1998 through 2007 (pre Order No. 890) to $2.2 billion for years 2008 through 2026 (post Order No. 890). As of June 30, 2026, the 1,859 supplemental projects with expected in service dates between January 1, 2026 and December 31, 2036, have a total cost estimate of $30.1 billion.


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## Table 12-85 Latest cost estimate by expected in service year and zone ($ millions): 1998 through 2050

| Year | ACEC | AEP | AMPT | APS | ATSI | BGE | COMED | DAY | DUKE | DUQ | DOM | DPL | EKPC | JCPLC | MEC | NEET | OVEC | PECO | PE | PEPCO | PPL | PSEG | REC | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.67 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.67 |
| 1999 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.77 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.77 |
| 2000 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $32.94 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $32.94 |
| 2001 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $6.79 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $6.79 |
| 2002 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $6.99 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $6.99 |
| 2003 | $7.42 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $8.77 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $9.60 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $25.79 |
| 2004 | $4.45 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $10.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.82 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $7.33 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $22.60 |
| 2005 | $4.06 | $14.66 | $0.00 | $10.12 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $2.57 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $10.98 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.50 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $42.91 |
| 2006 | $4.03 | $309.70 | $0.00 | $0.93 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $48.93 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $11.62 | $0.00 | $6.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.50 | $0.00 | $4.63 | $18.80 | $0.00 | $406.14 |
| 2007 | $0.56 | $2.06 | $0.00 | $9.85 | $0.00 | $37.61 | $4.64 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $31.75 | $0.00 | $9.71 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.34 | $2.28 | $0.00 | $98.80 |
| 2008 | $2.36 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $12.03 | $0.00 | $0.45 | $7.61 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $7.00 | $14.01 | $2.27 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.59 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $47.32 |
| 2009 | $0.77 | $0.90 | $0.00 | $12.22 | $0.00 | $5.00 | $21.11 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $19.60 | $2.12 | $7.35 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $48.10 | $2.73 | $0.00 | $0.16 | $17.60 | $0.00 | $137.66 |
| 2010 | $0.00 | $34.36 | $0.00 | $12.13 | $0.00 | $18.90 | $1.38 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $34.45 | $14.98 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.03 | $4.58 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $31.80 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.86 | $17.72 | $0.00 | $172.19 |
| 2011 | $0.00 | $37.60 | $0.00 | $9.30 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $16.72 | $85.67 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.16 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $113.30 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $11.87 | $34.60 | $0.00 | $311.22 |
| 2012 | $0.00 | $46.00 | $0.00 | $5.12 | $0.35 | $2.20 | $12.60 | $0.00 | $26.06 | $11.60 | $165.74 | $0.99 | $0.00 | $6.61 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $12.60 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $19.66 | $223.01 | $0.00 | $532.54 |
| 2013 | $3.15 | $134.93 | $0.00 | $1.10 | $33.68 | $0.00 | $59.25 | $0.00 | $9.93 | $79.10 | $25.03 | $0.99 | $0.00 | $0.05 | $4.10 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $22.50 | $0.00 | $2.40 | $76.70 | $503.72 | $0.00 | $956.63 |
| 2014 | $8.03 | $387.00 | $0.00 | $5.97 | $58.70 | $21.20 | $60.37 | $0.00 | $2.43 | $14.90 | $88.61 | $5.96 | $0.72 | $5.60 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $13.30 | $1.30 | $0.00 | $33.47 | $305.30 | $0.00 | $1,012.86 |
| 2015 | $3.73 | $237.45 | $0.00 | $3.80 | $21.90 | $2.00 | $376.00 | $0.00 | $14.12 | $4.53 | $113.53 | $13.06 | $1.22 | $0.30 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $33.80 | $0.00 | $42.50 | $50.17 | $721.91 | $0.00 | $1,640.02 |
| 2016 | $74.54 | $84.13 | $0.00 | $18.40 | $182.70 | $0.00 | $308.15 | $0.00 | $15.13 | $26.95 | $40.68 | $26.60 | $0.25 | $0.00 | $2.37 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $86.40 | $0.40 | $7.80 | $58.76 | $742.48 | $0.00 | $1,675.74 |
| 2017 | $66.28 | $648.74 | $0.00 | $8.60 | $164.45 | $0.09 | $145.97 | $0.00 | $64.31 | $3.62 | $104.25 | $92.29 | $2.21 | $0.00 | $14.70 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $8.30 | $12.00 | $264.34 | $988.92 | $0.00 | $2,589.07 |
| 2018 | $66.55 | $818.03 | $0.00 | $14.60 | $42.12 | $4.08 | $80.94 | $0.00 | $69.80 | $3.13 | $162.94 | $68.94 | $10.87 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $47.60 | $0.00 | $156.00 | $197.34 | $537.85 | $0.00 | $2,280.79 |
| 2019 | $64.30 | $1,114.64 | $0.00 | $11.97 | $190.40 | $76.55 | $90.19 | $0.30 | $90.69 | $0.30 | $90.14 | $33.55 | $23.67 | $0.90 | $62.30 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $2.00 | $75.80 | $0.00 | $298.00 | $356.41 | $0.00 | $2,582.11 |
| 2020 | $59.58 | $920.44 | $0.00 | $0.30 | $115.41 | $62.58 | $78.09 | $14.36 | $72.06 | $6.40 | $258.72 | $39.50 | $25.61 | $2.30 | $23.10 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $2.40 | $72.70 | $102.70 | $215.29 | $1,959.38 | $0.00 | $4,030.92 |
| 2021 | $86.54 | $1,195.03 | $0.00 | $9.50 | $184.21 | $32.52 | $140.90 | $17.79 | $117.39 | $18.90 | $98.40 | $0.00 | $25.67 | $47.84 | $85.89 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $73.40 | $63.48 | $0.00 | $197.67 | $460.84 | $0.00 | $2,855.97 |
| 2022 | $81.40 | $805.01 | $0.00 | $19.32 | $205.52 | $190.13 | $147.60 | $21.46 | $64.32 | $45.00 | $194.60 | $9.38 | $22.12 | $34.84 | $127.04 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $72.80 | $59.79 | $0.00 | $231.92 | $450.83 | $0.00 | $2,783.08 |
| 2023 | $59.10 | $852.55 | $0.00 | $49.09 | $160.41 | $18.35 | $48.34 | $25.60 | $112.27 | $0.00 | $333.30 | $87.57 | $29.77 | $3.41 | $130.50 | $68.77 | $0.00 | $24.40 | $20.07 | $218.84 | $183.73 | $628.26 | $0.00 | $3,054.33 |
| 2024 | $87.60 | $1,420.96 | $20.00 | $69.91 | $199.70 | $23.84 | $219.60 | $202.60 | $31.73 | $0.00 | $498.66 | $95.30 | $61.42 | $87.73 | $103.80 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $173.57 | $63.18 | $5.12 | $235.95 | $517.54 | $0.00 | $4,118.21 |
| 2025 | $40.00 | $2,003.44 | $18.00 | $116.70 | $509.68 | $123.82 | $39.45 | $58.75 | $97.76 | $44.90 | $413.94 | $0.00 | $40.83 | $58.21 | $184.66 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $13.39 | $178.96 | $594.13 | $323.20 | $398.90 | $0.00 | $5,258.72 |
| 2026 | $14.08 | $2,216.61 | $10.24 | $250.86 | $272.22 | $125.83 | $365.95 | $123.72 | $134.17 | $4.85 | $1,281.65 | $63.40 | $51.39 | $180.19 | $121.47 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $25.90 | $78.37 | $13.30 | $516.05 | $277.85 | $0.00 | $6,128.10 |
| 2027 | $31.80 | $1,384.26 | $70.20 | $263.98 | $588.76 | $363.30 | $779.90 | $124.60 | $74.36 | $160.00 | $1,240.74 | $14.10 | $97.50 | $200.22 | $201.13 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $54.40 | $166.90 | $3.60 | $991.88 | $407.92 | $0.00 | $7,219.55 |
| 2028 | $82.86 | $1,206.64 | $131.74 | $131.45 | $379.55 | $407.95 | $471.30 | $52.50 | $89.65 | $9.30 | $1,073.95 | $58.78 | $12.35 | $98.04 | $148.00 | $0.00 | $4.40 | $61.40 | $272.11 | $22.00 | $572.56 | $640.50 | $0.00 | $5,927.03 |
| 2029 | $241.67 | $727.05 | $11.50 | $224.24 | $217.78 | $314.00 | $264.00 | $46.20 | $84.43 | $0.00 | $1,090.12 | $42.00 | $53.20 | $84.71 | $79.54 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $36.00 | $36.50 | $2.36 | $311.90 | $924.30 | $0.00 | $4,791.50 |
| 2030 | $271.30 | $537.86 | $47.90 | $48.05 | $49.50 | $0.00 | $3.00 | $74.30 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $411.55 | $10.50 | $37.76 | $62.82 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $58.75 | $170.40 | $0.00 | $1,783.69 |
| 2031 | $31.50 | $942.58 | $0.00 | $18.80 | $453.70 | $276.00 | $24.50 | $0.00 | $11.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $42.50 | $0.00 | $8.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $82.00 | $159.40 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $2,049.98 |
| 2032 | $84.00 | $285.05 | $0.00 | $5.38 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $5.30 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $379.73 |
| 2033 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.90 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $30.40 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $242.17 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $274.47 |
| 2034 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $874.20 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $443.00 | $0.00 | $89.40 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1,406.60 |
| 2035 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2036 | $0.00 | $166.60 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $166.60 |
| 2037 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2038 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2039 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2040 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2041 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2042 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2043 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2044 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2045 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2046 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2047 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2048 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2049 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| 2050 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $7.50 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $7.50 |
| Total | $1,481.66 | $18,534.28 | $309.58 | $1,355.62 | $4,030.74 | $2,106.40 | $4,678.36 | $762.18 | $1,186.91 | $573.40 | $7,810.85 | $812.60 | $496.56 | $888.96 | $1,293.18 | $68.77 | $4.40 | $1,031.56 | $1,714.09 | $1,182.75 | $5,189.36 | $11,307.32 | $0.00 | $66,819.53 |

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On September 28, 2023, the Office of Ohio Consumers' Counsel filed a complaint regarding the impact of the volume and costs of supplemental projects on consumers. The complaint requests that the Commission develop a mechanism, to be included in the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement, whereby "FERC would review the need, prudence and cost-effectiveness of local transmission projects in Ohio." The complaint also requests the Commission to appoint an Independent Transmission Monitor (ITM) to assist "in reviewing the planning, need, prudence and cost-effectiveness of local transmission projects for consumers in Ohio", and to "consider precluding the Ohio Transmission Utilities from using formula rates for establishing transmission rates."[156] The Office of Ohio Consumers' Counsel's complaint is pending.

On December 19, 2024, a group of consumer interests filed against multiple transmission owners and RTOs/ISOs.[157] The complaint alleges that provisions in the tariffs of the transmission owning utilities and the RTOs/ISOs inappropriately authorize individual transmission owners to plan facilities rated at 100 kilovolts kV and above without regard to efficiency or cost-effectiveness. The complaint does not challenge the rates for any specific locally planned projects, but, rather, alleges that the cumulative effect of tariff provisions allowing local planning of transmission projects rated at 100 kV and above results in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates.[158] The complaint requests issuance of an order that, for transmission facilities rated at 100 kV and above, requires: (i) removal of planning from transmission owner tariffs (and RTO tariffs that confirm such transmission owner planning); (ii) amendment of regional planning tariffs to require that all planning be done at the regional or interregional level (specifying facilities reaching the end of operational life); and (iii) amendment of regional planning tariffs be to require that the regional planning within the existing Order No. 1000 regions be conducted by independent transmission system planners.[159] The complaint recommends that independent transmission planners be structured similar to independent market monitors or be included in an expanded market monitoring function.[160] The consumer interests' planning complaint is pending.

The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of supplemental projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated.

## End of Life Transmission Projects

An end of life transmission project is a project submitted for the purpose of replacing existing infrastructure that is at, or is approaching, the end of its useful life. Under the current process, end of life transmission projects are not subject to the RTEP open window process and have become a form of supplemental project that is exempt from competition under the existing rules.[161]

The MMU recommends, to increase the role of competition, that the exemption of end of life projects from the Order No. 1000 competitive process be terminated and that end of life transmission projects be included in the RTEP process and should be subject to a transparent, robust and clearly defined mechanism to require competition to build such projects.

## Competitive Planning Process Exclusions

There are several project types that are currently exempt from the competitive planning process. These project types include:

- **Immediate Need Exclusion.** If the violation needs to be resolved within three years or less, all such projects are excluded from competition. The local Transmission Owner is the Designated Entity.[162]

  On October 17, 2019, the Commission issued an Order Instituting Section 206 Proceedings to determine if RTOs have implemented the exemption in a manner consistent with the Commission's directives under Order

156 See Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel v. PJM, et al., Docket No. EL23-105 (September 28, 2023).
157 See Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. PJM, et al., Docket No. EL25-44-000 (December 19, 2024).
158 *Id.* at 11.
159 *Id.* at 42–43.
160 *Id.*, Attachment C (Declaration of Michael A. Giberson) at 36:11–37:8.
161 In recent decisions addressing competing proposals on end of life projects, the Commission accepted a transmission owner proposal excluding end of life projects from competition in the RTEP process, 172 FERC ¶ 61,136 (2020), ***reh'g denied***, 173 FERC ¶ 61,225 (2020), ***affirmed***, American Municipal Power, Inc., et al. v. FERC, Case No. 20-1449 (D.C. Cir. November 17, 2023), and rejected a proposal from PJM stakeholders that would have included end of life projects in competition in the RTEP process, 173 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020).
162 See OA Schedule 6 § 1.5.8(m).


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1000.[163] Some supplemental projects are in this category. In a decision issued August 19, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit found that FERC reasonably approved MISO's Immediate Need Reliability Exception.[164] The Court rejected arguments challenging the MISO rule because (i) the definition of projects eligible for the exception was insufficiently limited and (ii) the rule allows for designating the incumbent developer before posting of the basis for the exception.[165] The decision was largely based on deference to FERC expertise.[166]

- **Below 200kV.** All projects at voltages less than 200kV are excluded from competition. The local Transmission Owner is the Designated Entity.[167] Some supplemental projects are in this category.
- **Substation Equipment.** If the limiting element(s) is substation equipment, such projects are excluded from competition. The local Transmission Owner is the Designated Entity.[168] Some supplemental projects are in this category.

While the PJM Operating Agreement defines the Designated Entity for projects that are excluded from the competitive planning process, neither the PJM Operating Agreement nor the various commission orders on transmission competition prohibit PJM from permitting competition to provide financing for such projects. The MMU recommends that rules be implemented to require competition to provide financing for transmission projects. This competition could reduce the cost of capital for transmission projects and significantly reduce total costs to customers. In addition, the criteria for and need for all exclusions from the competitive process should be reviewed. There does not appear to be any market reason to exclude transmission projects from competition for any of these exclusion categories.

163 169 FERC ¶ 61,054 (2019).
164 LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v. FERC, 45 F.4th 979.
165 *Id.* at 999.
166 *Id.*
167 See OA Schedule 6 § 1.5.8(n).
168 See OA Schedule 6 § 1.5.8(p).

## Dominion Data Center Alley Immediate Need and Long Term Solution

Dominion presented 44 supplemental project requests to serve new data center load through the summer of 2025. PJM identified the need for additional baseline reinforcements to support the load growth. Rather than a competitive process, PJM decided to designate the upgrades as immediate need and allowed Dominion to construct these lines.[169] [170]

The 2022 RTEP Window 3 addressed long term reliability needs as well as the additional baseline reinforcements for Data Center Alley. The proposal window was open from February 24, 2023, to May 31, 2023, and received 72 submissions from 10 entities. The cost estimate for the total scope of work was $5.1 billion, $1.4 billion of which was for the necessary baseline upgrades specific to the Data Center Alley reinforcements.[171] The proposed Data Center Alley solution includes 500kV and 230kV lines extensions, the reconductoring of multiple 230kV lines and substation work.[172]

On December 8, 2023, the Maryland Office of People's Counsel (MDOPC) submitted a letter to the PJM Board.[173] The letter requested that the PJM Board defer the December 11, 2023, vote on the 2022 RTEP Window 3 proposal. The MDOPC letter cited concerns regarding the scale, scope and cost of the proposal. Additionally, the MDOPC expressed concerns that "the current failure to unpack the relative contribution of each of the "drivers" of the need for the W3 projects makes it impossible for the public to understand how cost causation principles apply to the projects." On December 11, 2023, the PJM Board approved the recommended solution. PJM filed the RTEP on January 10, 2024, and the Commission accepted it by order issued April 8, 2024.[174]

169 See "Dominion Northern Virginia Area Violations," presented at the July 12, 2022 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2022/20220712/item-08---dominion-northern-virginia-area-violations---need-statement.ashx>.
170 See "Dominion Northern Virginia Area Immediate Need," presented at the July 12, 2022 meeting of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2022/20220712/item-08---dominion-northern-virginia---immediate-need.ashx>.
171 See "*Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) Recommendations to the PJM Board*," December 2023. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2023/20231205/20231205-pjm-teac-board-whitepaper-december-2023.ashx>.
172 See "*Reliability Analysis Report: 2022 RTEP Window 3*," December 8, 2023. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/teac/2023/20231205/20231205-2022-rtep-window-3-reliability-analysis-report.ashx>.
173 See "MD Office of People's Counsel Letter regarding 2022 RTEP Window 3 Procurement," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/20231208-pjm-board-letter-2023-12-08-md-opc-final.ashx>.
174 See 187 FERC ¶ 61,012. Maryland Office of the People's Counsel filed a protest, which the Commission determined was outside of the scope of the RTEP filing.

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## Comparative Cost Framework

The MMU recommended that rules be implemented to require that project cost caps on new transmission projects be part of the evaluation of competing projects. On May 24, 2018, the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) approved a motion that required PJM, with input from the MMU, to develop a comparative cost framework to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of binding cost containment proposals versus proposals without cost containment provisions. On March 20, 2020, the Commission approved PJM's filing to amend the PJM Operating Agreement to incorporate this requirement.[175]

The 2020 RTEP Window 1 was the first open window that received cost capping proposals to be evaluated under the comparative cost framework. PJM has not provided the requested data to the MMU to allow for an analysis of their financial review process. Without this data and analysis, the MMU cannot verify that the analysis performed under the comparative cost framework was sufficient or adequately followed the process defined in the PJM manual.[176] The existing proposal templates do not provide enough information to adequately perform a financial analysis. The MMU recommends that PJM modify the project proposal templates to include data necessary to perform a detailed project lifetime financial analysis. The required data includes, but is not limited to: capital expenditure; capital structure; return on equity; cost of debt; tax assumptions; ongoing capital expenditures; ongoing maintenance; and expected life.

## Storage As A Transmission Asset (SATA)

The PJM Planning Committee considered whether storage devices should be included in the RTEP process as transmission assets.[177] On February 24, 2021, the Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) voted to defer endorsement of governing document language associated with Storage as a Transmission Asset in reliability planning. The MRC chose to defer the language until a comprehensive proposal addressing all aspects of incorporation of storage resources into markets, operations and planning.

Transmission and generation have, and have always had, a symbiotic relationship in the provision of wholesale power. Transmission needs generation to function and generation needs transmission to function. Transmission can substitute for generation at the margin and generation can substitute for transmission at the margin. This relationship has always been a relatively unexamined area in the design of competitive wholesale power markets. For example, there is little if any explicit consideration of the impact of transmission planning on competitive generation investment in RTO/ISO market rules. Improvement is needed in these areas. Introducing confusion about what assets are classified as generation and what assets are classified as transmission frustrates potential reform and undermines the competitive markets.

On July 22, 2020, through the supplemental planning process, American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP) filed, on behalf of Kentucky Power Company (Kentucky Power), a Petition for Declaratory Order seeking confirmation that its Middle Creek energy storage project is eligible for cost of service recovery through AEP's formula rates.[178] AEP's Middle Creek energy storage project was a proposed battery storage device that would discharge energy to serve retail load at the Middle Creek substation in the event of a transmission outage. On December 21, 2020, the Commission ruled that the Middle Creek energy storage project did not perform a transmission function, and was ineligible to recover its costs through formula rates.[179]

Storage devices like batteries that are defined to be part of PJM markets should not be treated as transmission assets. These devices should be treated as market assets. The MMU recommends that storage resources not be includable as transmission assets for any reason.

## Board Authorized Transmission Upgrades

The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) regularly reviews internal and external proposals to improve transmission reliability throughout PJM. These proposals, which include reliability baseline, network, market efficiency and targeted market efficiency projects, as well as scope changes

175 See 170 FERC ¶ 61,243 (2020).
176 See "PJM Manual 14F: Competitive Planning Process," Rev. 10 (October 30, 2024).
177 See PJM. "*Storage As A Transmission Asset: Problem / Opportunity Statement*," <https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/pc/2020/20200605-special/20200605-item-02a-storage-as-a-transmission-asset-problem-statement-clean.ashx>.
178 See *AEP*, Docket No. EL20-58 (July 22, 2020).
179 173 FERC ¶ 61,264 (2020).


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and project cancellations, but exclude supplemental and end of life projects, are periodically presented to the PJM Board of Managers for authorization.[180]

An RTEP project can be approved by the PJM Board if the project ensures compliance with NERC, regional and local transmission owner planning criteria or to address market efficiency congestion relief. These projects are considered Baseline Projects. PJM Board approved RTEP projects that are necessary to allow new generation to interconnect reliably are considered Network Projects.

In the first six months of 2026, the PJM Board approved a net change of $11.2 billion in transmission upgrades. The Board approved a net change of $12.1 billion in transmission upgrades approved in February 2026. In May 2026, the Board approved the cancellation of $1.04 billion in transmission upgrades resulting from the mutual termination of the New Jersey State Agreement Approach (SAA). As of June 30, 2026, the PJM Board had approved $69.7 billion in transmission system enhancements since 1999.

## Qualifying Transmission Upgrades (QTU)

A Qualifying Transmission Upgrade (QTU) is an upgrade to the transmission system, financed and built by market participants, that increases the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL) into an LDA and can be offered into capacity auctions as capacity. Once a QTU is in service, the upgrade is eligible to continue to offer the approved incremental import capability into future RPM Auctions.

If a QTU that was cleared in a Base Residual Auction (BRA) or Incremental Auction (IA) is not completed by the start of the Delivery Year, the submitting party is required to provide replacement capacity. Once a QTU is in service, the upgrade is eligible to continue to offer the approved incremental import capability into future RPM Auctions. As of June 30, 2026, no QTUs have cleared a BRA or IA.

180 Supplemental Projects, including the end of life subset of supplemental projects, do not require PJM Board of Managers authorization.

## Cost Allocation

Required transmission enhancements are categorized as: supplemental, network or baseline upgrades. The cost allocation of the transmission enhancements depends on the category of upgrades.

### Supplemental Upgrade Cost Allocation

Supplemental projects are defined to be "transmission expansions or enhancements that are not required for compliance with PJM criteria and are not state public policy projects according to the PJM Operating Agreement. These projects are used as inputs to RTEP models, but are not required for reliability, economic efficiency or operational performance criteria, as determined by PJM."[181] Supplemental projects are exempt from competition. The costs of supplemental projects are allocated 100 percent to the zone in which the transmission facilities are located.[182]

### Network Upgrade Cost Allocation

Any entity that requests interconnection of a new generating facility, including increases to the capacity of an existing generating unit, or that requests interconnection of a merchant transmission facility, must follow the process defined in the PJM tariff to obtain interconnection service.[183] PJM's process is designed to ensure that new generation is added in a reliable and systematic manner. The process assigns the upgrade costs to the project or projects that are causing the costs to be incurred. As part of the interconnection planning process, a series of studies are performed to determine the feasibility, impact, and cost of interconnecting projects in the queue. The interconnection service agreement identifies the transmission modifications needed to maintain the reliability of the transmission system as a result of a new service request. These identified modifications are known as network upgrades. For required network upgrades under the new cluster based service request cycles, the costs of the network upgrades are assigned to individual projects that caused the costs to be incurred.[184]

181 See PJM. "Transmission Construction Status," (Accessed on June 30, 2026) <https://www.pjm.com/planning/m/project-construction>.
182 See OATT Schedule 12(a)(iii).
183 See OATT Parts IV & VI.
184 See "PJM Manual 14H: New Service Requests Cycle Process," Rev. 04 (May 20, 2026).

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## Baseline Upgrade Cost Allocation

The PJM RTEP process is designed to identify needed transmission system additions and improvements to continue to provide reliable service throughout the RTO. Typically, load growth creates conditions that may create violations of reliability criteria, which in turn require upgrades. The PJM RTEP identifies necessary upgrades to remain compliant with national and regional reliability standards. These modifications are baseline upgrades. Baseline upgrades can also include market efficiency projects.

The costs of regional baseline facilities are allocated 50 percent on a load-ratio share and 50 percent on a directionally weighted solution based DFAX method.[185]

The costs of the necessary lower voltage facilities required to support the regional baseline facilities with estimated costs greater than or equal to $5 million are assigned on a directionally weighted solution based DFAX method.

The costs of the necessary lower voltage facilities required to support the regional baseline facilities with estimated costs below $5 million are assigned to the zone where the upgrade is located.

In response to complaints against PJM RTEP Baseline Upgrade Filings in 2014 that included cost allocations for $1.5 billion in baseline transmission enhancements and expansions, on November 24, 2015, FERC issued an order directing investigation of "whether there is a definable category of reliability projects within PJM for which the solution-based DFAX cost allocation method may not be just and reasonable, such as projects addressing reliability violations that are not related to flow on the planned transmission facility, and whether an alternative just and reasonable *ex ante* cost allocation method could be established for any such category of projects."[186] FERC convened a technical conference on January 12, 2016, to address the complaints in multiple proceedings and to address these two core issues.[187]

The issues identified in the complaints and at the technical conference included: whether the solutions based allocation method is appropriate for upgrades not related to transmission overload issues; whether the solutions based allocation method correctly identifies all the beneficiaries of the upgrades; whether it is reasonable to allocate a level of costs to a merchant transmission project that could force bankruptcy; and whether the significant shifts in allocation that result from use of the 0.01 distribution factor cutoff are appropriate.

On February 20, 2020, the Commission issued an Order denying rehearing requests.[188] The Commission found that PJM's solution based dfax method for regional cost allocation, including the 0.01 distribution cutoff factor, is just and reasonable.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2022 found that FERC had failed to explain its distinction between the projects eligible to use the dfax method and those not eligible.[189] The Court objected that without adequate explanation: "The Bergen project 'addresses a non-flow related reliability issue,' just like the non-flow-based stability issue in Artificial Island, but FERC had treated the two projects differently."[190] The Court also rejected the 0.01 distribution cutoff factor as "absurd."[191] The Court remanded issues concerning PJM's solution based dfax method to FERC, where the matter is now pending.[192]

It is clear that the allocation issues are difficult. Nonetheless, allocation methods affect the efficiency of the markets. Allocation methods also affect the degree to which transmission upgrades required to serve data center load are allocated to other customers. The MMU recommends a comprehensive review of the ways in which the solution based dfax is implemented. The goal for such a process would be to ensure that the most rational and efficient approach to implementing the solution based dfax method is used in PJM. Such an approach should allocate costs consistent with benefits and appropriately calibrate the incentives for investment in new transmission capability. No

185 See "PJM Manual 14B: PJM Region Transmission Planning Process," Rev. 59 (April 22, 2026) for a complete explanation of the directionally weighted solution based DFAX method.
186 153 FERC ¶ 61,245 at P 35 (2015).
187 See Docket Nos. EL15-18-000 (ConEd), EL15-67-000 (Linden), and EL15-95-000 (Artificial Island).
188 See 170 FERC ¶ 61,122 (2020).
189 See *Consolidated Edison v. FERC et al.*, 45 F.4th 265 (D.C. Cir. August 9, 2022).
190 *Id.* at 9.
191 See *id.*
192 See FERC Docket Nos. EL21-39-000, et al.


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replacement approach should be approved until all potential alternatives are thoroughly reviewed.

As an example, the use of the arbitrary 0.01 distribution factor cutoff can result in large and inappropriate shifts in cost allocation. If the intent of the use of the 0.01 cutoff is to help eliminate small, arbitrary cost allocations to geographically distant areas, this could be achieved by adding a threshold for a minimum usage impact on the line. The MMU recommends changing the minimum distribution factor in the allocation from 0.01 to 0.00 and adding a threshold minimum impact on the load on the line based on a complete analysis of the intent of the allocation and the impacts of the allocation.

By order issued March 6, 2026, the Commission issued an order finding the distribution factor cutoff unjust and unreasonable, consistent with the MMU's recommendation on this issue.[193] The order also found that "additional record evidence is necessary to determine whether the existing rate, in which PJM uses the solution-based DFAX method to allocate either 50% or 100% of the costs of transmission projects that address short circuit reliability issues, is unjust and unreasonable."[194] The order establishes paper hearing procedures to further develop the record on this issue.[195]

## Transmission Line Ratings

Transmission line ratings, and more broadly transmission facility ratings, are the metric for the ability of transmission lines to transmit power from one point to another. Transmission line ratings have significant and frequently underappreciated impacts on competitive wholesale power markets like PJM. Line ratings directly affect energy and capacity prices, the frequency and level of congestion in the day-ahead and real-time energy market, day-ahead nodal price differences and the associated value of FTRs, locational price differences in the capacity market, the need to invest in additional transmission capacity, the need to invest in additional generation capacity, the location of new power plants, and the costs for the interconnection of new power plants. The impact of transmission facility ratings on markets is a function both of the line ratings directly and the use of those ratings by the RTO/ISO.

Congestion payments by load result when lower cost generation is not available to meet all the load in an area as a result of limits on the transmission system. When higher cost local generation is needed to meet part of the local load because of transmission limits, 100 percent of the local load pays the higher price while only the local generation receives the higher price. The difference between what the load pays and generators receive is congestion. Since 2008, congestion costs in PJM have ranged from $0.5 billion to $2.05 billion per year. The fact that PJM rules continue to fail to ensure the return of 100 percent of congestion costs to the load that pays them means that higher congestion increases costs to load.

LMP may, at times, be set by transmission constraint penalty factors. When a transmission constraint is binding and there are no generation alternatives to resolve the constraint, system operators may allow the transmission limit to be violated. When this occurs, the shadow price of the constraint is set by transmission constraint penalty factors. The shadow price directly affects the LMP. Transmission constraint penalty factors were fully implemented in PJM pricing effective February 1, 2019.[196]

Transmission line ratings can result in short term, significant increases in prices as a result of the application of transmission constraint penalty factors. For example, violation of a transmission constraint, meaning that the flow exceeds the line limit, generally results in at least a $2,000 per MWh price. As the power flows approach their rated limits, PJM dispatchers often reduce the control percent on transmission limits applied in SCED by the setting the limit to an average of 95 percent of its actual limit.[197] Violation of these reduced control percent line ratings results in penalty factors setting prices in SCED.[198]

Holding aside the issues with operators reducing the control percent in SCED, the more important point is that the underlying line ratings have a significant

193 See 194 FERC ¶ 61,179 at PP 54–63 (2026).
194 *Id.* at P 72.
195 *Id.*

196 For more information, see the *2024 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 3: Energy Market.
197 See "Transmission Constraint Control Logic and Penalty Factors," presented at the May 10, 2018, meeting of the Markets Implementation Committee Special Session Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors at p14. <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/20180510-special/20180510-item-03-transmission-constraint-penalty-factor-education.ashx>.
198 See the *2024 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Section 3: Energy Market.

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impact on the cost of energy and capacity but have never been reviewed or standardized by ISOs/RTOs or by regulators.

Capacity market prices separate locally when transmission capability into Locational Deliverable Areas (LDA) is not adequate to meet the LDA capacity requirement with the lowest cost capacity. The available transmission capability into LDAs is defined as the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL). Higher cost LDAs are the equivalent in the capacity market of congestion in the energy market. Load in the higher cost LDAs pay more for capacity than those in lower cost LDAs. For example, the clearing price for the BGE LDA in the 2021/2022 Base Residual Auction was $200.30 per MW-day. The clearing price for the EMAAC LDA was $165.73 per MW-day.[199]

Transmission line ratings for a given transmission facility vary by the duration of the power flow, by ambient temperatures, by wind speed and by other conditions. Transmission lines can operate with higher loads for shorter periods of time. This is significant when a contingency is expected to last for only a short period. The transmission line rating can mean the difference between substantial congestion costs and no congestion costs. The transmission line rating can mean the difference between a transmission penalty factor and no penalty factor.

In PJM, transmission owners use a range of ratings by duration.[200] PJM requires transmission owners to provide thermal ratings under normal operating conditions, long term emergency operating conditions, short term emergency operating conditions and the extreme load dump conditions. But there is no requirement that the ratings differ for these operating conditions. PJM typically uses normal line ratings for precontingency (base case) constraints and long term emergency line ratings (four hours) for contingency constraints. PJM requires transmission owners to provide temperature based line ratings separately for night and day times. The temperature ranges from 32 degree Fahrenheit or below to 95 degree Fahrenheit or above in nine degree increments. But there is no requirement that the ratings differ for these operating condition temperatures. In PJM, transmission owners are responsible for developing their own methods to compute line ratings subject to a range of NERC guidelines and requirements. PJM does not review or verify the accuracy of transmission owners' methods to compute line ratings. In PJM, transmission owners have substantial discretion in the approach to line ratings. [201]

Given the significant impact of transmission line ratings on all aspects of wholesale power markets, ensuring and improving the accuracy and transparency of line ratings is essential. Line ratings should incorporate ambient temperature conditions, wind speed and other relevant operating conditions. PJM real-time prices are calculated every five minutes for thousands of nodes. PJM prices are extremely sensitive to transmission line ratings. For consistency with the dynamic nature of wholesale power markets, line ratings should be updated in real time to reflect real time conditions and to help ensure that real-time prices are based on actual current line ratings. New technologies that permit dynamic line ratings (DLR) should be implemented.

Line ratings determine the actual value of transmission in market operations. Yet the methods for defining line ratings remain opaque and vary significantly across transmission owners. Under defining line ratings results in over building transmission. Dynamic line ratings are essential to reflect the actual availability of transmission in real time as ambient conditions change. Ensuring that system operators have accurate information about line ratings, including a wide range of line ratings by duration of load, are essential to ensure that all market participants receive the maximum value from the investment in the transmission system.

Given the significant impact of transmission line ratings on all aspects of wholesale power markets, ensuring and improving the accuracy and transparency of line ratings is essential. Line ratings should incorporate ambient temperature conditions, wind speed and other relevant operating conditions. In PJM, real-time prices are calculated every five minutes for thousands of nodes. PJM prices are extremely sensitive to transmission line ratings.

199 See Monitoring Analytics, LLC "Analysis of the 2021/2022 RPM Base Residual Auction," <https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2018/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20212022_RPM_BRA_Revised_20180824.pdf> (August 24, 2018).

200 See "PJM Manual 03: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026) § 2.1.1, at p 30.

201 PJM presentation to the Planning Committee (PC) (May 3, 2018) "Transmission Owner Ratings Development and Reporting in PJM" ("There are no requirements for PJM to approve or verify a TO's ratings or do any kind of consistency check.") at 24.



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The MMU recommends that all PJM transmission owners use the same methods to define line ratings and implement dynamic line ratings (DLR), subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC. The same facilities should have the same basic ratings under the same operating conditions regardless of the transmission owner. Transmission owner discretion should be minimized or eliminated. The line rating methods should be based on the basic engineering facts of the transmission system components and reflect the impact of actual operating conditions on the ratings of transmission facilities, including ambient temperatures and wind speed when relevant.[202] The line rating methods should be public and fully transparent.

The MMU recommends that PJM routinely review all transmission facility ratings and any changes to those ratings to ensure that the normal, emergency and load dump ratings used in modeling the transmission system are accurate and reflect standard ratings practice.[203] All line rating changes and the detailed reasons for those changes should be public and fully transparent.

The Commission adopted rules that enhance the ability of PJM and the MMU to understand and monitor line ratings on the PJM grid. Order No. 881, issued December 16, 2021, requires that: transmission providers implement ambient adjusted ratings on transmission lines; RTOs/ISOs implement the systems and procedures necessary for hourly ratings updates; transmission providers use uniquely determined emergency ratings; transmission owners share transmission line ratings and transmission line rating methods with RTOs/ISOs and market monitors; transmission providers maintain a database of transmission line ratings and transmission line rating methods on OASIS or other password-protected website.[204] [205]

On rehearing, the Commission provided clarification of market monitors' ability to take action based on information received about transmission line ratings: "We expect that market monitors may use the transmission line rating information available to them in furtherance of their existing responsibilities, which are set forth in the Commission's regulations and the relevant tariffs of each RTO/ISO."[206]

Order No. 881 enhances transparency of information on line ratings and how they are determined. Requiring ambient and hourly adjustments constitutes substantive improvement. Continued reform consistent with the MMU's recommendations is needed in order to ensure consistent and accurate transmission line ratings in PJM.

By letter order issued November 22, 2023, the Commission accepted PJM's filing in compliance with Order Nos. 881 and 881-A, to be implemented no later than July 12, 2025.[207]

On February 28, 2025, PJM requested that the Commission extend PJM's deadline to comply with Order No. 881 compliance directives by nine months, (to no later than April 15, 2026).[208] The extension was requested to allow for required software development and testing. On March 31, 2025, the Commission approved the implementation extension request.[209] PJM implemented Order 881 on March 4, 2026.

Order No. 881 did not require the use of dynamic line ratings ("DLR") based on an insufficient record.[210] On June 27, 2024, the Commission issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket RM24-6 on the implementation of dynamic line ratings.[211]

## Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR) and Grid Enhancing Technology (GETs)

For consistency with the dynamic nature of wholesale power markets, line ratings should be updated in real time to reflect real time conditions and to help ensure that real time prices are based on actual current line ratings. The relevant real-time conditions include ambient air temperature, wind speeds, solar heating, transmission line tension, and transmission line sag.

202 *See* "Transmission Owner Ratings Development and Reporting in PJM," presented at the May 3, 2018 meeting of the Planning Committee.
203 *See* the *2024 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 3: Energy Market.
204 *Managing Transmission Line Ratings*, Order No. 881, 177 FERC ¶ 61,179 at P 39 (2021) ("Order No. 881"), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 881-A, 179 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2022) ("Order No. 881-A").
205 *See* 18 CFR § 35.28(c)(5)Et(g)(13).
206 Order No. 881-A at P 91.
207 See Docket No. ER22-2359-000. PJM must notify the Commission of the effective date no later than November 12, 2024.
208 See PJM, Docket No. ER22-2359-000. (February 28, 2025).
209 See 190 FERC ¶ 61,204 (March 31, 2025).
210 Order No. 881 at PP 25, 254.
211 See 187 FERC ¶ 61,201.

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The widespread adoption of dynamic line ratings should be pursued. The adoption of dynamic line ratings does not require the exorbitant incentives proposed by some. Dynamic line rating technology (DLR) and other Grid Enhancing Technology (GET) should be subject to competition and the costs of implementation should be capped at the costs that would result from the current cost of service method applied to transmission owners. The proposal that providers of GET should receive a share of forecast benefits is not consistent with competition, would pay rates of return many multiples of market rates of return and suffers from the same intractable problem of defining speculative benefits for long periods.

As a first small step towards broader implementation of DLR by all transmission owners in PJM, PPL Electric Utilities, on its own initiative, implemented DLR for three 230 KV transmission lines in northeastern Pennsylvania on October 6, 2022, that have experienced congestion. (The two circuit Susquehanna-Harwood path and the Juniata-Cumberland line.) PPL provides streaming data from the DLR system to PJM operators.

PJM developed technical reference guides to aid in the understanding and consideration of grid enhancing technologies on the PJM system. The technical reference guides provide additional information on dynamic line ratings, advanced power flow controllers, topology control and optimization and advanced conductors.[212]

# Transmission Facility Outages

## Scheduling Transmission Facility Outage Requests

A transmission facility is designated as reportable by PJM if a change in its status can affect a transmission constraint on any Monitored Transmission Facility or could impede free flowing ties within the PJM RTO and/or adjacent areas.[213] When a reportable transmission facility needs to be taken out of service, the transmission owner is required to submit an outage request as early as possible.[214] The specific timeline is shown in Table 12-87.[215]

212 See PJM. About PJM "Grid Optimization Solutions," <https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/grid-optimization-solutions>.
213 If a transmission facility is not modeled in the PJM EMS or the facility is not expected to significantly impact PJM system security or congestion management, it is not reportable. See PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).
214 See PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).
215 See PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).

Transmission outages have significant impacts on PJM markets, including impacts on FTR auctions, on congestion, and on expected market outcomes in the day-ahead and real-time markets. The efficient functioning of the markets depends on clear, enforceable rules governing transmission outages.

The outage data for the FTR market are for outages scheduled to occur in the 2024/2025 planning period and the 2025/2026 planning period, regardless of when they were initially submitted.[216] The outage data for the day-ahead market are for outages scheduled to occur from January 2015 through June 2026.

Transmission outages are categorized by duration: greater than 30 calendar days; less than or equal to 30 calendar days and greater than five calendar days; less than or equal to five calendar days.[217] Table 12-86 shows that 75.5 percent of requested outages were planned for less than or equal to five days and 9.3 percent of requested outages were planned for greater than 30 days in the 2025/2026 planning period. Table 12-86 also shows that 75.2 percent of the requested outages were planned for less than or equal to five days and 9.2 percent of requested outages were planned for greater than 30 days in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 12-86 Transmission facility outage request summary by planned duration: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration (Days) | Outage Requests | Percent of Total | Outage Requests | Percent of Total |
| <=5 | 15,091 | 75.2% | 16,669 | 75.5% |
| >5 &t <=30 | 3,148 | 15.7% | 3,352 | 15.2% |
| >30 | 1,842 | 9.2% | 2,052 | 9.3% |
| Total | 20,081 | 100.0% | 22,073 | 100.0% |

After receiving a transmission facility outage request from a TO, PJM assigns a received status to the request based on its submission date and outage planned duration. The received status can be On Time or Late, as defined in Table 12-87.[218]

216 The hotline tickets, EMS tripping tickets or test outage tickets were excluded. The analysis includes only the transmission outage tickets submitted by PJM companies which are currently active.
217 *Id.* at 70.
218 See PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).


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The purpose of the rules defined in Table 12-87 is to require the TOs to submit transmission facility outages prior to the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) auctions so that market participants have complete information about market conditions on which to base their FTR bids and PJM can accurately model market conditions.[219]

### Table 12-87 Transmission facility outage request received status definition

| Planned Duration (Calendar Days) | Request Submitted | Received Status |
|---|---|---|
| <=5 | Before the first of the month one month prior to the starting month of the outage | On Time |
| | After or on the first of the month one month prior to the starting month of the outage | Late |
| > 5 & <=30 | Before the first of the month six months prior to the starting month of the outage | On Time |
| | After or on the first of the month six months prior to the starting month of the outage | Late |
| >30 | Before the earlier of 1) February 1, 2) the first of the month six months prior to the starting month of the outage | On Time |
| | After or on the earlier of 1) February 1, 2) the first of the month six months prior to the starting month of the outage | Late |

Table 12-88 shows a summary of requests by received status. In the 2025/2026 planning period, 40.7 percent of outage requests received were late. In the 2024/2025 planning period, 40.5 percent of outage requests received were late.

### Table 12-88 Transmission facility outage requests by received status: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration (Days) | On Time | Late | Total | Percent Late | On Time | Late | Total | Percent Late |
| <=5 | 9,556 | 5,535 | 15,091 | 36.7% | 10,543 | 6,126 | 16,669 | 36.8% |
| >5 & <=30 | 1,684 | 1,464 | 3,148 | 46.5% | 1,786 | 1,566 | 3,352 | 46.7% |
| >30 | 705 | 1,137 | 1,842 | 61.7% | 754 | 1,298 | 2,052 | 63.3% |
| Total | 11,945 | 8,136 | 20,081 | 40.5% | 13,083 | 8,990 | 22,073 | 40.7% |

Once received, PJM processes outage requests in priority order: emergency transmission outage request; transmission outage request submitted on time; and transmission outage request submitted late. Transmission outage requests that are submitted late may be approved if the outage does not affect the reliability of PJM or cause congestion in the system.[220]

Outages with emergency status will be approved even if submitted late after PJM determines that the outage does not result in Emergency Procedures.[221] PJM cancels or withholds approval of any outage that results in Emergency Procedures, but does not prevent those outages from going forward.[222] Table 12-89 is a summary of outage requests by emergency status. Of all outage requests scheduled to occur in the 2025/2026 planning period, 12.1 percent were for emergency outages. Of all outage requests scheduled to occur in the 2024/2025 planning period, 12.1 percent were for emergency outages.

219 See "Report of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on Transmission Oversight Procedures," Docket No. EL01-122-000 (November 2, 2001).

220 See PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026). The following language was removed from Manual 3 Rev. 50: PJM retains the right to deny all jobs submitted after 8 a.m. three days prior to the requested start date unless the request is an emergency job or an exception request (i.e. a generator tripped and the Transmission Owner is taking advantage of a situation that was not available before the unit trip).

221 PJM, "Manual 13: Emergency Operations," Rev. 98 (Jun. 24, 2026).

222 PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026). "If it is determined that the outage may create an unreliable operating condition the outage will not be approved, but it will be recognized by PJM that the outage will occur."

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### Table 12-89 Transmission facility outage requests by emergency: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration (Days) | Emergency | Non Emergency | Total | Percent Emergency | Emergency | Non Emergency | Total | Percent Emergency |
| <=5 | 1,709 | 13,382 | 15,091 | 11.3% | 1,940 | 14,729 | 16,669 | 11.6% |
| >5 & <=30 | 400 | 2,748 | 3,148 | 12.7% | 394 | 2,958 | 3,352 | 11.8% |
| >30 | 325 | 1,517 | 1,842 | 17.6% | 336 | 1,716 | 2,052 | 16.4% |
| Total | 2,434 | 17,647 | 20,081 | 12.1% | 2,670 | 19,403 | 22,073 | 12.1% |

PJM will approve all transmission outage requests that are submitted on time and do not jeopardize the reliability of the PJM system. PJM will approve all transmission outage requests that are submitted late and are not expected to cause congestion on the PJM system and do not jeopardize the reliability of the PJM system. Each outage is studied and if it is expected to cause a constraint to exceed a limit, PJM will flag the outage ticket as "congestion expected."[223]

The definition of this congestion analysis in the PJM manuals is about physical limits and not about economic congestion. PJM approves on time outages based solely on whether limits are exceeded and available controlling actions, without regard to the resulting level of economic congestion. The MMU recommends that PJM draft a definition of the congestion analysis required for transmission outage requests and associated triggers, including both the extent of overloaded facilities and the level of economic congestion, to include in PJM manuals after appropriate review with appropriate rules for on time and late outage requests.[224]

After PJM determines that a late request may cause congestion, PJM informs the transmission owner of solutions available to eliminate the congestion. For example, if a generator planned or maintenance outage request is contributing to the congestion, PJM can request that the generation owner defer the outage. If no solutions are available, PJM may require the transmission owner to reschedule or cancel the outage.

Table 12-90 is a summary of outage requests by congestion status. Of all outage requests submitted to occur in the 2025/2026 planning period, 9.0 percent were expected to cause congestion. Of all the outage requests that were expected to cause congestion, 4.1 percent (81 out of 1,990) were denied by PJM in the 2025/2026 planning period and 16.5 percent (409 out of 1,990) were cancelled (Table 12-92). Of all outage requests submitted to occur in the 2024/2025 planning period, 9.1 percent were expected to cause congestion. Of all the outage requests that were expected to cause congestion, 5.2 percent (94 out of 1,818) were denied by PJM in the 2024/2025 planning period and 20.5 percent (373 out of 1,818) were cancelled (Table 12-92).

### Table 12-90 Transmission facility outage requests by congestion: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration (Days) | Congestion Expected | No Congestion Expected | Total | Percent Congestion Expected | Congestion Expected | No Congestion Expected | Total | Percent Congestion Expected |
| <=5 | 1,242 | 13,849 | 15,091 | 8.2% | 1,327 | 15,342 | 16,669 | 8.0% |
| >5 & <=30 | 388 | 2,760 | 3,148 | 12.3% | 431 | 2,921 | 3,352 | 12.9% |
| >30 | 188 | 1,654 | 1,842 | 10.2% | 232 | 1,820 | 2,052 | 11.3% |
| Total | 1,818 | 18,263 | 20,081 | 9.1% | 1,990 | 20,083 | 22,073 | 9.0% |

223 PJM added this definition to Manual 38 in February 2017. PJM, "Manual 38: Operations Planning," Rev. 20 (Jan. 22, 2026).

224 "PJM Manual 38: Operations Planning," Rev. 20 (Jan. 22, 2026) p 21. Manual 38 states: "The outages are analyzed for reliability and expected off-costs. Each outage is studied and any constraints (actual or facility/contingency pair) trending toward a limit or exceeding a limit is noted in eDART. The trending or exceeding of a limit in the study is referred to as potential "congestion". The limit may be any or a combination of thermal, voltage, or stability issues. If there is an expected constraint, PJM will mark the corresponding eDART ticket as "congestion expected". The "congestion expected" flag is used to indicate a potential issue that may occur in the Day-Ahead Market or in Real-time Operations. If there are non-cost controlling actions, changes to the generation pattern, or changes to system conditions, the noted congestion may not occur in the Day-Ahead Market or in Real-time Operations. For "On-time" outages, PJM ensures the constraint can be mitigated by applying both non-cost and off-cost operations. If there are no limit exceedances as a result, the outage will be approved. For "Late" outages, PJM will apply only non-cost operations."



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Table 12-91 shows the outage requests summary by received status, congestion status and emergency status. In the 2025/2026 planning period, 28.9 percent of requests were submitted late and were nonemergency while 1.6 percent of requests (348 out of 22,073) were late, nonemergency, and expected to cause congestion. In the 2024/2025 planning period, 28.5 percent of requests were submitted late and were nonemergency while 1.6 percent of requests (325 out of 20,081) were late, nonemergency, and expected to cause congestion.

### Table 12-91 Transmission facility outage requests by received status, emergency and congestion: June 2024 through May 2026

| | | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Received Status | | Congestion Expected | No Congestion Expected | Total | Percent of Total | Congestion Expected | No Congestion Expected | Total | Percent of Total |
| Late | Emergency | 121 | 2,286 | 2,407 | 12.0% | 130 | 2,490 | 2,620 | 11.9% |
| | Non Emergency | 325 | 5,404 | 5,729 | 28.5% | 348 | 6,022 | 6,370 | 28.9% |
| On Time | Emergency | 2 | 25 | 27 | 0.1% | 8 | 42 | 50 | 0.2% |
| | Non Emergency | 1,370 | 10,548 | 11,918 | 59.3% | 1,504 | 11,529 | 13,033 | 59.0% |
| Total | | 1,818 | 18,263 | 20,081 | 100.0% | 1,990 | 20,083 | 22,073 | 100.0% |

Once PJM processes an outage request, the outage request is labelled as Submitted, Received, Denied, Approved, Cancelled by Company, PJM Admin Closure, Revised, Active or Complete according to the processed stage of a request.[225] Table 12-92 shows the detailed process status for outage requests only for the outage requests that are expected to cause congestion. Status Submitted and status Received are in the In Process category and status Cancelled by Company and status PJM Admin Closure are in the Cancelled category in Table 12-92. Table 12-92 shows that of all the outage requests that were expected to cause congestion, 4.1 percent (81 out of 1,990) were denied by PJM in the 2025/2026 planning period, 68.0 percent were complete and 20.6 percent (409 out of 1,990) were cancelled. Of all the outage requests that were expected to cause congestion, 5.2 percent (94 out of 1,818) were denied by PJM in the 2024/2025 planning period, 67.6 percent were complete and 20.5 percent (373 out of 1,818) were cancelled.

### Table 12-92 Transmission facility outage requests by processed status[226]: June 2024 through May 2026

| | | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Received Status | | Cancelled | Complete | In Process | Denied | Congestion Expected | Percent Complete | Cancelled | Complete | In Process | Denied | Congestion Expected | Percent Complete |
| Late | Emergency | 12 | 104 | 3 | 1 | 121 | 86.0% | 10 | 115 | 3 | 2 | 130 | 88.5% |
| | Non Emergency | 63 | 222 | 9 | 28 | 325 | 68.3% | 65 | 246 | 14 | 19 | 348 | 70.7% |
| On Time | Emergency | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 50.0% | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 87.5% |
| | Non Emergency | 297 | 902 | 94 | 65 | 1,370 | 65.8% | 333 | 986 | 118 | 60 | 1,504 | 65.6% |
| Total | | 373 | 1,229 | 106 | 94 | 1,818 | 67.6% | 409 | 1,354 | 135 | 81 | 1,990 | 68.0% |

There are clear rules defined for assigning On Time or Late status for submitted outage requests in both the PJM tariff and PJM manuals.[227] The On Time or Late status affects the way in which PJM addresses the potential to exceed transmission limits. Table 12-92 shows that in the 2025/2026 planning period, 348

225 See PJM Markets & Operations, PJM Tools "Outage Information," <http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/oasis/system-information/outage-info.aspx> (2019).

226 The number of denied transmission outage requests is lower than calculated by PJM the MMU includes only the transmission outage requests with "Denied" as a final status, while PJM included both transmission outage requests with "Denied" as a final status and transmission outage requests with "Denied" as an intermediate status.

227 OA Schedule 1 § 1.9.2.

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nonemergency outage requests were submitted late and expected to cause congestion. The expected impact on congestion and the options for controlling that congestion is the basis for PJM's treatment of late outage requests.

The treatment by PJM and Dominion Virginia Power of the outage for the Lanexa – Dunnsville Line illustrates some of the issues with the current process. The outage was submitted and delayed more than once. It is not clear that PJM's analysis of expected congestion identified or highlighted the magnitude of the economic impact. Dominion Virginia Power did not stage the outage so as to minimize market disruption and congestion. After high congestion costs of Greys Point - Harmony Village constraint and market participant manipulative behavior caused by the outage were identified by the end of January, on February 11, 2022, Dominion decided to temporarily terminate the outage in March in order to work on upgrading Greys Point, Harmony Village and White Stone path. The Greys Point - Harmony Village Line has not been binding since March 14, 2022. It indicates that if the market impact of the outage was identified during PJM outage analysis process and action was taken because of the analysis result, the high congestion costs and manipulative behavior could have been prevented.

## Rescheduling Transmission Facility Outage Requests

A TO can reschedule or cancel an outage after initial submission. Table 12-93 is a summary of all the outage requests planned for the 2024/2025 planning period and the 2025/2026 planning period which were approved and then cancelled or rescheduled by TOs at least once. If an outage request was submitted, approved and subsequently rescheduled at least once, the outage request will be counted as Approved and Rescheduled. If an outage request was submitted, approved and subsequently cancelled at least once, the outage request will be counted as Approved and Cancelled. In the 2025/2026 planning period, 22.1 percent of transmission outage requests were approved by PJM and then rescheduled by the TOs, and 8.2 percent of the transmission outages were approved by PJM and subsequently cancelled by the TOs. In the 2024/2025 planning period, 30.1 percent of transmission outage requests were approved by PJM and then rescheduled by the TOs, and 12.5 percent of the transmission outages were approved by PJM and subsequently cancelled by the TOs.[228]

**Table 12-93 Rescheduled and cancelled transmission outage requests: June 2024 through May 2026**

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration (Days) | Outage Requests | Approved and Rescheduled | Percent Approved and Rescheduled | Approved and Cancelled | Percent Approved and Cancelled | Outage Requests | Approved and Rescheduled | Percent Approved and Rescheduled | Approved and Cancelled | Percent Approved and Cancelled |
| <=5 | 15,091 | 3,073 | 20.4% | 2,154 | 14.3% | 16,669 | 2,518 | 15.1% | 1,528 | 9.2% |
| >5 & <=30 | 3,148 | 1,810 | 57.5% | 260 | 8.3% | 3,352 | 1,312 | 39.1% | 190 | 5.7% |
| >30 | 1,842 | 1,217 | 66.1% | 96 | 5.2% | 2,052 | 1,052 | 51.3% | 83 | 4.0% |
| Total | 20,081 | 6,100 | 30.4% | 2,510 | 12.5% | 22,073 | 4,882 | 22.1% | 1,801 | 8.2% |

If a requested outage is determined to be late and TO reschedules the outage, the outage will be revaluated by PJM again as On Time or Late.

A transmission outage ticket with duration of five days or less with an On Time status can retain its On Time status if the outage is rescheduled within the original scheduled month.[229] This rule allows a TO to reschedule within the same month with very little notice.

228 The number of tickets in each category can change over time. For example, a ticket initially classified as canceled or denied may be resubmitted at a later date for a different date range. Once approved the resubmitted ticket overrides the original ticket dates and details.
229 PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026)


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A transmission outage ticket with a duration exceeding five days with an On Time status can retain its On Time status if the outage is rescheduled to a future month, and the revision is submitted by the first of the month prior to the revised month in which the outage will occur.[230] This rescheduling rule is much less strict than the rule that applies to the first submission of outage requests with similar duration. When first submitted, the outage request with a duration exceeding five days needs to be submitted before the first of the month six months prior to the month in which the outage was expected to occur. The rescheduling rule allows TOs to avoid the timing requirements associated with outages exceeding five days.

The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate all transmission outage tickets as on time or late as if they were new requests when an outage is rescheduled, create options for late requests based on the reasons, and apply the modified rules for late submissions to any such outages. The MMU recommends that PJM create options for treatment of late outages. The current rules apply more stringent rules, based on controlling actions, to late outages without distinguishing among reasons for late outages.

## Long Duration Transmission Facility Outage Requests

PJM rules (Table 12-87) define a transmission outage request as On Time or Late based on the planned outage duration and the time of submission. The rule has stricter submission requirements for transmission outage requests planned for longer than 30 days. In order to avoid the stricter submission requirement, some transmission owners divided the duration of outage requests longer than 30 days into shorter segments for the same equipment and submitted one request for each segment. The MMU recommends that PJM not permit transmission owners to divide long duration outages into smaller segments to avoid complying with the requirements for long duration outages.

More than one outage request can be submitted for the same transmission equipment. In order to accurately present the results, Table 12-94 shows equipment outages by the equipment instead of by outage request.

Table 12-94 shows that there were 13,821 transmission equipment planned outages in the 2025/2026 planning period, of which 1,767 or 12.8 percent were longer than 30 days, and of which 293 or 2.1 percent were scheduled longer than 30 days when the duration of all the outage requests are combined for the same equipment.

**Table 12-94 Transmission equipment outages: June 2024 through May 2026**

| | | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration (Days) | Divided into Shorter Periods | Count of Equipment with Planned Outages | Percent of Total | Count of Equipment with Planned Outages | Percent of Total |
| > 30 | No | 1,589 | 12.3% | 1,767 | 12.8% |
| | Yes | 251 | 1.9% | 293 | 2.1% |
| <= 30 | | 11,043 | 85.7% | 11,761 | 85.1% |
| Total | | 12,883 | 100.0% | 13,821 | 100.0% |

Table 12-95 shows the details of long duration (> 30 days) outages when combining the duration of the outage requests for the same equipment.[231] The actual duration of scheduled outages would be longer than 30 days if the duration of the outage requests was appropriately combined for the same equipment. An effective duration was calculated for each piece of equipment by subtracting the start date of the earliest outage request from the end date of the latest outage request of the equipment. In the 2025/2026 planning period, with an effective duration greater than a month and shorter than two months, there were 29 outages with a combined duration longer than 30 days.[232]

230 *Id.*

231 A transmission facility is modeled as equipment in the EMS model. Equipment has three identifiers: location (B1), voltage level (B2) and equipment name (B3). The types of equipment include, for example, lines, transformers, and capacitors. There can be multiple outage requests associated with the same equipment.

232 The length of a planned equipment outage can be modified by editing an existing ticket for the equipment outage or by adding new equipment outage tickets for the same equipment.

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**Table 12-95 Transmission equipment outages by effective duration: June 2024 through May 2026**

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Effective Duration of Outage | Count of Equipment with Planned Outages | Percent of Total | Count of Equipment with Planned Outages | Percent of Total |
| <=31 | 9 | 3.6% | 5 | 1.7% |
| >31 & <=62 | 33 | 13.1% | 29 | 9.9% |
| >62 & <=93 | 18 | 7.2% | 36 | 12.3% |
| >93 | 191 | 76.1% | 223 | 76.1% |
| Total | 251 | 100.0% | 293 | 100.0% |

## Transmission Facility Outage Analysis for the FTR Market

Transmission facility outages affect the price and quantity outcomes of FTR Auctions. The purpose of the rules governing outage reporting is to ensure that outages are known with enough lead time prior to FTR Auctions so that market participants can understand market conditions and PJM can accurately model market conditions.

There are Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period auctions in the FTR Market. For each type of auction, PJM includes a set of outages to be modeled.

### Annual FTR Market

The Annual FTR Market includes the Annual ARR Allocation and the Annual FTR Auction. When determining transmission outages to be modeled in the simultaneous feasibility test used in the Annual FTR Market, PJM considers all outages with planned duration longer than or equal to two weeks as an initial list. Then PJM exercises significant discretion in selecting outages to be modeled in the final model. PJM posts the final FTR outage list to the FTR web page usually at least one week before the auction bidding opening day.[233]

In the 2025/2026 planning period, 211 outage requests were included in the annual FTR market outage list and 21,862 outage requests were not included.[234] In the 2024/2025 planning period, 436 outage requests were included in the annual FTR market outage list and 19,645 outage requests were not included. Table 12-86, Table 12-97, Table 12-98 and Table 12-99 show the summary information on the modeled outage requests and Table 12-100 and Table 12-101 show the summary information on outages that were not included in the Annual FTR Market.

Table 12-86 shows that 14.7 percent of the outage requests modeled in the Annual FTR Market for the first 10 months of the 2025/2026 planning period had a planned duration of less than two weeks and that 19.0 percent of the outage requests (40 out of 211) modeled in the Annual FTR Market for the planning period were submitted late according to outage submission rules. It also shows that 23.2 percent of the outage requests modeled in the Annual FTR Market for the 2024/2025 planning period had a planned duration of less than two weeks and that 17.9 percent of the outage requests (78 out of 436) modeled in the Annual FTR Market for the planning period were submitted late according to outage submission rules.

233 PJM Financial Transmission Rights, "Annual ARR Allocation and FTR Auction Transmission Outage Modeling," <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/ftr/annual-ftr-auction/2018-2019/2018-2019-annual-outage-modeling.ashx?la=en> (April 5, 2018). There is no documentation on the deadline for when modeling outages should be posted on the PJM website.

234 PJM's treatment of transmission outages in the FTR models is discussed in the *2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June*, Section 13: FTRs and ARRs, Supply and Demand.



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### Table 12-96 Annual FTR market modeled transmission facility outage requests by received status: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration | On Time | Late | Total | Percent of Total | On Time | Late | Total | Percent of Total |
| <2 weeks | 93 | 8 | 101 | 23.2% | 23 | 8 | 31 | 14.7% |
| >=2 weeks & <2 months | 142 | 20 | 162 | 37.2% | 49 | 3 | 52 | 24.6% |
| >=2 months | 123 | 50 | 173 | 39.7% | 99 | 29 | 128 | 60.7% |
| Total | 358 | 78 | 436 | 100.0% | 171 | 40 | 211 | 100.0% |

Table 12-97 shows the annual FTR market modeled outage requests summary by emergency status and received status. Two of the annual FTR market modeled outages expected to occur in the 2025/2026 planning period were emergency outages. Three of the modeled outages expected to occur in the 2024/2025 planning period were emergency outages.

### Table 12-97 Annual FTR market modeled transmission facility outage requests by emergency: June 2024 through May 2026

| | | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Received Status | Planned Duration | Emergency | Non Emergency | Total | Percent Non Emergency | Emergency | Non Emergency | Total | Percent Non Emergency |
| On Time | <2 weeks | 0 | 93 | 93 | 100.0% | 0 | 23 | 23 | 100.0% |
| | >=2 weeks & <2 months | 1 | 141 | 142 | 99.3% | 0 | 49 | 49 | 100.0% |
| | >=2 months | 0 | 123 | 123 | 100.0% | 0 | 99 | 99 | 100.0% |
| | Total | 1 | 357 | 358 | 99.7% | 0 | 171 | 171 | 100.0% |
| Late | <2 weeks | 0 | 8 | 8 | 100.0% | 0 | 8 | 8 | 100.0% |
| | >=2 weeks & <2 months | 0 | 20 | 20 | 100.0% | 0 | 3 | 3 | 100.0% |
| | >=2 months | 3 | 47 | 50 | 94.0% | 2 | 27 | 29 | 93.1% |
| | Total | 3 | 75 | 78 | 96.2% | 2 | 38 | 40 | 95.0% |

PJM determines expected congestion for both On Time and Late outage requests. A Late outage request may be denied or cancelled if it is expected to cause congestion. Table 12-98 shows a summary of requests by expected congestion and received status. Of all the annual FTR market modeled outages expected to occur in the 2025/2026 planning period and submitted late, 17.5 percent (7 out of 40) were expected to cause congestion. Of all the annual FTR market modeled outages expected to occur in the 2024/2025 planning period and submitted late, 20.5 percent (16 out of 78) were expected to cause congestion.

### Table 12-98 Annual FTR market modeled transmission facility outage requests by congestion: June 2024 through May 2026

| | | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Received Status | Planned Duration | Congestion Expected | No Congestion Expected | Total | Percent Congestion Expected | Congestion Expected | No Congestion Expected | Total | Percent Congestion Expected |
| On Time | <2 weeks | 23 | 70 | 93 | 24.7% | 6 | 17 | 23 | 26.1% |
| | >=2 weeks & <2 months | 33 | 109 | 142 | 23.2% | 28 | 21 | 49 | 57.1% |
| | >=2 months | 32 | 91 | 123 | 26.0% | 26 | 73 | 99 | 26.3% |
| | Total | 88 | 270 | 358 | 24.6% | 60 | 111 | 171 | 35.1% |
| Late | <2 weeks | 2 | 6 | 8 | 25.0% | 1 | 7 | 8 | 12.5% |
| | >=2 weeks & <2 months | 4 | 16 | 20 | 20.0% | 1 | 2 | 3 | 33.3% |
| | >=2 months | 10 | 40 | 50 | 20.0% | 5 | 24 | 29 | 17.2% |
| | Total | 16 | 62 | 78 | 20.5% | 7 | 33 | 40 | 17.5% |

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Table 12-99 shows that 13.5 percent of outage requests modeled in the annual FTR market for the 2025/2026 planning period and with a duration of two weeks or longer but shorter than two months were cancelled after the FTR auction was open, compared to 24.1 percent for the 2024/2025 planning period. Table 12-99 also shows that 13.7 percent of outages requests modeled in the Annual FTR Market for the first 10 months of the 2025/2026 planning period and with a duration of two months or longer were cancelled, compared to 19.1 percent for the 2024/2025 planning period.

**Table 12-99 Annual FTR market modeled transmission facility outage requests by processed status: June 2024 through May 2026**

| | | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration | Processed Status | Outage Requests | Percent | Outage Requests | Percent |
| <2 weeks | In Progress | 8 | 7.9% | 1 | 3.2% |
| | Denied | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Approved | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Cancelled | 28 | 27.7% | 11 | 35.5% |
| | Revised | 1 | 1.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Active | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Completed | 63 | 62.4% | 19 | 61.3% |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0% | 31 | 100.0% |
| >=2 weeks & <2 months | In Progress | 25 | 15.4% | 9 | 17.3% |
| | Denied | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.9% |
| | Approved | 2 | 1.2% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Cancelled | 39 | 24.1% | 7 | 13.5% |
| | Revised | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Active | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Completed | 96 | 59.3% | 35 | 67.3% |
| | Total | 162 | 100.0% | 52 | 100.0% |
| >=2 months | In Progress | 24 | 13.9% | 26 | 20.3% |
| | Denied | 1 | 0.6% | 2 | 1.6% |
| | Approved | 1 | 0.6% | 1 | 0.8% |
| | Cancelled | 33 | 19.1% | 19 | 14.8% |
| | Revised | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | Active | 7 | 4.0% | 19 | 14.8% |
| | Completed | 107 | 61.8% | 61 | 47.7% |
| | Total | 173 | 100.0% | 128 | 100.0% |
| **Total Cancelled** | | **100** | **22.9%** | **37** | **17.5%** |
| **Grand Total** | | **436** | | **211** | |

More outage requests were not modeled in the Annual FTR Market than were modeled in the Annual FTR Market. In the 2025/2026 planning period, 211 outage requests were modeled and 21,862 outage requests were not modeled in the Annual FTR Market. In the 2024/2025 planning period, 436 outage requests were modeled and 19,640 outage requests were not modeled in the Annual FTR Market.


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Table 12-100 shows that 18.7 percent of outage requests not modeled in the Annual FTR Auction with duration longer than or equal to two months, labeled On Time according to the rules, were submitted or rescheduled after the Annual FTR Auction bidding opening date in the 2025/2026 planning period, compared to 21.7 percent in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 12-100 Transmission facility outage requests not modeled in Annual FTR Auction: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | On Time | | | Late | | | On Time | | | Late | | |
| Planned Duration | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After |
| <2 weeks | 1,812 | 8,473 | 82.4% | 202 | 6,163 | 96.8% | 2,779 | 8,598 | 75.6% | 1,676 | 5,356 | 76.2% |
| >=2 weeks & <2 months | 663 | 399 | 37.6% | 163 | 862 | 84.1% | 851 | 369 | 30.2% | 377 | 733 | 66.0% |
| >=2 months | 188 | 52 | 21.7% | 252 | 416 | 62.3% | 256 | 59 | 18.7% | 426 | 382 | 47.3% |
| Total | 2,663 | 8,924 | 77.0% | 617 | 7,441 | 92.3% | 3,886 | 9,026 | 69.9% | 2,479 | 6,471 | 72.3% |

Table 12-101 shows that 92.4 percent of late outage requests that were submitted after the Annual FTR Auction bidding opening date, were not modeled in the Annual FTR Auction, and had a duration longer than or equal to two months, were completed in the 2025/2026 planning period. It also shows that 90.6 percent of late outage requests which were not modeled in the Annual FTR Auction with duration longer than or equal to two months and submitted after the Annual FTR Auction bidding opening date were active or completed in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 12-101 Late transmission facility outage requests: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration | Completed Outages | Total | Percent Complete | Completed Outages | Total | Percent Complete |
| <2 weeks | 5,210 | 6,163 | 84.5% | 4,538 | 5,356 | 84.7% |
| >=2 weeks & <2 months | 725 | 862 | 84.1% | 618 | 733 | 84.3% |
| >=2 months | 377 | 416 | 90.6% | 353 | 382 | 92.4% |
| Total | 6,312 | 7,441 | 84.8% | 5,509 | 6,471 | 85.1% |

Although the definition of late outages was developed in order to prevent outages for the planning period being submitted after the opening of bidding in the Annual FTR Auction, the rules have not functioned effectively because the rule has no direct connection to the date on which bidding opens for the Annual FTR Auction. By requiring all long-duration transmission outages to be submitted before February 1, PJM outage submission rules only prevent long-duration transmission outages from being submitted late. The rule does not address the situation in which long-duration transmission outages are submitted on time, but are rescheduled so that they are late. There is no rule to address the situation in which short-duration outages (duration <= 5 days) are submitted on time, but are changed to long-duration transmission outages after the outages are approved and active. The Annual FTR Auction model may consider transmission outages planned for longer than two weeks but less than two months. Those outages not only include long duration outages but also include outages shorter than 30 days. In those cases, PJM outage submission rules failed to prevent those transmission outages from being submitted late. The MMU recommends that PJM create options for late requests based on the reasons, and modify the rules to reduce or eliminate the approval of late outage requests submitted or rescheduled after the FTR auction opening date, based on those options.

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## Monthly FTR Market

When determining transmission outages to be modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction, PJM considers all outages with planned duration longer than five days and may consider outages with planned durations less than or equal to five days. PJM exercises significant discretion in selecting outages to be modeled. PJM posts an FTR outage list to the FTR webpage usually at least one week before the auction bidding opening day.[235] Table 12-102 and Table 12-103 show the summary information on outage requests modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction and Table 12-104 and Table 12-105 show the summary information on outage requests not modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction.

Table 12-102 shows that on average, 28.4 percent of the outage requests modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction were submitted late according to outage submission rules in the first 10 months of the 2025/2026 planning period. On average, 28.8 percent of the outage requests modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction were submitted late according to outage submission rules in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 12-102 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction modeled transmission facility outage requests by received status: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 | | | | 2025/2026 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | On Time | Late | Total | Percent Late | On Time | Late | Total | Percent Late |
| Jun | 272 | 134 | 406 | 33.0% | 296 | 126 | 422 | 29.9% |
| Jul | 154 | 100 | 254 | 39.4% | 183 | 116 | 299 | 38.8% |
| Aug | 211 | 101 | 312 | 32.4% | 201 | 107 | 308 | 34.7% |
| Sep | 488 | 175 | 663 | 26.4% | 527 | 151 | 678 | 22.3% |
| Oct | 542 | 190 | 732 | 26.0% | 673 | 198 | 871 | 22.7% |
| Nov | 511 | 197 | 708 | 27.8% | 515 | 188 | 703 | 26.7% |
| Dec | 359 | 127 | 486 | 26.1% | 445 | 158 | 603 | 26.2% |
| Jan | 239 | 80 | 319 | 25.1% | 252 | 99 | 351 | 28.2% |
| Feb | 275 | 103 | 378 | 27.2% | 315 | 126 | 441 | 28.6% |
| Mar | 477 | 144 | 621 | 23.2% | 527 | 183 | 710 | 25.8% |
| Apr | 386 | 129 | 515 | 25.0% | 579 | 200 | 779 | 25.7% |
| May | 303 | 127 | 430 | 29.5% | 530 | 219 | 749 | 29.2% |
| Average | 351 | 134 | 485 | 28.4% | 406 | 149 | 576 | 28.2% |

235 PJM Financial Transmission Rights, "2015/2016 Monthly FTR Auction Transmission Outage Modeling," <http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/ftr/ftr-allocation/monthly-ftr-auctions/2015-2016-monthly-transmission-outages-that-may-cause-infeasibilities.ashx?la=en> (December 9, 2015).



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Table 12-103 shows that on average, 17.6 percent of outage requests modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction were cancelled in the 2025/2026 planning period. On average, 20.1 percent of outage requests modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction were cancelled in the 2024/2025 planning period.

**Table 12-103 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction modeled transmission facility outage requests by processed status: June 2024 through May 2026**

| Planning Year | Month | In Process | Denied | Approved | Cancelled | Revised | Active | Complete | Total | Percent Cancelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024/2025 | Jun | 28 | 13 | 16 | 93 | 0 | 90 | 166 | 406 | 22.9% |
| | Jul | 22 | 8 | 15 | 41 | 0 | 97 | 71 | 254 | 16.1% |
| | Aug | 18 | 16 | 10 | 68 | 0 | 81 | 119 | 312 | 21.8% |
| | Sep | 70 | 7 | 30 | 111 | 0 | 192 | 253 | 663 | 16.7% |
| | Oct | 60 | 1 | 19 | 174 | 2 | 209 | 267 | 732 | 23.8% |
| | Nov | 63 | 5 | 23 | 124 | 0 | 185 | 308 | 708 | 17.5% |
| | Dec | 40 | 16 | 8 | 101 | 0 | 101 | 220 | 486 | 20.8% |
| | Jan | 41 | 9 | 9 | 67 | 0 | 110 | 83 | 319 | 21.0% |
| | Feb | 27 | 6 | 11 | 79 | 0 | 116 | 139 | 378 | 20.9% |
| | Mar | 62 | 5 | 19 | 138 | 1 | 163 | 233 | 621 | 22.2% |
| | Apr | 47 | 5 | 11 | 99 | 0 | 171 | 182 | 515 | 19.2% |
| | May | 29 | 3 | 9 | 82 | 0 | 109 | 198 | 430 | 19.1% |
| | Average | 42 | 8 | 15 | 98 | 0 | 135 | 187 | 485 | 20.2% |
| 2025/2026 | Jun | 50 | 20 | 15 | 72 | 0 | 91 | 174 | 422 | 17.1% |
| | Jul | 29 | 17 | 10 | 52 | 0 | 97 | 94 | 299 | 17.4% |
| | Aug | 39 | 9 | 8 | 49 | 0 | 84 | 119 | 308 | 15.9% |
| | Sep | 73 | 6 | 25 | 128 | 1 | 204 | 241 | 678 | 18.9% |
| | Oct | 91 | 3 | 32 | 177 | 1 | 233 | 334 | 871 | 20.3% |
| | Nov | 59 | 10 | 16 | 126 | 0 | 186 | 306 | 703 | 17.9% |
| | Dec | 58 | 15 | 8 | 128 | 0 | 99 | 295 | 603 | 21.2% |
| | Jan | 57 | 34 | 14 | 57 | 4 | 85 | 100 | 351 | 16.2% |
| | Feb | 85 | 2 | 21 | 65 | 0 | 125 | 143 | 441 | 14.7% |
| | Mar | 82 | 7 | 31 | 155 | 0 | 183 | 252 | 710 | 21.8% |
| | Apr | 76 | 8 | 19 | 193 | 0 | 206 | 277 | 779 | 24.8% |
| | May | 74 | 24 | 22 | 161 | 2 | 166 | 300 | 749 | 21.5% |
| | Average | 48 | 13 | 15 | 75 | 0 | 119 | 157 | 427 | 17.6% |

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Table 12-104 shows that on average, 10.1 percent of outage requests not modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction, labeled On Time according to the rules, were submitted after the monthly FTR auction bidding opening dates in the 2025/2026 planning period, compared to 15.0 percent in the 2024/2025 planning period. On average, 45.5 percent of outage requests not modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction, labeled Late according to the rules, were submitted after the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction bidding opening dates in the 2025/2026 planning period, compared to 59.7 percent in the 2024/2025 planning period.

**Table 12-104 Transmission facility outage requests not modeled in Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction: June 2024 through May 2026**

| | 2024/2025 | | | | | | 2025/2026 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | On Time | | | Late | | | On Time | | | Late | | |
| | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After | Before Bidding Opening Date | After Bidding Opening Date | Percent After |
| Jun | 452 | 383 | 45.9% | 166 | 776 | 82.4% | 463 | 380 | 45.1% | 204 | 952 | 82.4% |
| Jul | 306 | 284 | 48.1% | 123 | 722 | 85.4% | 323 | 268 | 45.3% | 147 | 849 | 85.2% |
| Aug | 319 | 241 | 43.0% | 129 | 649 | 83.4% | 302 | 243 | 44.6% | 148 | 832 | 84.9% |
| Sep | 687 | 401 | 36.9% | 154 | 711 | 82.2% | 713 | 422 | 37.2% | 176 | 826 | 82.4% |
| Oct | 760 | 484 | 38.9% | 175 | 970 | 84.7% | 728 | 453 | 38.4% | 189 | 981 | 83.8% |
| Nov | 464 | 334 | 41.9% | 198 | 775 | 79.7% | 551 | 360 | 39.5% | 211 | 889 | 80.8% |
| Dec | 378 | 341 | 47.4% | 181 | 734 | 80.2% | 417 | 354 | 45.9% | 189 | 784 | 80.6% |
| Jan | 385 | 470 | 55.0% | 167 | 822 | 83.1% | 1,132 | 392 | 25.7% | 1,021 | 767 | 42.9% |
| Feb | 406 | 321 | 44.2% | 191 | 749 | 79.7% | 443 | 443 | 50.0% | 177 | 949 | 84.3% |
| Mar | 838 | 523 | 38.4% | 182 | 1,050 | 85.2% | 999 | 656 | 39.6% | 455 | 752 | 62.3% |
| Apr | 971 | 611 | 38.6% | 247 | 1,016 | 80.4% | 1,042 | 644 | 38.2% | 558 | 691 | 55.3% |
| May | 838 | 610 | 42.1% | 277 | 1,048 | 79.1% | 894 | 552 | 38.2% | 647 | 673 | 51.0% |
| Average | 567 | 417 | 43.4% | 183 | 835 | 82.1% | 667 | 431 | 40.6% | 344 | 829 | 73.0% |


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Table 12-105 shows that on average, 61.3 percent of late outage requests which were not modeled in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction, submitted after the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction bidding opening dates, were approved and completed in the 2025/2026 planning period, compared to 67.0 percent in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 12-105 Late transmission facility outage requests: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 | | | 2025/2026 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Completed Outages | Total | Percent Complete | Completed Outages | Total | Percent Complete |
| Jun | 459 | 776 | 59.1% | 560 | 952 | 58.8% |
| Jul | 436 | 722 | 60.4% | 475 | 849 | 55.9% |
| Aug | 408 | 649 | 62.9% | 540 | 832 | 64.9% |
| Sep | 402 | 711 | 56.5% | 444 | 826 | 53.8% |
| Oct | 542 | 970 | 55.9% | 531 | 981 | 54.1% |
| Nov | 445 | 775 | 57.4% | 563 | 889 | 63.3% |
| Dec | 416 | 734 | 56.7% | 450 | 784 | 57.4% |
| Jan | 403 | 822 | 49.0% | 342 | 767 | 44.6% |
| Feb | 405 | 749 | 54.1% | 605 | 949 | 63.8% |
| Mar | 579 | 1,050 | 55.1% | 359 | 752 | 47.7% |
| Apr | 550 | 1,016 | 54.1% | 306 | 691 | 44.3% |
| May | 655 | 1,048 | 62.5% | 332 | 673 | 49.3% |
| Average | 475 | 835 | 57.0% | 459 | 829 | 54.8% |

Table 12-105 shows that only 1.0 percent of all outage requests were modeled in the Annual FTR Auction in the 2025/2026 planning period, and 2.2 percent were modeled in the 2024/2025 planning period. For Monthly FTR Auctions in the 2025/2026 planning period, an average of 14.6 percent of all outage requests were modeled, and 25.7 percent were modeled in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 12-106 FTR market modeled transmission facility outage requests: June 2024 through May 2026

| | 2024/2025 (12 months) | | | 2025/2026 (12 months) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planned Duration | Annual Modeled | Monthly Modeled | Total | Annual Modeled | Monthly Modeled | Total |
| <2 weeks | 101 | 3,220 | 3,321 | 31 | 1,995 | 2,026 |
| >=2 weeks & <2 months | 162 | 1,305 | 1,467 | 52 | 789 | 841 |
| >=2 months | 173 | 644 | 817 | 128 | 447 | 575 |
| Total | 436 | 5,169 | 5,605 | 211 | 3,231 | 3,442 |
| All outage requests | | | 20,081 | | | 22,073 |
| Percent of Modeled | 2.2% | 25.7% | 27.9% | 1.0% | 14.6% | 15.6% |

## Transmission Facility Outage Analysis in the Day-Ahead Energy Market

Transmission facility outages also affect the energy market. Just as with the FTR market, it is critical that outages that affect the operating day are known prior to the submission of offers in the day-ahead energy market so that market participants can understand market conditions and PJM can accurately model market conditions in the day-ahead market. PJM requires transmission owners to submit changes to outages scheduled for the next two days no later than 09:30 am. [236]

There are three relevant time periods for the analysis of the impact of transmission outages on the energy market: before the day-ahead market is closed; when the day-ahead market save cases are created; and during the operating day. The list of approved or active outage requests before the day-ahead market is closed is available to market participants in eDART. The day-ahead market model uses outages included in the day-ahead market save cases as an input. The outages that actually occurred during the operating day

236 PJM, "Manual 3: Transmission Operations," Rev. 71 (May 20, 2026).

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are the outages that affect the real-time market. If the three sets of outages are the same, there is no potential impact on markets. If the three sets of outages differ, there is a potential negative impact on markets. For example, if the list of outages before the day-ahead market was closed was different from the list of outages that included in the day-ahead market save cases, the day-ahead market participant would have inconsistent outage information as what day-ahead market model used.

For example for the operating day of June 30, 2025, Figure 12-7 shows that: there were 278 approved or active outages seen by market participants before the day-ahead market was closed; there were 363 outage requests included in the day-ahead market model; there were 344 outage requests included in both sets of outages; there were 85 outage requests approved or active before the day-ahead market was closed but not included as inputs in day-ahead market model; and there were 65 outage requests included in day-ahead market model but not available to market participants prior to the day-ahead market.

### Figure 12-7 Illustration of day-ahead market analysis: June 30, 2025





Figure 12-8 compares the weekly average number of active or approved outages available to market participants prior to the close of the day-ahead market with the outages included as inputs to the day-ahead market by PJM.[237] Figure 12-8 shows that the number of outages modeled in the day-ahead market during the spring and fall has increased since 2021 (blue line), but many of these outages were not visible to market participants (gray line).

### Figure 12-8 Approved or active outage requests: January 2015 through May 2026





Figure 12-9 compares the weekly average number of outages included in the day-ahead market with the outages that actually occurred during the operating day. Figure 12-9 shows that beginning in 2021, the weekly average number of outages included in the day-ahead market (dark blue line) was higher in the spring and fall than previous years, but many of these outages

237 The analysis and figures in this report (Figure 12-8, Figure 12-9, and Figure 12-10) are based on a revised method (relative to the method used in prior State of the Market Reports) that correctly accounts for outages that did not, at the time the outage was active, have an end date specified on the outage ticket.



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did not actually occur in the real-time market (gray line). For example, some outages were scheduled to occur in day-ahead based on the information provided in eDART, but were cancelled or rescheduled in real time due to weather, equipment availability, reliability concerns, or the discretion of the transmission owner.

### Figure 12-9 Day-ahead market model outages: January 2015 through May 2026





Figure 12-10 compares the weekly average number of active or approved outages for which information was visible to market participants through eDART prior to the close of the day-ahead market with the outages that actually occurred in the real-time market during the operating day. Figure 12-10 shows the number of outages visible to market participants in eDART, but not actually occurring in the real-time market, varies from less than 10 to over 100 in any given week.

### Figure 12-10 Approved or active outage requests: January 2015 through May 2026





Figure 12-8, Figure 12-9, and Figure 12-10 show that on a weekly average basis, for the full years 2023, 2024, 2025, and the first six months of 2026, the active or approved outages for which information was visible to day-ahead market participants, the outages included as inputs in the day-ahead market model and the outages that actually occurred in real time are not consistent.

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# 13 Financial Transmission and Auction Revenue Rights

In an LMP market, the lowest cost generation is dispatched to meet the load, but when there are transmission constraints, load pays the high local price for all generation, including the low cost generation serving part of that load. The low cost generation receives payment only for its low local price and does not receive the payment made by load for the output of the low cost generation at the high local price. The result is that load pays the correct local price but pays too much in total for energy because it is paying more for the low cost generation than the low cost generation receives. Load pays the difference between the high local price and the low local price of the low cost generation. That payment is appropriately not made to the low cost generation which is paid its LMP. In an LMP market, load pays more than generation receives. FTRs are the mechanism for returning those excess payments to load. But the current FTR mechanism in PJM does not and cannot return all the excess payments to load. The FTR mechanism in PJM needs a significant redesign in order to achieve that objective. The FTR mechanism has become unduly complicated and has deviated significantly from its original purpose. Return of all the excess payments to load would result in a perfect hedge against congestion. The current FTR mechanism has significantly attenuated the value of the FTR/ARR design as a hedge against congestion for load.

The FTR mechanism should be a simple accounting method for assigning congestion rights to load. But PJM has added increasingly complex rules and regularly intervenes in the FTR mechanism as the PJM FTR design has moved further and further from these economic fundamentals. Some market participants have profited in various ways from these design flaws and those market participants now strongly defend the current design in the PJM stakeholder process and at FERC. The customers who ultimately pay congestion are generally not aware of the current, flawed FTR design and do not understand the extent to which the current design fails to offset their congestion payments compared to a fundamentally correct FTR design that would return congestion to load.

When the lowest cost generation is remote from load centers, the physical transmission system permits that lowest cost generation to be delivered to load, subject to transmission limits. This was true prior to the introduction of LMP markets and continues to be true in LMP markets.

After the introduction of LMP markets in PJM, financial transmission rights (FTRs) were introduced, effective April 1, 1999, for the real-time market and June 1, 2000, for the combined day-ahead and real-time (balancing) markets. FTRs permitted the loads, which pay for the transmission system, to continue to receive the economic benefits of access to either local or remote low cost generation by returning congestion to the load.[1] FTRs and the associated congestion revenues were directly provided to load in recognition of the fact that, as a result of LMP, load was required to pay more for low cost generation than is paid to low cost generation. But there was a flaw built in from the very beginning of the PJM FTR design that had no significant impact initially but which was ultimately the source of all the issues with the FTR mechanism. That flaw was the idea that congestion was based on contract paths in a network system rather than a result of the actual operation of the complex network. Prior to the introduction of LMP markets, payment for the delivery of low cost generation to load was based both on intrazonal generation and intrazonal transmission, both under cost of service rates, and on contracts with specific remote generation outside the local zone and the associated point to point transmission contracts. Most load was served by intrazonal generation. In both cases, customers paid for the physical rights associated with the transmission system used to provide for the delivery of low cost generation to load. There was no congestion revenue because customers paid only the actual cost of the low cost generation. The flawed idea that congestion is based on contract paths was inconsistent with the most basic logic of LMP and the resultant fissure has continued to widen. FTRs were a core part of the LMP design. FTRs ensured that the introduction of locational marginal pricing would not result in overpayments by load. The origin of FTRs was the recognition that the way to hold load harmless from making the excess payments created by the LMP system was to return the excess payments to load. The rights to congestion belong to load. If implemented

1 See 81 FERC ¶ 61,257 at 62,241 (1997).

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correctly, FTRs would be the financial equivalent of firm transmission service for load. If implemented correctly, FTRs would be a perfect hedge against congestion for load. The result of the current FTR mechanism is a significant reduction in the value of FTRs as a hedge for load. The current FTR mechanism results in significant wealth transfers from the load that pays congestion to traders of FTRs and traders of virtuals. The current FTR mechanism results in uneven and arbitrary differences in the share of congestion returned to load, depending on location and PJM's assignment of ARRs.

The notion that FTRs exist in order to provide a hedge for generation is a fallacy. In an LMP system, the basic incentive structure for generation derives from the fact that generation is paid the LMP at the generator bus. If generation were to be guaranteed a price at a distant constrained load bus rather than at the generation bus, there would be no incentive for generation to locate where it is needed on the system. In addition, the payment of the price at the generator bus is fundamental to the logic of locational marginal pricing which produces local prices equal to the marginal value of generation at every point. There is no logical or theoretical basis in locational marginal pricing for the assertion that generation at low price nodes is underpaid and should be paid more from congestion dollars. Generation does not pay congestion. Some generation receives a price lower than the system marginal price (SMP) and some generation receives a price greater than SMP, but that does not mean that generation is paying congestion. It means that generation is being paid an LMP that is higher or lower than the system load-weighted average LMP. If a generating unit wants a hedge, it may enter into an arm's length transaction with a willing counter party as a hedge. That is the way hedges work in markets. That is not the purpose of FTRs.

In an LMP system, the only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to use FTRs, or an equivalent mechanism, to pay back to load the difference between the total load payments and the total generation revenues. FTRs are a core theoretical part of the LMP design and were included in the PJM market design to offset the congestion costs that load pays in an LMP market. Congestion revenues are the source of the funds to pay FTRs. Congestion revenues should be assigned to the load that paid them through FTRs.[2] The only way to ensure that load receives the benefits associated with the use of the transmission system to deliver low cost energy is to ensure that all congestion revenues are returned to load or, more precisely, that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. In order to do that, congestion payments must be defined correctly based on the way that power actually flows in the PJM network and not based on arbitrary contract paths.

Effective April 1, 1999, when FTRs were introduced with the LMP market, there was a real-time market but no day-ahead market, and FTRs returned real-time congestion revenue to load. Effective June 1, 2000, the day-ahead market was introduced and FTRs returned total congestion including day-ahead and real-time (balancing) congestion to load.[3] Congestion is the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. Effective June 1, 2003, PJM replaced the direct allocation of FTRs to load with an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs). Under the ARR design, the load still owns the rights to congestion revenue, but the ARR design allows load to either claim the FTRs directly (through a process called self scheduling), or to sell the rights to congestion revenue in the FTR auction in exchange for a revenue stream based on the auction clearing prices of the FTRs. Under the ARR design, the right to all congestion revenues should belong to load and load should have the ability to retain or sell the congestion revenue rights on terms that load defines and accepts. The actual ARR implementation produces a very different result and fails to assign all congestion revenue rights to load.

ARRs were an add on concept, defined based on a misunderstanding of FTRs, which had its roots in the assignment of congestion to load using contract paths (generation to load paths) rather than on the calculation of congestion actually paid. Contract paths are a fiction in a network. ARRs used assumed contract paths to assign congestion to load. The use of contract paths for ARRs was a more critical mistake than using contract paths for FTRs because contract paths did not, do not, and cannot account for all congestion. The use of contract paths led to the mistaken conclusion that there was some excess congestion that did not belong to load and could be sold to FTR buyers. The

2 See *id.* at 62, 259–62,260 & n. 123.

3 PJM refers to the combination of the day-ahead and real-time (balancing) markets as a two settlement system.



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ARR concept, as it is currently implemented, does not allow the FTR sellers, load, to establish a price at which they are willing to sell, but forces load to accept whatever prices buyers are willing to pay. The revenue from the sale of congestion rights is not even paid in full to ARR holders. Sellers are required to return some of the cleared auction revenue to FTR buyers when FTR payments are less than target allocations. So called surplus revenue is paid to FTR holders to ensure payment, despite the fact that willing FTR buyers paid the revenues in the auction for the rights to an uncertain level of congestion.

The use of generation to load contract paths, rather than the direct calculation of congestion, led to an increased divergence between FTR target allocations on the generation to load contract paths and actual total congestion. This divergence between actual network use and historic contract paths was exacerbated as new zones were added with their own historic generation to load contract paths and as significant numbers of generating units retired and new units were added.[4] Rather than understanding that the divergence resulted from the fact that a contract path based approach did not correctly calculate congestion in a network system, especially as the system grew significantly, the issue was characterized as the existence of excess capacity on the transmission system. But congestion was never about capacity on the transmission system. Prior to the introduction of ARRs, the so called excess congestion that exceeded the congestion on the defined contract paths was returned to load, regardless of its source. There is no such thing as excess congestion. Congestion is congestion. In a well designed LMP/FTR system, all congestion is returned to load, neither more nor less. The overlay of ARRs on the FTR concept did not change the fundamental logic of congestion, but permitted the introduction of a system in which the divergence was formally created between the amount of congestion paid by load and the amount of congestion returned to load. Congestion belongs to the load, by definition. The introduction of ARRs based on the contract path fiction undermined the assignment of all congestion rights to load.

FTR revenue adequacy, like surplus congestion revenue, is a misnomer. FTR revenue adequacy, as defined in PJM rules, is an artifact of the flawed design of the current approach to FTR/ARRs. If FTRs only returned congestion to FTR holders, there could be no such thing as revenue inadequacy. As currently defined in PJM, FTR revenue adequacy simply compares day-ahead congestion revenues to FTR target allocations. (Target allocations are the day-ahead CLMP differences, shadow prices, between the source and sink of the FTR times the MW of the FTR.) There is no reason to expect congestion revenues to equal FTR target allocations under the path based approach. There are systematic differences between FTR target allocations and actual congestion in aggregate and on a path by path basis. Revenue adequacy is not a benchmark for how well the FTR process is working. Target allocations are not congestion. FTR revenue adequacy is not equivalent to the adequacy of ARRs as an offset for load against total congestion. A path specific target allocation is not a guarantee of payment. Yet PJM treats target allocations as a guarantee of payment and takes what is termed surplus auction revenue from ARR holders (load) and gives it to FTR holders when day-ahead congestion revenues are not enough to cover all FTR target allocations.

The contract path fiction is also the source of the incorrect definition of the product that is bought and sold as FTRs, the available supply of the product and the price paid to the buyers of the product. The FTR product is defined as the difference in congestion prices in the day-ahead market only, across specific transmission contract paths (the shadow price), multiplied by the FTR MW position on those paths. That is the definition of FTR target allocation. The difference in congestion prices across contract paths is not congestion and is not equal to congestion revenues when multiplied by the FTR MW position. The MW quantity of the product made available for sale in the FTR auctions is defined as system capability, meaning the capacity of the transmission system to deliver power. But system capability is not actual market flows and system capability is not congestion and system capability is not the difference in congestion prices across transmission contract paths nor the potential for such difference. Congestion is defined as the difference in congestion prices across a path multiplied by the market flow on that path, recognizing both day-ahead and balancing market results. That is the measure of the amount load pays in

4 For a comprehensive report on capacity retirements and capacity additions in PJM, see: "2020 PJM Generation Capacity and Funding Sources: 2007/2008 through 2021/2022," (September 15, 2020) available at <http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/Constraint_Based_Congestion_Calculations_20200722.pdf>.

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excess of what generation receives. The definition of ARRs based on contract paths led to the mistaken idea that some transmission system capacity was used by ARRs but some was not and that both the ARR capability and the excess capability was available for sale as FTRs. This fundamental confusion in the design of the market is the source of so called revenue shortfalls, of the redesign of the market to exclude balancing congestion, and of the need for PJM to intervene in the market. PJM has had to regularly intervene in the market because the market as designed cannot reach equilibrium based on the economic fundamentals. The product, the quantity of the product, and the price of the product are all incorrectly defined.

The ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient mechanism for returning congestion to load as a result of an FTR design that was flawed from its introduction and as a result of various distortions added to the design since its introduction. The distortions include the definition of target allocations based on day-ahead price differences only, the fact that ARR holders cannot set the sale price for the congestion revenue rights they own, the return of market revenues to FTR buyers when profit targets are not met, the failure to assign all FTR auction revenues to ARR holders, the differences between modeled and actual system capability, the definition and allocation of surplus, and the numerous cross subsidies among participants. The fundamental distortion was the assignment of the rights to congestion revenue based on specific generation to load transmission contract paths. This approach retained the contract path based view of how load is served that is fundamentally inconsistent with the way load is actually served in a network system and therefore inconsistent with the role of FTRs in a nodal, network system with locational marginal pricing.

For the 2025/2026 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 55.7 percent of total congestion. The cumulative offset of congestion by ARRs and self scheduled FTRs for the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period, using the rules effective for each planning period, was only 65.7 percent. Only 65.7 percent of congestion revenue was returned to load over this period. Load was underpaid by $2.2 billion in the 2025/2026 planning period, an increase from the $0.9 billion underpayment in the 2024/2025 planning period. This is the largest underpayment that load has experienced in a single planning period. Load was underpaid by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period.

The overall underassignment of congestion to load includes dramatically different results by zone. Load in some zones receives congestion revenues well in excess of the congestion they pay while the reverse is true for other zones.

If the original PJM FTR approach had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without use of the generation to load contract paths, and if the distortions subsequently introduced into the FTR design had not been added, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design and complex redesigns would have been avoided. PJM would not have had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy. The design should simply have provided for the return of all congestion revenues to load. The design should have also provided for the ability of load to sell the rights to congestion revenue. That sale could be organized as an FTR auction with the product and the price clearly defined. Now is a good time to address the issues of the FTR design and to return the design to its original purpose. This would eliminate much of the complexity associated with ARRs and FTRs and eliminate unnecessary controversy about the appropriate recipients of congestion revenues.

The *2026 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June* focuses on the 2025/2026 planning period as well as the 2025/2028 Long Term auction, the 2025/2026 Annual FTR auction and the 2025/2026 ARR allocation, specifically covering June 1, 2025, through June 30, 2026. The Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) analyzed measures of market structure, participant conduct and market performance, including market size, concentration, offer behavior, and price. The MMU concludes that the PJM FTR auction market results were partially competitive in the first six months of 2026. [5]

5 The MMU identified missing and erroneous distribution factors and shadow prices, primarily within the pricing run. The calculation of generator sensitivity factors requires accurate distribution factors and shadow prices. Where available, the MMU used distribution factors



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Table 13-1 The FTR/ARR markets results were partially competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---|---|---|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Partially Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Partially Competitive | Flawed |

- Market structure was evaluated as competitive. The ownership of FTR obligations is unconcentrated for the individual years of the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction and each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for prevailing flow FTRs. The ownership of FTR obligations is unconcentrated or moderately concentrated for each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for counter flow FTRs. The ownership of FTR options is moderately or highly concentrated for every Monthly FTR Auction period and unconcentrated for the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. Ownership of current FTRs is disproportionately (89.2 percent) by financial participants. The ownership of ARRs is unconcentrated.
- Participant behavior was evaluated as partially competitive because ARR holders who are the sellers of FTRs have no option to set an acceptable sale price and are not permitted to participate in the market clearing in any way and are not assured they will receive 100 percent of auction revenues.
- Market performance was evaluated as partially competitive because of the significant and persistent flaws in the market design. Sellers, the ARR holders, cannot set a sale price. Buyers can reclaim some of their purchase price after the market clears if the product does not meet a profitability target. The market resulted in a substantial shortfall in congestion payments to load and significant and unsupportable disparities among zones in the share of congestion returned to load. FTR purchases by financial entities remain persistently profitable in part as a result of the flaws in the market design.
- Market design was evaluated as flawed because there are significant, fundamental and persistent flaws in the basic ARR/FTR design. The FTR auction market is not actually a market because the sellers have no independent role in the process. ARR holders cannot determine the price at which they are willing to sell rights to congestion revenue. Buyers have the ability to reclaim some of the price paid for FTRs after the market clears and, as a result, sellers are not assured they will receive 100 percent of auction revenues. The market design is not an efficient or effective way to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. The product sold to FTR buyers is incorrectly defined as target allocations rather than a share of congestion revenue. ARR holders' rights to congestion revenues are not correctly defined because the contract path based assignment of congestion rights is inadequate and incorrect. The ongoing PJM subjective intervention in the FTR market that affects market fundamentals is also an issue and a symptom of the fundamental flaws in the design. The product, the quantity of the product and the price of the product are all incorrectly defined.
- The fact that load is not able to define its willingness to sell FTRs or to set the prices at which it is willing to sell FTRs and the fact that load is required to return some of the cleared auction revenue to FTR buyers when FTR profits are deemed to be not adequate, means that the FTR design does not actually function as a market and is evidence of basic flaws in the market design.

from the dispatch run. The MMU also calculated missing shadow prices for the relevant transmission constraints when feasible. This approach reduced the impact of the errors to 0.2 percent of all FTR target allocations within the affected month. Figures and Tables that are affected by this error are indicated with a footnote.

# Overview

## Auction Revenue Rights

### Market Design

- **ARR Target Allocations.** The value of ARRs is defined by the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction and Monthly FTR Auctions, times the MW of the ARR. ARR target allocations are the minimum value of an ARR. If any ARRs are deficient at the end of the planning period, deficient ARR holders will receive an uplift payment that will charged to FTR holders. If FTRs are fully funded at the end of the planning period, ARR holders will receive all surplus congestion revenues, proportional to ARR target allocations.

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## Market Structure

- **ARR Ownership.** In the 2026/2027 planning period, ARRs were allocated to 1,626 individual participants, held by 131 parent companies, up from 1,560 individual parents, held by 130 parent companies in the 2025/2026 planning period. ARR ownership for the 2026/2027 planning period was unconcentrated with an HHI of 590, down from 600 for the 2025/2026 planning period.

## Market Behavior

- **Self Scheduled FTRs.** For the 2026/2027 planning period, 26.5 percent of eligible ARRs were self scheduled as FTRs, up from 25.9 percent for the 2025/2026 planning period.

## Market Performance

- **ARRs as an Offset to Congestion.** ARRs have not served as an effective mechanism to return all congestion revenues to load. For the 2025/2026 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 55.7 percent of total congestion. Congestion payments by load in some zones were more than offset and congestion payments in other zones were less than offset. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was only 65.7 percent of total congestion. If ARR holders had self scheduled all of their allocated ARRs as FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period, the self scheduled FTR target allocations would have increased the offset from 55.7 percent to 83.6 percent of total congestion.
- **ARR Payments.** For the 2025/2026 planning period, the ARR target allocations, which are defined by the nodal price differences from the Annual FTR Auction and Monthly FTR Auctions times the MW of the ARR, were $1,885.5 million, while PJM collected $2,158.1 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. For the 2024/2025 planning period, the ARR target allocations were $1,448.1 million while PJM collected $1,664.9 million from the combined Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.
- **ARR Revenue.** For the 2025/2026 planning period there was enough total day-ahead congestion to pay FTR target allocations. However, as a result of the monthly settlement logic for FTRs and ARRs, $117.7 million of FTR auction revenue over ARR target allocations was transferred from ARR holders (load) to FTR holders in individual months. In the 2024/2025 planning period all $196.2 million of FTR auction revenue over ARR target allocations was transferred from ARR holders to FTR holders. Although PJM refers to this as a surplus, there is no such thing as surplus FTR Auction revenue based on market logic. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason.
- **Residual ARRs.** Residual ARRs are only available on contract paths prorated in Stage 1 of the annual ARR allocation, are only effective for single, whole months and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR clearing prices are based on monthly FTR auction clearing prices. Residual ARRs with negative target allocations are not allocated to participants. Instead, they are removed and the model is rerun.

  In the 2025/2026 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 27,865.4 MW of residual ARRs, down 8,232.2 MW (a 22.8 percent decrease) from 36,097.6 MW, with a total target allocation of $81.7 million, up $55.4 million (a 210.6 percent increase) from $26.3 million in the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **ARR Deficiency.** In July 2025, there was not enough FTR auction revenue collected from the monthly FTR auction to pay the high target allocations from Residual ARRs. As a result, July ARR funding was deficient for the first time since ARRs were introduced. The congestion revenues at the end of the 2025/2026 were sufficient to fund FTR target allocations and to fund the July ARR deficiency.
- **ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching.** There were 34,066 MW of ARRs associated with $3.6 million of revenue that were reassigned for the 2025/2026 planning period. There were 32,594 MW of ARRs associated


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with $1.2 million of revenue that were reassigned in the 2024/2025 planning period.

# Financial Transmission Rights

## Market Design

- **FTR Target Allocations.** The value of FTRs is defined in the PJM market rules as the day-ahead CLMP difference between the source and sink of the FTR times the MW of the FTR. FTR Target allocations are the maximum value of an FTR. If the FTR target allocations are greater than the congestion revenue paid in the planning period, payments to all FTRs are prorated, proportional to FTR target allocations. This would not be possible if the value of FTRs were defined logically and consistent with the LMP market design.
- **Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.** The design of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions includes auctions for each remaining month in the planning period.

## Market Structure

- **Patterns of Ownership.**[6] For the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, financial entities purchased 96.6 of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 95.5 percent of prevailing flow and 97.9 percent of counter flow FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period. Financial entities owned 89.2 percent of all prevailing and counter flow FTRs, including 83.0 percent of all prevailing flow FTRs and 96.0 percent of all counter flow FTRs during the 2025/2026 planning period. Self scheduled FTRs account for 3.4 percent of all FTRs held.
- **Market Concentration.** In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period, ownership of cleared prevailing flow bids was unconcentrated in all periods. Ownership of cleared counter flow bids was unconcentrated in 69.2 percent of periods and moderately concentrated in 30.8 percent of periods.

6 Beginning in the *2025 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March,* the MMU categorizes all participants owning FTRs in PJM as either physical or financial at an account level. In prior reports, participants were categorized as either physical or financial at an organization level.

## Market Behavior

- **Sell Offers.** In a given auction, market participants can sell FTRs acquired in preceding auctions or preceding rounds of auctions. In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 2,354,507 MW, up 51.2 percent from 1,557,455 in the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 2,031,149 MW, up 19.8 percent from 1,695,004 for the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 66,529,876 MW, up 45.0 percent from 45,897,764 for the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **Buy Bids.** In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR buy bids were 7,319,380 MW, up 8.8 percent from 6,729,600 MW in the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction, total participant FTR buy and self scheduled bids were 4,385,836 MW, down 34.1 percent from 6,658,483 MW in the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period, total participant FTR buy bids were 89,547,538 MW, up 22.7 percent from 66,979,067 for the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **FTR Forfeitures.** Total FTR forfeitures were $6,687,074 for the 2025/2026 planning period, up 67.2 percent from $4,000,330 from the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **Credit.** There were two collateral defaults and four payment defaults in the first six months of 2026.

## Market Performance

- **Quantity.** In the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction 1,247,476 MW (17.0 percent) of buy bids cleared and 334,486 MW (14.2 percent) of sell offers cleared. In the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction 1,324,299 MW (19.9 percent) of buy and self scheduled bids cleared, up 28.8 percent from the 2024/2025 Annual FTR Auction, and 183,410 MW (10.8 percent) of sell offers cleared, up 47.6 percent from the 2024/2025 Annual Auction. In

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the 2025/2026 planning period, Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions 16,198,371 MW (18.1 percent) of FTR buy bids cleared, up 44.1 percent from the 2024/2025 planning period and 10,330,538 MW (15.5 percent) of FTR sell offers cleared, up 55.0 percent from the 2024/2025 planning period.

- **Price.** The weighted average buy bid FTR price in the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction was $0.09 per MW, a $0.005 per MW decrease from the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. The weighted average buy bid FTR price in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2026/2027 planning period was $0.40 per MW, down from $0.53 per MW in the 2025/2026 planning period. The weighted average buy bid cleared FTR price in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for all periods in the 2025/2026 planning period was $0.44 per MWh, up from $0.43 per MW in the 2024/2025 planning period.
- **Revenue.** The 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction generated $102.5 million of net auction revenue, down 36.9 percent from $162.3 million from the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. The 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction generated $3,755.8 million of net auction revenue, up 98.2 percent from $1,875.3 million for the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions resulted in net auction revenue of $105.0 million in the 2025/2026 planning period, up 31.9 percent from $79.6 million in the 2024/2025 planning period. Net auction revenue is difference between what FTR buyers pay and what FTR sellers receive in an auction.
- **"Revenue Adequacy."** For the 2025/2026 planning period there was enough total day-ahead congestion revenue to pay FTR target allocations. However, as a result of the monthly settlement logic for FTRs and ARRs, $117.7 million of FTR auction revenue was transferred from ARR holders (load) to FTR holders in months where congestion revenue was less than FTR target allocation. For the 2025/2026 planning period FTRs were paid 100.0 percent of the target allocations and the total revenue distributed to ARR holders was $762.0 million, including $522.1 million of congestion revenue and $239.9 of ARR auction revenue. All day-ahead congestion revenue greater than FTR target allocations was distributed to ARR holders at the end of the planning period. Based on market logic, there is no such thing as surplus FTR auction revenue and there is no such thing as revenue inadequacy. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason.
- **Profitability.** FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received directly from holding an FTR plus any revenue from the sale of an FTR, and the cost of buying the FTR. In the 2025/2026 planning period, profits for all participants were $2.2 billion, up from $897.3 million in profits in the 2024/2025 planning period and the highest level of profits since at least the 2010/2011 planning period. In the 2025/2026 planning period, physical entities received $595.3 million in profits on FTRs purchased directly (not self scheduled), up from $42.6 million in profits in the 2024/2025 planning period. Financial entities received $1.6 billion in profits, up from $854.8 million in profits in the 2024/2025 planning period.

## Markets Timeline

Any PJM member can participate in the Long Term FTR Auction, the Annual FTR Auction and the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

Table 13-2 shows the date of first availability and the final closing date for all ARR and FTR auctions for ARRs and FTRs that are effective in the 2025/2026 planning period and for auctions with bidding dates in 2026.

### Table 13-2 Annual FTR auction dates

| Auction | Initial Open Date | Final Close Date |
|---|---|---|
| 2022/2025 Long Term | 1-Jun-21 | 3-Mar-22 |
| 2023/2026 Long Term | 2-Jun-22 | 3-Mar-23 |
| 2024/2027 Long Term | 1-Jun-23 | 5-Mar-24 |
| 2025/2028 Long Term | 3-Jun-24 | 5-Mar-25 |
| 2025/2026 ARR | 5-Mar-25 | 28-Mar-25 |
| 2025/2026 Annual | 9-Apr-25 | 2-May-25 |
| 2025/2026 Monthly | 15-May-24 | 17-Apr-26 |
| 2026/2029 Long Term | 2-Jun-25 | 4-Mar-26 |
| 2026/2027 ARR | 4-Mar-26 | 26-Mar-26 |
| 2026/2027 Annual | 8-Apr-26 | 4-May-26 |
| 2026/2027 Monthly | 14-May-26 | Apr-27 |
| 2027/2030 Long Term | 1-Jun-26 | 1-Mar-27 |


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# Recommendations

## Market Design

- The MMU recommends that the current ARR/FTR design be replaced with defined congestion revenue rights (CRRs). A CRR is the right to actual congestion revenue that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

### ARR

- The MMU recommends that the ARR/FTR design be modified to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that all historical generation to load paths be eliminated as a basis for assigning ARRs. The MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Partially adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, the rights to all congestion revenue be allocated as ARRs prior to sale as FTRs. Reductions in allocated revenue as a contingency for outages and increased system capability should be reserved for ARRs rather than sold in the Long Term FTR Auction. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from PJM's tariff, but that if IARRs are not eliminated, IARRs should be subject to the same proration rules that apply to all other ARR rights. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR

- The MMU recommends that FTR funding be based on total congestion, including both day-ahead and balancing congestion. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that bilateral transactions be eliminated and that all FTR transactions occur in the PJM market. (Priority: High. First reported 2022. Status: Not adopted.)[7]
- The MMU recommends a requirement that the details of all bilateral FTR transactions be reported to PJM. (Priority: High. First reported 2020. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM continue to evaluate the bilateral indemnification rules and any asymmetries they may create. (Priority: Low. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs, including a clear definition of persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Partially adopted, 2014/2015 planning period.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate generation to generation paths and all other paths that do not represent the delivery of power to load. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that the Long Term FTR product be eliminated. If the Long Term FTR product is not eliminated, the Long Term FTR Market should be modified so that the supply of prevailing flow FTRs in the Long Term FTR Market is based solely on counter flow offers in the Long Term FTR Market. (Priority: High. First reported 2017. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models, including the use of probabilistic outage modeling. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

## "Surplus"

- The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

7 If adopted, this recommendation would replace the next two recommendations.

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- The MMU recommends that FTR auction revenues not be used by PJM to buy counter flow FTRs for the purpose of improving FTR payout ratios.[8] (Priority: High. First reported 2015. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR Subsidies

- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR market participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Rejected by FERC.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
- The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)

### FTR Liquidation

- The MMU recommends that the FTR portfolio of a defaulted member be canceled rather than liquidated or allowed to settle as a default cost to the membership. (Priority: High. First reported 2018. Status: Not adopted.)

### Credit

- The MMU recommends that PJM's minimum credit requirements be reviewed and updated to appropriately reflect the risk created for the markets and other market participants. The PJM minimum credit requirements (minimum tangible net worth and minimum tangible assets) were set as fixed dollars amounts in 2011 in FERC Order No. 741 based on the specific market participation (FTRs or other). (Priority: Medium. First reported Q3 2025. Status: Not adopted.)

8 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

## Conclusion

### Solutions

The annual ARR allocation should be designed to ensure that the rights to all congestion revenues are assigned to load, without requiring contract path or point to point physical or financial transmission rights that are inconsistent with the network based delivery of power and the actual way congestion is generated in PJM's security constrained LMP market. When there are binding transmission constraints and locational price differences, load pays more for energy than generation is paid to produce that energy. The difference is congestion. As a result, congestion belongs to load and should be returned to load.

The current contract path based design should be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right should be to the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load can retain the right to the congestion revenues or sell the rights through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the voluntary sale by load of their congestion revenue rights at terms defined by load, recognizing that load has property rights to congestion.

### Issues

If the original PJM FTR approach had been designed to return congestion revenues to load without the use of generation to load contract paths, and if the distortions subsequently introduced into the FTR design had not been added, many of the subsequent issues with the FTR design and complex redesigns would have been avoided. PJM would not have had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy.

PJM has persistently and subjectively intervened in the FTR market in order to affect the payments to FTR holders. These interventions are not appropriate.


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For example, in the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 planning periods, PJM significantly reduced the allocation of ARR capacity, and FTRs, in order to guarantee full FTR funding. PJM reduced system capability in the FTR auction model by including more outages, reducing line limits and including additional constraints. PJM's modeling changes resulted in significant reductions in Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations, a corresponding reduction in the available quantity of FTRs, a reduction in congestion revenues assigned to ARRs, and an associated surplus of congestion revenue relative to FTR target allocations. This also resulted in a significant redistribution of ARRs among ARR holders based on differences in allocations between Stage 1A and Stage 1B ARRs. Starting in the 2017/2018 planning period, with the allocation of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load rather than FTRs, PJM increased system capability allocated to Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs, but continued to conservatively select outages to manage FTR funding levels.

PJM has intervened aggressively in the FTR market since its inception in order to meet various subjective objectives including so called revenue adequacy. PJM should not intervene in the FTR market to subjectively manage FTR funding. PJM should fix the FTR/ARR design and then should let the market work to return congestion to load and to let FTR values reflect actual congestion.

Load should never be required to subsidize payments to FTR holders, regardless of the reason.[9] The FERC order of September 15, 2016, introduced a subsidy to FTR holders at the expense of ARR holders.[10] The order requires PJM to ignore balancing congestion when calculating total congestion dollars available to fund FTRs. As a result, balancing congestion and M2M payments are assigned to load, rather than to FTR holders, as of the 2017/2018 planning period. When combined with the direct assignment of both surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenues to FTR holders, the Commission's order shifted substantial revenue from load to the holders of FTRs and further reduced the offset to congestion payments by load. This approach ignores the fact that load pays both day-ahead and balancing congestion, and that actual congestion is the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. Eliminating balancing congestion from the FTR revenue calculation requires load to pay twice for congestion. Load pays total congestion and pays negative balancing congestion again. The fundamental reasons that there has been a significant and persistent difference between day-ahead and balancing congestion include inadequate transmission modeling in the FTR auction and the role of UTCs in taking advantage of these modeling differences and creating negative balancing congestion. There is no reason to impose these costs on load.

These changes were made in order to increase the payout to holders of FTRs who are not loads. Increasing the payout to FTR holders at the expense of the load is not a supportable market objective. PJM should implement an FTR design that calculates and assigns congestion rights to load rather than continuing to modify the current, fundamentally flawed, design.

Load was made significantly worse off as a result of the changes made to the FTR/ARR process by PJM based on the FERC order of September 15, 2016. ARR revenues were significantly reduced for the 2017/2018 FTR Auction, the first auction under the new rules. ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 49.5 percent of total congestion costs for the 2017/2018 planning period rather than the 58.0 percent offset that would have occurred under the prior rules, a difference of $101.4 million.

A subsequent rule change was implemented that modified the allocation of what is termed surplus auction revenue to load. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period, surplus day-ahead congestion and surplus FTR auction revenue are assigned to FTR holders only up total target allocations, and then distributed to ARR holders.[11] ARR holders will only be allocated this surplus after FTRs are paid 100 percent of their target allocations. While this rule change increased the level of congestion revenues returned to load under some conditions, the rules do not recognize ARR holders' rights to all congestion revenue, and only improves congestion payouts to load when there is a surplus. There was no surplus for the 2020/2021 or 2021/2022 planning years. With this rule in effect for the 2021/2022 planning period, ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset 31.6 percent of total congestion. There was surplus for the 2022/2023 and the 2023/2024 planning periods. However,

9 Such subsidies have been suggested repeatedly. See FERC Dockets Nos. EL13-47-000 and EL12-19-000.
10 See 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016), *reh'g denied*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,093 (2017).
11 163 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2018).

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FTR auction surplus revenues were taken from load and given to FTR holders because day-ahead congestion revenues were less than target allocations in the 2023/2024 planning period. For the 2024/2025 planning period, there was not enough congestion revenue to fund FTR target allocations and all FTR auction surplus revenues were taken from load and given to FTR holders. For the 2025/2026 planning period, there was enough congestion revenue to fund FTR target allocations, and FTR auction surplus revenues were distributed to ARR holders. Based on market logic, there is no such thing as surplus FTR auction revenue. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason. ARRs and self scheduled FTRs offset only 55.7 percent of total congestion paid by load in the 2025/2026 planning period. Load was underpaid $2.2 billion in the 2025/2026 planning period, an increase from the $0.9 billion underpayment in the 2024/2025 planning period. This is the largest underpayment that load has experienced in a single planning period. Load has been underpaid congestion revenues by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. The cumulative offset for that period was only 65.7 percent of total congestion.

The complex process related to what is termed the overallocation of Stage 1A ARRs is entirely an artificial result of reliance on the contract path model in the assignment of FTRs. For example, there is a reason that transmission is not actually built to address the Stage 1A overallocation issue. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load contract paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows.

PJM proposed, and on March 11, 2022, FERC accepted, an increase to Stage 1A ARR allocations from 50 percent of Network Service Base Load (NSBL) to 60 percent of Network Service Peak Load (NSPL).[12] NSBL is a network service customer's contribution to the lowest daily zonal peak load in the prior twelve month period, and NSPL is a network service customer's contribution to the highest daily zonal peak load in the prior twelve month period. PJM's new ARR allocation rules have increased Stage 1A rights at the cost of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations. More importantly, PJM's new ARR allocation rules have exacerbated the current misalignment between congestion property rights and the congestion paid by load.

12 See 178 FERC ¶ 61,170.

## Proposed Design

To address the issues with the current contract path based ARR/FTR market design, the MMU recommends that the current design be replaced with a design in which the rights to actual congestion paid are assigned directly to the load that paid that congestion by node. The assigned right would be the actual difference between load payments, both day-ahead and balancing, and revenues paid to the generation used to serve that load. The load could retain the right to the congestion or sell the right through auctions. The correct assignment of congestion revenues to load is fully consistent with retaining FTR auctions for the voluntary sale by load of their congestion revenue rights at terms defined by load.

With a network assignment of actual congestion, there would be no cross subsidies among rights holders and no over or under allocation of rights relative to actual network market solutions. There would be no revenue shortfalls as congestion payments equal congestion collected. The risk of default would be isolated to the buyer and seller of the right, and any default would not be socialized to other rights holders. In the case of a defaulting buyer, the rights to the congestion revenues would revert to the load. There would be no risk of a network right flipping in value from positive to negative, because congestion is always the positive difference between what load pays for energy and what generation is paid for energy as a result of transmission constraints.

The MMU proposal requires the calculation of constraint specific congestion and the calculation of that specific constraint's congestion related charges to each physical load bus downstream of that constraint. Under the MMU proposal, the constraint specific congestion calculated by hour, from both the day-ahead and balancing market would be paid directly to the physical load as a credit against the associated load serving entity's (LSE) energy bill. This right to the congestion is defined as the congestion revenue right (CRR)


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that belongs to the physical load at a defined bus, zone or aggregate. The LSE could choose to sell all or a portion of the CRR through auctions.

A CRR is the right to actual, realized network related congestion that is paid by physical load at a specific bus, zone or aggregate. Under the MMU proposal a bus, zone or aggregate specific CRR could be sold as a defined share of the actual congestion. For example, an LSE could sell 50 percent of its congestion revenue right for the planning period to a third party. The third party buyer would then be entitled to 50 percent of the congestion that is credited to that specific bus, zone or aggregate for the planning period. The remaining 50 percent of the congestion credit for the specified bus, zone or aggregate would be paid to the LSE along with the auction clearing price for the 50 percent of the CRR that was sold to the third party. Depending on actual congestion and the price paid for a CRR, an LSE selling its congestion revenue rights could be better or worse off than if it retained its rights.

Under the MMU proposal, the LSE would be able to set reservation prices in the auction for the sale of portions or all of its CRR. Third parties would have an opportunity to bid for the offered portions of the CRR, and the market for the congestion revenue associated with the specified bus, zone or aggregate would clear at a price. If the reservation price of an identified portion of the offered CRR was not met at the clearing price, that portion of the offered CRR would remain with the load. Auctions could be annual and/or monthly and/or more frequent.

Under the MMU proposal, point to point rights (FTRs) could exist as a separate, self-funded hedging product based on simultaneously feasible prevailing and counter flows in a PJM managed network based auction. The only supply and the only source of revenues in the point to point market for prevailing flow FTRs would be counter flow offers and direct payments for specific rights.

## Auction Revenue Rights

Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) are the mechanism used to assign congestion rights to load, using an archaic and invalid contract path based approach, and to sell those rights to FTR buyers in various auctions. ARR values are based on nodal price differences established by cleared FTR bids in the Annual FTR Auction times the MW of the ARR. ARR sellers have no opportunity to define a price at which they are willing to sell and must accept the prices set by FTR buyers. ARR revenues are a function of FTR auction participants' expectations of congestion, risk, competition and available supply. But some auction revenues may be returned to FTR buyers as "surplus," despite the fact that FTR buyers willingly paid a defined price for FTRs. There is no surplus. PJM has significant discretion over the level of supply made available to FTR buyers. That discretion is needed only as a result of the flawed design. As long as the current design persists, the goals of that discretion should be significantly limited and defined clearly in the tariff.

ARRs are available only as obligations (not options) and only as a 24 hour product. ARRs are available to the nearest 0.1 MW. The ARR target allocation is equal to the product of the ARR MW and the price difference between the ARR sink and source from the Annual FTR Auction.[13] The value of annual ARR target allocations is set by the Annual FTR Auction. ARRs would be revenue inadequate if the money collected from the Annual FTR auction is not enough to pay the entirety of Annual ARR target allocations for the planning period which could happen only if there is a modeling difference between the system model used for ARRs and the system model used for FTRs and the FTR MW are reduced. The Annual FTR Auction and annual ARR target allocations were not the issue in the 2025/2026 planning period. Residual ARR target allocations are set by Monthly FTR auctions (the month that they are awarded). The large increase in Residual ARR target allocations compared to Annual ARR target allocations and FTR Auction Revenue in the beginning of the 2025/2026 planning led to the first month with an ARR deficiency in the history of the ARR market. An ARR's target allocation can be a positive or negative depending on the price difference between sink and source. Residual ARR target allocations can only be positive.

13 These nodal prices are a function of the market participants' annual FTR bids and binding transmission constraints.

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The goal of the ARR/FTR design should be to provide an efficient mechanism to ensure that load receives the rights to all congestion revenues. In the current design, all auction revenues should be paid to ARR holders.

The quantity of the product made available as ARRs or for sale in the FTR auctions is defined as system capability, meaning the capacity of the transmission system to deliver power. But system capability is not congestion and system capability is not the difference in congestion prices across transmission contract paths nor the potential for such difference and system capability is not the market flow across transmission paths. The concept of system capability is not relevant to assigning the rights to congestion revenues to load. The use, or misuse, of the concept of system capability in assigning ARRs is derived entirely from the contract path approach used in the PJM design. The definition of ARRs based on contract paths led to the mistaken idea that some transmission system capacity was used by ARRs but some was not and that both the ARR capability and the excess capability were available for sale as FTRs. Power does not flow on contract paths. In the current approach, system capability available to ARR holders is limited by the system capability made available in PJM's annual FTR transmission system market model. PJM's annual FTR transmission market model represents annual, expected system capability, modified by PJM to achieve PJM's goal of guaranteeing revenue equal to target allocations for FTRs, and subject to the requirement that all Stage 1A ARR requests must be allocated. Stage 1A ARR right requests are guaranteed and system capability necessary to accommodate the rights must be included in PJM's annual FTR transmission system market model despite the fact that there are not real world paths, real world capability, or real world flows that correspond to Stage 1A rights.

## Market Design

ARRs have been available to network service and firm, point to point transmission service customers since June 1, 2003, when the annual ARR allocation was first implemented for the 2003/2004 planning period. The initial allocation covered the Mid-Atlantic Region and the APS Control Zone. For the 2006/2007 planning period, the choice of ARRs or direct allocation FTRs was available to eligible market participants in the AEP, DAY, DUQ and DOM Control Zones. For the 2007/2008 and subsequent planning periods through the present, all eligible market participants were allocated ARRs.

Each March, PJM allocates annual ARRs to eligible customers in a three stage process: Stage 1A, Stage 1B and Stage 2B. Stage 1A ARRs are assigned based on historic contract paths and Stage 1A ARRs must be preserved for at least ten planning periods regardless of system or regulatory changes.[14]

The 2022/2023 planning period annual auction was the first auction under PJM's new ARR allocation rules. Under the new rules, Stage 1A ARR allocations increase from 50 percent of Network Service Base Load (NSBL) to 60 percent of Network Service Peak Load (NSPL).[15] NSBL is a network service customer's contribution to the lowest daily zonal peak load in the prior 12 month period, and NSPL is a network service customer's contribution to the highest daily zonal peak load in the prior twelve month period. PJM's new ARR allocation rules have increased Stage 1A rights at the cost of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations.

In Stage 1A, LSEs can obtain ARRs, based on their contribution to the network service peak load (NSPL) and based on putative generation to load contract paths, or their qualified replacements if the resource has retired and PJM has replaced it with a different generator regardless of whether there is a contract. The historical reference year is the year in which PJM markets were implemented, which is 1999 for the original zones, or the year in which a zone joined PJM. Firm, point to point transmission service customers can obtain Stage 1A ARRs up to 50 percent of the MW of firm, point to point transmission service provided between the receipt and delivery points for the historical reference year, subject to a cap of 60 percent of the participants total network service peak load for the zone or load aggregation zone that the ARRs are obtained. Effective for the 2023/2024 planning period, network service customers can obtain Stage 1A ARRs based on the MW of firm service provided during the reference year, subject to a cap of 60 percent of the participants total network service peak load for the zone or load aggregation zone that the ARRs are obtained. Stage 1A ARRs cannot be prorated. If Stage 1A ARRs are found to be infeasible, transmission system upgrades must be

14 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025) at 20.
15 See 178 FERC ¶ 61,170.


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undertaken to maintain feasibility.[16] However, PJM does not actually upgrade the transmission system to address Stage 1A ARR infeasibility because there is no actual physical infeasibility. The apparent infeasibility is an artificial result based on the fiction that power flows on the unsupported, outdated, fictional and irrelevant generation to load contract paths on which PJM's current and incorrect ARR allocation is based. Stage 1A rights have nothing to do with actual power flows or transmission limits.

In Stage 1B, network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs, up to the difference between their share of network service peak load and Stage 1A allocations. Effective for the 2023/2024 planning period, Stage 1B ARRs can be obtained from historical generation resources, qualified replacement resources, hubs, zones, or interfaces to designated load aggregation zones. Firm, point to point transmission service customers can obtain ARRs based on the MW of long-term, firm, point to point service provided between the receipt and delivery points for the historical reference year.

In Stage 2, network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs from any hub, control zone, generator bus or interface pricing point to any part of their aggregate load in the control zone, load aggregation zone, or any generator, interface, hub or zone, up to their total peak network load in that zone. Firm, point to point transmission service customers can obtain ARRs consistent with their transmission service as in Stage 1A and Stage 1B.

ARR holders can self schedule ARRs as FTRs during the Annual FTR Auction.[17] When ARR holders self schedule FTRs, the ARR holders choose to be paid based on variable FTR target allocations rather than the fixed ARR value determined in the annual FTR auction. ARRs can be traded between LSEs prior to the first round of the Annual FTR Auction.

Effective for the 2015/2016 planning period, when residual zonal pricing was introduced, ARRs default to sinking at the load settlement point if different than the zone, but the ARR holder may elect to sink their ARR at the zone instead.[18]

16 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).
17 OATT Attachment K 7.1.1.(b).
18 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025) at 35.

In 2016, FERC ordered PJM to remove retired resources from the generation to load contract paths used to allocate Stage 1A ARRs.[19] PJM replaced retired units with operating generators, termed qualified replacement resources (QRRs), regardless of whether there was a corresponding contract.[20] Existing Stage 1A resources retain their current allocations, while ARR allocations to QRRs that replace retired Stage 1A resources are prorated based on the feasibility of these ARRs after existing resources are allocated. As a result of this proration, ARRs for QRRs have lower priority than ARRs from generators that existed in 1998.

Generation to load paths, even from active generators, are based on a contract path model rather than a network model. Generation to load contract paths should not be used as a basis for assigning the rights to congestion revenue. There is no basis for assuming that a contract existed in 1999 or exists currently. Contract paths are a fiction and are not an accurate representation of the reasons that congestion exists or of how load is served in a network and will, by definition, not accurately measure the exposure of load to congestion.

## Market Structure

ARRs are allocated on an annual basis. For the 2026/2027 planning period there were 1,626 individual participant LSEs and 131 parent companies, up from 1,560 individual participants and 130 parent companies for the 2025/2026 planning period.

The ownership of ARRs by parent company was unconcentrated, with an HHI of 590, for the 2026/2027 planning period compared to 600 for the 2025/2026 planning period.

19 156 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2016) *reh'g denied*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,093 (2017).
20 See FERC Docket No. EL16-6-003.

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# Market Performance

## Volume

Table 13-3 shows the MW of ARR allocations for each round of the 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods. There was a 3,415.1 MW increase (2.1 percent) in Network Service Peak Load (NSPL) between the 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods. This increase resulted in an increase in ARR MW requested by load of 10,583 MW (5.1 percent) from the 2025/2026 to the 2026/2027 planning period. The ARR MW actually provided to load increased by 8,413 MW (7.4 percent) from the 2025/2026 to the 2026/2027 planning period. The cleared volume of Stage 1B ARR MW decreased 1.2 percentage points from 23.1 percent in the 2025/2026 planning period to 22.0 percent in the 2026/2027 planning period.

### Table 13-3 Annual ARR allocation volume: 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods

| Planning Period | Stage | Round | Requested Count | Requested Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume | Uncleared Volume (MW) | Uncleared Volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025/2026 | 1A | 0 | 35,072 | 89,253 | 89,245 | 100.0% | 8 | 0.0% |
| | 1B | 1 | 10,807 | 55,826 | 12,919 | 23.1% | 42,907 | 76.9% |
| | 2 | 2 | 9,006 | 31,316 | 5,261 | 16.8% | 26,055 | 83.2% |
| | | 3 | 6,660 | 31,276 | 6,032 | 19.3% | 25,244 | 80.7% |
| | | Total | 15,666 | 62,592 | 11,293 | 18.0% | 51,299 | 82.0% |
| | Total | | 61,545 | 207,671 | 113,457 | 54.6% | 94,214 | 45.4% |
| 2026/2027 | 1A | 0 | 34,659 | 92,663 | 92,540 | 99.9% | 123 | 0.1% |
| | 1B | 1 | 11,372 | 64,397 | 14,141 | 22.0% | 50,256 | 78.0% |
| | 2 | 2 | 9,974 | 30,847 | 6,803 | 22.1% | 24,044 | 77.9% |
| | | 3 | 12,413 | 30,347 | 8,386 | 27.6% | 21,961 | 72.4% |
| | | Total | 22,387 | 61,194 | 15,189 | 24.8% | 46,005 | 75.2% |
| | Total | | 68,418 | 218,254 | 121,870 | 55.8% | 96,384 | 44.2% |

Table 13-4 shows the share of ARR MW, by stage, for ARRs with paths that source inside or outside the zone where the load is located, for the 2026/2027 planning period. Table 13-4 shows that, for the 2026/2027 planning period, 79.7 percent of the ARR MW is based on generation inside the zone where the ARR load is located and 20.3 percent of the ARR MW are based on generation outside the zone where the ARR load is located. In contrast, only 10.0 percent of congestion resulted from constraints inside the zone where load is located and 90.0 percent of congestion resulted from constraints outside the zone where load is located during the 2025/2026 planning period (See Table 13-55). This mismatch between the assignment of ARRs and the actual patterns of congestion illustrates one of the fundamental issues with the path based approach to ARRs which originated in the prior regulated utility design in which most load was served by generation in the same zone as load and owned by the vertically integrated transmission owner/utility. In fact, in the PJM market, which operates as an integrated network, a significant proportion of congestion results from constraints that are not in the same zone as load. The path based approach cannot and does not reflect the actual congestion paid by load.

### Table 13-4 Share of ARR MW that source in/out of load zone: 2026/2027 planning period

| | Stage 1A | | Stage 1B | | Stage 2 | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone |
| ACEC | 24.8% | 28.8% | 16.2% | 3.4% | 8.8% | 18.1% | 49.7% | 50.3% |
| AEP | 8.7% | 56.2% | 3.7% | 16.3% | 0.8% | 14.3% | 13.2% | 86.8% |
| APS | 8.0% | 74.6% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 2.7% | 12.7% | 12.6% | 87.4% |
| ATSI | 33.6% | 38.2% | 10.1% | 3.9% | 0.0% | 14.1% | 43.7% | 56.3% |
| BGE | 40.0% | 55.3% | 2.2% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 1.5% | 42.4% | 57.6% |
| COMED | 0.0% | 65.9% | 0.0% | 10.0% | 0.2% | 23.8% | 0.2% | 99.8% |
| DAY | 72.0% | 8.7% | 14.0% | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.9% | 86.8% | 13.2% |
| DOM | 0.4% | 84.5% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 0.0% | 14.1% | 0.4% | 99.6% |
| DPL | 18.8% | 47.9% | 1.9% | 1.3% | 4.6% | 25.5% | 25.3% | 74.7% |
| DUKE | 47.4% | 35.8% | 0.3% | 7.8% | 0.8% | 8.0% | 48.5% | 51.5% |
| DUQ | 85.8% | 0.7% | 7.4% | 0.1% | 5.1% | 0.9% | 98.2% | 1.8% |
| EKPC | 11.5% | 65.4% | 19.6% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 2.9% | 31.6% | 68.4% |
| EXT | 32.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 67.7% | 0.1% | 99.9% | 0.1% |
| JCPL | 10.6% | 34.5% | 7.1% | 0.3% | 28.1% | 19.3% | 45.8% | 54.2% |
| MEC | 8.9% | 35.6% | 10.6% | 0.2% | 20.0% | 24.6% | 39.5% | 60.5% |
| OVEC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| PE | 31.4% | 49.2% | 0.1% | 5.0% | 0.2% | 14.2% | 31.6% | 68.4% |
| PECO | 16.3% | 59.3% | 0.3% | 17.9% | 1.4% | 4.8% | 18.0% | 82.0% |
| PEPCO | 19.6% | 64.8% | 0.0% | 14.2% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 19.6% | 80.4% |
| PPL | 0.3% | 63.3% | 0.0% | 13.3% | 1.9% | 21.3% | 2.2% | 97.8% |
| PSEG | 21.8% | 32.7% | 15.1% | 0.1% | 8.5% | 21.8% | 45.4% | 54.6% |
| REC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 62.9% | 0.0% | 37.1% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| Total | 14.1% | 57.0% | 4.0% | 7.4% | 2.3% | 15.2% | 20.3% | 79.7% |


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## Stage 1A Infeasibility

Stage 1A ARRs are allocated for a year, but guaranteed for 10 years, with the ability for a participant to opt out of any planning period within the 10 years. PJM conducts a simultaneous feasibility analysis to determine the transmission upgrades required to ensure that the long term ARRs can remain feasible. The rules provide that if a simultaneous feasibility test violation occurs in any year, PJM will identify or accelerate any transmission upgrades to resolve the violation and these upgrades will be recommended for inclusion in the PJM RTEP process. But such transmission upgrades must pass PJM's RTEP process.

PJM's transmission planning process (RTEP) does not identify a need for new transmission associated with Stage 1A overallocations because there is, in fact, no need for new transmission associated with Stage 1A ARRs. The Stage 1A overallocation issue is a fiction based on the use of outdated and irrelevant generation to load contract paths to assign Stage 1A rights that have nothing to do with actual power flows. This continues to be true even with the replacement of retired generating units.

For the 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods, Stage 1A of the Annual ARR Allocation was infeasible, resulting in an over allocation of ARRs on the affected facilities. As a result, modeled system capability, in excess of actual system capability, was provided to the Stage 1A ARRs and added to the FTR auction. According to Section 7.4.2 (i) of the OATT, the capability limits of the binding constraints rendering these ARRs infeasible must be increased in the model and these increased limits must be used in subsequent ARR and FTR allocations and auctions for the entire planning period, except in the case of extraordinary circumstances. Stage 1A related over allocations have to be made up elsewhere in PJM's FTR market model, in the form of reduced system capability, in order for PJM to achieve its goal of fully funding FTRs. The need for and use of these artificial and factually incorrect calculations are another illustration of the failure of the FTR/ARR design to meet basic logical standards.

Table 13-5 shows the MW quantity and count of overloaded constraint/contingency pairs and the reasons for the modeled overload for the 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods. In order to eliminate the infeasibilities for the requested Stage 1A ARR allocations, PJM needed to raise the modeled capacity limits above the actual transmission line limits on 99 constraint/contingency pairs, 55 of which were internal to PJM, a total of 8,988 MW in the 2026/2027 planning period. This is a decrease of 14 constraint/contingency pairs (12.4 percent), a decrease of 30 constraint/contingency pairs internal to PJM, (35.7 percent), and a decrease of 16,577 MW (64.8 percent) compared to the 2025/2026 planning period.[21] [22]

### Table 13-5 Stage 1A overloaded constraint reasons and MW: 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods

| | | 2025/2026 | | 2026/2027 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reason | Type | MW | Count | MW | Count |
| Network Load | Internal PJM | 17 | 1 | 877 | 5 |
| Network Load | M2M Flowgate | 2,177 | 23 | 4,445 | 27 |
| Transmission Outage | Internal PJM | 23,316 | 84 | 3,413 | 50 |
| Transmission Outage | M2M Flowgate | 55 | 5 | 253 | 17 |
| Transmission Outage | Tie Line | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | | 25,565 | 113 | 8,988 | 99 |

21 *PJM 2025/2026 Stage 1A Over allocation notice*, PJM FTRs, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/ftr/annual-arr-allocation/2025-2026/2025-2026-stage-1a-over-allocation-notice.pdf> (March 10, 2025).

22 *PJM 2026/2027 Stage 1A Over allocation notice*, PJM FTRs, <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/ftr/annual-arr-allocation/2026-2027/2026-2027-stage-1a-over-allocation-notice.pdf> (March 9, 2026).

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Table 13-6 shows the share of Stage 1A over allocations for the 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods for ARR allocations that source inside and outside the zone where the over allocated MW sink. The share of over allocations that have a source outside the zone in which they sink increased 2.3 percentage points (8.3 percent) from 27.7 percent in the 2025/2026 planning period to 30.0 percent in the 2026/2027 planning period. The total MW of overloaded constraint/contingency pairs (Table 13-5) is greater than the total MW of overloaded Stage 1A ARR paths in the 2025/2026 planning period (Table 13-6) because an individual overloaded ARR path can require the modeled capacity limit to be increased for multiple constraint/contingency pairs and multiple contingencies per constraint.

## Table 13-6 Stage 1A overloaded paths that sink inside and outside source zone: 2025/2026 and 2026/2027 planning periods

| | 2025/2026 Planning Period | | | | 2026/2027 Planning Period | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MW | | Proportion | | MW | | Proportion | |
| | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone |
| ACEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA |
| AEP | 2,644.9 | 489.6 | 84.4% | 15.6% | 2,259.0 | 572.2 | 79.8% | 20.2% |
| APS | 0.5 | 414.9 | 0.1% | 99.9% | 464.5 | 428.0 | 52.0% | 48.0% |
| ATSI | 1,640.3 | 2,030.8 | 44.7% | 55.3% | 1,373.2 | 2,170.2 | 38.8% | 61.2% |
| BGE | 0.0 | 300.7 | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 | 83.8 | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| COMED | 1,586.5 | 0.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% | 3,656.8 | 0.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| DAY | 0.0 | 255.3 | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 | 187.4 | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| DOM | 7,053.2 | 7.6 | 99.9% | 0.1% | 2,473.3 | 0.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| DPL | 384.4 | 156.7 | 71.0% | 29.0% | 48.6 | 33.2 | 59.4% | 40.6% |
| DUKE | 192.1 | 1,175.8 | 14.0% | 86.0% | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA |
| DUQ | 0.0 | 133.7 | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 | 309.3 | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| EKPC | 0.0 | 93.0 | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 | 81.3 | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| JCPL | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA |
| MEC | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA | 0.2 | 12.8 | 1.5% | 98.5% |
| PE | 97.1 | 10.5 | 90.2% | 9.8% | 578.8 | 806.2 | 41.8% | 58.2% |
| PECO | 10.1 | 0.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA |
| PEPCO | 0.0 | 151.5 | 0.0% | 100.0% | 213.5 | 176.3 | 54.8% | 45.2% |
| PPL | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA | 289.2 | 0.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| PSEG | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA | 0.0 | 0.0 | NA | NA |
| TOTAL | 13,609.1 | 5,220.1 | 72.3% | 27.7% | 11,357.1 | 4,860.7 | 70.0% | 30.0% |



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Table 13-7 shows the MW of retired generation sources for Stage 1A ARRs, the Qualified Replacement Resource (QRR) MW assigned by PJM for all resources and the replacement MW that were considered rate based by PJM. A rate based unit is a replacement generator that is owned by the ARR holder, or subject to firm energy and capacity supply contracts.[23] The term rate based is a misleading reference to the premarket cost of service regulation paradigm. If PJM does not find such a unit, PJM will use another unit that is close to where the retired unit was located even if it is not owned or under contract.

### Table 13-7 Qualified Replacement Resource (QRR) results: 2026/2027 planning period

| Zone | Historical Retired | Replacement (All) | Replacement (Rate-based) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACEC | 1,779.8 | 1,056.5 | 59.0 |
| AEP | 8,330.2 | 8,774.4 | 1,964.7 |
| APS | 3,315.5 | 3,456.2 | 97.2 |
| ATSI | 7,154.3 | 4,642.1 | 36.7 |
| BGE | 1,511.0 | 867.0 | 0.0 |
| COMED | 8,653.8 | 6,456.1 | 34.0 |
| DAY | 2,416.5 | 263.4 | 6.4 |
| DOM | 5,996.6 | 6,407.8 | 5,361.6 |
| DPL | 976.7 | 445.6 | 218.3 |
| DUKE | 3,234.5 | 2,029.2 | 57.6 |
| DUQ | 2,045.0 | 811.7 | 0.0 |
| EKPC | 198.1 | 229.3 | 0.0 |
| JCPL | 2,137.1 | 1,373.2 | 0.0 |
| OVEC | 0.0 | 459.2 | 1,854.0 |
| MEC | 1,082.0 | 1,059.4 | 0.0 |
| PE | 1,606.5 | 1,570.3 | 0.1 |
| PECO | 1,432.3 | 1,077.0 | 0.0 |
| PEPCO | 3,726.0 | 2,030.3 | 0.0 |
| PPL | 1,224.3 | 779.6 | 0.0 |
| PSEG | 5,093.2 | 3,177.0 | 0.0 |
| REC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 61,913.5 | 46,965.3 | 9,689.6 |

23 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025) at 21.

## ARR Reassignment for Retail Load Switching

PJM rules provide that when load switches between LSEs during the planning period, an LSE gaining load in the same control zone is allocated a proportional share of positively valued ARRs and residual ARRs within the control zone based on the shifted load.[24] ARRs are reassigned to the nearest 0.001 MW and may be reassigned multiple times over a planning period. The reassignment of positively valued ARRs supports competition by ensuring that the offset to congestion follows load, thereby removing a barrier to competition among LSEs and, by ensuring that only ARRs with a positive value are reassigned, preventing an LSE from assigning poor ARR choices to other LSEs. However, when ARRs are self scheduled as FTRs, the self scheduled FTRs do not follow load that shifts while the ARRs do follow load that shifts, and this may result in lower value of the congestion offset for the receiving LSE compared to the total value held by the original ARR holder. The original holder of the ARRs has to pay directly for the self scheduled FTRs after the transfer of the ARRs.

24 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

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Table 13-8 summarizes ARR MW and associated revenue reassigned for network load in each control zone where changes occurred from June 1, 2024, through May 31, 2026.

There were 34,066 MW of ARRs associated with $3.6 million of revenue that were reassigned in the 2025/2026 planning period. There were 32,594 MW of ARRs associated with $1.2 million of revenue that were reassigned in the 2024/2025 planning period.

**Table 13-8 ARRs and ARR revenue automatically reassigned for network load changes by control zone: June 2024 through May 2026**

| | ARRs Reassigned (MW-day) | | ARR Revenue Reassigned [Dollars (Thousands) per MW-day] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2024/2025 | 2025/2026 | 2024/2025 | 2025/2026 |
| Control Zone | (12 months) | (12 months) | (12 months) | (12 months) |
| ACEC | 300 | 356 | $4.2 | $5.4 |
| AEP | 3,427 | 2,677 | $64.9 | $97.1 |
| APS | 1,666 | 1,824 | $75.8 | $221.1 |
| ATSI | 4,572 | 4,568 | $161.5 | $294.9 |
| BGE | 2,408 | 3,327 | $341.1 | $1,430.0 |
| COMED | 2,975 | 2,271 | $30.0 | $98.5 |
| DAY | 1,298 | 1,395 | $20.5 | $51.0 |
| DOM | 288 | 342 | $15.1 | $59.1 |
| DPL | 689 | 806 | $67.9 | $198.3 |
| DUKE | 1,824 | 2,327 | $106.6 | $169.1 |
| DUQ | 1,437 | 1,460 | $20.0 | $27.6 |
| EKPC | 0 | 0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| JCPLC | 907 | 1,093 | $11.4 | $33.1 |
| MEC | 750 | 861 | $30.1 | $44.1 |
| OVEC | 0 | 0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| PE | 749 | 779 | $42.2 | $140.1 |
| PECO | 3,020 | 3,078 | $32.7 | $70.1 |
| PEPCO | 2,320 | 2,231 | $61.1 | $343.7 |
| PPL | 2,948 | 3,737 | $66.5 | $248.0 |
| PSEG | 865 | 814 | $21.4 | $49.7 |
| REC | 151 | 121 | $2.7 | $7.3 |
| Total | 32,594 | 34,066 | $1,175.6 | $3,588.5 |

## Revenue

ARRs are allocated to qualifying customers rather than sold, so ARR revenue (target allocation) is different from the revenue that results from the FTR auctions.

Figure 13-1 shows the revenue per ARR MW held for each month of the 2010/2011 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. The revenue per ARR MW held does not include target allocation related payouts for self scheduled FTRs or surplus revenue, but does include Residual ARRs starting in August 2012.

PJM has had to repeatedly intervene in the functioning of the FTR system in an effort to meet the artificial and incorrectly defined goal of revenue adequacy. None of the interventions changed the basic facts of actual congestion but did result in a redistribution of congestion revenues and a change in PJM's preferred but inaccurate and misleading FTR market performance metrics. FTR prices increased in the 2014/2015 Annual FTR Auction in part as a result of reduced supply caused by PJM's assumption of more outages in the model relative to prior years. The decrease in system capability caused by PJM's more conservative modeling of the FTR market model reduced Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR allocations. The increased FTR prices resulted in an increase in revenue per ARR MW, for a smaller number of ARR MW. For the 2014/2015 planning period, the total dollars per MW of ARR allocation was $11,279, while the previous planning period resulted in revenue per MW of $6,692, a 68.5 percent increase in revenue per allocated ARR MW. Some of the ARR MW lost from proration were provided in the Residual ARR process, but the residual allocations are not comparable to the ARRs awarded in the annual process because residual ARR allocations change each month and cannot be self scheduled as FTRs. For the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 planning periods, the revenue per MW of ARR allocation was $10,642 and $10,411. During these planning periods PJM chose more restrictive modeling criteria, which did not release the full capacity of the FTR model in order to reduce calculated revenue inadequacies. Beginning in the 2017/2018 planning period, when balancing congestion was arbitrarily removed from FTR funding and assigned to load, PJM reinstated less restrictive modeling criteria, and the revenue


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per MW of ARR decreased due to an increase in modeled capability. For the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 planning periods the revenue per MW of ARR was $5,168 and $6,841. For the 2022/2023 planning period, cleared ARR MW decreased significantly (see Table 13-3) from the previous planning period, because PJM again chose more restrictive modeling criteria for the FTR model to improve PJM's metric of FTR funding. This results in fewer ARRs being awarded. Due to significant increases in FTR prices in the 2022/2023 planning period, the revenue per MW of ARR was $12,274. For the 2023/2024 planning period, FTR prices decreased compared to the 2022/2023 planning period and the revenue per MW of ARR was $14,463, a 17.8 percent decrease. For the 2024/2025 planning period PJM again used less restrictive modeling criteria in the FTR model, resulting in more ARRs being awarded. The revenue per MW of ARR decreased to $12,058, a 16.6 percent decrease. In the 2025/2026 planning period there was both a significant decrease in the amount of Residual ARR MW and a substantial increase in the target allocation from Residual ARRs (See Table 13-11). This resulted in a 42.4 percent increase to $17,170 of revenue per MW of ARR.

Under the current rules, load is required to directly pay balancing congestion costs, not included in Figure 13-1, which reduce the revenue received by ARR holders. There is no support for the assertion made by proponents of shifting balancing congestion to load that higher ARR values would result, and there is no evidence of any kind that load is better off as a result of the arbitrary assignment of balancing congestion to load.

**Figure 13-1 Revenue per ARR MW paid to ARR holders compared to congestion and FTR target allocations: 2010/2011 through 2025/2026 planning periods**





Table 13-9 shows the share of ARR revenue, by stage, for ARRs with paths that source inside or outside the zone where the load is located, for the 2025/2026 planning period. Table 13-9 shows that, for the 2026/2027 planning period, 75.3 percent of ARR revenue is based on generation inside the zone where the ARR load is located and 24.7 percent of ARR revenue is based on generation outside the zone where the ARR load is located. In contrast, only 10.0 percent of congestion resulted from constraints inside the zone where load is located and 90.0 percent of congestion resulted from constraints outside the zone where load is located during the 2025/2026 planning period. The primary source of a zone's actual congestion is the result of transmission constraints that separate that zone from resources external to that zone, not constraints internal to that zone.

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Under the current rules, ARR holders have limited options to pick source points for their ARRs. The holders of Stage 1A rights are limited to specific sources based on assertions about historical generation (or PJM defined replacement sources when resources retire). For the 2026/2027 annual ARR allocation, 57.0 percent of allocated Stage 1A MW are based on generation inside the zone where the ARR load is located and 14.1 percent are based on generation outside the zone where the ARR load is located (See Table 13-4).

Table 13-9 shows that for revenue from all ARRs allocated for the 2026/2027 planning period, 68.1 percent is based on generation inside the zone where the ARR load is located and 22.9 percent is based on generation outside the zone where the ARR load is located. Stage 1A rights accounted for 71.1 percent of all ARR MW and 90.0 of all ARR revenue for ARRs allocated for 2026/2027 planning period.

This illustrates one of the fundamental issues with the path based approach which originated in the premarket cost of service paradigm in which most load was served by generation in the same zone as load. In fact, in the PJM market, which operates as an integrated network, a significant proportion of congestion is based on constraints that are not in the same zone as load. The path based approach does not and cannot reflect the actual congestion paid by load. The use of the path based approach is the fundamental source of the under assignment of congestion revenue rights to load in the ARR/FTR model. The path based approach is an illogical and unsupportable approach to defining the actual congestion paid by load in PJM.

### Table 13-9 Share of ARR revenue that sources in/out of load zone: 2026/2027 planning period

| | Stage 1A | | Stage 1B | | Stage 2 | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone |
| ACEC | 29.6% | 18.1% | 10.9% | 4.6% | 12.1% | 24.7% | 52.6% | 47.4% |
| AEP | 16.8% | 61.8% | 2.2% | 12.0% | 0.6% | 6.7% | 19.6% | 80.4% |
| APS | 12.9% | 82.5% | 1.4% | 0.1% | 0.6% | 2.5% | 14.9% | 85.1% |
| ATSI | 48.0% | 37.5% | 3.4% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 10.4% | 51.4% | 48.6% |
| BGE | 89.5% | 10.1% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 89.8% | 10.2% |
| COMED | 0.0% | 73.5% | 0.0% | 3.5% | (1.3%) | 24.3% | (1.3%) | 101.3% |
| DAY | 84.9% | 0.6% | 14.4% | 0.2% | 0.6% | (0.7%) | 99.9% | 0.1% |
| DOM | 0.7% | 96.4% | 0.0% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 2.2% | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| DPL | 25.1% | 57.2% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 2.6% | 14.2% | 28.4% | 71.6% |
| DUKE | 86.7% | 9.1% | 0.2% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 2.4% | 87.7% | 12.3% |
| DUQ | 81.8% | (0.0%) | 14.1% | (0.0%) | 3.9% | 0.1% | 99.9% | 0.1% |
| EKPC | 130.0% | (64.8%) | 27.5% | 0.0% | 0.9% | 6.4% | 158.4% | (58.4%) |
| EXT | 65.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 34.6% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| JCPL | 31.4% | 5.9% | 8.5% | 0.1% | 45.9% | 8.3% | 85.7% | 14.3% |
| MEC | 5.7% | 50.6% | 16.3% | 0.2% | 19.9% | 7.3% | 41.9% | 58.1% |
| OVEC | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| PE | 30.7% | 58.0% | 0.1% | (0.1%) | 0.1% | 11.2% | 30.9% | 69.1% |
| PECO | 14.9% | 73.8% | 0.3% | 5.0% | 1.3% | 4.8% | 16.4% | 83.6% |
| PEPCO | 83.7% | 14.0% | 0.0% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 83.7% | 16.3% |
| PPL | (0.6%) | 108.7% | (0.0%) | 0.8% | 0.5% | (9.4%) | (0.1%) | 100.1% |
| PSEG | 28.5% | 44.4% | 8.5% | 0.1% | 4.2% | 14.2% | 41.3% | 58.7% |
| REC | 0.0% | 0.0% | 81.0% | 0.0% | 19.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| Total | 22.9% | 68.1% | 1.2% | 2.1% | 0.7% | 5.1% | 24.7% | 75.3% |


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## ARR Target Allocations

Table 13-10 shows the monthly ARR target allocations from Annual ARRs and Residual ARRs for the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods. Table 13-10 also shows the FTR auction revenue available to fund ARR target allocations. Annual ARR target allocations (Table 13-10) are based on the nodal clearing prices from FTR obligations in the Annual FTR Auction times the MW of the ARR. The annual ARR target allocation is divided evenly among every day of the planning period. Residual ARR target allocations (Table 13-10) are based on the nodal clearing prices from FTR obligations in the monthly FTR auctions and vary each month.

In the 2025/2026 planning period, total ARR target allocations (the sum of annual and residual ARR target allocations) were $1,918.1 million, up 30.6 percent from $1,468.7 million in 2024/2025 planning period. Total ARR target allocations in the 2025/2026 planning period include $1,836.5 million annual ARR target allocations (up 27.3 percent from the 2024/2025 planning period) and $81.7 million Residual ARR target allocations (up 210.6 percent from the 2024/2025 planning period). In 2025/2026 planning period FTR auction revenue available to pay ARR target allocations was $2,158.1 million, up 29.6 percent from $1,664.9 million in the same period of the 2024/2025 planning period. The significant and unprecedented increase in Residual ARR target allocations compared to Annual ARR target allocations and FTR Auction Revenue led to the first month with an ARR deficiency in the history of the ARR market. In July 2025 there was a $229,526 deficiency for ARR holders. PJM's monthly auction process does not consider the impact of Residual ARR target allocation when the Monthly FTR Auctions are optimized and cleared. At the end of the 2025/2026 planning period, the congestion revenues were available to fully fund the ARRs.

**Table 13-10 Monthly ARR target allocations compared to FTR auction revenue: 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods**

| Month | Annual ARR Target Allocations | Residual ARR Target Allocations | Total ARR Target Allocations | FTR Auction Revenue | ARR Surplus or Deficiency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun-24 | $118,548,955 | $1,542,269 | $120,091,225 | $133,459,438 | $13,368,213 |
| Jul-24 | $122,500,587 | $817,746 | $123,318,333 | $139,272,100 | $15,953,768 |
| Aug-24 | $122,500,587 | $2,192,686 | $124,693,273 | $140,450,805 | $15,757,532 |
| Sep-24 | $118,548,955 | $940,983 | $119,489,938 | $135,797,655 | $16,307,717 |
| Oct-24 | $122,500,587 | $675,276 | $123,175,863 | $142,077,688 | $18,901,826 |
| Nov-24 | $118,548,955 | $389,592 | $118,938,547 | $137,582,288 | $18,643,741 |
| Dec-24 | $122,500,587 | $1,423,964 | $123,924,551 | $142,273,691 | $18,349,140 |
| Jan-25 | $122,500,587 | $3,351,831 | $125,852,418 | $141,776,870 | $15,924,451 |
| Feb-25 | $110,645,692 | $9,503,030 | $120,148,721 | $128,790,514 | $8,641,793 |
| Mar-25 | $122,500,587 | $1,258,883 | $123,759,470 | $141,476,041 | $17,716,571 |
| Apr-25 | $118,548,955 | $3,845,490 | $122,394,445 | $138,463,040 | $16,068,595 |
| May-25 | $122,500,587 | $367,497 | $122,868,084 | $143,447,210 | $20,579,127 |
| Summary For Planning Period 2024/2025 | | | | | |
| Total | $1,442,345,621 | $26,309,246 | $1,468,654,867 | $1,664,867,340 | $196,212,473 |
| Jun-25 | $150,943,224 | $12,903,832 | $163,847,056 | $170,292,924 | $6,445,867 |
| Jul-25 | $155,974,665 | $23,175,461 | $179,150,126 | $178,920,600 | ($229,526) |
| Aug-25 | $155,974,665 | $13,502,528 | $169,477,193 | $179,519,198 | $10,042,005 |
| Sep-25 | $150,943,224 | $952,098 | $151,895,322 | $174,046,010 | $22,150,688 |
| Oct-25 | $155,974,665 | $4,658,518 | $160,633,183 | $179,868,836 | $19,235,654 |
| Nov-25 | $150,943,224 | $5,780,545 | $156,723,769 | $173,946,507 | $17,222,738 |
| Dec-25 | $155,974,665 | $1,556,605 | $157,531,270 | $176,753,225 | $19,221,956 |
| Jan-26 | $155,974,665 | $6,173,623 | $162,148,288 | $180,118,776 | $17,970,489 |
| Feb-26 | $140,880,342 | $2,951,786 | $143,832,128 | $169,142,110 | $25,309,981 |
| Mar-26 | $155,974,665 | $4,313,687 | $160,288,352 | $194,725,363 | $34,437,011 |
| Apr-26 | $150,943,224 | $2,977,603 | $153,920,827 | $185,872,717 | $31,951,890 |
| May-26 | $155,974,665 | $2,716,717 | $158,691,382 | $194,873,387 | $36,182,005 |
| Summary For Planning Period 2025/2026 | | | | | |
| Total | $1,836,475,891 | $81,663,004 | $1,918,138,895 | $2,158,079,652 | $239,940,758 |

## Residual ARRs

Introduced August 1, 2012, Residual ARRs are available for eligible ARR holders when a transmission outage was modeled in the Annual ARR Allocation, but the transmission facility returns to service during the planning period. Residual ARRs can only be allocated to participants whose ARRs were prorated in Stage 1B and only to a maximum of the prorated reduction, so not all available Residual ARRs are allocated. Residual ARRs are automatically assigned to eligible participants the month before the effective date, are

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effective for a single month and cannot be self scheduled. Residual ARR target allocations are based on the clearing prices from FTR obligations for FTRs of the same period purchased in the relevant monthly auctions, may not exceed zonal network services peak load or firm transmission reservation levels and are only available up to the prorated ARR MW capacity as allocated in the Annual ARR Allocation. For the following planning period, these Residual ARRs are available as ARRs in the annual ARR allocation. Residual ARRs are a separate product from incremental ARRs. Beginning with the June 2017 monthly auction, Residual ARRs that would have cleared with a negative target allocation are not assigned to participants.[25] In prior planning periods, PJM's modeling of excess outages in order to manage FTR market outcomes resulted in the allocation of some ARRs that would have been allocated in Stage 1B being allocated as Residual ARRs on a month to month basis without the option to self schedule.

Table 13-11 shows the Residual ARRs allocated to participants and the associated target allocations. The available volume is the total additional capacity available to be allocated as Residual ARRs. The cleared volume is the residual ARR capacity actually allocated to participants with prorated ARRs based on the level of prorated ARRs in Stage 1B and the affected paths. In the 2025/2026 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 27,865.4 MW of Residual ARRs with a target allocation of $81.7 million. In the 2024/2025 planning period, PJM allocated a total of 36,097.6 MW of residual ARRs with a target allocation of $26.3 million. The 210.6 percent increase in target allocations for Residual ARRs without a corresponding increase in monthly FTR auction revenue (See Table 13-45) in the 2025/2026 planning period contributed to the ARR deficiency in July 2025.

25 See FERC Letter Order, Docket No. ER17-1057 (April 5, 2017).

**Table 13-11 Residual ARR allocation volume and target allocation: 2014/2015 planning period through 2025/2026 planning period**

| Planning Period | Available Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume | Target Allocation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014/2015 | 65,095.3 | 22,532.9 | 34.6% | $8,160,918 |
| 2015/2016 | 61,807.0 | 37,042.4 | 59.9% | $8,620,353 |
| 2016/2017 | 71,000.7 | 35,034.9 | 49.3% | $6,986,723 |
| 2017/2018 | 81,040.8 | 39,597.4 | 48.9% | $17,497,626 |
| 2018/2019 | 49,646.9 | 27,335.6 | 55.1% | $11,817,002 |
| 2019/2020 | 48,286.5 | 27,233.2 | 56.4% | $12,369,581 |
| 2020/2021 | 43,484.2 | 25,028.0 | 57.6% | $11,677,033 |
| 2021/2022 | 46,092.0 | 27,619.2 | 59.9% | $18,806,123 |
| 2022/2023 | 71,068.9 | 34,502.8 | 48.5% | $38,140,961 |
| 2023/2024 | 81,055.2 | 27,055.0 | 33.4% | $8,721,413 |
| 2024/2025 | 128,523.3 | 36,097.6 | 28.1% | $26,309,246 |
| 2025/2026 | 134,120.6 | 27,865.4 | 20.8% | $81,663,004 |

## IARRs

In theory, Incremental Auction Revenue Rights (IARRs) are ARRs made available by physical transmission system upgrades from customer funded transmission projects or from merchant transmission or generation interconnection requests. In order for a transmission project to result in IARRs, the project must create simultaneously feasible incremental market flow capability in PJM's ARR market model, over and above all system capability being used by existing allocated ARRs and/or would be used by granting any prorated outstanding ARR requests, in the ARR market model.[26]

There are three sources of IARRs: IARRs based on a specific transmission investment; IARRs based on merchant transmission or generation interconnection projects; and IARRs based on RTEP upgrades. In the case of a specific transmission investment, the participant elects desired IARR MW between a specified source and sink and PJM and the affected transmission owners determine the upgrades necessary to create incremental capability. [27] In the other two cases, the participants paying for the upgrades are assigned IARRs if any are created. IARR requests have resulted in 12 unique source and sink combinations, totaling 1,887.2 MW of IARR paths.

26 See PJM Incremental Auction Revenue Rights Model Development and Analysis, PJM June 12, 2017. <https://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/ftr/pjm-iarr-model-development-and-analysis.ashx>.

27 See PJM OATT. Attachment EE <https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/oatt.pdf>.



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The MMU supports increased competition to provide transmission using market mechanisms. The IARR process is not a viable mechanism for facilitating competitive transmission investments. Maintaining the IARR process impedes the search for real solutions. PJM's process for creating and assigning IARRs is fundamentally flawed and cannot be made consistent with the requirements of Order No. 681 which established IARRs.[28]

Order No. 681 requires that long-term firm transmission rights made feasible by transmission upgrades or expansions be available upon request to the party that pays for such upgrades or expansions.[29] Order No. 681 also requires that the rights granted by upgrades/expansions cannot come at the expense of transmission rights held by others. IARRs are treated as Stage 1A rights, which are given first and absolute priority in PJM's annual allocation process. Granting Stage 1A status to IARRs is preferential treatment of IARR rights relative to the ARR rights belonging to load. If the annual market model used to assign existing ARR rights in a given year cannot simultaneously support all Stage 1A ARR requests, the system model is modified so as to make the Stage 1A ARR requests feasible. The result is an over allocation of congestion rights relative to expected congestion. To avoid having FTR target allocations exceed expected congestion, PJM reduces the annual supply (market model system capability) available to non-Stage 1A rights through selective line outages and line rating reductions. The resulting market model artificially supports all the Stage 1A ARR requests and artificially reduces the amount of remaining later tier ARRs from other rights holders. Stage 1A ARRs, including IARRs, are approved at the expense of other preexisting congestion rights. In the case of IARRs, this is in violation of Order No. 681.

The MMU recommends that IARRs be eliminated from the PJM tariff. If IARRs are not eliminated, the MMU recommends that IARRs be subject to prorating like all other ARR rights rather than being exempt from prorating.

28 See November 7, 2019 Comments on TranSource, LLC v. PJM, 168 FERC ¶ 61,119 (2019) ("Opinion No. 566").

29 *Long-Term Firm Transmission Rights in Organized Electricity Markets*, Order No. 681, 116 FERC ¶ 61,077 (2006) ("Order No. 681"), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 618-A, 117 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2006), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 681-A, 126 FERC ¶ 61,254 (2009).

## Financial Transmission Rights

FTRs are financial instruments that entitle their holders to receive revenue or require them to pay charges based on locational congestion price differences in the day-ahead energy market across specific FTR transmission paths. These day-ahead congestion price differences (shadow prices), multiplied by the FTR position in MW, are termed the FTR target allocations. The FTR target allocations define the maximum, but not guaranteed, payout for FTRs. The target allocation of an FTR reflects the difference in day-ahead congestion prices (CLMPs) rather than the difference in LMPs, which includes both congestion and marginal losses. Negative target allocations require the FTR holder to make payments rather than receive revenues in the FTR market. One of the fundamental flaws in the FTR design is the mismatch between congestion and the differences in day-ahead prices between nodes. The difference in day-ahead congestion prices is not congestion. Target allocations are not congestion. It is this fundamental flaw that creates what PJM refers to as "underfunding" or "revenue inadequacy." If FTRs were the rights to congestion revenue, there could never be revenue inadequacy. Congestion payments to FTR holders would always exactly equal congestion revenues.

Under the current rules, the revenue available to pay FTR holders' target allocations in a given month includes day-ahead congestion, payments by holders of negatively valued FTRs, and FTR auction revenues greater than ARR target allocations. Any such revenue above FTR target allocations from prior months in a planning period are used to pay any current month shortfalls. Payments to FTR holders for each planning period cannot exceed the target allocations because the target allocations define the FTR product purchased. At the end of each planning period, any surplus revenue above the target allocations is distributed to ARR holders.

FTR funding is not on a path specific basis or on an hour to hour basis and treats all FTRs the same. For example, if the payout ratio is less than 1.0 at the end of the planning period, the payments to all FTRs are reduced. Payments are made pro rata based on target allocations. The result is widespread cross subsidies because assignment of path specific FTRs may exceed system capability and affect the payments to FTRs on other paths. FTR auction

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revenues and excess revenues are carried forward from prior months and distributed back from later months within a planning period. At the end of a planning period, if the total revenue is less than the total target allocations, an uplift charge is collected from any FTR market participants that hold FTRs for the planning period, based on their pro rata share of total net positive FTR target allocations, excluding any charge to FTR holders with a net negative FTR position for the planning period.

Auction market participants may offer to buy FTRs between any eligible pricing nodes on the system, as defined by PJM for each auction. For the Annual FTR Auction and FTRs bought in the monthly auctions, the available FTR source and sink points include hubs, control zones, aggregates, generator buses, load buses and interface pricing points. For the Long Term FTR Auction there is a smaller set of available hubs, control zones, aggregates, generator buses and interface pricing points available. PJM does not allow FTR buy bids to clear with a price of zero unless there is at least one constraint in the auction which affects the FTR path. FTRs are available to the nearest 0.1 MW.

FTRs are bought from supply defined by PJM. The fact that load is selling congestion revenue rights is not recognized in the FTR design, although FTR buyers can resell FTRs at a price they agree to accept. Load has no role in defining the price at which PJM sells FTRs on their behalf. Load has no role in deciding the total FTR MW to be sold. Load has no role in deciding whether to sell load's rights to congestion revenues. PJM's objective in the FTR auctions is to maximize auction revenue, based only on the total set of bid prices and bid MW, but absent reservation prices from load. The failure to allow sellers the ability to decide at what price to sell FTRs is a fundamental flaw in the FTR market. The result is that PJM cannot actually maximize auction net revenue and that the FTR market is not really a market.

Once bought from PJM, FTRs can be bought and sold. Buy bids are bids to buy FTRs in the auctions. Sell offers are offers to sell existing FTRs in the auctions.

Market participants can buy and sell existing FTRs, outside of the auction process, through a voluntary bulletin board, termed the PJM bilateral market. FTRs can also be exchanged bilaterally without using the bulletin board. Prior to June 30, 2024, there was no requirement to report accurate detailed information about bilateral transactions settled through PJM billing systems. Effective June 30, 2024, the Commission accepted PJM's proposed revisions to the rules that required the reporting of bilateral price information and corroborating contract documents of any bilateral change of FTR ownership between participants/accounts that is settled through PJM settlement systems.[30] Bilateral transactions remain dependent on the contract established between the parties. PJM has no knowledge of bilateral transactions, or the terms and risks of bilateral transactions, that are done outside of PJM's bilateral market system.

## Supply and Demand

Total FTR supply in each auction as defined by PJM is limited by the definition of the transmission system capacity included in the PJM FTR market model as modified, for example, by PJM assumptions about transmission outages, for which there are no clear rules. PJM may also limit available transmission capacity through subjective judgment exercised without any clear guidelines.

The FTR auction process does not account for the fact that significant transmission outages, which have not been provided to PJM by transmission owners prior to the auction date, will occur during the periods covered by the auctions. Such transmission outages may or may not be planned in advance or may be emergency outages.[31] In addition, it is difficult to model in an annual auction two outages of similar significance and similar duration in different areas which do not overlap in time. The choice of which to model will generally have significant distributional consequences; they will affect different areas very differently. The fact that outages are modeled at significantly lower than historical levels results in selling too much FTR capacity, which creates downward pressure on ARR prices. To address this issue within the existing design, the MMU recommends that PJM use probabilistic outage modeling to better align the supply of ARRs and FTRs with actual expected transmission capacity.

30 *See* 187 FERC ¶ 61,020.

31 See the *2022 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 12: Transmission Facility Outages: Transmission Facility Outages Analysis for the FTR Market.



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## Long Term FTR Auctions

In July 2006, FERC approved Order No. 681 mandating the creation of long term firm transmission rights in transmission organizations with organized electricity markets. FERC's goal was that "load serving entities be able to request and obtain transmission rights up to a reasonable amount on a long-term firm basis, instead of being limited to obtaining exclusively annual rights."[32] Despite that order and inconsistent with the directive in that order, LSEs are not able to request ARRs nor are LSEs guaranteed rights to the revenue from Long Term FTR Auctions in PJM's long term FTR auction market design. Excess system capability in years two and three of the long term FTR auction is never made available to load in the form of ARRs and is only made available to FTR buyers.

PJM conducts the Long Term FTR Auction for the next three consecutive planning periods. The Long Term FTR Auction consists of five rounds beginning in June of the preceding planning period and continuing through March. FTRs purchased in prior rounds or Long Term Auctions may be offered for sale in subsequent rounds of the long term, annual or monthly FTR auctions. FTRs obtained in the Long Term FTR Auctions have terms of one year. FTR products available in the Long Term Auction include 24 hour, on peak and off peak FTR obligations, with FTR options unavailable in the Long Term FTR Auctions.

Beginning with Round 2 of the 2019/2022 Long Term FTR Auction, PJM implemented revisions to the determination of residual system capability made available in the Long Term FTR Auctions, and eliminated the YRALL product, consistent with the MMU's recommendation. The revisions affect the determination of ARR rights reserved for ARR holders. Rather than simply preserving the ARR cleared capacity from the previous annual allocation, PJM reruns the simultaneous feasibility test for the ARR/FTR market model, without outages, using the previous year's ARR requests, prorated when necessary, and uses the resulting ARRs as the basis for reserving capability for ARR holders in the Long Term FTR Auction. The ARR requests are greater than the previously cleared ARRs. The difference between the requested ARRs and the ARR/FTR market model's transmission system capacity, both without outages, determines the residual capability offered in the Long Term FTR Auction. The revisions provide ARR holders with more congestion rights in the Long Term FTR Auction that will carry into the Annual FTR Auction.

But the revisions do not address the congestion revenue rights sold in years two and three of the Long Term FTR Auction, which remain unavailable to ARRs. As a result, the rights to significant congestion revenues are still assigned to the Long Term FTR Auction without ever having been made available to ARR holders. That outcome is inconsistent with the basic logic of ARRs and inconsistent with the stated intent of the market design which is to return all congestion revenues to load.

Long Term FTR Auction transmission capacity is determined by removing all outages and running an offline model of the previous Annual FTR Auction model with all ARR bids from the prior annual ARR allocation. Any ARR MW that clear in this offline model are reserved for ARR holders in the relevant planning periods, and are removed from the Long Term FTR Auction capability. Even this approach does not, and cannot, preserve all congestion revenues for ARR holders in the first year of the Long Term Auction due to changes in system topology and outage selection between planning periods. PJM outage assumptions are a key factor in determining the supply of ARRs and the related supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction.

## Annual FTR Auctions

Annual FTRs are effective for an entire planning period, June 1 through May 31. Outages expected to last two or more months, as well as any outages of a shorter duration that PJM decides would cause FTR revenue inadequacy if not modeled, are included in the determination of the simultaneous feasibility for the Annual FTR Auction.[33] While the full list of outages selected is publicly posted, PJM exercises significant subjective judgment in selecting outages to accomplish FTR revenue adequacy goals and the process by which these outages are selected is not clear, is not defined and is not documented. ARR holders who wish to self schedule must inform PJM prior to round one of the annual auction. Any self scheduled ARR requests clear 25 percent of the requested volume in each round of the Annual FTR Auction as price takers.

32 Order No. 681 at P 17.

33 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

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The Annual FTR Auction consists of four rounds that allow any PJM member to bid for any FTR or to offer for sale any FTR that they currently hold. FTRs in the auctions include obligations and options and 24 hour, peak, off peak, and weekend peak products. FTRs purchased in one round of the Annual FTR Auction can be sold in later rounds or in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.

## Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions

Total Monthly FTR Auction capacity is based on the residual capacity available after the Long Term and Annual FTR auctions are conducted and adjustments are made to outages to reflect anticipated system conditions for the time periods auctioned. Outages expected to last five or more days are included in the determination of the simultaneous feasibility test for the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction. These are single round monthly auctions that allow any transmission service customer or PJM member to bid for any FTR or to offer for sale any FTR that they currently hold. Beginning with the 2020/2021 planning period, market participants can bid for or offer monthly FTRs for any of the remaining individual calendar months in the planning period. FTRs in the auctions include obligations and options and 24 hour, peak, off peak, and weekend peak products.[34]

## Bilateral Market

Market participants can buy and sell existing FTRs, outside of the auction process, through a voluntary bulletin board, termed the PJM bilateral market. FTRs can also be exchanged bilaterally without using the bulletin board. Bilateral transactions that are not done through PJM can involve parties that are not PJM members. PJM has no knowledge of bilateral transactions, or the terms and risks of bilateral transactions, that are done outside of PJM's bilateral market system. Prior to June 30, 2024, there was no requirement to report accurate detailed information about bilateral transactions settled through PJM billing systems. Effective June 30, 2024, the Commission accepted PJM's proposed revisions to the rules that required the reporting of bilateral price information and corroborating contract documents of any bilateral change of FTR ownership between participants/accounts that is settled through PJM settlement systems.[35] Bilateral transactions remain dependent on the contract established between the parties.

For bilateral trades reported to PJM, the FTR transmission path must remain the same, FTR obligations must remain obligations, and FTR options must remain options. However, an individual FTR may be split up into multiple, smaller FTRs, down to increments of 0.1 MW. Bilateral FTRs reported to PJM can also include more restrictive start and end times, meaning that the start time cannot be earlier than the original FTR start time and the end time cannot be later than the original FTR end time. Once the bilateral transaction is reported to PJM, PJM transfers ownership and adjusts credit requirements accordingly. Participants have used bilateral trades reported to PJM to reduce their credit requirements.

PJM's revised rules related to bilateral contracts fail to address the impact of PJM's indemnification rules. PJM stated that the "maintenance of the assumption of risk and costs is not a continuing interest in the FTR once sold; a continuing interest would be a right or benefit with respect to the subject FTR that survives the bilateral transaction." Contrary to logic, PJM asserts that only positive interests count as interests. Assumption of risks and costs of an FTR is, by definition, assumption of a financial interest in an FTR. When a participant buys an FTR in an auction, they assume the risks and costs of the FTR. Under PJM's indemnification rules the participant that bilaterally trades an FTR retains risks and costs associated with that FTR. Under PJM's indemnification rules, a bilateral seller of an FTR therefore has a continuing direct financial interest in that FTR and a direct financial interest in the credit and collateral of the buyer.

PJM's FTR market is the most transparent of all PJM markets. The facilitation of confidential bilateral transactions undercuts that transparency and therefore the efficiency of the FTR market. The bilateral information would be provided solely to PJM and not to the market. Transparency for PJM alone is not market transparency. The facilitation of confidential bilateral transactions does nothing to advance or improve the basic function of FTR markets.

34 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

35 *See* 187 FERC ¶ 61,020.



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There is no reason to continue to permit bilateral transactions outside the PJM FTR market. The MMU recommends that the bilateral FTR transactions market be eliminated and that all FTR transactions should take place in the FTR auctions, in order to provide full transparency, effective price discovery, and to minimize risk to market participants and PJM members.[36] The bilateral FTR market provides a PJM facilitated mechanism that undermines transparency for market participants and for loads whose congestion revenues fund FTRs. Bilateral FTR trading outside of PJM's transparent FTR market is inefficient, inconsistent with the basic structure and purpose of the PJM FTR market, and creates unnecessary credit risk.

## Market Structure

In order to evaluate the ownership of FTRs, the MMU categorizes all participants owning FTRs in PJM as either physical or financial. The MMU modified the method for categorizing participants as physical and financial participants. Prior to the *2025 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through March,* participants were defined as either physical or financial at an organization level. Under the modified approach, physical entities are defined as individual accounts in PJM's settlement systems that take physical positions in PJM markets and typically include utilities and customers. Financial entities are defined as individual accounts in PJM's settlement systems that take financial positions in PJM markets and typically include banks and trading firms.

Table 13-12 shows the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction market cleared FTRs by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. The results show that financial entities purchased 94.9 percent of prevailing flow buy bid FTRs and 96.8 percent of counter flow buy bid FTRs with the result that financial entities purchased 95.8 percent of all long term FTR auction cleared buy bids. Physical entities purchased 4.2 percent of all cleared long term FTRs in the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, down 1.1 percentage points from the previous Long Term FTR Auction.

### Table 13-12 Long term FTR auction patterns of ownership by FTR direction: 2026/2029 auction

| | | FTR Direction | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | Organization Type | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | All |
| Buy Bids | Physical | 5.1% | 3.2% | 4.2% |
| | Financial | 94.9% | 96.8% | 95.8% |
| | Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Sell Offers | Physical | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| | Financial | 100.0% | 99.9% | 100.0% |
| | Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Table 13-13 shows the HHI for the individual periods in the 2017/2020 through 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auctions and the entire auction. The YRALL auction was highly concentrated until its removal in the 2020/2023 Long Term Auction. The individual annual auctions are unconcentrated with the exception of years two and three of the 2017/2020 Auction and year three of the 2023/2026 Auction.

### Table 13-13 Long term HHIs by auction

| Auction | YR1 | YR2 | YR3 | YRALL | Entire Auction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17/20 Long Term Auction | 779 | 1779 | 1354 | 8533 | 884 |
| 18/21 Long Term Auction | 711 | 940 | 749 | 8654 | 693 |
| 19/22 Long Term Auction | 492 | 647 | 768 | 9954 | 506 |
| 20/23 Long Term Auction | 567 | 575 | 638 | NA | 463 |
| 21/24 Long Term Auction | 495 | 535 | 767 | NA | 460 |
| 22/25 Long Term Auction | 518 | 626 | 888 | NA | 598 |
| 23/26 Long Term Auction | 496 | 713 | 1049 | NA | 644 |
| 24/27 Long Term Auction | 473 | 656 | 949 | NA | 592 |
| 25/28 Long Term Auction | 485 | 603 | 786 | NA | 553 |
| 26/29 Long Term Auction | 502 | 643 | 720 | NA | 576 |

36 See Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER24-374-000 (November 30, 2023); Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER24-374-000 (February 6, 2024).

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Table 13-14 shows the annual FTR auction cleared FTRs for the 2026/2027 planning period by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. In the Annual FTR Auction for the 2026/2027 planning period, financial entities purchased 88.2 percent of prevailing flow FTRs, down 1.4 percentage points, and 95.9 percent of counter flow FTRs, down 1.9 percentage points, with the results that financial entities purchased 91.2 percent, unchanged, of all annual FTR auction cleared buy bids for the 2026/2027 planning period.

### Table 13-14 Annual FTR Auction patterns of ownership by FTR direction: 2026/2027 planning period

| | | | FTR Direction | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | Organization Type | Self-Scheduled FTRs | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | All |
| Buy Bids | Physical | Yes | 4.0% | 0.3% | 2.5% |
| | | No | 7.8% | 3.8% | 6.3% |
| | | Total | 11.8% | 4.1% | 8.8% |
| | Financial | No | 88.2% | 95.9% | 91.2% |
| | Total | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Sell Offers | Physical | | 1.6% | 2.3% | 1.9% |
| | Financial | | 98.4% | 97.7% | 98.1% |
| | Total | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Table 13-15 shows the HHI values for cleared buy and self scheduled bids for the 2016/2017 through 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auctions. Obligation buy bids are consistently unconcentrated, while Option buy bids are unconcentrated to moderately concentrated. Cleared self scheduled bids are always highly concentrated.

### Table 13-15 Annual auction HHIs by auction

| Auction | Offset Type | Trade Type | HHI |
|---|---|---|---|
| 26/27 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 471 |
| | Obligation | SelfScheduled | 2,361 |
| | Option | Buy | 1,143 |
| 25/26 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 425 |
| | Obligation | SelfScheduled | 2,650 |
| | Option | Buy | 815 |
| 24/25 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 399 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 2,975 |
| | Option | Buy | 822 |
| 23/24 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 425 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 2,595 |
| | Option | Buy | 1,220 |
| 22/23 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 424 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 3,398 |
| | Option | Buy | 884 |
| 21/22 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 420 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 3,291 |
| | Option | Buy | 957 |
| 20/21 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 278 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 2,970 |
| | Option | Buy | 1,299 |
| 19/20 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 251 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 2,661 |
| | Option | Buy | 978 |
| 18/19 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 357 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 2,620 |
| | Option | Buy | 1,213 |
| 17/18 Annual Auction | Obligation | Buy | 303 |
| | Obligation | Self Scheduled | 2,794 |
| | Option | Buy | 2,099 |



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Table 13-16 presents the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction cleared FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period by trade type, organization type and FTR direction. Financial entities purchased 95.5 percent of prevailing flow FTRs, up 2.1 percentage points, and 97.9 percent of counter flow FTRs, up 1.2 percentage points, from the 2024/2025 planning period, with the result that financial entities purchased 96.6 percent, up 1.7 percentage points, of all prevailing and counter flow FTR buy bids in the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction for the 2025/2026 planning period.

### Table 13-16 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction patterns of ownership by FTR direction: 2025/2026 planning period

| | | FTR Direction | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | Organization Type | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | All |
| Buy Bids | Physical | 4.5% | 2.1% | 3.4% |
| | Financial | 95.5% | 97.9% | 96.6% |
| | Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Sell | Physical | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% |
| | Financial | 99.7% | 99.7% | 99.7% |
| | Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Table 13-17 shows the monthly cumulative HHI values for cleared obligation MW for the 2025/2026 planning period monthly auctions for prevailing flow FTRs. Ownership of cleared prevailing flow bids was unconcentrated in 100 percent of auction periods.[37]

### Table 13-17 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction HHIs by period for prevailing flow FTRs

| | Auction Period | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auction | JUN | JUL | AUG | SEP | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY |
| Jun-25 | 470 | 486 | 481 | 623 | 793 | 704 | 615 | 580 | 586 | 732 | 731 | 812 |
| Jul-25 | | 479 | 498 | 613 | 718 | 673 | 619 | 606 | 590 | 665 | 639 | 736 |
| Aug-25 | | | 479 | 690 | 742 | 749 | 687 | 606 | 587 | 723 | 695 | 833 |
| Sep-25 | | | | 593 | 730 | 757 | 693 | 588 | 592 | 750 | 736 | 876 |
| Oct-25 | | | | | 588 | 770 | 685 | 585 | 598 | 753 | 765 | 902 |
| Nov-25 | | | | | | 643 | 690 | 591 | 608 | 769 | 798 | 936 |
| Dec-25 | | | | | | | 614 | 600 | 634 | 806 | 829 | 956 |
| Jan-26 | | | | | | | | 559 | 644 | 814 | 809 | 953 |
| Feb-26 | | | | | | | | | 563 | 795 | 794 | 915 |
| Mar-26 | | | | | | | | | | 692 | 744 | 870 |
| Apr-26 | | | | | | | | | | | 661 | 837 |
| May-26 | | | | | | | | | | | | 745 |

37 See *2025 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM,* Volume 2, Section 3: Energy Market, Competitive Assessment for HHI definitions.

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Table 13-18 shows the monthly cumulative HHI values for cleared obligation MW for the 2025/2026 planning period monthly auctions by month for counter flow FTRs. Ownership of cleared counter flow bids was unconcentrated in 69.2 percent of periods and moderately concentrated in 30.8 percent of auction periods.

### Table 13-18 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction HHIs by period for counter flow FTRs

| | Auction Period | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auction | JUN | JUL | AUG | SEP | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY |
| Jun-25 | 694 | 736 | 769 | 991 | 1073 | 1025 | 1079 | 1020 | 1123 | 1030 | 1185 | 1156 |
| Jul-25 | | 597 | 790 | 943 | 1027 | 1004 | 1000 | 1061 | 1042 | 1013 | 1155 | 1096 |
| Aug-25 | | | 672 | 914 | 991 | 983 | 960 | 1041 | 1014 | 962 | 1064 | 1042 |
| Sep-25 | | | | 686 | 939 | 934 | 903 | 1014 | 988 | 963 | 1036 | 1009 |
| Oct-25 | | | | | 733 | 889 | 895 | 1013 | 989 | 945 | 1008 | 970 |
| Nov-25 | | | | | | 722 | 856 | 965 | 965 | 932 | 963 | 942 |
| Dec-25 | | | | | | | 700 | 925 | 941 | 930 | 964 | 935 |
| Jan-26 | | | | | | | | 740 | 892 | 888 | 940 | 918 |
| Feb-26 | | | | | | | | | 781 | 885 | 951 | 920 |
| Mar-26 | | | | | | | | | | 772 | 907 | 895 |
| Apr-26 | | | | | | | | | | | 807 | 900 |
| May-26 | | | | | | | | | | | | 817 |

Table 13-19 shows the average daily FTR ownership for all FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period by organization type, by FTR direction and self scheduled FTRs. Financial entities owned 83.0 percent of all prevailing flow FTR MW, up 0.5 percentage points, and 96.0 percent of all counterflow FTR MW, up 1.3 percentage points, from the 2024/2025 planning period, with the result that financial entities purchased 89.2 percent, up 1.1 percentage points, of all prevailing flow and counter flow FTR MW for FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period.

### Table 13-19 Daily FTR held position ownership by FTR direction: June through May, 2025/2026 planning period

| | FTR Direction | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Organization Type | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | All |
| Physical | 10.7% | 4.0% | 7.5% |
| Physical Self Scheduled | 6.3% | 0.0% | 3.3% |
| Financial | 83.0% | 96.0% | 89.2% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

# Market Performance

## Volume

PJM regularly intervenes in the FTR market based on subjective judgment which is not based on clear or documented guidelines. Such intervention in the FTR market, or any market, is not appropriate and not consistent with the operation of competitive markets. In an apparent effort to manage FTR revenues, PJM may adjust normal transmission limits in the FTR auction model. If, in PJM's judgment, the normal transmission limit is not consistent with revenue adequacy goals and simultaneous feasibility, then transmission limits are reduced pro rata based on the MW of Stage 1A infeasibility and the availability of auction bids for counter flow FTRs.[38] PJM may also remove or reduce infeasibilities caused by transmission outages by clearing counter flow bids without being required to clear the corresponding prevailing flow bids.[39] The use of both of these procedures is contingent on the conditions that: PJM actions not affect the revenue adequacy of allocated ARRs; all requested self scheduled FTRs clear; and net FTR auction revenue is positive.

## Long Term FTR Auction

In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, 605,041 MW (25.6 percent of bid volume; 48.5 percent of total FTR volume) of counter flow FTR buy bids cleared, an increase in MW from 465,963 MW and a decrease in share from 50.4 percent of total FTR volume compared to the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, prevailing flow FTR buy bids cleared 642,434 MW (13.0 percent of bid volume; 51.5 percent of total FTR volume) an increase in MW from 457,906 MW and an increase in share from 49.6 percent of total FTR volume. In the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction, 119,069 MW (10.4 percent) of counter flow sell offers and 215,417 MW (17.8 percent) of prevailing flow sell offers cleared.

38 See "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).
39 See *id.*



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## Table 13-20 Long Term FTR Auction market volume: 2026/2029 auction

| Trade Type | FTR Direction | Period Type | Bid and Requested Count | Bid and Requested Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume | Uncleared Volume (MW) | Uncleared Volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buy bids | Counter Flow | Year 1 | 242,882 | 904,881 | 259,015 | 28.6% | 645,866 | 71.4% |
| | | Year 2 | 201,983 | 772,574 | 195,474 | 25.3% | 577,100 | 74.7% |
| | | Year 3 | 194,874 | 684,050 | 150,553 | 22.0% | 533,497 | 78.0% |
| | | Total | 639,739 | 2,361,505 | 605,041 | 25.6% | 1,756,464 | 74.4% |
| | Prevailing Flow | Year 1 | 495,020 | 2,138,961 | 293,087 | 13.7% | 1,845,874 | 86.3% |
| | | Year 2 | 333,220 | 1,529,406 | 203,042 | 13.3% | 1,326,364 | 86.7% |
| | | Year 3 | 296,538 | 1,289,508 | 146,305 | 11.3% | 1,143,203 | 88.7% |
| | | Total | 1,124,778 | 4,957,875 | 642,434 | 13.0% | 4,315,441 | 87.0% |
| | Total | | 1,764,517 | 7,319,380 | 1,247,475 | 17.0% | 6,071,905 | 83.0% |
| Sell offers | Counter Flow | Year 1 | 142,853 | 541,294 | 62,573 | 11.6% | 478,721 | 88.4% |
| | | Year 2 | 110,799 | 446,081 | 42,115 | 9.4% | 403,966 | 90.6% |
| | | Year 3 | 48,342 | 155,997 | 14,381 | 9.2% | 141,617 | 90.8% |
| | | Total | 301,994 | 1,143,373 | 119,069 | 10.4% | 1,024,303 | 89.6% |
| | Prevailing Flow | Year 1 | 164,207 | 662,404 | 126,143 | 19.0% | 536,261 | 81.0% |
| | | Year 2 | 104,953 | 419,806 | 69,119 | 16.5% | 350,687 | 83.5% |
| | | Year 3 | 40,479 | 128,925 | 20,156 | 15.6% | 108,769 | 84.4% |
| | | Total | 309,639 | 1,211,134 | 215,417 | 17.8% | 995,717 | 82.2% |
| | Total | | 611,633 | 2,354,507 | 334,486 | 14.2% | 2,020,021 | 85.8% |

Figure 13-2 shows the percent of FTR MW cleared, and bid and cleared volume, by direction, for each round of the Long Term FTR Auction from the 2015/2018 through the 2026/2029 auctions.

## Figure 13-2 Long Term FTR Auction bid and cleared volume by round and direction




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Table 13-21 compares cleared FTR obligations (not options) acquired in the Long Term FTR Auctions to the total cleared FTR obligations from the Annual FTR Auction, for FTRs in the 2014/2015 through 2026/2027 planning periods. A three year FTR is distributed to each individual planning period during its three year effective period. Long term FTRs that are effective in a single planning period were an average of 40.8 percent of total FTR volume in the 2014/2015 through 2026/2027 planning periods.

## Table 13-21 Long Term and Annual Auction total cleared FTR MW

| | Long Term FTR Product (Including YRALL) | | | Obligation Volume (MW) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Effective Planning Period | YR3 | YR2 | YR1 | Total Long Term | Annual (including self scheduled) | Long Term Percent of Total Cleared |
| 2014/2015 | 81,666 | 86,754 | 131,911 | 300,330 | 356,522 | 45.7% |
| 2015/2016 | 89,419 | 99,329 | 123,400 | 312,148 | 355,682 | 46.7% |
| 2016/2017 | 97,837 | 95,637 | 107,182 | 300,656 | 397,258 | 43.1% |
| 2017/2018 | 69,161 | 86,323 | 108,126 | 263,609 | 493,683 | 34.8% |
| 2018/2019 | 87,232 | 109,827 | 176,998 | 374,057 | 549,669 | 40.5% |
| 2019/2020 | 80,947 | 118,112 | 188,438 | 387,496 | 576,937 | 40.2% |
| 2020/2021 | 54,451 | 125,330 | 127,054 | 306,835 | 525,550 | 36.9% |
| 2021/2022 | 98,829 | 80,998 | 205,008 | 384,835 | 512,449 | 42.9% |
| 2022/2023 | 67,603 | 120,621 | 193,268 | 381,492 | 467,194 | 45.0% |
| 2023/2024 | 100,973 | 118,618 | 249,482 | 469,073 | 770,310 | 37.8% |
| 2024/2025 | 101,674 | 144,699 | 298,773 | 545,146 | 944,669 | 36.6% |
| 2025/2026 | 130,392 | 171,988 | 427,073 | 729,453 | 1,219,310 | 37.4% |
| 2026/2027 | 167,911 | 268,413 | 552,102 | 988,425 | 1,175,383 | 45.7% |

Table 13-22 shows the MW proportion of FTRs by source and sink node type for cleared buy bids in the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction. Generator to generator FTRs comprise 64.9 percent of all cleared FTR buy bids, up 1.4 percentage points from the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction.

## Table 13-22 Long Term FTR node type matrix: 2026/2029 auction

| | Sink Type | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source Type | Aggregate | Generator | Hub | Interface | Load | Residual Metered Aggregate | Zone |
| Aggregate | 1.2% | 7.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Generator | 6.7% | 64.9% | 1.5% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.4% | 2.1% |
| Hub | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.5% |
| Interface | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Load | 0.2% | 0.8% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Residual Metered Aggregate | 0.5% | 1.9% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Zone | 0.3% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 1.4% |



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## Annual FTR Auction

Table 13-23 shows the annual FTR auction market volume for the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction. Total FTR buy bids were 4,353,340 MW, down 34.3 percent from 6,628,872 MW for the previous Annual FTR Auction. For the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction 1,241,435 MW (28.5 percent) of buy bids cleared, down 4.1 percent from 1,294,688 MW (19.5 percent) for the previous Annual FTR Auction. There were 2,031,149 MW of sell offers, up 19.8 percent from 1,695,004 for the previous Annual FTR Auction. For the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction 246,294 MW (12.1 percent) of sell offers cleared, up 34.3 percent from 183,410 (10.8 percent) for the previous Annual FTR Auction. The total volume of cleared buy and self scheduled bids was 1,273,931 MW, down 3.8 percent from 1,324,299 MW in the previous Annual FTR Auction.

### Table 13-23 Annual FTR Auction market volume: 2025/2026 auction

| Trade Type | Type | FTR Direction | Bid and Requested Count | Bid and Requested Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume | Uncleared Volume (MW) | Uncleared Volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buy bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | 330,275 | 1,095,293 | 489,665 | 44.7% | 605,628 | 55.3% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 696,794 | 2,584,916 | 653,222 | 25.3% | 1,931,695 | 74.7% |
| | | Total | 1,027,069 | 3,680,209 | 1,142,887 | 31.1% | 2,537,323 | 68.9% |
| | Options | Counter Flow | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | 0 | NA |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 100,085 | 673,131 | 98,549 | 14.6% | 574,582 | 85.4% |
| | | Total | 100,085 | 673,131 | 98,549 | 14.6% | 574,582 | 85.4% |
| | Total | Counter Flow | 330,275 | 1,095,293 | 489,665 | 44.7% | 605,628 | 55.3% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 796,879 | 3,258,047 | 751,770 | 23.1% | 2,506,277 | 76.9% |
| | | Total | 1,127,154 | 4,353,340 | 1,241,435 | 28.5% | 3,111,905 | 71.5% |
| Self-scheduled bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | 188 | 1,370 | 1,370 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 8,424 | 31,125 | 31,125 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| | | Total | 8,612 | 32,496 | 32,496 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| Buy and self-scheduled bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | 330,463 | 1,096,664 | 491,036 | 44.8% | 605,628 | 55.2% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 705,218 | 2,616,042 | 684,347 | 26.2% | 1,931,695 | 73.8% |
| | | Total | 1,035,681 | 3,712,705 | 1,175,383 | 31.7% | 2,537,323 | 68.3% |
| | Options | Counter Flow | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | 0 | NA |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 100,085 | 673,131 | 98,549 | 14.6% | 574,582 | 85.4% |
| | | Total | 100,085 | 673,131 | 98,549 | 14.6% | 574,582 | 85.4% |
| | Total | Counter Flow | 330,463 | 1,096,664 | 491,036 | 44.8% | 605,628 | 55.2% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 805,303 | 3,289,172 | 782,896 | 23.8% | 2,506,277 | 76.2% |
| | | Total | 1,135,766 | 4,385,836 | 1,273,931 | 29.0% | 3,111,905 | 71.0% |
| Sell offers | Obligations | Counter Flow | 221,378 | 893,852 | 100,494 | 11.2% | 793,358 | 88.8% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 232,670 | 1,095,843 | 143,648 | 13.1% | 952,195 | 86.9% |
| | | Total | 454,048 | 1,989,696 | 244,142 | 12.3% | 1,745,554 | 87.7% |
| | Options | Counter Flow | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | 0 | NA |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 6,867 | 41,454 | 2,152 | 5.2% | 39,302 | 94.8% |
| | | Total | 6,867 | 41,454 | 2,152 | 5.2% | 39,302 | 94.8% |
| | Total | Counter Flow | 221,378 | 893,852 | 100,494 | 11.2% | 793,358 | 88.8% |
| | | Prevailing Flow | 239,537 | 1,137,297 | 145,800 | 12.8% | 991,497 | 87.2% |
| | | Total | 460,915 | 2,031,149 | 246,294 | 12.1% | 1,784,855 | 87.9% |

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Figure 13-3 shows the percent of FTR MW cleared and bid and cleared volume, by direction, for each round of the Annual FTR Auction from the 2015/2016 planning period through the 2026/2027 planning period.

### Figure 13-3 Annual FTR Auction bid and cleared volume by round and direction






Figure 13-4 shows the proportion of ARRs self scheduled as FTRs for the last sixteen planning periods. The maximum possible level of self scheduled FTRs is equal to total ARRs. Eligible participants self scheduled 62,496 MW (26.5 percent) of ARRs as FTRs for the 2026/2027 planning period, compared to 32,496 MW (26.5 percent) in the previous planning period.

### Figure 13-4 Comparison of self scheduled FTRs: 2009/2010 through 2026/2027 planning periods






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Table 13-24 shows the MW proportion of FTRs by source and sink node type for cleared buy and self scheduled bids in the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction.

Generator to generator FTRs comprise 58.1 percent of all cleared FTR buy and self scheduled bids in the 2026/2027 Annual Auction, down 2.0 percentage points from the previous planning period. Generator to generator FTRs make up a disproportionate share of total FTRs. Congestion results from load paying more for generation than generators receive. By definition, congestion is between generator sources and load sinks. Generator to generator paths do not represent the delivery of generation to load. FTRs between generators simply create a speculative opportunity because they can be a low cost or zero cost FTR in the current design with a significant payoff if there is a price difference between the two nodes.

The MMU recommends that PJM examine the source and sink node combinations available in the FTR market and eliminate generation to generation paths and all other paths that do not represent the delivery of power to load.

### Table 13-24 Annual auction FTR node type matrix by proportion of MW: 2025/2026 auction

| | Sink Type | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source Type | Aggregate | Generator | Hub | Interface | Load | Residual Metered Aggregate | Zone |
| Aggregate | 1.8% | 6.4% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 0.7% |
| Generator | 11.0% | 58.1% | 2.5% | 0.6% | 0.1% | 4.0% | 5.9% |
| Hub | 0.2% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 1.3% |
| Interface | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| Load | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Residual Metered Aggregate | 0.3% | 1.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% |
| Zone | 0.4% | 0.9% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.9% |

## Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions

Table 13-25 provides the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction market volume for the 2025/2026 and 2024/2025 planning periods. There were 63,410,958 MW of FTR obligation buy bids and 60,527,379 MW of FTR obligation sell offers for all bidding periods in the 2025/2026 planning period.[40] The monthly balance of planning period FTR auction cleared 15,413,532 (24.3 percent) of FTR obligation buy bids and 8,999,735 MW (14.9 percent) of FTR obligation sell offers.

There were 26,136,580 MW of FTR option buy bids and 6,002,498 MW of FTR option sell offers for all bidding periods in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period. The monthly balance of planning period FTR auction auctions cleared 784,839 MW (3.0 percent) of FTR option buy bids and 1,330,803 MW (22.2 percent) of FTR option sell offers.

40 The term obligation is used only to distinguish FTRs from options.

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## Table 13-25 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction market volume: June 2025 through May 2026

| Monthly Auction | Type | Trade Type | Bid and Requested Count | Bid and Requested Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume (MW) | Cleared Volume | Uncleared Volume (MW) | Uncleared Volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 1,524,117 | 10,459,179 | 1,857,497 | 17.8% | 8,601,683 | 82.2% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,672,291 | 7,831,025 | 1,599,672 | 20.4% | 6,231,353 | 79.6% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 265,505 | 4,907,680 | 142,485 | 2.9% | 4,765,195 | 97.1% |
| | | Sell offers | 151,286 | 726,502 | 183,122 | 25.2% | 543,380 | 74.8% |
| Jul-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 1,461,684 | 9,825,906 | 2,030,984 | 20.7% | 7,794,922 | 79.3% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,608,014 | 7,053,811 | 1,108,932 | 15.7% | 5,944,879 | 84.3% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 192,280 | 4,109,077 | 129,501 | 3.2% | 3,979,576 | 96.8% |
| | | Sell offers | 167,051 | 839,164 | 151,938 | 18.1% | 687,226 | 81.9% |
| Aug-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 1,389,431 | 7,505,218 | 1,905,638 | 25.4% | 5,599,580 | 74.6% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,454,737 | 6,916,441 | 887,665 | 12.8% | 6,028,776 | 87.2% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 148,953 | 3,021,657 | 94,914 | 3.1% | 2,926,743 | 96.9% |
| | | Sell offers | 146,719 | 772,381 | 144,017 | 18.6% | 628,365 | 81.4% |
| Sep-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 1,224,942 | 6,808,072 | 1,753,024 | 25.7% | 5,055,048 | 74.3% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,374,215 | 6,887,734 | 885,108 | 12.9% | 6,002,626 | 87.1% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 128,052 | 2,275,607 | 96,071 | 4.2% | 2,179,536 | 95.8% |
| | | Sell offers | 135,829 | 703,499 | 128,738 | 18.3% | 574,761 | 81.7% |
| Oct-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 1,113,435 | 6,235,731 | 1,597,537 | 25.6% | 4,638,195 | 74.4% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,260,502 | 6,508,856 | 760,306 | 11.7% | 5,748,550 | 88.3% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 106,509 | 2,321,999 | 66,598 | 2.9% | 2,255,401 | 97.1% |
| | | Sell offers | 116,305 | 629,172 | 114,934 | 18.3% | 514,238 | 81.7% |
| Nov-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 992,819 | 5,651,963 | 1,407,040 | 24.9% | 4,244,923 | 75.1% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,070,635 | 5,962,898 | 812,119 | 13.6% | 5,150,779 | 86.4% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 87,908 | 1,968,750 | 53,602 | 2.7% | 1,915,148 | 97.3% |
| | | Sell offers | 103,859 | 570,872 | 110,578 | 19.4% | 460,294 | 80.6% |
| Dec-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | 826,687 | 4,543,634 | 1,178,819 | 25.9% | 3,364,815 | 74.1% |
| | | Sell offers | 960,553 | 5,377,220 | 736,306 | 13.7% | 4,640,914 | 86.3% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 71,601 | 1,939,135 | 51,101 | 2.6% | 1,888,034 | 97.4% |
| | | Sell offers | 84,988 | 507,706 | 127,413 | 25.1% | 380,293 | 74.9% |
| Jan-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | 734,406 | 3,462,240 | 981,515 | 28.3% | 2,480,725 | 71.7% |
| | | Sell offers | 775,539 | 4,612,198 | 688,668 | 14.9% | 3,923,531 | 85.1% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 82,379 | 1,739,393 | 39,408 | 2.3% | 1,699,985 | 97.7% |
| | | Sell offers | 68,387 | 410,084 | 89,250 | 21.8% | 320,834 | 78.2% |
| Feb-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | 616,966 | 2,977,742 | 865,735 | 29.1% | 2,112,007 | 70.9% |
| | | Sell offers | 663,526 | 3,804,169 | 574,018 | 15.1% | 3,230,151 | 84.9% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 64,142 | 1,361,817 | 37,763 | 2.8% | 1,324,055 | 97.2% |
| | | Sell offers | 56,167 | 347,404 | 81,688 | 23.5% | 265,715 | 76.5% |
| Mar-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | 506,097 | 2,542,126 | 789,773 | 31.1% | 1,752,353 | 68.9% |
| | | Sell offers | 491,025 | 2,814,840 | 435,468 | 15.5% | 2,379,372 | 84.5% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 44,982 | 1,184,644 | 38,397 | 3.2% | 1,146,248 | 96.8% |
| | | Sell offers | 39,380 | 262,308 | 88,966 | 33.9% | 173,342 | 66.1% |
| Apr-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | 401,106 | 1,928,736 | 583,211 | 30.2% | 1,345,525 | 69.8% |
| | | Sell offers | 311,590 | 1,839,837 | 314,060 | 17.1% | 1,525,777 | 82.9% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 36,466 | 901,084 | 29,212 | 3.2% | 871,872 | 96.8% |
| | | Sell offers | 24,092 | 170,723 | 76,367 | 44.7% | 94,357 | 55.3% |
| May-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | 294,847 | 1,470,409 | 462,760 | 31.5% | 1,007,650 | 68.5% |
| | | Sell offers | 157,589 | 918,349 | 197,412 | 21.5% | 720,936 | 78.5% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 6,813 | 405,737 | 5,786 | 1.4% | 399,951 | 98.6% |
| | | Sell offers | 8,135 | 62,684 | 33,793 | 53.9% | 28,891 | 46.1% |
| 2024/2025 | Obligations | Buy bids | 10,250,462 | 51,695,684 | 10,486,345 | 20.3% | 41,209,339 | 79.7% |
| | | Sell offers | 10,167,424 | 40,510,062 | 5,622,983 | 13.9% | 34,887,079 | 86.1% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 756,191 | 15,283,383 | 757,379 | 5.0% | 14,526,004 | 95.0% |
| | | Sell offers | 899,936 | 5,387,701 | 1,041,790 | 19.3% | 4,345,912 | 80.7% |
| 2025/2026 | Obligations | Buy bids | 11,086,537 | 63,410,958 | 15,413,532 | 24.3% | 47,997,426 | 75.7% |
| | | Sell offers | 11,800,216 | 60,527,379 | 8,999,735 | 14.9% | 51,527,644 | 85.1% |
| | Options | Buy bids | 1,235,590 | 26,136,580 | 784,839 | 3.0% | 25,351,742 | 97.0% |
| | | Sell offers | 1,102,198 | 6,002,498 | 1,330,803 | 22.2% | 4,671,695 | 77.8% |


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Figure 13-5 shows the bid volume from each monthly auction for each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions of the 2025/2026 planning period. The prompt month is the final month for which FTRs for a specific month are sold. For example, June is the prompt month for June FTRs sold in the June auction, which occurs in May. The bid volume for the non-prompt months is significantly lower than for the prompt months. On average, the non-prompt month bid volume is 53.2 percent of the prompt month bid volume.

### Figure 13-5 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction bid volume (MW per period): June 2025 through May 2026 Auction






Figure 13-6 shows the cleared volume from each monthly auction for each period of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions of the 2025/2026 planning period. The cleared volume for non-prompt months is also significantly lower than in prompt months. On average, the non-prompt months cleared volume is 32.6 percent of the prompt month cleared volume.

### Figure 13-6 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared volume (MW per period): June 2025 through May 2026 Auction




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Figure 13-7 shows the FTR bid, net bid and cleared volume from June 2003 through June 2026 for Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions. Cleared volume includes FTR buy and sell offers that were accepted. The net bid volume includes the total buy, sell and self scheduled offers, counting sell offers as a negative volume. The bid volume is the total of all bid and self scheduled offers, excluding sell offers. Following the implementation of the Historical Simulation Initial Margining (HSIM) analysis model in the September 2022 Monthly Auction, bid and net bid volumes have increased significantly. On average in the 2025/2026 planning period there was a 22.2 percent increase in bid volume and a 13.5 percent decrease in net bid volume compared to the same month in the previous planning period.

### Figure 13-7 Long Term, Annual and Monthly FTR Auction bid and cleared volume: June 2003 through June 2026






Figure 13-8 shows cleared auction volumes by auction type as a percent of the total FTR cleared volume by calendar months for June 2004 through May 2026. FTR volumes are included in the calendar month they are effective, with long term and annual FTR auction volumes spread equally to each month in the relevant planning period. Over the course of each planning period an increasing number of Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTRs are purchased, resulting in a greater share of total FTRs. When the Annual FTR Auction occurs, FTRs purchased in previous Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, other than the current June auction, are no longer effective, resulting in a smaller share for monthly and a greater share for annual FTRs.

### Figure 13-8 Cleared auction volume (MW) as a percent of total FTR cleared volume by calendar month: June 2004 through May 2026





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## Bilateral Market

Table 13-26 provides the PJM registered secondary bilateral FTR market volume for the 2025/2026 and 2024/2025 planning periods. Market participants can buy and sell existing FTRs, outside of the auction process, through a voluntary bulletin board, termed the PJM bilateral market. FTRs can also be exchanged bilaterally without using the bulletin board. Prior to June 30, 2024, there was no requirement to report accurate detailed information about bilateral transactions settled through PJM billing systems. Effective June 30, 2024, the Commission accepted PJM's proposed revisions to the rules that required the reporting of bilateral price information and corroborating contract documents of any bilateral change of FTR ownership between participants/accounts that is settled through PJM settlement systems.[41] Bilateral transactions remain dependent on the contract established between the parties. PJM has no knowledge of bilateral transactions, or the terms and risks of bilateral transactions, that are done outside of PJM's bilateral market system. As a result, the bilateral data are not a reliable basis for evaluating actual bilateral activity in PJM FTRs.

In the 2025/2026 planning period there were two pairs of bilateral trading participants, one pair of unaffiliated participants, and 47 total bilateral FTR transactions. In the 2024/2025 planning period, there were eight total pairs of bilateral trading participants, three pairs of unaffiliated participants and 121 total bilateral FTR transactions.

41 *See* 187 FERC ¶ 61,020.

### Table 13-26 Secondary bilateral FTR market volume: 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods[42]

| Planning Period | Type | Class Type | Volume (MW) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024/2025 | Obligation | 24-Hour | 1,196.4 |
| | | On Peak | 480.4 |
| | | Daily Off Peak | 127.9 |
| | | Weekend On Peak | 147.8 |
| | | Total | 1,952.5 |
| | Option | 24-Hour | 0.0 |
| | | On Peak | 0.0 |
| | | Daily Off Peak | 0.0 |
| | | Weekend On Peak | 0.0 |
| | | Total | 0.0 |
| 2025/2026 | Obligation | 24-Hour | 294.0 |
| | | On Peak | 255.7 |
| | | Daily Off Peak | 276.9 |
| | | Weekend On Peak | 272.0 |
| | | Total | 1,098.6 |
| | Option | 24-Hour | 0.0 |
| | | On Peak | 0.0 |
| | | Daily Off Peak | 0.0 |
| | | Weekend On Peak | 0.0 |
| | | Total | 0.0 |

## Price

Table 13-27 shows the cleared, weighted average prices by trade type, FTR direction, period type and class type for the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction. Only FTR obligation products (no options) are available in the Long Term FTR Auctions. In this auction, weighted average buy bid counter flow and prevailing flow FTR prices were -$0.92 and $1.03, compared to -$0.82 and $0.99 from the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. Weighted average sell bid counter flow and prevailing flow FTR prices were -$0.87 and $0.85, compared to -$0.79 for counter flow FTRs and $0.73 for prevailing flow FTRs for the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction.

42 The 2024/2025 planning period covers bilateral FTRs that are effective for any time between June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025, which originally had been purchased in a Long Term FTR Auction, Annual FTR Auction or Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction.

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### Table 13-27 Long Term FTR Auction: weighted average cleared prices (Dollars per MW): 2026/2029 auction

| | | | Class Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | FTR Direction | Period Type | 24-Hour | On Peak | Weekend On Peak | Daily Off Peak | All |
| Buy bids | Counter Flow | Year 1 | ($3.62) | ($0.42) | ($0.79) | ($0.64) | ($0.91) |
| | | Year 2 | ($3.80) | ($0.47) | ($0.89) | ($0.72) | ($0.91) |
| | | Year 3 | ($3.91) | ($0.55) | ($0.97) | ($0.83) | ($0.94) |
| | | Total | ($3.71) | ($0.47) | ($0.87) | ($0.71) | ($0.92) |
| | Prevailing Flow | Year 1 | $3.43 | $0.53 | $0.95 | $0.78 | $1.04 |
| | | Year 2 | $3.54 | $0.53 | $0.98 | $0.78 | $0.99 |
| | | Year 3 | $3.42 | $0.71 | $1.09 | $0.98 | $1.07 |
| | | Total | $3.46 | $0.57 | $0.99 | $0.83 | $1.03 |
| | Total | | $0.10 | $0.05 | $0.11 | $0.09 | $0.09 |
| Sell offers | Counter Flow | Year 1 | ($1.95) | ($0.60) | ($0.96) | ($0.87) | ($0.85) |
| | | Year 2 | ($1.57) | ($0.65) | ($1.04) | ($0.92) | ($0.91) |
| | | Year 3 | ($1.20) | ($0.57) | ($1.02) | ($0.85) | ($0.84) |
| | | Total | ($1.87) | ($0.61) | ($1.00) | ($0.88) | ($0.87) |
| | Prevailing Flow | Year 1 | $4.81 | $0.56 | $0.95 | $0.79 | $0.90 |
| | | Year 2 | $3.34 | $0.53 | $0.89 | $0.65 | $0.77 |
| | | Year 3 | $3.20 | $0.67 | $0.92 | $0.68 | $0.82 |
| | | Total | $4.44 | $0.56 | $0.93 | $0.73 | $0.85 |
| | Total | | $3.17 | $0.14 | $0.23 | $0.17 | $0.24 |

Table 13-28 shows the weighted average cleared buy bid prices by trade type, FTR product, FTR direction and class type for the Annual FTR Auction for the 2026/2027 planning period. The weighted average cleared buy bid price in the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction was $6.76 per MW, up from $2.88 per MW in the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction.

### Table 13-28 Annual FTR Auction weighted average cleared prices (Dollars per MW): 2026/2027 planning period

| | | | Class Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | Type | FTR Direction | 24-Hour | On Peak | Weekend On Peak | Daily Off Peak | All |
| Buy bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($2.26) | ($0.96) | ($0.77) | ($0.49) | ($0.81) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $4.87 | $1.48 | $1.15 | $0.70 | $1.52 |
| | | Total | $3.53 | $0.46 | $0.32 | $0.17 | $0.55 |
| | Options | Counter Flow | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $0.33 | $0.62 | $0.54 | $0.40 | $0.49 |
| | | Total | $0.33 | $0.62 | $0.54 | $0.40 | $0.49 |
| Self-scheduled bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($0.44) | ($0.68) | ($0.35) | ($0.03) | ($0.46) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $7.81 | $4.82 | $3.27 | $1.59 | $7.58 |
| | | Total | $7.58 | $4.03 | $2.65 | $1.52 | $7.31 |
| Buy and self-scheduled bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($2.02) | ($0.96) | ($0.77) | ($0.49) | ($0.81) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $6.47 | $1.50 | $1.16 | $0.71 | $2.16 |
| | | Total | $5.56 | $0.48 | $0.33 | $0.18 | $1.01 |
| | Options | Counter Flow | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $0.33 | $0.62 | $0.54 | $0.40 | $0.49 |
| | | Total | $0.33 | $0.62 | $0.54 | $0.40 | $0.49 |
| Sell offers | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($4.32) | ($1.33) | ($1.11) | ($0.73) | ($1.41) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $6.91 | $1.20 | $1.04 | $0.68 | $1.49 |
| | | Total | $1.86 | $0.19 | $0.19 | $0.09 | $0.31 |
| | Options | Counter Flow | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $0.77 | $1.03 | $0.76 | $0.57 | $0.79 |
| | | Total | $0.77 | $1.03 | $0.76 | $0.57 | $0.79 |



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Table 13-29 shows the cleared buy bid volume, cleared buy bid revenue and cleared revenue/cleared MW for the 2012/2013 Annual FTR Auction through the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction. Changes in modeling assumptions and changes in rules across planning periods can cause shifts to buy bid revenue in the Annual FTR Auction. For example, conservative modeling by PJM for the 2014/2015 planning period led to a 52.8 percent increase in the $/MW compared to the 2013/2014 planning period. For the 2017/2018 planning period, PJM reversed its conservative modeling practices after balancing congestion and M2M payments were, inappropriately, directly assigned to load beginning in the 2017/2018 planning period. The reassignment of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load did not increase the per MW value of ARRs. Instead, the $/MW decreased 46.8 percent from the 2016/2017 planning period to the 2017/2018 planning period. In the 2014/2015 planning period the $/MW increased significantly from the 2013/2014 planning period due to PJM's decisions to limit capacity through conservative modeling. In the 2017/2018 Annual FTR Auction, the $/MW decreased to lower than 2013/2014 levels, due in part to the partial relaxation of PJM's conservative modeling practices due to the reassignment of balancing congestion and M2M payments to load and exports. This reduction continued into the 2019/2020 planning period. Due to the more restrictive modeling for the 2022/2023 planning period (relative to the 2021/2022 planning period), quantities and revenue were similar to 2016/2017 levels, when PJM was restricting the FTR market to account for balancing congestion.

Market results affect bidding behavior. The two Annual FTR Auctions with the largest increases in buy bid revenue were preceded by planning periods with record levels of congestion (See Table 13-50). Day ahead congestion had increased 130.0 percent at the end of the 2021/2022 planning period, compared to the 2020/2021 planning period, and increased 126.5 percent at the end of the 2025/2026 planning period compared to the 2024/2025 planning period. There was a significant increase in buy bid revenue and $/MW in the 2022/2023 planning period and the 2026/2027 planning period. For the 2022/2023 Annual FTR Auction buy bid revenue increased 111.3 percent from $519 million to $1,096 million, and $/MW increased 133.6 percent from $970 million to $2,265 million, compared to the 2021/2022 Annual FTR Auction. For the 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction buy bid revenue increased 67.9 percent from $1,264 million to $2,121 million and $/MW increased 75.1 percent from $976 million to $1,709 million, compared to the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction.


### Table 13-29 Cleared volume, revenue and $/MW: 2012/2013 through 2026/2027 Annual FTR Auction

| | Buy Bid Volume | Cleared Buy Bid Volume | Percent Cleared | Buy Bid Revenue (millions) | Buy Bid Revenue ($/MW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012/2013 | 2,520,119 | 329,578 | 13.1% | $389.1 | $1,181 |
| 2013/2014 | 3,245,033 | 391,148 | 12.1% | $382.5 | $978 |
| 2014/2015 | 3,243,346 | 338,879 | 10.4% | $506.3 | $1,494 |
| 2015/2016 | 2,437,964 | 354,630 | 14.5% | $620.5 | $1,750 |
| 2016/2017 | 2,565,494 | 393,509 | 15.3% | $615.8 | $1,565 |
| 2017/2018 | 2,281,534 | 488,734 | 21.4% | $406.5 | $832 |
| 2018/2019 | 2,880,105 | 587,628 | 20.4% | $635.7 | $1,082 |
| 2019/2020 | 2,787,716 | 611,878 | 21.9% | $649.0 | $1,061 |
| 2020/2021 | 2,336,551 | 556,034 | 23.8% | $449.6 | $809 |
| 2021/2022 | 2,043,408 | 535,277 | 26.2% | $519.0 | $970 |
| 2022/2023 | 1,984,377 | 483,988 | 24.4% | $1,096.3 | $2,265 |
| 2023/2024 | 3,746,935 | 851,248 | 22.7% | $957.9 | $1,125 |
| 2024/2025 | 4,741,013 | 999,108 | 21.1% | $941.4 | $942 |
| 2025/2026 | 6,628,872 | 1,294,688 | 19.5% | $1,263.6 | $976 |
| 2026/2027 | 4,353,340 | 1,241,435 | 28.5% | $2,121.1 | $1,709 |

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Figure 13-9 shows the weighted average cleared buy bid price of obligations in the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions by bidding period for the 2025/2026 planning period and the average price per MWh for each of the FTR periods. The average price per MWh across all bidding periods for the 2025/2026 planning period was $0.44.

**Figure 13-9 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction cleared weighted-average buy bid price per period (Dollars per MWh): 2025/2026 planning period**




## Profitability

FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received directly from holding an FTR plus any revenue from the sale of an FTR and the cost of the FTR. FTR profitability is relevant only to participants purchasing FTRs and is not relevant to self scheduled FTRs. For a prevailing flow FTR, the FTR revenue is the actual revenue that an FTR holder is paid as the target allocation plus the auction price from the sale of the FTR, if relevant, and the FTR cost is the auction price. For a counter flow FTR, the FTR revenue is the auction price that an FTR holder is paid to take the FTR plus the positive auction price from the sale of the FTR, if relevant, and the FTR cost is the target allocation that the FTR holder must pay plus the negative auction price from the sale of the FTR, if relevant. Profits include the payment of surplus to FTRs. Bilateral transactions are excluded from the profit calculations. Bilateral profits and losses net to zero in market total profits and losses. ARR holders that self schedule FTRs receive congestion revenues but do not receive profits from those FTRs because ARR holders are assigned the rights to congestion revenues which they choose to take directly as the congestion payments associated with the corresponding FTRs.

Profits in the 2025/2026 planning period include the auction cost and revenue from both buying and selling FTRs that were effective from June 2025 through May 2026. This includes FTRs from the 2023/2026, 2024/2027 and 2025/2028 Long Term auctions, the 2025/2026 Annual auction, and the Monthly auctions from June 2025 through May 2026. The costs and revenues of the yearly FTR products are prorated based on the period of the FTRs. Any revenues or costs related to bilateral transactions are not included in profits.

Hourly FTR profits are the sum of the hourly revenues minus the hourly costs for each FTR. The hourly revenues equal any positive hourly FTR target allocations, adjusted by the payout ratio plus any hourly auction revenues from the sale and/or the purchase of the FTR. The hourly auction costs equal any negative hourly FTR target allocations plus any hourly auction costs from the purchase and/or the sale of the FTR. The hourly auction costs and auction revenues are the product of the FTR MW and the auction price divided by the period of the FTR in hours. The FTR revenues do not include after the fact adjustments which are very small and do not occur in every month.

The surplus includes surplus day-ahead congestion revenue and FTR auction surplus. The surplus is first allocated to FTR holders to cover any shortfall in paying FTR target allocations for the current month or prior months in the planning period. A negative surplus (shortfall) at the end of the planning period is a deficiency that is charged as FTR uplift to FTR holders. The end


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of planning period surplus or uplift was distributed to FTR holders prorata based on FTR positive target allocations through the 2017/2018 planning period. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period, any surplus is given to FTR holders only up to FTR target allocations within the planning period, and, after any surplus assigned to FTRs, the net surplus at the end of the planning period is distributed to ARR holders. Profits include any surplus distribution or uplift payments that was used to satisfy any shortfall in FTR target allocations.

The fact that FTR profits in each planning period have been positive for financial entities as a group, regardless of the payout ratio, raises questions about the competitiveness of the market. FTR profits for financial entities were not positive in the 2019/2020 planning period when accounting for GreenHat losses, but were positive otherwise. FTR profits for financial entities without GreenHat losses were positive in every planning period from 2012/2013 through 2025/2026 except the 2016/2017 planning period, and were positive if summed over the entire period. Financial entities have been much more profitable than physical and physical ARR entities combined except for the 2015/2016 and the 2016/2017 planning periods (Table 13-33). It is not clear, in a competitive market, why FTRs remain persistently profitable for financial entities and much more profitable for financial entities than for other participants. In a competitive market, it is be expected that profits would be competed to zero.

Table 13-30 lists FTR profits, and the congestion returned through self scheduled FTRs, by organization type and FTR direction in the 2025/2026 planning period. All physical participants who were assigned ARRs are classified as physical. Some participants that are not eligible for ARRs are classified as physical because they are physical participants, for example companies that own only generation.

In the 2025/2026 planning period, physical participants, including physical ARR and IARR participants, received $595.3 million in profits on FTRs purchased directly (not self scheduled), up from $42.6 million profits in the 2024/2025 planning period. Financial participants, including financial IARR participants, received $1.6 billion in profits, almost double the $854.8 million in profits in the 2024/2025 planning period.[43] Some IARRs owned by financial participants were self scheduled as FTRs, which received $1.5 million. Self scheduled FTRs have zero cost. Physical ARR holders who self scheduled FTRs received $1.6 billion in congestion revenues, up from $650.0 million in revenue in the 2024/2025 planning period. Revenues from self scheduled FTRs are a return of congestion to the load that paid the congestion and are not profits. Since the revenue from self scheduled FTRs is not profit it is excluded from the other tables in the profitability section.

### Table 13-30 FTR profits and revenues by organization type and FTR direction: June through May, 2025/2026

| | Purchased FTRs Profit | | | Self Scheduled FTRs Revenue Returned | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Organization Type | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | Total | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | Total |
| Financial | $2,616,730,216 | ($1,038,342,228) | $1,578,387,988 | $1,547,692 | | $1,547,692 |
| Physical | $250,796,293 | ($21,821,464) | $228,974,829 | | | |
| Physical ARR | $518,826,867 | ($152,520,488) | $366,306,379 | $1,553,737,272 | ($175,381) | $1,553,561,891 |
| Total | $3,386,353,375 | ($1,212,684,180) | $2,173,669,196 | $1,555,284,965 | ($175,381) | $1,555,109,583 |

43 There are financial participants who hold IARRs. The IARRs held by the financial participants were originally assigned to transmission upgrades associated with generation interconnection projects where the participant subsequently sold the associated physical assets (generation units) but kept the associated IARRs. Since these participants have not offered MW into the physical energy or capacity market and currently only hold financial positions, they are currently classified as financial participants.

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Table 13-31 compares the revenue from self scheduled FTRs and the ARR target allocation if the self scheduled FTRs were held as ARRs. Table 13-31 shows whether the self scheduled FTR holders were better off by self scheduling compared with holding ARRs. In the 2025/2026 planning period, the total revenue returned to self scheduled FTRs was $1.6 billion. If the self scheduled FTRs were held as ARRs, they would have received $751.6 million in ARR target allocation, or only 48.3 percent of the revenue received from self scheduled FTRs. One self scheduled FTR holder accounted for $909.6 million, or 58.5 percent, of the total revenue received by all self scheduled FTRs in the 2025/2026 planning period.

## Table 13-31 Self scheduled FTR revenues and unrealized ARR target allocation: June through May, 2025/2026

| | Self Scheduled FTRs Revenue Returned | | | Unrealized ARR Target Allocation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Organization Type | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | Total | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | Total |
| Financial | $1,547,692 | | $1,547,692 | $254,694 | | $254,694 |
| Physical | | | | | | |
| Physical ARR | $1,553,737,272 | ($175,381) | $1,553,561,891 | $751,426,652 | ($101,575) | $751,325,077 |
| Total | $1,555,284,965 | ($175,381) | $1,555,109,583 | $751,681,346 | ($101,575) | $751,579,771 |

Table 13-32 lists the monthly FTR profits for the 2024/2025 planning period and the 2025/2026 planning period by organization type. In the 2025/2026 planning period, profits for all participants were $2.2 billion, up from $897.3 million in profits in the 2024/2025 planning period and the highest level of profits since the 2010/2011 planning period. The increase in profits is due to the increase in FTR target credit. January had the largest monthly profit in the 2025/2026 planning period, $540.7 million, the largest monthly profit since the 2013/2014 planning period. The largest month to month increase in profits in the 2025/2026 planning period was also in January, an increase of $410.9 million. Among organization types, financial organizations' profits were the largest, $1.6 billion, or 72.6 percent of the market's total profits. Financial organizations had the largest increase in profits, an increase of $723.6 million. Physical organizations had the smallest profits among organization types, $229.0 million.

## Table 13-32 Monthly FTR profits by organization type: 2024/2025 through May 2025/2026

| | Organization Type | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Financial | Physical | Physical ARR | Total |
| Jun-24 | $47,118,337 | ($625,023) | ($6,496,086) | $39,997,228 |
| Jul-24 | $140,890,180 | $26,747,762 | $3,673,731 | $171,311,673 |
| Aug-24 | $89,115,812 | $14,471,496 | ($3,597,813) | $99,989,494 |
| Sep-24 | $38,225,761 | $5,734,554 | ($3,506,030) | $40,454,285 |
| Oct-24 | $34,019,402 | $4,437,290 | $4,457,735 | $42,914,427 |
| Nov-24 | $4,454,325 | ($4,204,643) | ($11,749,666) | ($11,499,985) |
| Dec-24 | $94,290,172 | $23,591,538 | ($119,565) | $117,762,146 |
| Jan-25 | $135,793,868 | $4,793,121 | ($10,788,364) | $129,798,624 |
| Feb-25 | $46,755,828 | $12,458,346 | ($17,964,016) | $41,250,157 |
| Mar-25 | $114,057,458 | $6,111,111 | $6,838,610 | $127,007,179 |
| Apr-25 | $60,134,385 | ($3,340,649) | $2,667,505 | $59,461,242 |
| May-25 | $49,921,607 | ($5,061,517) | ($5,977,119) | $38,882,971 |
| Summary for Planning Period 2024/2025 | | | | |
| Total | $854,777,135 | $85,113,384 | ($42,561,078) | $897,329,441 |
| Jun-25 | $92,206,975 | $10,730,035 | $13,494,064 | $116,431,074 |
| Jul-25 | $165,773,391 | $29,775,894 | $25,986,128 | $221,535,414 |
| Aug-25 | $45,813,799 | $6,474,427 | ($21,925,617) | $30,362,609 |
| Sep-25 | $49,029,634 | $8,259,195 | $20,164,447 | $77,453,277 |
| Oct-25 | $109,152,868 | ($2,911,850) | $18,999,374 | $125,240,392 |
| Nov-25 | $61,740,719 | $5,688,375 | $18,925,861 | $86,354,955 |
| Dec-25 | $183,209,865 | $40,870,109 | $31,100,999 | $255,180,973 |
| Jan-26 | $332,432,616 | $78,522,390 | $129,732,020 | $540,687,026 |
| Feb-26 | $232,902,253 | $44,083,845 | $50,168,556 | $327,154,654 |
| Mar-26 | $65,304,476 | $6,735,426 | $26,898,756 | $98,938,658 |
| Apr-26 | $92,877,365 | ($1,487,795) | $27,096,957 | $118,486,526 |
| May-26 | $147,944,026 | $2,234,776 | $25,664,833 | $175,843,636 |
| Summary for Planning Period 2025/2026 | | | | |
| Total | $1,578,387,988 | $228,974,829 | $366,306,379 | $2,173,669,196 |



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Table 13-33 lists the historical profits by planning period by organization type beginning in the 2012/2013 planning period for purchased FTRs. (Profits do not include congestion revenue to self scheduled FTRs.) The rules governing the allocation of surplus are described later in this section.

### Table 13-33 FTR profits by organization type: 2012/2013 through 2025/2026

| | | 2012/2013 | 2013/2014 | 2014/2015 | 2015/2016 | 2016/2017 | 2017/2018 | 2018/2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | Profit | $201,825,234 | $913,502,323 | $250,551,943 | $68,895,867 | ($12,525,947) | $239,981,474 | $113,086,231 |
| | Surplus | ($50,304,408) | ($145,080,521) | $19,453,837 | $4,921,078 | $8,810,267 | $90,361,918 | |
| | Total | $151,520,826 | $768,421,802 | $270,005,781 | $73,816,945 | ($3,715,680) | $330,343,392 | $113,086,231 |
| Financial without GreenHat | Profit | $201,825,234 | $913,502,323 | $250,551,785 | $70,094,918 | ($11,821,248) | $240,111,850 | $223,376,757 |
| | Surplus | ($50,304,408) | ($145,080,521) | $19,453,837 | $4,921,078 | $8,810,267 | $90,361,918 | |
| | Total | $151,520,826 | $768,421,802 | $270,005,623 | $75,015,995 | ($3,010,981) | $330,473,768 | $223,376,757 |
| Physical | Profit | $68,537,800 | $297,456,284 | $82,853,390 | $10,007,327 | ($4,010,669) | $57,532,872 | ($5,945,233) |
| | Surplus | ($41,626,011) | ($53,642,077) | $5,395,706 | $1,865,146 | $4,181,855 | $34,296,618 | |
| | Total | $26,911,789 | $243,814,207 | $88,249,096 | $11,872,473 | $171,186 | $91,829,490 | ($5,945,233) |
| Physical ARR | Profit | $26,572,818 | $366,128,947 | $112,609,140 | $82,181,795 | ($2,468,152) | $66,458,939 | ($6,248,557) |
| | Surplus | ($25,873,836) | ($81,279,067) | $18,515,990 | $7,110,576 | $12,040,688 | $47,753,635 | |
| | Surplus from Self scheduled FTRs | ($45,978,766) | ($81,765,964) | $15,530,158 | $3,073,711 | $6,469,297 | $42,513,186 | |
| | Total | $698,982 | $284,849,881 | $131,125,130 | $89,292,371 | $9,572,536 | $114,212,574 | ($6,248,557) |
| Total | | $179,131,597 | $1,297,085,890 | $489,380,007 | $174,981,788 | $6,028,043 | $536,385,456 | $100,892,442 |

| | | 2019/2020 | 2020/2021 | 2021/2022 | 2022/2023 | 2023/2024 | 2024/2025 | 2025/2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | Profit | ($21,139,644) | $280,586,579 | $831,489,515 | $376,720,527 | $227,123,570 | $854,777,135 | $1,578,387,988 |
| | Surplus | | | | | | | |
| | Total | ($21,139,644) | $280,586,579 | $831,489,515 | $376,720,527 | $227,123,570 | $854,777,135 | $1,578,387,988 |
| Financial without GreenHat | Profit | $25,150,852 | $280,906,014 | $831,489,515 | $376,720,527 | $227,123,570 | $854,777,135 | $1,578,387,988 |
| | Surplus | | | | | | | |
| | Total | $25,150,852 | $280,906,014 | $831,489,515 | $376,720,527 | $227,123,570 | $854,777,135 | $1,578,387,988 |
| Physical | Profit | ($42,860,656) | $60,941,495 | $228,289,196 | $10,155,622 | $3,268,080 | $85,113,384 | $228,974,829 |
| | Surplus | | | | | | | |
| | Total | ($42,860,656) | $60,941,495 | $228,289,196 | $10,155,622 | $3,268,080 | $85,113,384 | $228,974,829 |
| Physical ARR | Profit | ($49,614,191) | $18,982,052 | $35,163,444 | ($14,794,445) | $12,419,666 | ($42,561,078) | $366,306,379 |
| | Surplus | | | | | | | |
| | Surplus from Self scheduled FTRs | | | | | | | |
| | Total | ($49,614,191) | $18,982,052 | $35,163,444 | ($14,794,445) | $12,419,666 | ($42,561,078) | $366,306,379 |
| Total | | ($113,614,490) | $360,510,126 | $1,094,942,155 | $372,081,704 | $242,811,317 | $897,329,441 | $2,173,669,196 |

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Table 13-34 shows the profits and losses of the five most and the five least profitable participants by ownership type. Total MWh is the sum of all MWh by ownership type regardless of profitability. The Top 5 Profit is the sum of the profits of the five most profitable participants by ownership type. The Top 5 Profit/MWh is the Top 5 Profit divided by the sum of the MWh of the top 5 participants by ownership type. The Top 5 Market Share of MWh is the sum of the MWh of the top 5 participants by ownership type divided by Total MWh of that ownership type. The Top 5 Profit Share Among Profitable Participants is the Top 5 Profit divided by the sum of the profits of all profitable participants by ownership type. The same logic applies for the statistics related to the Bottom 5 participants. The All row considers all ownership types when selecting the Top 5 and Bottom 5 participants.

The sum of the Top 5 financial participants' profits was the largest of all the ownership types, $640.0 million, but had the lowest profit per MWh. In contrast, the Top 5 physical participants had the smallest total profits but their profit per MWh was the largest. The Bottom 5 financial participants had the largest total losses while the Bottom 5 physical ARR participant's loss per MWh was the largest. When all participants across ownership types are considered, three of the Top 5 participants and all of the Bottom 5 participants were financial participants.

There are participants who have had persistent losses for multiple years. It is possible for PJM FTR participants to have complementary positions on other trading platforms such as the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) or Nodal Exchange or in other products in the PJM market.

### Table 13-34 Top 5 and bottom 5 FTR profits by ownership type: June through May, 2025/2026

| Organization Type | Total MWh | Top 5 Profit | Top 5 Profit/MWh | Top 5 Market Share in MWh | Top 5 Profit Share Among Profitable Participants | Bottom 5 Loss | Bottom 5 Loss/MWh | Bottom 5 Market Share in MWh | Bottom 5 Loss Share Among Unprofitable Participants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | 6,438,012,393 | $640,005,111 | $0.55 | 18.1% | 34.8% | ($149,087,958) | ($1.23) | 1.9% | 56.7% |
| Physical | 177,918,831 | $227,124,957 | $2.21 | 57.7% | 93.1% | ($14,426,582) | ($0.45) | 18.0% | 96.5% |
| Physical ARR | 355,665,062 | $406,079,123 | $1.35 | 84.5% | 96.0% | ($31,631,171) | ($1.42) | 6.3% | 55.9% |
| All | 6,971,596,287 | $918,804,969 | $1.17 | 11.2% | 36.6% | ($149,087,958) | ($1.23) | 1.7% | 44.6% |

Table 13-35 shows the shares of profitable and unprofitable participants by ownership type weighted by FTR MW in the 2025/2026 planning period. There were more profitable participants than unprofitable participants for each organization type and for market total. Compared with the 2024/2025 planning period, in the 2025/2026 planning period, the share of profitable participants increased by 1.7 percentage points from 88.5 percent to 90.2 percent. Financial organizations were the only organization type whose share of profitable participants decreased. Financial organizations' share of profitable participants decreased while their total profits increased. Profits were more concentrated among Financial organizations in the 2025/2026 planning period compared with the same time period in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 13-35 Share of participants MWh by profitability by ownership type: June through May, 2025/2026

| Organization Type | Unprofitable | Profitable |
|---|---|---|
| Financial | 9.6% | 90.4% |
| Physical | 19.2% | 80.8% |
| Physical ARR | 8.8% | 91.2% |
| Total | 9.8% | 90.2% |


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13-36 show the top 5 and bottom 5 profitable participants aggregated at a parent company level across all ownership types and their profits and losses in the 2025/2026 planning period.

### Table 13-36 Top 5 and Bottom 5 Profitable participants across all ownership types

| Top 5 Participants | | | Bottom 5 Participants | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Organization | Organization Type | Profit | Organization | Organization Type | Loss |
| Constellation Energy Generation, LLC | Physical | $343,377,026 | Viribus Fund LP | Financial | ($48,980,019) |
| Susquehanna International Group, LLP | Financial | $175,641,581 | Vitol Inc. | Financial | ($37,695,191) |
| Appian Way Energy Partners East, LLC | Financial | $155,345,490 | BP P.L.C. | Financial | ($23,087,109) |
| Elliott Bay Energy Trading, LLC | Financial | $138,152,331 | Bank of America Corporation | Financial | ($15,995,984) |
| DC Energy, LLC | Financial | $137,222,201 | AltaGas Ltd. | Physical | ($15,692,494) |

Table 13-37 shows the profits by source and sink node type in the 2025/2026 planning period. The sink total row is the sum of all profits and losses of FTRs that have the same sink node type. The source total column is the sum of all profits and losses of FTRs that have the same source node type. The profits of generator to generator FTRs were the largest, $729.5 million in the 2025/2026 planning period and had the second largest increase in profits ($334.6 million increase) compared with the 2024/2025 planning period. The profits of generator to generator FTRs were 33.6 percent of the market total profit, $2.2 billion. The profits of zone to hub FTRs were the second largest, $337.4 million, and had the largest increase in profits ($369.6 million increase). The losses of hub to zone FTRs were the largest, a loss of $208.3 million and had the largest increase in losses ($239.9 million increase), in the 2025/2026 planning period.

### Table 13-37 Profits by node type matrix: June through May, 2025/2026

| | Sink Type | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source Type | Aggregate | EHVAGG | Generator | Hub | Interface | Load | Residual Metered Aggregate | Zone | Source Total |
| Aggregate | ($2,535,903) | $240,084 | ($4,270,421) | $3,634,034 | $1,849,185 | ($1,756,555) | $3,755,133 | $3,044,611 | $3,960,167 |
| EHVAGG | $94,732 | $5,654,237 | $8,125,441 | $95,751 | $2,144 | $17,501,932 | $128,203 | $36,444 | $31,638,885 |
| Generator | $308,776,974 | $6,926,271 | $729,472,256 | $226,123,291 | $21,381,433 | $47,968,310 | $62,578,268 | $235,647,976 | $1,638,874,779 |
| Hub | ($16,474,072) | $621,299 | $17,007,783 | $324,123,640 | ($9,741,843) | $373,254 | $18,528,982 | ($208,271,064) | $126,167,979 |
| Interface | $77,093 | ($10,813) | ($8,137,105) | $4,391,666 | $382,708 | $1,035,176 | $1,402,009 | ($1,518,704) | ($2,377,970) |
| Load | $896,645 | ($7,078,887) | ($2,313,670) | $785,714 | $436,406 | $48,541,020 | $273,200 | $215,451 | $41,755,879 |
| Residual Metered Aggregate | ($435,895) | ($170,642) | ($22,904,168) | ($1,132,090) | ($403,353) | $410,499 | $3,403,980 | $584,124 | ($20,647,545) |
| Zone | $2,357,454 | $12,740 | ($39,225,577) | $337,397,758 | $33,713,145 | $2,283,271 | ($2,627,709) | $20,385,939 | $354,297,021 |
| Sink Total | $292,757,029 | $6,194,288 | $677,754,540 | $895,419,763 | $47,619,826 | $116,356,908 | $87,442,066 | $50,124,777 | $2,173,669,196 |

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Table 13-38 shows the profit per MWh by source and sink node type in the 2025/2026 planning period. The sink total row represents the average profit per MWh of FTRs that have the same sink type. The source total column shows the average profit per MWh of FTRs that have the same source type. Hub to EHV Aggregate FTRs had the highest profit per MWh, $5.49 per MWh. Residual Metered Aggregate to EHV Aggregate FTRs had the largest loss per MWh, -$3.80 per MWh. Profit per MWh of generator to generator FTRs was $0.21 per MWh, below the market average of $0.31 per MWh.

### Table 13-38 Profit per MWh by node type matrix: June through May, 2025/2026

| | Sink Type | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source Type | Aggregate | EHVAGG | Generator | Hub | Interface | Load | Residual Metered Aggregate | Zone | Source Total |
| Aggregate | ($0.03) | $0.35 | ($0.01) | $0.40 | $0.36 | ($0.12) | $0.17 | $0.11 | $0.01 |
| EHVAGG | $0.12 | $0.59 | $1.17 | $1.11 | $0.14 | $1.15 | $0.85 | $0.22 | $0.96 |
| Generator | $0.63 | $0.92 | $0.21 | $1.31 | $0.43 | $0.31 | $0.71 | $0.71 | $0.35 |
| Hub | ($0.77) | $5.49 | $0.44 | $4.29 | ($1.93) | $0.37 | $0.74 | ($0.98) | $0.33 |
| Interface | $0.04 | ($0.32) | ($0.41) | $2.17 | $0.81 | $4.35 | $1.50 | ($0.84) | ($0.09) |
| Load | $0.07 | ($0.89) | ($0.02) | $0.30 | $0.54 | $0.08 | $0.10 | $0.08 | $0.06 |
| Residual Metered Aggregate | ($0.03) | ($3.80) | ($0.35) | ($0.36) | ($0.40) | $0.15 | $1.65 | $0.06 | ($0.21) |
| Zone | $0.09 | $0.80 | ($0.49) | $3.77 | $1.68 | $0.71 | ($0.05) | $0.14 | $0.86 |
| Sink Total | $0.45 | $0.24 | $0.16 | $2.53 | $0.58 | $0.15 | $0.46 | $0.07 | $0.31 |


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Table 13-39 shows the top 20 source and sink node type pairs by MWh in the 2025/2026 planning period. Table 13-39 compares settled MWh, profit and target credit of FTRs whose source and sink nodes are in different zones (across zones) with whose source and sink nodes are in the same zone (within a zone). The percentage shown under MWh column represents the proportion of FTRs that are within a zone and across zones for each source and sink node type pair. For example, 18.3 percent of generator to generator FTRs had source and sink nodes located in different zones, while 81.7 percent of generator to generator FTRs had source and sink nodes that are in the same zone. Generator to generator FTRs receive greater profits when they are within a zone than when they are across zones, while across zone generator to generator FTRs receive greater target allocation credit.

**Table 13-39 FTR MWh, Profit and Target Credit from inside a zone and across zones by top 20 source and sink node type**

| | | MWh | | | | Profit | | Target Credit | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source Type | Sink Type | Across Zones | Within a Zone | Across Zones | Within a Zone | Across Zones | Within a Zone | Across Zones | Within a Zone |
| Generator | Generator | 631,172,983 | 2,809,082,652 | 18.3% | 81.7% | $358,039,104 | $371,433,153 | $480,171,618 | $362,001,282 |
| Load | Load | 39,258,611 | 552,063,345 | 6.6% | 93.4% | ($20,482,590) | $69,023,610 | ($22,304,771) | $112,053,104 |
| Generator | Aggregate | 118,087,154 | 375,020,563 | 23.9% | 76.1% | $111,294,219 | $197,482,754 | $131,966,189 | $221,020,759 |
| Aggregate | Generator | 89,390,061 | 289,383,718 | 23.6% | 76.4% | ($48,402,181) | $44,131,761 | ($49,817,275) | $46,379,460 |
| Generator | Zone | 68,104,462 | 262,210,865 | 20.6% | 79.4% | $69,700,778 | $165,947,198 | $128,881,347 | $340,443,216 |
| Hub | Zone | 191,537,526 | 20,305,843 | 90.4% | 9.6% | ($203,664,488) | ($4,606,576) | ($404,294,546) | ($5,150,518) |
| Generator | Hub | 81,914,658 | 90,333,349 | 47.6% | 52.4% | $192,093,146 | $34,030,145 | $386,017,916 | $63,745,162 |
| Generator | Load | 21,508,410 | 131,624,133 | 14.0% | 86.0% | $5,532,647 | $42,435,663 | $34,085,863 | $91,283,771 |
| Zone | Zone | 144,129,451 | | 100.0% | | $20,385,939 | | $160,789,068 | |
| Load | Generator | 15,011,134 | 112,867,873 | 11.7% | 88.3% | ($921,917) | ($1,391,753) | ($9,564,847) | ($14,569,083) |
| Zone | Hub | 87,181,296 | 2,203,932 | 97.5% | 2.5% | $337,132,355 | $265,403 | $836,237,664 | $247,804 |
| Generator | Residual Metered Aggregate | 19,656,987 | 69,077,398 | 22.2% | 77.8% | $19,605,136 | $42,973,132 | $38,086,585 | $56,585,506 |
| Aggregate | Aggregate | 13,060,917 | 66,772,654 | 16.4% | 83.6% | $5,360,219 | ($7,896,122) | $3,258,969 | ($11,996,220) |
| Zone | Generator | 27,434,216 | 52,039,985 | 34.5% | 65.5% | $6,381,470 | ($45,607,047) | ($2,344,370) | ($64,341,359) |
| Hub | Hub | 23,121,503 | 52,450,405 | 30.6% | 69.4% | $155,095,175 | $169,028,464 | $254,505,373 | $266,979,975 |
| Residual Metered Aggregate | Generator | 20,947,499 | 44,208,812 | 32.1% | 67.9% | ($8,182,487) | ($14,721,681) | ($22,932,219) | ($33,323,296) |
| Zone | Residual Metered Aggregate | 406,288 | 50,453,152 | 0.8% | 99.2% | $771,028 | ($3,398,738) | $1,040,080 | ($5,533,568) |
| Generator | Interface | 27,071,262 | 22,607,317 | 54.5% | 45.5% | $23,174,472 | ($1,793,040) | $48,210,788 | $404,901 |
| Hub | Generator | 16,062,441 | 22,314,778 | 41.9% | 58.1% | $5,911,166 | $11,096,618 | $97,145 | $7,888,963 |
| Aggregate | Zone | 4,713,419 | 22,609,276 | 17.3% | 82.7% | ($1,731,557) | $4,776,169 | $2,204,741 | $10,640,902 |

## Revenue

Net FTR auction revenue is the difference between what FTR buyers pay and what FTR sellers receive in an auction, including what FTR buyers receive and FTR sellers pay for counterflow FTRs. Net FTR auction revenue from the Long Term, Annual, and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions is used to fund ARR Target Allocations each month. Long Term and Annual FTR auction revenue is allocated to ARR holders throughout the planning period in which the FTR is effective. For example, net FTR auction revenue generated from the 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction for Year 1 FTRs will be allocated to ARR holders in each month of the 2026/2027 planning period. Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenue is allocated to ARR holders in the month in which the FTR is effective.

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## Long Term FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-40 shows the Long Term FTR Auction revenue data by trade type, FTR direction, period type and class type. The 2026/2029 Long Term FTR Auction netted $102.5 million in revenue, $59.8 million less (36.8 percent) than the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction. Buyers paid $343.7 million, up $67.3 million (24.3 percent), and sellers received $241.3 million, up $127.1 million (111.4 percent) over the 2025/2028 Long Term FTR Auction.

### Table 13-40 Long Term FTR Auction Revenue: 2026/2029 auction

| | | | Class Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | FTR Direction | Period Type | 24-Hour | On Peak | Weekend On Peak | Daily Off Peak | All |
| Buy bids | Counter Flow | Year 1 | ($267,915,419) | ($281,854,050) | ($88,502,456) | ($103,477,368) | ($741,749,293) |
| | | Year 2 | ($145,558,688) | ($240,635,329) | ($76,314,261) | ($87,892,417) | ($550,400,696) |
| | | Year 3 | ($76,638,680) | ($204,330,475) | ($68,197,374) | ($80,085,439) | ($429,251,968) |
| | | Total | ($490,112,788) | ($726,819,854) | ($233,014,092) | ($271,455,224) | ($1,721,401,957) |
| | Prevailing Flow | Year 1 | $297,204,561 | $403,875,546 | $124,921,499 | $135,695,085 | $961,696,691 |
| | | Year 2 | $151,480,484 | $288,441,544 | $87,298,494 | $97,164,118 | $624,384,641 |
| | | Year 3 | $69,767,295 | $237,687,739 | $79,327,465 | $92,277,880 | $479,060,379 |
| | | Total | $518,452,340 | $930,004,829 | $291,547,459 | $325,137,083 | $2,065,141,711 |
| | Total | | $28,339,552 | $203,184,975 | $58,533,367 | $53,681,859 | $343,739,753 |
| Sell offers | Counter Flow | Year 1 | ($4,940,779) | ($90,991,193) | ($28,976,787) | ($35,325,020) | ($160,233,779) |
| | | Year 2 | ($848,204) | ($70,091,833) | ($20,409,798) | ($24,393,544) | ($115,743,380) |
| | | Year 3 | ($64,043) | ($21,862,825) | ($6,424,283) | ($8,009,179) | ($36,360,331) |
| | | Total | ($5,853,027) | ($182,945,851) | ($55,810,869) | ($67,727,743) | ($312,337,490) |
| | Prevailing Flow | Year 1 | $45,003,642 | $180,060,196 | $54,442,956 | $64,355,581 | $343,862,376 |
| | | Year 2 | $8,670,593 | $94,139,529 | $25,226,532 | $32,554,702 | $160,591,355 |
| | | Year 3 | $1,624,940 | $27,289,833 | $7,630,539 | $12,621,704 | $49,167,017 |
| | | Total | $55,299,175 | $301,489,559 | $87,300,028 | $109,531,987 | $553,620,748 |
| | Total | | $49,446,148 | $118,543,707 | $31,489,159 | $41,804,244 | $241,283,258 |
| Total | | | ($21,106,596) | $84,641,268 | $27,044,208 | $11,877,615 | $102,456,495 |


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## Annual FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-41 shows the Annual FTR Auction revenue by trade type, type, FTR direction and class type. The Annual FTR Auction for the 2026/2027 planning period generated $3,755.8 million, up 98.2 percent from $1,895.3 million in the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction. Counter flow FTR holders received $745.8 million, up 6.4 percent from the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction and prevailing flow FTR holders paid $4,501.6 million, up 73.4 percent from the 2025/2026 Annual FTR Auction.

### Table 13-41 Annual FTR auction revenue: 2026/2027 planning period

| | | | Class Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade Type | Type | FTR Direction | 24-Hour | On Peak | Weekend On Peak | Daily Off Peak | All |
| Buy bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($101,204,565) | ($636,876,227) | ($204,963,451) | ($239,290,447) | ($1,182,334,690) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $946,955,676 | $1,372,704,732 | $400,022,261 | $424,614,941 | $3,144,297,610 |
| | | Total | $845,751,111 | $735,828,505 | $195,058,810 | $185,324,494 | $1,961,962,921 |
| | Options | Counter Flow | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $17,342,423 | $75,229,669 | $27,435,707 | $39,140,489 | $159,148,287 |
| | | Total | $17,342,423 | $75,229,669 | $27,435,707 | $39,140,489 | $159,148,287 |
| | Total | Counter Flow | ($101,204,565) | ($636,876,227) | ($204,963,451) | ($239,290,447) | ($1,182,334,690) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $964,298,099 | $1,447,934,401 | $427,457,968 | $463,755,430 | $3,303,445,897 |
| | | Total | $863,093,534 | $811,058,174 | $222,494,517 | $224,464,983 | $2,121,111,208 |
| Self-scheduled bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($2,973,499) | ($735,982) | ($161,021) | ($5,832) | ($3,876,333) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $1,832,941,947 | $31,204,246 | $7,180,672 | $6,905,198 | $1,878,232,062 |
| | | Total | $1,829,968,448 | $30,468,264 | $7,019,651 | $6,899,366 | $1,874,355,729 |
| Buy and self-scheduled bids | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($104,178,064) | ($637,612,209) | ($205,124,472) | ($239,296,278) | ($1,186,211,023) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $2,779,897,623 | $1,403,908,978 | $407,202,933 | $431,520,138 | $5,022,529,673 |
| | | Total | $2,675,719,559 | $766,296,769 | $202,078,461 | $192,223,860 | $3,836,318,650 |
| | Options | Counter Flow | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $17,342,423 | $75,229,669 | $27,435,707 | $39,140,489 | $159,148,287 |
| | | Total | $17,342,423 | $75,229,669 | $27,435,707 | $39,140,489 | $159,148,287 |
| | Total | Counter Flow | ($104,178,064) | ($637,612,209) | ($205,124,472) | ($239,296,278) | ($1,186,211,023) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $2,797,240,046 | $1,479,138,647 | $434,638,640 | $470,660,627 | $5,181,677,960 |
| | | Total | $2,693,061,982 | $841,526,438 | $229,514,168 | $231,364,349 | $3,995,466,937 |
| Sell offers | Obligations | Counter Flow | ($129,529,115) | ($185,732,559) | ($59,894,500) | ($65,248,976) | ($440,405,150) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $253,117,386 | $251,862,593 | $86,457,760 | $83,554,884 | $674,992,622 |
| | | Total | $123,588,271 | $66,130,033 | $26,563,260 | $18,305,908 | $234,587,473 |
| | Options | Counter Flow | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $607,153 | $2,224,131 | $1,035,164 | $1,255,373 | $5,121,821 |
| | | Total | $607,153 | $2,224,131 | $1,035,164 | $1,255,373 | $5,121,821 |
| | Total | Counter Flow | ($129,529,115) | ($185,732,559) | ($59,894,500) | ($65,248,976) | ($440,405,150) |
| | | Prevailing Flow | $253,724,538 | $254,086,724 | $87,492,924 | $84,810,257 | $680,114,443 |
| | | Total | $124,195,423 | $68,354,165 | $27,598,424 | $19,561,281 | $239,709,294 |
| Total | | | $2,568,866,559 | $773,172,273 | $201,915,744 | $211,803,068 | $3,755,757,643 |

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FTRs sold in Long Term FTR Auctions are sold at a substantial discount to the same FTRs sold in Annual FTR Auctions. Table 13-42 shows the increase in total auction revenue that would have resulted for the 2014/2015 through 2026/2027 planning periods if long term FTRs were sold at annual auction clearing prices.

Long Term FTR Auction MW are determined by removing all outages and running an offline model of the previous Annual FTR Auction model with all ARR bids from the prior annual ARR allocation. Any ARR MW that clear in this offline model are reserved for ARR holders in the relevant planning periods, and are removed from the Long Term FTR Auction. But even this approach does not, and cannot, preserve all the capacity for ARR holders in the first year of the Long Term Auction. The MW purchased in the Long Term FTR Auction are made available to FTR holders before ARR holders have access to them. The result is that MW are reserved, inappropriately and for unexplained reasons, in future auctions for FTR holders. This difference provides an estimate of the value of the MW made available in the Long Term FTR Auction that are not made available to ARR holders. These MW should be made available to ARR holders in the Annual FTR Auctions where they are the most valuable. Under the current market rules, MW made available in the Long Term FTR auction are not available to ARR holders as ARRs. The MMU recommends that the Long Term FTR product be eliminated. If the Long Term FTR product is not eliminated, the Long Term FTR Market should be modified so that the supply of prevailing flow FTRs in the Long Term FTR Market is based solely on counter flow offers in the Long Term FTR Market, and not projected residual system capability based on a snapshot of prior ARR requests.

### Table 13-42 Estimated additional Long Term FTR Auction revenue at Annual FTR Auction prices

| | Long Term FTR Product | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planning Period | YR3 | YR2 | YR1 | YRALL | Total Difference |
| 2014/2015 | $59,598,642 | $30,284,173 | $52,030,909 | $926,989 | $142,840,713 |
| 2015/2016 | $67,896,588 | $40,975,278 | $9,936,078 | $303,082 | $119,111,026 |
| 2016/2017 | $42,378,048 | $3,854,373 | $11,055,824 | $1,079,901 | $58,368,147 |
| 2017/2018 | $6,134,076 | ($1,841,715) | $12,396,817 | $227,524 | $16,916,702 |
| 2018/2019 | $7,872,604 | $2,926,457 | $13,480,353 | ($111,226) | $24,168,189 |
| 2019/2020 | $9,711,188 | $4,098,887 | $103,227,004 | $805,425 | $117,842,504 |
| 2020/2021 | ($416,585) | $52,736,819 | ($9,690,808) | $1,242,707 | $43,872,132 |
| 2021/2022 | $73,050,796 | ($3,111,721) | $13,856,264 | NA | $83,795,339 |
| 2022/2023 | $42,759,622 | $62,664,762 | $104,025,268 | NA | $209,449,652 |
| 2023/2024 | $45,464,085 | $31,335,632 | $39,140,382 | NA | $115,940,099 |
| 2024/2025 | $42,500,160 | $23,979,155 | $36,720,756 | NA | $103,200,071 |
| 2025/2026 | $100,410,553 | $68,518,553 | $93,705,408 | NA | $262,634,514 |
| 2026/2027 | $325,853,448 | $216,736,617 | $165,863,778 | NA | $708,453,843 |
| Total | $823,213,224 | $533,157,271 | $645,748,033 | $4,474,401 | $2,006,592,930 |


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## Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction Revenue

Table 13-43 shows monthly balance of planning period FTR auction revenue by trade type, type and class type for the 2025/2026 and the entire 2024/2025 planning periods. The Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2025/2026 planning period netted $105.0 million in net revenue, the difference between buyers paying $1,099.5 million and sellers receiving $994.5 million. For the 2024/2025 planning period, the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions netted $79.6 million in revenue with buyers paying $671.2 million and sellers receiving $591.6 million.

Revenue from obligation buy bids for the 2025/2026 planning period was $945.9 million, up 58.4 percent compared to the 2024/2025 planning period. Expenditure from obligation sell offers in the 2025/2026 planning period was $687.4 million, up 57.7 percent compared to the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 13-43 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction revenue: 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning period

| | | | Class Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monthly Auction | Type | Trade Type | 24-Hour | On Peak | Daily Off Peak | Weekend On Peak | All |
| Jun-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | $43,963,789 | $59,550,615 | $11,244,539 | $17,818,883 | $132,577,826 |
| | | Sell offers | $10,807,119 | $53,694,995 | $13,744,740 | $17,282,983 | $95,529,837 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $232,202 | $8,861,467 | $4,007,673 | $2,867,090 | $15,968,432 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,969,446 | $21,150,179 | $5,658,918 | $6,780,519 | $36,559,061 |
| Jul-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | $11,769,736 | $47,782,060 | $10,707,639 | $14,767,032 | $85,026,467 |
| | | Sell offers | $3,763,947 | $38,944,621 | $8,273,644 | $11,761,740 | $62,743,951 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $2,132,213 | $7,568,007 | $3,473,035 | $2,743,547 | $15,916,801 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,703,871 | $19,837,413 | $4,823,689 | $6,517,948 | $33,882,921 |
| Aug-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | ($346,749) | $50,008,965 | $12,464,614 | $16,378,232 | $78,505,063 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,897,894 | $31,862,957 | $7,672,652 | $11,359,638 | $53,793,141 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $534,023 | $7,479,258 | $3,559,637 | $2,734,285 | $14,307,204 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,638,486 | $16,477,506 | $4,647,661 | $5,396,476 | $29,160,129 |
| Sep-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | ($3,169,946) | $54,069,302 | $21,118,313 | $17,242,156 | $89,259,824 |
| | | Sell offers | $21,189,710 | $31,183,579 | $9,973,679 | $9,419,961 | $71,766,929 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $834,043 | $8,840,903 | $3,789,646 | $3,408,415 | $16,873,008 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,077,559 | $13,173,571 | $5,452,261 | $4,425,345 | $25,128,736 |
| Oct-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | $330,610 | $43,891,284 | $17,587,815 | $14,819,286 | $76,628,996 |
| | | Sell offers | $12,291,500 | $26,016,645 | $9,932,175 | $8,807,709 | $57,048,028 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $1,689,799 | $5,748,664 | $2,178,939 | $2,512,539 | $12,129,941 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,072,980 | $13,144,149 | $5,294,750 | $4,034,201 | $24,546,080 |
| Nov-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | ($5,040,920) | $41,152,793 | $16,577,605 | $13,569,145 | $66,258,623 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,767,144 | $25,702,926 | $9,650,692 | $7,604,093 | $45,724,856 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $704,949 | $6,399,585 | $2,215,866 | $2,324,471 | $11,644,870 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,217,435 | $12,046,857 | $5,757,145 | $4,698,133 | $24,719,571 |
| Dec-25 | Obligations | Buy bids | $17,174,878 | $45,620,898 | $21,025,928 | $13,605,325 | $97,427,029 |
| | | Sell offers | $1,636,246 | $40,254,138 | $22,675,021 | $12,666,371 | $77,231,776 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $1,426,323 | $5,683,516 | $5,390,206 | $1,828,956 | $14,329,001 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,588,420 | $15,439,317 | $7,558,590 | $4,738,373 | $30,324,700 |

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Cont'd

| | | | Class Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monthly Auction | Type | Trade Type | 24-Hour | On Peak | Daily Off Peak | Weekend On Peak | All |
| Jan-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | $10,031,185 | $41,953,890 | $21,539,613 | $12,597,073 | $86,121,761 |
| | | Sell offers | $5,487,761 | $31,303,225 | $16,049,555 | $9,817,400 | $62,657,941 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $2,011,390 | $4,538,922 | $1,488,891 | $1,704,839 | $9,744,042 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,525,857 | $15,498,004 | $6,760,423 | $4,876,000 | $29,660,284 |
| Feb-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | $6,980,665 | $36,505,375 | $17,095,518 | $9,638,334 | $70,219,892 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,533,267 | $25,283,956 | $11,674,650 | $6,511,547 | $46,003,420 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $3,052,488 | $3,992,532 | $1,113,211 | $1,485,475 | $9,643,706 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,179,795 | $12,744,346 | $5,952,647 | $3,724,270 | $24,601,058 |
| Mar-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | $18,511,237 | $30,503,023 | $10,261,086 | $9,067,463 | $68,342,810 |
| | | Sell offers | $1,034,993 | $19,890,696 | $7,029,680 | $6,463,036 | $34,418,404 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $1,512,121 | $2,606,457 | $1,173,685 | $773,654 | $6,065,917 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,046,360 | $12,012,123 | $5,006,854 | $3,714,733 | $22,780,070 |
| Apr-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | $28,191,439 | $29,177,124 | $6,962,223 | $6,837,259 | $71,168,046 |
| | | Sell offers | $3,248,045 | $22,177,662 | $6,306,113 | $7,775,928 | $39,507,747 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $2,208,809 | $1,344,785 | $829,983 | $678,964 | $5,062,541 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,452,250 | $14,577,579 | $4,062,271 | $3,241,620 | $24,333,720 |
| May-26 | Obligations | Buy bids | $10,860,687 | $20,876,947 | $2,770,613 | $6,457,502 | $40,965,749 |
| | | Sell offers | $2,393,997 | $12,973,602 | $2,493,101 | $4,066,391 | $21,927,091 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $110,286 | $571,532 | $573,374 | $166,233 | $1,421,425 |
| | | Sell offers | $1,877,284 | $6,284,162 | $1,407,772 | $2,218,310 | $11,787,528 |
| 2024/2025 | Obligations | Buy bids | $92,291,775 | $334,508,875 | $87,723,212 | $82,618,475 | $597,142,337 |
| | | Sell offers | $24,741,555 | $270,347,683 | $73,133,231 | $67,754,244 | $435,976,713 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $16,363,731 | $31,182,988 | $14,530,149 | $11,936,121 | $74,012,989 |
| | | Sell offers | $19,034,193 | $80,149,449 | $30,035,406 | $26,381,757 | $155,600,805 |
| | Net Total | | $64,879,758 | $15,194,731 | ($915,277) | $418,596 | $79,577,808 |
| 2025/2026 | Obligations | Buy bids | $130,848,174 | $494,792,908 | $170,647,166 | $149,581,810 | $945,870,057 |
| | | Sell offers | $78,518,312 | $367,192,347 | $125,753,215 | $115,927,906 | $687,391,780 |
| | Options | Buy bids | $18,732,355 | $76,037,698 | $31,713,873 | $27,128,627 | $153,612,552 |
| | | Sell offers | $26,582,745 | $166,672,575 | $61,548,584 | $52,313,851 | $307,117,755 |
| | Net Total | | $44,479,472 | $36,965,684 | $15,059,240 | $8,468,678 | $104,973,075 |



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Table 13-44 shows the monthly balance of planning period FTR auction revenue by FTR direction and trade type for FTRs effective in each month. For example, June 2025 shows FTR auction revenue for FTRs that are effective in June that were sold in the June 2025 Auction. July 2025 shows FTR auction revenue for FTRs that are effective in July that were sold in the June 2025 Auction and the July 2025 Auction. Table 13-44 also shows the monthly Residual ARR target allocations. Residual ARR target allocations in a month should be fully funded by FTR auction revenue from FTRs that are effective in the same month.

Auction revenue from monthly FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period was $109.8 million, up 37.9 percent from $79.6 million in the 2024/2025 planning period. However, Residual ARR target allocations in the 2025/2026 planning period were $81.7 million, up 210.6 percent from $ $26.3 million in the 2024/2025 planning period.

While total auction revenue from monthly FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period was up 37.9 percent, the results by FTR direction (prevailing versus counterflow) and by trade type (buy versus sell) were different. Negative auction revenue from buy bids for counter flow FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period was $1,310.8 million, up 69.3 percent from $774.2 million in the 2024/2025 planning period. Positive auction revenue from sell bids for counter flow FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period was $617.9 million, up 123.2 percent from $276.8 million in the 2024/2025 planning period. Positive auction revenue from buy bids for prevailing flow FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period was $2,406.4, up 66.5 percent from $1,445.4 in the 2024/2025 planning period. Negative auction revenue from sell bids for prevailing flow FTRs effective in the 2025/2026 planning period was $1,603.7 million, up 84.7 percent from 868.4 million in the 2024/2025 planning period. The large increase in both residual ARR target allocations and negative auction revenue from counter flow FTRs effective in the first three months of the planning period contributed to the first ARR deficiency in the history of the ARR market in July 2025 (See Table 13-10). If PJM had sold fewer counter flow FTRs effective in July 2025, there would not have been an ARR deficiency. Residual ARR target allocations decreased following the highs in June 2025, July 2025, and August 2025 and revenue from FTR sell bids for counterflow increased, preventing another ARR deficiency from occurring.

### Table 13-44 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction revenue by FTR period compared to Residual ARR target allocations: 2024/2025 and 2025/2026


| | Revenue From Monthly FTR Auctions By Period | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Counter Flow Buy Bids | Counter Flow Sell Bids | Prevailing Flow Buy Bids | Prevailing Flow Sell Bids | All | Residual ARR Target Allocations |
| Jun-24 | ($12,935,096) | $6,463,400 | $30,668,516 | ($21,035,151) | $3,161,668 | $1,542,269 |
| Jul-24 | ($27,907,987) | $12,672,303 | $62,067,006 | ($42,200,251) | $4,631,071 | $817,746 |
| Aug-24 | ($35,671,626) | $17,132,476 | $88,169,309 | ($63,820,383) | $5,809,776 | $2,192,686 |
| Sep-24 | ($47,035,465) | $17,030,440 | $95,463,590 | ($59,958,680) | $5,499,885 | $940,983 |
| Oct-24 | ($61,463,190) | $22,257,984 | $113,529,086 | ($66,887,221) | $7,436,660 | $675,276 |
| Nov-24 | ($57,049,350) | $21,841,656 | $110,922,641 | ($68,430,428) | $7,284,518 | $389,592 |
| Dec-24 | ($73,445,957) | $24,806,231 | $127,502,478 | ($71,230,090) | $7,632,662 | $1,423,964 |
| Jan-25 | ($96,757,094) | $33,228,566 | $172,405,984 | ($101,741,615) | $7,135,841 | $3,351,831 |
| Feb-25 | ($94,081,134) | $32,261,091 | $164,140,690 | ($95,141,385) | $7,179,262 | $9,503,030 |
| Mar-25 | ($79,877,699) | $27,581,488 | $141,629,663 | ($82,498,441) | $6,835,012 | $1,258,883 |
| Apr-25 | ($88,162,518) | $29,973,301 | $158,981,445 | ($92,626,958) | $8,165,270 | $3,845,490 |
| May-25 | ($99,848,832) | $31,544,129 | $179,910,865 | ($102,799,980) | $8,806,182 | $367,497 |
| Summary For Planning Period 2024/2025 | | | | | | |
| Total | ($774,235,947) | $276,793,065 | $1,445,391,273 | ($868,370,583) | $79,577,808 | $26,309,246 |
| Jun-25 | ($25,629,760) | $11,335,282 | $51,618,952 | ($35,385,606) | $1,938,869 | $12,903,832 |
| Jul-25 | ($61,853,731) | $22,288,524 | $111,168,475 | ($66,648,525) | $4,954,744 | $23,175,461 |
| Aug-25 | ($73,536,354) | $29,025,252 | $133,268,414 | ($83,203,970) | $5,553,342 | $13,502,528 |
| Sep-25 | ($80,532,210) | $29,608,604 | $141,134,731 | ($84,519,169) | $5,691,956 | $952,098 |
| Oct-25 | ($92,124,081) | $31,856,580 | $162,569,433 | ($96,398,953) | $5,902,980 | $4,658,518 |
| Nov-25 | ($92,700,403) | $36,268,021 | $163,026,687 | ($101,001,852) | $5,592,453 | $5,780,545 |
| Dec-25 | ($113,946,473) | $52,799,488 | $208,682,619 | ($144,748,264) | $2,787,369 | $1,556,605 |
| Jan-26 | ($157,236,107) | $77,332,765 | $273,466,286 | ($187,410,024) | $6,152,920 | $6,173,623 |
| Feb-26 | ($136,508,092) | $67,099,802 | $249,730,898 | ($168,310,949) | $12,011,659 | $2,951,786 |
| Mar-26 | ($147,508,420) | $81,108,186 | $271,571,444 | ($184,411,703) | $20,759,507 | $4,313,687 |
| Apr-26 | ($147,727,631) | $77,869,076 | $292,204,600 | ($204,827,383) | $17,518,662 | $2,977,603 |
| May-26 | ($181,474,090) | $101,274,615 | $347,943,783 | ($246,836,778) | $20,907,530 | $2,716,717 |
| Summary For Planning Period 2025/2026 | | | | | | |
| Total | ($1,310,777,351) | $617,866,195 | $2,406,386,324 | ($1,603,703,175) | $109,771,993 | $81,663,004 |

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## FTR Target Allocations

FTR target allocations were examined separately by source and sink contribution. Hourly FTR target allocations were divided into those that were benefits and liabilities and summed by sink and by source. Figure 13-10 shows the 10 largest positive and negative FTR target allocations, summed by sink, for the 2025/2026 planning period. The top 10 sinks that produced financial benefit accounted for 22.5 percent of total positive target allocations with Western Hub accounting for 9.1 percent of all positive target allocations. The top 10 sinks that created liability accounted for 13.7 percent of total negative target allocations with Black Oak (APS) accounting for 2.0 percent of all negative target allocations.


### Figure 13-10 Ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations summed by sink: June through May, 2025/2026[44]




44 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

Figure 13-11 shows the 10 largest positive and negative FTR target allocations, summed by source, for the 2025/2026 planning period. The top 10 sources with a positive target allocation accounted for 14.0 percent of total positive target allocations with Western Hub accounting for 2.5 percent of total positive target allocations. The top 10 sources with a negative target allocation accounted for 15.8 percent of all negative target allocations, with the Western Hub accounting for 10.5 percent of total negative target allocations.

### Figure 13-11 Ten largest positive and negative FTR target allocations summed by source: June through May, 2025/2026[45]




## The Effect of Fast Start Pricing on FTR Target Allocations

PJM implemented fast start pricing on September 1, 2021, and as a result, PJM produces separate dispatch and pricing market solutions. The dispatch run results in dispatch instructions and matching prices, termed dispatch run locational marginal prices, or DLMP. The DLMP prices are the prices

45 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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that would have been the LMPs prior to fast start pricing. The pricing run results in the final prices used in settlements and for FTR target allocations, termed pricing run locational marginal prices, or PLMP. The two runs result in different sets of target allocations for the same FTR paths. Table 13-45 compares the target allocations that result from the pricing and dispatch runs for both self scheduled and all other FTRs for the 2021/2022 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. The difference indicates whether the target allocations increased or decreased as a result of fast start pricing. Since its introduction, fast start pricing has resulted in $508 million less in FTR target allocations for FTR holders in the pricing run than in the dispatch run, of which $462 million occurred in the 2025/2026 planning year.

### Table 13-45 Pricing run and dispatch run FTR Target Allocations: 2021/2022 through 2025/2026 planning periods[46]

| Planning Period | | Pricing Run | Dispatch Run | Difference | Percent Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021/2022* | Not Self Scheduled | $1,499,077,738 | $1,497,963,895 | $1,113,844 | 0.1% |
| | Self Scheduled | $429,271,338 | $430,800,598 | ($1,529,260) | (0.4%) |
| | Total | $1,928,349,076 | $1,928,764,493 | ($415,416) | (0.0%) |
| 2022/2023 | Not Self Scheduled | $1,641,324,421 | $1,586,284,502 | $55,039,919 | 3.4% |
| | Self Scheduled | $622,535,802 | $668,468,552 | ($45,932,751) | (7.4%) |
| | Total | $2,263,860,223 | $2,254,753,054 | $9,107,169 | 0.4% |
| 2023/2024 | Not Self Scheduled | $1,396,273,015 | $1,435,733,398 | ($39,460,383) | (2.8%) |
| | Self Scheduled | $371,433,164 | $371,620,633 | ($187,469) | (0.1%) |
| | Total | $1,767,706,179 | $1,807,354,031 | ($39,647,853) | (2.2%) |
| 2024/2025 | Not Self Scheduled | $2,077,018,180 | $2,088,851,413 | ($11,833,233) | (0.6%) |
| | Self Scheduled | $657,847,842 | $660,668,360 | ($2,820,518) | (0.4%) |
| | Total | $2,734,866,022 | $2,749,519,773 | ($14,653,751) | (0.5%) |
| 2025/2026 | Not Self Scheduled | $3,576,519,697 | $3,909,616,477 | ($333,096,780) | (9.3%) |
| | Self Scheduled | $1,553,660,757 | $1,682,942,102 | ($129,281,345) | (8.3%) |
| | Total | $5,130,180,454 | $5,592,558,580 | ($462,378,126) | (9.0%) |

* starting in September 2021

46 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

## Surplus Congestion Revenue

Surplus congestion revenue is a misnomer. There is no such thing as surplus congestion revenue. The rights to all congestion revenue belong to load. Surplus congestion revenue, as defined in PJM rules, is an artifact of the flawed design of the current approach to FTR/ARRs. In the current design, surplus congestion revenue should be allocated to ARR holders because such revenue is part of total congestion revenues.

Based on market logic, there is no such thing as surplus FTR auction revenue. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders who are the sellers, and should not be returned to FTR buyers for any reason.

Under the existing PJM rules, surplus day-ahead congestion is defined as the difference between the day-ahead congestion paid and FTR target allocations. Under the existing PJM rules, surplus FTR auction revenue is defined as the difference between the sum of monthly FTR auction revenue from the Long Term, Annual and monthly auctions, and ARR target allocations. Surplus FTR auction revenue can result from high prices in the FTR auctions, and from FTR capacity sold in excess of assigned ARR capacity on specific paths, and FTR capacity sold on paths not available to ARR holders.

Under the existing PJM rules, surplus congestion revenue is defined as the sum of the surplus day-ahead congestion revenue and the surplus FTR auction revenue at the end of each month.[47] Beginning with the 2014/2015 planning period, PJM may use surplus FTR auction revenue to pay for the clearing of counter flow FTRs as part of the auction clearing process.[48] The remaining surplus is first used to ensure that ARR target allocations in the month are fully funded. Any remaining surplus is used to pay any negative difference between day-ahead congestion revenue and FTR target allocations for the current month or prior months in the planning period. Any remaining surplus is used to pay any negative difference between day-ahead congestion revenue and FTR target allocations for the entire planning period at the end of the

47 Prior to the 2017/2018 planning period, the surplus congestion revenue was not the simple sum of the surplus FTR auction revenue and surplus day-ahead congestion because there were various cross market charges subtracted from FTR revenue, including M2M and competing use charges, which reduced available surplus congestion revenue.

48 *See* "PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights," Rev. 34 (May 21, 2025).

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planning period. Any remaining surplus after that is distributed to ARR holders.[49]

If, at the end of the planning period, all the surplus congestion revenue has been provided to FTR holders and target allocations for the year are not covered, an uplift charge is assigned to FTR holders to cover the net planning period deficiency. An individual participant's uplift charge allocation is the ratio of their share of net positive target allocations to the total net positive target allocations.

Figure 13-12 shows the monthly composition of total surplus, by surplus FTR auction revenue and surplus congestion revenue from June 2017 through May 2026 as if FTRs were settled monthly, based on the congestion and FTR auction revenue in each individual month. In only six months of the 2025/2026 planning period (June, July, October, January, February, and May) was the day ahead congestion in that month alone enough to pay FTR target allocations for the month. In July 2025 there was no auction surplus and ARR holders were not paid the full target allocations for the month. Months with ARR deficiencies will be funded at the end of the planning period from surplus FTR revenues if there is an FTR surplus or through an uplift charge to FTR holders if there is not an FTR surplus. Figure 13-12 shows the extent to which FTRs are funded by the auction surplus. As part of the illogic of the FTR/ARR construct and as an illustration that it is unlike any actual market, FTR buyers pay ARR holders for the rights to congestion but FTR buyers may reclaim part of their payment if actual congestion is less than they expected and not enough to cover target allocations.

The market rules should recognize that ARR holders have the right to all surplus FTR auction revenue, not just the remainder after guaranteeing that FTRs are paid target allocations. The surplus FTR auction revenue results from the prices that FTR buyers willingly paid for the rights to price differences across specific paths. The MMU recommends that all FTR auction revenue be distributed to ARR holders monthly, regardless of FTR funding levels. The MMU recommends that, under the current FTR design, all congestion revenue in excess of FTR target allocations be distributed to ARR holders on a monthly basis. Under the MMU recommendation, the amount represented by each bar in Figure 13-13 would be assigned to ARR holders in every month.

49 On May 31, 2018, a rule change was implemented. Effective for the 2018/2019 planning period, surplus day-ahead congestion charges and surplus FTR auction revenue that remain at the end of the Planning Period allocated to ARR holders, rather than to FTR holders. 163 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2018).

### Figure 13-12 Monthly surplus auction revenue and surplus congestion revenue: June 2017 through May 2026[50]





Figure 13-13 shows the increase or decrease in total accrued surplus for the planning period for each month (orange line). In Figure 13-13, if the FTR payments from the auction surplus are positive in a month (blue line above zero), that means that FTR payments in that month were dependent on FTR auction surplus from that month to cover the FTR target allocations in that month. If the change in the total accrued surplus for a month is positive, that means that there was surplus revenue (equal to the height of the orange bar) left over after paying FTR target allocations in that month from congestion or from auction revenue. This net surplus is carried until the end of the planning

50 The bars for January 2018 and January 2026 are truncated.



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period and used to backfill FTR target allocations as needed before distributing to ARR holders. If the change in total accrued surplus for a month is negative, that means that were insufficient revenues, including the auction surplus, to pay FTR target allocations in that month. If the net surplus is negative at the end of the planning period, total revenue paid to FTRs will be lower than total FTR target allocations. Under the current rules, FTRs are made whole using surplus revenue from other months within the same planning period or by an uplift charge to all FTR holders at the end of the planning period. The final settlements are not known until the end of the planning period.


In the 2024/2025 planning period there was not enough revenue from congestion plus auction surplus to pay FTR target allocations, resulting in a reduction to the entire planning period surplus of $196.2 million. ARR holders were required to subsidize FTR holders because congestion revenues were less than FTR target allocations.

In the 2025/2026 planning period, there was enough congestion to pay FTR target allocations. However, due to the monthly settlement process $117.7 million of FTR auction revenue was transferred from ARR holders to FTR holders in individual months that did not have enough revenue from congestion to pay FTR target allocations. Because there was enough congestion to pay FTR target allocations when summed over the entire planning period, all $117.7 million will be returned to ARR holders for the 2025/2026 planning period. Under the MMU's recommendation to distribute all FTR auction revenue to ARR holders every month, regardless of FTR funding levels, the $117.7 million of FTR auction revenue would have been paid to ARR holders in the month that it was collected by PJM and ARR holders would not be required to subsidize underperforming FTRs.

In the 2025/2026 planning period, day-ahead congestion increased by $3,157.4 million, 126.6 percent, from $2,494.9 million in the 2024/2025 planning period to $5,652.3 million the 2025/2026 planning period. Target allocations increased by $2,398.1 million, 87.8 percent, from $2,732.4 million in the 2024/2025 planning period to $5,130.4 million in the 2025/2026 planning period. The actual day-ahead congestion ($5,652.3 million) was greater than the target allocations ($5,130.4 million) in the 2025/2026 planning period.

In July 2025, there was a large increase in Residual ARR target allocations without a corresponding increase in Monthly FTR Auction revenue, resulting in the first month with an ARR deficiency in the history of the ARR market. This disconnect between the ARR and FTR markets is a result of the fact that congestion is incorrectly defined as target allocations, i.e. the property rights for congestion in the current ARR/FTR market design are not correctly defined.

**Figure 13-13 Monthly ARR surplus: June 2017 through May 2026**[51]





51 The bars for January 2018 and January 2026 are truncated.

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Figure 13-14 shows the surplus FTR auction revenue from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. Each new planning period introduces a new FTR model, including outages and PJM's discretionary adjustments for revenue adequacy. The differences in the assumptions in the market model can result in large differences in FTR auction surplus and ARR revenue from one planning period to another. Payments to FTRs have relied on payments from the surplus rather than from day-ahead congestion. The persistent mismatch between target allocations and day-ahead congestion and the use of the surplus are another illustration of the internal illogic and incoherence of the PJM FTR/ARR design.

FTR auction revenue is the value that FTR buyers assign to congestion rights that belong to ARR holders. There is no logical or market based reason to assign any part of that auction revenue back to the FTR buyers. It is inconsistent with the operation of a market that sellers are required to return some of the purchase price to buyers if the purchase is less profitable for buyers than expected. Auction revenue from the sale of FTRs should be distributed directly and completely to ARR holders.

**Figure 13-14 Monthly FTR auction surplus: 2011/2012 through 2025/2026 planning period**






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Table 13-46 shows the surplus FTR auction revenue, surplus day-ahead congestion revenue and surplus congestion revenue for planning periods 2010/2011 through the 2025/2026 planning period.

**Table 13-46 Surplus FTR Auction Revenue: 2010/2011 through 2025/2026 planning period[52]**

| Planning Period | Surplus FTR Auction Revenue (Millions) | Surplus Day-Ahead Congestion (Millions) | Surplus Congestion Revenue (Millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010/2011 | $29.7 | ($1,218.7) | ($449.3) |
| 2011/2012 | $108.9 | ($460.3) | ($192.5) |
| 2012/2013 | $66.7 | ($328.5) | ($292.3) |
| 2013/2014 | $71.7 | ($715.3) | ($678.7) |
| 2014/2015* | $29.0 | $139.8 | $139.6 |
| 2015/2016 | $29.6 | $56.4 | $42.5 |
| 2016/2017 | $27.9 | $97.1 | $72.6 |
| 2017/2018 | $27.4 | $344.0 | $371.2 |
| 2018/2019 | $180.8 | ($68.5) | $112.3 |
| 2019/2020 | $217.8 | ($87.9) | $140.7 |
| 2020/2021 | $166.1 | ($185.1) | ($14.5) |
| 2021/2022 | $168.5 | ($198.0) | ($29.5) |
| 2022/2023 | $289.2 | ($54.0) | $235.2 |
| 2023/2024 | $264.4 | ($146.7) | $117.8 |
| 2024/2025 | $196.2 | ($236.1) | ($39.9) |
| 2025/2026 | $239.9 | $522.0 | $761.8 |
| Total | $2,114.0 | ($2,539.8) | $296.9 |

*Start of counter flow "buy back"

## "Revenue Adequacy"

FTR revenue adequacy, like surplus congestion revenue, is a misnomer. FTR revenue adequacy, as defined in PJM rules, is an artifact of the flawed design of the current approach to FTR/ARRs. If FTRs only returned congestion to FTR holders, there could be no such thing as revenue inadequacy.

As currently defined in PJM, FTR revenue adequacy simply compares day-ahead congestion revenues to FTR target allocations. (Target allocations are the day-ahead CLMP differences, shadow prices, between the source and sink of the FTR times the MW of the FTR. Congestion revenues are the day-ahead CLMP differences, shadow prices, between sources and sinks times the MW flow on the lines.) There is no reason to expect congestion revenues to equal FTR target allocations under the path based approach. There are systematic differences between FTR target allocations and actual congestion in aggregate and on a path by path basis. Revenue adequacy is not a benchmark for how well the FTR process is working. Target allocations are not congestion. FTR revenue adequacy is not equivalent to the adequacy of ARRs as an offset for load against total congestion. A path specific target allocation is not a guarantee of payment. Yet PJM treats target allocations as a guarantee of payment and takes what is termed surplus auction revenue from ARR holders (load) and gives it to FTR holders when day-ahead congestion revenues are not enough to cover all FTR target allocations.

Actual day-ahead congestion revenues are not a result of PJM's decisions about the FTR auction model, but result from the operation of the day-ahead energy market. As a result, the fewer FTRs sold, the higher the probability that congestion will exceed the sum of the FTR target allocations. For example, PJM's subjective decision to reduce available ARR/FTR supply in the ARR/FTR market model through outage selection for the 2014/2015 through 2016/2017 planning periods resulted in actual day-ahead congestion exceeding target allocations at the expense of a reduction in available ARRs and associated FTRs. PJM's decisions have included the arbitrary use of higher outage levels and the decision to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) both of which reduced the FTRs made available for sale in FTR auctions. PJM's actions have led to a significant reduction in the allocation of Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs and therefore a reduction in available FTRs.

PJM's arbitrary decision to increase outages in the ARR allocation and in the Annual FTR Auction did not address the Stage 1A ARR over allocation issue directly because Stage 1A ARR allocations cannot be prorated. Instead, PJM's actions for the 2014/2015 through 2016/2017 planning periods resulted in decreased Stage 1B ARR allocations, decreased Stage 2 ARR allocations and decreased FTR capability. The direct assignment of balancing congestion (generally negative) and M2M payments to load beginning in the 2017/2018 planning period arbitrarily decreased congestion available for load and increased the congestion revenue available to pay FTR holders. PJM reduced

52 Total congestion surplus not equal to the sum of the columns in years prior to the 2017/2018 planning period because other charges were subtracted from the congestion surplus.

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the number of outages taken in the ARR allocation and in the Annual FTR Auction, increasing the supply of ARRs and FTRs. The current ARR/FTR design does not serve as an efficient way to ensure that load receives all the congestion revenues or has the ability to receive the auction revenues associated with all the potential congestion revenues. There are several reasons for the disconnect between congestion revenues and ARR/FTR revenues in the current design. The reasons include: the use of generation to load paths rather than a measure of total congestion to assign congestion revenue rights; the failure to provide to ARR holders the full system capability that is provided to FTR purchasers in the Long Term FTR Auction; unavoidable modeling differences such as emergency outages; avoidable modeling differences such as outage modeling decisions; and cross subsidies among and between FTR participants and ARR holders.

Revenue adequacy for ARRs is, for practical purposes, a meaningless concept. Revenue adequacy for ARRs means that FTR buyers collectively pay more than zero for FTRs in FTR auctions, and that those payments were received by ARR holders. For that reason, ARRs have unsurprisingly been defined to be revenue adequate for every auction to date. ARR revenue adequacy has nothing to do with the adequacy of ARRs as an offset to total congestion. ARRs can be revenue adequate at the same time that ARRs return only half of congestion to load, or even much less.

Total net FTR auction revenue for the 2024/2025 planning period, before accounting for self scheduling, load shifts or residual ARRs, was $1,664.9 million. For the 2025/2026 planning period, total net FTR auction revenue from each FTR auction occurred was $2,158.1 million. Total ARR target allocations for the 2024/2025 planning period were $1,448.1 million. For the 2025/2026 planning period, ARR target allocations were $1,885.5 million.

Table 13-47 presents the PJM FTR revenue detail for the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods. This includes ARR target allocations from the Annual ARR Allocation and net revenue sources from the Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.[53] In this table, under the balancing congestion and M2M payment rules, any net negative congestion revenue is from day-ahead congestion and does not include balancing congestion. Any remaining surplus will be distributed to ARR holders at the end of the planning period, while any remaining deficiency will be charged to all FTR holders as FTR uplift at the end of the planning period. The actual surplus or deficiency for the planning period is not known until the end of the planning period. In the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods, FTRs were paid part of the ARR auction surplus to ensure the payment of the FTR target allocations for months where FTR target allocations were greater than the congestion revenue collected in that month. In the 2024/2025 planning period, there was not enough FTR revenue (including ARR auction surplus) to pay FTR target allocations, and ARR holders received no surplus at the end of the planning period. In the 2025/2026 planning period, there was enough congestion revenue to pay FTR target allocations. As a result, ARR holders received a surplus of $762.0 million at the end of the 2025/2026 planning period. This surplus includes $522.1 million of congestion revenue and the entire $239.9 ARR auction surplus. ARR revenues should not be held until the end of the planning period and should not be used to subsidize FTRs.

53 The final ARR values may change if load shifts.



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### Table 13-47 Total annual ARR and FTR revenue detail (Dollars (Millions)): 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods

| Accounting Element | 2024/2025 | 2025/2026 |
|---|---|---|
| **ARR Information** | | |
| ARR Target Allocations | $1,448.1 | $1,885.5 |
| ARR Credits | $1,448.1 | $1,885.5 |
| **FTR Auction Revenue** | **$1,664.9** | **$2,158.1** |
| Annual FTR Auction Net Revenue | $1,475.3 | $1,895.3 |
| Long Term FTR Auction Net Revenue | $110.0 | $153.0 |
| Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction Net Revenue | $79.6 | $109.8 |
| **Surplus Auction Revenue** | | |
| ARR Surplus (FTR Auction Revenue - ARR Credits) | $216.8 | $239.9 |
| ARR Payout Ratio | 100% | 100% |
| **FTR Targets** | | |
| Positive Target Allocations | $2,731.0 | $6,530.4 |
| Negative Target Allocations | ($573.4) | ($1,400.2) |
| FTR Target Allocations | $3,304.4 | $5,130.3 |
| **FTR Revenues** | | |
| ARR Surplus | $216.8 | $239.9 |
| **Congestion** | | |
| Net Negative Congestion | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Hourly Congestion Revenue | $2,494.9 | $5,652.3 |
| *Surplus Congestion Revenues Distributed to Other Months* | $52.9 | $60.2 |
| **Total FTR Congestion Credits** | $2,691.1 | $5,130.3 |
| **FTR Payout Ratio** | | |
| Congestion | 75.5% | 110.2% |
| Congestion and ARR Surplus | 98.8% | 100.0% |
| **Remaining Deficiency** | **$39.9** | **$0.0** |
| **Remaining Surplus** | $0.0 | $762.04 |

FTR target allocations are defined based on hourly CLMP differences in the day-ahead energy market for FTR paths. FTR credits are paid to FTR holders and, depending on market conditions, can be less than the target allocations but are capped at target allocations. Table 13-48 lists the FTR revenues, target allocations, credits, payout ratios, congestion credit deficiencies and excess congestion charges by month for the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods. FTR revenues include congestion and surplus FTR auction revenue.

The total row in Table 13-48 is not the sum of each of the monthly rows because the monthly rows may include excess revenues carried forward from prior months and excess revenues distributed back from later months.

### Table 13-48 Monthly FTR accounting summary (Dollars (Millions)): 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods

| Period | FTR Revenues | FTR Target Allocations | FTR Payout Ratio (original) | FTR Credits (with adjustments) | FTR Payout Ratio (with adjustments) | Monthly Credits Surplus (with adjustments) | Monthly Credits Deficiency (with adjustments) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun-24 | $168.6 | $164.0 | 100.0% | $161.6 | 98.6% | $4.7 | $0.0 |
| Jul-24 | $387.4 | $347.8 | 100.0% | $343.2 | 98.7% | $39.6 | $0.0 |
| Aug-24 | $272.4 | $249.9 | 100.0% | $246.5 | 98.6% | $22.5 | $0.0 |
| Sep-24 | $144.9 | $169.2 | 85.7% | $166.8 | 98.6% | $0.0 | ($24.2) |
| Oct-24 | $156.2 | $176.3 | 88.6% | $173.7 | 98.5% | $0.0 | ($20.1) |
| Nov-24 | $103.2 | $99.3 | 100.0% | $97.8 | 98.5% | $3.9 | $0.0 |
| Dec-24 | $236.6 | $260.7 | 90.7% | $256.9 | 98.5% | $0.0 | ($24.1) |
| Jan-25 | $377.6 | $334.0 | 100.0% | $328.8 | 98.5% | $43.5 | $0.0 |
| Feb-25 | $155.2 | $154.0 | 100.0% | $151.6 | 98.4% | $1.2 | $0.0 |
| Mar-25 | $213.2 | $291.2 | 73.2% | $286.7 | 98.5% | $0.0 | ($78.0) |
| Apr-25 | $201.8 | $216.7 | 93.1% | $213.5 | 98.5% | $0.0 | ($14.9) |
| May-25 | $274.0 | $267.9 | 100.0% | $264.0 | 98.5% | $6.0 | $0.0 |
| | | | Summary for Planning Period 2024/2025 | | | | |
| Total | $2,691.1 | $2,731.0 | | $2,691.1 | | | ($39.9) |
| Jun-25 | $430.0 | $346.8 | 100.0% | $346.8 | 100.0% | $83.2 | $0.0 |
| Jul-25 | $625.4 | $522.0 | 100.0% | $522.0 | 100.0% | $103.4 | $0.0 |
| Aug-25 | $186.8 | $177.0 | 100.0% | $177.3 | 100.0% | $9.8 | $0.0 |
| Sep-25 | $257.3 | $263.4 | 97.7% | $263.6 | 100.0% | $0.0 | ($6.1) |
| Oct-25 | $405.5 | $378.0 | 100.0% | $378.0 | 100.0% | $27.6 | $0.0 |
| Nov-25 | $239.9 | $251.1 | 95.5% | $251.1 | 100.0% | $0.0 | ($11.2) |
| Dec-25 | $457.2 | $463.0 | 98.7% | $463.0 | 100.0% | $0.0 | ($5.5) |
| Jan-26 | $1,359.7 | $996.0 | 100.0% | $996.0 | 100.0% | $363.6 | $0.0 |
| Feb-26 | $765.7 | $623.0 | 100.0% | $623.0 | 100.0% | $142.7 | $0.0 |
| Mar-26 | $233.9 | $271.3 | 86.2% | $271.3 | 100.0% | $0.0 | ($37.3) |
| Apr-26 | $313.7 | $306.2 | 100.0% | $313.7 | 100.0% | $7.5 | $0.0 |
| May-26 | $617.3 | $533.0 | 100.0% | $617.3 | 100.0% | $84.2 | $0.0 |
| | | | Summary for Planning Period 2025/2026 | | | | |
| Total | $5,892.3 | $5,130.8 | | $5,223.0 | | $762.0 | |

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Figure 13-15 shows the original PJM reported FTR payout ratio by month, excluding excess revenue distribution, for January 2004 through May 2026. The months with payout ratios above 100 percent have congestion revenue greater than the target allocations and the months with payout ratios under 100 percent have congestion revenue that is less than the target allocations. Figure 13-15 also shows the payout ratio after distributing surplus congestion revenue across months within the planning period. The payout ratio for months with a payout ratio less than 100 percent in the current planning period may change if surplus congestion revenue is collected in the remainder of the planning period and assigned to prior months.

### Figure 13-15 FTR payout ratio by month, excluding and including excess revenue distribution: January 2004 through May 2026





Table 13-49 shows the FTR payout ratio by planning period from the 2003/2004 planning period forward. The 2013/2014 planning period includes the additional revenue from unallocated congestion charges from Balancing Operating Reserves. Beginning with the 2018/2019 planning period payments to FTRs are limited to 100 percent of the target allocations.

The 2025/2026 planning period had a payout ratio of 100.0 percent.

### Table 13-49 Reported FTR payout ratio by planning period[54]

| Planning Period | FTR Payout Ratio |
|---|---|
| 2003/2004 | 97.7% |
| 2004/2005 | 100.0% |
| 2005/2006 | 90.7% |
| 2006/2007 | 100.0% |
| 2007/2008 | 100.0% |
| 2008/2009 | 100.0% |
| 2009/2010 | 96.9% |
| 2010/2011 | 85.0% |
| 2011/2012 | 80.6% |
| 2012/2013 | 67.8% |
| 2013/2014 | 72.8% |
| 2014/2015 | 116.2% |
| 2015/2016 | 106.8% |
| 2016/2017 | 112.6% |
| 2017/2018 | 138.5% |
| 2018/2019 | 100.0% |
| 2019/2020 | 100.0% |
| 2020/2021 | 98.7% |
| 2021/2022 | 99.0% |
| 2022/2023 | 100.0% |
| 2023/2024 | 100.0% |
| 2024/2025 | 98.8% |
| 2025/2026 | 100.0% |


54 The actual payout ratios for the 2006/2007, 2007/2008, and 2008/2009 planning periods may have exceeded 100 percent.



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Figure 13-16 shows the day-ahead balancing, total congestion and the FTR surplus from 2005 through May 2026.

**Figure 13-16 FTR surplus and day-ahead, balancing and total congestion: 2005 through May 2026[55]**




## Target Allocations and Congestion by Constraint Do Not Match

The path based ARR/FTR market design does not align with congestion based on actual network use. A comparison of the FTR target allocations for individual constraints to the day-ahead and total congestion by constraint provides evidence of this misalignment. Total congestion is the sum of day-ahead and balancing congestion. If FTR target allocations on some paths are significantly greater than actual congestion and FTR target allocations on other paths are significantly less than actual congestion, this is evidence of a serious flaw in the design. It is evidence of a mismatch between the definition of target allocations paid to FTR holders and the congestion that is the purported source of those payments.

FTR target allocations are the result of constraints on day-ahead paths in the energy market. Any specific FTR path may be affected by multiple constraints. Constraints that result in FTR target allocations greater than the congestion that results from those constraints mean that the FTR target allocations are greater than the actual congestion. Figure 13-17 shows the constraints that are the top 10 sources of positive FTR target allocations, for the 2025/2026 planning period. Figure 13-17 also shows the corresponding day-ahead congestion and total congestion that result from the identified constraints. Constraints for which FTR target allocations were greater than total congestion resulted in $9523.3 million of excess target allocations not funded by actual congestion. Such constraints include constraints in Figure 13-17, such as Lenox – North Meshoppen, which resulted in FTR target allocations that were 1.8 times larger than the corresponding total congestion. In order to pay FTRs their target allocations on these constraints, congestion from other constraints where congestion exceeds target allocations and auction surplus are used as the source. This is not consistent with an efficient market either for other FTR holders or for load.

55 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

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### Figure 13-17 Top ten constraint sources of positive FTR target allocations: June 2025 through May 2026[56]






Figure 13-18 shows the hourly FTR target allocations, day-ahead congestion and balancing congestion for the Bedington – Black Oak constraint for the 2025/2026 planning period. Bedington – Black Oak constraint was the largest source of FTR target allocations during this period. The significant and variable difference between constraint specific FTR target allocations and constraint specific day ahead congestion provides evidence of the misalignment and over allocation of the path based FTR congestion rights relative to the actual network use of the physical energy market.

The Bedington – Black Oak constraint was a significant component of the overallocation of FTRs. FTRs routinely receive more target allocations than the congestion collected from the system because of the misalignment and over allocation of the path based FTR congestion rights relative to the actual network use of the physical energy market. The misalignment and overallocation of path based FTRs is exacerbated when line outages reduce the physical system capability between generation and load (the source of congestion revenue) relative to system capability assumed in the FTR market model.

### Figure 13-18 Hourly FTR target allocations, total congestion, day-ahead congestion and balancing congestion for the Bedington – Black Oak constraint: June 2025 through May 2026[57]




56 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

57 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.




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Figure 13-19 shows the constraints that are the top 10 sources of negative FTR target allocations (counter flow) for the 2025/2026 planning period. Figure 13-19 also shows the corresponding day-ahead congestion and total congestion that result from the identified constraints.

In the 2025/2026 planning period, there were 63 constraints that were sources of negative target allocations. Of the 54 constraints that were sources of negative target allocations, 58 resulted in positive actual total congestion. Constraints that contribute positive congestion revenues and have negative FTR target allocations are a source of funds used in the settlement process to pay for FTR target allocations on FTR paths that are overallocated relative to actual congestion.

**Figure 13-19 Top ten constraint sources of negative FTR target allocations: June 2025 through May 2026[58] [59]**




58 New Carisle – Bosserman is the spelling provided in PJM data, rather than New Carlisle – Bosserman.
59 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

## ARRs as an Offset to Congestion for Load

Load pays 100 percent of congestion revenues. FTRs, and later ARRs, were intended to return congestion revenues to load to offset an unintended consequence of locational marginal pricing. With the implementation of the current, path based FTR/ARR design, the purpose of FTRs has been subverted. The inconsistencies between actual network solutions used to serve load and path based rights available to load cause a misalignment of congestion paid by load and the congestion paid to load, in aggregate and on a specific load basis. These inconsistencies between actual network use and path based rights cause cross subsidies between ARR holders and FTR holders and among ARR holders. One result of this misalignment is that individual zones have very different offsets due to the location of their path based ARRs compared to their actual congestion costs from actual network use.

Table 13-50 shows the ARR and FTR revenue paid to load, the congestion offset available to load with and without allocating balancing congestion to load and the congestion offset when surplus congestion revenue is allocated to load. The highlighted offsets are the actual offsets based on the rules that were effective in that planning period. The pre 2017/2018 offset is calculated as the ARR credits and the FTR credits excluding balancing congestion and M2M payments, divided by the total day-ahead congestion and the load share of balancing and M2M payments.

Total ARR and self scheduled FTR revenue offset only 55.7 percent of total congestion costs for the 2025/2026 planning period. Load was underpaid by $2.2 billion in the 2025/2026 planning period, a $1.3 billion increase from the $0.9 billion underpayment in the 2024/2025 planning period. The $2.2 billion underpayment is the difference between the 2025/2026 planning period congestion ($4.9 billion) and the 2025/2026 planning period offset ($2.7 billion) in Table 13-50. This is the largest underpayment that load has experienced in a single planning period. Load was underpaid by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period.

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## Table 13-50 ARR and self scheduled FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders: 2011/2012 through 2025/2026 planning periods[60]

| | | Revenue | | | | | | | Pre 2017/2018 (Without Balancing) | | 2017/2018 (With Balancing) | | Post 2017/2018 (With Balancing and Surplus) | | Effective Offset | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Planning Period | ARR Credits | Unadjusted SS FTR Credits | Day Ahead Congestion | Balancing + M2M Congestion | Total Congestion | Surplus Revenue Pre 2017/2018 Rules | Surplus Revenue 2017/2018 Rules | Post 2017/2018 Rules | Total ARR/ FTR Offset | Percent Offset | Current Revenue Received | Percent Offset | New Revenue Received | New Offset | Cumulative Revenue | Offset |
| 2011/2012 | $515.6 | $310.0 | $1,025.4 | ($275.7) | $749.7 | ($50.6) | $35.6 | $113.9 | $775.0 | 103.4% | $585.5 | 78.1% | $663.8 | 88.5% | $775.0 | 103.4% |
| 2012/2013 | $356.4 | $268.4 | $904.7 | ($379.9) | $524.8 | ($94.0) | $18.4 | $62.1 | $530.7 | 101.1% | $263.2 | 50.2% | $306.9 | 58.5% | $530.7 | 101.1% |
| 2013/2014 | $339.4 | $626.6 | $2,231.3 | ($360.6) | $1,870.6 | ($139.4) | ($49.0) | ($49.0) | $826.5 | 44.2% | $556.3 | 29.7% | $556.3 | 29.7% | $826.5 | 44.2% |
| 2014/2015 | $487.4 | $348.1 | $1,625.9 | ($268.3) | $1,357.6 | $36.7 | $111.2 | $400.6 | $872.2 | 64.2% | $678.4 | 50.0% | $967.8 | 71.3% | $872.2 | 64.2% |
| 2015/2016 | $641.8 | $209.2 | $1,098.7 | ($147.6) | $951.1 | $9.2 | $42.1 | $188.9 | $860.2 | 90.4% | $745.5 | 78.4% | $892.3 | 93.8% | $860.2 | 90.4% |
| 2016/2017 | $648.1 | $149.9 | $885.7 | ($104.8) | $780.8 | $15.1 | $36.5 | $179.0 | $813.1 | 104.1% | $729.6 | 93.4% | $872.1 | 111.7% | $813.1 | 104.1% |
| 2017/2018 | $429.6 | $212.3 | $1,322.1 | ($129.5) | $1,192.6 | $52.3 | $80.4 | $370.7 | $694.2 | 58.2% | $592.8 | 49.7% | $883.1 | 74.1% | $592.8 | 49.7% |
| 2018/2019 | $531.6 | $130.1 | $832.7 | ($152.6) | $680.0 | ($5.8) | $16.2 | $112.2 | $655.87 | 96.4% | $525.3 | 77.2% | $621.3 | 91.4% | $621.3 | 91.4% |
| 2019/2020 | $547.6 | $91.9 | $612.1 | ($169.4) | $442.7 | ($1.6) | $21.6 | $157.8 | $637.9 | 144.1% | $491.7 | 111.1% | $627.9 | 141.8% | $627.9 | 141.8% |
| 2020/2021 | $392.7 | $179.9 | $899.6 | ($256.2) | $643.4 | ($43.2) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $529.31 | 82.3% | $316.4 | 49.2% | $316.4 | 49.2% | $316.4 | 49.2% |
| 2021/2022 | $469.7 | $500.5 | $2,069.2 | ($457.4) | $1,611.8 | ($104.6) | ($2.9) | ($2.9) | $865.6 | 53.7% | $509.9 | 31.6% | $509.9 | 31.6% | $509.9 | 31.6% |
| 2022/2023 | $998.7 | $630.0 | $2,223.5 | ($526.5) | $1,697.1 | ($80.6) | $65.1 | $235.2 | $1,548.2 | 91.2% | $1,167.4 | 68.8% | $1,337.5 | 78.8% | $1,337.5 | 78.8% |
| 2023/2024 | $912.1 | $371.4 | $1,618.9 | ($327.0) | $1,291.9 | ($44.1) | $24.6 | $117.2 | $1,239.4 | 95.9% | $981.2 | 76.0% | $1,073.7 | 83.1% | $1,073.7 | 83.1% |
| 2024/2025 | $954.7 | $658.0 | $2,494.8 | ($475.5) | $2,019.4 | ($124.2) | ($9.6) | ($9.6) | $1,488.6 | 73.7% | $1,127.7 | 55.8% | $1,127.7 | 55.8% | $1,127.7 | 55.8% |
| 2025/2026 | $1,179.6 | $1,553.7 | $5,651.5 | ($777.8) | $4,873.8 | ($5.0) | $230.5 | $761.2 | $2,728.2 | 56.0% | $2,186.0 | 44.9% | $2,716.7 | 55.7% | $2,716.7 | 55.7% |
| Total | $9,404.9 | $6,240.1 | $25,496.0 | ($4,808.8) | $20,687.3 | ($579.9) | $620.7 | $2,637.3 | $15,065.1 | 72.8% | $11,456.9 | 55.4% | $13,473.5 | 65.1% | $13,601.6 | 65.7% |

Table 13-50 illustrates the inadequacies of the ARR/FTR design. The goal of the design should be to give the rights to 100 percent of the congestion revenues to the load.

60 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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Table 13-51 shows the cumulative offset and shortfall using the rules that were effective in the given planning period to calculate the ARR/FTR revenue. The cumulative offset, beginning in the 2011/2012 planning period, is the sum of the revenue received for that planning period and all previous planning periods divided by the total congestion for that planning period and all previous planning periods. The cumulative shortfall is the cumulative difference between the ARR holders' revenue and the congestion they paid, for each planning period and the planning periods prior to each planning period.

From the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period, the cumulative offset, the cumulative return of congestion to load, was only 65.7 percent based on the total congestion and the effective offset rules that were in place for each planning period. Load has been underpaid by $7.1 billion from the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2025/2026 planning period. This is an increase of $2.2 billion from the $4.9 billion that load had been underpaid for the 2011/2012 planning period through the 2024/2025 planning period. This is the largest underpayment that load has experienced in a single planning period. The $7.1 billion underpayment is the difference between the total congestion ($20.7 billion) and the total offset ($13.6 billion) in Table 13-50.

**Table 13-51 ARR and self scheduled FTR cumulative offset for ARR holders: 2011/2012 through 2025/2026 planning periods[61]**

| Planning Period | Cumulative Offset | Cumulative Shortfall (Millions) |
|---|---|---|
| 2011/2012 | 103.4% | $25.3 |
| 2012/2013 | 102.4% | $31.2 |
| 2013/2014 | 67.8% | ($1,012.9) |
| 2014/2015 | 66.7% | ($1,498.3) |
| 2015/2016 | 70.9% | ($1,589.2) |
| 2016/2017 | 75.0% | ($1,556.9) |
| 2017/2018 | 71.0% | ($2,156.7) |
| 2018/2019 | 72.7% | ($2,215.4) |
| 2019/2020 | 76.3% | ($2,030.2) |
| 2020/2021 | 74.4% | ($2,357.2) |
| 2021/2022 | 68.0% | ($3,459.1) |
| 2022/2023 | 69.5% | ($3,818.7) |
| 2023/2024 | 70.7% | ($4,036.8) |
| 2024/2025 | 68.8% | ($4,928.5) |
| 2025/2026 | 65.7% | ($7,085.6) |

## Zonal ARR Congestion Offset

Zonal ARR congestion offsets vary significantly across zones. There is no good reason that this should be the result of a system designed to return congestion to load. PJM has offered no explanation for this result. This outcome is a direct result of the flawed definition of congestion and of the method for assigning rights to congestion to ARR holders. The results show that path based ARR assignments in the current path based ARR/FTR design are not aligned with actual network use by load, and are therefore not aligned with how congestion is actually paid by load on actual network usage. Due to this misalignment of ARR rights relative to actual network usage, individual loads cannot claim the congestion they paid through assigned ARRs. One result of the misalignment of path based ARR rights are cross subsidies among ARR holders.

ARRs are allocated to zonal load based on historical generation to load transmission contract paths, in many cases based on 1999 contract paths. ARRs are allocated within zones based on zonal base load (Stage 1A) and

61 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

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zonal peak loads (other stages). ARR revenue is the result of the prices that result from the sale of FTRs through the FTR auctions. ARR revenue for each zone is the revenue for the ARRs that sink in each zone.

Congestion paid by load in a zone is the total difference between what the zonal load pays in congestion charges net of payments to the generation that serves the zonal load, including generation in the zone and outside the zone.[62]

Table 13-52 shows the day-ahead congestion and balancing congestion and M2M charges paid by load in each zone along with the congestion offsets paid to load: FTR auction revenue; self scheduled FTR revenue adjusted by the payout ratio for FTRs if below 100 percent; and the allocation of end of planning period surplus.[63] The offset for the 2025/2026 planning period includes the current surplus revenue at the end of the planning period. Table 13-52 also shows payments by load for balancing congestion and M2M payments. The total congestion offset paid to load is the sum of all of those credits and charges.

The zonal offset percentage shown in Table 13-52 is the sum of the congestion related revenues (offset) paid to load in each zone divided by the total congestion payment made by load in each zone.

### Table 13-52 Zonal ARR and self scheduled FTR total congestion offset (in millions) for ARR holders: 2025/2026 planning period[64]

| Zone | ARR Credits | Adjusted FTR Credits | Balancing+ M2M Charge | Surplus Allocation | Total Offset | Day Ahead Congestion | Balancing Congestion | M2M Payments | Total Congestion | Offset |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACEC | $2.4 | $0.2 | ($8.37) | $1.0 | ($4.9) | $60.2 | ($6.4) | ($2.0) | $51.8 | (9.4%) |
| AEP | $89.2 | $265.2 | ($122.9) | $89.2 | $320.7 | $894.5 | ($94.2) | ($28.7) | $771.6 | 41.6% |
| APS | $86.0 | $231.8 | ($52.3) | $52.0 | $317.5 | $383.3 | ($42.3) | ($10.0) | $331.0 | 95.9% |
| ATSI | $60.5 | $5.1 | ($54.7) | $24.8 | $35.6 | $395.4 | ($41.3) | ($13.5) | $340.6 | 10.5% |
| BGE | $212.8 | $25.2 | ($29.3) | $89.1 | $297.7 | $249.7 | ($23.2) | ($6.1) | $220.4 | 135.1% |
| COMED | $108.5 | $4.3 | ($73.9) | $44.0 | $82.8 | $570.8 | ($55.0) | ($18.8) | $496.9 | 16.7% |
| DAY | $13.9 | $4.3 | ($14.7) | $6.1 | $9.6 | $106.6 | ($11.1) | ($3.5) | $91.9 | 10.4% |
| DOM | $144.0 | $931.9 | ($141.4) | $17.0 | $951.4 | $1,035.2 | ($114.2) | ($27.2) | $893.8 | 106.5% |
| DPL | $104.6 | $18.1 | ($20.0) | $5.0 | $107.6 | $147.2 | ($16.3) | ($3.8) | $127.1 | 84.7% |
| DUKE | $40.7 | $3.1 | ($22.5) | $253.9 | $275.2 | $164.2 | ($17.2) | ($5.3) | $141.7 | 194.1% |
| DUQ | $12.0 | $0.7 | ($10.7) | $47.3 | $49.3 | $72.9 | ($8.1) | ($2.6) | $62.3 | 79.3% |
| EKPC | $7.5 | ($0.0) | ($13.2) | $3.0 | ($2.7) | $98.5 | ($10.3) | ($2.9) | $85.3 | (3.2%) |
| EXT | $2.1 | $0.0 | ($16.4) | $0.4 | ($13.9) | $79.8 | ($16.4) | $0.0 | $63.4 | (22.0%) |
| JCPLC | $6.5 | $6.5 | ($22.8) | $3.7 | ($6.1) | $166.8 | ($18.4) | ($4.4) | $144.0 | (4.3%) |
| MEC | $16.1 | $2.5 | ($20.2) | $7.1 | $5.5 | $106.2 | ($17.1) | ($3.0) | $86.0 | 6.4% |
| OVEC | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.8) | $0.0 | ($0.7) | $6.8 | ($0.7) | ($0.0) | $6.1 | (12.3%) |
| PE | $52.6 | $21.7 | ($14.2) | $25.5 | $85.6 | $103.1 | ($10.9) | ($3.3) | $88.9 | 96.3% |
| PECO | $12.4 | $0.3 | ($35.1) | $5.1 | ($17.4) | $239.1 | ($27.4) | ($7.8) | $204.0 | (8.5%) |
| PEPCO | $90.0 | $21.9 | ($27.4) | $39.4 | $123.8 | $236.0 | ($21.8) | ($5.6) | $208.6 | 59.3% |
| PPL | $63.0 | $7.9 | ($38.2) | $26.0 | $58.6 | $266.7 | ($30.0) | ($8.2) | $228.4 | 25.7% |
| PSEG | $52.9 | $2.7 | ($37.5) | $21.4 | $39.6 | $259.8 | ($28.9) | ($8.6) | $222.3 | 17.8% |
| REC | $2.5 | $0.0 | ($1.3) | $1.0 | $2.3 | $9.0 | ($1.0) | ($0.3) | $7.7 | 29.3% |
| Total | $1,179.6 | $1,553.4 | ($777.8) | $761.8 | $2,717.1 | $5,651.5 | ($612.2) | ($165.6) | $4,873.8 | 55.7% |

62 See "Constraint Based Congestion Calculations," PJM ARR FTR Market Task Force (July 17, 2020) <https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/task-forces/afmtf/2020/20200722/20200722-item-03a-constraint-based-congestion-calculations.ashx>.
63 See *2020 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 11: Congestion and Marginal Losses
64 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.


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The total congestion offset paid to loads in the 2025/2026 planning period was 55.7 percent of congestion costs. The results vary significantly by zone. Loads in some zones, like BGE and DOM, receive substantially more in offsets than their total congestion payments. Loads in other zones, like MEC, receive substantially less in offsets than their total congestion payments. Loads in some zones, like ACEC and PECO, have higher balancing congestion and M2M charges than the load is able to offset with ARRs and FTRs, resulting in a negative total offset meaning that loads in these zones pay more than 100 percent of their congestion instead of having congestion fully offset which is goal of FTRs. The offsets are a function of the assignment of ARRs and the valuation of ARRs in the FTR auctions.

The amount and proportion of the offset that can be realized by load serving entities via their ARR allocations varies by planning period. The offsets are a function of the assignment of ARRs relative to the actual network sources of congestion, the valuation of ARRs in the FTR auctions and the congestion revenue from self scheduled ARRs. If the prices for FTRs are high relative to realized congestion, the offset provided by ARR is increased relative to cases where the prices for FTRs are low relative to realized congestion. While the amount of congestion that is returned to the load varies by planning period, PJM's ARR/FTR design has consistently failed to return the congestion revenues to the load that paid it. It is not possible for load to recover all of the congestion that they pay under the current design in which the rights to congestion revenues are assigned based on fictitious contract paths.

## Offset If All ARRs Are Held As ARRs

Table 13-53 shows the total congestion offset that would be available to ARR holders via allocated ARRs, by zone, if the ARRs holders held all their allocated ARRs in the 2023/2024, 2024/2025, and 2025/2026 planning periods and did not self schedule any. The calculated offset assumes that ARR holders receive the same surplus allocation from each planning period. If ARR holders held all their allocated ARRs for the 2025/2026 planning period, the ARR Target Allocations and Surplus Allocation would have offset only 39.0 percent of the congestion paid by load. However, the offset that would be received by individual zones varies widely, from -9.5 percent for ACEC to 128.9 percent for BGE. If ARR holders self scheduled all their allocated ARRs for the 2025/2026 planning period, the ARR Target Allocations and Surplus Allocation would have offset 55.7 percent of the congestion paid by load (Table 13-54). These results reflect the fact that actual congestion was relatively high, meaning that FTRs were comparatively more valuable, and FTR prices were relatively low, meaning the ARRs were comparatively less valuable. Self scheduled FTRs are paid from actual congestion revenues while ARRs are paid from auction revenues, in both cases plus any remaining congestion revenues not paid to FTRs (incorrectly referred to as surplus).

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## Table 13-53 Offset available to load if all ARRs are held: 2023/2024 through 2025/2026 planning periods[65]

| | 23/24 Planning Period | | | | | 24/25 Planning Period | | | | | 25/26 Planning Period | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ARR Held TA | Surplus Allocation | Bal+M2M Charges | Congestion+M2M | Offset | ARR Held TA | Surplus Allocation | Bal+M2M Charges | Congestion+M2M | Offset | ARR Held TA | Surplus Allocation | Bal+M2M Charges | Congestion+M2M | Offset |
| ACEC | $4.9 | $0.3 | ($3.8) | $10.8 | 12.8% | $4.5 | ($0.0) | ($5.4) | $18.8 | (5.1%) | $2.5 | $1.0 | ($8.4) | $51.8 | (9.5%) |
| AEP | $185.2 | $13.5 | ($50.4) | $201.8 | 73.5% | $160.6 | ($0.0) | ($72.1) | $327.3 | 27.1% | $224.7 | $89.2 | ($122.9) | $771.6 | 24.8% |
| APS | $85.5 | $6.2 | ($22.4) | $87.6 | 79.3% | $96.9 | ($0.0) | ($33.3) | $149.2 | 42.6% | $130.9 | $52.0 | ($52.3) | $331.0 | 39.5% |
| ATSI | $50.3 | $3.7 | ($25.6) | $99.4 | 28.5% | $61.9 | ($0.0) | ($33.8) | $169.2 | 16.6% | $62.5 | $24.8 | ($54.7) | $340.6 | 9.6% |
| BGE | $145.8 | $10.6 | ($12.5) | $44.4 | 324.3% | $153.0 | ($0.0) | ($18.2) | $79.9 | 168.7% | $224.2 | $89.1 | ($29.3) | $220.4 | 128.9% |
| COMED | $44.9 | $3.3 | ($31.4) | $215.9 | 7.8% | $55.3 | ($0.0) | ($42.4) | $232.2 | 5.5% | $110.7 | $44.0 | ($73.9) | $496.9 | 16.3% |
| DAY | $13.3 | $0.9 | ($6.7) | $23.7 | 31.7% | $13.7 | ($0.0) | ($8.8) | $39.1 | 12.5% | $15.3 | $6.1 | ($14.7) | $91.9 | 7.3% |
| DOM | $642.0 | $46.9 | ($52.0) | $181.8 | 350.4% | $430.5 | ($0.0) | ($82.9) | $323.2 | 107.6% | $639.0 | $253.9 | ($141.4) | $893.8 | 84.1% |
| DPL | $69.6 | $5.1 | ($8.4) | $51.2 | 129.6% | $90.8 | ($0.0) | ($13.9) | $70.7 | 108.8% | $119.1 | $47.3 | ($20.0) | $127.1 | 115.1% |
| DUKE | $52.1 | $3.8 | ($10.3) | $37.7 | 121.0% | $49.2 | ($0.0) | ($13.3) | $55.2 | 64.9% | $42.7 | $17.0 | ($22.5) | $141.7 | 26.2% |
| DUQ | $8.6 | $0.6 | ($5.2) | $15.1 | 26.5% | $12.1 | ($0.0) | ($6.8) | $25.1 | 21.0% | $12.5 | $5.0 | ($10.7) | $62.3 | 10.9% |
| EKPC | $6.5 | $0.4 | ($5.7) | $20.6 | 6.1% | $8.3 | ($0.0) | ($8.1) | $32.2 | 0.7% | $7.6 | $3.0 | ($13.2) | $85.3 | (3.1%) |
| EXT | $1.9 | $0.1 | ($9.6) | $26.4 | (28.8%) | $1.2 | ($0.0) | ($12.7) | $27.2 | (42.1%) | $1.6 | $0.4 | ($16.4) | $63.4 | (22.8%) |
| JCPLC | $4.6 | $0.3 | ($10.4) | $32.4 | (17.1%) | $9.1 | ($0.0) | ($14.6) | $54.8 | (10.0%) | $9.4 | $3.7 | ($22.8) | $144.0 | (6.7%) |
| MEC | $34.2 | $2.5 | ($6.7) | $21.8 | 137.7% | $24.2 | ($0.0) | ($12.7) | $35.5 | 32.4% | $17.8 | $7.1 | ($20.2) | $86.0 | 5.4% |
| OVEC | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | ($0.4) | $2.1 | (20.4%) | $0.0 | ($0.0) | ($0.5) | $3.6 | (13.6%) | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.8) | $6.1 | (12.3%) |
| PE | $22.2 | $1.6 | ($6.5) | $28.3 | 61.2% | $50.0 | ($0.0) | ($9.6) | $43.7 | 92.5% | $64.1 | $25.5 | ($14.2) | $88.9 | 84.8% |
| PECO | $21.2 | $1.5 | ($14.9) | $42.3 | 18.4% | $29.8 | ($0.0) | ($22.0) | $75.6 | 10.3% | $12.9 | $5.1 | ($35.1) | $204.0 | (8.4%) |
| PEPCO | $65.4 | $4.8 | ($11.6) | $38.3 | 153.1% | $65.3 | ($0.0) | ($17.0) | $69.3 | 69.8% | $99.1 | $39.4 | ($27.4) | $208.6 | 53.3% |
| PPL | $80.0 | $5.9 | ($15.6) | $57.9 | 121.3% | $68.1 | ($0.0) | ($23.2) | $97.0 | 46.3% | $65.4 | $26.0 | ($38.2) | $228.4 | 23.3% |
| PSEG | $69.3 | $5.1 | ($16.4) | $50.3 | 115.0% | $81.1 | ($0.0) | ($23.5) | $87.2 | 66.1% | $53.9 | $21.4 | ($37.5) | $222.3 | 17.0% |
| REC | $2.7 | $0.2 | ($0.6) | $2.2 | 107.9% | $3.1 | ($0.0) | ($0.8) | $3.5 | 66.0% | $2.5 | $1.0 | ($1.3) | $7.7 | 29.3% |
| Total | $1,610.1 | $117.2 | ($327.0) | $1,291.9 | 108.4% | $1,468.7 | ($0.0) | ($475.4) | $2,019.4 | 49.2% | $1,918.1 | $761.8 | ($777.8) | $4,873.8 | 39.0% |

65 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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## Offset If All ARRs Are Self Scheduled

Table 13-54 shows the total congestion offset that would be available to ARR holders via allocated ARRs, by zone, if the ARR holders self scheduled all their ARRs received in the annual auction process as FTRs in the 2023/2024, 2024/2025, and 2025/2026 planning periods. Market rules allow ARRs available in the annual auction process to be self scheduled as FTRs. Any ARRs awarded monthly as residual ARRs cannot be self scheduled but provide ARR revenue based on monthly auction results. The calculated offset assumes self scheduled FTR target allocations receive the same payout ratio and that ARR holders receive the same surplus allocation from each planning period. Residual ARRs cannot be self scheduled and are included in addition to the self scheduled FTR target allocations. If ARR holders had self scheduled all their allocated ARRs to FTRs for the 2025/2026 planning period, the self scheduled FTR Target Allocations and Residual ARR Target Allocations would have offset 83.6 percent of the congestion paid by load. The results show that the recovery of congestion varies significantly by zone and that the load in some zones recovers more than the congestion paid and the load in other zones recovers less. This result is not consistent with a rational FTR/ARR design under which all load would be returned their congestion, but no more and no less.

### Table 13-54 Offset available to load if all ARRs self scheduled: 2023/2024 through 2025/2026 planning periods[66]

| | 23/24 Planning Period | | | | | | 24/25 Planning Period | | | | | | 25/26 Planning Period | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | SS FTR | Surplus Allocation | Residual ARR Credits | Bal+M2M Charges | Congestion+M2M | Offset | SS FTR | Surplus Allocation | Residual ARR Credits | Bal+M2M Charges | Congestion+M2M | Offset | SS FTR | Surplus Allocation | Residual ARR Credits | Bal+M2M Charges | Congestion+M2M | Offset |
| ACEC | $4.5 | $0.3 | $0.0 | ($3.8) | $10.8 | 9.7% | $0.7 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($5.4) | $18.8 | (25.3%) | $3.3 | $1.0 | $0.0 | ($8.4) | $51.8 | (7.8%) |
| AEP | $101.4 | $13.5 | $3.2 | ($50.4) | $201.8 | 33.5% | $212.6 | ($0.0) | $4.7 | ($72.1) | $327.3 | 44.4% | $404.5 | $89.2 | $0.7 | ($122.9) | $771.6 | 48.2% |
| APS | $77.5 | $6.2 | $0.6 | ($22.4) | $87.6 | 70.7% | $132.1 | ($0.0) | $8.3 | ($33.3) | $149.2 | 71.8% | $668.7 | $52.0 | $0.2 | ($52.3) | $331.0 | 202.0% |
| ATSI | $84.3 | $3.7 | $0.1 | ($25.6) | $99.4 | 62.8% | $73.9 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | ($33.8) | $169.2 | 23.7% | $107.7 | $24.8 | $0.0 | ($54.7) | $340.6 | 22.8% |
| BGE | $190.3 | $10.6 | $0.0 | ($12.5) | $44.4 | 424.6% | $183.8 | ($0.0) | $0.2 | ($18.2) | $79.9 | 207.6% | $393.0 | $89.1 | $2.2 | ($29.3) | $220.4 | 206.5% |
| COMED | $83.0 | $3.3 | $0.0 | ($31.4) | $215.9 | 25.4% | $75.7 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | ($42.4) | $232.2 | 14.4% | $228.7 | $44.0 | $0.0 | ($73.9) | $496.9 | 40.0% |
| DAY | $12.3 | $0.9 | $0.2 | ($6.7) | $23.7 | 28.3% | $15.1 | ($0.0) | $0.9 | ($8.8) | $39.1 | 18.4% | $18.8 | $6.1 | $0.0 | ($14.7) | $91.9 | 11.1% |
| DOM | $292.8 | $46.9 | $0.5 | ($52.0) | $181.8 | 158.6% | $32.0 | ($0.0) | $8.5 | ($82.9) | $323.2 | (13.1%) | $1,312.0 | $253.9 | $64.3 | ($141.4) | $893.8 | 166.6% |
| DPL | $87.8 | $5.1 | $0.0 | ($8.4) | $51.2 | 165.2% | $619.5 | ($0.0) | $0.5 | ($13.9) | $70.7 | 857.5% | $68.6 | $47.3 | $11.0 | ($20.0) | $127.1 | 84.1% |
| DUKE | $55.8 | $3.8 | $0.0 | ($10.3) | $37.7 | 130.8% | $87.6 | ($0.0) | $0.2 | ($13.3) | $55.2 | 134.9% | $10.9 | $17.0 | $0.1 | ($22.5) | $141.7 | 3.9% |
| DUQ | $19.7 | $0.6 | $0.0 | ($5.2) | $15.1 | 100.3% | $12.5 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($6.8) | $25.1 | 22.8% | $123.9 | $5.0 | $0.0 | ($10.7) | $62.3 | 189.9% |
| EKPC | $8.7 | $0.4 | $0.0 | ($5.7) | $20.6 | 16.6% | $4.7 | ($0.0) | $1.1 | ($8.1) | $32.2 | (7.2%) | $7.4 | $3.0 | $0.0 | ($13.2) | $85.3 | (3.2%) |
| EXT | $1.3 | $0.1 | $0.0 | ($9.6) | $26.4 | (31.0%) | $1.2 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($12.7) | $27.2 | (42.1%) | $2.8 | $0.4 | $0.0 | ($16.4) | $63.4 | (20.8%) |
| JCPLC | $6.1 | $0.3 | $0.0 | ($10.4) | $32.4 | (12.4%) | $9.0 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | ($14.6) | $54.8 | (9.8%) | $15.0 | $3.7 | $0.7 | ($22.8) | $144.0 | (2.3%) |
| MEC | $5.4 | $2.5 | $0.0 | ($6.7) | $21.8 | 5.1% | $18.4 | ($0.0) | $0.3 | ($12.7) | $35.5 | 17.0% | $17.8 | $7.1 | $0.7 | ($20.2) | $86.0 | 6.3% |
| OVEC | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.4) | $2.1 | (19.3%) | ($0.0) | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.5) | $3.6 | (13.6%) | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | ($0.8) | $6.1 | (12.3%) |
| PE | $46.0 | $1.6 | $0.0 | ($6.5) | $28.3 | 145.2% | $6.3 | ($0.0) | $0.2 | ($9.6) | $43.7 | (7.0%) | $134.0 | $25.5 | $0.0 | ($14.2) | $88.9 | 163.4% |
| PECO | $29.0 | $1.5 | $0.0 | ($14.9) | $42.3 | 37.0% | $118.4 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($22.0) | $75.6 | 127.6% | $4.8 | $5.1 | $0.0 | ($35.1) | $204.0 | (12.4%) |
| PEPCO | $73.3 | $4.8 | $0.0 | ($11.6) | $38.3 | 173.8% | $89.0 | ($0.0) | $0.3 | ($17.0) | $69.3 | 104.4% | $215.5 | $39.4 | $0.1 | ($27.4) | $208.6 | 109.1% |
| PPL | $37.1 | $5.9 | $0.0 | ($15.6) | $57.9 | 47.2% | $106.0 | ($0.0) | $0.6 | ($23.2) | $97.0 | 86.1% | $178.8 | $26.0 | $0.0 | ($38.2) | $228.4 | 72.9% |
| PSEG | $49.3 | $5.1 | $0.0 | ($16.4) | $50.3 | 75.3% | $66.0 | ($0.0) | $0.1 | ($23.5) | $87.2 | 48.9% | $90.6 | $21.4 | $1.1 | ($37.5) | $222.3 | 34.0% |
| REC | $3.7 | $0.2 | $0.0 | ($0.6) | $2.2 | 152.7% | $4.4 | ($0.0) | $0.0 | ($0.8) | $3.5 | 102.7% | $3.8 | $1.0 | $0.2 | ($1.3) | $7.7 | 48.9% |
| Total | $1,269.4 | $117.2 | $4.5 | ($327.0) | $1,291.9 | 82.4% | $1,891.6 | ($0.0) | $26.3 | ($475.4) | $2,019.4 | 71.4% | $4,010.7 | $761.8 | $81.7 | ($777.8) | $4,873.8 | 83.6% |

66 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

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## ARR Allocation and Congestion In and Out of Zone

Table 13-55 shows the share of ARR MW in the annual ARR allocation for the 2024/2025, 2025/2026, and 2026/2027 planning periods with paths that source inside and outside the zone where the ARR load is located (see Table 13-4) and the proportion of congestion that results from constraints that are inside and outside the zone for the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning period. Table 13-55 allows a comparison of externally sourced ARRs with the congestion that results from external constraints. For the 2025/2026 planning period, 90.0 percent of congestion resulted from constraints that are outside the zone of the load that paid the congestion, up 5.4 percentage points from 84.5 percent for the 2024/2025 planning period. In contrast for the 2025/2026 planning period, only 21.4 percent of ARR MW originate outside the zone where the ARR load is located, down 1.0 percentage points from 22.4 percent for the 2024/2025 planning period. For the 2026/2027 planning period, 20.3 percent of ARR MW originate outside the zone where the load is located. While the share of ARR MW that originate outside the zone varies between the individual zones, congestion results primarily from constraints that are outside the zone, for each of the individual zones.

Table 13-55 illustrates one of the fundamental issues with the contract path based approach to ARR/FTR design. In the PJM market, which operates as an integrated network, a significant proportion of congestion results from constraints that are not in the same zone as load, but the assignment of ARRs is inconsistent with that fact. This inconsistency makes it impossible for load to match ARRs with the actual sources of congestion.

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**able 13-55 ARR Allocation and Congestion from inside and outside zone: 2023/2024, 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 planning periods[67]**

| | 2024/2025 ARRs | | 2024/2025 Congestion | | 2025/2026 ARRs | | 2025/2026 Congestion | | 2026/2027 ARRs | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone | Out of Zone | In Zone |
| ACEC | 55.1% | 44.9% | 98.1% | 1.9% | 44.1% | 55.9% | 98.3% | 1.7% | 49.7% | 50.3% |
| AEP | 9.4% | 90.6% | 86.2% | 13.8% | 13.9% | 86.1% | 96.1% | 3.9% | 13.2% | 86.8% |
| APS | 15.9% | 84.1% | 91.9% | 8.1% | 11.5% | 88.5% | 71.7% | 28.0% | 12.6% | 87.4% |
| ATSI | 35.1% | 64.9% | 96.7% | 3.3% | 41.5% | 58.5% | 98.6% | 1.4% | 43.7% | 56.3% |
| BGE | 39.9% | 60.1% | 87.7% | 12.3% | 49.4% | 50.6% | 93.9% | 6.1% | 42.4% | 57.6% |
| COMED | 0.1% | 99.9% | 77.6% | 22.4% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 88.9% | 11.1% | 0.2% | 99.8% |
| DAY | 92.6% | 7.4% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 79.9% | 20.1% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 86.8% | 13.2% |
| DOM | 2.0% | 98.0% | 65.7% | 34.3% | 0.5% | 99.5% | 74.7% | 25.3% | 0.4% | 99.6% |
| DPL | 26.0% | 74.0% | 46.2% | 53.8% | 28.7% | 71.3% | 80.6% | 19.4% | 25.3% | 74.7% |
| DUKE | 49.1% | 50.9% | 97.2% | 2.8% | 49.8% | 50.2% | 97.7% | 2.3% | 48.5% | 51.5% |
| DUQ | 97.0% | 3.0% | 97.4% | 2.6% | 91.2% | 8.8% | 99.8% | 0.2% | 98.2% | 1.8% |
| EKPC | 100.0% | 0.0% | 99.2% | 0.8% | 99.6% | 0.4% | 99.5% | 0.5% | 31.6% | 68.4% |
| EXT | 100.0% | 0.0% | 95.3% | 4.7% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 94.5% | 5.5% | 99.9% | 0.1% |
| JCPL | 58.9% | 41.1% | 96.5% | 3.5% | 72.2% | 27.8% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 45.8% | 54.2% |
| MEC | 38.7% | 61.3% | 55.9% | 44.1% | 30.2% | 69.8% | 98.7% | 1.3% | 39.5% | 60.5% |
| OVEC | 66.7% | 33.3% | 93.4% | 6.6% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 94.8% | 5.2% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| PE | 24.6% | 75.4% | 76.0% | 24.0% | 26.5% | 73.5% | 90.9% | 9.1% | 31.6% | 68.4% |
| PECO | 6.9% | 93.1% | 90.6% | 9.4% | 2.3% | 97.7% | 98.2% | 1.8% | 18.0% | 82.0% |
| PEPCO | 46.9% | 53.1% | 99.5% | 0.5% | 24.1% | 75.9% | 99.6% | 0.4% | 19.6% | 80.4% |
| PPL | 5.8% | 94.2% | 89.7% | 10.3% | 1.0% | 99.0% | 93.1% | 6.9% | 2.2% | 97.8% |
| PSEG | 54.6% | 45.4% | 99.3% | 0.7% | 53.5% | 46.5% | 99.1% | 0.9% | 45.4% | 54.6% |
| REC | 100.0% | 0.0% | 79.6% | 20.4% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 99.5% | 0.5% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| Total | 22.4% | 77.6% | 84.5% | 15.5% | 21.4% | 78.6% | 90.0% | 10.0% | 20.3% | 79.7% |

67 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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## Credit

There were four payment defaults and two collateral defaults in the first six months of 2026. Each of the payment defaults was promptly cured.

On December 21, 2021, PJM submitted a change to the credit rules to FERC.[68] PJM proposed to replace the credit calculation, which was largely based on a weighted average historical FTR value, with an initial margin based on a risk confidence interval from an Historical Simulation Initial Margining (HSIM) analysis model. PJM's proposal included the use of a 97 percent confidence interval, meaning a 97 percent probability that the initial margin collected would cover potential default costs.

On February 28, 2022, FERC rejected PJM's filing recommending a 97 percent confidence interval because the record did not support 97 percent.[69] FERC instituted a Section 206 proceeding, but recognized that PJM could propose revisions through a Section 205 filing. On June 3, 2022, PJM submitted the same change to the credit rules as the December 21, 2021, filing to FERC.[70] The June 3, 2022, filing included a cost benefit analysis for the proposed use of a 97 percent confidence interval compared to the use of a 99 percent confidence interval. The MMU objected to PJM's filing and proposed a 99 percent confidence interval, with a transition to a 100 percent confidence interval.[71] On September 21, 2023, FERC directed PJM to use a 99 percent confidence level in the HSIM model.[72]

The most fundamental point is that if costs are shifted from FTR buyers to other market participants, no logical cost-benefit analysis can show that the other market participants benefit in any way. Under the current default rules, the cost of default is socialized to all market participants, not just those participating in the FTR market. The 99 percent confidence interval places more of the risk where it belongs, on the FTR market participants that are engaged in the risky behavior, than the 97 percent confidence interval. The goal of internalizing as much of the risk to the FTR participants as possible, where it belongs, could be more directly addressed either by using 100 percent or by directly assigning the risk to those in the FTR market rather than all market participants.

The PJM minimum credit requirements (minimum tangible net worth and minimum tangible assets) were set as fixed dollar amounts in 2011 in FERC Order No. 741 based on whether the market participant held FTRs. PJM completed a review of the minimum credit requirements in the Risk Management Committee in 2025. The MMU and PJM developed a joint package to increase the fixed minimum credit requirements to be consistent with updated risks. The proposal was approved by the Risk Management Committee on October 22, 2025. The proposal was approved by the Markets and Reliability Committee on December 17, 2025. The proposal was approved by the Members Committee on January 22, 2026. The new minimum credit requirements will be implemented on the first December 31 after PJM receives FERC approval for the revised tariff.


Under the revised tariff, minimum tangible net worth requirements will increase from $1,000,000 to $2,000,000 for FTR participants and from $500,000 to $1,000,000 for all other market participants. For five years, there will be a $200,000 annual increase in the minimum tangible net worth requirements for all other market participants. Beginning in the sixth year, there will be an annual 3 percent increase to the minimum credit requirements for all participants, rounded to the nearest $50,000. Participants will continue to be able to satisfy the minimum credit requirements with minimum tangible assets exceeding $10,000,000 for FTR participants or $5,000,000 for all other participants. Under the revised tariff, any participant who satisfies the minimum credit requirements through tangible assets must also have a positive tangible net worth.

Figure 13-20 shows the maximum tangible net worth requirements for FTR participants and all other participants for 2025 through 2035 under the revised tariff language, if the revised tariff language is approved by FERC in 2026. After 2035, minimum tangible will continue to increase 3 percent each year, rounded to the nearest $50,000.

68 *See* "Revisions to PJM's FTR Credit Requirement and Request for 28-Day Comment Period," Docket No. ER22-000 (December 21, 2021).
69 See 178 FERC ¶ 61,146.
70 See "Revisions to PJM's FTR Credit Requirement," Docket No. ER22-2029-000 (June 3, 2022).
71 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER22-2029-000 et al. (October 31, 2022).
72 See 184 FERC ¶ 61,168.

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Figure 13--20 Minimum tangible asset requirement changes under the revised tariff language if approved in 2026: 2025 through 2035




## Treatment of Defaulted Portfolios

Under the method applied to the GreenHat default, when an FTR participant defaults on their positions, their portfolio remains in the FTR market and continues to accrue revenues and/or charges and must be reconciled. Under this method, PJM leaves the participant's positions unchanged, lets the positions settle at day-ahead prices, and charges any net losses to the default allocation assessment. This method exposes all members in PJM to an uncertain charge for the default allocation assessment that will not be known until those FTRs settle.

The MMU recommends that the defaulted FTRs be canceled rather than holding or liquidating them.[73] Canceling the FTRs would release the FTRs to the FTR market. The market would then decide the value of the capacity released and the timing of its release. There would be no discretion necessary to settle the defaulted position and the losses would be contained within the ARR/FTR market.

Cancellation of a defaulting portfolio does not change congestion. Cancellation of a defaulting portfolio can affect ARR/FTR funding as a result of changes in auction revenue, changes in the net target allocations, and potential simultaneous feasibility violations, while any collateral collected from the defaulted participant is available to offset losses from the cancelled FTRs. However, PJM can and does address similar issues routinely. PJM has tools available, such as the counter flow buyback and Stage 1A over allocation rules, and uses them regularly in the Annual FTR Auction, to improve funding as well as address feasibility concerns. Cancellation of FTRs would isolate the costs of the default to those participating in and benefitting from the FTR market.

## FTR Forfeitures

By order issued January 19, 2017, the Commission determined that the FTR forfeiture rule is just and reasonable and "...serves to deter such manipulation" related to virtual transaction cross product manipulation.[74] The Commission identified four main tenets with which the Forfeiture Rule must comply, including that it: deter manipulation, provide transparency allowing participants to modify their behavior, base forfeitures on an individual participant's actions and is not punitive.[75]

The point of the FTR forfeiture rule is to avoid an inefficient and costly market power mitigation process and to establish an objective rule that prevents manipulation of the FTR market. The FTR forfeiture rule is designed to remove the incentive to engage in manipulation. The rule does not result in findings of manipulation.[76]

The FTR forfeiture rule considers the impact of a participant's net virtual transaction portfolio on all constraints.[77] If a participant's net virtual portfolio

73 See Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Docket No. ER18-2068-000 (August 16, 2018).

74 See 158 FERC ¶ 61,038 at P 33 (2017).
75 See *id.* at P 62.
76 *See* "Protest and Motion for Rejection of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM," Docket No. EL20-41 (June 1, 2020).
77 A modified FTR forfeiture rule was implemented effective January 19, 2017. See *2019 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM*, Volume 2, Section 13: Financial Transmission Rights for the full history.


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impacts a constraint by the greater of 0.1 MW or 10 percent or more of the constraint line limit, and that constraint affects an individual FTR's target allocation by $0.01 or more, the participant's net virtual portfolio increased the value of the FTR, and the FTR is subject to FTR forfeiture. The FTR forfeiture also requires that congestion on the FTR path in the day ahead market be greater than congestion on that path in the real time market.

The FTR forfeiture rule does not require FTR holders to pay penalties. The FTR forfeiture rule does not affect the profits or losses of virtual activity. The FTR forfeiture rule, if triggered by a participant's virtual portfolio, results in forfeiting only FTR profits and only in the specific hours for which the rule is violated. The profit is calculated as the hourly FTR target allocation minus the FTR's hourly cost. Even when FTR profits are forfeited, the value that the buyer assigned to congestion in the FTR auction (the price paid) is not affected. For example, if a buyer paid $5.00/MWh for congestion and congestion was $5.00/MWh, the forfeiture would be zero. If congestion were $7.00/MWh, the forfeiture would be $2.00/MWh. Market participants understand the relationship between FTR and virtual positions in detail and can avoid violating the FTR forfeiture rule if they choose to do so.

The FTR forfeiture rule is less effective than initially intended as a result of the element of the rule requiring that day-ahead congestion on the FTR path be greater than real-time congestion the same path. As a result of model differences, there is a significant opportunity for virtual participants to profit from differences between day-ahead and real-time prices without driving the prices together, termed false arbitrage. As a result, FTR holders can use virtual positions to make their FTR positions more valuable without violating the rule.

The FTR forfeiture rule has not reduced participation in the PJM FTR market or participation in virtual activity. There has been an increase in the number of participants in the FTR market since the implementation of the new FTR forfeiture rule, and a decrease in the number of participants with forfeitures.

On June 24, 2019, PJM implemented a new method to calculate the hourly cost of an FTR only for hours in which it is effective.[78] Beginning with the September 2019 bill, PJM began billing using the correct hourly cost calculation. For the 2020/2021 planning period, total FTR forfeitures were $4.6 million.

On May 20, 2021, FERC issued an order ruling the $0.01 definition of an increase in the value of an FTR unjust and unreasonable, but upheld the other parts of PJM's forfeiture rule.[79] In this order, FERC required PJM to modify the FTR forfeiture rule and submit a compliance filing. As a result, there was no FTR forfeiture rule in place from May 21, 2021 until February 1, 2022. These months have zero forfeiture in Figure 13-21.

On June 21, 2021, PJM filed a request for clarification, or alternatively rehearing.[80] PJM asked that FERC clarify the status of the forfeitures that were assessed over the four years between the initial FERC order for a compliance filing, and their order rejecting PJM's compliance filing. On July 19, 2021, PJM made a compliance filing to address FERC's concerns with the $0.01 element of the FTR forfeiture rule.[81] PJM's compliance filing eliminated that element and replaced it with a constraint based FTR forfeiture. The forfeiture is based on the increased value of each constraint that violates the rule, determined by the shadow price multiplied by the net dfax on that constraint. This change meets FERC's previously established criteria established under the initial FERC order and creates a more precise FTR forfeiture value, to meet the criteria established under the new FERC order.

On January 31, 2022, FERC accepted PJM's July 19, 2021 compliance filing to implement FTR forfeitures using a constraint based method, effective February 1, 2022.[82]

78 *See* "Minor modification to Tariff Language for FTR Forfeiture Rule," Docket No. ER19-2240 (June 24, 2019).
79 See 175 FERC ¶ 61,137 (2021).
80 See Request for Clarification or, in the Alternative, Rehearing of PJM Interconnection, LLC, FERC Docket No. ER17-1433-000 (June 21, 2021).
81 *See* "FTR Forfeiture Rule Compliance Filing," FERC Docket No. ER17-1433 (July 19, 2021).
82 See 178 FERC ¶ 61,079, ***reh'g denied***, 179 FERC ¶ 61,010 (2022), ***affirmed***, XO Energy MA, LPC, et al. v. FERC, Case No. 22-1096 (D.C. Cir. January 24, 2023), ***affirmed en banc***, XO Energy MA, LPC, et al. v. FERC, Case No. 22-1096 (D.C. Cir. September 13, 2023).

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Figure 13-21 shows the monthly FTR forfeitures under the FTR forfeiture rules in effect from January 19, 2017, through May 31, 2026.

### Figure 13-21 Monthly FTR forfeitures for physical and financial participants: January 2017 through May 2026[83]





Table 13-56 shows the monthly FTR forfeitures by organization type for the 2024/2025 planning period and the 2025/2026 planning period. For the 2025/2026 planning period there were $6,687,074 in FTR forfeitures, up 67.2 percent from $4,000,330 in the 2024/2025 planning period. Financial participants accounted for 86.4 percent of all FTR forfeitures for the 2025/2026 planning period, down 11.5 percentage points from 97.9 percent in the 2024/2025 planning period.

### Table 13-56 Monthly FTR forfeitures by organization type: June 2024 through May 2026[84]

| | Organization Type | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Physical | Financial | Total |
| Jun-24 | $2,062.39 | $488,478.10 | $490,540.49 |
| Jul-24 | $7,263.55 | $147,024.31 | $154,287.86 |
| Aug-24 | $265.40 | $136,407.60 | $136,672.99 |
| Sep-24 | $13,609.35 | $155,922.29 | $169,531.63 |
| Oct-24 | $153.22 | $179,545.06 | $179,698.29 |
| Nov-24 | $1,159.23 | $114,091.82 | $115,251.06 |
| Dec-24 | $23,393.12 | $689,808.14 | $713,201.26 |
| Jan-25 | $538.39 | $500,477.32 | $501,015.71 |
| Feb-25 | $12,543.78 | $197,063.07 | $209,606.85 |
| Mar-25 | $22,717.56 | $446,139.20 | $468,856.76 |
| Apr-25 | $638.34 | $773,771.75 | $774,410.09 |
| May-25 | $17.41 | $87,239.94 | $87,257.35 |
| | Summary for 2024/2025 Planning Period | | |
| Total | $84,361.73 | $3,915,968.60 | $4,000,330.34 |
| Jun-25 | $615.50 | $420,868.10 | $421,483.61 |
| Jul-25 | $1,055.22 | $324,455.09 | $325,510.31 |
| Aug-25 | $5,596.14 | $293,350.91 | $298,947.05 |
| Sep-25 | $3,094.75 | $263,182.16 | $266,276.91 |
| Oct-25 | $0.00 | $255,200.29 | $255,200.29 |
| Nov-25 | $465.72 | $344,978.68 | $345,444.39 |
| Dec-25 | $12,240.88 | $780,149.87 | $792,390.75 |
| Jan-26 | $51,030.21 | $439,411.04 | $490,441.25 |
| Feb-26 | $39,391.25 | $601,523.72 | $640,914.97 |
| Mar-26 | $46,221.46 | $199,886.87 | $246,108.33 |
| Apr-26 | $19.76 | $2,289,409.29 | $2,289,429.05 |
| May-26 | $6,340.18 | $308,587.29 | $314,927.47 |
| | Summary for 2025/2026 Planning Period | | |
| Total | $166,071.06 | $6,521,003.33 | $6,687,074.38 |

83 This figure is affected by the identified distribution factor error.

84 This table is affected by the identified distribution factor error.



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